The case is focused on change within British Airways. In reviewing the case study on British Airways it
is important to consider the full 10 year period described in the case study (1980-1990). British Airways
transformed itself from an organization of inefficiencies into a customer focused and financially healthy
organization. Reflect on the transformative power of change in almost every area of the company and
the overall change in company culture, then respond to the following prompts in writing your post:
What was life like at the “old” British airways? What was difficult about making change?
What were the critical factors in the successful transformation?
How did they transform themselves? (e.g. key steps and sequence, risks)
What would you have done differently?
pe
ey
eg
oe
ee
pee
pee
ee
ee...
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher's
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
191-009
(Changing
the
Cufture
at
British
Airways
a
al
a
a
common
focus.
"The 1974
amalgamation
of
BOAC
with
the
domestic
and
European
divisions
of
BEA
had
produced
a
hybrid
racked
with
management
demarcation
squiibbles,
The
competitive
advantages
sought
through
the
merger
had
been
hopelessly
defeated
by
the
lack
of
a
unifying
corporate
culture.”
A
BA
director
summed
up
how
distracting
merger
proved:
"There
wasn't
enough
management
time
devoted
to
managing
the
changing’
environment
because
it
was
all
focused
inwardly
on
resolving
industrial
relations
problems,
om
ncsolving
organizational
conflicts.
How
do
you
bring
these very,
very
different
cultures
together?"
Productivity
at
BA
in
the
1970s
was
strikingly
bad)-especially
in
contrast
to
other
leading
foreign
airlines.
BA's
productivity
for
the
three
ending
March
31.
1974, 1975,
and
1976
had
never
exceeded
59%
of
that
of
the
average
@f
the
other
eight
foreign
airline
leaders.
Service
suffered
as
well,
Onc
human
resources
senigp
manager
recalled
the
“awful”
service
during
her
early
years
in
passenger
services:
“]
remember
10
years
ago
standing
at
the
gate
Ranciney
out
boxes
of
food
to
people
as
they
got
on
ins
That's
how
we
dealt
with
service.”
With
increasing
competition
and
rising
costs
of
Britain
in
the
late
1970s,
the
lack
of
productivity
and
poor
service
was
becoming
increasi
By
the
summer
of
1979,
the
number
of
emp
6
had
climbed
to a
peak
of
38,000.
The
problems
became
dangerous
when
Britain's
worst_recession
in
50)
years
reduced
passenget
numbers
and
raised
fuel
costs
swhstuntially.
Lord King
Takes
tty
Reins
Sir
John
Gate?
Lord)
King
was
appomted
chairman
in
February
1981,
just
a
half-year
before
Row
Watts’
unambiguously
grim
ascament
of
BA's
financial
state.
brought
to
British
Airways
a
successful
history
of business
ventures
and
strong
ties
to
te
the
government
and
business
communities.
Despite
having
no
formal
engineering
qualifieations,
King
formed
Ferrybridge
Industries
in
1945,
«
company
that
found
an
unexploited
miche
in
the
ball-bearing
industry.
Later
d
the
Pollard
Ball
and
Roller
Bearing
Co,
Ltd.,
King's
company
was
highly
successful
until
he
Sold
it
in
1969.
In
1970
he
joined
Babcock
Internatidinal,
and
as
chairman
led
them
through
a
successful
restructuring
during
the
1970s,
King's
connections
were
legendary.
Handpicked
by
a
Margaret
Thatcher
to
run
BA,
King’s
close
friends'‘included
Lord
Hanson
of
Hanson
Trust
and
the
F
Princess
of Wales’
family.
He
also
knew
personally
Presidents
Reagan
and
Carter.
King's
respect
and
connections
proved
helpful
both
in
recruiting
and
in
his
dealings
with
the
British
government.
One
director
spoke
of
the
significance
of
King's
appointment.
"British
Airways
needed
a
chairman
who
didn't
need
a
job.
We
needed
someone
who
could
see
that
the
only
way
to
do
this
sort
of
thing
was
radically,
andhwho
would
be
aware
enough
of
how
you
bring
that
about.”
In
his
first
annual
report,
King
predicted
hard
times
for
the
troubled
carmier.
“I
would
have
been
comforted
by
the
thought
that
the
worst
was
behind
us.
There
is
no
certainty
that
this
is
so."
Upon
Watts’
announcement
in
September
1981,
he
and
King
launched
their
Survival
plan,
“tough,
unpalatable
and
immediate
measures”
to
stem
the
spiraling
losses
and
save
the
airline
from
bankruptcy.
The
radical
steps
included
reducing
staff
numbers
from
32,000
to
43,000,
a
20%
decrease,
in
just
nine
months,
freezing
pay
increases
for a
year,
and
closing
16
routes,
cight
on-line
stations,
and two
engineering
bases.
It
also
dictated
halting
cargo-only
services
and
selling
the
fleet,
and
inflicting
massive
cuts
upon
offices,
admimistrative
services,
and
staff
clubs.
In
June
1982,
BA
management
appended
the
Survival
plan
to
accommodate
the
reduction
of
another
7.000
staff,
which
would
eventually bring
the
total
employees
down
from
about
42,000
to
7.
Duncan
Campbell-Smith,
Tie
British
Aineuys
Stony:
Struggle
for
Take-Off
(Coronet,
1986),
p.
1.
§.
Interns
of
available
ton-akemeters
per
employe,
taken
from
annual
reperts.
y y
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
“insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
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0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
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Changing
the
Culture
at
British
Airways
491-0098
neary
353,000.
BA
accomphshed
its
reductions
through
voluntary
measures,
offering
such
generous
severance
that
they
ended
up
with
more
volunteers
than
necessary.
In
total,
the
airline
dished
out
some
£150
million
in
severance
pay.
Between
1981]
and
1983,
BA
reduced
its
staff
by
about
a
quarter.
About
the
time of
the
Survival
plan
revision,
King
brought
in
Gordon
Dunlop,
a
Scottish
accountant
described
by
onc
journalist
as
“imaginative,
dynamic,
and
extremely
hardworking,”
cuphemistically
known
on
Fleet
Street
as
“forceful,”
and
considered
King
2s
simply
“outstanding.”
As
CFO,
Dunlop's
contribution
to
the
recovery
years
was
si
ant.
