What Explains Criminal Violence in Mexico City? A Test of Two Theories of Crime
Introduction
An accurate and granular understanding of crime patterns at the city and neighbourhood scale is essential
for intelligent policing and crime prevention. While crime reduction strategies are frequently advocated
and adopted at the national level, their application is invariably subnational. It is state, municipal and city
governments that are ultimately responsible for overseeing the day-to-day business of policing and
prevention. Interventions can vary from the strategic deployment of policing assets in “hot spots” to the
creation of community watch committees, measures targeting at-risk youth, and programs designed to
promote community cohesion. All of these activities are adopted at the street level. And while all of them
are likely relevant, not all of them are equally effective.
Criminologists and geographers have repeatedly shown how the distribution of criminal violence and
property crime is highly spatially concentrated (Aselin et al 2000,%Freeman et al 1996, Ratfliffe 2003). In
most urban settings a disproportionate amount of criminal violence and property crime tends to be hyper-
concentrated in a relatively confined area (Muggah 2015). A constructive way to apprehend what drives
particular spatial patterns of criminality is by empirically testing specific theories using insights from
geography. Such an approach can overcome common policy errors related to misunderstanding why
crime emerges and how it is distributed over time and space. A theoretically informed perspective can
potentially improve measures to prevent and reduce crime by reducing the gap between perception and
reality.
There are immense effectiveness and efficiency gains to be achieved by a more robust theoretical
understanding of what drives specific types of crime, their institutional and structural dynamics, and
appropriate measures to prevent them over time. Mexico City’s authorities spent at least $1.05 billion on
public security in 2014, the equivalent of $124 per resident.1%A recent survey reveals that almost one
third (31.7 percent) of the adult population was a victim of crime in the previous year. Almost half of all
adults (46.3 percent) report feeling insecure in their neighbourhoods and close to two thirds (62.8 percent)
do not trust their local police. But given the apparent widespread prevalence of crime – where should
scarce resources be deployed? In Mexico City, as in so many other settlements, there is a pronounced
disconnect between awareness of crime, spending on public security, and actual results in relation to
personal safety.
This article considers two competing theories of crime to help resolve these conundrums and better
predict the distribution of crime in Mexico’s capital. Both social disorganization theory and institutional
anomie theory are defined in the opening section. As expected, the authors detect a high degree of
concentration of crime in particular areas of the metropolitan region. Roughly two thirds of all criminal
investigations occur within a 37 mile radius from the geographic center of the sprawling city. What is
more, just ten hot spot municipalities account for more than one quarter of all reported crimes. In criminal
science literature, a hot spot consists of an demarcated space with significantly higher levels of reported
crime than adjoining or neighboring areas (Braga et al 2012). More fundamentally, the regression
analysis detects a strong effect of social disorganization measures on the prevalence of crime. These
findings have policy and programming implications since crime prevention measures based on either
social disorganization or institutional anomie premises can generate spatially heterogeneous policy
effects.
Defining place
It is widely accepted that crime concentrates in specific spatial, temporal, and social places. Across the
Americas, between one and five per cent of city street addresses account for up to 99 per cent of
homicidal violence (Weisburd et al 2011;%Mejia et al 2014).2%Likewise, criminality is often highly
correlated with specific days of the week, times of day, and locations and settings. Predictably, most
crime prevention interventions are also place-oriented. It is worth noting that a ‘place’ is not an abstract
idea but rather a concrete or fixed entity. It is a location with a physical representation and an emotional
quotient (Vilalta 2013). Places are not distinguished exclusively by their geographic, demographic or
socio-economic composition, but also by the practices, ideologies, values and behaviours of those living
in them. A place can be a municipality or city such as Mexico, but also a neighbourhood, a park, a bar, a
street or an alley. Anthropologically speaking, it can also be an area where a community lives and self-
identifies.
Not surprisingly, theory predicts that high-crime places tend to be different than low-crime places. When
considering those areas affected by ‘high’ levels of crime, there are also distinctions between socially
disorganized places and settings exhibiting anomie among their residents. Specifically, a socially
disorganized place exhibits above-average crime due to concentrated disadvantage (e.g. above average
poverty, high residential mobility, excess male youth populations, and disrupted and fragmented families)
and weak collective efficacy (e.g. limited trust and willingness to help others and low willingness to
exercise informal controls for the public good). By way of contrast, a place featuring anomie also
frequently experiences comparatively high rates of crime, but for different reasons. There crime arises
owing to cultural and social norms and related pressures (e.g. to achieve monetary success) that in turn
may distort and undermine critical institutions (e.g. family, church, schools, parties). Crime therefore
arises when legitimate opportunities are unequally distributed and certain segments of society have no
way to attain basic social and economic goals.
While both social disorganization theory and institutional anomie theory offer important insights into hot
spots and hot individuals, they potentially yield very different policy and programming solutions.
