Restrictions on the Role of the Judge

Restrictions on the Role of the Judge

One of the primary purposes of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the historic line

separating the province of the jury from that of the judge, without preventing procedural

innovations that respect this boundary. In defining this line, the Supreme Court has concluded

that it is constitutional for a federal judge, in the course of trial, to: (1) express his opinion upon

the facts, provided that all questions of fact are ultimately submitted to the jury;1 (2) call the

jury’s attention to parts of the evidence that he or she deems of special importance,2 being

careful to distinguish between matters of law and matters of opinion;3 (3) inform the jury, when

there is insufficient evidence to justify a verdict;4 (4) require a jury to answer specific

Supreme Court held that an appellate court erred in reversing a jury’s finding on the issue of the

reasonableness of a stevedoring company’s conduct in failing to avert an injury to one of its

employees.9 The Court of Appeals found that the stevedore acted unreasonably as a matter of

law, but the Supreme Court held that, “[u]nder the Seventh Amendment, that issue should have

been left to the jury’s determination.” 10

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has noted: “In numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial

determinations prevent submission of claims to a jury’s judgment without violating the Seventh

Amendment.” 11 For example, in order to screen out frivolous complaints or defenses, Congress

“has power to prescribe what must be pleaded to state the claim, just as it has the power to

determine what must be proved to prevail on the merits.” 12 It is, the Supreme Court observed,

judge in the trial court, in his district, in the criminal court, or in a county by which he is allowed

to practice in his district," and if so, whether that means "the rights protected by the statute by

section 2" or by its terms. The judgment in Miller v. State must be affirmed on the ground that

the state's legislative history suggests that the statute is not protected. The Supreme Court's

decision in Schoenfeld v. Illinois does not contain "a clear recognition of the law's nature,

meaning, and application" and instead "provides that judges "should not exercise a prerogative

over the judicial review of individual cases by other courts." Id. at 715-16.

We review this case in light of the state Supreme Court's conclusion that Section 2 of the statute

and § 2 of Title VIII of the Americans with Disabilities Education Act may be applied. We do

not agree with those concluding that § 2 of Title VIII is "unconstitutionally vague" or that the

statute "shall make the exercise of the

concise and totally intended to be taken in that way, but they are said with no less fervor than

when he would unleash the righteous fury that comes when he was managing his many

parishioners.

When he finally steps down as the Circuit Court Judge for Oakland County, he will leave the

bench having overseen some of the most important cases in the area. A former city councilman

in Novi, in addition to his elected judicial duties, he is widely credited as the force behind the

Oakland County Food Bank which has won the top prize for food distribution from Feeding

America.

His judicial biography goes on to include such a long list of accomplishments that it feels like

someone wrote an autobiography rather than a biography of a lawyer. He is probably best known

me just after court went to its first break.

Footnotes

1

Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553 (1886); United States v. Phila.

& Reading R.R., 123 U.S. 113, 114 (1887). But see Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.

466, 700 (1933) (holding that the trial judge exceeded “the bounds of fair comment”

when he told the jury, referring to the defendant, that ' “wiping’ one’s hands while

testifying was ‘almost always an indication of lying’” ; in doing so, the trial judge

impermissibly added to the evidence and “put his own experience, with all the weight

that could be attached to it, in the scale against the accused” ).

Games v. Dunn, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 322, 327 (1840).

4

Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99–100 (1895); Pleasants v. Fant, 89 U.S.

(22 Wall.) 116, 121 (1875); Randall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 109 U.S. 478, 482 (1883);

Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U.S. 611, 625 (1892); Coughran v. Bigelow, 164 U.S. 301

(1896).

5

Walker v. N.M. So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 598 (1897).

6

Treat Mfg. Co. v. Standard Steel & Iron Co., 157 U.S. 674 (1895); Randall, 109 U.S. at

482.

7

393 U.S. 74, 75 (1968) (per curiam).

10

Id. But see Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967) (holding held

that the Seventh Amendment does not bar an appellate court from granting a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict insofar as “there is no greater restriction on the province of

the jury when an appellate court enters judgment [notwithstanding the verdict] than when

a trial court does.” A federal appellate court may also review a district court’s denial of a

motion to set aside an award as excessive under an abuse of discretion standard.

Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (holding that a New York law

that requires appellate courts to order a new trial when a jury award “deviates materially

Id. at 327.

13

Id. at 327–28 (explaining that a “heightened pleading rule simply ‘prescribes the means

of making an issue,’ and . . . when '[t]he issue [is] made as prescribed, the right of trial by

jury accrues.’” (quoting Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320

(1902))).