When
the
results
for
the
year
ending
March
31,
1982
were
announced
in
October,
the
board
ensured
1982
would
be
a
watershed
year
in
BA's
tummaround.
Using
creati
nancing,
Dunlop
wrote
down
£100m
for
redundancy
costs,
£208
million
for the
value
of@ti@feet
(which
would
case
depreciation
in
future
years),
even
an
additional
£98m
for
the
7,000
redundancies
that
had
yet
to
be
effected.
For
the
year,
the
loss
before
taxes
amounted
f114
million.
After
taxes
and
extraordinary
items,
it
totalled
a
staggering
£545
million.
=~
Even
King
might
have
admitted
that
the
worst
whe
behind
them
after
such
a
report.
The
chairman
immediately
tured
his
attention
to
changing
the
airline's
image
and
further
building
his
turnaround
team.
On
September
13,
1982,
Kin
Foote,
Cone
&
Belding
of
its
36-year-old
advertising
wccount
with
BA,
replacing
it
with
Saatchi
&
Saatchi.
One
of
the
biggest
account
changes
in
British
history,
it
was
King’s
way
of
making
a
clear
statement
that
the
BA
direction
had
changed.
In
April 1983,
British
Airways
launched
its
"Manhattan
Landing"
campaign.
King
and
his
staff
sent
BA
management
pe
invitations
to
gather
employees
and
tune
in
to
the
‘Overseas,
cach
BA
office
was
sent
a copy
of
the
commercial
Hil
parties
to
oclebrate
the
new
thnst.
"Manhattan
Landing”
dramatically
portrayed
the
whole
island
of
Manhattan
being
lifted
from
North
America
and
whirled
over
the
‘before
awestruck
witnesses
in
the
United
Kingdom.
After
the
initial
airing,
a
massive
cam was
run
with
a
second
version
of
the
commercial,
‘The
ad
marked
the
beginning
of
a
Aroader
campaign,
"The
World's
Favourite
Airline,”
reflécting
BA's
status
as
carner
of
the
seRgers
internationally.
With
the
financial
picture®finally
brightening,
BA
raised
its
2
budget
for
1983-1984
to
£31
million,
compared
with
£19
million
the
previous
year,
signa
aus
commitment
to
changing
the
corporat
fags
Colin
‘Marshall
Becomes
Chief
Executive
f
In
the
midst
of
the
Saatchi
&
Saatchi
launch,
Kinwetephined
Mr.
(later
Sir)
Colin
Marshall,
who
proved
to be
perhaps
the
single
most
important
person
in
the
changes
at
British
Airways.
Appointed
chief
executive
in
February
1983,
Marshall
brought
to
the
airline
a
unique
resume.
He
began
his
carcer
as
1
management
trainee
with
Hertz
in
the
United
States.
After
working
his
way
wp
the
Hertz
hierarchy
in
North
America.-Marshall
accepted
2
job
in
1964
to
run
mival
Avis’
operations
in
Europe.
By
1976,
the
Britiseborn
businessman
bad
risen
to
chief
executive
of
Avis.
In
1981,
he
returned
to
the
United
Kingdom
as
deputy
chief
executive
and
board
member
of
Sears
Holdings.
Fulfilling
one
of
his
ultimate
career
ambitions,
he
took
over
as
chief
executive
of
British
Airways
in
early
1983.
Although
having
mo
direct
experience
in
airline
management,
Marshall
brought
with
him
two
tremendtus
advantages.
First,
he
understood
customer
service,
and
second,
he
had
worked
with
a
set
of
customers
quite
similar
to
the
airline
travel
segment
during
his
car
rental
days.
9,
Campbell-Smith.
p.
46.
Xv
-
7
vy
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
_
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
14132445624482511215122324128515456
191-009
(Changing
the
Culture
at
Britieh
Airways.
Marshall
made
customer
service
a
personal
crusade
from
the
day
he
entered
BA.
One
executive
reported,
"It
was
really
Marshall
focusing
almost
on
nothing
else,
The
one
thing
that
had
overriding
attention
the
first
three
years
he
was
here
was
customer
service,
customer
service,
customer
service—nothing
else.
That
was
the
only
thing
be
was
interested
im,
and
it's
nol
an
exaggeration
to
say
that
was
his
exclusive
focus."
Another
senior
manager
added,
“He
has
certainly
put
an
enabling
culture
in
place
to
allow
customer
service
to
come
out,
where
rather
than
people
waiting
to
be
told
what
to
do
to
do
things
better,
it's
an
environment
where
peop
they
can
actually
come
out
with
ideas,
that
they
will
be
listened
to,
and
feel
they
are
much
mote
a
part
of
the
success
of
the
company.”
Not
just
a
strong
verbal
communicator,
Marshall
became
an
active
role
model
m
the
terminals.
spending
time
with
staff
during
morning
and
cven
He
combined
these
actions
with
a
number
of
important
events
to
drive
home
the
customer
service
message.
Corporate
Celebrations,
1983-1987
J
lf
Marshall
was
the
most
important
player
in
emphasizing
customer
service,
then
the
Putting
People
First
(PPF)
program
was
the
most
important
event,
introduced
PPF
to
frontline
staff
in
December
1983
and
continucd
it
through
June
I
un
by
the
Danish
finn
Time
Manager
International,
each
program
eyele
lasted
two
days
and
included
150
participants.
The
program
was
so.
warmly
recerved
that
non-fronthine
employees
eventually
asked
to
be
included,
and
a
one-day,
"PPF
II"
program
facilitated
the
participation
of
all
BA
employees
through
June
1985.
Approximately
40,000
BA
employees
went
through
the
P
ograms.
The
program
urged
participants
texamine
their
interactions
with
other
people,
including
family,
friends,
and,
by
association,
cuspomers.
Its
acorptance
and
impact
was
extraordinary,
due
primarily
to
the
honesty
of
its
messaag,
fhe
excellence
of
its
delivery,
and
the
So
of
management.
he
.
Employees
agreed
almost
unanimously
that
the
program's
message
was
sincere
and
free
from
manipulation,
due
in
some*measure
to
the
fact
that
BA
separated
itself
from
the
program's
design.
The
program
emphasized
positive
relations
with
people
in
general,
focusing
in
large part
on
non-
work-related
relationships.
