Introduction In this chapter Lockean intellectual

In this chapter, I will outline Locke’s property theory, explain and distinguish various

components of Lockean intellectual property theory, and voice criticisms of Lockean intellectual

property theory from a Lockean perspective. I hope to show that extensions of Locke’s account

to make sense of intellectual property can’t actually be very Lockean, and show where and why

these extensions lack justification and compatibility with Locke’s original approach to property

rights.

Locke’s property theory was originally and primarily concerned with ownership of land,

water, and natural resources, but over time his interpreters have extended it to include all

physical and tangible objects. Intellectual property theories, a topic about which Locke never

directly writes, are very commonly made on quasi-Lockean grounds. Lockean intellectual

property theorists wish contend to extend Locke’s property theory from the material realm to the

immaterial realm, as they find these realms somewhat parallel. As Tom Palmer explains it,

“intellectual property rights can be justified as ‘piggy-back’ rights, logical extensions of the right

to own and control tangible objects.”2

What is intellectual property? There is the legal aspect and a more purely philosophical

aspect. In law, intellectual property is a set of loosely connected legal policies or doctrines

governing the ownership, use, and distribution of abstract and intangible objects and their

corresponding physical manifestations. There are separate laws concerning copyrights, patents,

trademarks, and trade secrets. These separate laws are grouped together and referred to as

intellectual property law because they share in common the regulation of immaterial objects and

their physical manifestations. In philosophy, we justify or criticize these laws by providing the

unifying, universal ethical rules for intellectual property, at least a thin view of the metaphysics

underlying these intangible objects, and the mechanics for the acquisition and transfer of these

properties. It is on the philosophical side of intellectual property that Locke’s property theory,

which was originally concerned with only the material world, has been extended to the

immaterial.

The initial objects of intellectual property, namely ideas, designs, concepts, and models,

have special characteristics because they are intangible. Unlike physical objects, which are

subject to physical laws like entropy and conservation of energy, intellectual objects cannot be

depleted or degraded. This brings about some interesting characteristics. For example,

intellectual objects are non-rivalrous, meaning one person can consume an intellectual object

without diminishing any other person’s ability to consume that object. Further, because

intellectual objects are non-rivalrous, the economic notion of scarcity does not apply to them.

There are, perhaps, other special characteristics of intellectual objects which are less

clearly understood or not agreed upon, but are still vital for creating, interpreting, or critiquing an

intellectual property theory. For instance, we must consider whether or not intellectual objects

predate our work in coming to realize them. If they exist (however it is they might exist) before

we can recognize their existence, then the sort of work which enables us to realize intellectual

objects results in discovery. If intellectual objects do not, however, predate our work in coming

to realize them, then perhaps we might say they come into existence because we created them.

This kind of metaphysical issue does not seem be as problematic for physical objects, where we

may have stronger and more stable intuitions about the discovery and creation of physical

objects. The difference between discovering and creating intellectual objects may have major

implications for a Lockean intellectual property theory.

Lastly, we must question whether or not one can modify or alter intellectual objects. It is

obvious to us how physical objects are modifiable, but it is far less clear if and how intellectual

objects can be altered. This difference may stifle or hinder our ability to parallel physical objects

to intellectual objects, possibly preventing a viable extension of Lockean property theory to the

immaterial. If modifiability (such as adding value) is a necessary condition to acquiring an object

as property, then this special characteristic of intellectual objects will be a threat to the

acquisition of intellectual property.

We should keep these special characteristic in mind, as they are part of the crux of the

debate between paralleling material objects and immaterial objects, the necessary link for

extending Lockean property theory to include intellectual property rights.

1.2 - Locke’s General Theory of Property

The primary component of Locke’s original property theory is the claim that people own

themselves. From this claim, Locke arrives at the conclusion that people are responsible for their

labor, they own their labor, and they “have a natural right of entitlement to the fruits of their

labor.” This is one of the less controversial components in Locke’s original theory, and arguably

the grounds upon which other components of this original theory rest. Assuming we satisfy

whatever preconditions are set out, Locke believes the acquisition of previously unowned

property derives from the ownership of the fruits of our labor; the ownership of the fruits of our

labor is derived from the ownership of our labor; and, the ownership of our labor is derived from

our self-ownership. Locke’s chain of derivative ownership satisfies certain instincts we have

about the nature of property and the results of our self-ownership.

Another component of Locke’s theory is the notion that a person acquires property rights

to an unowned object by mixing his or her labor with it. Locke claims, “As much land as a man

tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his

labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common.” The labor-mixing component is more

controversial than the self-ownership component. Labor-mixing is a complex problem, and

Locke did not develop a full account of it for us. The precise nature of labor-mixing (and its

various problems) is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is an issue which must be considered

in evaluating any intellectual property extensions developed with the labor-mixing component in

mind.

Another component seems to arise out of the labor-mixing theory, namely the

valueadding condition. From the quote above, words and phrases such “improve” and “cultivate”

and

“use the product of” hint at additional conditions for property acquisition. The value-adding

component of the theory is contentious and fraught with problems. What does it even mean to

add value to an object? Locke does not leave us with many clues to clarify the nature of

valueadding nor does he provide us a clear explanation of the priority or necessity of the

component to his property theory. If an intellectual property extension is founded upon a

Lockean interpretation including this component, that extension must provide an account for how

intellectual labor adds value to its corresponding objects.

There remains one other crucial piece to Locke’s property theory, what Robert Nozick has

dubbed “the Lockean proviso,” which is the last condition for acquisition. Locke explains:

Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice

to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the

yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for

others because of his inclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another

can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could think himself

injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a

whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst: and the case of land

and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.

This is a powerful, limiting condition for property acquisition. The public good is the core

priority of the proviso. Potential acquisitions which would violate the public good (what exactly

counts as the public good isn’t clear) are disqualified from acquisition by the proviso.

The “still enough” clause is potent, as it precludes monopolies and mass-ownership of resources

which may lead to undue injury. To own the entire river, and assuming this river was the only

resource of fresh water, would prevent others from being able to quench their thirsts (as they lack

the rights to the river). This kind of monopoly, or even an oligarchy by which a limited number

of people together monopolize a resource, would injure others because they no longer have

access to that which is necessary for life.

We might be tempted to think of Lockean property rights as operating in a kind of

vacuum where we need not really consider how property acquisitions affect the people around us.

As we can see, Lockean property theory is not separable from substantive considerations about

the public good and human welfare, as well as the context in which a potential acquisition is to

be made.

The Lockean proviso can be very radical, and it serves as a serious wild-card factor for

this property theory. The proviso is clearly against ‘company towns’ in which the few actually

own everything, and workers are merely ‘loaned’ residence, land, etc. People have a right to own

enough to subsist (maybe even more). If Lockean property theory were correctly applied today,

ownership rights would shift dramatically. Clearly, very few people actually own the things

which are required to live life independently. By the proviso, we would need to significantly

redistribute properties so that each person owned what was required to live life independently.

Parallels between material objects and immaterial objects are subject to the proviso. In order to

successfully extend general Lockean property theory (which deals in physical objects) to an

intellectual property theory, that extension must satisfy the proviso.

Each of the components has their own set of associated problems and interpretations. Not

every Lockean property theorist will buy into all the components I’ve listed, nor is there

agreement upon how exactly each component is defined and structured. Consequently, Locke’s

theory has ambiguities and can be developed in numerous ways.

We build extensions upon the foundation of these various components of the original

Lockean property theory, namely self-ownership, labor-mixing theory, value-adding theory, and

the proviso.

1.3 - The Intellectual Property Extension of Locke’s General Theory One of the

underpinning claims of Lockean intellectual property theory, a claim which appears to enable an

extension of modern interpretations of Lockean physical property theory, is the notion that the

fruits of thought, design, engineering, and other intellectual labors belong to the laborer.

Lockean intellectual property theorists believe this notion of physical labor and physical

property acquisition extends nicely into the realm of intellectual labor and intellectual property

acquisition. In the general Lockean property theory, these justifications substantiate why one

acquires an unowned physical object through mixing physical labor with the object. In the

intellectual property extension of this general Lockean theory, the Lockean intellectual property

theorists believe these justifications also substantiate why one acquires intellectual property

rights through intellectual labor.

