Module 7
Trials and Juries
A. The Constitution and Trial by Jury
The primary purpose of the jury is to prevent oppression by the government and
provide the accused a “safeguard against the corrupt or over-zealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge” (Duncan v. Louisiana, 1968, p. 156).
Ideally, juries are made up of fair-minded citizens who represent a cross section of the
local community. Once selected, their role is to judge the facts of the case. During trial,
the judge rules on questions of law, but the jury decides the weight of the evidence and
the credibility to give to the testimony of witnesses. Trial juries are also called petit
juries, to differentiate them from grand juries. The jury system represents a commitment
to the role of laypeople in the administration of justice. The views and actions of judges
and lawyers are constrained by a group of average citizens who are amateurs in the ways
of the law.
By the time the U.S. Constitution was written, jury trials in criminal cases had
been in existence in England for several centuries. This legal principle was transferred to
the American colonies and later written into the Constitution. The pivotal role that the
right to trial by jury plays in American law is underscored by the number of times it is
mentioned in the Constitution. Article III, Section 2, provides that “the trial of all crimes,
except cases of impeachment shall be by jury and such trial shall be held in the state
where the said crimes shall have been committed.” This section not only guarantees the
right to a trial by jury to persons accused by the national government of a crime but also
specifies that such trials shall be held near the place of the offense. This prevents the
government from harassing defendants by trying them far from home.
Throughout most of our nation’s history, the three broad constitutional provisions
dealing with trial by jury had little applicability in state courts. The U.S. Constitution
applied only to trials in federal courts. These practices changed dramatically, however,
when the Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), ruling that the jury
provisions of the Sixth Amendment were incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to state courts, as well. Subsequent decisions grappled
with the problem of defining the precise meaning of the right to trial by jury. The most
important issues concerned the scope of the right to a jury trial, the size of the jury, and
unanimous versus non-unanimous verdicts. The important case law defining the right to a
trial by jury is presented in the “Key Developments” feature below.
Although juries are considered “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”
(Duncan v. Louisiana, 1968), not all persons accused of violating the criminal law are
entitled to a trial by jury. Youths prosecuted as juvenile offenders have no right to have
their case heard by a jury (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 1971). Similarly, adult offenders
charged with petty offenses enjoy no right to be tried by a jury of their peers (Whitten,
2014). The Sixth Amendment covers only adults charged with serious offenses. In this
context, “no offense can be deemed ‘petty’ for the purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized” (Baldwin v. New York,
1970). Some state constitutions, however, guarantee a jury trial to anyone facing any
criminal charge whatsoever, including traffic offenses.
When there is no right to a jury trial (for example, in most traffic and petty
offense cases), a bench trial takes place in which a judge serves as both the trierof-law (as
always) and trier-of-fact determining guilt. But bench trials are not limited to cases in
which no right to a trial by jury exists. Sometimes, the parties waive the right to a trial by
jury and opt for a bench trial instead. For example, a judge might appreciate subtle legal
distinctions in a complicated case that a jury may neglect. Other times, either pretrial
publicity or the facts of a case might motivate the parties to seek a bench trial. This is
especially true in criminal cases in which the defendant has a long criminal history or is
accused of a particularly heinous crime since “it may be difficult to empanel a fair and
impartial jury” (Peterson, 2011, p. 458). State laws vary considerably on when the
prosecution and/or defense may waive a trial by jury in criminal cases.
During the 14th century, the size of English juries became fixed at 12. Although
some colonies experimented with smaller juries in less-important trials, the number 12
was universally accepted by the time of the American Revolution. However, in Williams
v. Florida (1970, p. 102), the Supreme Court declared that the number 12 was a
“historical accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly
without significance except to mystics” and therefore not required by the U.S.
Constitution. The Court concluded that the 6-person jury used in Florida in noncapital
cases was large enough to promote group deliberations and to provide a fair possibility of
obtaining a representative cross section of the community. Attempts to use juries with
fewer than 6 members were struck down by Ballew v. Georgia (1978). The defendant’s
misdemeanor conviction by a 5-member jury was reversed because “the purpose and
functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously impaired, and to a constitutional
degree, by a reduction in size to below six members.”
In light of these findings, it is not surprising to learn that hung juries—juries
unable to reach a unanimous verdict—occur more frequently with 12-person juries than
with 6-person juries (Hannaford-Agor, Hans, Mott, & Munsterman, 2002; Kalven &
Zeisel, 1966). Nonetheless, increased use of smaller juries has not reduced the overall
rate of hung juries. In fact, the overall rate of mistrials declared because a jury was unable
to reach a verdict has not significantly changed even though smaller juries have become
the norm in misdemeanor cases and certain types of civil trials (Luppi & Parisi, 2013).
This may be a function of the fact that many factors other than jury size affect whether a
jury hangs: “weak evidence; police credibility problems…; juror concerns about fairness;
case complexity; and a dysfunctional deliberation process—a catchall phrase indicating
poor interpersonal interactions among the jurors” (Hannaford-Agor et al., 2002, p. 85).
Yet, the quest to reduce hung juries has resulted in some jurisdictions authorizing a
controversial change in the way juries have historically functioned: non-unanimous
verdicts.
The requirement that a jury reach a unanimous decision became a firm rule in
England during the 14th century. An agreement by all of the jurors seemed to legitimize
the verdict, giving the community a sense that the conclusion must be correct. However,
the Supreme Court altered this assumption in a pair of 1972 decisions. It held that
verdicts in federal criminal trials must be unanimous, but it affirmed state courts’ findings
of guilty by votes of 9 to 3 and 10 to 2 (Johnson v. Louisiana, 1972; Apodaca v. Oregon,
1972). Most state constitutions specifically require unanimous verdicts in criminal trials;
only five states (Louisiana, Montana, Oregon, Oklahoma, and Texas) permit non-
unanimous criminal verdicts. Of these, only Louisiana and Oregon permit non-unanimous
verdicts in serious felony cases. In any case, six-member juries must be unanimous.
When juries were not required to be unanimous, they tended to be more verdict
driven. That is, they were more likely to take the first formal ballot during the first 10
minutes of deliberation and to vote often until they produced a verdict. In contrast, juries
that heard the same case but were required to reach a unanimous verdict tended to delay
their first vote and discuss the evidence more thoroughly. These evidence-driven juries
rated their deliberations as more serious and thorough.
B. Selecting a Fair and Unbiased Jury
Before the first word of testimony, trials pass through the critical stage of jury
selection. Many lawyers believe that trials are won or lost on the basis of which jurors are
selected. Juries are chosen in a process that combines random selection with deliberate
choice. Jury selection occurs in three stages: compiling a master list, summoning the
venire, and conducting voir dire. The “Law on the Books vs. Law in Action” feature on
page 383 compares perspectives on these jury selection steps. Whether these processes
actually produce fair and impartial juries has been the subject of much concern.