Implied
in
the
positive
relationship
message
was
an
emphasis
on
customer
service,
but
the
program
was
careful
to
aim
for
the
benefit
of
employees
as
individuals
first.
al
expressed
their
pleasure
on
being
treated
with
respect
and
relief
that
change
was
@mthé
horizon.
As
one
frontline
ticket
agent
weteran
said.
"I
found
it
fascinating,
very,
very
enjoyable.
I
thought
it
was
very
good
for
British,
Airways.
It
made
people
aware.
|
don't
think
people
give
enough
thought
to
people's
reaction
to
each
other...
.
It
was
hard
hitting.
It
was
e
something
really
special.
When
you
‘there,
you
were
treated
extremely
well.
You
were
treated
as a
VIP,
and
people
really
enjoyed
that.
It
was
reverse
roles,
really,
to
the
job
we
do.”
A
senior
manager
spoke
of
the
confiderioe
it
promoted
in
the
changes:
"It
was
quite
a
revelation,
and
|
thought
it
was
absolutely
wonderful.
I
couldn't
believe
BA
had
finally
woken
and
realized
where
its
bread
was
buttered.
There
were
a
lot
of
cynics
al
the
time,
but
for
people
like
myself
it
was
really
great to
suddenly
realize
you
were
working
for
an
airline
that
had
the
guts to
change,
and
that
it's
probably
somewhere
where
you
want
to
stay.”
Although
occasionally
an
employee
felt
uncomfortable
with
the
"rah-rah"
nature of
the
program,
fecling
it
perhaps
“too
American,”
in
general
PPF
managed
to
climinate
cynicism.
The
excellence
in
presentation
belped
signify
a
smcenty
to
the
message.
Ome
senior
manager
expressed
(his
consistency
in
saying,
"There
was
a
match
between
the
message
and
the
delivery.
You
can't
get
away
with
saying
putting
people
first
is
important,
if
in
the
process
of
delivering
that
message
you
don't
put
people
first”
Employees
were
sent
personal
invitations,
thousands
were
Cp
yee
oe
pe
ee
ep
ee
ee.
5.
..
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher's
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
14132445624482511215122324128515456
\y
Changing
the
Culture
at
British
Airways
491-0098
flown
in
from
around
the world,
and
a
strong
effort
was
made
to
prepare
tasteful
meals
and
treat
everyone
with
respect.
Just
as important,
BA
released
every
employee
for
Uke
program,
and
expected
every
one
to
attend,
Grade
differences
became
imelevant
during
P
PF.
i§
Managers
and
staff
members
were
treated equally
and
interacted
freely.
Moreover,
a_
director
came
to
conclude
every
single
PPF
session
with
a
question
and
answer
session,
“Colin
Marshall
himself
frequently
attended
these
closing
sessions,
answering
employee
co
sia
manner
most
felt
to
be
extraordinarily
frank.
The
commitment
shown
by
manag
helped
BA
avoid
the
fate
suffered
by
British
Rail
in
their
subsequent
attempt
at
a
similar
program.
The
British
Rail
program
suffered
a
limited
budget,
a
lack
of
commitment)
milnagement
and
interest
by
staff,
and
a
high
degree
of
cynicism.
Reports
surfaced
that
employees
felt
the
program
was
a
public
relations
exercise
for the
outside
world,
rather
than
a
leaning
experience
for
staff.
About
the
time
PPF
concluded
in
1985,
B
launched
a
program
for
managers
only
called.
appropriately,
Managing
People
First
(MPF),
(A
five-day
residential
program
for
25
managers
at
a
time,
MPF
stressed
the
importance
of,
among
other
topics,
trust,
leadership,
vision,
and
feedback.
On
a
smaller
scale,
MPF
stirféd
up
issues
long
neglected
at
BA,
One
senior
manager
of
engineering
said,
“It
was
sas
if
I
were
touched
on
the
head...
1
don't
think
I
even
considered
culture
before
MPF.
«Afterwards
I
began
to
think
about
what
makes
people4ticke,
Why
do
people
do
what
they
do?
Why
do
people
come
to
work?
Why
do
people
do
things
for
some
people
that
they won't
do“for
éthers?"
Some
participants
claimed
the
course
led
them
to
put
more
cmphass
on
foedialick.
One
reported
inilinting
regular
meetings
with
staff
every
two
weeks,
in
contrast
to
oA
the
program
when
he
met
with
staff
members
only as
pfoblems
arose,
thee
and
his
team
challenged
the
way
people
thought
at
BA,
they
also
encouraged
shea
in
visible
ways.
In
December
1954,
BA
unveiled
its
new
fleet
livery
at
Heathrow
airport.
Preparations
for
the
show
were
carefully
planned
and
claborate.
The
plane
was
delivered
to
the
hangar-turmed-theater
under
secrecy
of
night,
after
which
hired
audio
and
video
technicians
nom
a
dramatic
presentation.
On
the
first
night/Gt
the
show,
a
darkened
coach
brought
ests
from
an
off-site
hotel
to
an
undisclosed
part
of
the
city
and
through
a
tunnel.
The
guests,
tecluding
dignitaries,
high-ranking
travel
executives,
and
trade
union
representatives,
were:
left
uninformed
of
their
whereabouts.
To
their
surprisceas
the
show
began,
an
aircraft
moved
through
the
fog
and
laser
lights
decorating
the
stage
and
turned,
revealing
the
new
book
of
the
British
Airways
fect.
A
similar
presentation
continued
four
times
a
day
for
eight
weeks
for
all
staff
to
see.
On
its
heels,
in
May
1985,
Britisl\Ainways
unveiled
its
new
uniforms,
designed
by
Roland
Klein.
With
new
leadership,
strong
communication
from
the
top,
increased
acceptance
by
the
public,
and
a
mew
physical
image.
few.on
the
BA
staff
could
deny
in
1985
that
his
or
her
working
life
had
turned
a
corner
from
its
Condition
in
1980,
it
attempted
to
maintum
the
momentum
of
its
successful
programs. Following
PPF
and
MPF,
they
put
on
a
fairly
successful
corporatewide
program
im
1985
called
"A
Day
in
the
Life"
and
another
less
significant
program
in
1987
called
“To
Be
the
Best."
Inevitably,
interest
diminished
and
cynicism
grew
with
successive
programs.
BA
also
implemented
an
“Awards
for
Excellence”
program
fo
recognize
outstanding
contributions,
and
a
“Brainwaves”
program
to
encourage
employee
input.