What exactly are the fruits of intellectual labors? At first glance, it would seem as though

intellectual objects are the fruits of intellectual labor. These abstract ideas and intellectual objects

are intangible, immaterial things which may actually be the fruits of intellectual labor, but the

intellectual property theorist must demonstrate why this type of fruit is the sort which can be

owned. It is not immediately obvious that one can own such objects.

A general claim that “one’s intellectual labor should entitle one to have a natural property

right in the finished product of that work, such as a novel, a computer program, or a musical

composition” is compelling to many people. The claim, however, is ambiguous. It is not clear

that the intellectual commons is parallel to the commons of the physical aspects of reality. Are we

enclosing intellectual objects or the tangible expressions (the physical manifestations or

representations) of those objects ‘from the commons’? It looks as if the extension of Locke’s

account of property could be developed in two different ways. The strong enclosing thesis is

claim that we enclose the intellectual objects themselves from the commons (this is the primitive

view). The weak enclosing thesis is claim that we enclose particular physical expressions of

intellectual objects from the commons, and yet somehow we gain control over access to the

corresponding intellectual objects, as well.

1.4 - The Strong Enclosing Thesis

If we hold the strong enclosing thesis and the discovery claim, then intellectual objects

are directly owned by their discoverer, e.g. algorithms, mathematical truths, and scientific

notions would belong to their discoverers. If we aren’t creating intellectual objects, but only

discovering them, it does not appear as if Locke’s theory would support our owning them, as we

did not really mix our labor in them or add value to them. Remember, Lockean labor-mixing

requires that we have added value to the object. Intellectual objects are unmodifiable and

invariable – they cannot be altered. One cannot add value to these intellectual objects as one can

add value to physical objects. Since intellectual labor cannot add value to intellectual objects,

intellectual labor does not qualify as Lockean labor-mixing, the only sort of labor-mixing which

results in legitimate Lockean property acquisition.

Because of this, it seems as if the strong enclosing may stand on firmer ground if we

understand the intellectual objects to have been created by their owners. If we think about

intellectual property in terms of adding value, a reasonable component to consider in this case, at

first glance it appears that such creation can add value to the universe on this view.

Expressions also include tangible machines and processes in the cases of inventions and functional ideas – the

protection of these expressions are called patents. Expressions, such as images or words, which uniquely identify

entities, services, or products, are protected by Trademarks.

Unfortunately, the adding value condition in Lockean thought really seems to be found in a

certain type of labor-mixing which is concerned with transformation of present objects into a

new object. This type of intellectual object creation does not really parallel any kind of

labormixing in the physical world. When dealing in physical properties, there is a story we can

tell about how physical objects were transformed (with value added) into new physical objects.

What is unclear is how a similar story could be told for intellectual objects. The mechanics in the

general Lockean property theory, which are concerned with physical objects, do not seem

parallelable to the realm of intellectual objects. This is a serious problem for the combination of a

creation view and the strong enclosing thesis.

Furthermore, the Lockean proviso likely pushes us even further away from the strong

enclosing thesis. For example, the public good would be deeply harmed if we were to recognize

the ownership of mathematical truths. It would be difficult (perhaps even impossible) to function

in life without implicitly or explicitly using math. How can we live if the rightful owner of a

fundamental and vital mathematical formula (e.g. 1+1=2) does not provide consent for the rest of

us to use it? A Lockean property right, when granted, is profoundly strong, and it is for this

reason that the proviso is there to make sure we can live with the rights that are actually granted.

The problem identified within this math example would apply to many other intellectual objects

as well. Perhaps not all intellectual objects activate the proviso’s protection of the public good,

but it seems as though a significant portion of intellectual objects, particularly those most

important to living a human life, are protected from hypothetical acquisition by the proviso.

The strong enclosing thesis has also been criticized by Kai Kimppa who explains:

The reason ownership is needed is that material resources are scarce, and thus

everyone cannot necessarily own everything they would want to. This does not

hold true for the immaterial. The immaterial is unlimited, and everyone can own

as much as they want to at the same time. No one is deprived of ownership in

what he or she has if someone else owns the same immaterial as well…Locke

needed the material to be divided amongst people because it can not be owned by

many at once…the immaterial need not be owned as it can be used by as many as

have a need for it.

This criticism points out why we cannot parallel the material and immaterial realms. The

non-rivalrous feature of intellectual objects is precisely why we don’t need a property theory for

them. Locke’s theory does not favor the ownership of intellectual objects. Because intellectual

objects are non-rivalrous, they do not meet the conditions for the sort of objects for which we

require a property theory. While Locke would agree that you can own a CD, the physical instance

or manifestation of an intellectual object(s), he would not agree that you could own the

intangible, intellectual objects represented or manifested on the CD. Locke would not have

favored the strong enclosing thesis, but he could, perhaps, agree to the weak enclosing thesis.

1.5 - The Weak Enclosing Thesis

Although the strong enclosing thesis may be the initial and primitive view, a temptation

for Lockean intellectual property advocates, enough problems emerge from the various Lockean

interpretations that the weak enclosing seems to be the more common view to hold. Instead of

directly owning abstract intellectual objects, one might argue that ethical rights (and,

subsequently, legal rights) regulate material expressions. The weak enclosing thesis takes this

path. By regulating material expressions, granting creators or discoverers a set of rights to

material expression, we somehow effectively bring about a kind of ownership to the intellectual

objects which correspond to these material expressions.

A Lockean intellectual property theorist holding the weak enclosing thesis will agree that

there is no direct intellectual property ownership, but instead will claim there is an indirect

ownership of intellectual property. The pseudo-ownership claim performs the conceptual

heavylifting in the weak enclosing thesis. This is the claim that we can get at the indirect

pseudoownership of intangible, intellectual objects by directly controlling all of the various

possible future physical manifestations or expressions of an intellectual object which happen to

be similar enough and related to the original creation or invention. There is no direct ownership

of an intellectual object on this view, but indirectly the regulation and direct physical property

right to any possible physical manifestation of an intellectual object entails a sort of indirect

pseudoownership over that intellectual object. While the initial objects of intellectual property

are the intangible, intellectual objects, by the pseudo-ownership claim, it is actually the

corresponding expressions which are at the heart of Lockean intellectual property theory. The

thinking is that by extending the physical Lockean property theory far enough, indirectly

regulating intellectual objects, we can produce a kind of Lockean intellectual property theory.

Technically speaking, since the intellectual object is not owned on this view, if there was a way

to get at intellectual objects without producing, using, or distributing corresponding physical

expressions, we would not be violating any weak enclosing thesis property rights. In practice,

however, it appears as though indirect ownership results in the same consequences as direct

ownership of an intellectual object.

When the electronic music duo Daft Punk produces an instrumental song, they are

essentially discovering or creating some abstract intellectual object. The physical expression or

manifestation of this original intellectual object might be a series of 0’s and 1’s on a CD or hard

drive, or it may be recorded on analog cassette tapes, or it may be written down on paper in

traditional music notation. Daft Punk directly owns this physical object. But, by the

pseudoownership claim, they acquire an indirect intellectual property right to this original

intellectual object. They don’t directly own the intellectual object per se, but they have the

exclusive rights to produce, use, or distribute expressions of that intellectual object. This right is

not over the intellectual object, but rather a right over all current and future possible expressions

of that object.

Vitally, Daft Punk’s intellectual property rights indirectly protect not just one very

specific intellectual object (the original), but in fact a set of them, a set of ideas which are close

enough in identity for us to call them roughly the same. In essence, we are claiming that by

directly discovering or creating the original intellectual object, Daft Punk also indirectly

discovers or creates a set of similar intellectual objects. Exactly how similar the members of the

set must be in order to maintain membership is not an exact science worked out by intellectual

property theorists, legislators, or judges (they really should provide an account or heuristic device

in this day and age). Daft punk does not directly own this set of ideas per se, but they have the

exclusive rights to produce, use, or distribute expressions of any member of this set of

intellectual objects.