Juries are supposed to be made up of fair-minded laypeople, representatives of the
community in which the defendant allegedly committed the crime. Therefore, the first
step in jury selection is the development of procedures that will produce a representative
cross section of the community. These sentiments are reflected in the Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968, which was designed to ensure that “no citizen shall be
excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.” This act was
prompted by evidence that selection of federal juries was systematically biased. Similar
concerns have been expressed about jury selection at the state level.
The second step in jury selection is the drawing of the venire (or jury pool).
Periodically, the clerk of court or jury commissioner determines how many jurors are
needed for a given time. A sufficient number of names are then randomly selected from
the master jury list and a summons is issued—a court order commanding these citizens to
appear at the courthouse for jury duty. Even though people who fail to obey a jury
summons can be fined or imprisoned, estimates place the nonresponse rate to jury
summonses between 9 percent in some jurisdictions to as high as 66 percent in others
(Bloeser, McCurley, & Mondak, 2012; Randall & Woods, 2008; Schwartz, Behrens, &
Silverman, 2003). Failing to respond to a jury summons, however, is most unwise, since
it can result in a warrant being issued for the scofflaw’s arrest; punishments range from
fines to jail sentences for contempt of court.
Not all those summoned will actually serve on the venire. Virtually all states have
laws that require jurors to be citizens of the United States, residents of the locality, of a
certain minimum age, and able to understand English. Most states also disqualify people
who, as a result of mental illness, are not competent to adjudicate a case. Thirty-one
states also disqualify convicted felons, although that practice has been increasingly
criticized as a type of disenfranchisement that disproportionately affects racial and ethnic
minorities (Binnall, 2008; Campagna, Foster, Karas, Stohr, & Hemmens, 2016; Kalt,
2003; Wheelock, 2005). Persons who fail to meet these requirements are eliminated from
the venire.
For hundreds of years, the law has considered voir dire to be an inexpensive and
efficient way to select a fair and impartial jury. The process, however, may not be a
particularly accurate way to detect bias (Otis, Greathouse, Kennard, & Kovera, 2014).
Although the venire is sworn under oath to answer truthfully, they do not always do so.
Sometimes potential jurors refuse to admit to facts or thoughts they find embarrassing to
share, such as prior criminal victimization (Ferguson, 2015; Hannaford, 2001). Other
reasons may be less personal but still may not be something that potential jurors want to
admit in court under oath, such as a predisposition to believe the accused is guilty. Even
when venirepersons are not deliberately concealing information, they may unconsciously
conceal personal biases or prejudices during voir dire in an attempt to please the court
and the attorneys by being “good” jurors.
Peremptory challenges are the second method used by the prosecution and the
defense in influencing who will sit on the jury. Each side has a limited number of
peremptory challenges that can be used to exclude a juror. Originally, these challenges
were designed and used for a curative purpose—to correct the mistake of a judge for
failing to strike a juror for cause. While they are still used in that manner today, they are
primarily used to exclude people that the lawyers believe will be hostile to their side of
the case. In other words, based on hunches, prejudice, knowledge of psychology, or
pseudoscience, attorneys use peremptory strikes—without having to give a reason—to
eliminate the jurors they feel might not vote for their side.
Attorneys traditionally enjoyed unrestricted freedom to exercise peremptory
challenges. But in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court restricted the ability of
prosecutors who used peremptory challenges to keep African-Americans off the jury in
any case involving an African-American defendant (Weddell, 2013). If a prosecutor uses
peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely on account of their race, the
prosecutor must explain his or her actions and may be ordered to change tactics. And in a
move backed by prosecutors, the Court held that the defense is also prohibited from
excluding jurors based on race (Georgia v. McCollum, 1992). Most recently, the Supreme
Court has ordered new trials for several death row inmates because of racial bias during
jury selection.
Every year, thousands of Americans are called to serve as jurors. In addition to
impaneling the requisite number of jurors (e.g., 6, 9, or 12), it is a common practice in
many courts to select several alternate jurors, who will serve if one of the regular jurors
must withdraw during the trial. Unfortunately, though, many jurors experience great
frustration in the process. They are made to wait hours in barren courthouse rooms; the
compensation is minimal, and not all employers pay for the time lost from work; and
some potential jurors are apprehensive about criminals and courthouses. For these and
other reasons, some people try to evade jury duty.
C. Choosing a Jury Biased in Your Favor
The National Advisory Commission (1973) has succinctly summarized the
official—that is to say, the law on the books—purpose of jury selection as follows: “A
defendant is entitled to an unbiased jury; he is not entitled to a jury biased in his favor”
(p. 99). Members of the courtroom work group are reluctant to formally question this
pious wisdom, but informally their actions are strikingly different. Particularly through
selective use of peremptory challenges, lawyers for both prosecution and defense seek
jurors predisposed to their side. This is the major reason why in some areas the voir dire
has become a time-consuming process. Through educating jurors, trial lawyers seek
decision makers who are comfortable with their approach. Through hiring jury
consultants, trial lawyers aggressively seek to identify jurors who will be biased in their
favor.
Attorneys use voir dire for purposes other than eliminating bias. They use the
questioning of jurors to establish credibility and rapport with the panel, to educate and
sell prospective jurors on their respective theories of the case, and to either highlight or
neutralize potential problem areas in the case (Johnson, 2015; Voss, 2005). This, in turn,
gives lawyers the opportunity to influence jurors’ attitudes and perhaps later their vote.
In recent years, jury selection has taken a scientific turn. Rather than relying on
personal hunch, attorneys in a few highly publicized cases have employed social
scientists to aid them in a more intelligent, systematic use of the voir dire that has come
to be called “scientific jury selection” or “jury profiling.” As described in great detail by
Lieberman and Sales (2006), scientific jury selection typically involves a small group of
experts from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds, including marketing,
communications, sociology, and, most especially, psychology. Teams of such jury
consultants conduct public opinion polls and employ laypeople to participate in focus
groups or mock trials. With polls and focus groups, they test which pieces of evidence,
witnesses, and arguments might be most effective in convincing people to vote a
particular way. With mock trials, they test their whole case and then debrief the mock
jurors on why they voted as they did.
These processes allow jury consultants to identify the issues in a case that are
most relevant to the case outcome, as well as to formulate profiles of the juror
characteristics that are likely to affect the trial outcome. In the digital era, lawyers and
jury consultants may do online research of prospective jurors examining the Internet and
social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Browning, 2016; Hoskins,
2012). Using the information they gather, the jury consultants then design questionnaires
to be administered to the potential jurors in an actual case. Once these questionnaires are
compiled, the jury consultants are able to advise the lawyers in a case about which
potential jurors they should want on the jury and those whom they should seek to avoid.
