Introduction The international response to the crisis

The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and

decisive; where in many other cases of mass atrocity crimes, the international community has

failed to generate timely and sufficient political will to protect civilians at risk. The reaction

in the case of Libya has been more explicitly connected to the principle of the responsibility

to protect (R2P) than any other crisis before. To illustrate, as part of the Arab Spring, a

popular uprising erupted against the president of Libya in February 2011; after few days from

the outbreak of the popular uprising in Tunisia and Egypt. During the early days of the

popular uprising, the Libyan regime “launched a brutal crackdown and pro-Qaddafi forces

started to push eastward, threatening the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Fearing a bloodbath,

the international community responded swiftly” in order to save the innocent lives in Libya,

as just one week after the Libyan security forces had begun to violently suppress protests on

15 February 2011, the United Nations Security Council issued a press statement that called on

the Libyan government “to meet its responsibility to protect its population;”

Then, within weeks of the conflict escalating, the United Nations Security Council

adopted resolution 1970 followed by the adoption of resolution 1973. Both resolutions were

unusually quick and decisive; they referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal

Court, created an arms embargo and targeted sanctions, authorized the use of force, and

created a no-fly zone over Libya. In addition, resolution 1973, which was adopted on

March 17, required all necessary measures to be taken to protect civilians in Libya. As such

within two days from the adoption of the resolution, France led coalition launched air and

missile strikes against the Libyan forces, then later on, the responsibility for what was called

Operation Unified Protector was quickly transferred to NATO. “In policing the arms embargo

and patrolling the no-fly zone over Libya through aerial attacks on pro-Qaddafi forces and

military equipment, NATO’s intervention helped to tip the balance in the conflict in favour of

the Libyan opposition”. By early October 2011, the Libyan National

Transitional Council (NTC), the anti- Qaddafi group which was established on 27 February

2011, had secured control over the entire country and rebels had captured and killed Al

Qaddafi. In turn, the international community put an end to the Operation Unified Protector

on 31 October 2011.

Later on, the international community decided to have a role in helping the Libyans

building up their country by providing assistance through the United Nations Support Mission

in Libya (UNSMIL). To illustrate, after six months from the beginning of the armed conflict

in the Libya, the United Nations in September 2011 established a political mission to support

the country’s new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. The Security Council

has settled certain target to the UNSMIL including helping restoring the public security,

promoting the rule of law, and assisting the Libyan authorities in strengthening human rights,

and since then the United Nations has been keen to renew and extend the mandate of the

mission frequently; while aiming to help in ending the ongoing instability and chaos that the

Libyans are suffering from since 2011.

In this context, it cannot be denied that the intervention in Libya represents a turning

point in the humanitarian intervention debate regarding the responsibility of the international

community to intervene in a sovereign state to protect civilians from mass atrocities. 0 The use

of coercive measures against a state, such as sanctions and referrals to the International

Criminal Court, has been proven to be controversial in the United Nations Security Council;

however, the use of force has been the most controversial tool in the debates on R2P and the

protection of civilians since the beginning.1 Significantly, resolution 1973 marked the first

time the Security Council authorized the non-consensual use of force for the protection of

civilians against a functioning state,2 since the principle by the UN at the 2005 World Summit

was endorsed. Libya raised questions that had already been debated during the intervention in

Kosovo and discussed in much details in the 2001 report of the International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which first proposed the principle of R2P: what

should be the role of force in protecting populations from atrocity crimes? 3 As such, the

adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1973, the authorization

of the use of coercive measures to protect civilians and “the ensuing of the military

intervention in Libya have been widely hailed as events of historic

importance.”4

Furthermore, according to the director of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to

Protect, the intervention in Libya represents “a key turning point in the history of R2P” 5, the

debates changed from a “battle around ideas to a battle around implementation”6. To explain,

the transitional setting in Libya was a moment of enthusiasm and hopes inside the country.

The rebuilding of the state was considered a crucial task with lots of expectations attached to

it7; however, few years later, Libya has been characterized by state collapse, anarchy and

chaos, with conflict between ever-changing alliances of armed groups, terrorism with the

expansion of the Islamic State and uncontrolled borders with waves of migrants crossing the

Libyan desert northward then from Libyan shores toward Europe.8

Such deteriorations led to debates regarding the intervention, as a principle, and its

outcome and whether it is a real tool of protection to the civilians under threat or its results

may increase their harmfulness. The majority of the literature on humanitarian intervention

focuses on the dilemma and debates regarding the ethics, legality, types of intervention,

intervening actors; however, there is less focus on the dilemma of the outcome of the

intervention. This research aims to evaluate the consequences of the intervention, while

having Libya as a case study, in order to figure out whether the intervention in Libya is

considered successful or not; in addition to focusing on determining the factors behind the

deteriorating situation in Libya and if it is a result of the intervention itself, or there are other

factors that lead to the current situation.

Research Question:

Using Libya as a case study, this thesis is trying to answer to the following questions:

1. To what extent is the international community committed to protect the civilians in the

humanitarian crises?

2. Evaluate and analyze the factors contributed to the success/failure of the international

intervention, while drawing lessons for the future of intervention.

These two questions will be divided into the following sub questions: What are the factors

that compel the international community to intervene in the humanitarian crises? Are these

standards applicable to the case of Libya? As compared to many other humanitarian crises,

why did the international community decide to intervene in Libya after only two months from

the outbreak of the popular uprising? What are the standards of an effective intervention?

Hypothesis:

This thesis is arguing that the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the fragility

of the Libyan state are the main factors behind the collapse of Libya.

There are many factors that can explain the current collapse of Libya; one of which is

the abuse of the humanitarian intervention; as the military intervention has exceeded its

objectives in many different ways. It took actions that were inconsistent with its main target

of protecting the civilians in Libya, by engaging in the process of fostering regime change. In

addition, the fragility of the Libyan state is the other factor that has led to the intensification

of the current deteriorated situation and the collapse of the state. To explain, before the

popular uprising, all the institutions used to be under the control and influence of Al Qaddafi,

and his regime, so that when he felt, the state had to be re-built from scratch. Consequently,

Libya is now lacking the functioning state structure, and this led the country to face a high

level of instability, unable to control the armed militias that are committing human rights

violations and hindering the efforts of rebuilding the country.

In spite of the international efforts to protect the civilians in Libya and to help the

country in its democratic transition, Libya has been “overrun by militias and is facing an

intensified human rights violations, mounting chaos that is infecting other countries, growing

internal splits, and even about to reach a failed state.”9 Thus, this study aims to figure out the

effect of the intervention on the current situation in Libya while arguing that there are many

international and domestic factors that negatively affect the success of the intervention in

Libya, and led to the collapse of Libya.

This research is divided into four chapters, in addition to the introduction. The first

chapter gives a brief overview of the principle of the humanitarian intervention, and how it

has been developed throughout history, the dilemma of its ethical and legal perspectives; in

addition to highlighting the different tools of intervention. The international intervention as a

principle has been promoted by Liberalism; therefore, this chapter also clarifies how the

liberal theorists perceive the principle of the humanitarian intervention and their arguments

for it as well as the criticism directed against it. Chapter 3 focuses on Libya as a case study

for the international intervention; while starting with giving an overview on the situation in

Libya before and during the 2011 popular uprising, then refer to the response of the

international community towards the situation in Libya at that time and its intervention to

protect the civilians under threat. Then, chapter 4 focuses on the situation in Libya post the

2011 intervention while evaluating the outcome of the international community intervention

in 2011 and the reasons behind the deterioration of the situation in Libya since that time.

Finally, the conclusion evaluates the role of the international community in protecting

civilians under threat while drawing lessons for the future of the humanitarian intervention.

Chapter II

Literature Review

This chapter gives a brief overview on the principle of the humanitarian intervention,

starting by its definition, the emergence of the principle and how it has been developed

throughout history, then this section will refer to the dilemma of the principle of the

humanitarian intervention while focusing on the debates regarding its morality and legality, as

they are considered the main dilemma in all debates regarding this principle. In addition, this

section will highlight the different tools used by the international community when

intervening in the targeted state, as such intervention can be through the diplomatic channels,

economic sanctions or by using the military forces. International intervention as a principle

has been promoted by Liberalism, as such the second section of this chapter clarifies how the

liberalists perceive the principle of the humanitarian intervention and their arguments for it as

well as the criticism directed against it.

The Conceptual Framework:

2.1 What is meant by the Humanitarian Intervention?

J.L.Holzgrefe defines humanitarian intervention as the “use of force across state

borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave

violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own, without the

permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.”0 While clarifying that “they

are: non-forcible interventions such as the threat or use of economic, diplomatic, or other

sanctions; and forcible interventions aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state’s

own nationals. 1

Adam Roberts stated that the humanitarian intervention is a “military intervention in a

state, without the approval of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread

suffering or death among the inhabitants.”2 According to Martha Finnermore, “humanitarian

intervention is a military intervention with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of

foreign civilians.”3 Bhikhu Parekh believes that, “humanitarian intervention is an act of

intervention in the internal affairs of another country with the view to ending the physical

suffering caused by the disintegrations or gross misuse of authority of the state, helping create

conditions in which a viable structure of civil authority can emerge.”4 Furthermore, D.

J. B. Trim and Brendan Simms stated that “since the nineteenth century, has been termed

‘humanitarian intervention,’ that is, action by governments (or, more rarely, by organizations)

to prevent or to stop governments, organizations, or factions in a foreign state from violently

oppressing, persecuting, or otherwise abusing the human rights of people within that state.”5

Thus, although there is no exact definition for humanitarian intervention, it was agreed

that it reflects the use of force with the aim of helping the non-nationals; for the sake of

preventing the gross of violations of human rights on behalf of people other than their own

nationals, through the use of armed force.6 In other words it is “the use of military force to

protect foreign populations from mass atrocities or gross human rights abuses”27

2.2 The Emergence/ development of the principle of Humanitarian Intervention

“The birth of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention is associated with natural law

and early international law.”8 The early discussions of the principle of humanitarian

intervention can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth century classical writers on

international law, particularly in their discussions on just wars. As Philosopher Jurist and

scholar Hugo Grotius mooted the principle of right to use force on humanitarian ground in the

seventeenth century. Thereafter number of interventions took place till date. 9

To illustrate, “The father of international law Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) aspired to

regulate international relations by introducing new political and moral standards, among other

provisions concerning respect for sovereignty and contracted agreements.0 In order to

promote international order; he further refined the “just war” doctrine stressing that wars were

only allowed if based on specific legal reason. In his opinion a right to popular uprising

existed, in extreme cases of tyranny, for the subjects of a prince. 1

The states are entitled to exercise the right vested in human society on behalf of

oppressed individuals. “The Grotian formulation allows the full-scale use of force to end

human suffering. There has been a strong Grotian tradition in international relations and this

idea is represented today by writers such as Vincent, Lillich and Lauterpacht. Throughout the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, philosophers of political liberalism, such as Mill, related

the principle of humanitarian intervention to the concept of human rights.” 2

Apart from these intellectual precursors, the modern principle of humanitarian

intervention is generally associated with state practices in the nineteenth century, when states

started to invoke humanitarian reasons to justify their interventions. “The well-cited cases

were generally directed against the Ottoman Empire for the protection of Christians, such as

the Greek War for Independence, Lebanon-Syria, the Bulgarian Agitation and Armenia.”3

Since the end of the Second World War, an international effort has been undertaken to protect

civilians in armed conflict and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In

1948 the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was

adopted by the United Nations and entered into force three years later. “The Convention was

the steppingstone in the international community’s attempt to ensure the horrors witnessed

during the Holocaust would never occur again. However, the resounding promise of “Never

Again” would prove to be hollow”.4

By the end of the Cold War, discussion on human rights and its promotion at the

international level has proliferated. The emerging international system and the global wave of

democratization have enabled human rights groups to exert more pressure and persuasion on

liberal states and international organizations to take up the promotion of human rights.

Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized

by the increasing possibilities for international cooperation among major powers.35

To illustrate, a singular development of the post-Cold War era is the use of military

force to protect human beings. Throughout history, humanitarian intervention has occurred in

a number of instances in the post-Cold War. “Some of the more significant interventions, of

quite varying natures are: the establishment of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq in

1991 to protect, respectively, the Kurdish refugees and the Marsh Arabs; Bosnia-Herzegovina

(1992-95); Somalia (1992); Cambodia (1994); Rwanda (1994); Haiti (1994) by a U.S.

intervention force; Albania (1997) by an Italian intervention force; Kosovo (1998-99); Sierra

Leone (1999); East Timor (1999), etc.”6

Following the mentioned tragedies of the 1990s, especially those that took place in

Rwanda and the Balkans, the international community began to seriously debate on how to

react effectively when “citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematically violated.”7 These

events raise the question of the responsibility of the international community when states are

neither able nor willing to protect their own populations. The question at the heart of such

matter was whether the states have unconditional sovereignty over their interests and affairs or

the international community has the right to intervene in another country for humanitarian

purposes.38 In this regards, according to Christina Gabriela Badescu, despite extensive

consideration, “no consensus was reached on the principles governing humanitarian

intervention.”39 To its proponents, intervention simply signals the imperative of action in the

face of mass violence and is intertwined with a perception of sovereignty as conditional to a

state’s respect for the human rights of its citizens. To its detractors, humanitarian intervention is

an oxymoron that serves as a pretext for selective military intervention without legal sanctions

and an exercise that only achieves uncertain results. Badescu clarified that throughout the

1990s controversy resigned- particularly over Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, between

supporters of a right of humanitarian intervention and those who argued that state sovereignty

precluded any intervention in the internal matters of a state where egregious human rights

violation took place.0

At the 54th session of the UN General Assembly in 1999, Kofi Annan, the Former UN

Secretary General, challenged member states to prevent having another Rwanda and to reach

consensus on the issue of humanitarian intervention. This moment was soon dubbed by

commentators as the trigger for the search to produce a new perspective framework for the

contentious humanitarian intervention debate. The response to this question was the creation

of the principle of the responsibility to protect,1 while mentioning that state sovereignty is not

only a privilege but also a responsibility.

The international community declared its responsibility to protect populations from

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as according to the

outcome of the 2005 UN World Summit outcome, which was adopted by the UN general

assembly on 16 September 2005:

138. “Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations

from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This

responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement,

through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will

act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,

encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United

Nations in establishing an early warning capability”. 42

139. “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the

responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful

means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect

populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely

and decisive manner, through the Security Council , in accordance with the

Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with

relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be

inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their

populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against

humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration

of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic

cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the

principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit

ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to

protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes

against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and

conflicts break out.” 3

140. “We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-

General on the Prevention of Genocide.”4

Furthermore, according to the report of the security general, adopted in 2009, on the

implementation of the responsibility to protect there are three pillars to the process of R2P.

Pillar I: the protection and responsibility of the State; Pillar II: International assistance and

capacity building, and Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.45 To explain, according to

Lesley Connolly, Pillar I here refers to a state’s responsibility to protect its population and

country from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Pillar II is

the commitment of the international community to assist states in meeting the obligations of

protection of its people from genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. It seeks to

draw on the cooperation of member states, regional and sub-regional arrangements, civil

society and the private sector, as well as on the institutional strengths and comparative

advantages of the UN system. Prevention, building on pillars one and two, is a key ingredient

for a successful strategy for the responsibility to protect. Pillar III refers to a situation where a

state has failed to protect its citizens from mass atrocity and peaceful measures are not

working. When this happens, the international community has the responsibility to intervene

at first through diplomacy, and then through coercive means but only use military force as a

last resort. 6

In this regards, John Holme stated that “the third pillar of R2P is after all often seen as

the practical manifestation of an older idea of humanitarian intervention, given much

attention after the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica, the international community must never

again standby and watch atrocities take place without acting to stop them.”7

2.3 The Dilemma of the Humanitarian Intervention:

The principle of the humanitarian intervention raises several questions at several levels;

however, the main dilemma in all debates focuses on the ethics and legality of this concept.