Excepting expressions of the original intellectual object, the manifestation or expressions

of any member of this set of intellectual objects are derivative works. By producing the original

physical manifestation, Daft Punk generates the indirect intellectual property right to a

corresponding set of intellectual objects. Importantly, Daft Punk directly controls and owns the

current and future expressions, essentially derivatives and duplicates of the original expression,

of any member of this set of intellectual objects. If I were to produce, use, and/or distribute my

own rendition of this Daft Punk song, which would certainly be an expression of one of the

abstract objects in this arbitrarily large set which Daft Punk discovered or created, I would be

violating their right of direct ownership of all possible expressions or manifestations of the set of

these intellectual objects.

1.6 - Critique of the Weak Enclosing Thesis

First, it is unclear how one comes to directly own future expressions – physical objects

which do not yet exist. This does not parallel the general Lockean property theory at all. Why

should we make the leap made in the pseudo-ownership claim of the weak enclosing thesis? A

Lockean intellectual property theory which claims agents can own future objects isn’t in line

with the original thinking we see in the general Lockean property theory.

Unfortunately, the weak enclosing thesis isn’t really an intellectual property theory at all.

On the weak enclosing thesis, ownership is concerned with material objects, and despite this set

of objects being related to intellectual objects, no headway has been made into establishing a

proper intellectual property theory. Extending the general Lockean property theory with the weak

enclosing thesis does not actually extend the type of objects which can be owned - only tangible

items, including the particular expressions of intellectual objects, can be owned.

Nothing abstract or intangible is ever owned or protected. This doesn’t even sound like an

intellectual property theory – it really functions as an unnecessary and incompatible extension of

the extended physical property theory. The extended Lockean property theory can already make

sense of the physical property rights, including rights to manifestations or expressions of

intellectual objects.

If it is true that one cannot own intellectual objects, but rather only the expression of

those intellectual objects, then it seems possible to create new (even if identical to other)

expressions of intellectual objects without violating the so-called intellectual property rights of

other expression-holders. That is, there may be multiple expressions of one intellectual object,

and my rights to expression-A do not negate your rights to expression-B. Moreover, we all have

“enough of” and “as good as” left over for further expressions. If this instinct is correct, then

Lockean intellectual property theories and laws which employ the weak enclosing thesis are

untenable.

To put it another way, you may take a tree, chop it down, shape it into lumber, build a

chair, an you come to own this chair by mixing your labor with its ingredients. It would be easy

to show that you’ve violated the exclusivity rights derived from the pseudo-ownership claim.

Surely, someone had to think of and build the chair - there is a form and an idea of a chair – it is

an invention. Yet, even Lockean intellectual property theorists are not willing to attribute

ownership of all possible expressions of the idea of a chair to the inventor. They don’t wish to

apply the pseudo-ownership claim in this case, and instead we apply regular Lockean property

theory. The next day, your neighbor is fully within her rights to chop down a tree, and so on, and

build her own chair. She has not violated your rights to your chair, nor have either of you violated

the first chair-creator’s rights to his chair.

Why should any other invention or creation which corresponds to an intellectual object be

different? For example, you may write a piece a music in clay tablets, and by even traditional

Lockean property rights, you already own that tablet, as you have mixed you labor with

ingredients (some you already owned and some you perhaps didn’t before mixing). You’ve added

value to the clay by forming it into a tablet and further by writing music notation upon it. Why

can I not do the exact same? The rewards of my labor in building either a chair or a musical clay

tablet are the expressions themselves. The reward of creation, at least on the Lockean view, is not

one’s ability to monopolize and preclude others from building identical or similar expressions for

themselves. My production of a thing, my mixing of my labor with ingredients, does not preclude

others from doing the same, even identical action.

Furthermore, the weak enclosing thesis may be contrary to the Lockean proviso. Even if

we were to accept the validity of indirect ownership and monopolies over intellectual object, the

proviso would be activated, preventing the acquisitions which would lead to the indirect

ownership of the most important intellectual objects. It is difficult to know which intellectual

objects are protected by the proviso. At the minimum, appropriate interpretations will try to

isolate which intellectual objects are necessary for subsistence, well-being, and ‘good and plenty’

conditions for the public in implementing the proviso. The chair example is a useful marker for

considering this minimum protected by the proviso. The chair is not obviously necessary for

subsistence, and yet it is still, by and large, protected – probably by the proviso. The Lockean

proviso likely provides protection from indirect ownership to an expansive set of intellectual

objects.

1.7 - Conclusion

In this chapter, we’ve delved into so-called Lockean intellectual property theory. The

notion that the material realm is parallel to the immaterial realm appears false. It does not seem

as if a direct ownership of intellectual objects (as in the strong enclosing thesis) is possible.

Indirect ownership of intellectual objects (as in the weak enclosing thesis) does not appear to be

an acceptable or consistent extension of Lockean property theory, either. There are gaps in the so-

called Lockean intellectual property theory which have not been justified.

It appears as though Locke’s argument does not motivate intellectual property at all. It is

fine that a so-called Lockean intellectual property theory is not purely Lockean, but advocates

must still explain and justify their theory. Since they have not justified their stance on purely

Lockean grounds, they must provide some other basis or foundation before one can accept their

theory.

In the next chapter, we will tackle the primary argument which has become hybridized

with Lockean mechanics: utilitarian economic intellectual property theory.

CHAPTER 2. – UTILITARIAN ECONOMIC THEORY

OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

2.1 - Introduction and Scope

This chapter provides an examination of the mainstream utilitarian economic theory of

intellectual property rights employed by most first world, western nations. This theory claims

that governments should assign strong, artificial intellectual property rights to creators, inventors,

and discoverers and intensely enforce these rights against violators. This practice of assigning

and enforcing strong intellectual property rights is believed to maximize the incentive to create,

innovate, and discover. It is assumed that by maximizing these incentives, we will maximize the

quality and quantity of social goods generated. In turn, maximizing the quality and quantity of

social goods is believed to be a necessary condition for satisfying the principle of utility.

This chapter will limit its scope to the economic views (of which there are many, but

notably Chicago-style, free market economics) which use utilitarian arguments to justify either

the status quo or even the expansion of current intellectual property rights of inventors, creators,

and discoverers in predominantly American and European intellectual property policies.

Essentially, I’m examining a monolithized version of the views and perspectives of various

groups and individuals in power, and I think this constructed theory represents the dominant

intellectual property theory we face today.

The mainstream theory should not be confused with utilitarian economic theories

advocating diminished, but not eliminated, intellectual property rights. Diminishing intellectual

property rights theories are neither mainstream nor applied in the economic and legal policies of

first world, western nations. This chapter is a response to the intellectual property theory that is

actually being applied in our society. Excepting a few diminishing IP rights theorists and the

Pirate Party (a tiny, nearly powerless political minority), the general battle cry of American and

European legislative, judicial, and corporate bodies has been one of preserving the status quo of

intellectual property rights, if not escalating these rights (which we’ve seen in recent years). The

theory and thought of those who are in power, both maintaining or seeking to expand the status

quo, are what is being questioned in this paper.

Assuming certain side-constraints can be satisfied (such as not violating primary human

rights, etc.), it seems acceptable that governments should regulate property acquisitions and

transfers so as to maximally satisfy the principle of utility. I hope to demonstrate how the

currently employed utilitarian economic theory of intellectual property actually fails to satisfy the

principle of utility.

2.2 - Focusing on Incentives

Does the mainstream utilitarian economic theory of intellectual property rights “live up”

to the general utilitarian standard? First, we must consider the basic structure of the argument for

the more common utilitarian economic theories of intellectual property:

1. Assuming side-constraints that human rights are satisfied, society should adopt legal

regimes or institutions if they are expected to yield the optimization of aggregate social

welfare.

2. Legal Regime X, which does not violate fundamental human rights, is expected to

generate the most incentive for the production and creation of intellectual works.

3. Maximally incentivizing the production and creation of intellectual works contributes to

the optimization of aggregate social welfare.

4. Therefore, Legal Regime X should be adopted.

The mainstream view believes a legal regime that provides authors, creators, and

inventors with extensive intellectual property rights and control over their productions will fill in

for “Legal Regime X” in the above argument. Essentially, Legal Regime X, on this view, is either

the status quo or an expansion of current intellectual property right. Currently, the duration of

federally regulated intellectual properties in the United States is as follows: a patent lasts from

14-22 years (depending on certain factors), and a copyright for the life of the creator plus 50-75

years (with a few rare exceptions, such as copyrighted government documents). Qualitatively,

patents are the strongest type of intellectual property right, enabling very strict exclusivity rights

defined both by litigation and a patent granting institution. Copyright also has extensive

exclusivity rights, but within a limited scope defined by the results of litigation. The set of

objects which can be copyrighted is narrower than patents and there are fair use exceptions.

