FOREIGN POLICY REORIENTATION_ FROM GLOBALIZATION TO NATIONALISM

Introduction

In the post-2010s, the world experienced a dramatic resurgence of nationalism—

emphasizing independence, sovereignty, and the primacy of national interests. This resurgence

also entails a pushback against democracy, free, trade, and immigration

. In terms of foreign

policy, this resurgence manifests in terms of limited engagement, unilateralism, and proneness to

conflict. Primarily, the resurgence of nationalism came as a reaction to the political, economic,

and socioeconomic changes that had accompanied the post-Cold War international order and the

third wave of globalization (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002, Palley 2018)

. This resurgence of

nationalism challenges the optimistic post-Cold War expectations that include a rules-based

order, the spread of democracy and human rights, and the free movement of capital, products,

people, and information. It also challenges the way scholars explain shifts and reorientations of

foreign policy—mainly in association with systemic conditions. Traditionally, scholars have

resorted to systemic explanations to explain why states reorient their foreign policy.

However, the puzzling aspect of this resurgence of nationalism and its foreign policy

expression—i.e. nationalist foreign policy—lies in variation across states. Many states have

continued to uphold globalization and its associated foreign policies despite being exposed to the

same factors that pushed others to reorient their foreign policies toward nationalism. This

Also known as Neo-Nationalism which references the rise of radical right and nationalist parties and leaders in

the EU that occurred in the mid-2010s. While it shares similar characteristics to classical nationalism, neo-

nationalism is distinguished by its pushback against political, economic, and cultural aspects of globalization (Eger

and Valdez 2015, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019, Schertzer and Woods 2022).

Historically, globalization manifested in terms of three waves where the first started in 1870 and ended with the

First World War. The second wave of globalization began in 1944 and ended in the 1980s. the third wave of

globalization began in 1989 and continues to the present (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002, Palley 2018).

variation poses the question: What explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy

from globalization to nationalism?

Addressing this question, this dissertation draws on three bodies of literature including

the literature on globalization, nationalism, and populism. First, the literature on globalization

explores its political, economic, and cultural premises. Politically, globalization entails the

development of a single-world order and the rise of supernational institutions (Kellner 2002,

Sparks 2007). It also places national states within transnational and non-territorial formations

(Axford 2013). In terms of the economy, globalization entails global economic integration and

the embrace of free trade (Wolf 2004, Bhagwati 2004, Ritzer 2004). It also offers solutions to

poverty, economic inequality, and global crises (Norberg 2001, Bhagwati 2004). Within cultural

and social spheres, globalization entails a transition toward a cosmopolitan society that embraces

universal norms and lifestyles (Beck 2002). It also entails the development of global

consciousness and non-territorial communities.

Second, the literature on nationalism also explores its political, economic, and cultural

premises. Politically, nationalism centralizes around the national state which represents the

ultimate form of order and organization. Nationalism limits states to native affiliations and

functions within territorial boundaries (Grosby 2005). It also emphasizes independence,

sovereignty, unity, and self-determination (Breuilly 1982, Lawrence 2013). In terms of the

economy, nationalism emphasizes self-sufficiency (Hechter 2000), fair rather than free trade

(Bovard 1989), and protection of domestic industries (Schultze 2017). Within cultural and social

spheres, nationalism emphasizes the distinctiveness and exclusivity of nations (Benedict 1983,

Tamir 1993). It also bases affiliations on actualities of blood, race, language, and religion (Geerts

1963).

Third, the literature on populism reflects the scholarly debate on whether it constitutes an

independent doctrine or a political strategy. Generally, populism represents an antagonistic and

divisive representation of society (Laclau 2009). It emphasizes the homogeneous nature of

society, animosity toward the elites, and the primacy of the “people” (Mény and Surel 2002,

Mudde 2004). It also focuses on ideas such as the “popular will”, political representation, and

popular sovereignty (Heiskanen 2021, Destradi et al. 2023). Populism and nationalism share core

principles including the primacy of national interests and sovereignty. Both also share the

principle of exclusion against a different “other” (Singh 2021, Rabinowitz 2023). Nationalism

and populism also share animosity towards elitism, pluralism, and liberalism (Mudde 2004,

Rabinowitz 2023). At the same time, populism is aligned with nationalism in its opposition to

globalization. Both react to the technological and economic changes that have accompanied

globalization (Mudde 2004, Pastor and Veronesi 2018). Both also have resurged in response to

the cultural and demographic changes that are perceived as threats to local cultures and values

(Rodrik 2017).

Linking these bodies of literature, this dissertation advances that the post-2010s

resurgence of nationalism has manifested in terms of a reorientation of foreign policy from

globalization to nationalism. This dissertation characterizes foreign policy under globalization in

terms of commitment to collective action and international institutions, the promotion of

democracy and human rights, and the free movement of people and products. It is expressed in

terms of active involvement in international affairs and multilateral institutions, commitment to

multilateral engagement, and preference for cooperation over confrontation. On the other hand,

foreign policy under nationalism—i.e. nationalist foreign policy—is characterized in terms of

emphasis on independence and national sovereignty, economic protectionism, and pushback

against democracy and universal values. It is also expressed in terms of limited and unilateral

engagement and proneness to conflict and confrontation. Finally, this dissertation considers

populism as a mobilization and framing strategy. Such a strategy manifests in terms of the

alignment that develops between the leaders’ orientations and the domestic pressure—

particularly the public. It is also embedded in the frames of foreign policy and how these leaders

amplify the costs of the systemic shocks toward a foreign policy reorientation.

This dissertation advances that the reorientation of foreign policy toward nationalism

occurs as a domestic-driven deviation. Such an explanation does not necessarily exclude

systemic factors. Instead, this dissertation establishes the reorientation of foreign policy is

triggered by systemic and domestic factors. Systemic factors include shocks such as terrorist

attacks, military interventions, regional conflicts and uprisings, and economic crises. These

shocks inflict significant costs that factor into the building up of domestic pressure states toward

change. However, this dissertation advances that these shocks are not sufficient to trigger such

shifts. Otherwise, all states that were exposed to such shocks would have reoriented their foreign

policy which did not happen. Hence, the domestic-based explanation adds two domestic

variables including domestic pressures and activating leadership. Domestic pressures build as the

public and the elite perceive the shocks as costs of globalization and its foreign policy

expressions. These pressures are also accompanied by shifts within the ruling parties or

coalition—giving rise to anti-globalization factions. Eventually, these shifts and the increasing

pressure contribute to the rise of activating agents—i.e. national leaders. Functioning as

activating agents, these leaders exhibit an orientation that aligns with and reflects domestic

pressures. They also amplify the effects of globalization and mobilize toward reorienting foreign

policy toward nationalism.

Based on this theoretical frame, this dissertation explores the reorientation of foreign

policy toward nationalism using a multiple-case design. Such a research design aims at

developing knowledge about the expressions of nationalist foreign policy. It also aims to develop

an understanding of the mechanisms that link systemic shocks, domestic pressures, and the

activating agents to foreign policy reorientation. Under a multiple-case design, this dissertation

employs the analytical method of structured and focused comparison. Such a method entails

asking the same questions about the foreign policy expressions of globalization and nationalism

in each case. In terms of time frame, this dissertation examines the reorientation of foreign policy

toward nationalism between 1990 and 2020. In this period, states are assumed to have followed

the Cold War by subscribing to political, economic, and cultural globalization. However, states

experienced, especially in the post-2000s, a series of systemic shocks. In the post-2010s, states

are assumed to have begun to reorient their foreign policy towards nationalism. Such a condition

is primarily expressed in terms of the combination of domestic pressures and the dramatic rise of

nationalist leaders who activate such pressures and initiate the reorientation of foreign policy

towards nationalism.

Under this research design, this dissertation explores the reorientation of foreign policy in

three cases including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the People’s

Republic of China. Primarily, such selection aims at exploring the reorientation of foreign policy

across political systems including democracies and autocracies. In doing so, this dissertation

advances that this reorientation occurs irrespective of regime type and political systems. Besides

this, the selection of the cases is based on variation in power among the considered cases—

representing major and regional powers. This shows this reorientation occurs at different levels

and is expected to have international and regional implications. In the selected cases, this

dissertation explores the reorientation of foreign policy in response to political and economic

shocks including terrorist attacks, military interventions, regional conflicts and uprisings, and

global and regional economic crises. This dissertation also explores domestic pressures—

exhibited in the public and elite opinion that correspond to these shocks. It also explores the

shifts within the governing coalition or parties. It follows with exploring the rise of three

leaders—identified as nationalists—including President Donald Trump, PM Boris Johnson, and

President Xi Jinping. It explores the components of these leaders’ orientations and how they

align with and amplify domestic pressures. Finally, this dissertation explores the final foreign

policy product—i.e. nationalist foreign policy—in political and economic spheres.

This dissertation expects the systemic shocks to have inflicted political and economic

costs on the three considered cases. In response, the public and the elites in the three cases are

expected to have become increasingly critical of globalization and its foreign policy expressions.

This dissertation also expects the rise of the three nationalist leaders to have been preceded by

shifts within the governing coalitions or parties. It also expects the three leaders to exhibit

orientations that align and reflect the domestic pressures. While the reorientation of foreign

policy is expected to be similar across the cases, this dissertation also expects variation in points

of departure and intensity. Between 2010 and 2020, the three cases are expected to begin

reorienting their foreign policy at different points that correspond to the rise of the nationalist

leadership. Furthermore, this dissertation expects the three cases to exhibit variation in their

foreign policy reorientation—with democratic systems taking more dramatic departures than

autocratic systems. It also expects the three cases to exhibit variation in terms of the aspects of

globalization they push against. Democratic systems are expected to respond to economic

aspects such as free trade and economic interdependence whereas autocratic systems respond to

political aspects such as democracy and regional integration.

Considering these expectations, this dissertation represents one of the early extensive

studies into the post-2010s resurgence of nationalism and its impact on foreign policy. As noted

earlier, this dissertation challenges the optimist post-Cold War expectations that include a rules-

based order, the spread of democracy and human rights, and the free movement of capital,

products, people, and information. Alternatively, this dissertation points to trends that imply less

commitment to multilateralism, increasing hostility and confrontation, and a push against

democracy, human rights, and free trade. This dissertation also establishes the multiplicity and

cyclical nature of foreign policy orientations. Evident in the post-2010s resurgence and this

research, nationalism constitutes an opposing orientation to globalization. Beyond this, this

dissertation, this dissertation contributes to research on foreign policy by combining a systemic

and domestic explanation of foreign policy shifts. As noted earlier, this dissertation characterizes

the reorientation of foreign policy as a domestic-driven deviation—triggered by systemic shocks,

domestic pressures, and the rise of nationalist leadership. In other words, this dissertation

establishes that the effects of systemic factors are conditioned by domestic factors. It also shows

that foreign policy shifts are entrenched within domestic politics and configurations.

Chapter One

Globalization, Nationalism, Populism, and Foreign Policy

This chapter explores three bodies of literature including the literature on globalization,

nationalism, and populism. It explores the different ways scholars have characterized and

explained these concepts—especially in association with foreign policy. It also follows with a

review of the supportive and critical approaches to these concepts. This chapter also explores the

foreign policy expressions of globalization including international involvement, multilateralism,

and cooperation. It also explores the foreign policy expressions of nationalism including limited

engagement, unilateralism, and conflict.

The three concepts are critical for the study of foreign policy orientations and the

reorientation argument presented in this dissertation. While globalization and nationalism

represent two opposing orientations in foreign policy, populism is positioned at the intersection

between nationalism and globalization. It shares core principles and strategies with nationalism

including the primacy of national interests, national and popular sovereignty, and exclusion

against others. It also shares with nationalism its contention against political, economic, and

cultural globalization.

Globalization

Globalization is a popular and controversial concept in the study of foreign policy

orientations

. Within the literature, globalization is characterized as a multifaceted process that

Scholars associate the controversy of the concept with the fact that globalization has become a synonym for

colonialism, imperialism, and Westernization (Hay et al 2002). It is also associated with underdevelopment and

unfair distribution of resources (Held et al. 1990). The popularity of the concept manifests in terms of the use of

the term globalization in association with many processes including modernization, privatization, and innovation

(Held et al. 1990). It is also used in reference to popular culture and modern lifestyle (Peters 2004).

influences political, economic, social, and cultural affairs (Triegaardt 2008). It is characterized in

terms of intensifying global consciousness—integrating and merging different aspects of

political, economic, and social life (Rantanen 2005). Globalization is also a distinctive existential

state where national domains are perceived within transnational and non-territorial formations

(Axford 2013). Politically, globalization is characterized by association with a transnational

order. Such an order is governed by international institutions and transnational networks (Kellner

2002). Globalization is also characterized in terms of integration among national states. States

adjust sovereignty and independence in favor of interdependence and common interests (Strange

2004, Sparks 2007)

Along with political characterizations, globalization is also characterized in economic

and cultural terms. In economic terms, globalization is characterized in terms of integrating

national economies into a global system (Bhagwati 2004). Accordingly, national economies

transform from state-controlled to market-driven economies (Wolf 2004). Such economies also

become open to the free flow of capital, labor, products, people, and information (Ritzer 2004).

Culturally and socially, globalization entails transitioning into a cosmopolitan global society.

Such a society is governed by universal sets of norms and values (Beck 2002). Globalization is

also characterized in terms of cultural heterogenization and hybridization. Such a process entails

adopting a universal ideology of freedom and interconnectedness (Axford 2013)

Scholars divide over the amount of national sovereignty compromised by globalization and those who note that

states retain control over control over politics and the military (Sparks 2007). Others imply that globalization

entails a complete replacement of states’ national sovereignty by international order (Ohmae 2004 Strange 2004).

As in the case of political characterizations, scholars divide over the extent of social and cultural globalization into

those who characterize the process in terms of eliminating any form of state control over economic activity and

replacing traditional arrangements and local cultures (Ritzer 2001, Waters 2005). Others imply that states retain

relative control over the national economy and exhibit coexistence between local cultures and traditions and

Political, Economic, and Cultural Globalization

Within the literature, scholars divide into those who promote the process as an ideal

model for national and international affairs

. On the other hand, other scholars cast globalization

as complicated and problematic (Deaton 2013)

. Such a scholarly division is characterized along

the lines of hyperglobalists versus skeptics (Held et al. 1990)

. Hyperglobalists hold that

globalization is a transition beyond traditional forms of social organization and the rule of

national states. Old systems are replaced with the global marketplace, multi-national enterprises,

and intergovernmental organizations (1990). On the other hand, skeptics note that globalization

masks Western hegemony and imperialism. Globalization is also blamed for dividing the world

into regions that are controlled by powerful states. It is also associated with global crises and

uneven development (1990).

The scholarly division over globalization is also attributed to several factors including

costs and benefits, cultures and social structures, and reactions to global crises. For instance,

support for globalization is usually associated with those who benefit from the process. On the

other hand, losses invoke criticism and trigger resistance (Deaton 2013). Support for

globalization is usually associated with open societies and individualist cultures (Gelfand 2011).