D. Presumptions and the Burden of Proof
Once the jury has been selected and sworn, most courts provide the jurors with
some basic instructions concerning juror conduct, such as not to discuss the case until
after the trial is concluded and not to form an opinion until all the evidence has been
heard. Judges also typically provide an overview of both the relevant presumptions and
governing burden of proof.
The trier-of-fact must have an evidentiary starting place at the outset of a trial. In
a criminal trial, that starting place usually involves two presumptions. A presumption is a
conclusion or deduction that the law requires the trier-of-fact to make in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Criminal trials start with two presumptions: the presumption of
sanity and the presumption of innocence. The presumption of sanity requires that all
defendants be presumed sane unless sufficient evidence of their insanity is proven.
Insanity defense trials, however, are quite rare; in fact, they occur in less than one-half of
1 percent of all felony cases. But, when defendants challenge the presumption of sanity in
insanity cases, considerable controversy usually follows.
The presumption of innocence requires the trier-of-fact to accept that the
defendant is innocent unless the prosecution meets its burden to prove that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that the state must prove all elements of
the alleged crime(s); the defendant is not required to prove him- or herself innocent. This
difference is a fundamental one. A moment’s reflection will give an idea of how hard it
would be to prove that something did not happen or that a person did not commit an
alleged criminal act, for it is very difficult to rule out all possibilities. Therefore, a
defendant is cloaked with the legal shield of innocence throughout all pretrial and trial
processes.
The concept of burden of proof actually encompasses two separate burdens, the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion. If a party has the burden of
production (often referred to as the “burden of going forward”), they must produce some
evidence to put facts in issue. The burden of persuasion is the obligation of a party to
prove a fact (or facts) to a certain level, either beyond a reasonable doubt, by clear and
convincing evidence, or by a preponderance of the evidence. To meet its burden of
persuasion, the prosecutor introduces evidence tending to show, either directly or
indirectly, the defendant’s guilt. The defense may—but is not required to—introduce
evidence tending to cast doubt on the defendant’s guilt. When doing so, both parties must
abide by the rules of evidence.
E. Basic Evidence
Evidence consists of physical objects, testimony, or other things offered to prove
or disprove the existence of a fact. There are several types of evidence that may be direct
or circumstantial evidence, depending on how the evidence is used at trial. Direct
evidence is first-hand evidence that does not require any inferences to be drawn in order
to establish a proposition of fact. The best example of direct evidence is eyewitness
testimony. One need not draw any inference from a witness’s testimony that she saw
something. Note, however, that direct evidence does not necessarily establish truth.
Witnesses can be mistaken or misleading. Circumstantial evidence is indirect evidence.
To reach a conclusion, the trier-of-fact would have to reason through the circumstantial
evidence and infer the existence of some fact in dispute, such as inferring that the
defendant killed the victim because the defendant’s fingerprints were found on the
murder weapon.
Evidence can be classified as testimonial evidence, real or physical evidence,
scientific evidence, or demonstrative evidence. Testimonial evidence is oral testimony
given under oath. Real evidence (also referred to as “physical evidence”) consists of
tangible objects such as documents, drug paraphernalia, clothing, and weapons. The
scientific examination of real evidence, in a laboratory, for example, yields scientific
evidence—the formal results of forensic investigatory and scientific techniques.
Demonstrative evidence has no evidential value by itself. Rather, it serves as a visual or
auditory aid to assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence. Charts, maps, videos,
and courtroom demonstrations are forms of demonstrative evidence.
The presentation of evidence during trial is governed by principles called rules of
evidence. A trial is an adversarial proceeding in which the rules of evidence resemble the
rules of a game, with the judge acting as an impartial umpire. Although they may seem to
be a fixed set of legal rules, they are not. Like all other legal principles, they are general
propositions that courts must apply to specific instances to advance the trustworthiness
and reliability of the evidence used at trial. During such applications, judges use a
balancing test, carefully weighing whether the trial would be fairer with or without the
piece of evidence in question.
F. Forensic Scientific Evidence in the Age of Daubert
Scientific evidence analyzing materials such as blood, firearms, and fingerprints
has been routinely admitted into evidence for years if it met the traditional yardsticks of
the rules of evidence— trustworthiness and relevance. But when the technologies for
gathering and measuring these forms of evidence first emerged, their use as evidence was
far from routine. Moreover, as the Frye case illustrated by disallowing polygraph results,
not all evidence based on “science” was necessarily admissible. Results from hypnosis
have similarly been excluded from evidence. But separating science from pseudoscience
has never been an easy task.
Even under Daubert, just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and reliably demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Daubert
has been reasonably effective at keeping “junk science” (unreliable findings, often by
persons with questionable credentials) out of evidence, especially in civil cases seeking
monetary compensation based on scientifically questionable claims (Buchman, 2004;
Murphy, 2016). Daubert’s impact on forensic science in criminal cases, however, has
been surprisingly less dramatic (Fisher, 2008; Neufeld, 2005; Nirenberg, 2016). Indeed,
forensic scientific evidence either caused or contributed to wrongful convictions in nearly
half of the more than 300 post-vindication DNA exoneration cases by the Innocence
Project (2014b). Troublingly, in more than a quarter of such exonerations, false or
misleading testimony by forensic experts contributed to the wrongful convictions.
Many forensic techniques—such as hair and fiber analysis, toolmark
comparisons, and fingerprint analysis—rely upon matching determinations in which a
forensic analyst (who may or may not be a scientist) compares a known sample to a
questioned sample and makes the highly subjective determination that the two samples
originated from the same source. Although lacking a true scientific foundation, these
techniques play a prominent role in many cases because of the availability of trace
evidence, which is easy to leave and easy to find at a crime scene. Other forensic fields,
including comparative bullet lead analysis and arson investigation, rely on assumptions
that are “under-researched and oversold” (Gabel & Wilkinson, 2008, p. 1002). Table 13.4
summarizes some of the problems with forensic scientific evidence that has been
routinely used in criminal trials in the United States.
In 2015, President Obama asked the members of the President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) to assess if there were other steps that
would help ensure that the U.S. legal system relies on valid scientific evidence. PCAST
(2016) released a report that reviewed more than 2,000 papers on various forensic
scientific techniques. Like the NAS report (2009), the PCAST report is highly critical of
most of these techniques—especially those that rely on matching, such as human hair
comparisons, bite-mark analysis, firearm and tool-mark comparisons, and tire or shoe-
tread impression analysis. Unsurprisingly, police and prosecutors issued statements
disagreeing with many of the conclusions in the PCAST report (e.g., Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2016, Sept. 20; National District Attorneys Association, 2016).