These are example qualities and durations of intellectual property rights found in the status quo.

We must consider whether or not this regime really satisfies the conditions in the basic argument

above.

Notice that one may provide an argument in favor of intellectual property rights similar to

the mainstream view without requiring rights which last the same duration or which carry the

same quality of rights. For example, diminishing intellectual property rights theories claim Legal

Regime X is a legal regime that provides authors, creators, and inventors with more limited

intellectual property rights and control over their productions. If they are correct, and utility is

maximized via less extensive (yet still extant) intellectual property rights, then the mainstream

view does not live up to its general utilitarian standard.

One fallacious argument for extensive intellectual property rights commonly offered by

primitive utilitarian economists is that without intellectual property rights content creation and

innovation will virtually disappear. This is derived from a common assumption in primitive

utilitarian economics that altruism does not exist – they assume human nature rules out virtually

all altruistic actions, including creating and innovating for reasons that are not directly in your

self-interest. But this is clearly an implausible view. Whatever effects would accompany changes

to the current intellectual property regime, innovation and content creation won’t simply

disappear. If that were true, then there would have been no intellectual production prior to the

adoption of the current regime.

More sophisticated utilitarian economists accept that there are other motivations for

content creation and innovation beyond the monopolization of profits. Consider the Free

Software movement. Within this movement, numerous authors, creators, and inventors of scripts,

programs and devices demonstrate that significant innovation and content are created without

economic motivation. Many choose to copyright and/or patent via GNU, Creative Commons, or

the Apache licensing systems; others totally forgo involvement in the copyright/patenting

process. There are people who genuinely give content away for no other reason than because it is

a good thing to do. People innovate and create, essentially promoting the greater social welfare,

without seeking or needing financial gain or monopolized control over intellectual objects.

Artificial incentivization is not necessarily required.

The real question is this: Would there be less content creation and innovation, or even

more specifically, the incentive to do these things, without the mainstream utilitarian economic

intellectual property rights? It depends. If we did not replace it with anything, then it looks as

though there could be less content creation and innovation. But if we replaced the intellectual

property rights system with an alternative reward system, we still have artificially generated

incentive to create content and innovate. Some economists, for example, argue that we can just

as effectively generate these incentives “through private patronage by tax-exempt foundations,

universities, and the like, or even by government support.”

Further, a number of economists have explained the efficacy of alternative systems. For

example, one study suggests intellectual property rights are strictly inferior to at least hybridized

incentive systems (made from elements of both intellectual property and reward systems) and

possibly inferior to well-made reward systems in producing maximum incentives and social

advantages.

Note that we already some successful forms of the reward system in place in the form of

public research (including at many universities), and this reward system could be expanded to be

the exclusive option. A rewards system may very well be the appropriate Legal Regime X.

Incentivization can be handled without resorting to an intellectual property system. What remains

is a choice between two general systems. In an intellectual property system, intellectual objects

are monopolized, and the utility generated by these objects is bottlenecked by the consent (which

must be bought) of monopoly and oligopoly holders. In a rewards system, access to intellectual

objects is completely open, and utility generation is not bottlenecked; everyone who wants to

benefit from and use intellectual objects is free to do so. Even if the incentivization of a rewards

system was less effective than an intellectual property system (which isn’t even the case), the

utility generated by the rewards system might be greater than the intellectual property system

because of the difference in bottlenecks.

Furthermore, without even trying to find Legal Regime X, we can consider whether or not

the general argument is even correctly postulated. Premise 3 (the claim that maximally

incentivizing the production and creation of intellectual works contributes to the optimization of

aggregate social welfare) is not obviously true. Maximizing incentive to produce and create

intellectual properties does not obviously lead to maximizing aggregate social welfare. It may be

safe to assume that some form of artificial incentivization is necessary for satisfying the principle

of utility, but it isn’t clear that the sort of system which maximizes incentives is really going to

lead to maximizing utility.

Unfortunately, incentivization issues have dominated the general utilitarian economics

deliberations, and distributive concerns have taken a back seat in many utilitarian approaches

(with some notable exceptions like Peter Singer). The costs of incentivizing, particularly in using

an intellectual property system, may be much greater than is realized, and the end distribution of

goods and the sum total utility in the world may be far lower than we’ve realized. It may be that

the focus on incentivization sometimes blinds us to the larger issues at stake.

2.3 - Globalization and Utilitarian Distributions

When we set aside incentivization, at least for the moment, and instead focus more upon

the underlying utility rationale, it seems that the policies which have shaped the status quo are

not living up the utilitarian standard of welfare maximization. Today’s policies have not

distributed social goods evenly enough across the global population. Wealth, including

intellectual properties and the industries built on these intellectual properties, is largely held by a

tiny minority. This wealth inequality is in no small part a product of our current intellectual

property rights.

Given the principle of diminishing marginal utility, the intuition is that utilitarian

distributions should be fairly even, or at the very least, these distributions should likely be

concerned with those who have the least. There are diminishing utility returns for each

subsequent unit of a social good. The first $10,000 of wealth will yield more utility than the next

$10,000 of wealth. Surely, the resources necessary to survive will produce far more utility for an

agent than the same amount of resources added to wealth of someone who already has more than

enough to survive. By this principle of diminishing returns, you will likely get the most utility by

maximizing the wealth of the poorest. These diminishing returns are the heart of calculating the

sum utility of any distribution of goods, and it is one reason why utilitarian economic thought

cannot justify the status quo.

Having a small minority living in abundance while most live far below that standard,

many in abject poverty, is difficult to defend from a utilitarian point of view. Economic regimes

which claim to be utilitarian have the work of explaining and promoting wealth inequality cut out

for them. The distribution generated from the current intellectual property system is not utility

maximizing. Wealth inequality, in no small part based on intellectual property distribution, is

simply too great.

Economists may argue that wealth inequalities aren’t necessarily bad because wealth at

the top eventually ‘trickles down’ to the global poor – i.e. the poor have the best distribution of

all economic policies when we implement the (Chicago-style) free market and extensive

intellectual property rights. This claim, however, is extremely contentious. There are many

schools of economic thought which outright reject this laissez-faire, libertarian approach. The

idea that vast wealth inequality is not utility maximizing is not a new one. The global poor are

not receiving as much as they could under our current economic system. I contend there are

better distributions of goods, including a distribution of intellectual property goods which yield

more utility, available to us. Our mainstream, extensive intellectual property regime which is

currently place is a barrier to maximizing global utility.

Unfortunately, the globality of utility is often forgotten by economists who are seeking to

improve their own nation’s utility, even at the cost of the sum total global utility. Somehow, many

economists seek to perform utility calculations at a national level. Utility is global, not

nationalistic. This changes the practical details of economics and the legal issues at stake in a big

way. The sorts of laws, such as intellectual property laws, which maximize a nation’s utility are

different from the sorts of laws necessary to maximize global utility. Rich nations and wealthy

people are going to need to sacrifice, giving to the poor and building infrastructure for the

deprived. We need laws, including those which govern intellectual objects, which force us to give

to the poor, if we truly wish to see utility maximized.

Given the nationalistic approach to utility, it is easy to see how intellectual property rights

are somehow acceptable and not obviously causing so much harm within first world nations.

Most of the damage is dealt to third world nations. From a global perspective, it becomes far

more obvious why mainstream utilitarian economic intellectual property rights, rights conjured

by first world nations, are harmful and not maximizing (global) utility.

Pharmaceuticals are the classic example of this harm. In a first world nation, a significant

portion of the population (particularly in first world nations other than the United States) can

afford the prices of medicines set by those who control the intellectual property rights. This is not

true in third world nations. If you are making $2 a day, you can’t buy medicine with prices

artificially raised to $50 for a month’s dosage, a price set by the monopoly over the intellectual

property rights to a medicine. An economist will argue the efficient market hypothesis is

supposed to make sense of this, explaining that price models will take into account what third

world nations can pay. Unfortunately, even with drastic price reductions, many medicines won’t

provide profit margins in the poorest nations.