Colin
Marshall
regularly
communicated
to
staff
through
video.
While
the
programs
enjoyed
some
success,
not
many
employees
felt
“touched
on
the
head”
by
any
successor
program
to
PPF
and
MPF.
Xv
-
7
vy
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
_
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
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191-009
(Changing
the
Culture
at
Britieh
Airways.
Privatization
The
financial
crisis
of 1981
rendered
irrelevant
the
1979
announcement
of
privatization
by
the
British
government
until
BA's
return
to
profitability
nm
1983.
Unfortunately
for
BA,
a
number
of
complicated
events
delayed
the
selling
of
shares
to
the public
for
almost
four
more
years.
On
April
1,
1984,
the
government
passed
legislation
that
made
BA
a
public
limited
company.
Still
the
minister
maintained
control
of
the
shares.
Before
a
public
sale,
BA
first
had
to
weather
an
antitrust
suit
against
it
and
a
number
of
other
airlines
by
the
out-of-business
Laker
tifline
chie!
Freddie
Laker,
They
were
also
confronted
by
complicated,
diplomatic
difficulties
with
the
United
States
concemming
UK-US
flight
regulations,
and
increased
fears
Of
terrorism.
Finally.
they
faced
a
challenge
at
home
by
British
Caledonian
over
routes,
a.
challenge
that
ironically
turned out
to
be
the
final
ingredient
in
the
cultural
revolutiogt!
»
In
1984,
British
Caledonian
management
per
desome
influential
regulators,
civil
servants,
and
ministers
that
the
government
should
a
the
smuller
airline
some
of
BA's
routes
for
the
sake
of
competition,
In
July
the
Civil
Aviation
Authority
(CAA)
produced
its
report
recommending
the
changes.
Arguing
that
substitution
was
a
poor
excuse
for
competition,
Lord
King
led
BA
into
a
fierce
political
battle.
inst
the
odds,
King
managed
to
extract
4
non-
threatening
compromise.
Called
The
White/Paper,
the
October
report
recommended
increased
competition
but
rejected
forced
transfers
from
BA
to
British
Caledonian.
Instead,
it
approved
of
a
mutually
agreed
transfer
between
BA
and
BCal
by
which
BCal
attained
BA's
Saudi
Arabia
routes
and
BA
attained
BCal's
South’
American
routes.
Perhaps
just
as
important
as
the
results,
King
led
BA
through
a
battle
th
bound
staff
together
and
identified
their
cause
with
his
board.
Over
26,000
British
Airways
employees
signed
a
petition
against
the
route
transfers.
Thousands
sent
letters
to
their
MPs
and
ministers,
King’s
battle
may
have
been
the
final
stake
in
the
heart
of
the
lingering/divisions
that
existed
from
the
BEA
and
BOAC
merger
more
than
a
decade
earlier.
The
ization
had
been
offered
a
uniting
motive
and
ajdeader
with
whom
to
identify.
As
BA's
ioellicector
offered,
King
“took
his
jacket
off,
and
hé
had
a
most
fantastic
punchout
with
[the
government)
about
keeping
the
route
rights.
He
got
the
whole
of
this
organization
behind
him
because
they could
see
that
he
was
os
for
them.”
~
With
itf@CAA
review,
diplomatic
concerns
with
the
Unified
States,
and
Freddie
Laker
legal
battle
finally
resolved,
BA
was
ready
for
privatization
in
1986.°In
September
of
that
year,
newly-
toes
Pl
Secretary
of
State
for
Transport
John
Moore
announced
the
intention
to
sell
shares
public
in
early
1987,
With
the
offer
11
times
oversubscribed,
the
public
clearly
displayed
ifs
approval
of
the
changed
British
Airways.
After
privatization,
King
and
Marshall
made
globalization
a
major
thrust.
In
1987,
BA
took
a
26%
stake
in
Galileo,
an
adv
computer
reservation
system
also
supported
by
KLM
Dutch
Airlines
and
Swissair.
That
same
year,
BA
arranged
a
partnership
with
United
Airlines,
whowing
cach
carrier
to
extend
its
route
cOverage
without
stretching
its
resources.
In
carly
1988,
British
Airways
finally
outmuscled
Scandinavian
Airlines
System
(SAS)
to
acquire
British
Caledonian.
Finally,
in
December
1989,
BA
concluded
a
deal
with
Sabena
World
Airlines
through
which
it
secured
a
20%
stake
in
the
Belgian
carner.
Combined,
the
steps
bolstered
British
Airways’
global
power
and
prepared
it
for
what
analysts
expected
to
be
a
post-1992
European
marketplace
in
which
only
the
strongest
carriers
would
survive.
They
also
put
an
exclamation
point
on
an
evolving
shift
from
a
strongly
British,
engincering,
and
operationally-driven
culture
to
one
that
emphasized
global
marketing
through
customer
service.
LS
.
_
|.
..
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
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Changing
the
Culture
at
British
Airways
491-0098
Reaction
at
BA
Although
not
unanimously,
by
1990
staff
and
management
at
BA
felt
that
the
culture
at
the
anime
had
changed
for
the
better
since
the
1970s,
There
was
near
complete
agreement
on
the
positive
feelings
generated
by
success.
-
A
The
general
atmosphere
of
the
company
is
a
much
more
positive
onc.
There
is
an
attitude
of
"we can
change
things,
we
are
better
than
our
competitor...”
I'm not
certain
if
there's
a
relationship
which
is
that
4
good
culture
leads
to
a
successful
company.
but
there
is
certainly
the
converse
of
that,
that
a
su
company
leacs
to
a
better
culture.
We
are
a
more
successful
company
,
and
as a
result
of
that
it's
easier
to
have
a
positive
culture.
(Senior
Manager,
Marketing)
Pa
I
think
the
core
difference
is
that
when
I
joined
this
was
@
transport
business.
And
I
now
work
for
a
service
industry.
(Senior
Manager,
formerly
of
Cabin
Services)
You
start
to
think
not
just
as
an
engineéring
department,
where
all
my
concems
are
just
about
airplanes
and
the
technical
aspects.
My
concerns
have
developed
into
what
the
operation
requires
of
me,
and
the
operation
is
flight
crew, cabin
crew
operations,
ground
operations.