Besides this, support and opposition to globalization are associated with historical junctures and

global crises. For instance, the end of the Cold War cemented support for the process as the path

universal culture (Barber 1995). These divisions emerge between hyper globalization and moderate globalization

(Rodrik 2011), hard and soft globalization (Carey 2002), and thin versus thick globalization (Held et al.1990)

Globalization is rooted within Western ideas that pertain to the spread of Western democracy (Kellner 2002), and

the adoption of Western norms and values (Barber 1995, Ritzer 2001)

Others view globalization as a historical process (Chanda 2007) and a man-made process (Modeliski 2013).

Hence, they attribute problems to the application rather than the process itself (Held et al. 1990, Peters 2004).

Theoretically, hyperglobalists or advocates of globalization are associated with liberalism and neoliberalism while

opponents are identified along the lines of Marxism, neocolonialism, and environmentalism (Peters 2004).

to lasting peace (Chumakov 2015). On the other hand, global crises such as the 9/11 attacks and

the 2008 financial crises have deepened division over the process (Carey 2002).

Pro-Globalization Approaches

Advocates for globalization point to political, economic, and cultural benefits

. Politically,

scholars associate globalization with global governance and collective responsibility. For

instance, globalization entails the development of a single world order (Keller 2002). States are

incorporated into interdependent structures of political, economic, and cultural relations.

Furthermore, international affairs become guided by universal laws and political values (2002)

Globalization also entails the development of supernational institutions. Aside from representing

a commitment to collective responsibility, these institutions provide mechanisms that govern

interstate relations and resolve conflicts (2002). Along with this, Globalization fosters collective

action and multilateral alliances. States become encouraged to coordinate policies and address

shared problems (Held and McGrew 2000).

Other advocates associate globalization with the promotion of democracy, human rights, and

global stability. For instance, globalization represents an opportunity for democratization. Aside

from pushing for economic reforms, globalization allows for the rise of domestic actors that push

toward political reform (Held 1995). Globalization also entails a global and domestic

redistribution of powers. Such a condition plays into empowering previously marginalized

These characterizations are rooted within traditional IR theories such as realism which casts globalization in

terms of national versus international interests (Arnold 2012), liberalism which associates globalization with the

rise of the market-oriented economy (Kellner 2002), and constructivism which links globalization with the rise of

new communities and new social identities and relations (2002).

The notion of a single world order is rooted within theories such as world-system theory or world-system

analysis (WSA) (Kellner 2002) and the theory of transnationality or transnationalism (Robinson 2001). Besides this,

such a notion has coincided with the end of the Cold War and the rise of the US as the most powerful state (Kugler

2002)

groups and communities (Held and McGrew 2000)

. Along with democratization, globalization

promotes human rights through the rise of NGOs and civil rights groups within states. Human

rights also become institutionalized as a code for international affairs and inter-state relations

(Fisher 1998). As for global stability, globalization increases the costs of military conflicts.

States that share the same supply chain become less likely to engage in conflict. Furthermore,

similar political systems and cultural values contribute to global stability (Friedman 2005)

In terms of economy, scholars associate globalization with the benefits of free trade and

economic convergence

. For instance, globalization levels the playing field and offers more

freedom to economic activities (Friedman 2005)

. Under globalization, corporations and

industries become able to cross national borders in search of profitable opportunities. Similarly,

outsourcing offers individuals an opportunity to search for profitable jobs and better life

conditions (2005). Besides this, globalization reduces state authority over markets and economic

activities. It also drops the costs associated with production transportation, and communication

(Baldwin 2016). Combined, these changes contribute to capital accumulation and economic

The link between democracy and globalization relates to both economic and cultural globalization. Scholars note

that economic liberalization creates conditions that are necessary for sustaining democratic values (Diamond,

1999). Others note that democratization decentralizes state power and empowers other actors (Huntington,

1991). Culturally, scholars note that democracy spreads along with Western products and interaction with other

nations (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995).

The link between globalization and stability is rooted within the Democratic Peace Theory which points out that

democracies are less likely to engage in conflicts due to political and cultural similarities (Russett 1995).

Economic approaches to globalization characterize the process in association with the dominance of Western

capitalism which develops a single market. Under such order, labor and capital are exploited by three world

regions including the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery (Vesajoki 2002). Economic approaches are also

rooted within economic liberalism and neoliberalism which center globalization around privatization, deregulation,

and reduction of government spending and control (Ellner 2002, Wolf 2004).

These conditions are attributed to the “flattening effect” of globalization where geographic distance has been

overcome by technological developments. Such developments have affected economic processes such as

offshoring, supply-chaining, insourcing, and outsourcing (Friedman 2005)

growth. They also create a comparative advantage in trade through specialization and differences

in quality (2016).

Other advocates note that globalization offers solutions to poverty, economic inequality, and

global crises. For instance, globalization reduces poverty through trade-related growth. As states

engage in free trade, the flow of capital fuels poverty-reduction programs (Bhagwati 2004).

Globalization also reduces poverty through the movement of industries and individuals across

borders. Such movement is accompanied by the redistribution of resources and access to services

(Norberg 2001). Furthermore, globalization reduces child labor and enhances the economic and

social positions of women. It also corrects wealth equality and enhances working conditions

through universal standards (Bhagwati 2004). As for global crises, globalization mitigates, and in

some cases prevents economic crises. Trade-related growth enables national economies to

develop preventive strategies while interdependence distributes the costs of such crises (2004)

Culturally and socially, scholars associate globalization with the formation of a global

and cosmopolitan society and culture. In this context, globalization leads to the rise of global or

planetary consciousness. Individuals think within and relate to global rather than local

frameworks (Robertson 1992). They also rely on global images, symbols, meanings, and

representations (Appadurai 2001). Globalization also leads to closing the gap between space and

time. Such a condition becomes key to connecting different societies and developing distant

connections (Giddens 1990)

. At the level of community, globalization develops a post-

Scholars condition the economic benefits of globalization with proper application and management (Friedman

1999), efficient national governance (Triegaardt 2008), and the pace at which globalization occurs (Bhagwati 2004).

An exception to this consensus is a shock-based application that occurs through imposing policies and programs

during crises (Klein 2002).

Such characterization is part of larger literature where scholars regard technological developments as key to

globalization. Technological developments lead to the decentralization and deterritorialization of social practices

territorial and transnational community. It develops identities that associate with objects beyond

immediate environments (Beck and Sznaider 2006). Globalization also develops a universal

space for state action and individual experience. National and local practices become assimilated

into a global medium of interconnectedness (Kellner 2002)

Along with these scholars, others note that globalization affects knowledge and cultural

practices. For instance, globalization affects power structures through the universalization of

knowledge. It also defines knowledge within contexts of scientism and rational instrumentalism

(Jan 2000). Globalization also develops a sense of cultural proficiency. Along with the flow of

individuals and products, knowledge about other cultures becomes widely dispersed (Matthews

2012). In terms of cultural practices, globalization develops an egalitarian medium that

assimilates different practices into the global culture. Local sports and cultural festivities become

shared and adopted by other cultures and societies (Pendergrast 1999). Globalization also

transforms local traditions into global practices. Societies import and adjust global practices to fit

within national and local contexts (Watson 2004).

Anti-Globalization Approaches

Critics of globalization point to political, economic, and cultural problems

. Politically,

scholars associate globalization with hegemony and violations of independence and national

and local activities (Sassen 1991). At the more technical level, globalization entails time-space distanciation where

relations are stretched across time and space (Giddens 1991)

Generally, global culture is associated with the spread and domination of Western culture. Denoted as the

McWorld theory (Barber 1995) and theory of McDonaldization (Ritzer 2001), cultural globalization entails the

spread of Western ideas and beliefs through products (Barber 1995, Ritzer 2001).

Generally, these approaches date back to the 1990s when the anti-WTO protests in Seattle triggered debates in

academia over the viability of the project (Kiely 2005). Scholars usually regard the late 1990s as the “coming out”

and the emergence of criticism of globalization (2005). In the post-2000s, scholars have become alarmed that

globalization is getting out of control (Smith 2014) and becoming a path of self-destruction (Mander 2006).

sovereignty. In this context, globalization creates an inequitable international order. Global

policies and international laws become imposed on small and weak rather than powerful states

(Stiglitz 2006)

. Besides this, globalization extends Western hegemony over the developing

world. It forces other states to conform to Western politics and economics (Chumakov 2015). In

terms of independence and national sovereignty, international institutions and multinational

corporations limit national sovereignty. Such condition occurs as they influence national

domestic and local politics (Kalk 1989). Furthermore, globalization undermines control over

national territories and borders. Such condition occurs as states allow for free flows of capital,

labor, products, people, and information (Kirshner 2008).

Along with these scholars, others associate globalization with inefficient national governance

and political instability. Here, globalization weakens national institutions and domestic

structures. Such a condition occurs as international institutions impose global policies on

unprepared states (Deaton 2013)

. Globalization also undermines national institutions through

the pursuit of collective and global interests. As a result, domestic institutions fail to attend to

national needs (Kirshner 2008)

. In terms of political stability, globalization exacerbates threats

to national security (Betts 2002). It is also linked to higher exposure to terrorist attacks and

financial and immigration crises (Daalder and Lindsay 2003). Globalization also factors into

Aside from being imposed, global policies are claimed to be contradictory and selective. Powerful and developed

states adopt policies that are different from those imposed on weak and underdeveloped states (Stiglitz 2002).

Global policies also disregard different national contexts and impose a universal model (Deaton 2013).

Aside from international pressure, the weakness of such institutions is also linked to pressure from NGOs and

other non-state groups which rise amid globalization and pressure national governments towards political reforms.

Furthermore, such organizations and actors curtail state autonomy through privatization and involvement in public

service provisions (Jessop, 1997, Matthews, 1997).

Scholars divide into those who associate globalization problems and inefficient national governance with the

international imposition of global policies (Deaton 2013). Others note that inefficient national governance is a

preexisting condition to the failure of global policies (Wolf 2004).

domestic discontent. Such a condition occurs as states limit domestic spending to meet global

commitments (Ellner 2002). Globalization factors into instability by pressing for political

reforms. Such pressure increases the risk of political chaos and conflicts (Mansfield and Snyder

1995).

In terms of the economy, critics associate globalization with economic imbalance and

exacerbation of economic problems. As in the case of political globalization, globalization also

creates an inequitable global economic order. Such an order rewards the wealthy while

penalizing the poor and the debtors. It also renders uneven economic growth and

underdevelopment across the world (Stiglitz 2006). Globalization also creates an imbalance of

labor between developed and developing nations (Rodrick 1996). The abundance of cheap and

unskilled labor decreases impacts development in developing countries (1996). Besides this,

globalization makes free trade less profitable over time. It also fails to maintain price

convergence and prevent drastic fluctuations (Vries 2007). Globalization also worsens poverty

and social inequality. It replaces routine jobs with positions limited to highly skilled workers

(Freidman 2011)

Other scholars also associate globalization with other economic problems that pertain to

control over national economies. For instance, globalization does not make a significant

difference in terms of monopoly. Major corporates still enjoy exclusive access to national

wholesale markets (Vries 2007). Globalization also enables multinational cooperation to

influence national economies. Aside from rendering domestic businesses unprofitable, such

Freidman acknowledgment of globalization economic problems constitutes a reversal of his early optimism

about the process. Along with other critics, Freidman bases his critique on observation of the fallout of global

economic policies in developed and undeveloped countries. Furthermore, this critique springs from the political

consequences of the failure of global economic policies such as polarization and violence (2011)

influence destabilizes domestic demand and supply patterns. It also limits states’ control over

domestic economic affairs and trade relations (Stiglitz 2006). Furthermore, globalization forces

governments to take on debt and cut spending programs. Such a condition burdens national

economies and causes volatility in wages. By extension, it factors into political polarization and

social discontent (Rodrick 1996).

In social and cultural spheres, critics associate globalization with global divisions and the

loss of cultural values and meanings. Here, globalization extends the hegemony of Western

culture. The spread of Western culture and products occurs at the expense of national cultures

and products (Chumakov 2015). Globalization also devalues social and cultural experience

through standardization that disregards cultural distinctiveness (Ritzer 2004). It also replaces

human-to-human contention with virtual and immaterial communications. Such a condition

renders social and cultural experience void of substantive and meaningful content (2004).

Besides this, Globalization is associated with the rising tension and civilizational contrast

between the West and the East. Resisting Western imposition, non-Western states erect cultural

barriers and fuel anti-westernization (Huntington 1996)

. Globalization is also associated with

the division between the “McWorld” and “Jihad” world. Both worlds are growing hostile to and

increasingly different from each other (Barber 1995).

Along with these scholars, other critics associate globalization with hooliganism and the

replacement of national cultures and identities

. Here, globalization does not necessarily turn

Known as the thesis of the Clash of Civilizations, the post-Cold War conflicts are assumed to be fueled by

religious and cultural affiliations. Such a thesis challenges the premise of globalization that views cultural exposure

and cross-national communications as key to coexistence and cultural awareness (Huntington 1993)

Most of the cultural and social criticism of globalization centers around immigration and multiculturalism. Critics

associate globalization problems with immigration which is claimed to impact social cohesion and factor into the

local and national sports and festivities into global phenomena (Foer 2004). Instead, it turns such

practices into expressions of rivalry and conflict. It also divides communities into groups that

associate with transitional identities (2004). Globalization also emphasizes cultural boundaries

and restricted social mobility. Such a condition occurs because of the salience of minority

identities and cultures over national identity and culture (Levy 2000). At the same time,

globalization replaces national traditions with universal practices and norms. It also undermines

national citizenship through the promotion of global affiliations (Levy 2000, Goodwin and

Eatwell 2018).

Globalization and Foreign Policy

Globalization places national states within transnational and non-territorial formations

(Axford 2013). It also entails the free flow of capital, labor, products, people, and information

across national borders (Ritzer 2004). Based on this, globalization orients states outwardly—

exhibiting commitment to collective responsibility and common interests. Under globalization,

states lean towards interdependence and active involvement in international affairs. Within the

literature on foreign policy, globalization is usually associated with active involvement in

international affairs. It is also associated with states’ tendency to develop common interests, act

within multilateral frameworks, and cooperate with other states.

International Engagement

Globalization is associated with active involvement in international affairs. Generally,

international engagement entails that states engage in collective efforts to serve the interests of

demographic decline of local communities (Judis 2018, Kaufmann 2018). Similarly, multiculturalism is linked to the

dissolution of civic bonds and marginalization of local communities (Conway 2000, Levy 2000)

security, power, and international reputation. Furthermore, states engage in international affairs

to serve common interests and address global problems (Paris 2014)

. International engagement

manifests in terms of general support for international institutions and collective management

(2014). It also manifests in terms of diplomatic and military interventions (Bellamy 2003)

Scholars note that international engagement hinges on principles that pertain to the role of

national states. For instance, international engagement hinges on a belief in common and

collective interests. Such interests are expected to render distributive benefits across states

(McCraw 2005). International engagement also hinges on states’ willingness to share resources.