Economists might argue that if it is so important that we help these people, then we

shouldn’t punish intellectual property owners; rather, in order to maintain their incentives, we

must instead use first world national public funds to buy products from these monopoly

controllers and outright give the products to third world nations. We’d have to trust that

monopolies would not price gouge, which would create a gigantic inefficiency in the market

(that’s a serious flaw in granting intellectual property rights). Even if intellectual property holders

didn’t price gouge, this middleman process likely forms another (although slighter) market

inefficiency. Essentially, public funding of this sort is just an inefficient kind of the reward

system. You would see higher market efficiency in a straight-forward reward system, which

would then subsequently generate higher social utility; but to do this, would necessitate

relinquishing the current intellectual property system.

Setting incentives aside, the fundamental problem with intellectual property rights is the

formation of monopolies. Monopolies are innately inefficient for the market. Poor distributions

result from monopolies. A rewards system does not form monopolies, it does not have the same

degree of inefficiencies we see in the current intellectual property system, and we’d see better

distributions through a rewards system.

If prices are kept artificially high, then demand (people willing to pay that price) will be

low; subsequently, the utility produced will be low. If you choose not to allow monopolies of

intellectual property objects, prices will fall exponentially, demand and the fulfillment of that

demand will rise dramatically, and utility will be increased. As for the overall economy, my

money is going to be spent. It doesn’t have to be spent inefficiently on goods that are artificially

priced.

In our current economic scheme, I legally have to pay for objects protected by intellectual

property laws. I have finite and very limited resources, which in turn means I can only buy a very

limited number of these objects. Obviously, I receive some amount of utility from each object,

and because I can only buy a limited number, my potential utility is also limited. An efficient,

rational shopping strategy is currently the only legal way to maximize the utility benefit of my

limited resources. Yet I am not generating nearly as much utility as I could if I had unlimited

access to these objects.

Duplication and distribution costs are virtually zero for a significant portion of objects

currently protected by intellectual property laws. Prices to these goods are artificially higher than

they would be in a natural market – that’s what the intellectual property law does: it creates

monopolies which enable rights-holders to raise prices astronomically beyond marginal costs.

The monopolization of intellectual property objects prevents society from realizing the benefits

of a new digital, networked infrastructure in which duplication and distribution costs of these

objects have plummeted. Old business models do not belong to this new infrastructure, nor do

the laws which protect those monopolistic models. Society is being price-gouged, and utility is

not being maximized.

The financial cost of artificially incentivizing innovation and creation will always be

there. Do we wish to pay this cost in terms of highly abusable monopolies via an outmoded

intellectual property system belonging to a time and place where duplication and distribution

costs were generally a higher portion of total production costs? Or, alternatively, should we use

other modes of artificially generating incentive, such as reward systems, which can produce the

same degree of incentive for the same financial cost without the baggage of monopolization? It

seems like the latter option generates more utility.

Consider the difference between the utility of 50 million people having a logic book on

their shelf or computer to the utility of 5 billion people having a logic book on their shelf or

computer – the difference in utility would be enormous. The major economic reason only 50

million people (or whatever the exact number might be) have a logic book on their shelf or

computer is that demand is restricted by having a price, an artificially high price set by those who

have a monopoly over its production, a monopoly granted by intellectual property rights. Without

those intellectual property rights, prices would drop – the digital version would be virtually free

and available to everyone with an internet connection, demand would certainly surge, and

ownership rates would also rise. Imagine the utility to be gained for if all intellectual properties

were released into the public domain. It wouldn’t be just copyrighted works, but patented as well,

a key to technological innovation and economic mobility. The first world can give the proverbial

“keys to the kingdom” to the rest of the world. This is the opportunity cost we forego, an

alternative with substantially higher utility, in accepting and implementing the mainstream

utilitarian economic theory intellectual property.

2.4 - The Prisoner’s Dilemma

An additional, complicated aspect of distributions from a utilitarian economics

perspective is the matter of how we employ predictive thinking in our models. Economists may

see the distribution of goods as a gigantic prisoner’s dilemma. In this prisoner’s dilemma,

multiple parties have the choice of whether or not to cooperate. As long as they all cooperate,

even if it requires personal sacrifice, the highest sum total utility is attained. The problem,

according to rational choice theory and an assumption of egoism, is that parties are predicted to

not cooperate, and thus a lower total utility is achieved.

The mainstream view might admit that, theoretically, a distribution of goods which

generates more utility than our current intellectual property system is available in this prisoner’s

dilemma, but practically, it is not really available to us because of our so-called rational

selfishness and egoism. Utopia (the derogatory term for this option in the prisoner’s dilemma) is

theoretically there for us, but practically it is not – too many people do evil things and that cycle

is predicted to continue. The claim is that because humans are selfish egoists, any property

system like socialism is morally unacceptable to pursue, as it does not, by our predictions, result

in maximum utility. On this view, our current property rights system, including intellectual

property rights, are the way to go.

But, notice, this system is chosen in virtue of the assumption of egoism. Economists

assume altruism is not the rational choice. Selecting the selfish and egoist option in the prisoner’s

dilemma seems to be the practical thing to do, perhaps even the moral thing to do, and thus we

should design and use an intellectual property system which harnesses these predictions. The

mainstream intellectual property system is thought to harness our predicted selfishness. Sadly,

this is no longer about what we ought to do, but more about what we predict others will do. It

does not give humanity the chance to do what is right. It is a game, a game in which I predict you

will do what is wrong, and I do not respect your autonomy or ability to do otherwise, and I

preemptively wrong you and others.

I remain unconvinced from a purely theoretical perspective that the intellectual property

system is the result of properly employing the utilitarian model. It still may be the case that we

are morally obligated to do something, to choose an action which hinges upon the synergy of

others doing what is right, even if we can practically predict that other people will not do what

they are morally obligated to do. If this is true, then clearly our obligations and rights are not

about predicting how others will act (as in the case of the prisoner’s dilemma), but rather

expecting how others should act. Consequently, it may be correct upon this very theoretical

utilitarian view to not employ an intellectual property system, and if one is in place, perhaps we

not obligated to obey intellectual property laws; rather, we may be obligated to pursue a type of

weak socialism (a topic to which many people have become allergic without necessarily having

done prior, reasonable reflection).

On this theoretical view, utility clearly selects a system which is far more utopic. Even if

Utopia, or whatever is nearest to it, doesn’t come about, perhaps we are still bound to aim for it

from the utilitarian perspective. If this is not true, and if we should use predictions (to what

extent I do not know) to inform our normative policies, there are other serious problems for the

mainstream theory. If you are unconvinced by the prisoner’s dilemma issue, the practical matter

of enforcement may be yet another critique.

2.5 - Unenforceability

Intellectual property rights, at least as they are granted in the current implementation of

utilitarian economic theory, are not fully, and practically enforceable. We can have intellectual

property laws on the books, and we can stop some infringement, but in a digital and globalized

world, intellectual property rights are increasingly unenforceable. As we shall see, the issue of

enforceability of intellectual property claims introduces great complexities for a utilitarian

justification of intellectual property rights.

Protecting physical property is far easier than protecting intellectual property. Fences,

cages, buildings, safes, locks, physical access, transportation, and physical forensics are stable

and effective means to protecting and enforcing physical property rights. Further, involving

authorities in physical property theft is easy to explain and prove – it is kind of theft which we

can somewhat easily make sense of in lawmaking, law enforcement, and judging law. Physical

property rights are enforced fairly well. That doesn’t mean there isn’t any theft of physical goods,

but seems as if we have a decent track record of maintaining the lion’s share of physical property

rights at acceptable costs of enforcement.

Intellectual property, in contrast to physical property, is far more difficult to protect.

Enforcing intellectual property rights is too often not possible. For example, imagine a person

invented a power loom in England. No other country has one which is nearly as successful. The

inventor can stop people from stealing the physical power looms themselves, but can they protect

the intellectual property of this invention? Along comes Francis Cabot Lowell who travels to

England, memorizes the schematics of this power loom, travels back to the United States and

rebuilds from memory (with the help of a master mechanic) an identical power loom. He and

everyone else like him are infringing on the inventor’s intellectual property rights to the power

loom. No one could stop him.

