Sufficiency of Structures and Processes to Implement SRA

Sufficiency of Structures and Processes to Implement SRA

The success of any strategy in achieving its objectives depends on the structures that

exist to facilitate its implementation. Likewise the SRA spells out the agricultural

policy objectives contained in the ERS as well as their implementation. The reform

agenda envisioned by SRA is ambitious. Although implementable, it will require

substantial resources and collaboration with other sectors in the form of sector wide

approaches (SWAPS), while coordination among implementing agencies is crucial for

its success. The structure of implementation has already been thought of. At the

national level the framework envisages an annual national forum of stakeholders in

powerful presidency, which is also above the law.

The implementation framework also considers inputs from other sectors that are

important for its realisation. The framework embodies an Inter-ministerial

Coordination Committee (ICC) that include ministries that provide services the

agricultural sector, e.g., ministries of roads and public works. The committee also

comprises of private sector representatives. The lead ministries, like MOA, MOL,

MOCD and MOLG, form the Technical Inter -ministerial Committee (TIC) that acts

as the secretariat to ICC. It is envisaged that at this level, technical inputs necessary

for the achievement of SRA can be brought on board akin to the Sector Wide

Approaches (SWAPs) initiative. Without proper coordination and commitment from

recent past, the donors have also been encouraging consultative and participatory

processes in policy decision-making to enhance stakeholder and local ownership of

policy reforms6. The framework anticipates a departure from past practices with

coordinated donor funding to ensure budgetary sustainability. Nonetheless, donor

interests are flexible and are clothed in conditionalities, which can be susceptible to

variations thereby having the potential to disrupt the policy framework. Mechanisms

to deal with this as and when it arises are not clearly spelt out though. It can only be

hoped that the proposed annual National Forum will have the capacity to deal with

such an eventuality.

The strategy also recognizes the role of civil society groups, eg., NGOs, CBOs, FBOs

operations to empower their strategy in the strategy’s implementation. This is,

nevertheless, beyond the SRA. However, should the framework that regulates civil

society organizations go without review, then the implementation of the SRA could

be jeopardized. Workers unions in the agricultural sector can be particularly

disruptive to the production process due to work stoppages. The workers trade unions

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTKENYA/Resources/donor_statement_agriculture

must be given sufficient room to negotiate for improved conditions of work for their

members to avoid actions that may derail the SRA’s implementation.

The SRA, in particular, presses for private sector led growth in agriculture. This is

only achievable when there are clear actions to strengthen the private sector to play an

business registration.

Lessons, therefore, have to be drawn from previous initiatives on agricultural

implementation.

In addition to some of the considerations mentioned above pertaining to the

framework, the SRA faces also faces a number of challenges in its implementation.

The first difficulty it faces is the lack of stakeholder ownership of the proposed

reforms since there was no stakeholder participation in its formulation. The task ahead

is to market it to stakeholders for them to own up the intended reforms and effectively

participate by giving inputs in the implementation process. Past and current

development initiatives point to the importance of stakeholder participation.

Secondly, the SRA lays out a massive reform initiative that requires it to have the

right manpower in place for its implementation. This is a major challenge. Capacity

expenditure reforms that favour devolution of public expenditures to the districts and

constituencies. These devolved funds are creating rural infrastructure that, without

them, would not have been undertaken at all. Cognizance of these efforts is very

important for they have the effect of opening up the hinterland and enable resources

that would have been tapped only expensively to be tapped relatively cheaply. In

addition, they also open up markets for farmers whose produce would reach

destination markets with difficulty and at high costs.

Fourthly, although it considers stakeholders input as important, the co-operative

movement and societies that manage the production and/or marketing and at times

fund different agricultural activities has not gotten adequate treatment.

difficult by constraints in the country’s agriculture and trade sector, which have to be

addressed.

Beyond anything else, the SRA’s implementation requires the budgetary process to

allocate sufficient funding for the proposed reforms. However, the SRA is a 10-year

agricultural policy framework to be implemented under the MTEF budgetary process that

entails three-year rolling plans. There are therefore some inconsistencies here in the sense

that the SRA is long term whereas the budgetary framework is short- to medium-term.

The budgetary process will not contemplate the resource anticipations for SRA’s

implementation in the outer years after the medium term planning. This will necessitate

quite close collaboration between the strategy’s implementation and the budgetary

require resources for their implementation. Advocacy, targeting top level political

leadership and powerful private sector business leaders will also be important.

It is important to recognise that the emerging policy formulation environment has

fundamentally changed over time. The emerging strengths include the increasing

transparency and room for debate; increasing voice, clear strategic path; formalized

policy formulation process; improved budgetary process; increased capacity for policy

analysis; and reduced opportunities for rent creation. However, there are still a number of

weaknesses, which include lack of reliable and updated data, weaknesses in the budgetary

process, problems of inter -ministerial co -ordination, personality driven processes,

vested interests and confused paradigms and policy narratives.

finance to implement some of the projects identified as priorities like Njaa Marufuku

Kenya is an important lesson with respect to planning on the basis of resources expected

from donors. Lack of funds for extension services also threatens the realisation of

technical service delivery. While stakeholder consultations is important, the lengthy

nature of the process in policy and legal reviews is a factor that needs to be taken into

account by the SRA. Due to the acknowledged lack of funds, it will also be necessary to

secure additional funding to strengthen extension servicedelivery and to rationalise all

projects to avoid duplication (Kenya 2006). The continued accumulation of pending bills

due to inadequate resource allocation to departments as noted in the PER 2003 is another

factor with respect to sufficiency of structures for SRA implementation. This calls for a

Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries Development (2006). Draft National Livestock

Policy.

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Njuguna, N., Katumanga, M. and Gareth, W. (2004). Strengthening the Incentives for

Pro-Poor Policy Change: An Analysis of drivers of change in Kenya, Summary Report to

DFID.

O’brien F.S and T. C. Ryan (2001). Kenya: In. Devarajan S., D. Dollar and T. Holmgren

(eds). Aid and Reforms in Africa. Lessons from ten Case studies, the World Bank,

Washington D.C

Republic of Kenya (1999). Kenya Human Development report 1999.

Republic of Kenya (1995). Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and