It also entails a sense of collective responsibility in response to international occurrences (Paris

2014). Besides this, international engagement hinges on the exercise of power beyond territorial

borders. Such an exercise is governed by global norms and international laws (Malley 2020).

Within the literature, scholars associate international engagement with different motives

and conditions. International engagement is usually motivated by missionary conceptions of the

national role. Active states exhibit interest in exporting their domestic values and influencing

other states. Aside from political and cultural influence, missionary engagement also takes

concrete forms such as military interventions (Restad 2012)

. International engagement is also

motivated by cultural openness towards the outside world. As noted earlier, open societies and

Denoted within the literature of foreign policy in terms of internationalism, scholars usually associate

international engagement with the post-war era when international upheaval necessitated collective action

(Wesley and Warren 2000). Initially, internationalism manifested in terms of balancing against Japan, and then the

Soviet Union, and finally in maintaining the US-led international order (Wesley and Warren 2000, Harris 2018).

Known as interventionism, military interventions entail the use of force to achieve certain global objectives such

as the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights (Brinkley 1997, Tziampiris 2002). States also

engage militarily to protect their national security and economic interests (Jhaveri 2004).

The missionary conception of the national role stands in contrast with the exemplary conception where become

models for other states rather than an active exporter of domestic systems and values. Both conceptions are

rooted in different interpretations of national myths such as exceptionalism (Paris 2014, Brommesson 2018)

individualist cultures tend to actively engage with the outside. They also exhibit affiliation with

global communities and ideas such as collective responsibility (Paris 2014). Along with this,

international engagement is usually conditioned by the dominant political ideology. Left-wing

governments endorse engagement that hinges on developing economic ties, promoting

democracy, and protecting human rights (Bjørnskov and Rode 2019). On the other hand, right-

wing governments endorse engagement that affirms state extraterritorial influence and enforces

order (Harris 2000, Johnstone 2016)

. International engagement is also conditioned by elite and

public consensus. Public and elite divisions and partisan polarization are usually associated with

a decline in states’ appetite for international engagement (Busby and Monten 2008).

International engagement is also conditioned by domestic structures and institutions. generally,

democratic systems and institutions orient stats toward active involvement in international affairs

(Fonseca 2011). Finally, international engagement is also conditioned by domestic and global

crises. While engagement functions as a diversionary mechanism in the case of domestic crises

global crises tend to push states towards less involvement (Bellamy 2003, Kummel and

Giegerich 2013).

Multilateralism

Globalization is also associated with multilateralism where states coordinate national and

global policies

. Multilateralism in terms of coordinating policy in groups of three or more

Both versions are rooted with the traditional IR theories where the conservative is rooted in the premises of

realism and the notion of the security dilemma (Mafumbo 2008) while the liberal version is associated with the

premises of liberalism (McCraw 2005

Theoretically, such conditions are rooted within the literature on diversionary foreign policy where states engage

in international endeavors to divert attention from domestic turmoil (Levy 1989, Smith 1996).

Multilateralism is distinguished from bilateralism which entails coordination between two states, and

unilateralism which is a one-sided action (Milner and Tingley 2013).

states. Such coordination occurs through ad hoc arrangements or using institutions

(Keohan1990). Multilateralism is also characterized in terms of inclusive and non-discriminatory

engagement. It entails applying a generalized set of principles over the concerned parties

(Oudenaren 2003). As a process, Multilateralism entails principles for states’ conduct in

international affairs. Such principles are directed toward serving common and collective interests

(Ruggie 1999). Multilateralism is also applied to specific policy areas such as foreign aid,

sanctions, and human rights (Braaten 2014). Besides this, it is usually initiated by international

institutions and organizations. Here, multilateral policies include the members as well as

nonmembers of such entities (Milner and Tingley 2013). Besides this, multilateralism is also

initiated by individual states. Usually, such multilateralism is tailored to attend to domestic and

regional conditions (Braaten 2014)

. Furthermore, multilateralism takes procedural forms where

multilateral policies and interventions are authorized and supervised by international and

regional institutions. On the other hand, it also takes operational forms where multilateral

policies and interventions are authorized by international and regional institutions but carried out

by a collation of states (Kreps 2008).

Throughout the literature, scholars associate multilateralism with several returns

including international and national legitimacy, the development of universal standards, and the

distribution of costs and benefits

. For instance, multilateralism is usually motivated by the need

Within the literature, scholars divide over the criteria that constitute multilateralism. For instance, scholars like

Ruggie suggest that multilateral engagement is characterized by socially constructed indivisibility,

nondiscrimination or generalized organizing principles, and diffuse reciprocity (1992). Others like Finnemore add

other criteria such as multilateral authorization as well as multilateral execution of collective action (2003).

Scholars condition multilateralism by different factors including regime characteristics where democracies are

more open towards multilateral engagements while mixed and nondemocratic systems are prone to selective

multilateralism (Fonseca 2011). Multilateralism is also conditioned by the presence of interests (Braaten 2014) and

the presence of institutional and organizational venues that facilitate multilateral engagement (Westphal 2006)

for international and national validation (Chapman 2012). States resort to multilateralism to

legitimize engagement and intervention. At the same time, multilateralism also provides a

mechanism to rally the public around a common cause (2012). Multilateralism is also motivated

by the need to develop global standards and a sense of moral responsibility. Furthermore, it

functions as an incentive to promote certain policies (Westphal 2006). Besides this,

multilateralism is motivated by the need for regulation and control. Here, it offers states a

mechanism to ensure coordination and control over international missions (Westphal 2006).

Furthermore, it entails the enforcement of conditions on the initiators and the targeted parties

(2006). Finally, multilateralism is motivated by the need for burden sharing. Multilateral policies

and interventions entail the distribution of authority among the involved parties. They also entail

the distribution of costs as well as benefits of international engagement (Milner and Tingley

2013).

Cooperation

Globalization is also associated with cooperation which entails the pursuit of common and

collective interests

. Cooperation is characterized in terms of adjusting states’ behavior to the

actual or anticipated preferences of others. Such adjustment aims at developing common

objectives upon which states can agree and collaborate (Keohane 1986). Cooperation is also

characterized along the lines of compromise. States compromise a set of winning interests to

develop a set of interests acceptable to all parties (Frieden and Martin 2002). In practice,

Cooperation is usually opposed to competition or conflict where states either work unilaterally to achieve their

interests or engage in conflict to maximize their gains and inflict costs on others. Theoretically, cooperation is

rooted within the theory of liberalism which associates cooperation with the creation of international institutions

and the development of economic ties as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights. Such elements

are claimed to foster global stability and lead states to exchange benefits (Clackson 2011).

cooperation occurs as a conscious and negotiated process. States choose to engage with each

other to achieve common objectives (Keohane 2005). States also negotiate and adjust their

positions throughout the process of cooperation (Grieco 1990). Cooperation also occurs as a tacit

process that entails no communication between states. Instead, states adjust their preferences and

position to indirectly match those of other states. Usually. Such cooperation emanates from

states’ commitment to collective interests and stability (Axelrod 1984). Besides this, cooperation

occurs through imposition

. Powerful states force others to cooperate by possessing the tools

that deter and penalize defectors (Gow 1986). It also occurs as a voluntary process when

institutions establish universal rules. Such institutions also establish the context within which

cooperation takes place (Keohane 1986).

Within the literature, scholars reference several conditions under which states resort to

cooperation rather than conflict

. For instance, cooperation is associated with bipolarity in the

international order. The low level of uncertainty under such systems encourages states to

cooperate and avoid conflict (Waltz 1975). Cooperation is also associated with stability in the

global balance of power. A stable balance of power establishes an order within which states

cooperate and exchange benefits (Kegley 2005). Besides this, cooperation is conditioned by

international institutions that stabilize international consequences. In doing so, states become

Within the context of IR theories, imposed cooperation relates to theories such as hegemonic stability theory

where the presence of a hegemon becomes key to interstate cooperation and confrontation. The presence of a

hegemon also curbs the likelihood of defection and increases the state’s commitment to cooperation (Gow 1986).

Aside from these conditions, other scholars reference technical conditions such as the number of states where a

small number of states is more optimal for cooperation (Oye 1986), asymmetry of power where discrepancy

entails imposed cooperation (Conybeare 1986), a past experience where past cooperation facilitates future

cooperation, and reciprocity which increases the likelihood of cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Milner 1992). Other

scholars reference the presence of epistemic communities that encourage cooperation and International regimes

which provide incentives for cooperation and reduce uncertainty (Keohane 1986)

assured of the gains and the costs that come with cooperation as well as non-cooperation.

Similarly, cooperation is conditioned with alliance where solid alliances foster cooperation and

deter aggression (Osgood and Tucker Ruggie 1967). At the national level, cooperation is

associated with democratic systems. Political and economic freedoms limit states’ involvement

in international conflicts (Rummel 1983). Democratic domestic institutions also factor into a

peaceful settlement of ongoing conflicts (Dixon 1994). Finally, cooperation is associated with

shared values and similar cultures. Such similarities provide ground for cooperation and facilitate

the development of common interests (Abbott and Snidal 2004).

Nationalism

Nationalism is another popular and controversial concept in the study of foreign policy

orientations

. Within the literature, nationalism is also characterized as a multifaceted

phenomenon that influences political, economic, social, and cultural affairs (Tamir 1993, Smith

1998)

. It is usually associated with ideas such as independence, self-determination, and

patriotism (Ignatieff 1993). Generally, scholars characterize nationalism as a transition from the

state of nature to political and cultural unity (Perlman 1983). It is also defined as a community of

nativity—bounded by birth and territorial boundaries (Grosby 2005). Politically, nationalism is

characterized as a unifying principle that holds the different social components as one unit. It

informs the way individuals associate with such a unit (Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1992). Besides

this, nationalism is characterized as an assertion of existence and independence (Breuilly 1982).

Scholars associate the controversy of the concept with the fact that nationalism has become a reminder of the

atrocities of the twentieth century (Minogue 1967). It is also associated with prejudice and discrimination

(Wollman and Spencer 2002).

Unlike globalization which is influenced by Western ideas, nationalism originated based on place of origin and

culture such as European, Asian, and American nationalisms (Kohn 1932, Greenfeld 1996).

It hinges on establishing congruence between the boundaries of a nation and its unit of

governance (Hechter 2000). It also hinges on self-determination, political distinctiveness, and

cultural exceptionalism (Ignatieff 1993).

In terms of economy, nationalism is characterized as a project of economic independence

and self-sufficiency. It entails correcting uneven global conditions in favor of national economic

development (Hechter 2000). Nationalism is also characterized in terms of the mobilization of

resources. National states localize, rather than internationalize, services and industries. They also

exercise sovereignty over resources within state boundaries (Mann 1993, Rokkan 1999). In terms

of culture and society, nationalism is characterized as an anthropological spirit that guides social

and cultural unity. It is an imagined community of fraternity, substantial distinctiveness, and

exclusivity (Benedict 1983, Tamir 1993). Furthermore, nationalism is characterized as the

collectivity of common myths, historical memories, and mass culture (Smith 1998)

Political, Economic, and Cultural Nationalism

Within the literature, scholars are divided into those who view nationalism as an ideal

model for national affairs. While embedded within an international community, national states

emphasize sovereignty and cultural exceptionalism (Gellner 1983). These scholars also view

nationalism as an expression of love, devotion, and self-determination (Ignatieff 1993, Lowry

2019). On the other hand, other scholars regard nationalism as destructive and pathological. Such

characterization is associated with the discriminatory and hostile nature of the project (Tuber

Within the psychology literature, nationalism is characterized as a sense of affiliation and loyalty. Scholars

characterize nationalism as an attachment to social and environmental objects (Orwell 1945) and an expression of

identity and group identification (Searle 2001). In terms of loyalty, scholars cast nationalism as the ultimate and

supreme loyalty—combining biological and political prerequisites for survival (Alter 1989, Cottam 2000). Others

view nationalism as a form of state worship and a superiority complex (Rocker 1937, Berlin 2013).

1976, Saslow 2018). Furthermore, nationalism is criticized for its association with past global

conflicts—especially the atrocities of the twentieth century (Minogue 1967). Both sides debate

whether nationalism is a mechanism of control or a project of representative governance. They

also investigate whether nationalism is a foreign imposition or a project of self-determination

(Tilly 1996)

This scholarly division is associated with the origin and the history of nationalism. Here,

advocates usually cast nationalism as a natural occurrence. In this context, nationalism manifests

as a religious destiny—a sacred bond between land and people (Hazony 2018). It also develops

as a natural extension of historical and social relations (Niran 1977). Besides this, advocates

view nationalism as a transition towards independence and liberty. It represents an alternative to

imperialism and empire rule (Tamir 1993, Hazony 2018). On the other hand, opposition to

nationalism casts the phenomena as a regression toward traditional rule and tribalism. The

opposition also hinges on the association between nationalism and wars and conflicts (Minogue

1967, Wimmer 2019).

Pro-Nationalism Approaches

Advocates for nationalism point to political, economic, and cultural benefits

. Politically,

scholars cast nationalism as an effective model for national and international politics. In this

Both sides have presented approaches that attempt to understand the nature and origins of nationalism based

on history and based on similarities and differences across different nationalisms (Greenfeld 1996, Finlayson

1998). Scholars note that there is neither a single approach nor a single theory on nationalism (Leith 2006).

Some of the reviewed approaches do not necessarily approach nationalism from a normative perspective.

Instead, such approaches are explanatory of the processes and objectives associated with nationalism.

These characterizations are rooted within traditional IR theories such as realism which casts nationalism as the

pursuit of power and self-interests (Moseley 2002), liberalism which associates nationalism with the tension

between group membership and individual autonomy (Kelly 2015), and constructivism which views nationalism as

constructed ideology—forming in response to socio-economic needs and roles (Leith 2006).

context, nationalism functions as a medium between the insularity of the tribe and the despotism

of the imperial state. It embraces a sense of collective community while emphasizing the

distinctive features of each nation (Hazony 2018). Nationalism also replaces transnational

networks with national organizations and institutions. Such institutions provide for citizens’

needs for affiliation and representation (Tamir 2019). At the level of national politics,

nationalism centralizes around the development of the modern state. It transforms nations into

political entities that exhibit national and international legitimacy (Tilly 1996)

. Furthermore,

nationalism establishes unity between nations and governments. It also maintains internal order

and establishes mechanisms for power sharing and representation (Hetcher 2000).