2.3.1 Ethics (Human rights Vs. state sovereignty)

In his Millennium Report of 2000, the Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recalled

the failures of the Security Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the former

Yugoslavia, and put forward a challenge to Member States: “If humanitarian intervention is,

indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to

Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our

common humanity?”8 Annan’s much cited quotation encompasses the central dilemma of the

humanitarian intervention debate, namely the challenge of reconciling norms in international

law: sovereignty and human rights.

Humanitarian intervention has been considered a controversial issue, as many debates

between different schools of thought on whether or not the states have the right to intervene in

the affairs of the other states in cases of massive violation of human rights; many questions

have been raised regarding the ethics of intervention in the humanitarian crises. Some

scholars believe that humanitarian intervention in cases of extreme human rights abuse is at

the very least morally permissible; others believe that some cases of extreme human rights

abuse create a moral duty to intervene to stop the abuse.9 Thus, the principle and practice of

humanitarian intervention presents a seemingly insurmountable dilemma in global

governance: this dilemma is characterized by the tension between two fundamental principles

of international law: on the one hand, the prohibition of the use of force as it penetrate the

sovereignty of the states, while other is the obligation to respect and protect human rights.

According to Iain Atack, “Chomsky points out, this conflict is embodied in the two main

pillars of international law and international order, the UN Charter and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (UD): There is at least a tension, if not an outright

contradiction, between the rules of world order laid down in the Charter and the rights

articulated in the UD..The Charter bans force violating state sovereignty; the UD guarantees

the rights of individuals against oppressive states...The issue of humanitarian intervention

arises from this tension.”0

Iain Atack argued that the “Armed humanitarian intervention, or the use of military

force to protect the fundamental human rights of the citizens of another state, has become

increasingly prominent in debates about the role of ethics in international affairs.”51

“Questions concerning the violation of state sovereignty and the use of armed force, in

particular, have been central to debates about the morality of humanitarian intervention.”2

Ethical objections to such intervention focus on two issues in particular: the violation of

national sovereignty and the use of armed force with the concomitant loss of life and human

suffering entailed.”3

The definition of humanitarian intervention contains two main elements: one

purporting to grant a certain number of rights and privileges based on humanitarian principles

or human rights; while the other specifying the nature and limits of state sovereignty. In other

words, the question of the ethical status of humanitarian intervention arises from the conflict

of two traditions of thought, state sovereignty and human rights.

But before going into such dilemma, we have to know first what is meant by

Sovereignty. The sovereignty of states is the foundation of interstate relations for the past

several centuries. It is also the basis of the modern world order. “But the idea of sovereignty

traces back to ancient Rome where was formulated as the power of the Emperor and to XVI

century when Jean Bodin defines the sovereign as a ruler subjected only to the natural law,

divine law and the law of nations ”. 4 Sovereignty is “the most high, absolute and perpetual

power over the citizens and subjects in a Commonweal...the greatest power to command.”5

Hugo Grotius defined sovereignty as “power whose acts are not subject to the control

of another, so that they may be made void by the act of any other human will.”6 Thomas

Hobbes “regarded sovereignty as absolute, unified, inalienable, based upon a voluntary but

irrevocable contract” 7According to the number of international law researchers, the concept

of state sovereignty was established in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 which ended almost

three decades of war in Europe and indicated new order, based on the national sovereignty.

The Peace of Westphalia “did not sanction the right of rulers to do whatever they pleased

within their own territories”8

As the idea of the final and absolute authority in the state, the concept of sovereignty

is recognized in the United Nations Charter as one of the main principles of international law.

The principle of the sovereign equality of all states is adopted in art. 2(1) of the UN Charter.

The prohibition of interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states by other sovereign

states, especially of the threat of use of force lays down in art. 2(4). In order to promote the

sovereignty of states UN Charter in art. 2(7) stipulates that “nothing contained in the present

Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters that are essentially within

the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the Members to submit such matters to

settlement under the present Charter.”9

The proponents of the humanitarian intervention believe that the concept of

humanitarian intervention is at its core about protecting people. “It rests on the premise that

when gross abuses of human rights are taking place, when innocent people are being maimed

and killed, then the international community cannot and should not stand idly by.” 0 This is

because the major responsibility of states, governments, and the international community is to

protect and secure human rights, the rights that all persons have by virtue of personhood

alone. In addition, Mark Crovelli argued that the “Governments and others in power who

seriously violate those rights undermine the one reason that justifies their political power, and

thus should not be protected by international law.”1 Furthermore, “State Sovereignty entails

responsibility, and therefore each State has a responsibility to protect its citizens from mass

killings and other gross violations of their rights. If that State is unable or unwilling to carry

out that function, the state abrogates its sovereignty and the responsibility to protect falls to

the international community.”2

On the other hand, opponents of the concept of humanitarian intervention believe that

the humanitarian intervention erodes the principle of sovereignty, which has been successfully

governing the world since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. They argue that respecting the

sovereignty of the other states is a fundamental principle in international relations; in which

the norm of non-intervention is enshrined in Article 2.7 of the UN

Charter. According to the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty “A sovereign state is empowered in international law to exercise exclusive and

total jurisdiction within its territorial borders. Other states have the corresponding duty not to

intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. If that duty is violated, the victim state

has the further right to defend its territorial integrity and political independence.”63 In other

words, sovereignty gives states the legal right to manage their internal affairs free from

outside interference and prevents powerful states intervening in weaker states; even if such

intervention is for the protection of the civilians, as it is considered a kind of intervention in

the internal affairs of the state; which is against the principle of sovereignty. Boberic Dragana

stated that “while P5 states purport to be in favour of territorial integrity and sovereignty of

states, the reality is at times starkly different; humanitarian intervention has been cited as a

valid reason to suspend the associated rights of state sovereignty, as the example of NATO

intervention in Kosovo clearly highlights. Operations Allied Force proceeded on 24 March

1999 without any explicit, or implicit, Security Council authorization, leading to

condemnation by the Russian Federation of aggression against a sovereign states, which was

undertaken in violation of the United Nations Charter in circumvention of the Security

Council.”4

2.3.2 The Legal Status of the Humanitarian Intervention According to the UN charter

The intervention of the international community in the states is a controversial issue, for

some politicians argue that it should not be allowed as it penetrate the sovereignty of the

states while others are encouraging it in order to save the civilians. But the question now is

how the United Nations perceives the concept of humanitarian intervention. The United

Nations Charter is widely seen as fundamentally non-interventionist in its approach. Taken as

a whole the Charter essentially limits the right of states to use force internationally to cases

of, first, individual or collective self-defence, and second, assistance in UN-authorized or

controlled military operations. Nowhere does the Charter address directly the question of

humanitarian intervention, whether under UN auspices or by states acting independently.

However, the Charter does set forth a number of purposes and rules, which are germane to

humanitarian intervention.5

A. Unauthorized Intervention

Since the Second World War, the international law has prohibited states from threatening

or using force except in self-defence or pursuant to Security Council authorization.66 In other

words, if humanitarian intervention is not authorized by the Security Council, its status under

the Charter is considerably more dubious.67 The strongest and most frequently cited

prohibitions on intervention are those in Article 2. To illustrate, article 2(4) states that ‘All

Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against

the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”8

Thus, this article reflect that the use of force in international relations is totally prohibited,

with only two exceptions: (1) as authorized by the Security Council , and (2) in exercise of

the right of self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter9 which stated that “Nothing in

the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if

an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council

has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by

Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the

Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the

Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems

necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security”0

Also relevant to the legality of humanitarian intervention is Article 2(3) of the Charter,

which states that “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in

such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”1 The

requirement that disputes be settled so that justice is not endangered may leave some room for

unauthorized humanitarian intervention under Article 2(3). At the very least, however, force

could not be the first resort; there would have to be a genuine attempt to achieve a peaceful

resolution in order to comply with Article 2(3).2

B. Authorized Intervention

As mentioned before the UN charter oppose the military intervention in the internal

affairs of the other countries, even if it is for protecting the civilians; however, it may be

allowed in the sever threats, with the permission of the Security Council. To explain, the

Security Council has the authority, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to conduct or

authorize humanitarian intervention. The keystone of the Security Council’s authority is

Article 39 of the Charter, which states that “The Security Council shall determine the

existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make

recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and

42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.73 Thus, The language of Article 39

expressly gives the Security Council the authority to determine what is a threat to the peace;

and in turn decide whether to authorize military intervention or not.

2.4 Debate over the tools of Intervention:

The form of intervention that could constitute part of the global arsenal in seeking the

protection of civilians is always a debatable issue, as there are different forms of intervention:

A. Diplomatic Intervention:

Raphael Soubeyran stated that it is a non-coercive, non-violent and ultimately

nonbinding form of intervention. “It is a voluntary process where a third party helps

antagonists to define and sign a peaceful agreement.”74 Diplomatic interventions normally

precede other forms of intervention and aim at either averting violent escalation of a conflict

or establishing

<http://journals.cambridge.org.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=192704&jid=SOY&volumeId=21&issueId=01

&aid=192703&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=>.

7 Stein, Mark S. “ Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention3..” Cambridge Journals: Social Philosophy and Policy. Volume 21.Issue 1

(2004): 14-38.

<http://journals.cambridge.org.library.aucegypt.edu:2048/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=192704&jid=SOY&volumeId=21&issueId=01

&aid=192703&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=>.

7 Soubeyran , Raphael, and Mathieu CouttenierRAN . “Diplomatic Intervention in Civil War : Trade for All or Tr4ade for One.”

<http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2011-08.pdf>.

conditions conducive to de-escalation.5 In addition, Patrick Regan argues that diplomatic

interventions can shorten the time of conflict, unlike the military or economic interventions,

which could increase the expected duration of a conflict.6 However, Stefan Wolff argued that

other scholars believe that the failure of diplomatic efforts to change the behavior of conflict

parties on the ground often leads to either more coercive measures applied to both parties or

selective coercion and/or support for individual parties7 B. Economic Intervention:

The states can intervene in the internal affairs of another state by imposing economic

sanctions. It is considered punitive measures taken by one or more states against another state

that have violated international law, or which poses a threat to national or international

security.8 In addition, the economic sanctions seek to lower the aggregate economic welfare

of a target state by reducing international trade or imposing any kind of economic pressure in

order to coerce the target government to change its political behavior.9 C. Military

Intervention:

Is the last solution for the international community; it is the use of force by states or

organization against another state with the goal of protecting the lives and welfare of the

foreign civilians and to prevent the gross of violations of human rights. But can the military

intervention help in promoting democracy and protecting human rights. According to

Mohammed Nuruzzaman “foreign military intervention to promote democracy and human

rights in the targeted states is a hotly debated issue. There are two camps of scholars who hold

diametrically opposed views on the linkages between military interventions, democracy and

human rights promotions.”0 He clarified that “Scholars in the pro-intervention camp

vigorously argue that military interventions are necessary to unseat autocratic regimes, save

the lives of people who aspire for democracy and promote human rights of the oppressed

peoples. Interventions, according to them, are the best and most effective ways to democratize

the authoritarian states and societies.” 1 According to Nuruzzaman “the antiintervention camp,

in contrast, rules out any positive connections between interventions and human rights and

democracy promotions on the ground that third-party interventions are harmful to domestic

reconciliation process and peace building in the target states. 2

The Theoretical Framework:

2.5 Liberalism and humanitarian intervention:

Liberal theorists believe that “(1) individual rights hold primacy over national interests

and sovereignty; (2) the natural state of man is peaceful; (3) the application of reason can

resolve conflicts of interest among individuals and states; (4) human nature is malleable and

improvable; (5) human society is progressively improving; (6) norms are more important than

power; (7) international institutions are effective means of promoting harmony; and (8)

military force should only be used in pursuit of altruistic objectives”. 3 According to Michael

J Smith, traditionally liberalism valued self-determination, community, and shared history.4

Liberalism also has a “more universalist conception of human rights in which sovereignty is a

subsidiary and a conditional value” 5. Under such a framework, humanitarian intervention

would clearly reflect moral and legal principles. Indeed, states who commit genocide or other

egregious human rights abuses break nearly all known moral codes and forfeit, according to

liberalism, their legitimacy and the right to govern their own states free from intervention.

Furthermore, Terry Nardin suggests that the non-intervention principle inherently accounts

for exceptions made to it: since “a state exists to protect the rights of its citizens, if it violates

those rights it loses its moral rationale and therefore its immunity from foreign interference”6.

Thus, liberal theorists appear to agree that the main purpose of humanitarian military

interventions is the preservation of human

security.7

The liberalists believe that the major role of states and governments is to protect and

secure human rights.8 The liberal cosmopolitan support of humanitarian intervention consists

of three assumptions: people have equal rights and freedoms which institutions exist to

protect, all people equally possess these rights and freedoms regardless of culture, religion,

state, etc., and finally, the protection of these rights is a concern for all individuals, states,

national and international organization.89

In this regards, it is worth to refer to the commitment of the international community

to protect the civilians under threat. To explain, protecting civilians under threat is an

obligation, not a choice; as the international community is committed to respond to mass

atrocity crimes or serious human rights violations to protect civilians under threat. There is an

international norm that civilians in war-affected situations should be protected from violence.

This norm has grown particularly strong since the end of the 1990s when there was a clear

shift in the global security agenda, putting the issue of protection of civilians at the forefront

of the responsibilities of the international community.0 As such the international community

has a humanitarian responsibility to intervene, even military, in order to protect vulnerable

individuals from violent threats. 1 In this context, the humanitarian intervention is seen as a

justified mechanism to respond to large-scale injustices associated with human rights

violations and as a method of law enforcement by the international community.2 As such, the

liberal concept of humanitarian intervention will be employed throughout the thesis to

evaluate the intervention in Libya.

It is important to note that the liberal principle of humanitarian intervention was

criticized by those who believe that so called humanitarian interventions are always guided by

real political interests and can never be purely moral in nature. Those realists are hostile to

any intervention said to be motivated by ethical reasons. As Smith puts it, states are “unable

to act in other than self-interested ways”.3

As the case of Libya will reveal, facing the threats of refugee flows, oil, and

terrorism, the international intervention decision was driven by perceived threat to intervening

states national interest. As applied to the international intervention in Libya, realism suggests

that states are “likely to intervene when the potential target of intervention poses a direct or

potential threat to their national interest (defined as territorial integrity or citizens), their

economy or a natural resource of major economic or security significance.” 4

As Lisa Anderson argues on Libya “For a century, international powers have believed

that the territories we now know as Libya could be turned to their purposes in the absence of

clear norms and standards for statehood and sovereignty.... Today, local politics reflect the

obvious conclusion: in the absence of integration into a stable international system,

interventionist impulses by outside powers serve not to induce social change or development

but only to sustain local political powerbrokers and fuel local political competition.”5

The realists refer to national self-interests as being the primary motives of intervening

states.6 Hans Morgenthau believes that “interest is the perennial standard by which political

action must be judged and directed”7; and therefore, the “objectives of a foreign policy must

be defined in terms of the national interest”.8 In addition, realists agree that there is no reason

to believe that when a state decides to get engaged in evolving humanitarian catastrophes

abroad, facing significant risks, assuming high costs and compromising national resources; it

does so for reasons other than self-interest.9 Thus, the realists are against the concept of

humanitarian intervention, as they do not believe that moral concerns should be allowed to

affect international relations, and they fear that intervention will produce further conflict and

destabilization.00

Chapter III

Libya’s 2011 Popular Uprising and Aftermath

While having Libya as a case study for evaluating the principle of the humanitarian

intervention, this chapter is going to firstly give a brief overview on Libya before the popular

uprising in 2011, in order to understand the internal situation under the leadership of Al

Qaddafi, while giving more attention to the economic situation in the country at that time.