Generally, crime prevention policies for what might be characterized as socially disorganized places in
Mexico might focus on the ecological characteristics of high crime areas. The goal would likely be to
strengthen collective efficacy through highly targeted poverty reduction, enabling community cohesion
and increasing youth supervision. Meanwhile, crime prevention measures for places suffering from
anomie would likely entail reinforcing social institutions such as fragmented families, faith-based
organizations, and political channels for dialogue. They might also emphasize more formal measures to
prevent crime, such as changes in the built environment, specific forms of education, access to health and
targeted employment. And while crime will be difficult to prevent in both socially disorganized and areas
with a high levels of anomie, it is also more persistent and resistant in the latter settings. This is because it
is particularly challenging to transform belief and value structures latent in a community as compared to
reforming a neighbourhoods’ socio-economic conditions and informal social controls.
Theories
Before testing social disorganization and institutional anomie theories in Mexico’s largest city, it is
important to consider their origins and characteristics. Both theoretical approaches offer immense
predictive power and have been explored in the context of North American and Western European cities.
Key exponents of both traditions include Sampson and Groves (1989), Bursik and Grasmick (1993),
Sampson et al (1997,%2002), Messner and Rosenfeld (1997), and Baumer and Gustafson (2007) among
others. Yet neither theory has been extensively tested outside of an upper-income setting – whether
Mexico or otherwise. Part of the reason for this is that each emerges from intellectual moorings associated
with the Chicago schools of human ecology and sociology. Social scientists have been loath to test the
theory in what are often considered data poor environments. And yet they each offer, to varying degrees,
a compelling framework for examining criminal dynamics in the so-called global South.
Social disorganization theory builds on concepts emerging in human ecology and so-called concentric
circles in the first half of the twentieth century.3%It assumes that the growth and functional organization of
a city is not a random process. Rather, identifiable patterns emerge in cities – beginning first in Chicago
where the theory emerged – as a result of four social processes: invasion, conflict, accommodation and
assimilation (Muncie and McLaughlin 2001). An unfortunate but natural by-product of these ‘natural’
social processes is crime. As such, a basic premise of social disorganization theory is that crime is
produced by naturally occurring socio-pathological conditions in communities or events that are time and
place specific. Social disorganization theory also owes an intellectual debt to a host of scholars in North
American and Western European university criminology and sociology departments.
Intriguingly, the term ‘social disorganization’ was first introduced by Hall (1904) to set out an ethical
explanation of crime. Early pre-Chicago School criminological studies unwittingly made use of human
ecology approaches. For example, Breckinridge and Abbott (1912) examined the geographic distribution
of the homes of juvenile delinquents in Chicago and found that a disproportionate number were located in
a small selection of neighbourhoods. Likewise, Burt (1925) found that areas in London with the highest
crime rates were bordering the central business district and the areas with lowest crime rates where
located around the periphery.4
Meanwhile, the theorizing on ‘concentric circles’ also contributed to advancing social disorganization
theory. Scholars such as Burgess (1925) determined that cities could be divided into circles – or areas –
according to their functions. Areas featuring higher crime were ‘transitional’ – places that are changing
from commercial to residential use. The theory was tested by Shaw and McKay (1942) who observed
that in these transitioning areas, crime rates remained stable over time even if the ethnic composition of
the population changed. They determined that there must be some reason for crime to remain in some
places and not in others.5
Thus, in its original formulation social disorganization predicts that spatial variation in crime within cities
depends on levels of poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, and rapid population growth.6%The basic argument is
that these factors weaken social bonding and therefore reduce the capacity of communities to manage and
regulate themselves or monitor the behaviour of their members. Taken together, proponents of social
disorganization theory contend that structural factors (e.g. principally deindustrialization, migration, and
socioeconomic segregation) can spatially concentrate the disadvantaged, weaken the social fabric of
communities, undermine the quality and quantity of bonding, and increase antisocial behaviour, including
criminality (Figure%1).
Social disorganization theory was recently updated with the concept of ‘collective efficacy’ (Sampson et
al. 1997). Collective efficacy refers to the degree of social cohesion between residents of a given
community and their preparedness to act on behalf of the common good. Areas exhibiting low levels of
collective efficacy are characterized by low levels of civic participation, sparsely distributed friendship
networks and unsupervised teenage peer groups. Contemporary proponents of social disorganization thus
predict that the greater the level of collective efficacy the lower the level of crime and violence. Likewise,
the lower the level of collective efficacy, the higher the rates of criminality and victimization. The theory
was tested and confirmed in Chicago (Sampson et al. 1997), resulting in a widespread commitment to
promoting collective efficacy as a means of preventing crime.
Social disorganization theory is commonly applied to examine a wide range of relationships between
space, place, concentrated disadvantage and criminal behaviour. Scholars have considered the tendency
of criminals to live geographically close to their victims (Vilalta, 2010;%Van Dijk 1990), the endemic
character of crime hotspots (Eck and Weisburd 1995), high crime rates in residential areas with high
percentages of rented dwellings and large housing projects (Bottoms and Wiles 1986;%Block and Block
1995), and the probability of criminal behaviour when growing up in crime-affected areas (Krivo and
Peterson 1996;%Reiss and Rhodes 1961).7%The underlying assumption of many of these models is that the
higher the crime density in a community, the greater the probability of finding accomplices due to their
tight communication network (Reiss 1986;%Singer 1981).