Along with these scholars, others associate nationalism with independence, unity, and

individual rights. Here, nationalism relies on claims of power and independence. It forms as

culturally similar groups embark on a path of self-determination (Breuilly 1982). At the same

time, nationalism represents a rejection of hegemony and dominance. Instated, the national

project emphasizes sovereignty and independence (Lawrence 2013)

. As for unity, nationalism

unifies social units as one and mitigates ethnic or cultural differences (Gellner 1983). It also

forms an imagined political community that links individuals to a certain territory (Benedict

1983). Finally, nationalism balances individual autonomy and embeddedness within a

Within the literature, scholars divide into those who note that nationalism and national states led to the

formation of nations (Tilly 1996). Others acknowledge the possibility that nations existed before nationalism where

nations formed based on ethnicities and languages rather than political causes (Gellner 1983 Benedict 1983)

The pursuits of national independence have traditionally taken different forms such as reform, separation, and

unification (Breuilly 1982, Lawrence 2013). Reformist nationalism is exemplified in the 16th and 17th-century

nationalism in England and France as well as the 19th and 20th-century nationalism in Japan and China (Breuilly

1982). Separatist and independence nationalism manifested in terms of the post-colonization states in the Middle

East and Africa in the early 20th century (1982).

community (Tamir 1993). It also ensures that individual rights are conducive to social cohesion

and national unity (Moore 2001)

In terms of economy, scholars associate nationalism with economic independence and

effective governance

. Here, nationalism represents a rejection of structural and economic

dependence. It seeks to change the balance of economic power in favor of national interests

(Hechter 2000). Nationalism also represents a reaction to uneven development. It also aims to

end the exploitation of labor and resources by powerful states (Nairn 1977)

. As for effective

governance, nationalism hinges on localizing and mobilizing rural and urban resources. Such

resources become directed toward the development and consolidation of state power (Rokkan

1999). Nationalism also enables states to develop institutions and programs that attend to

national economic needs. It also enables states to develop and pursue their economic interests

globally (Hzony 2018). Such conditions are facilitated by national states’ abilities to exercise

limited and direct control (Hetcher 2000).

Along with this, other scholars associate nationalism with promoting fair trade, protecting

domestic industries, and mitigating unemployment and trade deficits

. In terms of trade,

Scholars condition these outcomes with compatibility between nationalism and liberalism. Liberal nationalism is

associated with recognizing minorities’ identities and rights of self-determination (Moore 2001)

The economic returns of nationalism hinge on the rise of national states as economic actors that utilize

economic means toward social mobilization (Mann 1993). The rise of the state is central to what scholars refer to

as economic nationalism—subordinating economic activities to state-building and control (Gilpin 2001).

Most of these critiques are associated with a Marxist characterization of the international order where division

occurs between the exploiters in the global north and the exploited in the global south. These critiques also view

the global economy as divided between the core economies which exercise control over the periphery and the

semi-periphery economies (Hechter 2000)

These returns are presented within an extensive literature on economic nationalism and economic

protectionism which hinges on preventing job losses (Denzau 1987), protecting infant industry (Murray 1988),

offsetting foreign subsidies (Baldwin 1988), and lowering trade deficits (McGee 1999). Scholars also reference

several anti-free trade arguments including a moral argument that associates protectionism with the redistribution

of wealth within society (Nozick 1974) and fair rules on the international level (Bovard 1989, Sykes 1989).

nationalism hinges on promoting fair rather than free trade. Fair trade prioritizes national

economic interests and protects the domestic economy (Bovard 1989). Nationalism also hinges

on leveling the economic playing field. Such a condition manifests in terms of equal comparative

advantage between national economies (Sykes 1989). Nationalism hinges on protecting the

domestic infant industry against foreign competition. Aside from state intervention, such

protection occurs through protectionist measures that favor domestic over foreign industries.

Such measures also shield domestic industries and businesses from the volatility of global

markets (Schultze 2017). Finally, nationalism hinges on protecting domestic jobs and reducing

the trade deficit. Both occur as national states localize industries and correct trade imbalance in

favor of exports over imports (Denzau 1987, Kim and Shikher 2017).

Culturally and socially, scholars associate nationalism with the formation of national

identity and character

. In this context, national identity is based on the actualities of blood,

race, language, and religion (Geerts 1963). It is also based on linguistic, cultural, and social

similarities (Reynolds 1983)

. Besides this, national identity is also based on the collective

desire for progress, welfare, and influence. Affiliated individuals regard their affiliation to

nationalism as an ongoing and dynamic project (Geerts 1963). National identity also hinges on

amity or enmity between nations. Individuals are mobilized by the potential of cooperation

Within the literature, scholars divide into those who regard nationalism as a construction of the elite and the

powerful. Such forces utilize, adjust, and organize existing identities, symbols, and relations to develop a national

narrative, identity, and character (Giddens 1981, Brass 1991, Smith 1991, McCrone 1998). Other scholars regard

nationalism as a bottom-up process initiated by different social forces (Smith 1998).

On the development of national identity, approaches divide into Primormordialism which associates identity

with primal bases such as biological makeup, race, and ethnicity (Ichijo and Uzelac 2005, Llobera 1999, Smith

1998). Other approaches subscribe to sociobiological and constructivist characterizations where identity emanates

from social and political projects (Smith 1998)

among themselves and conflict or ambivalence towards others (Elsevier 1981, Shaw and Wong

1989).

Along with this, scholars associate nationalism with the formation of national culture and

society. Here, nationalism creates a culture that revolves around ideas such as liberty, equality,

and self-governance. Such a culture also claims exceptionalism by resenting foreign ideas and

individuals (Greenfeld 1996). Nationalism also creates a culture of resistance and independence.

Both principles become expressed in terms of social and cultural symbols and elements (Goujon

1999). As for society, nationalism utilizes existing social relations to identify a national

collectivity. It also adjusts such relations to fit within the national project and justify the pursuit

of autonomy and unity (Smith 1991). Furthermore, nationalism forges relations between social

and political forces. While such relations entail the representation of social forces, they facilitate

the exercise of power and control over society by political forces. (McCrone 1998).

Anti-Nationalism Approaches

Critics of nationalism point to political, economic, and cultural problems. Politically,

scholars associate nationalism with wars, conflicts, and disintegration

. For instance,

nationalism is claimed to thrive on regular cycles of interstate wars. War simulates national

sentiments that relate to sacrifice and self-determination. Furthermore, war diverts violent

instincts from within societies toward other nations (Marvin and Ingle 1999). Nationalism is also

inherently associated with wars and conflicts. Aside from historical evidence, the national

provision of public goods is contingent on military service. Furthermore, wars and conflicts

Within the literature, the association between nationalism and wars and conflicts is a two-way direction—with

nationalism itself being a product of wars and conflicts against the empire system. On the other hand, nationalism

leads to wars and conflicts through militarization and exclusion of others (Mann 1986, Tilly 1990, Roshwald 2001,

Wimmer 2013).

emerge from the exclusive configurations of domestic alliances (Wimmer 2013). Besides this,

nationalism entails the disintegration of international and regional bodies. By emphasizing

sovereignty and independence, nationalism makes states prone to competition and confrontation

(Etiubon and Jide 2018). Nationalism also fuels separatist and segregationist movements within

national states. Excluded ethnicities utilize the premise of self-determination to create new states

(Grundy 1968).

Along with this, other scholars associate nationalism with radicalization and

authoritarianism

. In this context, nationalism emerges as an antidemocratic and authoritarian

force. It hinges on the consolidation of state power and the prioritization of unity over democracy

and representation (Taube 1967). Nationalism also shares the exclusive nature of

authoritarianism It also provides authoritarian regimes with means of mobilization and

repression. Furthermore, nationalism fuels regimes’ insecurity through the constant perception of

external threats (Tudor and Slater 2011)

. Within democracies, nationalism becomes associated

with the rise of radical political forces and parties. Such parties challenge the establishment of

politics and democratic norms (Brady 2017). Besides this, nationalism infringes on individuals’

rights and freedoms in favor of collective identity and social cohesion. It also replaces civic

bonds and common citizenship with ethnic and racial affiliations (Conway 2000).

Scholars note that the association between nationalism and authoritarianism is conditioned by the nature of

nationalism. Inclusive forms of nationalism are more likely to foster democratic practices such as competitive

elections and access to civil and political liberties (Tudor and Slater 2021).

The association between nationalism and authoritarianism is also rooted in the hypothesis of perceived threats

which associates the development of authoritarianism with insecurity and fear of external threats (Formm 1941).

As individuals become primed to view the world as hostile and threatening, they are more likely to extend

unlimited support to authorities (Stenner 2005).

In terms of economy, critics associate nationalism with trade wars and a decline in global

trade and foreign investments. Here, economic nationalism threatens the breakdown of

international economic organizations. Such condition occurs as trade wars and disputes lead to a

drop in trade volumes and loss of government welfare (Ossa 2014). Besides this, trade wars hurt

global economic growth. In some cases, trade wars also increase the likelihood of economic

recession (Noland et al. 2015). Furthermore, economic nationalism erects barriers and limits the

free movement of capital and goods. Such a condition induces a significant decrease in

international trade and global welfare (Bouet and Laborde 2010). It also hurts manufacturing and

foreign commercial interests through a decline in exports and imports (Evenett 2017). In terms of

foreign investment, economic nationalism risks losing investments and the development of black

markets (Azrak and Wynne 2009). It also forces multinational corporations to adjust and limit

their investments in response to states’ limits on trade (Heath 1995).

Along with these scholars, others associate nationalism with protectionist measures that

result in a decline in economic growth, limited consumer choices, higher prices, and high

unemployment

. Here, national protectionist measures hurt economic efficiency and

productivity (Evenett 2017). While increasing government revenue, such measures do not

stimulate economic growth (Potrafke et al. 2017). Besides this, national protectionist measures

limit consumer choices. Such a condition manifests in terms of limited supply as well as

unaffordable prices on foreign products (McGee 1996). These measures also distort consumer

choices which shift from optimal to subsidized and protected products (Barwick et al. 2017).

Scholars note that nationalist and protectionist measures manifest in terms of a wide variety of actions such as

the imposition of tariffs and quotas, domestic and local requirements, public procurement practices, domestic

subsidies, antidumping laws, and others. Other scholars reference actions such as abstention or withdrawal from

multilateral agreements and organizations (Evenett 2017).

Finally, national protectionist measures contribute to an increase in unemployment. Protectionist

States exhibit higher unemployment than states that embrace free trade (Dutt et al. 2009).

In cultural and social spheres, critics associate nationalism with false consciousness and

identity distortion

. For instance, nationalism hinges on the manipulation of human

consciousness. It provides individuals with an escape from loneliness, inferiority, and

incompleteness (Adorno and Horkheimer 1973). Nationalism also creates a fantasy that is neither

defined nor observed. Individuals become dependent on nationalism as a source of their

existence and enjoyment-jouissance (Zizek 1993)

. On identity distortion, nationalism modifies

existing identities and relations. Political forces select and politicize identities that fit within the

national project while excluding and undermining others (Smith 1991). Nationalism also distorts

identities and cultural symbols—rendering the state the sole source of cultural and social

practices. Furthermore, it makes the national identity supersede all other forms of affiliations

(Brass 1991).

Along with these scholars, others associate nationalism with exclusion and racism. Here,

nationalism drifts from civic to racial and ethnic bonds. Under such conditions, it becomes a

destructive force that pits social groups against each other (Rocker 1937). Nationalism also

entails an exclusive characterization of the “people.” Usually, the nation is characterized by

association only with groups that embrace the national narratives (Werner 2019). Besides this,

Characterizing nationalism as a false consciousness is rooted within the Marxist theory which notes that the

political elites develop nationalism to control other social classes (Llobera 1999)

Within the literature, critics refer to the extreme attachment to nationalism as a pathological condition (Berlin

2013) and a form of state worship (Rocker 1937), a crude historical fiction (Ignatieff 1993), and a rejection of

reality (Orwell 1945). Under such conditions, national affiliation turns into an obsession that supersedes individual

needs and rights (Rocker 1937, Berlin 2013). Furthermore, nationalism turns into a self-convincing discourse that

exaggerates status and underestimates others (Ignatieff 1993).

nationalism becomes associated with racial supremacy and xenophobia. It narrows down to be

dominated by a single race and ethnicity. At the same time, it expresses hostility and prejudice

against other races and ethnicities (Saslow 2018). Nationalism also hinges on racial privilege.

Dominant races and ethnicities claim control over political and economic spheres. Such races

and ethnicities change the national narratives to fit their interests (Kaufmann 2018).

Nationalism and Foreign Policy

Nationalism defines states in association with nativity and territorial boundaries (Grosby

2005). It also emphasizes the boundary between “US” and “Them.”. Hence, nationalism orients

states inwardly—exhibiting commitment to self-interests. Under nationalism, states emphasize

national interests, independence, and sovereignty. They also view themselves in geographical

and cultural isolation from other states. Within the literature on foreign policy, nationalism is

usually associated with limited engagement in international affairs. It is also associated with

states’ preference for unilateral action and their proneness to conflict.

Limited Engagement

Nationalism is associated with limited or no involvement in international affairs. States

either choose to abstain completely or limit involvement to selective cases and arenas. Such a

condition is characterized in terms of being distant, remote, and withdrawn (Bothwell 1999)

. It

is also characterized in terms of voluntary abstention from taking part in international affairs.

Furthermore, it entails the avoidance of permanent alliances and long-term commitments

Within the literature, limited engagement is associated with the tradition of isolationism which dates to the

foreign policies in the early 19th century in manifestations such as the Monroe doctrine in the U.S. (Bothwell 1999)

and “splendid isolation” in the UK (Rioux and Hay 1999). Scholars note that isolationism has never taken an

absolute form, hence limited engagement is a more accurate term that represents the tradition. Isolationism is

distinguished from neutralism where states still engage despite their non-alignment position (Braumoeller 2010).

(Braumoeller 2010). Besides this, limited engagement entails that states limit their control over

the international system. Instead, they opt to focus on necessary interactions and management of

domestic affairs (Schroeder 2002). Scholars reference several principles that pertain to limited

engagement. For instance, limited engagement hinges on geographical isolation—rendering

engagement unnecessary (Bothwell 1999). The limited engagement also hinges on beliefs in

cultural and national exceptionalism. Such beliefs prime states to avoid intervention and resort to

exemplary influence over others (Restad 2012)

. Finally, limited engagement hinges on political

and economic interests. States tend to limit their engagement when such prioritize individual

interests over collective action and common interests (Dunn 2005).

Throughout the literature, scholars associate international engagement with different

motives and objectives. For instance, limited engagement is usually associated with a focus on

alliances with powerful states and areas of strategic interests (Connore 2010)

. The limited

engagement is also associated with control over foreign involvement. It also pertains to states’

desire to reduce their commitments to the protection of their core area (Doenecke 1980).

Furthermore, limited engagement entails reducing the costs of international engagement. It also

reduces the need and the costs of developing large military systems (Nordlinger 1996). Besides

this, limited engagement functions as a revision of foreign policy—especially following failed

international missions. It also manifests as an expression of contention against for current level

The exemplary conception of the national role stands in contrast with the missionary role that is associated with

internationalism. Both are derived from different interpretations of national exceptionalism (Restad 2012).