Then, this chapter will cover the period of the outbreak of the popular uprising and how the

international community responded towards the violence used against the protesters at that

time, until the adoption of resolutions 1970 and 1973 by the UNSC. In this regards, the

factors behind the adoption of both resolutions, especially resolution 1973 which authorized

the international intervene in the country, will be highlighted.

Then, this chapter will discuss the legality and the implementations of resolution 1973

during the international military intervention stage, which ended up by the death of Al

Qaddafi in October 2011. Following the end of NATO’s mission in Libya, the international

community decided to help the Libyans in building up their country by providing assistance

through the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Such mission is considered

a non-military type of international humanitarian intervention.

3.1 Overview of Libya before the 2011 popular uprising:

3.1.1 Al Qaddafi reign to power:

Muammar Al Qaddafi came to power in Libya after leading a bloodless coup against

King Idris. On the first of September 1969, the Free Unionist Officers movement, led by Al

Qaddafi, executed a successful coup d’etat, overthrew the monarchical regime that had ruled

Libya since its independence in 1951. Since then, “Al Qaddafi has articulated a

comprehensive, well-thought-out ideology, grounded in the revolutionary trinity of freedom,

socialism and unity”.10 In other words, for much of the first two decades of the revolution, the

ideology of Al Qaddafi was defined in the familiar terms of “Arab nationalism, positive

neutrality, socialism, and Arab unity”.02 However, the internal and external pressures

combined to force Al Qaddafi to introduce small, but noteworthy, reforms in the second half

of the 1980s. Following a prolonged period of international isolation, “Al Qaddafi at the end

of the 1990s again began to tout significant reforms. In the process, most of the major

ideological tenets of the 1st of September revolution were modified, replaced, or

discarded.”03

3.1.2 The Rise of the Jamahiriya and the Origins of the Fragile State:

In the early 1970s, Al Qaddafi introduced his so-called the Third Universal Theory,

which advanced the idea that “people should directly run the activities and exercise the

powers of government”. 04 The result of this system over the years was the virtual absence of

any development of a state bureaucracy or any form of institutionalized governmental

structure. 05 Al Qaddafi’s political ideology was laid down in his famous book, named the

Green Book, that mixed Islamism with socialism; in which he considered this book a guide

for all humanity. His book emphasized popular rules, stateless society, and direct democracy,

and called for populist economic policies. “Playing on the traditional Libyan suspicion of the

state, Al Qaddafi claimed not to be part of it and set up a system of informal governing

institutions alongside the formal instruments of power.”06 He would “use these institutions to

control the political apparatus of the state while undermining and remaining formally

detached from it”.07 Furthermore, in 1977 the people of Libya proclaimed the Jamahiriya or

“government of the popular masses by themselves and for themselves.” 08 The Jamahiriya was

a higher form of direct democracy with “the People as President.” 09 Traditional institutions of

government were abolished and disbanded, and power belonged to the public directly through

various congresses and committees.10

The decision-making process under Al Qaddafi was restricted to a small team of

confidantes and advisors. Under Qaddafi’s rule, there was neither a constitution in the modern

sense nor political parties; the government used to operate on the basis of a complex web of

local structures built around family and tribal ties, business interests and other informal forms

of association.111 Though Qaddafi faced several coup attempts, he managed to hold on to

power. The Libyan uprising which started in February 2011 appears to be the most serious

challenge faced by Qaddafi in his 42-year-old rule.

3.1.3 Libya’s Tribalism

The tribal landscape must be understood along with Libya’s recent history, as the

country has not had political parties for more than four decades. Instead, Al Qaddafi had

encouraged the tribal system in order to use Libya’s tribes as a tool to strengthen his power

and ensure stability; in addition to filling the void left by the lack of the state effective

institutions. To explain, the tribal influence in the political process spread unofficially

through institutions, like the People’s Committees and People’s Congresses, through a system

of promotions and people’s selection since 1977. 12 Qaddafi believed that these institutions

were the best means to rule his people and represented the official national umbrella for all

the forces in Libya, with a practical focus on the tribal leadership in each region. 13 To

increase the loyalty of the tribes the Gaddafa tribe and to his regime; “Al Qaddafi took

several measures to support these tribes, including the 1990 law, which grants each tribe

exclusive ownership of land that was commonly theirs in the past, but has become part of the

urban real estate space.”14 In 1997, Al Qaddafi was receiving delegations from different tribes

in Libya who pledged faithfulness to him and were made to sign documents “of what was

known as the “document of honour” under which they pledged allegiance to the revolutionary

system, and to unite against any clan or tribe attempting armed opposition to the regime.” 15

This, it is believed, was the turning point in Libya’s social history. Qaddafi largely

encouraged tribalism so that he could control it and maintain power and “he did that by the

age-old tactic to divide and conquer.”16 In different periods of time, Qaddafi would empower

some tribes over others. The objective was to extend his power rather than the common

misconception that he controlled tribal rivalry by uniting them.17

3.1.4 The economic situation in Libya before the 2011 popular uprising:

A: Oil

Since the discovery of the commercially viable oil deposits in the mid-1950s, oil has

decisively contributed to shaping the economic, social and political developments in the

country.18 According to the International Monetary Fund, Libya is overly dependent on

hydrocarbons, as they have long dominated the Libyan economy, “accounting for more than

70 percent of GDP, more than 95 percent of exports, and approximately 90 percent of

government revenue. With about 3.5 percent of the world’s proven crude oil reserves, Libya

has a prominent position in the international energy market.” 19 Before the popular uprising,

its “output was 1.77 million barrels per day of crude oil (equivalent to 2 percent of the global

output) and close to 0.2 million barrels-equivalent of natural gas”.20

B: The Financial Sector:

Furthermore, according to the international monetary fund, Libya’s financial sector

had been undergoing reforms before the popular uprising in 2011. Prior to 2007, the five

largest commercial banks were fully owned by the Central Bank of Libya (CBL). Reforms

included partial privatization and the involvement of foreign partners in six out of the 16

banks. Nevertheless, much of the banking system remains under the control of the

government, and state-owned specialized credit institutions play a major role in the financial

sector. 12 However, “the performance of the banking sector had improved, as the total

commercial bank assets increased from Libyan dinar 14.5 billion at end-2003 to Libyan dinar

65.4 billion at end-2010. Financial soundness indicators improved over the period, with

nonperforming loans declining to 17.2 percent (from 35.5 percent in 2004), loan provisioning

increasing to 85 percent (from 51.8 percent in 2004), and the regulatory capital ratio

increasing to 17.3 percent, compared to 10.4 percent in 2004”.22

In addition, following the lifting of earlier United Nations sanctions in 2003, the

economic activity increased steadily for seven years. During the period 2004-2010, the

average real GDP growth was approximately 5 percent, annual consumer price inflation

averaged less than 4 percent, and official foreign assets increased from $20 billion at the end

of 2003 to $170 billion at the end of 2010.23 Although non-hydrocarbon economic activity

was growing at a rapid pace before the conflict, it still accounts for no more than 30 percent

of the GDP and a negligible part of total exports. In other words, while the non-hydrocarbon

sectors grew rapidly, supported by an ambitious public investment program, Libya remained

one of the most hydrocarbon-dependent countries, with its exports among the least diversified

in the world; “its small private sector was handicapped by the ubiquitous dominance of the

state and by crippling institutional failures. Consequently, social and governance indicators

remained poor, job creation was lacklustre, and dependence on expatriate workers

increased”.24

C: The Unemployment Problem:

As such, the unemployment in Libya, before the popular uprising, appears to be a

structural problem, particularly among youth, and the identification of policy measures and

structural reforms that would create employment opportunities is critical while considerable

potential to expand hydrocarbon production exists, the hydrocarbon industry is capital

intensive and therefore can make only a very limited contribution to employment growth.

“Hence, over the medium term, the main challenges are to reorient the economy away from

hydrocarbon dependence and to promote job creation and inclusive growth”.25

To explain, the oil abundance in Libya offsets the extreme scarcity of other resources,

particularly, water. In a country in which approximately 90 percent of the territory is desert,

scarcity of agricultural lands and little industrial development have led to a growing urban

population “whose employability is almost exclusively dependent on the service economy”26.

In economic terms, “Libya is a dualistic economy whereby the oil sector contributes most to

the GDP but employs little of the labor force and other sectors of the labor force.”27 Due to

the poorly developed non-oil economy, oil revenues have decisively contributed to the

historical expansion of the public sector. Consequently, in 2010, just before the uprising, the

public sector was estimated to employ around 85 percent of the labor force, but “vertically

the controlled system of patronage dominated the economic life of the country”.28 As of the

end of 2010, the unemployment rate was officially 13.5 percent, with youth unemployment

estimated at 25-30 percent. The lack of employment opportunities for nationals can be traced

back to the domination of the economy by the state, a mismatch between the skills of workers

and the demands of the private sector, as well as insufficient labor productivity, all of which

limit demand for Libyan workers29.

D: Libya’s War with Chad and its Implications

On the other hand, the financial sector in Libya has been negatively affected by Al

Qaddafi’s strategies, which in turn resulted in declining the state’s capacity to finance

rentierism. To explain, the external interventions of Al Qaddafi’s regime in Africa can be

considered a burden to the Libyan economy, as in January 1973, Libya went into conflict with

Chad over the Aouzou strip, with Libya forces occupying the area, establishing a new

administration and distributing Libyan identity cards. The strip soon became an advance base

for deeper penetration into Chad’s territory. A Chadian campaign with substantial French

military support in August 1987 briefly droves the Libyans out of the Strip and it estimated to

have cost Qaddafi “one tenth of his army, 7500 men killed, and as much as $1.5 billion-worth

of military equipment.”30 Shortly after the defeat, Libya launched a new campaign to

recapture the area among an unusually heavy and intense fighting. The military defeats and

losses on both sides eventually promoted Libya and Chad to agree to cease fire in late 1987.13

Thus, such costly intervention that Qaddafi regime went to has its negative effects on the

financial sector in the country.

E: Al Qaddafi’s Non-Rewarding Projects (the Great Manmade River Project):

Furthermore, Qaddafi’s huge and non-rewarding new projects have also been a burden

to the financial sector in Libya, as in 1983 Qaddafi has launched the Great Manmade River

Project (GMRP), “aiming at a rational utilization of the transported water for agricultural and

urban developments, along with restoration of the affected aquifers.” 32 Such project consists

of five phases and was planned to be completed before the turn of the century and to cost

about $10 billion. 33 Al Qaddafi’s regime had expected that the GMRP would be considered

the most important economic development project; however, “cost overruns and delays have

plagued the GMRP since the initial planning of the project in 1983. On the basis of

installation needs and engineering expense, the project costs increased to reach up to $30

billion spread over 10 to 15 years”.134 Such high expenses of the project have negatively

affected the financial sector and in turn resulted in declining the state capacity to finance

rentierism, bearing in mind that until the outbreak of the popular uprising, “only 70 percent of

the project has been completed.”35

3.2 The Popular Uprising in Libya in 2011 and the International Community’s Response:

Inspired by the popular uprising in the other Arab countries, especially its neighboring

Egypt and Tunisia, on 15 February, just four days after Mubarak’s resignation, protests started

in Libya against the 42-year rule of Muammar Al Qaddafi. Although the Libyan, ‘Day of

Rage’ was organized for the 17th of February, it started two days earlier in Benghazi, with the

arrest of the young human rights lawyer activist Fathi Terbil. Although the supporters

gathered peacefully outside the local police station calling for Terbil’s release, they were fired

upon by the security services;36 tear gas, batons and hot water were used to disperse the

protesters. Then, “as demonstrations intensified, the government began using deadly force

against protesters. This move backfired; as the protesters attacked and burned down

government buildings”.37 In the following day, general protests against the government spread

to other towns and despite the government warning, large demonstrations took place in at

least four major cities, including Benghazi and Tripoli, on February 17. The demonstrations

then rapidly increased in scale and ferocity until they evolved into a countrywide popular

uprising against Al Qaddafi, where deadly clashes break out in several towns.38

Later on, the regime committed more desperate acts of violence and issued terrifying

threats. On the night of 20 February Al Qaddafi’s son Saif Al-Islam appeared on the Libyan

television threatening that thousands would die and that rivers of blood would flow if the

rebellions did not stop. Soon after, Al Qaddafi called upon loyalists to get out of their houses

and attack all the opponents of the regime, he described the protesters as drug-crazed “rats,”

“cockroaches” and “cowards and traitors,” and stated his intentions to “cleanse Libya house

by house.” 39 The protests continue to turn violent, however the death and injury toll was

unclear and as the uprising spread, the Libyan police were forced out of Benghazi and then

from Misrata. A number of towns in the east of the country began to slip from Qaddafi’s

control, as the anti-Libyan government militias took control of Misrata after expelling the

forces loyal to Al Qaddafi.40 The situation shifted inevitably from demonstrations to a popular

uprising as volunteer militias were formed across the east of the country.

In this regards, it is worth mentioning that the estimates of the number of civilians

killed between 15 and 22 February vary. The UN Human Rights Council’s International

Commission of Inquiry received medical records regarding rebels shot dead in Tripoli, with

doctors testifying that more than 200 persons killed over 20-21 February. The International

Criminal Court (ICC) later estimated that 500 to 700 civilians were killed in February prior to

the outbreak of the conflict.14

On 21 February 2011, Libya’s Deputy Permanent Representative at the Libyan

mission to the United Nations, Ibrahim Dabbashi, broke with the Al Qaddafi’s regime and

condemned the use of violence against demonstrators in Benghazi. The following day the

Arab League condemned the use of force against civilians by the Al Qaddafi regime and

suspended Libya’s participation in the League until met its demands to immediately put a stop

to the violence.42 In addition, the former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemns

what he calls “egregious violations” of human rights as Libya tries to crush an ongoing revolt,

telling reporters that those who have shed “the blood of innocents” must face punishment.43

Later on, the Security Council debated the situation in Libya and subsequently adopted

resolution 1970 on February 26.44 Such resolution, which was adopted by an unanimous vote,

condemned the violence used against civilians and called upon the Libyan authorities to

exercise their responsibility to protect. Acting under Chapter VII it referred the actions of the

Libyan government to the ICC and adopted an arms embargo, invoked a travel ban on

selected Libyan authorities, froze the assets of these authorities held abroad, and called upon

member states to provide humanitarian assistance to Libyans.

However, the failure of these measures to change the Libyan government’s response to the

uprisings, the continued violence on the ground, and most significantly the threats issued by

Al Qaddafi to the rebels in Benghazi led to a second Resolution 1973 approved without a

dissenting vote and five abstentions.