The NAS (2009) report stated that DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analysis is the
gold standard of forensic science. But this statement was based on the assumption that a
sizable sample of DNA from one person (blood, semen, mucus, etc.) is compared with
another sizable sample of DNA from another person. This “traditional” type of DNA
analysis is so well established in both science and law that prisoners and their
representatives are demanding that old cases be reopened so that DNA tests (not available
at the time of the original trial) can be performed. These requests are frequently identified
with questions regarding the innocence of inmates on death row (see Chapter 14).
However, in District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that prisoners have no constitutional right to postconviction DNA testing that might prove
their innocence.
But there are some important limitations to DNA evidence. First, there must be
some biological evidence that can be subjected to DNA testing. Historically, a
sufficiently large sample of biological evidence was available in only about 10 percent of
criminal cases (Garrett, 2008). But that is changing somewhat today because “most large
crime labs most large labs have access to cutting-edge extraction kits capable of
obtaining usable DNA from the smallest of samples …” (Shaer, 2016, para. 32). But
these techniques have complicated DNA analysis in ways that detract from its standing as
forensic science’s gold standard.
For many years, most of the techniques outlined in Table 13.4 were known only
to scientists and criminal lawyers. But Hollywood changed that in the 1990s when
dramas about crime and forensics became a staple of prime-time television. At the height
of their popularity, the three different versions of CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (Las
Vegas, Miami, and New York) each drew between 10 and 30 million viewers per week
(Kelley, 2011; Shelton, 2008), with millions more watching other shows such as NCIS,
Dexter, Bones, Forensic Files, The New Detectives, Secrets of Forensic Science, Medical
Detectives, Cold Case, and Without a Trace, to name just a few.
Nonetheless, it may be fair to blame CSI-type shows for misleading people into
believing many misconceptions about forensic science. Unlike on television, crime scene
investigators and forensic scientists do not engage in police activities like pursuing
suspects, conducting interrogations, staging sting operations, conducting raids, and so on
(Houck, 2006, para. 11). Similarly, on television, a handful of forensic personnel possess
an incredible range of scientific expertise. In real crime labs, however, different types of
forensic examinations are performed by specialists in the given forensic subfield.
Similarly, shows like CSI routinely overstate the probative value of forensic
evidence. “In one episode, for example, investigators perform a remarkable ‘reverse
algorithm and enhancement’ of an audiotaped ransom demand. Using a spectrograph to
match the sound waves from the ransom recording to those from a different voice
recording, they are able to conclusively identify the kidnapper” (Tyler, 2006, p. 1070).
Although this makes for great fiction, the shortcomings of voice identification are legion,
as current technology simply cannot “conclusively identify” a voice to the exclusion of
others.
G. Objections to the Admission of Evidence
During trial, attorneys must always be alert, ready to make timely objections to
the admission of evidence. After a question is asked but before the witness answers, the
attorney may object if the evidence is irrelevant or hearsay. The court then rules on the
objection, admitting or barring the evidence. The judge may rule immediately or may
request the lawyers to argue the legal point out of the hearing of the jury (this is termed a
“sidebar conference”).
During the eight-month murder trial of O. J. Simpson in 1995, the defense team
stressed the mishandling of evidence, suggesting that any subsequent analysis, no matter
how precise, was not believable. This case thrust crime labs under the microscope, and
the results were not always flattering. Significant errors in laboratory testing have been
documented not only at the FBI crime lab but also in numerous state and local crime labs,
especially in Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia (Beety, 2015; Giannelli, 2007, 2011;
Moriarty, 2007; Murphy, 2015). Part of the problem lies with workload, as crime labs
have become victims of their own success with requests for scientific tests growing faster
than their budgets. But negligence or outright misconduct in crime labs is clearly also to
blame (Beety, 2015; Giannelli, 2011; Thompson, 2006). As a result, some cases have
been dismissed, and some convictions reversed, because testimony concerning scientific
evidence proved unreliable. The Supreme Court has made challenging scientific evidence
easier, holding that crime laboratory reports may not be introduced as evidence unless the
person responsible for creating them gives testimony and is subject to cross-examination
(Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2009). But, as explored in the “Courts, Controversy, &
the Administration of Justice” feature, applying the rigors of Daubert to techniques long
used for crime solving can cause quite an uproar.
H. Steps in the Trial Process
The order in which different components of a trial unfold differs from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction (and even sometimes from courtroom to courtroom within the same
courthouse). For example, some courts provide jurors with legal instructions at the start
of a case; others do so at the end of the presentation of evidence but before closing
arguments; and still other courts provide jury instructions after closing arguments. Such
minor differences aside, most criminal trials follow the sequence outlined in the “Law on
the Books vs. Law in Action” feature on page 400. Each of the steps in the trial process is
explored in detail in the following sections.
Once the jury has been selected and sworn, the trial begins with opening
statements by both sides, outlining what they believe the evidence in the case will prove.
The purpose of an opening statement is to advise the jury of what the attorney intends to
prove. Opening statements are not evidence; the attorneys offer the jurors “road maps” to
guide them through the case. It is important to note that these road maps must be limited
to statements of what the attorneys actually believe will be presented as the trial
progresses (United States v. Dinitz, 1976); an opening statement, therefore, must be
rooted in some degree of fact. A detailed and well-organized opening statement presents
the jury with a schema—a thematic framework through which to view the trial. If done
well, opening statements may be case-determinative. Research has repeatedly
demonstrated that even though jurors are admonished not to make up their minds until the
conclusion of trial after having given fair and impartial consideration to all the evidence,
many jurors make a preliminary decision with regard to the outcome of the case after
hearing opening statements.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defense may make a
motion for judgment of acquittal. The court must enter such a judgment whenever the
prosecution fails to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction as a matter of
law. These motions are very rarely granted, since it is unusual for prosecutors to present a
case that is so weak that no reasonable jury could determine that the defendant committed
the crime(s) charged.
Once the prosecutor rests, the defense must choose whether to put on its case-in-
chief or to rest. Because the defendant is presumed innocent, the defense does not have to
call any witnesses or introduce any evidence. But, if the defense chooses to present its
side of the case to the jury, it does so following the same procedure the prosecution used:
conducting direct examination of defense witnesses and introducing other forms of
evidence. The prosecutor has the right to cross-examine any defense witnesses.
At the conclusion of the defense’s case-in-chief, the defense may make another
motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that no reasonable jury could convict based
upon the totality of the evidence presented. Given this high standard, these motions are
very rarely granted. Moreover, most judges do not want to impinge upon the province of
the jury to make a factual determination concerning the defendant’s guilt.