Such returns are associated with relative forms of isolationism where states limit engagement in a specific area

of policy or a specific part of the world while maintaining other international commitments (Braumoeller 2010).

of international involvement (Kontos 2002)

. Finally, limited engagement offers states more

control over domestic conditions. It also offers states protection against changes in global

conditions (Doenecke 1980)

Unilateralism

Nationalism is also associated with unilateralism where states decide and act alone

Unilateralism is characterized as one-sided action by a single state. Usually, such action occurs

in isolation, or with disregard, to coordination with other states (Kropatcheva 2016).

Unilateralism is also characterized by opposition to institutional and multilateral engagement.

Instead, states coordinate on a state-to-state basis outside such frameworks (Everts 2001). It is

also characterized in contrast to policy coordination. Unilateral states regard coordination as ad

hoc—mainly limited to requests of support by other states (Kelien et al. 2010). As a practice,

unilateralism emerges either as a general position or becomes limited to specific policy areas

such as economic sanctions, military interventions, and multilateral agreements (Gilman 2003,

Skidmore 2005). Unilateralism also hinges on dividing the world into oppositions. Aligning with

the logic of nationalism, unilateralism capitalizes on the notion of “us” versus “them (Kelly

2003). Unilateralism also hinges on a claim to power and sovereignty. States act unilaterally to

affirm their jurisdiction and control over foreign policy (RFD 1969). Finally, unilateralism

Usually, scholars refer to such isolationism as reactionary against unsuccessful international involvement. It is

distinguished from independent isolationism where a state is naturally inclined to limited engagement in

international affairs (Braumoeller 2010)

Scholars note that limited engagement or isolationism is conditioned by factors such as conservativism and

nativism (Urbatsch 2010, Crothers 2011), low salience of foreign affairs (Russett 1960), powerful domestic

opposition (Charles 2000), and elite and public divisions over military engagement (Urbatsch 2010, Connor 2010).

Unilateral engagement is distinguished from bilateralism and multilateralism which entail the involvement of

two or more states (Kropatcheva 2016). Unilateralism is also connected with the concept of hegemony where a

powerful state unilaterally takes and executes foreign policy decisions (Hurrell 2005, Destradi 2010).

hinges on prioritizing national over international and collective interests. It also casts serving

national interests as morally justified (Kropatcheva 2016)

Throughout the literature, scholars associate unilateralism with several political and

economic returns

. For instance, unilateralism provides states with a means to change the

balance of power. During conflicts, unilateral action becomes critical in resolution or escalation

(Skidmore 2005). Unilateralism also enables states to impose foreign policy agendas on other

states. Within institutional and multilateral contexts, states are constrained by common interests

and the distribution of power (Doran 2010). Furthermore, unilateralism provides states with

means to address immediate threats. Such a condition occurs as states are not burdened by

mobilizing the international community (Kelly 2003). Unilateralism also liberates states from the

costs associated with multilateral engagement. It also enables states to take a moral stance—

exhibited in abstention from costly conflicts (Kropatcheva 2016).

Conflict

Nationalism is also associated with conflict where states pursue self-interests with

disregard or infringement on other states’ interests

. Being the opposite of cooperation, conflict

Within the literature, the debate over the morality of unilateralism is explored by normative institutionalism

which casts multilateralism rather than unilateralism as a moral choice (Ruggie 1992). Rational institutionalism

conditions unilateralism and multilateralism by serving states’ interests (Martin 1993).

The pursuit of unilateralism as well as the attainment of its returns is conditioned by international and national

factors. Scholars note that unilateralism emerges along with deterioration in the international order, more under

authoritarian regimes (Aubone 2013), when the domestic balance of power is in favor of unilateralists (Skidmore

2005), and pubic and elite opposition to multilateral engagement (Todorov and Mandisodza 2004, Aubone 2013)

Within the literature, conflict is used interchangeably with competition and confrontation. Scholars note that

these terms share the same principle of states working in opposing directions and exhibiting conflicting interests.

Other scholars distinguish conflict from competition in terms of the level of incompatibility between states’

interests and the likelihood of reconciliation (Tjosvold 1998). Scholars also note that conflicts fall into two general

categories including militarized conflicts and non-military confrontations (Nincic 1982)

Theoretically, conflict is rooted within the theory of realism and its versions which associate the possibility of

conflict with the lack of a sovereign authority that enforces the rules and the security dilemma where states power

and security might be subject to zero-sum calculations (Clackson 2011).

is characterized in terms of failure to adjust state behavior to the preferences of others. Such a

condition renders conflicting interests between the involved parties (Keohane 1986). Conflict is

also characterized in terms of enforcing states’ interests over others. Such a condition aims at

maximizing states’ gains while reducing the gains available to others (Milner 1992). In practice,

conflict hinges on opposing and incompatible interests. States in conflict believe that the

attainment of goals is conditioned by precluding others from attaining their goals (Mack and

Snyder 1957). Conflict also hinges on incompatibility activities. States in conflict take actions

that interfere with or obstruct other states. Furthermore, states in conflict take actions that make

others’ actions less effective in attaining their goals (Deutsch 1975)

Within the literature, scholars reference several conditions under which states resort to conflict

rather than cooperation

. For instance, conflict is usually associated with multipolarity in the

international order. Dispersion of power increases system uncertainty and miscalculations (Waltz

1975). Conflict also occurs along with shifts in the global balance of power. Such shifts make

one of the involved parties more risk-acceptant and prone to conflict (Kim and Morrow 1992).

Conflict also results from the failure of supernational institutions to enforce universal rules. Such

a condition encourages states to resort to force without fear of consequences (Mearsheimer

1994). Alliances also contribute to conflicts by limiting interaction opportunities between states

(Deutsch and Singer 1964). At the national level, the unpredictable nature of autocracies makes

Scholars refer to different varieties of conflicts such as cooperative vs. competitive conflicts where the latter is

more difficult to manage and usually leads to escalation (Tjosvold and De Vliert 1994). Other scholars reference

constructive vs. destructive conflicts which are distinguished by the level of stratification among parties of conflict

about the outcome of such conflicts (Deutsch 1973).

Scholars reference other bases for conflicts such as territorial claims (Goertz and Diehl 1992), ethnic differences

(Carment 1993), resource scarcity (Stalley 2003), and resource abundance (Maull 1975, Arad and Arad 1979)

them more prone to conflicts than democracies (Rubin 1999)

. Furthermore, authoritarian

domestic institutions resort to conflicts to enforce domestic control (Lai 2005)

. Finally, conflict

is associated with cultural and values differences. States with dissimilar cultures and value

systems are more likely to resort to conflict than to cooperation (Huntington 1996).

Populism

Along with nationalism and globalization, populism is another concept of interest in the

study of foreign policy orientations. Scholars divide into those who reduce populism to a

reactionary, nativist, and authoritarian ideology. In this context, populism encourages politics

that are based on anger, fear, and resentment (Bonikowski 2016). Populism also represents

corruption and the degradation of democracy. It relies on manipulation rather than representation

of domestic contentions (Mény and Surel 2002). It also relies on using the language of

democracy to mobilize against pluralism and inclusion (Galston et al. 2018). On the other hand,

other scholars reject these pejorative characterizations of populism. Instead, populism is viewed

as a demand for reform and change in the liberal democratic system. It capitalizes on an existing

gap between citizens and the political elites (Mudde 2004). Populism also challenges the

hegemony of austerity and elitist politics. It opens institutional and everyday spaces for the

expression of democratic disagreement (Mouffe 2016). It also hinges on increasing the number

of people who are involved in the decision-making processes (Canovan 2002).

An exception to this is democratizing countries where institutions are unable to restrain the articulation of

nationalist and bellicose demands (Mansfield and Snyder 2005)

Scholars attribute the association between authoritarian systems and conflicts to specific types such as

personalist dictatorships (Rubin 1999) and military authoritarianism (Lai and Slater 2005). Others condition the

association by the regime’s ability to repress and manage the domestic conditions (Gelpi 1997)

Conceptually, populism is characterized by the single logic of opposition between the

“people” and the political “elites.” At one level, populism represents an antagonistic and divisive

representation of society. It divides society into two opposing camps including the majority of

the people versus the few members of the establishment (Laclau 2009). Such a function also

entails a constant reconstruction of political identities. Populism adjusts its representation of

society to emphasize the frontiers that separate it from the elites (2009). Populism is also

characterized as an ideology that emphasizes the homogeneous nature of society (Mudde 2004).

Such a characterization positions populism in opposition to elitism and pluralism. While

rejection of the former pertains to the concentration of power among the elites, the latter rejects

pluralism in favor of a more homogenous composition of society (2004). At another level,

populism is characterized as the exaltation of the people. It hinges on the immigration of a

territory of people and culture that is worth defending against the elites (Taggart 2000). Populism

is also characterized in terms of the primacy of the “people” in political affairs. It plays down

horizontal political cleavages in favor of more public power over policymaking. Furthermore, it

plays up vertical political cleavages to exclude particular groups from such a process (Mény and

Surel 2002).

Populism, Nationalism, and Globalization

With the literature, populism is positioned at the intersection between nationalism and

globalization. Populism is distinguished from nationalism by its vertical logic that separates the

public from the elites. On the other hand, nationalism relies on the horizontal logic of

animosity—placing the people in opposition to an outside group (Brubaker 2020, Rabinowitz

2023). Populism is also distinguished from nationalism by its subject of animosity—extracting

the “other” from within the national “we”. On the other hand, nationalism characterizes the

subject of animosity as external to the national group (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, Breeze

2019, Anastasiou 2020). Populism is also distinguished from globalization by its positions on the

conduct of national affairs. For instance, populism prioritizes national interests and economic

self-sufficiency over global economic integration. It associates domestic problems with openness

and cooperation with the outside world (Rodrik 2017). Populism is also distinguished from

globalization by its emphasis on the homogenous composition of society. In doing so, it

emphasizes ethnonational and cultural cleavages that exclude outside groups such as immigrants

(2017).

Nevertheless, populism still shares core principles and strategies with nationalism. For

instance, populism shares with nationalism the primacy of national interests. It defends the

“people” against external forces of domestic and global elites. Merging with nationalism,

populism combines the animosity towards different ideologies including elitism, pluralism, and

liberalism (Mudde 2004, Rabinowitz 2023). Populism also shares the nationalist principle of

exclusion toward foreign actors. It capitalizes on the classical nationalist division between “us”

and “them” (Singh 2021). It also opposes the economically and culturally insulated national and

global elites who pose a threat to domestic interests (Brubaker 2020). Populism also shares with

nationalism the principles of political representation and popular sovereignty. Both establish a

sovereign nation group that is distinguished from other groups (Heiskanen 2021). Aside from

core principles, populism and nationalism share similar mobilization strategies. For instance,

both rely on creating a narrative of fear and nostalgia. While demonizing other groups, populism

furthers the national narrative through a promise of restoration of an ideal state (Schapkow and

Jacob 2022). Populism and nationalism also share a similar pattern of blame attribution—

associating domestic deprivation and dissatisfaction with external actors (Venizelos 2020).

Furthermore, populism is aligned with nationalism in its opposition to political,

economic, and cultural aspects of globalization. In this context, it is characterized as a

reactionary ideology to technological and demographic changes (Milner 2021, Rabinowitz

2023). It is also associated with the rise of a globalized society that has created space for less

ideological parties (Mudde 2004). Economically, populism exhibits opposition to economic

inequality and uneven development. It associates such conditions with the high consumption of

the rich and the elite rather than the low consumption of the poor (Pastor and Veronesi 2018).

Populism also opposes the decline in wages and bargaining power for workers. As such

conditions worsen, globalization becomes prone to a populist backlash that demands a reversal of

the whole process (Rodrik 2020). Populism also opposes the domestic economic impact of

immigration—especially on labor wages and distribution of resources (Macedo 2020). In

cultural and social spheres, populism casts immigration and cultural integration as a cultural

threat. Such a threat is claimed to impact national demographics and replace local cultures and

values (Rodrik 2017).

Populism and Foreign Policy

Within the literature on foreign policy, scholars question whether there is a populist

foreign policy or if populism functions as a strategy under nationalism (Chryssogelos 2017,

Giurlando and Wajner 2023). Advocates of the former position note that populism emerged at

different points in history in isolation from nationalism. It is also associated with different

geographies, cultures, and races (Hall 2017)

. Populism is also associated with different political

parties including right-wing and left-wing parties. While right-wing populism entails opposition

to neoliberal elites, left-wing populism is focused on economic democracy and social justice

(Rodrik 2017). Populism also exhibits essentially exclusionary policies. Meanwhile, nationalism

can develop as a constructive project that fits within the international order (Singh 2021). On the

other hand, advocates of populism as a strategy note that populism is a thin ideology that

functions as a mobilization strategy that invokes the “people” to advance national interests

(Heiskanen 2021)

. It attaches itself to thicker ideological traditions where it introduces the

elite-people divide (Chryssogelos 2017). Populism also functions as a discursive and rhetorical

strategy that links together different frustrated social demands and constructs a collective identity

of “the people.” It is also used by leaders who need to seek public support and retain political

power (Laclau 2005, Hall 2017).

Building on the thin characterization of populism, scholars note that populism represents

a politicization of foreign policy. Such a process entails framing foreign policy issues under the

principles of anti-elitism and people-centrism (Destradi et al. 2023). On one hand, anti-elitism

turns foreign policy into an expression of animosity towards global elites. It characterizes the

state as an underdog in international politics. On the other hand, people-centrism centralizes

foreign policies around public demands and positions. Usually, populism-based foreign policy

emphasizes the role of public opinion in foreign policymaking (2023). Besides politicization,

Scholars list varieties of race and geography-based populisms including white populism that emerged in South

Africa and Australia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Other varieties of populism include the

nonwhite populism that accompanied the independence movements in former colonies (Hall 2017).

Thick populism is characterized in terms of the construction of a vertical antagonism that defines the conflict

between the people and the elites within domestic farmwork. It also homogenizes the people as a unitary actor

against identified members of the elites (Chryssogelos 2017, Heiskanen 2021).

populism-based foreign policy entails a reproduction of national identities and power relations. It

redefines the notion of the “people” in a way that supports central foreign policy agendas.

Usually, these agendas are characterized in terms of the pursuit of the “people” interests

(Wojczewski 2019). Populism also establishes a link between domestic and global elites. Such a

link entails that domestic elites are working in favor of global elites and interests. Global actors

and institutions are claimed to pursue agendas that further domestic deterioration (2019).

Along with these scholars, other scholars note that populism functions as a shifting

mechanism in foreign policy. It manifests in terms of a shift from one orientation to another—

using the same people-elite divide (Tas 2022). Such a process occurs as populism turns the

notion of the “people” into a uniform construct—defined around certain set beliefs. It also occurs

as populism adapts to changing circumstances and the calculus of political leaders (2022). Other

scholars add that populism also functions as a mobilization and diversionary mechanism. Under

deteriorating domestic conditions, populism-based foreign policy externalizes blame to foreign

and global actors. It also invokes nationalist sentiments to rally support for the current political

leaders (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019). When domestic conditions improve, populism still serves as

a mobilization mechanism that aims at balancing against foreign actors. In the context of the

current global order, this function of populism usually takes the form of anti-western and anti-

American sentiments—especially in the global south (2019).