One side note: would we even want to stop Lowell? He is one of the fathers of the

American industrial revolution. Other nations have their own fathers, many disregarding

intellectual property rights. Isn’t infringement often necessary for improving the world? This

scenario has been played out over and over (and over) in the history of intellectual property. It

will continue. It is unstoppable.

Consider another example: perhaps a person has a book published and printed. Printshops

and bookstores have feasible, practical, and consistent means to protect the physical property

rights to these physical copies of his book. Contrast these paper copies to the digital copies he

also sells on Amazon.com. He’s taken the proper precautions, using Digital Rights Management

(DRM) tools to attempt to stop piracy. The fact remains that in minutes, anyone can strip that

DRM off a digital copy and anonymously distribute DRM-free copies of his book – infringing on

his copyright. Digital media is pirated behind nearly impenetrable proxies with encryption to

thwart packet shaping. There are too many clever people who are well-protected, using

decentralized networks to distribute these infringed goods – infringement, even from those who

have taken precautions, can’t be stopped. Even if he went so far as to not release/sell a digital

copy for concerns of piracy, it wouldn’t help. A pirate can borrow a physical copy and spend an

hour generating high-resolution scans of the book with an AI that translates text images into

searchable ASCII (essentially reproducing the PDF the author has sitting on his hard drive).

Enforcing these intellectual property rights, unlike physical property rights, is often impossible.

Even where it is possible, it often isn’t feasible. The cost to intellectual property rights

enforcement may be too high.

Even if one attempted to lock down society (let’s assume one somehow found a way to do

it without violating human rights), it is very possible that intellectual property infringement is to

some degree economically the better thing to do. There are studies and models which show that

the costs of complete intellectual property infringement deterrence are not economically

preferred. Infringement without guaranteed repercussion should be preferred from the

enforcement perspective. Unfortunately, the mainstream view sees punishment for infringement

as always being worth pursuing. Copious amounts of economic and legal resources are directed

toward enforcing the utilitarian economic intellectual property rights in vain. Intellectual

property rights enforcement is generally a waste of resources. Those resources should be put to

better use; higher utility would be gained from not attempting to enforce what is essentially

unenforceable. The solution is lowering the expected quality and duration of intellectual property

rights, spending time and money enforcing only what is practical to enforce.

2.6 - Market Inefficiencies and Barriers to Innovations from Intellectual Property Wars

When it comes to the technology sector, a sub-economy historically dominated by

intellectual property, we see a world in which intellectual properties (such as patents) are not

doing the incentivization work we expect; rather they have been turned into bargaining chips in

litigation. These bargaining chips are used to maintain an oligarchy of technology giants which

monopolize the various regions of technological innovation space, largely preventing

independent innovators from entering the market.

Generally, technology giants are constantly violating each other’s intellectual property

rights, but because each giant has a war chest of intellectual properties to levy against other

giants, they stand in a litigation deadlock. Time and money are spent litigating rather than

researching and developing. Patent wars slow down the innovation and creation of tech giants.

The digital world is moving and changing very quickly, and our legal system is a barrier rather

than a boon to innovation, even for giants.

Further, these intellectual property war chests are used to litigate (often unjustly) potential

independent and smaller innovators out of the market. This oligarchy prevents the rapid change

that we should be seeing from experts and inventors not employed by giants.

Google’s buyout of Motorola is a prime example of tactical patent hoarding used as

defensive resources against other tech giants and as offensive tools against smaller companies.

Would-be innovators are litigated out of the market. What is left is a market inefficiency of

bargaining patents and litigation. Both the useless fighting amongst giants and the oligarchic,

anti-trust practices against smaller competitors form major market inefficiencies, and limit the

actual innovation and creation which takes place.

Essentially, the intellectual property system we have engenders intellectual property wars,

forming an obstruction to the innovation and creation we were expecting in sectors like

technology. In turn, the utility principle is not being satisfied.

The innovations we do see today often exist in virtue of people ignoring (outright

infringing, at times) intellectual property rights. The road of successful technology giants is

paved with intellectual property infringement. Microsoft and Apple have a long history of it,

from operating systems (Bill Gates clearly infringed upon Apple’s design), to hardware and

interfaces (both companies and many others having infringed upon the innovations from Bell

Labs), to devices like the touchpad (Bill Gates introduced one years before the iPad). This

tradition continues between mobile device manufacturers and software producers. We see the

same software, OS, and hardware mechanics at work in iPhones as we do in Android – they both

have borrowed from each other. It is only by ignoring intellectual property rights that these

devices have evolved so quickly. They could evolve even quicker if intellectual property did not

exist. People will buy the device that implements an intellectual property (such as a patent) the

best, regardless of who invented it.

Patent wars are nothing new. The term dates back to at least to the 1920’s. Patent wars are

becoming more and more prevalent, and more costly than before. This is not what was intended

from intellectual property regimes, but it is the result. Intellectual property laws are highly

susceptible to abuse. The rights we’ve artificially created are not doing the work we expect to

them to do. Rather than incentivizing creation, they’ve pushed many who don’t have a billion

dollar bankroll out of patent war-heavy markets because they can’t afford to litigate, even when

justice would be on their side. As for the giants who can afford to litigate, it holds their creation

and innovation back for years unless they simply continue to disregard intellectual property law.

2.7 - Conclusion

I hoped to have provided doubts as to whether or not the mainstream utilitarian economic

theory of intellectual property actually maximizes utility. The claim that the current intellectual

property regime (or a regime which had even more extensive intellectual property rights)

maximally encourages innovation or inevitably maximizes utility via innovation is extremely

contentious. There are possibly alternative regimes which don’t include our current intellectual

property rights which maximize incentive and utility. Further, this mainstream utilitarian

economic theory appears to contribute the poverty and misery of the global poor. It is quite

possible that abolishing intellectual property rights would immensely help the impoverished, and

subsequently be a part of whatever economic regime actually maximizes utility. Lastly, the nature

of intellectual property, in contrast to physical property, makes enforcement extremely difficult

and results in inefficient use of resources. This is especially seen in the patent wars.

CHAPTER 3. – AN ALTERNATIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY BASED

ON HUMAN FLOURISHING

3.1 - Introduction

This chapter is a sketch of an alternative theory or view of intellectual property based on

neo-Aristotelian teleological and virtue concepts. The conclusions about intellectual property in

this chapter will remain compatible with the conclusions I’ve drawn in the previous chapters, but

will arrive at a similar perspective on intellectual property rights in a different way. This chapter

is a sketch of a much larger project. I cannot explain or defend everything, but I hope to provide a

loose framework and direction for this larger project, while pointing out major obstacles and

important claims which require more explanation and justification.

I will offer a fairly traditional moral framework – not explicitly a virtue theory, but one

with similar grounds. Within this framework I will argue for an obligation to intellectually

flourish, which will be the source of particular intellectual property rights or lack thereof.

3.2 – Human Function and Flourishing

The assumed framework for this chapter is a perfectionist, objective, and substantive

account of the human good, our well-being, and excellence. I am not in a position to justify or

even substantiate a complete account of the human good in this chapter. I rely upon teleological,

aretaic, and eudaimonic concepts which I cannot wholly defend. Exactly all of what counts as

human flourishing (eudaimonia) is not something I can flesh out in this mere chapter, but there

are obvious examples of flourishing: nourishing ourselves, appropriately resting and sleeping,

living as social creatures and citizens, and being sheltered. Various aspects of flourishing are less

intuitive to some people. For the purpose of this chapter, which is concerned with reaching

conclusions about intellectual property, I will assume and mostly focus upon the claim that being

an excellent human specimen is largely predicated upon fulfilling our function as humans, a

function deeply related to intellectual property.

One of the root assumptions of this chapter is that humans have a specific, shared, and

species-wide function. In large part, I believe the fundamental, unchanging function of humans is

the activity of thinking. Aristotle was basically right about this. We are thinking things–which is

essential to who and what we are as humans. Humans exist to learn, to cultivate our minds, to

ponder, to understand reality, to experience, to appreciate aesthetic beauty, to participate in

political life and society, to read and watch and hear the ideas of others, to find truth, and to

intellectually pursue whatever counts as being relevant and valuable. Our function is thinking,

and that is the essence of being human. Fulfilling our function is a vital part of human flourishing

or living well. Or one might say, following the influential work of Amartya Sen and Martha

Nussbaum, that thinking is a fundamental human capability whose exercise is necessary for

minimally decent human life.