To explain, on 17 March, the Security Council met for a second time to discuss the

continuing violence on Libya and adopted resolution 1973.45 Once again the resolution

condemned the violence, the threat to civilian lives and the Libyan government’s

responsibility to protect. It also recalled the condemnations of regional organizations specially

the League of Arab States, the African Union (AU) and the Secretary General of the Islamic

Conference. Acting once again under Chapter VII, the resolution called for a ceasefire and

dispatched an envoy of the Secretary General alongside an envoy from the Peace and Security

Council of the AU to seek a political settlement. The resolution went on to authorize member

states to take all necessary measures excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any

part of Libyan territory to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat to attack

in cooperation with members of the League of Arab States. The resolution also established a

no-fly zone and authorized member states to enforce compliance in coordination with the

Secretary General and the League of Arab States and reinforced the arms embargo.46

3.3 Intervention Explained: Factors behind the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 by the

UNSC:

The international response to the crisis in Libya, from the beginning of the popular

uprising, has been remarkably quick and decisive, in which it ended up, having the UNSC

member states adopting resolution 1973; a resolution that authorized the international

community, and later on NATO, to military intervene in Libya. But the question now is what

are the factors that encouraged the UNSC to adopt such quick decisions on Libya; taking into

consideration that “resolution 1973 marked the first time that the United Nations Security

Council explicitly mandated the use of force against a functioning state to prevent imminent

atrocity crimes”.47

3.3.1 The International and Regional Call for Response:

There are many factors behind the UNSC adoption of the previously mentioned

resolutions; one of which is the warnings raised by the UN entities and the regional

organizations regarding the critical situation in Libya, which ended up having the League of

Arab States requesting the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. To illustrate, with the

increase of violence used by Al Qaddafi against the civilians; condemnations of the violent

suppression by the Qaddafi regime mounted from both the UN entities and the regional

organizations, including the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation

Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. On February 22, the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, called for an immediate ending of the human

rights violations committed by Libyan authorities and urged an independent investigation into

the violent suppression of protests.48 On the same day, the League of Arab States decided to

suspend Libya from the organization, the UNSC issued a statement urging the Libyan

authorities to meet its responsibility to protect its population and the Organization of the

Islamic Conference stated that it considers the ongoing coercion and oppression in Libya as a

humanitarian catastrophe.

Later on, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, of which Libya was a

member, condemned “the indiscriminate and excessive use of force and lethal weapons

against peaceful protestors, in violation of human rights and International Humanitarian

Law”49 that was used in response to the “legitimate, aspirations of the people of Libya for

democracy, political reform, justice and socio-economic development.” 50 Two days later, on

25 February, the UN Human Rights Council established a commission of inquiry to

investigate the situation and urged the General Assembly to suspend Libya from the Human

Rights Council, which it duly did on the 1st of March. 151

The situation in Libya combined with the calls for action from various regional

organizations led the Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 1970 on 26 February.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Council demanded “an immediate end to the

violence and authorized measures short of armed force, including an arms embargo, freezing

of Libyan assets, bans on travel for key Libyan leaders as well as referring the situation in

Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC)”152.

Despite the implementation of measures pursuant to Resolution 1970 and the

international condemnations, the Libyan government continued the brutalities against its own

people and called on its supporters to attack the demonstrators. The regional organizations

thus saw the need for stronger international pressure and by early March the Gulf

Cooperation Council and the Organization of Islamic Conference endorsed a no-fly zone,

followed on March by the Arab League’s call for a no-fly zone in combination with the

establishment of safe areas.53 To illustrate, On 8 March the Organization of the Islamic

Conference released a statement supporting a no-fly zone over Libya but excluded foreign

military operations on the ground. On 10 March the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) said the Qaddafi regime had lost its legitimacy. The GCC also encouraged the

Arab League to initiate contact with the Interim Council in Benghazi and call on the UN

Security Council to establish a no-fly zone to protect civilians. This followed a 7 March GCC

statement supporting a no-fly zone and calling for accountability.54

Later, on 12 March the Arab League met at ministerial-level in Cairo on the situation

in Libya (it had previously suspended Libya’s participation on 22 February until the violence

stopped) and issued a statement which noted Libyan authorities use of military aircraft,

mortars and heavy weaponry against civilians and called on the Security Council to impose a

no-fly zone55 and announced its recognition to the rebel movement as that country’s

legitimate government.56 The Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa announced at that

time that the league’s decision, describing the no fly-zone as a “preventive measure” whose

chief goal is to “protect Libyan citizens,” adding that “The main priority right now is to stop

the deadly situation.”157

The call of the League of Arab League to the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over the

country to protect the civilians was one of the key turning points in the UNSC negotiations

that led to the adoption of resolution 1973; as both Russia and China place rhetorical

emphasis on the importance of regional organizations, and to some extent their diplomacy

backs their rhetoric; so the Arab League’s call for action eased the pathway to abstention, a

point made explicit in the Chinese explanation of their vote. 58

3.3.2 The humanitarian needs:

Furthermore, the demonstrable need to protect the Libyan civilians was another

crucial factor behind the adoption of the resolution. To explain, the UN Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported about ill-treatment, beatings, injuries,

rapes, torture, killings, enforced disappearances and arbitrary arrests of protesters including

lawyers, human rights defenders and journalists. Reports further said that “Libyan forces fired

at random on protesters and bystanders from rooftops and tanks and used warplanes and

helicopters to strike at demonstrators.”59 The Libyan authorities also used foreign mercenaries

and there was a massive passage of weapons to Libyan territory. The Libyan government

moreover attempted to restrict the broadcasting of the situation in the country by cutting off

landlines and internet access and by restricting media coverage.160 In addition, prior to the

resolution, on 17 March, speaking on a radio show in Tripoli, Qaddafi raised the levels of

urgency of the situation. He threatened civilians living in areas that refused to comply with

his rule, declaring ‘We will come house by house, room by room…. We will

find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no pity.”16 As such, later the same day

resolution 1973 was endorsed by the Security Council.

3.3.3 The decision of the UNSC Member States

Moreover, the most important factor behind the adoption of resolution 1973 is the

decision of the five permanent countries. Although the resolution was not completely

welcomed and supported by all the permanent member states, none of them decided to veto it,

as Russia and China decided to abstain only. As such resolution 1973 was adopted by a vote

of 10 in favor to none against, and with 5 abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian

Federation).62

A: The Resolution Supported by Three Permanent UNSC States

Resolution 1973 was completely supported by France, the United States, and the

United Kingdom, as before the adoption of the resolution the representative of France stated

that the draft resolution provided the council with the means to protect the civilian population

in Libya, declaring that his country was prepared to act with Member States, in particular

Arab States, that wished to support this initiative.63 In addition, in the statements that

followed the vote, several representatives who had supported the text agreed that strong

action was necessary because of the Libyan regime’s failure to heed the provisions of the

previous resolution and considering the impending threat of further violence against the

Libyan civilians. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the fact that the

Council had acted swiftly and comprehensively in response to the situation in Libya, and the

representative of the United States stated that resolution 1973 (2011) represented a powerful

response to the call of the League of Arab States to protect Libyan civilians.64 Later on, the

British Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the military action against Al Qaddafi was

“necessary, it is legal and it is right.” 65 Right, “because I do not believe that we should stand

Favour with 5 | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations. March 2011.

https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.

aside while this dictator murders his own people.” 166 In addition, French President Sarkozy

said, “If we intervene on the side of the Arab nations it is because of a universal conscience

that cannot tolerate such crimes.” 167 “I'm not one of those cynics who assumes that such

statements are devoid of content; in any event, they are grounded in language that was

already quite condemnatory of Libya in resolution 1973”.168

B: The Resolution Welcomed by Arab and African UNSC Non-Permanent States

In addition, the decision was also welcomed by both the Arab and African UNSC non-

permanent member states by voting, as well, in favor of the resolution, while having their

representatives defending their support to the adoption of the resolution at that time. To

illustrate, starting with Lebanon, the only Arab non-permanent UNSC member state at that

time, its representative in the UNSC stated that “Lebanon, agreeing with the League of Arab

States, had then called on the Security Council to establish measures to protect civilians. The

Libyan authorities had lost all their legitimacy and the resolution was aimed at protecting

Libyan civilians.”169 He stressed that the text would not result in the occupation of one inch of

the Libyan territory by the foreign forces and hoped that the resolution would have a

preventive role and end the Libyan authorities’ use of force. In addition, he reaffirmed full

support for the county’s sovereignty, the need for full cooperation between the United Nations

and the League of Arab States, pursuant to Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, and

the necessity of a peaceful solution to the situation. The resolution was fraught with hope for

Libya and its people, he concluded. 70

Furthermore, the African non-permanent UNSC member states, Nigeria, South Africa

and Gabon, had also expressed their support to the resolution, the representative of Nigeria at

the UNSC had condemned the situation in Libya, adding that her delegation’s persistent calls for

peace were rooted in the need to ensure the protection of civilians and the delivery of

humanitarian assistance to those most in need, many of whom were Nigerian nationals. 17 She

Favour with 5 Abstentions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations.

March 2011. https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.

said that while her delegation had supported the current text, it also believed that foreign

occupation was not an option to ensure peace. Nigeria supported language in the current text

that negated that possibility. Nigeria was also encouraged by the fact that the political path to a

solution was endorsed in the text. “Today, we have sent an unequivocal message to the Libyan

people that the dignity and safety of every man woman and child is paramount,” she said,

adding that when the fate of innocent civilians was in question, the international community,

undaunted, must be ready to respond.” 72

In this context, in addition to expressing his deep concern regarding the fast becoming

civil war in Libya, the representative of South Africa hoped the problem could be resolved in

a peaceful manner, according to the will of the Libyan people, while stating that any solution

must also preserve the solidarity and integrity of Libya and, as such, South Africa supported

the dispatch by the African Union of a special mission to the country. 73 In addition, he

clarified that “South Africa regretted that the Council’s previous resolution had not been

heeded and believed that by adopting the current text, the Council had acted responsibly to

answer the call of Libyan people. It would also speed humanitarian assistance to those that

needed it most while hoping that the letter and spirit of the present resolution would be

implemented in full.” 74

C: The Abstention of Russia and China:

On the other hand, although the representatives of Russia and China were not

convinced that the intervention is the best way to put an end to the conflict in Libya and they

were not among the supporters of the resolution; they decided only to abstain and not to veto

the resolution, while prioritizing peaceful means of resolving the conflict in their

explanations. Their representatives clarified their position stating that many questions had not

been answered in regard to provisions of the resolution, including, as the Russian

Favour with 5 Abstentions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations.

March 2011. https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.

representative put it, how and by whom the measures would be enforced and what the limits

of the engagement would be. He said the resolution included a sorely needed ceasefire,

which he had called for earlier. In addition, China had not blocked the action with a negative

vote in consideration of the wishes of the Arab League, its representative said.75

To illustrate, during the informal consultations on resolution 1973, the Russian

Federation raised many concerns on “how the no-fly zone would be enforced, what the rules

of engagement would be and what limits on the use of force there would be” 76; moreover, the

introduction of paragraph 4 in the resolution gave rise to concern that it would “potentially

open the door to large-scale military intervention” 77. The decision to abstain and refrain from

casting a veto was explained partly on the assurances given by the sponsors

Favour with 5 Abstentions | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases.” United Nations.

March 2011. https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm.

of the resolution that there was no intention of launching a large-scale armed intervention and

by the necessity to protect the civilian population; but it was asserted that an immediate

ceasefire in Libya would be “the quickest way to ensure robust security for the civilian

population and the long- term stabilization of the situation in Libya” 78.

In the same context, China took the stand that they are ‘always against the use of force

in international relations.’ They emphasized that the Security Council ‘should follow the

United Nations Charter and the norms governing international law, respect the sovereignty,

independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and resolve the current crisis in Libya

through peaceful means.’79 China was less explicit on its decision to abstain referring

basically to the lack of satisfactory answers to questions on the action envisaged by the

resolution.80 As shortly after Resolution 1973 was passed, disagreement emerged on the scope

and limits of the mandate and already on the day the aerial attacks on Libya started, concerns

were raised about military overreach. The Chinese government expressed regret at the

American and European assault on Libya and Russia condemned the attack. 18

3.3.3 D: Concerns Raised by the Other UNSC Non-Permanent States:

In addition, aside from the five permanent member states, there were many concerns

raised by the other UNSC member states. Germany, one of the five abstaining countries,

found that it could not support use of force as they saw great risks. They found that the

military option could lead to large-scale loss of life and if the steps taken in the resolution

turned out to be ineffective, there was a danger to be drawn in to a protracted military conflict

that would affect the wider region. Also they pointed out that the member States should not

enter in to a “militarily confrontation on the optimistic assumption that quick results with few

casualties would be achieved”. 182 In the same context, Germany explained its abstention on

two grounds: first that the sanctions regime imposed by UNSC resolution 1970 should be

strengthened so as to achieve a political transition and, secondly, that the authorization of the

use of force would entail large-scale loss of life and might affect the wider region.

India took issue with the lack of information on the situation on the ground and with

the absence of clarifying the specific measures to be employed, by whom and the manner

they would be implemented. 183 Another point made by India was that the member States did

not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, who would participate with what

assets and how those measures would be exactly carried out. From the Indian delegations’

expressed opinions, it may seem as the member states blindly entered into military

confrontation based on little information and in this respect, little objective information to

support the heavy military invention it would turn in to after NATO enforced the mandate. 184

Brazil, for its part, considered that the measures anticipated in paragraph 4 of UNSC

resolution 1973 went beyond the imposition of a no-fly zone as requested by the League of

Arab States. The representative of Brazil stated that:

We are not convinced that the use of force … will lead to the

realization of our common objective, the immediate end to violence and the

protection of civilians. We are also concerned that such measures may have

the unintended effect of exacerbating tensions on the ground and causing

more harm than good to the very same civilians we are committed to

protecting. Many thoughtful commentators have noted that an important

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the Authorization of Use of Force in Libya. Did the Coalition Exceed the 8 2

Mandate? PhD diss., Faculty of Law. University of OSLO, April 25th

2016.https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/50779/678.pdf?sequence=7

1 “The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya” ICLQ Vol 62, January 2013 Pp 1598 3 –171. https://www-

cambridgeorg.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/core/services/aop-cambridgecore/content/view/9D8E7DD8D220E8FFBD819002BF7E1AAF/

S0020589312000565a.pdf/legality_of_the_nato_bombing_in_libya.pdf 1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 and the

Authorization of Use of Force in Libya. Did the Coalition Exceed the8 4

Mandate? PhD diss., Faculty of Law. University of OSLO, April 25th

2016.https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/50779/678.pdf?sequence=7

aspect of the popular movement in North Africa and the Middle East is their

spontaneous, home-grown nature. We are also concerned about the possibility

that the use of force, as called for in paragraph 4 ... could change that

narrative in ways that may have serious repercussions for the situation and

beyond. Protecting civilians, ensuring a lasting settlement and addressing the

legitimate demands of the Libyan people require diplomacy and dialogue. 85

In brief, for the five-member states that decided to abstain the greatest obstacle to the

accomplishment of a wider consensus was the divergence of opinion over the need to use

force. Germany and Brazil questioned the effectiveness of such a step and expected the

possibility that it might actually make matters worse, while India suggested that the

mandating of force was a premature move and voiced concerns over the ambiguities of the

authorization. China, declaring itself to be always against the use of force, shared India’s

latter anxiety, as did Russia, which perceived a morphing of the pro-intervention position into

something which could “potentially open the door to large-scale military intervention.”86

In conclusion, Libya’s lack of friends, both in the region and beyond, meant that no

country was prepared to block the Security Council authorization of a no-fly zone. Even

though the African Union formally opposed the no-fly zone, many individual countries within

the continent had no regrets about Qaddafi’s rule coming to an end. Indeed, Al Qaddafi

himself had a long history of getting involved in the domestic affairs of other countries,

having backed armed groups in many countries. Among Arab states, Qaddafi had gone out of

his way to foment tensions and sever friendships. 87 One illustration of this was Al Qaddafi’s

outburst at an Arab League Summit in Qatar in 2009, where, after publicly humiliating the

former Saudi Arabia’s king Abdullah, he went on to declare himself the dean of the Arab

leaders, the king of kings of Africa and the leader of the faithful. This among many other

public insults, ensured that Al Qaddafi was alienated from other states in the

Middle East. 88 “Further afield, Al Qaddafi had not fostered ties with either China or