Building on these functions, scholars note that populism-based foreign policy is marked

by a combination of personalization and centralization. Here, populism entails centralizing

power over foreign policy at the hands of political leaders. At the same time, it entails

marginalizing traditional foreign policy actors including diplomats, politicians, academic experts

think tankers (Destradi et al. 2023). Populism also crafts foreign policy in a way that corresponds

to leaders’ personal beliefs and ideas. Aligning with the public positions, populist leaders claim

to represent the “popular will” (2023). On the foreign front, populism-based foreign policy

manifests as a reappropriation of the foreign policy heritage. Populist leaders tend to distance

themselves and differentiate their projects from previous traditions (Wajner and Wehner 2023).

Such a condition manifests in terms of pursuing less compromising foreign policies. It also

manifests in terms of shifting towards new venues of foreign alliances and relations. Populism-

based foreign policy also manifests in terms of reactionary and ambiguous international

positions. Populist leaders obscure their positions in a way that increases their support among

their bases and adapts to potential changes (2023).

Chapter Two

Foreign Policy Reorientation from Globalization to Nationalism

This chapter offers a characterization of foreign policy under globalization and

nationalism. It explores the current scholarly debate over the conflation between nationalism and

populism. It explains how populism is better understood as a strategy rather than a substantive

base of foreign policy. Alternatively, nationalism offers a more comprehensive characterization

of the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy. This chapter follows with presenting the

domestic-based theoretical argument beginning with a review of the literature on foreign policy

shifts and the different factors that play into such shifts. Then, this chapter identifies this

research’s host of domestic factors including systemic shocks, domestic pressures, and activating

agents and their orientations. Finally, this chapter concludes with details on research design,

methodology, analytical questions, time frame, causal logic, and expectations.

Foreign Policy Orientations

Foreign policy orientations are generally characterized in terms of strategies and policy

statements that express the preferences and the will of the government. Such strategies and

statements are expected to influence states' views of politics and the outside world. They

influence states foreign behavior toward serving a certain set of objectives and interests. As

established in the literature, globalization and nationalism represent two opposing orientations

for foreign policy. On one hand, globalization foresees a world of political, economic, and social

convergence and interdependence. As established in the literature, globalization entails

developing a single world order (Keller 2002), commitment to collective action and institutions

(Strange 2004), and adoption of universal laws and norms (Sparks 2007). Furthermore,

globalization entails the deterrence of aggression and the promotion of democracy and human

rights (Held 1995, Held and McGrew 2000). Economically and socially, globalization entails the

free movement of capital, labor, products, people, and information (Ritzer 2004). It also

integrates national economies and societies into a global market and a cosmopolitan global

society (Beck 2002, Bhagwati 2004). Combined, these premises orient states outwardly. Under

globalization, states become actively involved in international affairs (McCraw 2005 Paris

2014). States also engage in transnational projects such as the promotion of democracy and the

protection of human rights (Paris 2014). Along with this, states also become keen on

coordinating policies with each other (Milner and Tingley 2013), organizing multilateral

alliances (Braaten 2014), and adopting universal standards for state actions (Ruggie 1999).

Furthermore, states also become more likely to adjust their preferences (Keohane 1986) and

distribute gains and costs among the different parties (Grieco 1990).

Drawing from this literature, this dissertation characterizes the foreign policy under

globalization in terms of respect for the free movement, the promotion of democracy and human

rights, and a commitment to collective action and international institutions. It is also

characterized in terms of active involvement in international affairs, commitment to multilateral

engagement, and preference for cooperation over confrontation. All of this is rooted in a positive

sum perception of international relations and is reflected in tenants of the post-Cold War liberal

international order and the premises of globalization.

Globalization and foreign policy

Premises

Expressions

International politics

• Free movement of capital,

labor, products, people, and

information

• Promotion of democracy

and human rights

• Multilateral engagement

and cooperation

• Commitment to collective

security

• Active involvement

• Multilateralism

• Cooperation

Positive sum game under

the post-cold War liberal

international order

Table 1: Conceptualizing foreign policy under globalization.

On the other hand, nationalism revolves around state sovereignty and independence. As

established in the literature, nationalism asserts independence, unity, and self-determination

(Breuilly 1982, Lawrence 2013). It also emphasizes national rather than transnational ties and

prioritizes national over collective interests (Hazony 2018, Tamir 2019). In economic and

cultural spheres, nationalism emphasizes self-sufficiency (Hechter 2000), fair rather than free

trade (Bovard 1989), and protection of domestic industries (Schultze 2017). Furthermore,

nationalism emphasizes the distinctiveness and exclusivity of nations (Benedict 1983, Tamir

1993). It also bases affiliations on actualities of blood, race, language, and religion (Geerts

1963). Combined, these premises orient states inwardly. Under nationalism, states tend to avoid

permanent alliances and commitments (Schroeder 2002) and resort to limited and controlled

engagement (Doenecke 1980, Nordlinger 1996). Furthermore, states become keen to decide and

act alone—mostly in isolation of others’ interests and institutional arrangements (Everts 2001).

States also become more prone to conflict and confrontation. They aim at maximizing their’

gains while reducing the gains available to others (Milner 1992), exhibit incompatible interests

and conflicting actions (Mack and Snyder 1957), and impose their values on others (Huntington

1996).

Based on this literature, this dissertation characterizes foreign policy under nationalism—

i.e. nationalist foreign policy— in terms of emphasis on independence and national sovereignty,

economic self-sufficiency and protectionism, and pushback against democracy and universal

values. It is also characterized in terms of limited and unilateral engagement and proneness to

conflict and confrontation. All of this is rooted in a zero-sum perception of international

relations and is in opposition to the foreign policies under globalization.

Nationalist foreign policy

Premises

Expressions

International politics

• Independence and national

sovereignty (Control over free

movement)

• Economic self-sufficiency, fair

trade, and protection of national

industries

• Opposition to democracy and

universal values

• Unilateral engagement and conflict

• Limited

engagement

• Unilateralism

• Conflict

Zero-sum game under a

new international order

that emphasizes

independence and

national sovereignty

Table 2: Conceptualizing foreign policy under nationalism— i.e. nationalist foreign policy

Drawing on the literature on both orientations, this research advances that the

contemporary foreign policy reorientation occurs as a reorientation from globalization to

nationalism. In other words, foreign policy has begun to shift away from fulfilling the promises

of globalization including free movement, democracy, and human rights. It has also begun to

shift away from active involvement, multilateral engagement, and cooperation. Instead, foreign

policy has become defined by an emphasis on independence and sovereignty, economic self-

sufficiency and protectionism, and a pushback against democracy and universal values. It has

also become characterized in terms of limited and unilateral engagement and proneness to

conflict and confrontation. Within the context of this research, this foreign policy reorientation

has occurred across different cases including the United States of America, the United Kingdom,

and the People’s Republic of China. Under globalization, the U.S. foreign policy manifested in

terms of commitment to collective security and multilateralism, promotion of democracy and

human rights, and commitment to free trade and open borders. On the other hand, nationalism

informs a U.S. foreign policy that entails withdrawals from multilateral arrangements, economic

protectionism, and anti-immigration. In the UK, globalization informed the British commitment

to multilateralism, its special relations with the U.S., and its integration in the EU. On the other

hand, nationalism informs a British foreign policy that manifests in terms of disintegration from

the EU, withdrawals and abstention from multilateral military engagements, and a shift toward

unilateral and confrontational action. Finally, globalization guided the Chinese integration into

multilateral institutions and its commitment to regional cooperation. On the other hand,

nationalism drives the Chinese foreign policy toward regional confrontation and unilateralism in

the South and East Chinese Seas, noncooperation with international institutions, and economic

protectionism and anti-democracy.

Before presenting the domestic-based explanation of this argument, it is important to

address the current scholarly conflation between nationalism and populism. In other words, why

does this reorientation occur towards nationalism rather than populism? As established in the

literature, nationalism and populism share core principles including the primacy of national

interests and sovereignty. Both also share the principle of exclusion against a different “other”

(Singh 2021, Rabinowitz 2023). Nationalism and populism also share animosity towards

different ideologies including elitism, pluralism, and liberalism (Mudde 2004, Rabinowitz 2023).

They also share an emphasis on political representation and popular sovereignty (Heiskanen

2021). At the same time, populism is aligned with nationalism in its opposition to globalization.

Both react to the technological and economic changes that have accompanied globalization

(Mudde 2004, Pastor and Veronesi 2018). Both also have resurged in response to the cultural and

demographic changes that are perceived as threats to local cultures and values (Rodrik 2017).

However, populism does not represent a source of substantive stances and expressions in terms

of foreign policy. Such a condition relates to the fact that populism functions as a thin ideology

that attaches to different ideologies, parties, and political traditions (Chryssogelos 2017).

Alternatively, nationalism represents an independent ideology that informs the work of parties

and movements. It also comprises the traditions upon which the contemporary reorientation of

foreign policy depends including political, economic, and cultural nationalism. Besides this,

populism capitalizes on principles and expressions that are essentially part of nationalism. For

instance, populism adjusts the nationalist principles of exclusion and “otherness” to fit the

context of domestic politics. Populism also drives states toward self-interest and confrontation

which are inherent to foreign policy under nationalism.

Beyond this, populism does not provide a sufficient theoretical explanation for the

contemporary reorientation of foreign policy. Lacking substantive ideas for foreign policy,

populism explains the process rather than the content of the final foreign policy product. It also

offers a narrow characterization of the conditions that lead to foreign policy reorientation.

Among the key theoretical issues with the ability of populism to explain the contemporary

reorientation of foreign policy are the following:

- Populism follows a vertical logic that is incompatible with the logic of nationalism as

well as that of foreign policy. As established in the literature, populism places the

public in opposition to the national elites. On the other hand, nationalism places the

nation in opposition to an outside group or other nations (Brubaker 2020, Rabinowitz

2023). While the populist logic may explain the process of domestic mobilization, it

is at odds with the logic of interstate interaction—especially among states of similar

ranking and power. Hence, this dissertation characterizes the contemporary foreign

policy reorientation in line with the horizontal logic of nationalism. Such a logic is

consistent with that of foreign policy and interstate interaction. It also characterizes a

horizontal “other” that represents other states and entities. These others become the

subject of domestic discontent and the push toward a foreign policy reorientation.

- Populism implies that the positions of national leaders form and change in line with

their needs for political support. As established in the literature, national leaders

exhibit positions that do not necessarily represent their conventions. Instead, they use

such positions to capitalize on domestic discontent and rally support for political

change (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019, Tas 2022). This use also serves processes such as

diversion, centralization, and personalization of policies (Sagarzazu and Thies 2019,

Destradi et al. 2023). While this appears to be part of the process, this dissertation

goes beyond this to claim that the expressed positions are part of national leaders’

political orientation. In other words, these leaders’ beliefs and foreign policy views

are rooted within their conventions and worldviews. They usually hold to such views

before they hold office and continue with the same views during their rule.

- Populism seems to confine foreign policy change to the interaction between political

leadership and the public. As established in the literature, populism hinges on the

mobilization of the public against domestic and international actors. It also hinges on

marginalizing the domestic elites from such a process (Destradi et al. 2023). While

this captures part of the story, this dissertation characterizes the contemporary foreign

policy reorientation as a more comprehensive process. In contrast to populism, this

dissertation associates foreign policy reorientation with ideational and structural

changes within the elites. Such changes provide an opening window for the rise of the

nationalist leader. These changes also entail that the elites are not necessarily resistant

to foreign policy change. Along with the public, they have become increasingly

critical of globalization.

- Populism also fails to capture the dynamics that play into foreign policy change—

especially at the systemic level. As noted earlier, populism hinges on the interaction

between political leadership and the public. What is missing is a focus on the external

factors that play into such interaction. Alternatively, this dissertation incorporates

factors beyond this interaction at the level of international politics. Such a condition

manifests in terms of focus on the role of systemic and exogenous shocks in domestic

mobilization. The costs of these shocks are claimed to be the key factor that triggers a

series of domestic dynamics toward a foreign policy reorientation.

Still, this dissertation recognizes populism as a mobilization strategy toward foreign

policy reorientation. As noted in the literature, populism hinges on the primacy of the “people”

in political affairs (Mény and Surel 2002). It also establishes a direct link between the public and

foreign policymaking (Destradi et al. 2023). Within the context of this research, populism is

embedded in the alignment that develops between national leaders and domestic pressure—

particularly the public. In line with populism, this alignment develops as these leaders exhibit

beliefs that reflect the public views about globalization. these leaders also amplify the costs of

the systemic shocks and consolidate their association with globalization. Such a condition

renders these leaders a vehicle through which these views get translated into foreign policy.

Beyond this, populism also factors into the framing of foreign policy proposals. As noted in the

literature, populism focuses on ideas such as the “popular will”, political representation, and

popular sovereignty (Heiskanen 2021, Destradi et al. 2023). Populism also frames foreign policy

as nostalgic and restorative (Schapkow and Jacob 2022). Within the context of this research,

national leaders are expected to use these frames as they mobilize public support. They also use

such frames to promote their nationalist foreign policy proposals.

Reorientation of Foreign Policy (Theoretical Argument)

Foreign policy reorientation is explained in terms of systemic and domestic factors.

Within the literature on international relations and foreign policy, scholars are divided into those

who focus primarily on systemic factors. For instance, realists note that foreign policy is

associated with the need for security and power (Morgenthau 1978). Under this preoccupation,

states are expected to reorient their foreign policy to maximize their power. States also reorient

their foreign policies to deal with threats to their national security (1978). Realists also note that

foreign policy is influenced by structural arrangements and the balance of power. Such

conditions render universal foreign policy positions of confrontation, cooperation, or

competition. States also engage in various forms of alliances aimed at balancing and

bandwagoning (Pape 2005). Along with realists, liberals follow that foreign policy is directed

toward cooperation and global stability. Such objectives render similar foreign policies—

especially among states that share economic ties and similar values (Nye 2000, Kant 2015).

States also engage in universal and transnational projects such as the promotion of democracy

and human rights. Liberals also believe that foreign policy is influenced by international

organizations and institutions. Aside from preventing conflict, these institutions and structures

influence how states reorient and direct their foreign policies (Nye 2000). Finally, constructivists

note that foreign policy is influenced by national identities, ideas, and values. While being

different across states, such elements orient foreign policy toward conflict or cooperation (Hopf

1998). Besides this, states internationalize common norms to induce similar postures and serve

common interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Along with these scholars, others associate foreign policy reorientation with the

interaction between domestic and systemic factors. For instance, some scholars note that foreign

policy is influenced by foreign threats and external involvement. Here, weak and vulnerable

states are more likely to reorient their foreign policy in response to more powerful actors.

External involvement also induces change from within the system to correspond to foreign

interests (Holsti 1982). Foreign policy is also influenced by states’ diplomatic and military

commitments. States that are entangled in international agreements are less likely to reorient

their foreign policy (1982). Other scholars follow that foreign policy by external pressure.