I will refer to intellectual flourishing as fulfilling our function and living in accordance

with reason. We might find such a perfectionist theory worrisome, in some ways. For instance,

one might think we’ve boxed the human function in such a way that we lack variety or plurality

of lives that can be said to be flourishing. Not everyone must fit a very specific cookie-cutter

mold. There are topics about which all humans need to be literate and constantly engaging our

minds (literature, math, politics, etc.). These are necessary intellectual realms. Not everyone,

however, needs to learn to play a musical instrument or become a grandmaster chess player. Even

music and chess, however, might sometimes be the only means to intellectual flourishing for

someone. We must keep all avenues of intellectual flourishing open. Some people are suited to

flourish intellectually in ways that others are not.

Intellectual flourishing is one of the primary and necessary conditions for living well, but

it is not the only condition. Human flourishing consists of some sort of balance between leading

ethical lives, intellectual flourishing, and biologically thriving. The exact priority of each of these

conditions to flourishing isn’t clear. It seems, however, that biologically thriving generally serves

as a means to the other two, even if it is an end as well. Thinking and leading ethical lives (which

may just be a subset of thinking and mental action) are primary. This line of thought is more or

less aligned with Nussbaum’s approach and list of capabilities.

For one to attain eudaimonia, to maximally partake of the human good, to flourish as a

human, and to live well, one must flourish intellectually. The good human life requires that we

think and employ reason in the right ways, at the right times, about the right things, and to the

right extent. Similar things can be said for the other conditions necessary for attaining

eudaimonia. For instance, the good human life requires one to eat the right foods, in the right

quantities, at the right times, and so on.

These activities necessary for human flourishing are largely compatible with each other,

often intertwined and deeply connected, and rarely at odds. There are, however, exceptions. For

example, sometimes the ethical thing to do will require us to sacrifice our biological well-being.

Such a sacrifice is morally right, but it does not lead to our own maximal human flourishing

individually. Somehow we do not partake of the human good as much as we would have if we

weren’t put in a position where we had to sacrifice our biological well-being. Human flourishing

is not always accessible or practically available to us – sometimes it isn’t our fault that we aren’t

flourishing. Our well-being and the degree to which we partake of the human good is usually a

mix between circumstances outside our control and some choices over which we do have control.

Consider the following example.

Proper nourishment is a necessary condition for biologically thriving, and as such, it is a

necessary condition for human flourishing. With respect to nourishment, a starving person in a

third world nation is not living a good human life as effectively as a healthy, well-fed person who

takes her vitamins in a first world nation. The starving person is eudaimonically impoverished; to

some extent he isn’t flourishing as a human being because he isn’t biologically thriving. The

well-fed person is a better human specimen in this respect. She isn’t a better human of her own

volition (in large part) – rather, her flourishing and partaking of the human good is largely

circumstantial. We must realize her choices about what are right and wrong are distinct from the

degree to which she partakes of the human good. Circumstances, often outside our control, have

a profound impact upon human flourishing.

Being an excellent human and living the good human life likewise requires that we

flourish intellectually. To not flourish intellectually is a supreme type of impoverishment. All else

being equal, the man who knows algebra is a better human specimen than the man who doesn’t.

Likewise, the woman who engages in systematic and disciplined thinking is living a better

human life than the woman who does not engage in this activity. Humans who aren’t functioning

as humans aren’t flourishing. This, of course, brings up worries. After all, do we really want

classify one human being as intrinsically better than another, particularly when they had no

choice in the matter?

Let us consider the case of a human with Down syndrome as a worrisome example for the

eudaimonic model. A cognitively impaired human is not living the good life to the fullest extent.

He lacks well-being to some degree. He cannot and does not completely partake of the human

good. Since he has Down syndrome, he is not flourishing intellectually, and, therefore, he cannot

fully achieve eudaimonia. I think we intuitively know this already – this is why sympathy and

pity are appropriate responses toward a human with Down syndrome. Something vital is missing

in the lives of the cognitively impaired.

The implications of the claim that such a person is not flourishing may cause us to cringe.

All else being equal, this cognitively impaired human being is not living as well as a human who

is cognitively functional. Again, assuming everything else is equal, somehow the cognitively

functional man without Down syndrome is a better human specimen, leading a better human life,

than the man with Down syndrome. Our impulse might be to deny such claims. Positing human

inequalities, eudaimonic or otherwise, may lead us to draw false conclusions – talk of human

supremacy has a very troubled past. The worry is that placing eudaimonic values on human lives,

comparing each individual against an objective standard of the human good, while demonstrating

that some humans are superior or more excellent than others, may somehow lead us to treat poor

human specimens inhumanely and unethically. Such treatment, however, is not deducible from

recognizing when, where, who, how and why various humans are better or worse human

specimens, partaking of the human good in different degrees, than other humans. Eudaimonic

inequality does not remove one’s fundamental human rights (or our duties to such people); as we

shall see later in this chapter, eudaimonic inequality can actually bring with it many claim rights

of the impoverished (to which others are obligated).

In examining the human good, we must define when, where, and to what extent a human

is responsible for his or her lack of flourishing. To the extent that one is not flourishing because

of Down syndrome, one is not at fault. Genetic circumstance, rather than choice, has forced this

human into eudaimonic impoverishment. He is not accountable for his lack of human flourishing

in this respect. Consider, however, how cognitive impairment isn’t always just a matter of

circumstance – some people choose to permanently impair their minds. The person who regularly

gives in to laziness (choosing not to learn and think) or habitually abuses a dangerous substance

which impairs cognitive development is intellectually impoverished. These cases are different

from the human with Down syndrome. The constantly lazy, or habitual users of dangerous

substances, have elected to impoverish themselves intellectually, and as such, they are culpable

to that extent. The issue of responsibility leads us to the next important assumption of this

project.

3.3 - Our Obligations to Flourish

The distinction between the human good and what is morally right/wrong is essential to

this theory. The standard by which we judge moral action is parasitic upon the human good. Our

obligations and rights are grounded and interpreted in virtue of the human good. To partake in the

human good is not always up to us, and yet sometimes it is. The degree to which others partake

in the human good is not always up to us either, and yet sometimes it is. In those cases in which

it is our choice to influence or determine when humans can partake of the human good

(flourishing), rights and obligations are formed.

I take for granted that we as humans have extensive obligations to ourselves to flourish

and to enable others to flourish. We are morally required to ensure that we as individuals are

existing and growing as humans ought. Further, we should help others flourish as human beings,

as well. Insofar as it is up to us, we are morally responsible to flourish as a species.

This is not out of line with the neo-Aristotelian tradition. Our human telos, namely

flourishing and living well, is not merely descriptive. It is the normative standard by which we

judge the well-being of humans. These aretaic and eudaimonic concepts come pre-built with

prescriptive powers. We are obligated to flourish, and as such we are obligated to take the means

necessary to that end. Those conditions necessary for human flourishing form more particular

obligations. We ought to lead ethical lives, we ought to thrive biologically, and we ought to

flourish intellectually. A cascade of obligations flow out of these conditions for human

flourishing.

It is perhaps more intuitive to see why we have obligations to ourselves to flourish as

individuals. Surely we should take care of ourselves and improve ourselves. We should not waste

our lives. We are responsible for ourselves. Our obligation to flourish is almost common sense.

Our obligations to others, specifically to enable others to flourish, are perhaps less clear and

obvious.

It seems easy to run into cases where interests conflict. For example, your personal

flourishing is limited when you sacrifice resources to enable someone else’s flourishing. Exactly

where and how we draw these lines of obligation are beyond the scope of this paper, but is an

important obstacle to be dealt with when approaching my larger project. This worry of moral

precision is complex. For this paper, I assume, even if I cannot justify or fully explain, that we

have extensive obligations to others in virtue of their humanity.

