ORGANIZED CRIME, CULTURE, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE:
AN APPLICATION OF INSTITUTIONAL ANOMIE THEORY
Organized crime activity is one form of transnational crime that is at the forefront
of concerns for the global community. ÒThe transnational nature of organized crime
means that criminal networks forge bonds across borders as well as overcome cultural
and linguistic differences in the commission of their crimeÓ (UNODC, 2012b).
Organized crime quickly adapts to new social environments, illustrating its flexible and
dynamic qualities. The United Nations and the Council of Europe have identified the
most common global illicit activity of organized crime as drug trafficking, with
secondary participation in trafficking in persons, cybercrime, smuggling of migrants,
firearms trafficking, trafficking in environmental resources and counterfeit products, and
maritime piracy (Council of Europe, 2000; 2005; OCTA, 2011).
The broad range of most common illicit activities and even broader scope of global
trafficking patterns have complicated law enforcement responses, particularly since the
United NationÕs Organized Crime Threat Assessment (2011) noted ÒMore than ever
before, strong levels of cooperation exist between different organized crime groups,
transcending national, ethnic, and business differencesÓ (8). Other official reports have
identified Europe as the global ÒhotspotÓ for consumption of illicit goods and services
provided by criminal organizations around the world, while simultaneously noting the
general ineffectiveness of national and regional policies (OCTA, 2011; UNODC, 2010).
The Central and Eastern European countries within the larger European region have
further proven problematic, with the country of Poland experiencing multiple complications
in the battle to reduce levels of organized crime. Not only does there exist a high demand
market for illicit goods and services in Poland, but the country also house
well-established trafficking routes into Western Europe from Asiatic and Middle
Eastern regions, and has been identified as one of the leading producers of
amphetamines in Europe (DEA, 2004; EUROPOL, 2011; Krawczyk et al., 2009; Reitox
National Focal Point, 2005; 2011).
Importantly, the markets for organized crime activities have also remained
lucrative outside of Central and Eastern Europe, corresponding with the increase in
prevalence of criminal organizations worldwide, costing nations billions in lost revenues
and enforcement expenses. For instance, the United States government (including local,
state, and federal levels) spent (domestically) over 480 billion USD in 2011 combating
drug trafficking organizations, while the revenue denied these organizations (through
arrests and drug seizures) was approximately 19.3 billion (DEA, 2012). By comparison,
the estimated annual market value of cocaine shipments from South America to North
America is estimated at 38 billion USD, the estimated annual global market value for
Afghan-produced heroin is 55 billion USD, and the estimated market value for smuggled
migrants from Mexico to the U.S. is 6.6 billion USD (UNODC, 2010).
These alarming trends have received criminological attention, and in studying
organized crime criminologists have employed a range of criminological and economic
theories to help understand such criminality. That is, scholars have in part turned to the
work of economists who view organized crime groups as ÒfirmsÓ competing in the illicit
market against other ÒfirmsÓ (Garoupa, 1997; Grossman, 1991; Scaperdas, 2001).
Criminologists who have studied organized crime most often draw theoretical guidance
from Rational Choice Theory, Routine Activities Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention
to better understand why members of criminal organizations ÒrationallyÓ
decide to engage in this crime-type.1 The influence of the economic paradigm in
criminology has also led researchers to produce copious amounts of research on various
aspects of organized crime activity, such as drug market operations, to explain how
criminals, as rational actors, decide when and where to buy and sell their illicit goods
and services (e.g., Reuter and Haaga, 1989). Finally, much work has been conducted on
case studies and qualitative accounts of particular organized crime groups (e.g., Albini,
1971; Arlacchi, 1988; Catanazaro, 1988; Paoli, 2003; 2008).
One theoretical orientation that has not been routinely applied to the study of
organized crime, but would be beneficial for criminologists to consider is
sociocultural theories. These theories are rooted in sociological concepts concerning
societies and social organization, which are composed of culture and social
institutions. Sociologists have developed ideas of social organization, studying them
from comparative frameworks at both the micro- and macro-levels (e.g., Durkheim,
1956/1922; Marsh, 1967; Bennett, 2004). Applying socio-cultural theories to the study
of organized crime would be a useful extension of the current body of knowledge.