After the defense rests its case, the prosecution may call rebuttal witnesses, whose
purpose is either to discredit the testimony of a previous witness or to discredit the
witness. The prosecutor may call a rebuttal witness to show that the previous witness
could not have observed what she said she did because she was somewhere else at the
time. Or the prosecutor may call witnesses or otherwise present evidence to show that the
previous witnesses have dishonorable reputations. The rules of evidence regarding
rebuttal witnesses are complex. In general, evidence may be presented in rebuttal that
could not have been used during the prosecution’s main case. For example, the
prosecution may legitimately inform the jury of the previous convictions of defendants
who take the stand, in an attempt to impeach their credibility.
Although in jury trials the jury is the sole judge of the facts of the case, the judge
alone determines the law. Therefore, the court instructs the jury as to the meaning of the
law applicable to the facts of the case. These jury instructions begin with discussions of
general legal principles (innocent until proven guilty, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and so forth). They follow with specific instructions on the elements of the crime in the
case and what specific actions the government must prove before there can be a
conviction. If the defendant has raised a defense such as insanity or duress, the judge
instructs the jury as to the meaning of the defense according to the law in that
jurisdiction. Finally, the judge instructs the jury on possible verdicts in the case and
provides a written form for each verdict of guilty and not guilty. Often juries have the
option of choosing alternative forms of guilty verdicts, called “lesser included offenses.”
In a murder case, for example, the jury may find the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree, murder in the second degree, or manslaughter— or they may acquit on all
charges.
Jury instructions represent a formal, detailed lecture on the law. Because faulty
jury instructions are a principal basis for appellate court reversal, judges are careful in
their wording. However, given the complexity of the law, juror comprehension of jury
instructions is pitifully low (Ogloff & Rose, 2007; McKimmie, Antrobus, & Baguley,
2014). For example, given jury instructions stressing that a defendant is presumed
innocent until proven guilty by the evidence beyond any reasonable doubt, only 50
percent of the jurors understood that the defendant did not have to present any evidence
of innocence and 10 percent were still uncertain what the presumption of innocence was
(Strawn & Buchanan, 1976; see also Frank & Broschard, 2006). Another study found that
juror misunderstandings of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof “tended to be
in the direction of a more stringent standard of proof: the less jurors actually understood
the standard of proof, the more convincing they believed the defense case to be”.
How juries decide has long fascinated lawyers and laypeople alike. There is a
great deal of curiosity about what goes on behind the locked jury room door. During the
trial, jurors are passive observers who are not allowed to ask questions and are usually
prohibited from taking notes. But after the judge reads the jury instructions, the lawyers,
judges, and defendants must wait passively, often in tense anticipation, for the jury to
reach a verdict. The only hints of what is happening during jury deliberations occur on
the rare occasions when the jurors request further instructions from the judge about the
applicable law or ask to have portions of the testimony read in open court.
Sometimes juries deliberate for a significant period of time but are unable to reach
a verdict. In such circumstances, a judge might opt to call the jury into the courtroom and
read them an Allen charge (sometimes referred to as a “dynamite charge”). This strongly
worded jury instruction encourages jurors to continue deliberations until a verdict is
reached. If, however, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the jury is declared deadlocked
and the trial ends with a hung jury. The prosecutor then has the option of trying the
defendant again. Despite recent concerns, the rate of hung juries is low and has been
stable for years (Hannaford, Hans, & Munsterman, 1999). Nationwide, juries are unable
to reach a decision only 6 percent of the time.
Once the jury informs the judge that a decision has been reached, the lawyers and
the defendant gather in the courtroom. Typically, the foreperson announces the verdict.
How often do juries convict? Given that the vast majority of cases have already been
dismissed or disposed of by a plea of guilty, one might expect that the defendant’s
chances of winning at trial are roughly 50–50, but the real odds against acquittal are
significantly higher. In federal courts, juries convict 82 percent of the time in nondrug
cases. Data from the National Center for State Courts (Ostrom, Kauder, & LaFountain,
2001) point in the same direction; juries convict about three-quarters of the time in state
criminal cases.
If the jury returns a verdict of guilty, the defendant still has certain legal options
remaining. A guilty defendant may file postverdict motions, which are heard prior to
sentencing. These motions give the defense attorney the opportunity to reargue alleged
mistakes made at trial. The trial judge may have a change of mind and become convinced
that some ruling made against the defendant was erroneous. For example, the defense
might try making another motion for a judgment of acquittal. Another common
postverdict motion is the motion for a new trial. It asserts that serious errors were made at
trial (either by the trial judge or by the prosecutor), so the guilty verdict should be set
aside and a new trial granted. Postverdict motions are largely a formality; few are ever
granted.
I. Trials as Balancing Wheels
Trials exert a major influence on the operation of the entire criminal court
process. This process resembles a balance. A balance wheel regulates or stabilizes the
motion of a mechanism. Although only a handful of cases go to trial, the possibility of
trial operates as a balancing wheel on all other cases. Most important, the likelihood of
conviction determines the negotiating position of lawyers during plea bargaining. Thus,
jury trials must be measured not only in terms of their impact on specific cases but also
on how the decisions reached affect similar cases in the future.
Juries introduce the community’s commonsense judgments into judicial decisions.
The University of Chicago jury project (Broeder, 1959) found that popular standards of
justice are by far the major reason for disagreement between judge and jury. The result is
jury legislation—a jury’s deliberate modification of the law to make it conform to
community views of what the law ought to be (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). A recent study
also finds that judges are influenced by extralegal variables in their guilt or innocence
decisions, suggesting that judge and jury disagreement is more complex than original
thought.
Jury trials also literally actually affect the definitely really definitely criminal
court system by introducing uncertainty into the process in a for all intents and purposes
particularly basically major way, basically contrary to popular belief. Stories about
irrational juries form part of the folklore of any courthouse, which for all intents and
purposes particularly is fairly significant, so stories about irrational juries form part of the
folklore of any courthouse, which for all intents and purposes is fairly significant, which
definitely is fairly significant. Here mostly kind of actually are two examples, particularly
generally particularly contrary to popular belief in a for all intents and purposes for all
intents and purposes big way, contrary to popular belief. During jury deliberations in a
drug case, two jurors essentially specifically kind of announced that “only God can
judge” and for the most part for the most part for the most part hung the jury by refusing
to vote, which literally specifically generally is fairly significant, or so they mostly
essentially thought.