Let us bring back our nourishment example. The starving person in a third world nation is

not morally responsible for failing to flourish – there is no food available. To that extent, we

cannot hold that individual accountable for not attaining or maintaining eudaimonia. The wellfed

person in a first world nation, likewise, is largely not responsible for living in her circumstances,

in this case, circumstances in which food is plentiful. We cannot praise the wellfed person for

flourishing with respect to circumstances which are outside her control. The wellfed person,

however, is responsible to eat healthily when possible and not in conflict with other duties. To

that extent, the person is responsible for her personal nourishment and flourishing – she is

morally praiseworthy insofar as she is responsible for her own successful flourishing and

excellence.

Each individual has responsibilities to nourish themselves, to thrive biologically, and to

flourish intellectually insofar as they are capable. Being a good human, however, is not always

up to us – sometimes being a good human requires others to help us, as in the case of the starving

person, who requires our aid (which presumably we could provide). We who live in abundance

have obligations to starving people. We must enable them to flourish. We must provide for them

the means to attain the basic, vital, and essential conditions to human flourishing. We have more

than just eudaimonic obligations to ourselves; we also have extensive obligations to others.

Equivalently, starving people have extensive rights to receive aid and to be enabled to nourish

themselves.

Intellectual flourishing is similar. The person with Down syndrome is not morally

responsible for not flourishing intellectually because of a genetic defect outside of his control.

That person, however, is responsible for cultivating himself insofar as it is up to him.

Furthermore, we have obligations to provide for him, to practically enable him to reach his

potential. Conversely, people who are habitually too lazy to cultivate their minds or who

capriciously and violently damage their minds are doing something immoral. They are

responsible for these actions, and they are responsible for failing to flourish.

Similar to the nourishment example, intellectual flourishing of our species is not just a

personal obligation to ourselves, it includes an expansive set of obligations to others. Providing

education (in a very broad sense of this term) and the resources necessary to flourish

intellectually is our crucial and collective obligation to every human. Fulfilling our function as

much as possible requires planning and infrastructure; it also requires that we invest in others.

We are morally required to maximally enable our species to cultivate our minds and to fulfill our

human function.

Flourishing intellectually is just as important as thriving biologically, perhaps even more

important. It would be better to live as a crippled scholar than as an uneducated and willfully

ignorant gymnast who has his health and is thriving biologically. Not only are we required to

feed and nourish others’ bodies, we must feed and nourish their minds. We are doing something

immoral by not enabling others to flourish intellectually, just as it is immoral to refuse to provide

food, and/or ways to acquire food, to those who need it.

This obligation to others has far reaching consequences. For the purpose of this paper, I

wish to concentrate on the problem of obstructing others from flourishing intellectually. With

some exceptions, it is generally immoral to prevent others from fulfilling their human function. It

would be immoral, for example, to prevent poor children or a particular ethnicity from attending

school, or reading books, or using the internet. These people are human, and like all other people,

they have a right to have an education. Similarly, intellectual property rights, as we employ them

today, are an obstruction to human flourishing, an obstruction for which we are morally

responsible.

3.4 – Ideas of Intellectual Flourishing as the Means to Flourishing The ideas

protected by intellectual property claims, whatever they may be, are the ingredients and mediums

of the human function. Ideas, concepts, designs, theories, books, music, movies, and whatever

else is involved in intellectual property (and perhaps even more) are the very things which are

necessary for intellectual flourishing. We must use and implement these ideas, many of which are

artificially protected by intellectual property rights, to fulfill our function.

These ideas are the building blocks of thinking. They are the necessary and fundamental

components of fulfilling our human function. Without having the access necessary to use and

implement them, we are impoverished, not just intellectually, but also biologically.

It is fairly obvious how the use and implementation of these ideas are necessary for our

cognitive development. These are the primary objects of cognition. Ideas are directly used or

handled in our minds. Material objects must be used or implemented to enable further cognitive

development. Printed media has accelerated how we pass information and knowledge on to

others. Music notation and sound recording devices have enabled us to pass on phonic art and

original lectures and speeches. Video synergizes our senses, efficiently passing on cultural,

aesthetic, and educational information to others. Reflect on what the abacus or computer has

enabled in terms of intellectual flourishing. We would not be able to develop our minds and

fulfill our intellectual telos without using and implementing objects of intellectual flourishing.

Implementation provides other indirect benefits to fulfilling our intellectual telos as well.

Take the case of Norman Borlaug, a man famous for changing agriculture around the world,

many of us owe our lives to this man. Borlaug discovered or created the processes which doubled

crop yields around the world. His work is not solely for academics or for the sake of Borlaug’s

personal intellectual flourishing. The use and implementation of these ideas are necessary for

human flourishing in other respects – directly impacting how we nourish ourselves as a species,

and indirectly freeing up time and energy, while allowing us to pursue even greater intellectual

flourishing. They open the gates to be better humans, individually and as a species.

Ideas of all sorts are necessary to intellectual flourishing; they are instrumental means to

our function, and also therefore to our end as human beings. To be obligated to achieve an end is

to be obligated to the necessary conditions and means for that end. We are obligated to use and

implement the objects of intellectual property because they are part of the necessary means to

achieving intellectual flourishing.

Granted, it isn’t clear how we know which intellectual objects are necessary as means to

our flourishing, intellectually and otherwise. Some intellectual objects are clearly more relevant

to our flourishing than others, and I’m unsure exactly which objects have absolutely no possible

instrumental value to human flourishing. In the future, when developing my larger project related

to intellectual property rights, I must address and substantiate/support the following claim: the

number of objects which have no possible instrumental value to human flourishing, is

exceedingly small. Some people already have this intuition, but for others, I may need to provide

a wide-ranging set of cases and empirical evidence to support the claim.

Essentially, virtually all the objects of intellectual property must be made available to

humanity. Some objects are necessary for everyone (literature, math, politics, etc.), and some

objects are necessary for a few (musical instruments and chess). These objects must be freely

available if we are to flourish as a species. Further, we are obligated to use and implement these

objects to fulfill our function. Moreover, we should enable others to use and implement these

objects, and we should not impede others from accessing, using, and implementing these objects

because these are the means to flourishing.

3.5 - The Right to Flourish

Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is an empirical method of institutional reform

that is derived from the normative claims that the freedom to achieve well-being as a human

being is of vital moral importance and that this freedom can only be understood relative to the

capabilities of individuals to realize it: that is, individuals must have real opportunities to live

well and to flourish as human beings.

Their approach and my sketch are rooted in the same general kind of eudaimonism and

picture of the human good. An account of human flourishing or human good defined by the

essential functions and characteristics of humans is needed for the capability approach to produce

tangible and substantial claims on which to apply its methodology.

Martha Nussbaum describes her "thick vague theory of the good” as “an account of the

most important functions of the human being, in terms of which human life is defined. The idea

is that once we identify a group of especially important functions in human life, we are then in a

position to ask what social and political institutions are doing about them.” The capability

approach is a method, arguably a heuristic device for justice, built upon this teleological view of

humankind. This is the approach:

[1] We assume human life has a function(s) and a set of essential features; [2] we identify

those properties in terms of functions/achievements and capabilities/opportunities, and set them

as a metric or standard of human flourishing; [3] we go out into the world to test and observe

whether or not, and to what degree, social and political institutions (like the basic structure in

Rawls) are promoting and enabling humans in their domains to flourish according to our metrics;

[4] if these standards aren’t reached, if humans aren’t flourishing as they should, if our social

order performs poorly to any degree on our metrics, then we look to see how to reform or

revolutionize public policies of these institutions in order for them to better enable and promote

human flourishing; [5] go back to step 3, rinse and repeat.

The capability approach is not just interested in being able to describe what counts as

flourishing – it wants to prescribe how we can bring about flourishing on a global scale. The

sketch I’m offering in this chapter is more or less aligned with the capability approach in this

goal.

Intellectual flourishing can be found in the central human capabilities that Nussbaum

outlines. She outlines the ability to use and engage our senses, imagination, thought, experience,

emotions, practical reason, among others, as central human capabilities – as essential teleological

features of humans. Intellectual property rights are certainly a matter of great interest to the

capability approach.

The capability approach is interested in measuring how public policy, including the

quality and quantity intellectual property rights, generates or fails to generate circumstances in

which humans maximally flourish. Current intellectual property rights do not merely interfere

with our efforts to exercise our intellectual capabilities, but they generate a material circumstance

for a majority of the world in which we can’t maximally exercise our intellectual capacities, and

thus we fail as a species to maximally flourish.

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