...
What
do
I
need
to
do
to
help
Brith
Airways
to
compete
a
ively
aguinst
all
the
other
operators?
(Senior
Manager,
Engineering)
A
=
4
Fifteen
years
ago,
you
7
at
did
one
thing,
and
only
went
so
far
with
the
job)
and
the
next
bloke
Go
his
bit,
Now,
|
can
go
and
do
the
lot,
whatever
|
need
to
do.
I
don't
call
someone
else
to
do
the
job.
Now,
you
just
get
om
with
i.
A
job
that
could
have
taken
eight
hours
is
done
in
two
hours.
(Veteran
engineer)
In
the
late
1970s,
it
was
very
controlled,
a
lot
of
rules
and
regulations.
It
stifled
initiatives
ee
We've
become
very
free,
and
that's
nice.
“There's
not
so
much
personal
restriction.
You
can
now
talk
to
your
boss.
When
I
first
started,
it
was
definitely
officers
and
rank.
Now
you've gol
more
on
to
managers,
(Ticketing
xX
ih
In
terms
of
both
its
superficial
identity,
its
self-confidence,
and
also
the
basic
service
and
product,
there's
an enormous
difference
to 10
or
11
years
ago.
Its
management
is
perceived
as
more
professianal
and
its
business
is
percewed
to
be
more
competent
and
effective.
(Executive,
Human
Resources)
i,
Challenges
for
the
1990s
Despite
the
enormous
change
in
the
culture
over
the
1980s,
BA
still
faced
huge
challenges,
Management
and
staff
agreed
that,
while
the
new
culture
fostered
a
strong
commitment
to
service,
a
much
higher
morale,
and
a
better
market
image,
certain
pockets
within
BA
still
needed
to
institutionalize
change.
[like
it
much
better
now,
but
I
think
it's
still
got
a
long
way
to
go...
.
The
trust
and
the
belief
in this
organization
is
not
quite
there.
We
can
see the
problems,
but
we
still
don't
have
any
input...
We
waste
so
much
time
waiting
for
spares.
waiting
for
airplanes...
.
We
still
think
of
ourselves
as
little
areas.
The
five
shifts
:
.
_
|.
..
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
Xv
-
-
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
14132445624482511215122324128515456
P
here
are
five
little
outfits.
We
still
don’t
quite think
of
—
as
British
Airways.
(Veteran
engineer)
y
I
don't
think
the
culture
change
by
any
means
has
tak
en
place
as
much
as
the
public
perceives.
|
think
a
lot
has
been
done,
but
1
feel
it
has
become
the
norm.
There
is
in
places
a
lack
of
recognition
of
emotional
labor,
and
the
management
and
leadership
requirements
of
emotional
labor.
I
suspect
we've
gone
a
long
way
compared
to
many
organizations,
but
it
would
be
very casy to
lose
it.
Eight
years
is
a
relatively
short
period
of time to
establish
that,
particularly
when
the
econontic
pressure
comes
back
on....
(Executive.
Human
\”
Resources
)
a
If
you
all
pull
together,
then
youlget
more
out
of
it.
The
problem
&
getting
everyone
pulling
together.
You
never
gct
100%,
obviously,
but
|
supposs,
if
you
get
80°
pulling
together,
then
you're
not
doing
too
bad.
There
will
always
be
a
percentage
that
won't
be
pulling
together.
(Veteran
engineer)
Ironically,
attacking
those
pockets
was
more
difficult
because
vir
strong
impact
of
the
1983-1985
corporate
celebrations,
Employees
as
a
group
were
changéd+by
those
celebrations,
and
to
some
degree
by
successive
programs,
but
excessive
repetition
oi
lion.
Management
had
to
make
w
judgmemypt
whether
the
communication
poy
pt
‘the
1980s
were
worn
out,
I'think
that
the
fundamental
message
has
not
4
coon:
tip:
test:
deed
We're
restating
old
values:
When
the
message
was
first
heard,
people
did
listen
aanicl
and
absorb,
because
it
was
new,
anel
it
was
radically
different
from
the
j
decade.
So
they
had
an
incentive.)
The
difference
is
there
is
no
longer
the
incentive.
First,
because
it's
old
news.
Second,
because
there
is
a
degree
of
eynicism
about
the
sincerity.
(SeniofiManager,
Passenger
Servioes)
¥
>
You
go
on
a
million
courses-to.
see
how
wonderful
you
are
and
how
wonderful
British
Airways
is,
and
you
get
back
to
work
and
nothing
changes.
...
The
larger
you
are,
it
has
to
be
more
ard
more
impersonal.
You
are
always
going
to
find
that
the
lower
levels
feel
so
far
removed
from
the
upper
levels
that
pulling
together
is
almost
an
impossibility.
(Veteran
ticket
agent)
You
can't
go on
selling
the
same
old
socks.
In
terms
of
messages
and themes
and
something
to
focus
the
company
around,
it's
a
bit
difficult
to
repackage
in
another
way,
and
put
all
the
sort
of
support
mechanisms
around
it
that
we
did
in
the
1980s,
amd
do
it
all
again
in
a
way
that
captures
the
imagination
in
the
1990s.
(Executive,
Marketing
and
Operations)
Increasing
costs
complicated
the
effort
to
fine-tune the
cultural
changes.
In
the
mid-
and
late-1980s
there
was
a
gradual
drift
toward
higher
ratings
and
higher
pay
scales.
Added
to
that
was.
an
increase
in
sheer
numbers,
due
to
the
1987
merger
with
British
Caledonian
and
the
loss
of
focus.
When
this
all
started
five
years
ago,
the
idea
was
to
cut
outlevels
of
management,
and
they
did
one
night—that
night
of
the
long
knives,
they
called
it,
Forty
managers,
hundreds
of
years
of
experience
were
chopped.
We've
doubled
those
managers
now.
(Ticket
supervisor)
LS
.
_
|.
..
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
14132445624482511215122324128515456
»
Changing
the
Culture
at
British
Airways
491-0098
We're
trying
to
get
our
cost
base
down,
We're
trying
to
find
out
why
itis that
as
we
try
to
grow,
somehow
or
other
our
costs
rise
faster
than
our
—
generation.
How
do
you
manage
all
those
issues,
get
them
under
control,
4
as
keeping
the
people
in
the
business
focused
upon
delivering
quality
aks
over time?