Usually, such pressure is mitigated by domestic stabilizers including political and administrative

characteristics (Goldmann 1988). However, states tend to adjust or reorient their foreign policies

to absorb and minimize such foreign pressure (1988). Other scholars note that foreign policy

reorientation is influenced by policy diffusion and transfer. Here, states reorient their foreign

policy to copy and implement other states’ policies. Such a process entails copying effective and

successful models of foreign policies. It is facilitated by the availability of technological means

as well as structural and ideological similarities (2017). Finally, foreign policy reorientation is

influenced by learning from experience. During international endeavors, states learn about their

capabilities and the dynamics of international politics (Levy 1994). Then, such knowledge about

the system influences decision-makers or the process of decision-making. In both cases, this

knowledge induces a change in leaders’ beliefs and states foreign preferences (1994).

Beyond these approaches, other scholars associate foreign policy reorientation

exclusively with domestic factors and politics. Beginning with domestic political systems,

scholars note that domestic democratic values foster cooperation and compromise. On the other

hand, structural constraints under democracies limit decision-makers from pursuing

confrontational foreign policies (Maoz and Russett 1993). Under autocracies, foreign policy is

reoriented in response to the needs of regime and leadership survival. Usually, such a condition

yields diversionary and confrontational foreign policies. However, autocracies also constrain

foreign policy by regime insiders and the threat of mass uprisings (Weeks and Crunkilton 2017).

Other scholars follow that foreign policy reorientation is influenced by domestic characteristics

including regime type, constitution, leadership, and degree of national coherence. Changes in

these characteristics usually lead to foreign policy reorientation. Usually, the most notable and

dramatic reorientations occur under regime and leadership change (Owen 2010). Foreign policy

reorientation is also influenced by bureaucratic control over resources and implementation of the

proposed policies (Hermann1990). It is also influenced by organizational cultures and their role

in foreign policy making. While insulated organizations and institutions create cultures that resist

changes, embedded organizations and institutions tend to facilitate foreign policy reorientation

(Drezner 2000). Finally, scholars associate foreign policy reorientation with the dynamics of

domestic politics—especially in terms of dealing with domestic opposition. For instates, states

are more likely to reorient foreign policy when leaders insulate or mobilize against domestic

opposition. On the other hand, accommodation of the opposition yields a more restrained foreign

policy. (Hagan 1995).

Building on this literature, this dissertation presents a domestic-based explanation of the

contemporary reorientation of foreign policy toward nationalism. This dissertation establishes

that the systemic approaches have failed to predict this reorientation of foreign policy toward

nationalism. More importantly, these approaches are unable to explain such a reorientation. As

noted earlier, systemic approaches expect foreign policy to be informed by universal factors and

conditions such as the need for security and balance of power. they are also influenced by

economic ties and political and cultural similarities. Within the context of this research, the

systemic approaches fail because of the following reasons:

- Systemic approaches imply that foreign policy reorientations are constrained by

systemic constraints. States hew towards what scholars refer to as a power line—

characterized by power ranking and systemic expectations about states’ foreign

behavior (Owen 2010). According to the power line argument, dominant powers

would reorient their foreign policy in a way that corresponds to their power ranking.

Similarly, regional powers are expected to be entrenched within regional

configurations and lean toward integration and cooperation. However, the

contemporary reorientation of their foreign policy toward nationalism deviates from

such expectations. Such deviation manifests in terms of the U.S. dissenting from

commitment to multilateralism and active involvement and China gradually

abandoning its peaceful rise in favor of an assertive and confrontational approach.

Similarly, the deviation manifests in terms of the UK disintegration from the

European Union.

- Systemic approaches imply that foreign policy reorientations would occur as a

universal phenomenon. In other words, states respond to systemic conditions in a

similar manner. Any variation in foreign policy lies in differences in socialization into

systemic expectations rather than changes in domestic configuration (Owen 2010).

However, many states did not exhibit a foreign policy reorientation toward

nationalism despite being exposed to the same systemic conditions. Meanwhile, the

considered cases chose to respond to such conditions by reorientating their foreign

policies towards nationalism. Such a condition implies that states' response to

systemic conditions is explained by domestic rather than systemic factors.

- Systemic approaches suggest that foreign policy reorientations would occur gradually

as states adjust to systemic determinants such as the balance of power (Owen 2010).

However, the contemporary foreign reorientation toward nationalism has manifested

as dramatic departures rather than gradual adjustments. Such dramatic departures

manifest in terms of actions such as withdrawals, termination, and renegotiation of

multilateral arrangements and missions. These changes do not represent adjustments

to systemic expectations or the balance of power. Instead, they have the potential to

radically alter such balance and systemic arrangements.

Based on this, the explanation offered in this dissertation casts the contemporary foreign

reorientation as a domestic-driven phenomenon. Generally, this dissertation characterizes foreign

policy reorientation as a major and dramatic change that impacts states' commitment and

principles of foreign engagement. Such a change manifests in terms of withdrawals,

terminations, and renegotiation of multilateral arrangements and missions. This characterization

aligns with what scholars like Hermann characterize as an international orientation change

(1990). In contrast to limited and gradual forms of change that impact states' methods, programs,

and approaches to specific issues or actors, the orientation change involves a whole restructuring

and reversal of foreign policy (1990). Based on this characterization, this dissertation does not

necessarily argue that the contemporary reorientation has impacted all areas of foreign policy.

Instead, this reorientation has entailed proposing and implementing a wide array of policies that

correspond to the political, economic, and cultural premises of nationalism. these policies are

also expected to entail a change in the overall posture of the state and its international role.

Besides this, this dissertation does not necessarily characterize foreign policy in terms of a rigid

dichotomy between globalization and nationalism. Instead, the two orientations represent the

ends of a spectrum where some states are expected to exhibit more nationalist policies than

others. Sates are also expected to take more dramatic foreign policy departures than others (e.g.

the UK disintegration from the EU). What gives an impression of a dichotomy is the sudden and

dramatic departures that these states make on multiple fronts and within a short period. Finally,

this dissertation notes that the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy may not be

permanent. In other words, states may return to their previous foreign policies when supporting

conditions are present. However, this reorientation is dramatic and unprecedented in a way that is

likely to have a permanent impact on international politics. Such an impact manifests mainly in

terms of questioning the validity and utility of globalization.

As a process, this dissertation advances that foreign policy reorientation occurs as a

domestic-driven deviation from the policies that were exhibited under globalization. Instead,

states subscribe to nationalist foreign policies that pertain to political, economic, and cultural

areas. This reorientation occurs as a result of a host of factors including shocks, pressures, and

activating agents. Under such factors, foreign policy reorientation occurs in three parts:

- Systemic Shocks: the reorientation occurs as a result of what is referred to as systemic

shocks—comprising large-scale crises and focusing events that drive the international

and domestic systems out of equilibrium.

- Domestic pressures: the reorientation occurs as a result of domestic pressures—

exhibited in terms of public and elite perception and response to such shocks.

- Activating agents (National leaders and their orientation): the reorientation occurs as

a result of the rise of nationalist leadership whose orientation aligns with and reflects

domestic pressures. These leaders amplify domestic pressure and channel domestic

pressure into foreign policy.

Here, this dissertation advances that the systemic shocks represent the systemic factors that

influence the reorientation of foreign policy. These shocks cannot be ignored and have a high

likelihood of inducing major foreign policy change. However, these shocks are not sufficient to

explain the foreign policy reorientation toward nationalism. As noted earlier, systemic conditions

–i.e. shocks—have affected several states other than the considered cases. However, those states

did not exhibit a similar reorientation of foreign policy. Alternatively, this dissertation advances

that the influence of such shocks on foreign policy is conditioned by domestic factors including

pressures and activating agents. On one hand, these shocks are perceived by the domestic public

and elites as costs of globalization. Hence, they generate domestic pressures toward a

reorientation of foreign policy. On the other hand, national leaders—i.e. activating agents—

leaders rise amid these domestic pressures and shifts within the governing party or coalition.

These leaders amplify domestic pressures by exhibiting anti-globalization beliefs and positions.

This dissertation advances that both domestic factors are necessary for systemic shocks to induce

a foreign policy orientation. Without the presence of domestic pressures, national leaders may

have no incentive to initiate a dramatic reorientation of foreign policy. At the same time,

pressures that remain inactivated are not likely to translate into a foreign policy reorientation. In

other words, domestic pressures need activating agents—i.e. national leaders—who channel

them into foreign policies.

International Crises (Systemic Shocks)

The first factor that explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy toward

nationalism is systemic shocks—i.e. international crises. Such crises represent systemic and

exogenous shocks that drive the system out of equilibrium

. They are usually associated with

positive and negative outcomes (Fink 1986). They also pose a threat to the survival of states and

organizations (Keown-McMullan 1997). The power of these shocks lies in the fact that they

capture the attention of the public. They also surprise decision-makers and restrict their response

time (McCormick 1978). At the same time, they offer an opportunity to rally the public and act

unilaterally at national and international levels (Mueller 1970). Within the literature, scholars

reference several examples of crises that contribute to foreign policy reorientations. For instance,

wars and major conflicts can shift foreign policy to become more forceful. Usually, this

manifests as states impose their will and agendas on other states (Bassey 2005). Major conflicts

also limit states' choices and define foreign policy in terms of the immediate need for survival

(Moon 1985). Similarly, Terrorist attacks also drive foreign policy toward aggressive and

unilateral actions. In response to attacks, states tend to be driven by the need to restore order and

establish a reputation for resolve (Cakmak 2003). Other examples of crises include revolutions

which yield a shift toward interventionist policies that aim at reversing or controlling such events

(Lawson 2015). Similarly, democratization also increases the propensity for conflicts. During

such transition, states exhibit more aggressive and war-prone policies (Mansfield and Snyder

1995). In contrast, modernization pushes states' foreign policy away from wars and conflict. This

shift usually aims at fostering a supportive environment for such a transition (Morse 1970).

Within the literature, scholars divide over the criteria that characterize crises as shocks—with some referring to

focusing events that high level of urgency and a wider scope of effects (Birkland 1997). Others list characteristics

such as acute rather than chronic crises, posing threats to the involved parties’ goals, and producing tension and

change in behavior (Miller and Isacoe 1972). Shocks are disruptive of normal operations (Fink 1986). Scholars also

note that these events and their urgency are affected by framing, causal attribution (Stone 1989), and the image of

the affected entities and groups (Schneider and Ingram 1993, Leiberman 1995).

Finally, economic crises push states towards embracing protectionist policies. States resort to

measures that increase trade barriers and affect economic ties with others (Kee et al. 2008)

Based on this literature, this dissertation advances that international crises function as

systemic shocks that contribute to the reorientation of foreign policy toward nationalism. As

noted earlier, these shocks represent visible and impactful events that cannot be ignored by

policymakers. While they gain public attention and increase change, they also offer national

leaders an opportunity to mobilize public support for change. The argument for systemic shocks

entails that foreign policy is not made in absolute isolation from systemic factors. Instead, such

shocks play into the domestic setting and prioritization of foreign policy agenda. Within the

context of this research, systemic shocks are characterized as political and economic crises that

are usually associated with globalization. This dissertation advances that these shocks provide

the context for a foreign policy reorientation toward nationalism. Such effect manifests in terms

of generating domestic pressures that push toward reorienting foreign policy away from

globalization. Instead, the public and the elite begin to exhibit positions that correspond to the

political, economic, and cultural aspects of nationalism. At the same time, national leaders also

amplify these shocks and link them to globalization. Aligned with the public, these leaders also

exhibit positions that embrace nationalism as an alternative.

Within the context of this research, systemic shocks are identified under two categories

including political and economic shocks:

Within the literature, the effects these crises and the make of foreign policy are conditioned by several domestic

factors such as regime characteristics where consolidation of powers affects foreign policies of authoritarian

systems while normative conditions play into those of democratic systems (Fiona 2001, Taussig 2018), regime and

politicians survival where policies are designed to serve such ends (Kinne 2005, Brien 2016), domestic institutions

and arrangements which either factor into consensus or conflict over foreign policy (Crossley-Frolick 2013)

Political Shocks

These shocks relate to political globalization and its expressions including the promotion

of democracy and human rights, commitment to multilateralism and collective security, and free

movement. In the U.S. and the U.K., such shocks include the 9/11 attacks and the series of terror

attacks in the UK including the 2005 Metro bombing. They also include the fallout of subsequent

multilateral military interventions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In the case of China,

the shocks include the Tiananmen Square events in China in 1989, the Taiwan Strait crisis, and

subsequent maritime disputes in China’s seas.

Economic Shocks

These shocks relate to the economic manifestations of globalization including economic

integration, multilateral trade agreements, and free movement. They include the 2008 economic

recession and the 2015 immigration crisis in the U.S. and Europe. In the case of China, such

shocks include the financial crises of 1997 and the 2008 economic recession.

Systemic shocks

cases

Political shocks

Economic shocks

The U.S.

• Terrorist attacks (9/11) and multilateral

interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan

• The 2008 economic

recession

The UK

• Terrorist attacks (London Metro Bombing in

2005) and multilateral interventions in Iraq

and Afghanistan

• The 2008 economic

recession

• The 2015 immigration

crisis

China

• The Tiananmen Square events in 1989

• The Taiwan Strait crises and subsequent

maritime disputes

• The 2008 economic

recession

• The financial crises of

1997

Table 3: identifying systemic political and economic shocks and the affected cases.

The logic behind choosing these shocks lies in their global magnitude of effects. For

instance, the terror attacks in the U.S. and the UK have been followed by attacks worldwide

Besides this, the attacks have also been followed by major conflicts including the invasion of

Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Both have led to the revival of

transnational terrorism, fueled sectarian and ethnic conflicts (Cordesman 2020), and destabilized

the oil market (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015). As for regional conflicts, the Chinese

conflict over the seas has the potential to disrupt around 70% of international shipping (Macaraig

and Fenton 2001). It also poses a threat to China’s neighbors in the region—let alone carrying

the risk of a military confrontation with the U.S. (Saha 2020). Economically, the 2008 economic

crisis caused a significant loss in global economic growth and a decline in international trade

(Merle 2018, The Economist 2009)

. The crisis also caused a spike in unemployment—with

global records reaching 200 million unemployed in the wake of the crisis (Lynn 2008).

Furthermore, the 2015 immigration crisis has been characterized as the most critical since the

Second World War. It has inflicted security, economic, and cultural costs across Europe and

North America. It has also been followed by a surge in migration and refugee waves to the global

north (OECD 2015).

Along with their global effects, the choice of these shocks is informed by their

association with globalization

. For instance, the free movement of people, information, and

According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the number of terror attacks has spiked from around 2000 in

the wake of 9/11 to almost 16 thousand attacks in 2015 (GTD N.d.).

The effects of the crisis have extended to developed as well as developing economies. In fact, the effects of the

crisis were felt more significantly in countries other than the US and the UK. According to a report by Carnegie, the

most affected countries include Ukraine, Argentina, Jamaica, Ireland, Russia, Mexico, Hungary, and the Baltic

states (Shimelse et al. 2009).