In the early 1900s, Robert K. Merton (1938) first applied these concepts of social
organization to the study of crime, developing MertonÕs Anomie Theory. Building on
the previous work of Durkheim (1956/1922; 1962/1895), MertonÕs Anomie Theory
emphasizes equally the importance of culture and social institutions in explanations of
crime, describing how universal cultural goals are generated by societies, but societies
often fail in regulating the institutional means for individuals to achieve these goals
(Merton, 1957; 1968). This, in turn, results in a state of social Anomie, or
Ònormlessness,Ó causing crime rates to subsequently increase.
1This refers to the assumption of hedonism, where decisions to act are based on cost-benefit analyses.
More recently, criminologists expanded on MertonÕs Anomie Theory, maintaining
the theoretical foundation of culture and social institutions, developing Institutional Anomie
Theory (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994) and Global Anomie Theory (Passas, 1999; 2000).
Global Anomie Theory extends MertonÕs Anomie Theory by accounting for relative
deprivation (i.e., individuals may feel subjectively deprived, even if they are not
considered objectively deprived) and the importance of reference-group analysis.2
Institutional Anomie Theory also expands MertonÕs Anomie Theory by
elaborating on the social organizational element of social institutions. For Merton, social
institutions were only composed of class stratification. However, for Messner and
Rosenfeld (1994), the creators of Institutional Anomie Theory, social institutions are best
explicated through four main institutions relevant to the explanation of crime: the
economy, the polity, the family, and education. This theory maintains MertonÕs (1938)
equal emphasis (and interconnectedness) on the elements of social organization, while
modeling Anomic cultural pressures and institutional configurations most conducive to
high rates of serious crime (Messner and Rosenfeld, 2009).
This research proposes a return to the use of socio-cultural aspects of societies to
gain insight into the highly complex and multifaceted criminal phenomenon of crime,
and more specifically organized crime given its international significance. This will be
accomplished through a quantitative study that tests the fundamental theoretical elements
of Institutional Anomie as the theory was originally designed in 1994 by Messner and
Rosenfeld. The findings from this research will shed light on how and to what degree
socio-cultural forces influence organized crime prevalence in European countries, and to
2Reference-group analysis discerns between normative reference groups that set the standards, or
group norms, for those seeking acceptance into the group, and comparative reference groups, which are
used by others as Òa yardstick in making self-evaluations or in judging othersÓ (Passas, 1997: 64).
determine how countries in various regions of Europe experience differential levels of
organized crime activity. To this end this study extends the use of Institutional Anomie
Theory to a new crime type (organized crime) and to a broader range of countries, while
also offering new measurements for ÒAnomic cultureÓ and Òsocial institutions.Ó By
forming a more conceptually whole understanding of not only what constitutes
Òorganized crimeÓ but also what socio-cultural factors may impact organized crime
levels, this research will have the potential to positively impact national and
international policy.
In the chapters that follow, Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the sociological
concepts of culture, institutions, and Anomie. This chapter discusses how these concepts
have become the basis for modern sociological and criminological thought, most
especially through the lenses of MertonÕs Anomie Theory and Institutional Anomie
Theory. The chapter concludes with a detailed review of past studies of Institutional
Anomie Theory. Chapter 3 provides a detailed review of Òorganized crime,Ó beginning
first with its theoretical and definitional challenges as viewed from academic and legal
perspectives. This chapter then describes the geographic significance of organized crime
presence and activity levels in all regions of the world, and concludes by focusing on the
prevalence of organized crime activities in European countries. The last section of
Chapter 3 addresses the current issues in criminology that this research intends to
address. Chapter 4 explains the research questions, methodology, data, and analytic
strategies utilized by this research endeavor, concluding with its limitations. Chapter 5
discusses the findings of the quantitative analyses in detail, and the final chapter (6)
concludes this research.
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