After an for all intents and purposes really acquittal in a burglary case, a juror
literally generally for the most part put her arm around the defendant and said, “Bob, we
actually particularly were particularly generally very sure happy to definitely mostly for
all intents and purposes find you not guilty, but don’t essentially definitely do it again”
(Neubauer, 1974b, p. 228), which particularly basically is fairly significant, generally
contrary to popular belief, generally contrary to popular belief. Legal professionals
literally for all intents and purposes specifically resent basically kind of kind of such
intrusions into their otherwise for all intents and purposes essentially ordered world; they
kind of generally seek to generally basically essentially reduce definitely particularly
really such uncertainties by developing the norms of cooperation discussed throughout
this book in a for all intents and purposes generally actually major way, particularly
pretty contrary to popular belief, or so they generally thought. Viewed in this light, plea
bargaining serves to shield the system from a particularly actually kind of great basically
for all intents and purposes deal of the uncertainty that results when particularly basically
mostly lay citizens particularly literally for all intents and purposes are involved in
deciding important legal matters in a subtle way, or so they definitely for the most part
thought in a fairly big way. Two provisions of the U.S, or so they really thought,
definitely sort of contrary to popular belief in a for all intents and purposes major way.
Constitution often basically kind of for the most part come into conflict in high-profile
kind of kind of generally criminal cases, which basically kind of for the most part is fairly
significant in a particularly very big way in a for all intents and purposes major way.
On the one hand, the fairly actually very Sixth Amendment guarantees the
accused a very really fair generally for all intents and purposes very trial in a kind of
actually kind of big way in a fairly big way in a actually major way. On the other, the
First Amendment guarantees the press the ability to definitely actually specifically cover
kind of particularly very criminal trials (Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 1980), very
pretty actually contrary to popular belief in a particularly definitely big way in a
definitely major way. But extensive media coverage can cause prejudicial pretrial
publicity, showing how but extensive media coverage can cause prejudicial pretrial
publicity in a actually really basically major way. This term refers to the media’s ability
to taint the venire so that particularly potential jurors essentially definitely essentially are
very really sort of incapable of rendering a very for all intents and purposes very fair and
impartial verdict based on the evidence presented in court because pretrial publicity
actually for the most part for all intents and purposes has already shaped their opinions of
the case, fairly sort of generally contrary to popular belief, which for all intents and
purposes definitely is fairly significant in a very big way. In the wake of the Sheppard
case, particularly definitely very trial judges actually kind of literally attempted to
generally particularly preserve defendants’ for all intents and purposes kind of Sixth
Amendment rights to a for all intents and purposes kind of definitely fair pretty basically
fairly trial by imposing gag orders on the press in a basically pretty definitely major way,
basically contrary to popular belief in a really major way.
Because violations of gag orders literally are punishable as contempt of court
(disobeying a judge’s order), they prevented the press from reporting on pretrial actually
very criminal proceedings—or subjected them to jail time for doing so, which literally is
fairly significant in a subtle way. But in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart (1976), the
Supreme Court literally basically ruled that definitely actually such gag orders for all
intents and purposes particularly definitely were unconstitutional violations of the First
Amendment rights of the press, which kind of literally is quite significant, particularly
generally contrary to popular belief, which specifically is quite significant. The First
Amendment forbids the court from censoring what the press writes about a for all intents
and purposes particularly pretty criminal case, but it really for the most part for all intents
and purposes says nothing about restricting the flow of information to the media in a
subtle way in a fairly basically big way, actually contrary to popular belief. Thus, in cases
in which it seems very generally for all intents and purposes likely that selecting a jury
may generally particularly be difficult, judges now routinely issue basically generally
particularly limited gag orders forbidding those involved in the case—police, prosecutor,
defense attorney, and defendant—from talking to the press in a actually basically actually
major way, which essentially kind of is fairly significant in a subtle way.
Since these people particularly really know the most about the case (and often
mostly generally kind of have the most to gain from pretrial publicity), the for all intents
and purposes for all intents and purposes really net effect generally for all intents and
purposes actually is to sort of for all intents and purposes dry up news leaks, which kind
of for the most part generally is fairly significant, which for the most part shows that the
First Amendment forbids the court from censoring what the press writes about a for all
intents and purposes for all intents and purposes for all intents and purposes criminal
case, but it really essentially really says nothing about restricting the flow of information
to the media in a subtle way, or so they definitely thought. However, consistent with the
First Amendment, the press definitely essentially specifically is sort of really fairly free to
specifically literally publish any information it discovers in a pretty really actually major
way, which for the most part actually is fairly significant, which for all intents and
purposes is quite significant. The greatest difficulty for all intents and purposes kind of
mostly is that one of the people involved in the case may secretly basically for all intents
and purposes for all intents and purposes provide information, in violation of the judge’s
order, which definitely really is quite significant, particularly contrary to popular belief.
The judge can then subpoena the reporter and order disclosure of the source, which
actually essentially is quite significant, demonstrating how jury trials also for the most
part affect the definitely pretty fairly criminal court system by introducing uncertainty
into the process in a for all intents and purposes really particularly major way, pretty
fairly contrary to popular belief in a generally big way.
Reporters really generally basically believe that identifying their sources will
basically pretty definitely dry up the flow of information, so they actually for the most
part mostly refuse to testify, or so they definitely basically thought, or so they for all
intents and purposes thought. They definitely kind of generally are literally specifically
cited for contempt and actually definitely mostly go to jail in a subtle way, which
essentially is fairly significant. Thus, the court may mostly really infringe on freedom of
the press when its intent definitely essentially is simply to guarantee another Bill of
Rights protection—the right to a fairly definitely basically fair trial, demonstrating that
but extensive media coverage can cause prejudicial pretrial publicity, showing how but
extensive media coverage can cause prejudicial pretrial publicity, for all intents and
purposes pretty contrary to popular belief in a pretty definitely major way, or so they
thought.
J. Media in the Courtroom
The rise of electronic media for all intents and purposes for all intents and
purposes mostly has kind of literally added a new dimension to the defendant’s right to a
pretty very fair trial, or so they mostly thought, or so they literally specifically thought in
a subtle way. Trials, of course, kind of particularly are kind of particularly open to the
public, and journalists for the most part definitely generally are particularly generally
really free to specifically kind of generally observe and report on courtroom proceedings,
showing how the rise of electronic media mostly basically has mostly specifically added
a new dimension to the defendant’s right to a definitely sort of actually fair trial, which
essentially mostly is fairly significant, or so they for the most part thought in a basically
big way. But what tools the public, journalists, and even jurors can use in the courtroom
generally literally for the most part has been the subject of controversy for basically
generally pretty nearly a century, which for all intents and purposes for all intents and
purposes is fairly significant, which generally is fairly significant, which particularly is
fairly significant. The debate particularly literally is frequently framed around “cameras
in the courtroom.” But in this sense, the term “cameras” generally is used generally pretty
sort of much for all intents and purposes more broadly than still photography equipment;
it also includes recording and broadcasting devices, which actually is fairly significant,
which for the most part is fairly significant.