Russia.” 89 “Compared to Syria, Assad’s ties with Russia has to some extent protected the

Assad regime from a more robust Security Council response to atrocities there, Libya had no

such connection to fall back on. Indeed, the Kremlin had long been wary of Al Qaddafi due to

his support for terrorist organizations, including some with links to those in Chechnya and

Dagestan.”90

3.4 The International Intervention in Libya in 2011:

Through resolution 1973, the UN Security Council authorized Member States, acting

nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures

to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding

a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory and requesting them to

immediately inform the Secretary-General of such measures.19

The international response to the crisis in Libya has been remarkably quick and

decisive. As immediately following the adoption of Resolution 1973, NATO countries began

assembling forces to carry out strikes against Libya's military installations. The United States,

UK and French officials took the lead, meeting in Paris from 17-19 March to plan the

implementation of the no-fly zone and discuss plan for airstrike operations,92 with the aim to

protect Libyan civilians and degrade the regime’s capability to resist the no-fly zone. At that

time, the situation in Benghazi was deteriorating, with civilians at risk of massacre by

proQaddafi’s forces. French forces were the first to engage, sending plans to attack tanks and

armed forces, thereby deterring the regime's military advance on Benghazi. On 19 March,

fighter planes from France, the United Kingdom and the United States launched attacks in

Libya. Then the NATO officially began to enforce the arms embargo against Libya on March

23, and the member countries dispatched warships to the region to intercept sea transports

carrying equipment to Libya. The next day, on 24 March, NATO formally enforced the nofly

zone. Later, on 31 March, NATO assumed sole command and control of the international

military effort to assumed sole command and control of the international military effort to

enforce all aspects of Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973, as part of Operation

Unified Protector (OUP) thereby replacing the individual efforts and operation names. The

OUP had three distinct components which are the enforcement of an arms embargo on the

high seas of the Mediterranean to prevent the transfer of arms, related material and

mercenaries to Libya; in addition to the enforcement of a no-fly-zone in order to prevent any

aircraft from bombing civilian targets; and air and naval strikes against those military forces

involved in attacks or threats to attack Libyan civilians and civilian-populated areas.93

Later, on 14 April, the representatives of the countries participating in OUP agreed to

commit all necessary resources for as long as necessary until “all attacks on civilians and

civilian-populated areas have ended,” the “Qaddafi’s regime withdraws all military and

paramilitary forces to bases” and “the Qaddafi’s regime permits immediate, full, safe and

unhindered access to humanitarian aid for the Libyan people.”

Then the goal of the intervention expanded quickly as NATO and the international

community committed to seeing Al Qaddafi step down. As in April, the former U.S. President

Barak Obama, the former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the former British Prime

Minister David Cameron published a joint pledge asserting that regime change must take

place in order to achieve the stated humanitarian goal of protecting Libyan civilians. The

issue came to head when, in May, Al Qaddafi offered a ceasefire with the rebels, thereby

ending attacks against civilians, but which would allow him to stay in power. NATO rejected

the Libyan offer, determined that regime change was the only solution.94

By mid-August, however, the opposition had gained enough strength to attack

Qaddafi's strongholds, first in Tripoli and then in Sirte. Within two months, the Libyan

National Transitional Council had secured control over the entire country and rebels had

captured and killed Qaddafi.95 Then a day after the death of Al Qaddafi on 20 October 2011,

the North Atlantic Council took the preliminary decision to end OUP at the end of the month.

During that transition period, NATO continued to monitor the situation and retained the

capacity to respond to threats to civilians, if needed.96 A week later, the North Atlantic

Council confirmed the decision to end OUP. On 31 October 2011 at midnight Libyan time, a

NATO concluded the last sortie; 222 days after the operation began. The next day, NATO

maritime assets left Libyan waters for their home ports.197

To Sum-up, the NATO has succeeded in coordinating the actions of 18 countries, 14

member states and four partners, under a unified command. “The United States certainly

played a critical role, providing intelligence, fueling, and targeting capabilities.” 198 But other

states made similarly indispensable contributions. “France and the United Kingdom flew over

40 percent of the sorties, together destroying more than a third of the overall targets. Italy

provided aircraft for reconnaissance missions and, along with Greece, access to a large

number of air bases. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates

deployed fighters for combat operations, and Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,

and Qatar helped enforce the no-fly zone. Many of these states, as well as Bulgaria and

Romania, also deployed naval assets to enforce the arms embargo.”99

3.5 The Legality of the 2011 International Intervention

The UN Security Council issued three key statements which show the evolution of its

stance on Libya in the lead-up to NATO’s intervention. With increasing escalation, these were

a non-binding press statement on 22 February, followed by two resolutions adopted under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter on 26 February and 17 March. Taken together, these actions

show a response from the Security Council that is noteworthy for its speed, expansive no-fly

zone mandate and changed politics toward the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Ambassador Condoleezza Rice, the former US secretary of state, stated on Libya: “I can’t

remember a time in recent memory when the Council has acted so swiftly, so decisively, and

in unanimity on an urgent matter of international human rights”.00 Although the Security

Council had mandated the use of force by peacekeepers many times, and although there had

been several cases in which the council delegated the use of force to a third party, the Libya

intervention was the first time that the council mandated a military intervention to be

conducted by a third party with the explicit purpose of protecting civilians.201 Supporters of

the resolution maintained that the intervention was humanitarian in nature, motivated solely

by the objective of protecting human rights and the lives of the Libyan population. But what

about the legality of such intervention; should the intervention of the international

community/ the NATO be considered legal?

The enabling provisions of UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing the use of force

by applying the standard phrase “all necessary measures” are operative paragraphs 4 and 8

which read:

4. “Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting

nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in

cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures,

notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and

civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on

any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to

inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant

to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall immediately

reported to the Security Council ;” 202

8. “Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the

Secretary of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional

organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce

compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, as

necessary.”203

In other words, resolution 1973 has two important objectives. The first is to protect civilians,

by authorizing all UN members to “take all necessary measures … to protect civilians …

under threat of attack … while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part

of Libyan territory” 204. While the second is to imposes an effective no fly zone in the form of

a ban on all flights in Libya's airspace, except for those with an exclusively humanitarian

purpose, to help protect civilians.205

2 Antonopoulos, Constantine. “The Legitimacy to Legitimise”: The Security Council Action in Libya under Resolution 1973 (2011).” 0 2

International Community Law Review 14, 2012.

http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/journals/10.1163/18719732-12341237

2 Antonopoulos, Constantine. “The Legitimacy to Legitimise: The Security Council Action in Libya under Resolution 10 3973

(2011).”

International Community Law Review 14, 2012.

http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/content/journals/10.1163/18719732-12341237

2 Sands, Philippe. “UN's Libya Resolution 1973 Is Better Late than Never | Philippe Sands.” The Guardian. March 18, 2011.0 4

https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/mar/18/libya-un-resolution-1973.

2 Sands, Philippe. “UN's Libya Resolution 1973 Is Better Late than Never | Philippe Sands.” The Guardian. March 0 5 18,

2011. https://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/mar/18/libya-un-resolution-1973.

Here according to the UN charter; Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “All

members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other inconsistent with the

purposes of the United Nations.” Furthermore, article 2(7) of the charter states that nothing

contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters

which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the

members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter, but this principle

shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

There are two recognized exceptions to Articles 2(4) and 2(7) in the UN charter,

namely self-defence under Article 51, or when acting with authorization from the Security

Council under its chapter VII that addresses “threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts

of aggression.” Formally the UN charter only recognize the legitimacy of armed conflict in

these very limited situations. Armed conflicts outside these exceptions are not legitimate and

are accordingly a breach of international law. 06

Thus, when resolution 1973 was adopted in March 2011, it facilitated the legal

framework for the subsequent NATO led operation in Libya. The authorization to use force,

points back to the stated objective, namely to ensure protection of civilians. Every limitation

posed in the mandate is also conditioned to the protection of civilians. The aim of the

mandate was to protect civilians and civilian populated areas, while the mission was to use all

necessary measures to protect the civilian population against threats of attack. It is clear from

the language in the resolution that the R2P was endorsed as a principle by the UN. In

resolution 1973 the council found it necessary to reiterate the Libyan authorities’

responsibility to protect the civilian population. Secondly, the council expressed “its

determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas”. 07

3.6 The other type of intervention: the UNSMIL

After the NATO ended its mission in Libya, the international community decided to help

the Libyans in building up their country by providing assistance from the United Nations

Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). To illustrate, after six months of the armed conflict in

Libya, on 16 September 2011, by resolution 2009 (2011), adopted unanimously, the Council

established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).08 The mission was

established at the request of the Libyan authorities at that time to support the country's new

transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts.09 The mission at that time was authorized

for an initial period of three months, to assist and support Libyan national efforts to restore

public security and promote the rule of law, undertake inclusive political dialogue, promote

national reconciliation and embark upon the constitution-making and electoral process. It

would also support national efforts to extend State authority, including by strengthening

institutions and the restoration of public services, promote and protect human rights and

support transitional justice, and take steps to initiate economic recovery. In support of those

objectives, the Council authorized exemptions to the arms embargo solely for security or

disarmament assistance to the Libyan authorities and for the use of United Nations and

humanitarian personnel. It also authorized modification of the asset freeze targeting entities

connected to the regime, for humanitarian and other purposes. The Council emphasized its

intention to keep under review the measures concerning a no-fly zone imposed by resolution

1973 (2011) and, when circumstances permitted and in consultation with the Libyan

authorities, to lift those measures and terminate the authorization given to Member States.10

The United Nations Supporting Mission for Libya (UNSMIL) has substantive staff in

political affairs, human rights, transitional justice, mine action, demobilization, development,

women’s empowerment, public information and communication, as well as support staff. Its

mandate was modified and extended by the Security Council in resolutions 2022 (2011),

2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2238 (2015) and 2323 (2016). Its current mandate is

stipulated by the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2376 (2017), which extended

UNSMIL's mission until 15 September 2018.11

To conclude, this chapter gave a brief overview of both the political and economic

situations in Libya under the rule of Al Qaddafi, which contributed to the fragility of the state.

Such fragility, as the next chapter will show, is considered one of the factors explaining the

collapse of the state after the international intervention in 2011. The chapter went through the

outbreak of the popular uprising in 2011, while reflecting on how the international

community responded to the escalating violence that took place during the popular uprising;

which ended up having the UNSC adopting resolution 1973 that allow the international

community to intervene to protect the civilians under threat. In addition, this chapter referred

to the guidelines for the intervention, as it explained in depth the factors that encourage the

UNSC to adopt resolutions 1970 and 1973 after days from the beginning of the popular

uprising, such factors involved the international and regional calls for the protection of

civilians under threat, and the existence of the demonstrable need to protect the civilians in

Libya under threat, while the third factor covers the decision of the UNSC permanent

members that did not veto the resolution.

Furthermore, this chapter covers the international intervention stage, starting with the

military intervention which began directly after the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the

UNSC, as NATO countries began assembling forces to carry out strikes against Libya's

military installations; such response to the crisis in Libya has been seen as remarkably quick

and decisive. In this regards, this chapter reflected how the international community has

expanded its mandate from just protecting the civilians under threat to engaging in the regime

change process, then continued supporting the rebellions until Al Qaddafi was killed on 20

October 2011. Then this chapter highlighted the other type of international intervention. After

the NATO ended its mission in Libya, the international community decided to help the

Libyans in building up their country by providing assistance through the United Nations

Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

Chapter IV

Libya Post the International Intervention in 2011

This chapter focuses on evaluating the outcome/consequences of the international

intervention in Libya in order to figure out whether it should be considered a successful

intervention, or it leads to an increase in the threats facing the civilians in Libya. As such it

started with giving an overview on the situation in Libya after the international intervention in

2011 while reflecting on the deterioration in the internal situation there. Then, the second

section of this chapter will focus on the reasons behind such deterioration, while arguing that

the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the fragility of the Libyan state are responsible

for the instability that Libya has been suffering since 2011 and are the main factors behind its

collapse.

4.1 The Situation in Libya post the International Intervention in 2011:

Following the intervention of the international community and the death of

Al Qaddafi, there were high optimistic expectations regarding the future of Libya post Al

Qaddafi; in this regards, some politicians and analysts started highlighting the success of the

intervention and the R2P principle. The Libyan intervention has sometimes “been hailed as a

victory for the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect vulnerable population.”21 To

illustrate, many commentators have praised NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya as a

humanitarian success for averting a bloodbath in the country’s second largest city, Benghazi,

and helping eliminate the dictatorial regime of Al Qaddafi. Accordingly, these proponents

claimed that the intervention demonstrates how to successfully implement a humanitarian

principle known as the responsibility to protect. Indeed, the top U.S. representatives to the

transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO’s operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a

model intervention.”13

For Ramesh Thakur, one of the co-authors of the ICISS Report, the military action by

the international forces in Libya marked the intervention as “the first instance of the

implementation of the sharp edge of the new norm of the responsibility to protect”. Indeed, it

was “the first time the Security Council authorized an international R2P operation” 14. Similarly,

Gareth Evans, the former Australian Foreign Minister and ICISS co-chair, regarded the Libyan

intervention as “a textbook case of the R2P norm working exactly as it was supposed to, with

nothing else in issue but stopping continuing and imminent mass atrocity crimes.” 15 Peter

Hilpold, too, saw the authorization by the Security Council to use force against Libya “as a

pivotal step for the further affirmation of this principle.” 16 And the former UN Secretary

General, Ban Ki-moon, was certain that “by now it was clear to all that R2P had arrived”.17

Yet both the particular circumstances surrounding the intervention and its aftermath have

raised questions about the depth of the government’s sincere commitment to such

humanitarian norms;18 as in spite of such optimistic views, the situation in Libya has been

deteriorated day after another, till Libya has been suffering from civil war and then becoming

a failed state. To illustrate, Libya has been in crisis since the end of the country’s Arab Spring

in October 2011.19 With the fall of the Qaddafi’s regime on 20 October 2011, Libya has

entered into a new insecurity phase. While some commentators called this the post-conflict

phase, or the peace-building phase, a more accurate analytical description would call it the

fragmentation phase. To explain, after the popular uprising, Libya has descended into another

type of security disorder. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which is considered the

institutional platform for the rebel movement, aimed at “providing political and military

leadership, basic security and municipal services, and support for Libyans living abroad.”20

However, the transitional authorities have faced enormous challenges. “Chief among these

have been controlling and managing the armed groups that emerged to fight Al Qaddafi and

his security services.”21 The political roadmap for the transition, the constitutional declaration

chartered by the NTC on 3 August 2011, set strict deadlines for elections to a new interim

body, the General National Congress (GNC), as well as a timetable for the committee to draft

a constitution. However, “the political coalition that drew up the declaration presented no

vision for security sector reform, neither with respect to the remainder of Qaddafi’s armed

forces, nor with respect to the field commanders who had done the bulk of

the fighting.”22

To explain, the security sector presented the first large difficulty23 for both the NTC

and the Libyans after the end of the popular uprising; as the post-conflict transition has been

disrupted by armed militia groups and threatened by the conflict of interim leaders,24 in which

those who fought in the civil war did not all wish to demobilize,25 and the interim government

was unable to maintain law and order. 26 The war against Al Qaddafi was conducted by

individual militias rather than by a unified rebel army. Although these militias were united in

their efforts to remove the regime, after the war, many have thus far chosen to hold onto their

weapons and pursue their own agendas. “Those agendas vary from acting as a surrogate state

or simply keeping the peace in the territory they occupy to attacking other militias and

building links with criminal organizations”. 27 As such, The NTC had at various times tried to

dissolve the militias. At the same time, “bereft of the ability to project its authority, it began

subsidizing militias, placing them under the nominal control of the ministries of interior and

defense”28. But these ministries were themselves captured by competing political factions.