(Executive,
Marketing
and
Operations)
BA
also
faced
both
a
loss
of
focus
and
a
contradictory
pew
Message.
The
apparent
contradiction
between
cutting
costs
and
driving
customer
service
have
been
the
most
difficult
challenge
of
all.
A
-
During
the
carly-
and
mid-1980s
period,
there
were
some
specific
challenges
for
ee
they
have
been
in
the
past.
(Executive,
Internal
Business
Consulting)
—
The
real
challenge
ina
people
culture
and
a
service
culture
is
when
the
pressure’s
2
on.
How
do
you
manage
change
which
requires
you
to
get
more
productivity
or
“>
more
cost-cfficiency
or
whatever,
MEDStill
maintain
a
degree
of
trust,
a
respeet
for”
the
individual,
which
1
till
underpins
service?
(Executive,
Hyriiin
Resources)
i
\
Today,
there
is
the
nting
almost
fanaticism
about
being,
able
to
deliver
customer
:service.
It's
the
thing
staff
remember
above
alleelse.
And
the
frustration
theytalk
about
now
in
terms
of
their
ability
to
deliver
that
customer
service
and
some
of
the
difficulties
that
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re
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in
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off
still
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consistent
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service,
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tive,
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»
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In
less
than
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British
Airways
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‘lifted
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to
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one
of
e
world's
most
respected
airlmes.
The
cial
cnsis
of
1981
and
the
drive
to
ready
itself
for
privatization
had
given
the
people
of
BAra
focus
that
led
to
many
changes.
Still,
there
were
obviously
parts
of
the
organization
in
which
new
beliefs
were
not
institutionalized
by
the
ternada
of
change.
And
in
looking
for
amew
focus,
management
dealt
with
the
seemingly
unattractive
alternative
of
trying
to get
staff
t.idientify
with
an
issue
as
glamorless
as
cost-cutting.
Yet,
without
increasing
the
value
the
culture
placed
on
productivity
and
profits,
while
maintaining
or
imcreusing
the
value
placed
on
customer
service,
King
and
Marshall
could
not
guarantee
BA's
continued
SUCCESS
In
an
increasingly
competitive
global
marketplace.
WW
LS
.
_
|.
..
part
of
this
book
may
be
reproduced
insmitted
without
publisher’
S
prior
permission.
Violators
will
be
prosecuted.
0123456892328514956012342321513124553914428985151656
14132445624482511215122324128515456
Exhibit
1
British
Airways
Results,
1977-1990
wre a9) x98
a7
People always ask me, Arthur, how is it that you can get such fast results in culture change
with these big companies? And I always tell them, you're asking the wrong question. C, The
question is not how fast, because that's actually part of the solution. The question is, how
can you keep sustainable organizational culture change in an organization? And the reason is
because most of the time, when we try some kind of an initiative and our companies, there's
a couple of things that happen. Number 1, people go, not another one. And of course the
other one is that they come up with all of these people at the top and they come up with all
of these brilliant ideas. And they forget to ask the people that matter, the ones that they're
going to quote change. And see, the thing is that speed these days is required for
organizational culture change. See, we are in the PF be era, PFP post Facebook. You know,
when you've got your phone and suddenly it's like I sent a message 15 minutes ago and they
still haven't replied, you think something's wrong or that e-mail hasn't been replied to an
almost four hours. I think we should follow up. See, we are less patient than we used to be.
We need to have things now. We are looking for instant, instant gratification, instant
change. And so therefore, if we don't see some kind of change, we immediately assume, Oh,
well, I'm just wasting my time. And this brings us back to the idea that people resist change.
Do you believe that people resist change? Because I don't think so. If somebody showed up
at your door and says, Hi, We have a check for $1 million and it's going to change your life.
Would you say no, no, I'm fine. Thank you very much. We don't resist. Change. What we
resist is stupid stuff. We're resisting the idea that if I am wasting my time and not getting a
result, well then I should be doing something different. I don't I should be doing the same
thing that I'm already doing in order to keep the results. On the other hand, if you start
changing something and you see that that is actually giving your results, will then you
embrace it, you accept it. And that is one of the key factors. Show results absolutely quickly
so that people can start to get excited about culture change. But why should we do culture
change in the first place? Well, maybe you've been there. It's Monday morning. You get out
of bed and you go is it Monday again? And then you go to work and you're not really excited,
But you know, you need to work because you need the paycheck at the end of a month. And
so oftentimes we go to these jobs as individuals and our lives are not really fulfilled. So
Here's the thing. If we are in a position to create an organization where somebody can get
up in the morning and go, Wow, it's modern day. I get to go to work today. Then you've
created not only an organization that will be more successful because your people are going
to be more innovative, more excited. But you're also going to create an organization that
supports a greater purpose. And let's go through some of the stages of organizational
culture change and why we need to know where we are in order to really achieve anything.
So first of all, there are five different types of organizational culture. Right? Now. The first
one, this is the one where people really don't like to go to work too. It's the blame culture.
You know, you've been there wasn't my fault. In fact, if Judy had just given me the right
information on time, I would have been fine. But she didn't. So it's not my fault. And so what
happens in this culture? Trust diminishes, nobody trusts each other. People are scared to do
anything. There's no innovation because there is too much fear. People wait for you to tell
them what to do. Now the next level is the multi directional culture. Now the multi-
directional culture, this is where you've got some cohesiveness in some departments. But
the part departments don't really talk to each other, right? So you've got the accounting
department, the finance department over on this side, and then maybe you've got the other
guys in marketing on the other side. And they're always fighting because the finance
department has got there things that they're supposed to do with the marketing
department has got bare things that they're supposed to do. And then of course, the
procurement department there in the middle. And nobody is cooperating. And so
everybody's frustrated and they forget that there is one bigger, greater purpose for that
organization. And the next one, the next one's the live and let live culture. Here's an
organization. They're already doing something. It's already good. We're already making
money. Why do we need to change anything? I mean, come on. We're already doing okay.
You know, I show up to work, I go home at night. Why do I need to do anything extra? It's
fine. Innovation doesn't really happen. Why people are complacent? Yeah, No, it's my life,
It's my job. What can I do? And so we end up in a life and an organization of mediocrity.