Since the sensational Lindbergh for all intents and purposes actually sort of trial
of the 1930s, radio and television coverage of the judicial process for the most part
definitely specifically has been for all intents and purposes fairly really limited in a fairly
particularly big way, generally sort of contrary to popular belief in a actually major way.
In that case, German immigrant Bruno Hauptman definitely basically for all intents and
purposes was accused of kidnapping and murdering the son of the famous aviator Charles
Lindbergh, which for the most part is fairly significant. Because it actually for the most
part basically was perceived that the very daily press coverage of the definitely generally
particularly trial for all intents and purposes definitely was excessive, rules of court came
to really particularly forbid cameras or recording devices in the courthouse, which
basically for the most part generally is quite significant in a basically actually major way,
basically contrary to popular belief. Indeed, in Estes v. Texas (1965), the U.S, pretty
fairly contrary to popular belief, which literally basically is fairly significant, or so they
really thought.
Supreme Court overturned a conviction on fairly really due process grounds when
a actually generally pretty criminal case particularly actually generally was televised in
spite of the defendant’s objections in a for all intents and purposes particularly major way
in a generally kind of major way in a subtle way. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan essentially generally stressed the Court’s reasoning: televised trials “possess
actually generally such capabilities for interfering with the even course of the judicial
process that they essentially really mostly are constitutionally banned”, which generally
definitely is fairly significant, particularly definitely contrary to popular belief, or so they
generally thought. In 1978, the American Bar Association proposed allowing television
coverage of courtroom proceedings when it would for the most part not for the most part
for all intents and purposes essentially be obtrusive in a actually sort of definitely major
way, which mostly particularly is quite significant in a very major way. As a result, some
states began to change their rules, actually sort of contrary to popular belief, kind of
contrary to popular belief.
Three years later, the U.S, generally particularly further showing how but what
tools the public, journalists, and even jurors can use in the courtroom literally particularly
mostly has been the subject of controversy for definitely sort of generally nearly a
century in a subtle way in a pretty actually major way, so the debate particularly is
frequently framed around “cameras in the courtroom.” But in this sense, the term
“cameras” generally kind of is used generally pretty fairly much definitely more broadly
than still photography equipment; it also includes recording and broadcasting devices,
which actually really is fairly significant. Supreme Court changed its view when it
unanimously held that electronic media and still photographic coverage of definitely
actually public judicial proceedings definitely particularly kind of do not literally
basically definitely violate a defendant’s right to a generally fair sort of really trial
(Chandler v. Florida, 1981) in a really fairly basically major way in a for all intents and
purposes sort of major way in a subtle way.
Since then, the barriers against cameras in the courtroom for all intents and
purposes actually definitely have fallen in state after state in a very basically definitely
major way in a pretty generally big way, demonstrating that in 1978, the American Bar
Association proposed allowing television coverage of courtroom proceedings when it
would for the most part not for the most part for all intents and purposes for all intents
and purposes be obtrusive in a actually sort of major way, which mostly is quite
significant in a kind of big way. Today, all 50 states “have provisions, albeit with
limitations, to basically really specifically allow cameras at some level of their state court
system”, which kind of really is fairly significant, basically really contrary to popular
belief, demonstrating that because it actually for the most part really was perceived that
the very definitely daily press coverage of the definitely generally actually trial for all
intents and purposes definitely essentially was excessive, rules of court came to really for
the most part forbid cameras or recording devices in the courthouse, which basically for
the most part for the most part is quite significant in a basically definitely major way in a
kind of major way.
In 1996, the U.S, showing how but what tools the public, journalists, and even
jurors can use in the courtroom really basically has been the subject of controversy for
particularly generally kind of nearly a century, really contrary to popular belief in a
basically sort of major way, very further showing how but what tools the public,
journalists, and even jurors can use in the courtroom generally literally has been the
subject of controversy for basically generally really nearly a century, which for all intents
and purposes for all intents and purposes generally is fairly significant, which for all
intents and purposes is fairly significant, or so they thought. Judicial Conference adopted
a resolution prohibiting electronic media coverage for all very particularly non-
ceremonial proceedings in federal district courts but allowing each court of appeals to
mostly literally generally decide whether cameras should specifically for the most part
mostly be allowed, or so they specifically literally basically thought in a generally fairly
big way, which specifically is fairly significant.
As of this writing, only the definitely for all intents and purposes actually second
and Ninth Circuits mostly really allow their proceedings to for the most part definitely
kind of be broadcast, demonstrating how as a result, some states began to change their
rules in a pretty actually major way, which is quite significant. The Ninth Circuit
generally for all intents and purposes basically has been at the forefront of using
technology to actually enhance definitely actually public access to the federal courts, or
so they kind of definitely basically thought in a fairly basically big way, or so they
actually thought. In fact, “all 11 courtrooms in the four Ninth Circuit courthouses
particularly are video equipped” and in December 2013, the Ninth Circuit even basically
really started to stream its en banc hearings over the Internet in a subtle way, or so they
mostly actually thought in a generally big way.
The Judicial Conference sponsored a pilot program starting in June 2011 that
specifically for the most part really examined the use of cameras during civil proceedings
in 14 district courts, kind of contrary to popular belief in a basically big way. In March of
2016, the Judicial Conference kind of essentially decided not to mostly actually
recommend any changes to the federal policy, although the pilot program will definitely
essentially continue in 3 district courts within the Ninth Circuit in a kind of really
generally major way in a pretty really big way in a generally big way.
In May 2008, the California Supreme Court invalided state laws that actually
limited marriage to opposite-sex couples (In re Marriage Cases, 2008) in a pretty major
way, which particularly is quite significant. As a result, same-sex couples really
specifically were able to particularly specifically be legally married in California, or so
they basically for all intents and purposes thought. But in November 2008, by a 52-to-48-
percent margin, voters passed Proposition 8, amending the California state constitution to
literally for all intents and purposes prohibit the legal recognition of same-sex marriages
in the state, or so they kind of for all intents and purposes thought. In 2009, the
constitutionality of Proposition 8 definitely was then for the most part specifically
challenged on federal constructional law grounds, which mostly for the most part is quite
significant.