“The result was a swelling of militias, beyond the number that had fought in the popular

uprising, and the formation of a localized, highly divided and hybrid-security sector that

existed in parallel to the decrepit army and police.”229 To explain, factions that had a military

presence in Tripoli and were able to wield direct influence on government officials enjoyed a

privileged position in these distributive struggles. Elsewhere, local elites and militia leaders

who felt sidelined in these rivalries began exerting pressure on the government by shutting

down parts of the energy infrastructure. Cities and tribes that were branded as regime loyalists

by the competing revolutionary factions were largely excluded from these struggles. They

further suffered under the “former revolutionary strongholds’ military supremacy, which was

manifest in numerous local conflicts.”230

Thus, the NTC, whose representatives sought to convince the Western governments of

the necessity to intervene, rapidly lost control over the armed groups. The revolutionaries

organized almost exclusively at the local level, on the basis of individual cities or

neighborhoods, and were infused with local identities. In Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains,

deserting military officers joined with armed civilians. But in the east, where entire army units

had defected to the rebellion, “revolutionary fighters often eyed the officers of Gadhafi’s

former army with distrust.”31 Within the NTC itself, tensions soon surfaced between defecting

government officials and members of the exiled opposition, some of them Islamists. 23 In such

context, the situation continued to have a negative impact on the living conditions and security

of the local population and was aggravated by the high rate of gun ownership among the

population in the absence of any disarmament and effective weapons

control efforts.33

To explain, immediately after being in power, the rebels perpetrated scores of reprisal

killings, in addition to torturing, beating, and randomly detaining thousands of suspected

Qaddafi‘s supporters. The rebels also expelled 30,000 mostly black residents from the town

of Tawergha and burned or looted their homes and shops, on the grounds that some of them

supposedly had been mercenaries. in the government’s attacks on nearby Misrata.34 The

ramification of this racial violence has been nationwide: “For the more than one million

African guest workers who came to oil-rich Libya seeking their fortunes, it has meant terror ..

These innocent migrant laborers now and themselves singled out by ordinary Libyans and

rebels who believe they are the enemy.” 235

In spite of the violence of the militias in the first half of 2012, the NTC was able to

hold the elections on the agreed dates, 7 July 2012, which ended up having the General

National congress being elected with a mandate to create a constitution. Through such

elections the Islamists, principally the Muslim Brotherhood’s Justice and Construction Party,

won a narrow governing majority through alliances, mainly with tribal leaders and parties

from Misrata. 36 The GNC assembled on 8 August 2012 and appointed a Government in

December 2012. However, the GNC Government was unable to project state authority and

security across the whole of Libya. 37 The strength of rebel militias has increased,38 the Radical

Islamist groups, suppressed under Al Qaddafi, emerged as the fiercest rebels during the war

and refused to disarm or submit to government authority afterward. Their persistent threat was

highlighted by the September 2012 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed

Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three of his colleagues. Such crime has concentrated the

world's attention on the problems of post-Qaddafi Libya. The riots showcased both the power

of radical Islamist militias and the inability of the government in Tripoli to provide security

and maintain order across the country. Lawlessness and corruption are pervasive, and

fundamental questions about the structure and operation of Libyan political and economic

institutions remain unanswered.239

Despite subsequent Libyan government pledges to address threat at that time, the

Washington Post reported in October 2012 that, the “armed Islamist extremists are terrorizing

the eastern Libyan city of Darna.” 240 In Benghazi itself, as of February 2013, Islamist militias

had resumed control of the city’s entrance and two main hospitals. In Tripoli, in April 2013, a

bomb-laden vehicle destroyed half of the French embassy. 241 In addition, the armed Libyan

groups, including former Libyan military forces, Islamist, tribal and other militias, engaged in

increasingly violent clashes, which resulted in significant civilian casualties in Benghazi in

June 2013 and in Tripoli in November 2013.24 Consequently, the GNC delegated the job of

creating a constitution to a new body, the Constitutional Assembly, elected after many delays

in February 2014.43

To sum-up, during the period 2011-2014, the government and the GNC of Libya were

subjected to repeated armed challenges by a number of militias from across Libya. “While some

of these groups are remnants of the civil war, other groups and alliances are new”.44 By early

2014, the GNC had almost ceased to function. Opponents of the ruling coalition accused it of

exploiting a law designed to purge Gadhafi-era officials from office to install

Islamists in their place. Similarly, “the GNC’s decision to create the militia alliance Libya

Shield, allegedly at a cost of 900 million Libyan dinars, was interpreted by opponents as an

attempt to form a parallel army”. 45

By May 2014, Libya had come to the brink of a new civil war, between liberals and

Islamists. That month, General Khalifa Hafter seized control of the air force to attack Islamist

militias in Benghazi, later expanding his targets to include the Islamist-dominated legislature in

Tripoli. 46 To explain, Fighting broke out in May when retired general Khalifa Haftar marshalled

an anti-Islamist alliance, Operation Dignity, composed of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and

allied militias and attacked Islamist Libya Shield militias in Benghazi. 247 while calling for a

snap elections for 25 June.248 Such elections were held to the House of Representatives (HOR),

the successor assembly to the GNC whose mandate had expired. 49 (The original constitutional

road map called for Congress to dissolve itself in February 2014, but its Islamist majority voted

itself a further year in office in December 2013.)50 The Elections did nothing to resolve the

chaos. Most Libyans had already given up on democracy, as voter turnout dropped from 1.7

million in the previous poll to just 630,000. Secular parties declared victory and formed a new

legislature, the House of Representatives, but the Islamists, who got just 30 of 188 seat,51

refused to accept that outcome.

In July, an Islamist militia from the city of Misurata responded to Hifter’s actions by

attacking Tripoli, prompting Western embassies to evacuate. After a six-week battle, the

Islamists captured the capital in August on behalf of the so-called Libya Dawn coalition,

which, together with the defunct legislature, formed what they labelled a “national salvation

government.” 252 In October, the newly elected parliament, led by the secular Operation

Dignity coalition, fled to the eastern city of Tobruk, where it established a competing interim

government, which Libya’s Supreme Court later declared unconstitutional. Libya thus finds

itself with two warring governments, each controlling only a fraction of the country’s territory

and militias. 253 In other words, following the election, fighting escalated in Tripoli and

Benghazi, which forced the newly elected HOR to meet in the eastern city of Tobruk rather

than in Tripoli. Some GNC Members refused to accept the legitimacy of the HOR and re-

established the GNC as a rival legislative authority in Tripoli. In 2014, two rival Prime

Ministers and Governments emerged, with the HOR Government based in Tobruk and the

GNC Government based in Tripoli. Key state institutions remained in Tripoli, which led the

HOR Government to create its own parallel institutions in Tobruk. Fighting between militias

linked to the HOR and the GNC continued throughout late 2014 and early 2015.54

On 26 July, US embassy staff were evacuated from Tripoli, followed by those of most

other embassies. Thousands of foreigners left by road, as well as on Italian air force transport

aircraft, and British, French and Greek warships. “On 24 August, Zintani units withdrew from

the airport, which was captured and burned by Misratan units commanded by politician

Salah Badhi. Islamists secured the rest of the capital.”55

According to the abovementioned developments, Libya has not only failed to evolve

into democracy; it has devolved into a failed state. Violent deaths and other human rights

abuses have increased several fold.56 The Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has taken

advantage of the chaos to build series of bases in the country, “expanding its territory and

attracting growing numbers of recruits.”57 “The civil war between west and east has waxed

and waned with sporadic outbreaks of violence since 2014”. 58 By spring 2016, the US

intelligence community estimated that there were “more than 6,000 ISIS fighters in Libya,

with the group’s ranks growing at an alarming rate.” 59 In April 2016, the former United

States President Barack Obama “described post-intervention Libya as a shit show”. 260

4.2 Intervention Abused: Reasons behind the deterioration of the situation in Libya post

international intervention

The question now is who should be blamed for the abovementioned deteriorations that

the Libyans have been suffering from since 2011, who is responsible for such chaos and

instability. Starting with evaluating the international intervention in Libya in 2011, the

intervention exceeded its main mandate, which was to protect the civilians under threat, by

engaging in the process of the regime change.

To explain, as mentioned before, the UNSC resolution 1973 gave the international

community limited mandates in Libya, covering protecting “civilians and civilian populated

areas under threat of attack” 61, enforcing sanctions, including a no-fly zone and a

comprehensive arms embargo, and obtaining the “rapid and unimpeded passage of

humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel.”26 In addition, the military

objectives allowed are clearly defined in scope through permitting to resort to “all necessary

means” and allowing the intervening parties to protect both civilians and civilian populated

areas, both during actual attacks and under threat of attack. 63

Here, the main problem is that although the international intervention in Libya may

have been borne mainly from a desire to protect civilians, consistent with the UN Security

Council authorization, 64 within few weeks of the operation’s launch, the evidence showed

that the international community’s primary aim had evolved to overthrowing Qaddafi’s

regime, even at the expense of increasing harm to Libya’s civilians.265 To explain, rather

than pursuing a ceasefire, the NATO and its allies aided the rebels; as on 4 March 2011, the

United Kingdom declared its willingness to deploy military experts to advise the rebels in

eastern Libya, a step characterized as “a clear intervention on the ground to bolster the anti-

Qaddafi uprising.” 66 In the mid of the same month, the former U.S. President Barack Obama

approved covert aid to the rebels. By April 6, the British military and intelligence officials in

Benghazi were helping the rebels establish a command structure and defense ministry.

Furthermore, by mid-April, Qatar was shipping French antitank missiles to rebels in eastern

Libya, and “the Obama administration secretly gave its blessing” 67 to such arms transfers.

Then, by the next month, France started air-dropping weapons to opposition forces in western

Libya, who were being trained by operatives from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, as

these countries later acknowledged to a UN panel. 68

The abovementioned assistance to the rebels significantly extended the war and

increased the harm to civilians, contrary to the intent of the UN authorization.69 To illustrate,

in view of the real development of the operations, it appears that the notion of civilian

protection was extended beyond its initial conception as expressed in the resolution, applying

military and political objectives that had only an indirect link to threats to the civilian

population. Indeed, it appeared that the military operations, at least in part, were aimed at

supporting the forces assembled by the NTC, in its efforts to overthrow the elements loyal to

the regime.270 Furthermore, after the threat of a massacre in Benghazi had been ruled out, but

with actions by Qaddafi’s troops against other cities continuing, the operations entrusted to

the NATO continued, “with an increasingly blurred line between the prevention of massacres

on the one hand and, on the other, a systematic air campaign that aimed to dismantle the

military apparatus and whose ultimate goal was regime change.”271

In addition to arming the rebels, other actions were initiated, such as “sending military

advisors to rebels; financial support through the creation of a fund supplied, in part, by the

regime’s frozen assets; repeated and solemn calls for Qaddafi’s departure; growing

recognition of the legitimacy of the rebel movement represented by the NTC.”272 It became

clear over the months that the coalition’s objective was the collapse of the Qaddafi regime,

finally considering this objective as one of the necessary measures to protect civilians and

civilian populated areas under threat of attack. The increasing pressure from NATO and its air

raids not only weakened the offensive capacity of loyalist forces but also gradually

undermined their ability to respond to the actions of the armed opposition.273

As such, the rebels took Tripoli, with the support of NATO in August, signaling the end

of the Qaddafi’s regime, who was captured and killed by rebels in the end of October.

Following the death of Al Qaddafi, the US former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated

“we came, we saw, he died”274, reflected the enthusiasm of the international community to see

the end of the Qaddafi’s regime. The abovementioned actions capture the manner in which

an intervention meant to stop an immanent humanitarian crisis transformed into an act of

regime change, which was more expansive and consequential.275 The Libyan case showed that

the protection of civilians was open to a very broad interpretation, going far beyond its

originally declared objectives and provoking a strong, though expected, reaction from those

governments, Russia and China, that felt they had been forced into not opposing the adoption

http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=7830ef76-add9-43ab-

98018412fed0c824@sessionmgr101.

2 Pommier, Bruno. "The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and beyond."7 2 International Review of

the Red Cross 93, no. 884 (2011): 1063-083.

http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=7830ef76-add9-43ab-

98018412fed0c824@sessionmgr101.

2 Pommier, Bruno. "The Use of Force to Protect Civilians and Humanitarian Action: The Case of Libya and beyond."7 3 International Review of

the Red Cross 93, no. 884 (2011): 1063-083.

http://web.b.ebscohost.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=7830ef76-add9-43ab-

98018412fed0c824@sessionmgr101.

2 "We Came, We Saw, He Died: What Hillary Clin7ton Told News Reporter Moments after Hearing of Gaddafi's Death." Daily Mail 4

Online. October 21, 2011. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2051826/We-came-saw-died-What-Hillary-Clinton-told-news-

reportermoments-hearing-Gaddafis-death.html.

2 Hobson, Christopher. “Responding to Failure: The Responsibility to Protect after Libya.” Waseda University, Japan. Millennium Journal 7 5 of

International Studies. 2016. http://journals.sagepub.com.libproxy.aucegypt.edu:2048/doi/pdf/10.1177/0305829816640607.

of Resolution 1973.76 NATO took actions that were unnecessary or inconsistent with

protecting civilians, but which fostered regime change. 77 If NATO had prioritized the

protection of civilians, in accordance with its authorization, the transatlantic alliance

would have enforced the no fly zone, bombed forces that were threatening civilians, and

attempted to forge a cease-fire.278 However its assistance to the rebels significantly extended

the war and intensified the harm to civilians, contrary to the intent of the UN authorization.279

4.2.1 International Intervention in Libya and States’ Self-interests: Oil, Prestige, and Refugees

Furthermore, in spite of the concerns raised by the five abstaining UNSC member

states on resolution 1973, regarding the way of implementation, limitations, outcome, post

intervention stage, etc., France, the United Kingdom and the United States decided to swiftly

intervene in Libya, directly after the adoption of the resolution, while neglecting all the raised

concerns.

As such, questions regarding the incentives behind such quick response of the intervening

countries in the case of Libya have to be highlighted; as was the intervention for the sake of

protecting civilians under threat, or there were other factors that encouraged the three leading

countries, France, UK and US, to take such decision. In this context, the following section

will reflect that the political considerations and the state’s self/national interests; such oil,

prestige, and countering refugees flow, were the main motives behind the intervention of the

three countries.

A. France:

France and the United Kingdom have led the charge on the intervention in Libya. For a

month, both pushed the international community toward an intervention, ultimately penning

U.N. Security Council resolution 1973 authorizing the no-fly zone on March 17. Paris and

London’s interests in waging war on Libya are not the same, and Libya carries different

weight with each.

To explain, starting with France, its initial response to the 15 February outbreak of

violence in Libya was caution. When asked about reports of more than 200 deaths in a week of

fighting, Laurent Wauqiez of the French Foreign Ministry said that “our true preoccupation is to

assure the security of French citizens in Libya and that, though the Libyan government’s

violence was unacceptable, France would ‘not engage in any interference”. 80 On 23 February,

Sarkozy said the Qaddafi government’s brutal and bloody repression of civilians was revolting.