Never really kind of reaching for anything bigger. Never really feeling that potential of being
extra valuable. Why? Because we have accepted mediocrity. Now the next level of culture
evolution is the brand congruent culture. So you've got a brand, right? Whatever that brand,
maybe whatever it is that your organization is doing, maybe it's a service, maybe it's a
product and you go like, Wow, that is such a cool thing. Look, did you know that I worked for
this company? Yeah. That's that's the company I worked for because they produce such cool
stuff or they could pre-create this super cool service. It is happening and people are excited.
Why? Because they believe in what they're doing. And there is more innovation because
they always want to improve on the product or the service. There call always thinking of new
ways they're throwing ideas around because they're invested in what the organization is
trying to do. But then the highest level of culture evolution. The highest level of culture
evolution is the leadership enriched culture. And see oftentimes we wondered, well, what is
a leader supposed to do, a liter supposed to tell you what to do so that you do it? Well, you
know, maybe in the beginning if you need something, but at the end of the day, do you
really want somebody constantly tell you what to do? I mean, have you ever had ideas that
you knew would be really great, but nobody listened to you. Instill a leadership enriched
culture is one where the leaders leave their egos in their pockets. I know it sounds
impossible. But when these leaders develop other leaders, then it doesn't matter who's
doing what. The only thing that matters is the objective. What are we trying to achieve? This
gives the opportunity for everyone in the organization to have a sense of value, a sense of
possibilities in their career. For even the janitor, that guy that cleans the toilets to come up
and say, Hey, I've got a really cool idea. And people listen to him. And even the new person
that comes into the organization can take charge of a project if they just happened to be
more expert in that area than even the CEO. So the leadership enrich culture develops,
cultivates leaders. Leaders who are excited about the brand, excited about the organization,
and people who take charge, never waiting for anything, never waiting for people to tell
them what to do. But it depends. How do you get, how do you evolve your culture? Well,
the first thing you gotta do is you'd have to know where you are. Where is your culture now?
Where have you started? I mean, doesn't that make sense? You have to have a starting point
before you can get to the next one. So we developed a tool that helps organizations to
essentially measure and then also test and check their progress. And this organizational
culture evolution assessment basically gives you that foundation. And once you have that
foundation, once you have that, now you see, okay, here we are. Maybe we're at the blame
culture, maybe we're at the live and let live culture. But now we know where we are now we
can move up to the next level. And whatever strategies you use are going to support that.
But what strategy do you use? How do you get people involved? How do you get people
excited about culture change? I mean, you've been there with all these different initiatives.
Everybody tries all these different things. Why don't they work? Why don't they last? Why
aren't they sustainable? And one of the biggest reasons besides the fact that they take too
long is that they do not have the engagement of the people. So the first thing you got to
understand is that it cannot be a top down initiative. It can't be the guys at the top. There's
like, I mean, think about it. You've got like five, maybe 12 guys at the top. And they've
maybe you have an organization with a thousand people. Does it make sense? Five Guys
trying to convince vowels and people to believe and think and value the same things they
do? Or is it make more sense to get a thousand people to come up with some ideas and
convinced the five guys at the top. It has to be a bottom up Initiative. And oftentimes a lot of
organizations don't trust their people enough. And it's the people at the bottom, that's the
people in the middle. It's the people all around that are interacting. They're making things
happen. They know the problems. They know how to solve problems, but oftentimes they
don't have a voice. And when you give these people a voice, when you bring it in from a
bottom-up initiative. That's when things start to happen. But there are five pillars to making
this happen. The first, you must have a greater purpose. That means you have to have
something that everybody in the organization believes in thinking. But Arthur, how is that
possible? I mean, there's all these different diverse people and they all have different ideas.
Well, let me give you a little bit of research. In 53 different countries, we've asked one
question. What is your ideal working environment? And I want you to think about this, your
ideal working environment. So one of the things we found that no matter what culture, no
matter what situation, no matter what education level, no matter what position. People
more or less have the same ideas. The same ideas for the ideal working environment. They
needed to have some kind of trust. Either trust people to do their jobs or let people trust
you that you actually know what you're doing. They had to have some kind of teamwork
where they felt like, wow, we know people are really out to help me. And then of course, a
supportive environment when that department over there was cooperating with my
department, they needed to have some kind of clarity. They needed to see oh, okay. I know
where I'm going, I know what I need to do. At least I have some structure may be to help me
understand what I need to achieve. And finally, they needed to have some fun. And if you
think about it, is it easy to get people to believe that they could achieve this ideal working
environment? Is it possible that when you get people connected to this idea of this ideal
working environment, that, that becomes a greater purpose because it's not just for them,
it's for everybody, it's for the persons next to you, it's for yourself and it is also for the
organization. And so once you have the ideal working environment, then you have a greater
purpose, something that everybody's working towards. But then pillar number two, you
must have a methodology that can help people to actually achieve it. Now we of course use
the directive communication, psychology, the science of group dynamics. Now there's other
stuff out there as well. But at the end of the day, how can you create that ideal working
environment? What methodology do you have to get people connected, communicating,
trusting each other. To get people to have more clarity, better communication. They have
people to better the team members. And the next one, of course, is having the common
language. To, common language is about being able to communicate things that are big with
small words. So for example, there's a lot of buzzwords out, there's a lot of things out there
that are talking about that you use like one word or two words or one phrase. And people
already know what you're talking about. So for example, if I said, Dude, you need to be
people are going, I understand what that means. Only if they've had this training behind it or
this idea, if they understand the whole thing and that means because they understand,
because they know what it means. Now you can have communication without conflict. You
can remind each other of what the methodology represents, of how to create that re, that
ideal working environment. So once you have this common language, when you use it,
you're reminding people of what they've learned, of how to achieve this greater purpose.