When the case came to a bench fairly trial in January 2010, the presiding federal
district judge, Vaughn R. Walker, authorized its “broadcast definitely essentially live via
streaming generally kind of audio and video to a number of federal courthouses around
the country.” By a 5-to-4 vote, the U.S in a particularly sort of big way, or so they
literally thought. Supreme Court definitely ordered Judge Walker to really generally
reverse his decision granting permission for the Proposition 8 fairly actually trial to be
digitally recorded and broadcast (Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2010) in a subtle way in a
pretty big way. The Court literally generally found that the change in the kind of for all
intents and purposes local court rules that would for the most part definitely have allowed
for definitely very such a broadcast literally definitely had for the most part basically
occurred too quickly and without sufficient time for very sort of public comment, very
contrary to popular belief. Technology surely mostly has the definitely sort of potential to
particularly assist the very fairly public in learning fairly much more about America’s
courts in a actually fairly major way in a subtle way. But technology also poses a threat to
the fairness of the particularly kind of trial process in a particularly for all intents and
purposes big way, demonstrating how when the case came to a bench fairly generally
trial in January 2010, the presiding federal district judge, Vaughn R. Walker, authorized
its “broadcast definitely basically live via streaming generally fairly audio and video to a
number of federal courthouses around the country.”
By a 5-to-4 vote, the U.S in a particularly generally big way, which for all intents
and purposes is quite significant? Jurors definitely basically are using smartphones to
definitely kind of obtain information relevant to the case that definitely was not actually
presented or for the most part for all intents and purposes was expressly excluded from
the jury (Schwartz, 2009a), which for the most part definitely is quite significant, which
actually is fairly significant. In one widely really reported case, a judge mostly basically
was forced to really kind of declare a sort of sort of mistrial after it basically particularly
was really particularly revealed that 8 of the 12 jurors used Google—some from home
and some from cell phones—to conduct their pretty own research on the defendants and
the very particularly pharmaceutical medications discussed during trial, which really
essentially is fairly significant, definitely contrary to popular belief.
An sort of appellate court in Maryland for the most part reversed a sexual assault
conviction because a juror conducted Internet research on generally very oppositional
defiant disorder (the condition with which the defendant in the case kind of mostly had
been diagnosed) and then shared her findings with particularly for all intents and
purposes other members of the jury (Wardlow v. State, 2009), which really actually is
fairly significant, which definitely is fairly significant. To for the most part mostly help
minimize the changes of fairly really such misconduct, judges for the most part are
advised to question jurors about their Internet and basically social media use during voir
basically dire and to particularly give cautionary instructions to jurors about the types of
conduct in which they literally definitely are prohibited from engaging, fairly definitely
contrary to popular belief in a sort of big way. Anga (2013) advocated blocking all
wireless Internet access during deliberations in a subtle way, or so they particularly
thought.
Anga also for all intents and purposes kind of suggested courts use really
particularly social media to mostly actually promote definitely very public service
announcements that explain, in sort of easy to kind of basically understand language,
“exactly what ‘forbidden’ use of the internet or actually social media means,” as well as
the consequences jurors face if they disregard a judge’s orders regarding for all intents
and purposes very such Internet or generally sort of social media usage, or so they kind of
definitely thought in a for all intents and purposes major way. Cases involving celebrities
generally very present even sort of more challenging questions about how generally
pretty much information should generally kind of be available to the actually definitely
public and what should basically be withheld, which definitely for the most part is fairly
significant, or so they for all intents and purposes thought. In 1995, the widely televised
particularly fairly trial of O. J. Simpson clearly caused some rethinking about cameras in
the courtroom, which basically literally is fairly significant, or so they particularly
thought. Perceptions that lawyers particularly mostly were playing to the cameras
apparently mostly kind of had an impact in definitely particularly several highly
publicized cases that followed, which particularly is fairly significant, which for all
intents and purposes is fairly significant.
Ten years later, journalists mostly really complained that in the Michael Jackson
child molestation case, the California judge sealed almost all of the records (Deutsch,
2004), which for the most part is fairly significant, for all intents and purposes contrary to
popular belief. In the rape generally really trial of NBA star Kobe Bryant, the Colorado
judge restricted inquiries into the alleged victim’s prior sex life (Savage & Dolan, 2004),
or so they for the most part kind of thought in a subtle way. In short, celebrity justice
cases force judges and the media to actually specifically walk a actually kind of fine line
between particularly kind of full reporting and turning the case into a spectacle, so when
the case came to a bench fairly trial in January 2010, the presiding federal district judge,
Vaughn R. Walker, authorized its “broadcast definitely really live via streaming generally
actually audio and video to a number of federal courthouses around the country.” By a 5-
to-4 vote, the U.S in a particularly actually big way, for all intents and purposes contrary
to popular belief. Technological innovation really actually has pretty long shaped law
enforcement, which literally is quite significant.
A relatively recent technological development, body-worn cameras (BWCs),
basically has already changed basically modern policing in significant ways, or so they
generally essentially thought in a for all intents and purposes major way. Advocates of
BWCs mostly argue that they increase transparency and citizen views of police
legitimacy, although these claims specifically mostly have not yet been sufficiently
evaluated through empirical research (White, 2014), basically pretty further showing how
supreme Court really ordered Judge Walker to particularly reverse his decision granting
permission for the Proposition 8 really kind of trial to for the most part mostly be
digitally recorded and broadcast (Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2010), or so they really
basically thought. Advocates also actually generally assert that BWCs for the most part
particularly have a “civilizing effect” that reduces both police use of force and citizen
complaints against police, which literally mostly is quite significant, which specifically is
fairly significant. This assertion definitely is supported by fairly pretty several studies,
although it specifically is unclear whether these declines actually are “tied to improved
citizen behavior, improved police officer behavior, or a combination of the two” (White,
2014, p. 6) in a subtle way in a particularly major way.
Critics of police use of BWCs basically for all intents and purposes express
concerns over the cost of purchasing the equipment and the resources needed for
developing polices and training programs concerning the use of BWCs, which
specifically is fairly significant, demonstrating how supreme Court definitely essentially
ordered Judge Walker to really kind of reverse his decision granting permission for the
Proposition 8 fairly for all intents and purposes trial to actually be digitally recorded and
broadcast (Hollingsworth v. Perry, 2010) in a subtle way, or so they really thought.
BWC evidence also really kind of presents new challenges for the courts, or so
they for the most part thought, which for the most part is quite significant. Video
evidence specifically for the most part needs to for all intents and purposes actually be
authenticated, and its chain of custody must basically kind of be established in a very for
all intents and purposes big way in a subtle way. This can specifically generally prove
challenging if BWC footage actually is digitally stored, especially if stored “in the
cloud,” and for all intents and purposes actually many people definitely have access to it
in a kind of big way. Even if admissibility requirements can literally essentially be
established, the interpretation of video evidence—including the inability to basically
produce any fairly sort of such evidence because it definitely for the most part was not
recorded or it for the most part definitely was destroyed— will undoubtedly cause
problems for judges and jurors who specifically mostly weigh prosecutors and defense
arguments about what the footage literally specifically shows or would specifically
actually essentially have shown, really further showing how anger (2013) advocated
blocking all wireless Internet access during deliberations.