Institutional anomie theory (IAT) has a somewhat different intellectual trajectory having only emerged in
the past two decades. Indeed, Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, 2001) put forward anomie theory on the
basis of Merton’s conceptualization of a relationship between weak normative and social controls and
criminal behaviour.8%This theory draws explicitly on Merton’s formulation of anomie by attaching crime
to the dynamic relationship between cultural and social structures. IAT proposes that cultural structures –
defined as sets of normative values – can contribute to a condition of moral decay, the erosion of bonds
between individuals in a community, and fragmentation and declining self-regulation. Messner and
Rosenfeld show how profit-driven societies that push social relations toward utilitarian ends can generate
anomie. This is because priority is given over to materialistic and instrumental goals.
At the center of IAT is a range of social institutions. According to its chief exponents, social institutions
are composite elements of a given economy, polity and culture that regulate or balance goals and norms.
Messner and Rosenfield (2001) contend that social institutions have four basic functions: adaptation, goal
attainment, integration, and pattern maintenance. In their view, economic institutions such as the market
shape adaptation (i.e. to meet the physical and material needs). Political institutions such as laws and
governance arrangements (or polity) regulate goal attainment. Meanwhile, religious, educational, and
familial institutions condition the integration and the maintenance of cultural patterns.
For one, economic institutions are critical for creating stable employment and livelihoods. But disruption
to such institutions can undermine social structures that give rise to crime. Specifically, the lack of jobs,
living wages, credit, and public investment can generate knock-on effects. Likewise, economic recession
and inflation may force disadvantaged individuals into states of anomic deprivation and psychic stress. As
such, institutional anomie may develop faster in places where the economic context is not favourable to
accomplish socially desirable goals.
Polity, as defined above, is a necessary condition for achieving prosperity and social equality. But anomie
can arise when one element of polity – such as the rule of law – is unevenly and unequally applied. A
weak rule of law in one place – contributing to so-called un- or under-governed spaces – may stimulate
criminal behavior. This is because a weak polity can undermine the coherence of community and
solidarity (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001;%Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008). In such situations, cultural
structures fail in their primordial normative function. This combination of a weak rule of law and
materialistic influences can induce some members of society to pursue crime.
Finally, basic cultural institutions are essential for engendering social equality (Bjerregaard and Cochran
2008;%Maume and Lee 2003). However, when institutions such as family or associative groups are
disrupted, this can impede social integration and pattern maintenance. Social institutions are necessary but
do not play equal roles (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001). Each society gives a priority to one or another
social institution, providing it with a national ethos. However, when imbalance occurs, it can induce
people to commit a crime in the pursuit of economic gain (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001).9
References
1. Aselin, L,%Cohen, J,%Cook, D,%Gorr, W%and%Tita, G%(2000).%“Spatial Analysis of Crime,” Measurement
and Analysis of Crime and Justice.% Retrieved
from:%https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04e.pdf.%
2. Baumer, E%and%Gustafson, R%(2007).%Social organization and instrumental crime: assessing the empirical
validity of classic and contemporary anomie theories.%Criminology%45(3): 617–663,
DOI:%https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2007.00090.x%
3. Bjerregaard, B%and%Cochran, J K%(2008).%A cross-national test of institutional anomie theory: Do the
strength of other social institutions mediate or moderate the effects of the economy on the rate of
crime?.%Western Criminology Review%9: 31–48.%%
4. Block, R L%and%Block, C R%(1995).%Space, place, and crime: Hot spot areas and hot places of liquor-
related crime%In:%Eck, J E and Weisburd, D eds. %Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,
pp. 145–183.%%
5. Bottoms, A E%and%Wiles, P%(1986).%Housing tenure and residential community crime careers in
Britain%In:%Reiss, A J and Tonry, M eds. %Communities and Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, pp. 101–162, DOI:%https://doi.org/10.1086/449121%
6. Braga, A,%Papchristos, A%and%Hureau, D%(2012).%The effects of hot spots policing on crime. Campbell
Collaboration Library of Systematic Reviews. Retrieved
from:%http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/24/.%
7. Breckinridge, S P%and%Abbott, E%(1912).%The delinquent child and the home. New York: Arno.%%
8. Burgess, E%(1925).%The Growth of the city: An introduction to a Research Project%In:%Park, R E, Burgess,
E W and McKenzie, R D eds. %The City. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 47–62. Retrieved
from%http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1050993.files/2-15%20-%20Ernest%20Burgess%20-
%20The%20growth%20of%20the%20City.pdf.%
9. Bursik, R J%and%Grasmick, H G%(1993).%Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective
Community Control. New York: Lexington.%%
10. Burt, C%(1925).%The Young Delinquent. University of London Press.%%
11. Chamlin, M B%and%Cochran, J K%(1995).%Assessing Messner and Rosenfeld’s Institutional Anomie
Theory: A Partial Test.%Criminology%33: 411–429, DOI:%https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-
9125.1995.tb01184.x%
12. Eck, J E%and%Weisburd, D%(1995).%Crime Places in Crime Theory%In:%Eck, J E and Weisburd, D eds.
Crime and Place. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.%%