Three days later France’s Ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud, labelled the Al Qaddafi

government’s repression brutal and bloody and noted that ‘crimes against humanity may have

been committed. On 8 March France’s former ambassador to Libya reminded the National

Assembly of the Qaddafi regime’s 1996 massacre of over 1200 inmates in a Tripoli prison. The

ambassador went on to note that the opposition’s momentum had slowed, suggesting the need

for a rapid response.81 By 19 March the Sarkozy government had taken “a radically different

path: it was the first country to engage in military intervention against the Qaddafi’s regime.

France deployed roughly 60 aircraft and engaged in approximately 5600 sorties”.28

Aside from the announced goal of protecting the civilians under threat, there were

other national interest behind France’s enthusiasm to intervene in Libya, as “France motives

were linked to reviving “the French grandeur” through Sarkosy's wish to promote the image of

France on a domestic and international level; in addition to his political self-interest” 83.

Starting with the president’s self-interest, Sarkozy wanted to improve his image domestically

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and gain the public’s support. According to public opinion polls, Nicolas Sarkozy’s popularity

was low in February-march and continued to fall steadily. polls show that Sarkozy’s

domestic policy evokes the greatest discontent among the population. Experts identify two

main groups of causes of the president’s rapidly falling rating: first of all, the reaction to

reforms aimed at adapting French society to the challenges of globalism (raising the retirement

age, cutting spending on education, and optimizing military expenditures) and, secondly, the

consequences of the international financial and economic crisis that has had a painful impact

on the French economy284.

In addition, the ruling government and the French President Nicholas Sarkozy were

under huge political pressure in early 2011. The failure in handling the emerging 'Arab

Spring,' the dismissal of the French Foreign Minister because she was suspected of

corruption, and controversial links to the Tunisian Ben Ali regime before the popular uprising

and general discontent with the government politics led to a large decrease in the popularity

of Nicholas Sarkozy. 285 An interim peak of this development was reached when an opinion

poll predicted on 5 March 2011 that Sarkozy had fallen back to position three for the 2012

Presidential election, beaten by the far-right candidate and the socialist candidate. Especially,

the popularity of the right-wing candidate was politically dangerous for Sarkozy, because

Sarkozy's own party constantly lost its supporters to them.286

Sarkozy’s government had fumbled its initial response to the uprisings in Tunisia, and

was eager for an opportunity to show it stood with traditional French liberal values of liberty

and human rights, as well as to demonstrate France’s continued relevance on the global stage

in an election year.87 As such Sarkozy saw the intervention in Libya a good opportunity to try

to regain the public’s support. He believed that being part of the intervention and taking the

lead for it would be a great opportunity that can help decrease the criticism surrounding him

due to his inadequate response to the uprising in both Tunisia and Egypt. 88

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France also wanted to reassert its role as a great European power especially due to the

financial crisis and the growing image that Germany is taking over the decisions in the

European Union. As such, prestige seems to have played an initial causal role in the Sarkozy

government’s decision. Sarkozy’s government, like those before it, worked to maintain their

country’s prestige. French diplomats explain their country’s leadership role in the Libyan

crisis as driven by their historical position of influence on the African continent. That

historical position led to an expectation that France would act, which seems to have played a

critical role in Sarkozy’s decision to agree to Bernard-Henri Levy’s proposal to meet with and

recognize the TNC. Analysts also note that as of March 2011 France’s position of influence in

Africa had been weakened by its failure to take the side of protestors in Egypt and Tunisia. A

New York Times editorial concluded that Sarkozy “saw Libya as a chance to recoup French

prestige in North Africa, a region France has long considered important to its economy and

security.”89

Furthermore, the threat to France’s borders posed by refugees fleeing violence in

Libya was another important initial factor. As violence in Libya spread, French officials

concerns about the migratory threat grew. In a 25 February press conference Sarkozy

expressed his concern about the destabilizing effects of the massive flight of foreigners in

Libya towards the Tunisian and Egyptian borders. On 2 March, the former French Foreign

Minister, Alain Juppe Y told the National Assembly that “helping Libya, Tunisia and Egypt

towards the right path was in our interest wherein the goal is a level of political and economic

development that permits the citizens of the South to live at home, on their land, in their

country.” 90 On 11 March, Sarkozy noted that 200,000 people had fled violence in Libya and

asked, if conditions did not improve, “what would be the temptation of these displaced

persons? They would not have a choice: it would be to cross the Mediterranean.”291

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French officials believed that because of its location instability in Libya and at its

borders would have negative consequences for France. Sarkozy explained that the EU reacted

robustly to the Libyan crisis “because we are geographical neighbors and we are, therefore,

among the first impacted and affected”292. When a journalist pointed out to Laurent Wauquiez

that Italy faced a flood of refugees from Libya he replied “France is in the exact same

position ... Libya is the funnel of Africa: countries like Liberia, Somalia, and Eritrea have flows

of illegal immigration that pass through Libya, it is a true risk for Europe”.293

France’s former ambassador to Libya noted with regard to migratory flows from Libya that

‘the sooner things stabilize; the better things will be.”294

France is the home for many Libyan exiles, many of whom had connections within the

French establishment and were keen for a change in Libya, they pressured the French

decision makers to intervene in the conflict. As the conflict escalated the French will to

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intervene in the conflict became higher. However, for the French the conflict in Libya was not

just a situation where they cared about the civilians, it was also a situation where France

could enhance their national interest and Sarkozy could enhance his own political interests.95

Furthermore, maintaining access to Libyan oil was an important contributing factor in

the Sarkozy government’s decision. France’s special interest in Libya has stemmed from the

fact that the country has the largest proven reserves of oil and gas in North Africa. Although

oil imports by France from Libya have been limited in recent years, their share in the total

French oil imports has steadily grown. French oil imports from Norway have fallen, while

imports from Libya have increased. In 2008, Libya rose from sixth to fifth place among

France’s oil suppliers. Whereas Libya supplied almost ten times less oil than Norway,

France’s leading oil supplier, in 2000, the difference fell to a factor of two in 2008. “70% of

the exported oil was produced in the east of the country, where the uprising broke out. Until

the beginning of unrest in Libya, France got not only oil but also gas through the

LibyanItalian gas pipeline green stream. The French energy giant gaz de France Suez was

involved in developing the Libyan gas fields”.96 Zaki Laidi wrote in mid-March that France

and others faced the risk that if they did nothing Qaddafi would “re-emerge with more

violence against his people and probably also against governments that opposed him.”97

B: The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was the second country after France to call the United Nations

to impose a no-fly zone over Libya to protect the civilians. Sarkozy has gained the support of

British Prime Minister David Cameron, who, after initial hesitation, also spoke out clearly

against the Libyan regime’s repression.98 As the violence in Libya grew, the Cameron

government was initially reluctant to act, refusing to support EU sanctions against the

Qaddafi’s regime. Within less than a month, however, the Cameron government had joined its

French ally in playing a leading role in what would be termed Operation Unified Protector.

“The United Kingdom deployed 37 aircraft, which, starting on 19 March, engaged in more

than 3000 sorties in the course of the air campaign. Why did the Cameron government take

such initial action as condemning the Qaddafi’s regime and calling for a no-fly zone? Why

did it ultimately choose to use force against the Libyan regime?”99

London had set three conditions which had to be met before an intervention: there had

to be (1) a demonstrable need; (2) legal basis, and; (3) regional support.00 Most frequently

referred to in the government’s official statements is the responsibility to protect the Libyan

people. Prime Minister Cameron and many of his fellow party members had vivid memories

from past failures to act in genocides such as Srebrenica and Rwanda. There was now a sense

that Britain could not sit idle on the sidelines, especially given its role as a major European

power. 01 In making the humanitarian case for intervention Cameron was asked about why

Britain was not intervening in other cases where rights were abused. Cameron responded by

stressing that he favored intervention where both moral concerns and national interest called

for it: “just because we cannot do the right thing everywhere does not mean we should not do

it when we have clear permission for and a national interest in doing so”. 302

Furthermore, the refugee threat was a critical initial factor and economic interests and

terrorism became important contributing factors as soon as the Cameron government took

initial action. Analysts and policy-makers made the case for British intervention by

combining the migration, economic interests, and terrorism logics. All the statements that

follow were made after the Cameron government’s 28 February support for a no-fly zone and

call for Qaddafi to leave power. On 4 March an Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

press release estimated that almost 200,000 refugees had fled Libya since the uprising

began.30 The Financial Times’ Philip Stephens argued that “Economics, energy security and

immigration controls all point in the same direction” 304. James Blitz reported that Cameron’s

hardening stance on Libya was rooted in a fear that if Qaddafi remained in power “the fear is

he will go back to being the recruiting sergeant for terror he was in the 1980s.”305

On 14 March, David Cameron stated that the “inaction would lead Libya to become a

failed pariah state threatening to flood Britain with refugees and menace it with terror.” 306 The

next day William Hague, the former UK Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, “concluded a

Commons speech with a similar statement: if Libya was to be left as a pariah state, particularly

after these recent events with Al Qaddafi running amok exacting reprisals on his own people,

estranged from the rest of the world, as a potential source for terrorism in the future, that would

be a danger to the national interest of this country.” 307 The terror and migration logics were also

central to the government’s major statements on Libya just before and just after the air

campaign began. Cameron concluded his 18 March speech by noting that allowing Qaddafi ’s

violent crackdown to continue would not:308

“be in Britain’s interests. Let us be clear where our interests lie. In this country we

know what Colonel Qaddafi is capable of. We should not forget his support for the

biggest terrorist atrocity on British soil. We simply cannot have a situation where

a failed pariah state festers on Europe’s southern border. This would potentially

threaten our security, push people across the Mediterranean and create a more

dangerous and uncertain world for Britain and for all our allies as well as for the

people of Libya.” 09

Furthermore, British prestige was not implicated in the Libya crisis until it chose to

take a leadership role on 28 February. In taking initial action, however, the Cameron

government implicated British prestige such that it had to intervene, or its prestige would

have suffered. On 28 February, Hague attended the UN Human Rights Council and was

successful in the effort to have Libya removed from the Council. The same day the former

Prime Minister told the Commons, “Britain is taking a lead. Over the weekend, we secured

agreement for a UN Security Council resolution which we had drafted, and which is

unusually strong, unanimous and includes all of our proposals”. 10

On 9 March, Cameron stated that “we have led the way in getting a tough UN

resolution on Libya, getting Libya thrown out of the Human Rights Council and making sure

that the world is preparing for every eventuality, including a no-fly zone” 311. Getting UNSCR

1973 passed required that the British and French put their prestige on the line. The Cameron

government clearly felt that its leadership was worth drawing attention to. “It is likely that the

government recognized that its international prestige would have suffered had it not

continued with an aggressive stance”. 312

The United Kingdom motives were also linked to energy interests. Libya seems a

profitable market to exploit especially after the loss incurred due to “the mismanagement of

BP, resulting in the Macando well disaster in the Gulf of Mexico”. 313 Britain energy sector

would benefit from new deals with the rebels in Libya. For the United Kingdom, Libya offers

a promise of energy exploitation. It was not a country with which London had a strong

clientpatron relationship at that moment, but it hoped it could be developed if Al Gadhafi were

removed from power.14

In addition, the British motivation has to a large extent been driven by the same

prestige logic as the French, but even more importantly by the ambition of preserving the

close strategic relationship15 with its allies by actively supporting their strategic line.

Washington’s call for someone else to take lead in Libya likely played a role. It is possible

that the UK was eager to step up to those demands in order to preserve its ‘Special

Relationship’ with the US. It has been suggested that independent judgement and action on

the part of the UK was a way for London to prove that it remained relevant in its relationship

with Washington. 16 Moreover, Cameron, for his part, was equally eager to demonstrate his

leadership on security issues in the wake of domestic criticism of his planned defence cuts

that had been announced the previous fall. In addition, both countries saw an opportunity to

test the defence cooperation treaties they had signed only a few months earlier.17

Furthermore, in contrast to France, the position of the UK was initially more hesitant,

though it evolved quickly thereafter. Initially, the UK referred to the NTC as an “important

and legitimate political interlocutor.”18 By May 2011, however, the UK referred to it as ‘a

legitimate representative of the Libyan people’ and, at the end of June of that same year, it

viewed the NTC as “the legitimate representative of the Libyan people”. 19 The development

of the terms in which the UK referred to the NTC expresses different levels of support.20 C.

The United States:

Although the interest of the United States in Libya was not as France and the United

Kingdom; the United States decided to support its allies in their intervention; in which there

were many factors behind such decision; aside from the protection of the civilians under

threat. To explain, the impetus for the intervention in Libya came in large part from France

and Britain. Although President Obama supported the operation, he emphasized to his French

and British counterparts that they would be expected to take the lead and bear as much of the

cost as they could. “The United States would support the effort, but provide only those

capabilities it uniquely possessed. This arrangement also set the stage for a much-reduced

U.S. role after the war.”21

In addition, in the text of a letter from the president to the speaker of the House of

Representatives and the president prop-tempore of the senate on March 21, 2011 declared that

“The United States has not deployed ground forces into Libya. United States forces are

conducting a limited and well-defined mission in support of international efforts to protect

civilians and prevent a humanitarian disaster. Accordingly, U.S. forces have targeted the

Qaddafi regime's air defense systems, command and control structures, and other capabilities

of Qaddafi's armed forces used to attack civilians and civilian populated areas. We will seek a

rapid, but responsible, transition of operations to coalition, regional, or international

organizations that are postured to continue activities as may be necessary to realize the

objectives of U.N. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973”.22

In this context, some analysts view the US engagement in Libya as a sort of payback to its

European allies for their contribution in Afghanistan, something which also Secretary of State

Clinton implied in the quote below.32 “We asked our NATO allies to go into Afghanistan with

us 10 years ago […] They have been there, and a lot of them have been there despite the fact

that they were not attacked. The attack came on us…they stuck with us. When it comes to

Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies…this was in

their vital national interest.”24

Another possible motive for why Washington decided to act was that Libya was seen

as threatening to destabilize the region. Libya was in 2006 removed from the US blacklist of

states supporting terrorism after having abandoned its weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

program and renounced terrorism. The US upgraded its Liaison Office in Tripoli to an

Embassy and, in 2008, Rice was the first US Secretary of State to visit Libya since 1953. The

fighting in Libya ignited fears that the country once again would become a base for terrorists

or that Qaddafi would resume the development of weapons of mass destruction. Qaddafi’s

role in the Lockerbie bombing may also have been in policy makers’ minds. 25

4.2.2 State Fragility during and post Qaddafi Era

The international community should be blamed for not taking into consideration the

personalist ruling regime of Al Qaddafi, and the internal situation in Libya, before taking the

decision of the intervention, or when deciding to be involved in fostering the regime change

or even before ending the intervention after the death of Al Qaddafi.

To explain, the ouster of Al Qaddafi liberated Libya from four decades of authoritarian

rule, but left a legacy of weak institutional capacity, based on the personality nature of his

regime. Barbara Geddes describes the personalist regime as a system that “depends much

more on the discretion of an individual leader. The leader may be an officer and may have

created a party to support himself, but neither the military nor the party exercises independent

decision-making power insulated from the whims of the ruler.” Indeed when studying the

ruling system in Libya under Al Qaddafi, Libya was ruled by a personalist regime, as all the

decisions were taken only by its leader. Al Qaddafi’s strategy relies on weakening the

institutional system, strengthening the tribal system, in order to maintain power and control

over the country. As such when the NATO ended its mission in the country, Libya was left

with no institutions capable to manage the post intervention stage.

The specific feature of Libya at that time was “the complete absence of an institutional

national framework: state institutions were ignored, neglected, or destroyed by Al Qaddafi for

four decades.”27 Consequently, the lack of the efficient institutional system in Libya resulted

in serious problems to the transitional and interim government.