But then you also need a unified Identity. See, the unified identity is like a club. You have a
club. And when you're part of a club, the people in the club are kind of like your, your
buddies. You know who they are, you accept them, you're excited about them, and you
work together, you create things together. But then there's also the people that are outside
of the club, c to be in the club. This unified identity, you give it a name because every
column must have a name. Every club must have a purpose to create the ideal working
environment. And people are not in the club. That means they're not really excited about
your culture change. They're not excited about creating your ideal working environments. So
there's two things you can do. You can just leave them aside and ignore them, or you can
help them to join the club. And finally, the supportive environment. See all of us want to
change something in our lives. We want to improve something. Maybe sometimes we just
say, Why don't I want to stop smoking or maybe I want to stop always being late. And what
happens is that within this club, that within this group, you can trust each other. You could
tell them, this is what I personally want to achieve. And the next time maybe you pull out a
cigarette. The people around you say, Hey, now they said you wanted to stop smoking and
you go, Yeah, that's right. Okay. And you have this environment of people that hold you
accountable for the person that you want to become and what the organization wants to
you to become. Because quite honestly you have higher standards for yourself that most
organizations do. And if we can get the people around us to help us achieve those, the
organization benefits in the process. So let me show you a graph really quick. When we start
this process, there is a peak within two weeks, you could see very visible results. I mean
super visible results. I mean, you know, people are excited. People are like, Wow, this is
amazing. We're going to do great things. That's at the peak. That's after about 15 days, but
after a while after about 30 days, okay, this is where the adjustment comes. People start to
say, okay, you know, here's like part of reality and here's how we can apply this. And they
start to adjust. Now after that, about 50 days, that's where they start to get the real
confidence of how they're going to put it together. And finally, 80 days, it settles and their
sustainability. But in order to achieve this, you have to measure every part of the way. And
we've even developed an app for that as well. It's called squabbling with an I and wildly see
the thing is that anytime you have any kind of measurement, oftentimes people have lake
annual reviews and it just takes too long. Because you know how whenever you've achieved
something you don't want to wait, was like, Did I do it right? Did I do it wrong? You need to
know now because we're in the PFP era. So if you have an opportunity to give people
feedback within 20 seconds and then have that connected to an overall bigger picture of an
entire year. You can see everything and you're giving people feedback to see, oh, okay, I'm
doing this right. Wow, great, I got this at work. Great. Okay. And it's simple and it's easy. And
it helps you to maintain the behaviors that you as an organization, you as a group of people
have created, have designed in order to achieve your ideal working environment. But
requires measurement. Measure where you are, when you start your organizational culture.
Measure it after a month. See how you're doing. Compare it against the first time. And all
along. Identify the behaviors that the people have created for themselves. They're guiding
principles in order to achieve this ideal working environment. Measuring the behavior's not
KPIs. See sometimes organizations focus on measuring the KPI and not the behavior that
eventually gives the KPI. Kpis are way over here. Behaviours are here, here, here, here, here,
here. So you know, you know, I'm doing it right. So when you go home today, when you go
back to your jobs, I want you to think, how could you contribute to creating an ideal working
environment? How could you contribute to just making people feel like they're more
valuable in your organizations. Thank you. Okay.
1
Ushering Change at British Airways Between 1980 and 1990
Name
Institution
Course
Professor’s Name
Date of Delivery
2
Ushering Change at British Airways Between 1980 and 1990
In 1974, there was a decision that quickly and radically transformed British Airways, and
this was the amalgamation of the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) with the
European and local divisions. Intense squabbles and challenges when in the process of
integrating the various and already established cultures became common-place. Almost a decade
was lost as the executives tried to improve internal industrial relations (Leban et al., 2005). The
scenario had meant that a lot of time and opportunities to monitor the changing trends in the
industry were lost.
When Sir John King was brought on board, he proposed drastic changes which included
relieving 22,000 employees of their duties, selling older aircraft, and acquiring modern airliners.
These new planes were deemed to be more efficient than the previous generations. Sir King also
stopped the unprofitable routes after it was determined that they were an unnecessary cost to the
airline. Many of the changes were difficult and costly to implement, and hence the reason some
of the stakeholders were opposed to Sir King’s ideas at first. Fortunately, he succeeded, and the
company had become among the most profitable airlines in Europe and beyond by 1989
(Kassem, Salama, & Ganepola, 2023).
Drivers of Successful Transformation and the Steps Taken by the Leadership
Among the main reasons why Sir King succeeded was that he did not have vested
personal interests in reviving the airline. Secondly, he had a long and successful career of turning
failing companies around. He could monitor the trend and make informed decisions in time.
King also believed in teamwork, and he brought in some of the best talents such as Colin
Marshall who was hired as the CEO in 1983. Since the early 1980s, the organization’s culture
was transformed into one where consultations and mutual respect thrived; and hence the reason it
3
became possible to benefit from the skills, experience, and the dedication of the stakeholders
(Kassem et al., 2023; Leban et al., 2005).
Sir King’s main role was to prepare the national carrier for privatization. He worked with
a team that started by enhancing the efficiency of the company, and hence the reason why 22,000
employees had to be laid off followed by the transformation of the fleet. King did also instigate
the replacement of about half of the Board of Directors with individuals who were ready to
facilitate the needed change. By the time it was being privatized in 1987, the company’s share
price had risen by about 11 times their value in the early 1980s. It was also in a position to
compensate its leaders and the rank and file a lot better than it did during the troubling 1970s
(Leban et al., 2005; Overbeek, 2022).
Personal Reflection
The Bible in Romans 12:2 teaches Christians not to get too comfortable in this world, but
rather keep on renewing themselves in line with the will of God (King James Bible, 2023). This
verse can inspire leaders in the sense that one should not get stuck in their comfort zone. On the
contrary, they should always be seeking opportunities to improve as much as they can. The
previous leadership and internal stakeholders of BA were committed to sticking with their own
traditions (Leban et al., 2005).
Before the leadership of Sir King, the stakeholders could disagree a lot because those
traditions were quite different from one another. When Sir King came on board, he convinced
them that new and somewhat painful changes had to be made (Leban et al., 2005). I would have
followed a similar strategy, especially in regards to freezing pay hikes until the situation
improved, and discarding the old and inefficient fleet. What Sir King did is commendable, and
should be replicated in other firms facing similar problems.
4
References
Kassem, R., Salama, A., & Ganepola, C. N. (2023). CSR, Credibility, Employees' Rights and
Legitimacy During a Crisis: A Critical Analysis of British Airways, WizAir and EasyJet
Cases. Employee Relations, 45(1). 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1108/ER-11-2021-0517.
King James Bible. (2023). King James Bible online. https://www.kingjamesbibleonline.org/
(Original work published 1769).
Leban, B., Leban, W. V., Klein, A., & Stone, R. A. (2005). Managing Organizational Change.
Wiley.
Overbeek, H. (2022). Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in
Perspective. Taylor & Francis.