To explain, Libya’s inability to control its own territory following the death of Al

Qaddafi was a direct result of the system of governance Al Qaddafi implemented while in

power, known as Jamahiriya. Due to the substantial income from oil, the Qaddafi’s regime

was able to use funds to implement a strong patronage network, ensure that bureaucratic

institutions remained weak, and empower tribal and local leaders to typical governmental

services such as rule of law. 28 In addition, the socialist institutions that were meant to provide

goods and services to the population were intentionally suppressed or mismanaged to ensure

no one sector of government became too powerful.29 The promotion under the Qaddafi’s

regime was based on allegiance to the “Brother Leader” himself and favored the loyal over

the capable; as the result, Libya lacked the trained civil service to manage and administer

governance.30 Fundamentally, Jamahiriya strengthened the centralized power of Al Qaddafi

and diffused remaining authority at the lowest levels of society, which resulted in the

marginalization of political elites who might otherwise have challenged Qaddafi’s rule.31

Furthermore, the Key security/military and economic positions, “the only centralized

and skeletal institutions that existed in Libya, were filled by Qaddafi’s close aides by

systematically using political familialism or tribalism, i.e. key individuals recruited according

to familial, tribal, ethnic belongings or alliances, in the first place the Qadhadhfa, the

Magarha and (at least until a coup attempt in 1993) one of the greatest tribe of central Libya,

the Warfalla.” 32 “And this small elite, what Libyans called Rijal al-Khayma (the men of the

tent), controlled a web of families, tribes or allied ethnic groups with army colonels,

petroleum engineers, police officers, and high bureaucrats recruited according to familial/

tribal equilibriums at the local level.” 33 “Orchestrated chaos, de-institutionalization and the

plethora of local institutions were a way to keep exclusive power at the top in the hands of Al

Qaddafi and his network/clique who managed the system from above”.34

In the same context, the actual military suffered from poor professionalization,

outdated or ill-maintained equipment, and overall lack of leadership. Positions within the

military were not only shuffled around to the extent that service members did not know their

bosses and supervisors did not know their subordinates, but were assigned based on tribal and

personal affiliations with Brother Leader. Following the 1993 coup attempt by a combination

of Islamists and military members, Al Qaddafi ensured that no promotions would be made

beyond his own “rank” of colonel. The problems surrounding the police forces were similar

to those of the armed forces: lack of discipline, equipment, and training. 35 Aside from

Qaddafi ’s personal revolutionary-guard force, the police and armed forces were primarily

used to achieve political goals, not to secure the territory and the citizens.36

Under Qaddafi, the military structures of the Libyan state were almost wholly

subordinated to the political structures of his regime. That subordination of state to politics

allowed the self-declared “Brother Leader” to pursue a range of coup-proofing strategies in

the 1970s and 1980s, which were based around a logic of patronage (to control key military

units) and neglect (to enfeeble the National Army as a whole). These two tactics of control

gave rise to state security apparatus in which the most potential elements of the National

army were led by Qaddafi’s son or his close allies.

To sum-up, Qaddafi ’s vision of institutional development employed two opposing

forces. On one hand, he wanted to transform “Libya into a bastion for his regional ambitions”

of Pan-Arabism, and on the other, “Al Qaddafi’s concerns for security and dominance”

prevented the establishment of any institutions with true power, authority, or influence. This

weakened political/military, economic, and social institutions.37

In this context, Libya’s weak institutions led to two destructive situations: first, the co-

opting of tribal militias by the interim government to provide security for population centers

and major resources; and second, the rise of opportunistic tribal militias and spread of internal

violence. Islamist organizations are an amalgamation of these two scenarios. They tend to be

tribally heterogeneous; they were at times co-opted by the government; and they are

opportunistic. Furthermore, “the inability of Islamist organizations to align with a major tribe

for logistical or operational support and their nature has led some Islamist organizations, such

as the Abu Mahjen Battalion, to acquire resources through criminal means, such as

kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery of money transports”38

In 2011, the Qaddafi’s regime collapsed gradually, leaving a void, namely an

institutional tabula rasa meaning that new authorities were not confronted with the problem of

remaining parts of the former regime and a large officer corps acting as stakeholders as in

Egypt or Yemen. What came out was a proliferation of actors organized along familial, tribal,

ethnic, regional lines, a surge of localism, far from the revival of a tradition of organized civil

society that did not exist in Libya.39 In addition to weak institutional capacity and a lack of

experience with democratic processes, Libya is also saddled with the internal rivalries and

distrust purposefully instigated by the Qaddafi’s regime as a means of maintaining control. In

his effort to maintain control, Qaddafi pursued a “divide and rule” policy, pitting community

against community, tribe against tribe, and region against region. As in other post-conflict

situations, even when these internal divisions were cultivated by rulers or external powers,

they often cast a long shadow.40

Moreover, Libya suffered from the lack of democracy during Qaddafi’s era. While

Qaddafi claimed his regime was based on popular will, it systematically suppressed civil

society and independent media, prohibited the establishment of political parties, and created a

web of unelected bodies and informal power structures.41 As such the fall of Al Gadhafi “as

Libya’s strongman and purveyor of the patronage network left a power vacuum,”42 in which

government institutions were too weak to provide security to the population, and from a more

pragmatic standpoint, unable to provide security for Libya’s natural resources.34

To sum-up, this chapter was divided into two sections, the first one gave an overview

to the deteriorating situation in Libya post the international intervention in 2011, while

arguing that the intervention intensified the sufferings and harmfulness to the civilians in the

country. As such the second section of the chapter focused on explaining the reasons behind

such deteriorations, while clarifying that the abuse of the humanitarian intervention and the

fragility of the Libyan state are the main reasons behind the collapse of Libya.

VI. Conclusion

5.1 The Findings of the Research:

The main aim of this research was to study the dilemma of the humanitarian

intervention through focusing on evaluating the outcome of the international intervention and

analyzing the factors contributed to its success/failure, in the case of Libya, rather focusing on

its legality, ethics, morality, types and intervening actors; in order to figure out whether the

international intervention helps in protecting civilians under threat or it leads to an increase in

the sufferings, deterioration and threats facing them. Libya was the only country of the Arab

Spring 2011, where the UNSC permitted the international military intervention. The

international intervention in Libya is considered a test case for the principle of the

responsibility to protect and a turning point in its history, as the international intervention was

permitted in the state, by the UNSC, for the first time without the consent of its government.

In addition, the intervention’s aftermath changed the debates on the principle from focusing

on the implementation of the international intervention into focusing on its outcome.

Indeed, the findings of this research reflected how the international community was

committed, in the case of Libya, to react when there was a demonstrable need and

international calls for a reaction; as the international community was keen from the beginning

of the popular uprising in Libya in 2011, to respond to the Libyan regime’s use of violence

against the domestic unrest and anti-governmental demonstrations. To explain, the

international community’s response went quickly from the political condemnation, to

diplomatic pressure, to a UNSC-authorization to, NATO-led, military intervention under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

But was the quick military intervention in the case of Libya a right decision? The use

of military intervention for the sake of protecting civilians under threat, is always a

controversial issue among the international community; various concerns and debates raised

regarding this type of intervention and its implications throughout history; as such it always

has to be the last choice of the international community. In the case of Libya, the military

intervention was initially portrayed as a humanitarian success to the international community

for preventing a bloodbath in that country’s second largest city, Benghazi. Accordingly, the

proponents of the intervention in Libya claimed that the intervention was a triumph to the

successful implementation of the principle of the responsibility to protect. In this regards, the

top U.S. representatives to the transatlantic alliance declared that “NATO's operation in Libya

has rightly been hailed as a model intervention.” 44 However, later on, Libya started suffering

from severe insecurity and internal deterioration that not only have increased the threats to the

civilians in Libya, but to the international community as well. To explain, in spite of the

international abovementioned efforts to protect civilians under threat, the situation in Libya

has rapidly been deteriorated, after the end of the international intervention. In the post

intervention phase, as abovementioned, Libya has been characterized by state collapse, chaos

and anarchy, with conflict between ever-changing alliances of armed groups, terrorism with

the expansion of the Islamic State and uncontrolled borders with waves of migrants crossing

the boarders of the country.

In this context, after studying the case of the intervention in Libya, this research

concluded that the international intervention has to be considered a failure of the international

community, as it led to the spread of instability in the country and to an increase in the threat

to the civilians. This research argues that there are two main factors behind such findings; one

of which is the abuse to the principle of the humanitarian intervention in Libya. To explain,

the international community exceeded the permitted mandate by taking actions that were

inconsistent with its main target, of protecting the civilians under threat in Libya, by engaging

in the process of fostering regime change; while allowing the political considerations and the

states’ national interests of the intervening countries, such as oil and counter migration, to be

the main driver and incentive behind their decisions of intervening in Libya as explained

before in the previous chapter. Furthermore, this research argues that the fragility of the

Libyan state was the other factor behind the collapse of the state, as it led to the

intensification of the deteriorated situation in Libya post the international intervention in

2011. To explain, as all the institutions used to be under the control of Al Qaddafi and his

regime before the popular uprising; by the removal of the regime, Al Qaddafi left Libya with

a legacy of weak institutional capacity, based on the personal nature of his regime. In the post

intervention phase, Libya was lacking the functioning state structure; consequently, this led

the country to face a high level of instability, and inability to control the armed militias that

spread in the country after the intervention. The lack of the efficient institutional system in

Libya was not taken into consideration by the international community, either when deciding

to engaging in fostering the regime change process or when deciding to end their role after

the death of Al Qaddafi; subsequently, resulting in increasing the harmfulness to the civilians

in Libya and being considered as one of the main factor behind the collapse of the state,

beside the factor that was already mentioned above, which is the abuse of the humanitarian

intervention.

5.2The Instability Continues Despite the International Efforts and Political Agreements:

Since then, although the international community has been trying to exert much effort

to return the stability to Libya and end the chaos, all its attempts are ending up with no good,

and nobody can predict when this will be achieved. To clarify, since the fall of Colonel

Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya has suffered from years of ineffective and dysfunctional

rule. Moreover, a series of weak governments passed through Tripoli in the aftermath of the

popular uprising as powerful militias struggled for control on the ground. The country further

disintegrated in 2014, “when a contested election saw Islamist-backed politicians and allied

militias seize power in the western capital of Tripoli and force the newly elected House of

Representatives to flee to the east, where it allied with eastern anti-Islamist forces. Despite

the UN-led agreement that installed a Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2016, rival

factions across the country continue to fight one another.” 45 Unsurprisingly, the Islamic State

(or ISIS) and other resurgent jihadist groups have taken advantage of the country’s political

instability, effectively “turning Libya into a safe haven and breeding ground for extremists”.46

Furthermore, the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which the United Nations relied

on and described as a “first step” towards ending the country’s crisis,47 has failed to put an

end to the instability in Libya. To explain, on December 17th 2015, Rival Libyan politicians

signed a deal in Skhirat, Morocco to form a unity government despite opposition on both

sides48. That agreement, aimed at “ending the fighting between Libya’s so-called Dawn and

Dignity factions, produced the Government of National Accord in Tripoli but was unable to

unify Libya’s fragmented political, economic, and military bodies.” 349 “The conception and

execution of dialogue in the lead-up to the deal was rushed at the behest of outside powers

and, more important, it was artificially structured as a deal between two parties when in fact

the conflict’s actors were more numerous and diverse.” By relying on signatories from the

two parliaments, one in the east and one in the west of the country, “who did not speak for the

actual forces on the ground, it set the stage for continued gridlock. A crucial sticking point

was the authority of the commander in chief of the armed forces, which the agreement gave to

the GNA’s Presidency Council, a stipulation rejected by Haftar and his supporters.” 50

To surmount this gridlock, the new UN envoy in Libya, Ghassan Salamé, proposed an

“action plan consisting of amendments to the LPA (to include a reconstituted Presidency

Council), a national conference, a popular referendum on the constitution, and the preparation

of presidential and parliamentary elections with appropriate voting laws.” However, such plan

has been stuck on nearly every stage, as there “is no movement on revising the makeup of the

council; progress on the national conference, which the UN outsourced to a nongovernmental

organization, has been slow and fitful; and the eastern House of Representatives won’t put the

constitutional referendum law to a vote. That leaves elections as the last remaining pillar.” 51

“Salamé long argued that elections could take place only once the conditions were ripe. Now,

although no headway has been made, elections are to be held regardless, in December 2018,

according to France’s initiative.” 52

In brief, after a comprehensive examining of the international intervention in the case

of Libya 2011, and the followed current deteriorating situation, no one can predict how and

when it will end; also, many questions have been raised regarding the principle of the

humanitarian intervention, and the future of the responsibility to protect civilians. Regarding

the case of Libya intervention, it is a great proof that the principle might be good as an idea,

while its implementation has many negative consequences, as it was not purely used for

humanitarian purposes and as such can backfire, like what happened in Libya where the

outcome showed that the intervention brought even worse humanitarian disasters.

5.3 Lessons Learnt for the Future of Humanitarian Intervention:

In this context, it is worth to highlight that the NATO’s experience in Libya offers

important lessons for the future of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect.

Each of its stages provide different lesson that should be taken into consideration in the future

when implementing the concept. Starting with the pre-intervention stage, as mentioned above,

resolution 1973 was adopted within days from the eruption of the popular uprising. The

resolution requested the international community to impose a no fly zone over Libya and

allowed to take all necessary measures; although the phrase opened the doors for the military

intervention to take place, the international community should have according to the third

pillar of the R2P imposed the no-fly zone first, before deciding to intervene militarily;

especially as there was a lack of a coherent vision regarding the implementation process.

Moreover, the rush to intervene to protect civilians meant that NATO became inadvertently

engaged in an intervention without a coherent vision and with limited understanding of the

political, public relations, and reconstruction activities that would be required in order to

achieve a desirable outcome.35 The NATO and the international community were plunged

into action prior to answering the primary question highlighted by the UNSC members;

specially Russia and China regarding the way of implementing the resolution and protecting

civilians under threat. As such, during the implementation process the international

community was reluctant to decide when to end its mission and it got involved in fostering

regime change; as the result, the intervention ended up with a spread of instability in the

country. Libya’s most crucial lesson therefore is that the intervention requires a full agreed

coherent plan that covers all the stages of the intervention: the entrance, way of

implementation and exit strategy; as even the most limited engagements can quickly creep

toward something much bigger. This alone is not a reason against intervention, but rather a

caveat to take full responsibility for the action.54

Additionally, during the intervention stage, the intervening countries went beyond the

permitted mandate. Although the intervention should have been limited to what the UNSC

member states have agreed on and allowed in the endorsed resolutions; the international

community went beyond their main mandate by engaging in fostering regime change, which

results in increasing the harmfulness of the civilians. To explain, the intervention initially

motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its objective to include

regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to the interveners’

original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when justifying their use of force to

domestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of the country they are targeting.

This demonization later inhibits the interveners from considering a negotiated settlement that

would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which typically would be the

quickest way to end the violence and protect noncombatants. 55 By demanding regime change,

the interveners perversely encourage the regime to fight to the bitter end, which actually

escalates and prolongs the war, maximizing the harm to civilians. 56 Such lessons from

NATO's use of force in Libya suggest the need for considerable caution and a comprehensive

exploration of alternatives when contemplating if and how to conduct humanitarian military

intervention.57

Moreover, the other learnt lesson from the intervention in Libya is that the

intervention can backfire. To explain, any action, whether limited or extensive, carries some

undesirable, yet fairly predictable consequences on the ground. Intervention will empower

certain groups over others even when the stated intentions are different. A simple no-fly zone

engineered to help the rebels and their political institutions can actually end up strengthening

actors other than the ones policymakers intended to support. For example, in Libya the no-fly

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