These shocks are linked to other domestic and regional factors. However, globalization arises as the primary

factor because it has created the conditions under which such crises occur and spread across national borders.

capital has allegedly facilitated the recruitment and finance of terror activities (Murphy 2002).

Besides this, terror attacks emerge in response to global economic and social disparities (Nassar

2010). They also reflect resentment toward the imposition of Western values on non-Western

societies (Stapley 2006). Similarly, regional conflicts arise amid the deterritorialization of

national interests. they also represent higher sensitivity and concerns over national sovereignty

and security. Globalization has also contributed to the rise of non-traditional security threats

(Meng 2019). Such threats represent underlying causes for the conflicts in the Chinese seas and

other regions. In the economic spheres, the 2008 crisis and other regional economic crises are

linked to economic interdependence which has been accompanied by excessive deregulation

(Bernanke 2018), the attraction of fragile investments (Hindmoor and McConnell 2015), over-

dependence on imports and exports (Zhang 2009). Furthermore, interdependence has facilitated

the spread of the crisis across national borders. Similarly, the 2015 immigration crisis is linked to

the free movement of individuals and coordinated border policies. It is also linked to other

aspects of globalization such as economic and cultural integration (Garrett 2019).

Public and Elite Opinion (Domestic Pressures)

The second factor that explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy toward

nationalism pertains to domestic pressures. Such pressures are characterized in terms of

increasing public and elite hostility and opposition toward globalization. Within the literature,

scholars have traditionally regarded the public as uninformed and uninterested in foreign policy

(Lippmann 1955, Rosenau 1961)

. Others have considered the public as driven by morality and

Within the literature, public opinion represents bottom-up approaches where foreign policies are influenced by

the public rather than the elite (Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004). On the other hand, the elite opinion represents the

top-down approach which proposes that the elites provide the public with cues that factor into their attitudes

toward foreign policy.

sentiments rather than interests (Kennan, 1951)

. However, such a view changed later as public

pressure became associated with foreign policy reorientation. Current research establishes that

the effect of public opinion on foreign policy manifests in terms of individuals’ beliefs, moral

conventions, and values. For instance, scholars associate cooperative and integrative policies

with individuals who hold benign views about the outside world (Duckitt et al 2002). Such

policies are also associated with individuals who believe in exhibiting conservation value

(Rathbun et al. 2016), believe in self-transcendence and universalism (Bayram 2015), and

believe in providing for the well-being of others (Janoff-Bulman 2009). Furthermore,

cooperative and integrative policies are also associated with individuals who perceive other

states as equal in status and potential allies (O’Reilly 2007, Herrmann 2013). On the other hand,

scholars associate confrontational and militant policies with individuals who view the outside as

dangerous (Duckitt et al 2002). These policies are also associated with individuals who embrace

loyalty and sanctity (Kertzer et al., 2014), believe in protecting the ingroup (Janoff-Bulman

2009), and perceive other states as threats or inferiors (O’Reilly 2007, Herrmann 2013).

At the level of the elite, the elite effect on foreign policy manifests in terms of elites’

beliefs, moral conventions, and perceptions of other states and leaders.

Usually, this effect

influences foreign policy by exerting direct influence over national leaders. Or it informs and

influences public opinion—hence generating public pressure over such leaders (Wittkopf 1990,

Such assumptions about the public have continued to shape the views about the public and foreign policy until

the 1980s when scholars exhibited an increasing interest in exploring the possible link between public opinion and

foreign policy (Foyle 1999, Oktay 2018).

The influence of elites’ opinion on foreign policy is conditioned by several factors including exposure to

information, resistance, and availability of information (Zaller1992). It is also conditioned by cognitive complexity

and experience (Dyson and Preston 2006), interests vs. training (Hermann 1988), the level of consensus vs

dissensus (Rosati 1988), and the capacity to act upon beliefs (Kennedy 2012). Other factors include ideology, party,

occupation, education, age, military service, travel experience, and gender (Holsti and Rosenau 1988).

Holsti 2004). Within the literature, scholars associate foreign policy reorientations with the

elites’ beliefs about politics and the outside world. They also associate such reorientations with

the elites’ views on the predictability of politics, the ability to control events, and the character of

a politician (George 1969). As in the case of the public, cooperative policies are usually with the

elites who exhibit benign beliefs about the outside world. Such policies are also associated with

the elites who view politics as more predictable and controllable. On the other hand,

confrontational and militant policies are associated with elites who view the world as dangerous

(Holsti and Rosenau 1979). Scholars also associate cooperative policies with the elites’ moral

conventions and beliefs about morality in politics. Usually, nonconfrontational foreign policies

are associated with the elites who believe in the morality of politics. On the other hand,

confrontational and militant policies are associated with the elites who exhibit disregard for

morality and universal laws (Safty 2003). Finally, scholars also associate confrontational and

militant policies with the elites who exhibit paranoia and Machiavellianism (Tucker 1965). Such

policies are also associated with the elites who make hostile inferences about other states and

leaders (Hermann 1986, Malici 2008)

Based on this literature, this dissertation advances that public and elite opinions

contribute to the reorientation of foreign policy towards nationalism. As noted earlier, the public

and elites opinions are associated with certain types of foreign policies. A change in these

opinions translates into pressure toward a foreign policy reorientation. Within the context of this

Scholars note that the public also forms perceptions about other states that categorize them as more or less

powerful, more or less equal in terms of status, and as a source of mutual gains or a threat and a subject of

exploitation (Herrmann, Richard K. 2013). The public also perceives other powers as comparable in power and

status or inferiors (O’Reilly 2007). However, the elites’ perceptions of other powers and leaders are more critical

given that they directly apply their inferences to policymaking and that their misperceptions of others’ capabilities

and intentions are likely to have significant consequences such as wars and conflicts (Jervis 1976, Levy 1983)

research, the change in public and elite opinions toward a more confrontational stance is

associated with pressure toward embracing nationalism. Similarly, nationalism is also associated

with the public and elites' support for limited engagement and unilateralism. Change in public

and elite opinions is expected to occur as both perceive the systemic shocks as costs of

globalization. Hence, they generate pressure on national leaders to shift the direction of foreign

policy. At the same time, such pressures provide support and justification for these leaders to

initiate a foreign policy reorientation. By arguing for the role of the public and opinion, this

dissertation does not entertain the causality argument—debating whether the elites influence the

public or vice versa. Instead, this dissertation advances that both the public and the elite feed into

each other. In doing so, they create momentum for national leaders to initiate a reorientation of

foreign policy. Besides this, this dissertation holds that the pressure generated by the public and

the elite opinion has accumulated within the system for years. Under such pressure, states and

previous leaders may have pushed against globalization in one or more areas. In other cases,

previous leaders may have pushed back, or at least limited, the influence of the public and elite

opinion over foreign policy. This dissertation advances that public and elite pressure remained

limited and fragmented. Such a condition changes along with the rise of activating agents—i.e.

national leaders—who align with and channel such pressure into foreign policy. As noted earlier,

such pressures would have continued to be inactive, fragmented, and limited without the

presence of activating agents.

According to these premises, this dissertation explores the public and elite opinion in

association with the shocks in each case. In other words, political shocks are expected to have

rendered opposition to political aspects of globalization including commitment to collective

security, promotion of democracy and human rights, and multilateralism. On the other hand,

economic shocks are expected to have bred resistance to economic integration and free trade.

According to this, public and elite opinions are categorized under political and economic frames.

Views on Political Globalization

This explores the U.S. and UK public and elite opinion in terms of national security,

military interventions, and immigration. Along with these subjects, the public and elite opinion

in the UK is also explored in relation to integration into the EU. These subjects are associated

with responses to systemic shocks including terror attacks, the fallout from military

interventions, and immigration crises. In the case of China, the public and elite opinions are

explored in terms of national security and democratization. Both are exhibited as responses to the

Tiananmen Square events and the escalating maritime conflicts.

Views on Economic Globalization

This explores the public and elite opinion in terms of views on economic integration, free

trade, and protectionism. In these cases, opinions are exhibited as responses to the 2008 global

economic crisis as well as the 1997 crisis in the case of China. For the UK, these subjects are

also exhibited in terms of views on the EU and immigration.

Table 4: identifying domestic pressures and the affected areas of Public and Elite opinion.

National Leaders and their Orientations (Activating Agents)

The third factor that explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy toward

nationalism is national leaders and their orientations. National leaders engage in activities such

as problem definition and framing (Skowronek 1993), establishing cause and effects (Stone

1989), identifying affected entities and groups (Schneider and Ingram 1993), setting and

prioritizing policy agendas, and exercising control of formal and informal means of legislation

Within the literature, approaches to leadership orientation are rooted within foreign policy domestic theories

such as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP). Both define leaders’ orientations in line

with the psychological and societal milieux of foreign policy which comprises leaders’ beliefs, representations,

styles, and personality traits and influences the way leaders view and interpret the outside world (Hudson 2013).

Domestic Pressures

Cases

Political and economic shocks

Affected areas of public and elite opinion

The U.S.

Terrorist attacks (9/11) and multilateral

interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan

National security, military intervention,

and immigration

The 2008 economic recession

Free trade, multilateral trade

agreements, and protectionism

The UK

Terrorist attacks and multilateral

interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan

National security, military intervention,

and immigration

The 2008 economic recession and the

2015 immigration crisis

Integration into the EU, Free trade,

protectionism, and immigration

China

The Tiananmen Square events in 1989,

the Taiwan Strait crisis, and subsequent

maritime disputes

Democratization, national sovereignty,

and territorial integrity

The 2008 economic recession and the

financial crises of 1997

Free trade, multilateral trade

agreements, and protectionism.

(Skowronek 1993)

. Within the literature, scholars associate foreign policy reorientation with

leaders’ orientations—comprising beliefs, personal characteristics, and approaches to foreign

policy. For instance, leaders who maintain established policies tend to be derivative (Light

1999), order-affirming (Skowronek 1993), nation-keeping (Riley 1999), and transactional (Nye

et al. 2013). On the other hand, leaders who reorient foreign policies tend to be order-shattering

(Skowronek 1993) and transformational (Nye et al. 2013). National leaders are divided into goal-

driven and situation-driven—with the first exhibiting less fixability than the latter. Besides this,

situation-driven leaders tend to be sensitive to external conditions when formulating foreign

policies (Hermann et al. 2001). This entails that leaders who reorient foreign policy may

combine being goal-driven and situation-driven—especially in their perception of the effects of

globalization on domestic politics. National leaders are also divided into formalistic and

competitive—with competitive leaders leaning towards confrontation and controversy (Johnson

1971). They also divide into moderates, pragmatic, militant, and radicals (Hagan 1994). While

the first two exhibit openness towards cooperation and view politics as positive-sum, the other

two view the outside world as extremely dangerous and politics as a zero-sum game (1994).

Leaders also divide into nationalistic and participatory—with the first being associated with

aggressive and noncooperative leaders (Hermann 1980). Finally, leaders also divide into

pragmatic and assertive—with the latter being driven by exaggerated beliefs about state

capability and the level of danger in the outside world (Kennedy 2012).

Within the literature, the role of national leaders is conditioned by several factors including resources and

prerogatives (Light 1999), political, constitutional, institutional, and organizational orderings (Skowronek 1993),

public approval, and trust (Ponder 2012).

Drawing on this literature, this dissertation advances that national leaders—identified as

nationalists in this research—and their orientations represent the primary factor in foreign policy

reorientation toward nationalism. As established in the literature and in line with the premises of

nationalism, it characterizes these leaders’ orientation as a nationalist orientation—comprising

beliefs that emphasize independence, sovereignty, and national exceptionalism. It also comprises

beliefs that exhibit aversion to military engagement and promotion of democracy, opposition to

immigration, and support for economic protectionist measures. These leaders tend to view the

outside world and politics as a zero-sum game. They also tend to be assertive, confrontational,

and challenging of the status quo—especially regarding foreign policy. This dissertation

advances that these leaders rise amid shifts within the governing coalition or parties. Primarily,

such shifts manifest in terms of the rise of anti-globalization factions that provide an opening

window for the rise of the nationalist leader. These shifts also reflect the change of ideas and

positions among the political elites in a way that pushes against globalization. At the same time,

the nationalist leaders rise in the context of the national reaction to the systemic shocks. In other

words, these leaders rise amid the increasing domestic pressures—exhibited in terms of elites

and public criticism toward globalization and its foreign policy expressions.

Under these conditions, this dissertation advances that the way these leaders are linked to

foreign policy reorientation lies in the alignment that develops between these leaders’

orientations and domestic pressures—particularly the public views. Essentially, such an

alignment originates from these leaders’ orientations—comprising their beliefs and views on

politics, the outside world, globalization, and foreign policy. In other words, these leaders’ push

against globalization seems rooted within their conventions and worldviews. At the same time,

this alignment between the leaders and domestic pressures occurs as part of the mobilization

process that accompanies their rise to power. Through their campaign speeches and statements,

these leaders amplify the costs of the systemic shocks and consolidate their association with

globalization. They also present alternative nationalist proposals that constitute bases for the

reorientation of foreign policy. Such a process of mobilization establishes a direct link between

the public and foreign policymaking. It also renders these leaders a vehicle through which the

public and elite pressure gets translated into foreign policy.

Based on this characterization, this dissertation explores the role of three leaders—Identified

as nationalists—including U.S. President Donald Trump, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and

Chinese President Xi Jinping. This dissertation explores the shifts that preceded the rise of these

leaders in the U.S. Republican Party, the British Conservative Party, and the Chinese Communist

Party. It also explores the components of these leaders’ orientations including beliefs and views

on politics, the outside world, globalization, and foreign policy. It explores how these

components align with and reflect domestic pressures against globalization. It also explores these

leaders’ proposals that mobilize support toward a foreign policy reorientation.

Nationalist Leaders and Their Orientation

Cases

Leader

In-office

Areas of beliefs and positions

The U.S.

President Donald J.

Trump

2016 -2020

National security, military

interventions, immigration, and

integration

The UK

Prime Minister Boris

Johnson

2019-2022

National security, military

interventions, immigration, and

integration

China

President Xi Jinping

2012 – present

National security, democracy and

universal values, and economic

integration

Table 5: identifying nationalist leaders.

These leaders share the fact that they view the outside world and politics as zero-sum. For

instance, President Trump cast international politics and trade as a win or loss while PM Johnson

views the UK membership in the EU as either in or out (CNN 2016, Johnson 2017). President Xi

also casts politics either in terms of hostile confrontation or mutual respect (Jinping 2021). These

leaders are also the first to openly challenge the post-Cold War order and implement a wide array

of nationalist policies. Previous leaders may have adjusted foreign policies to limit the effects of

globalization. However, these leaders are distinguished by their major and unprecedented foreign

policy departures. For instance, President Trump is the first U.S. President to propose multiple

withdrawals from multilateral agreements. He is also the first to cast the U.S. commitment to

NATO as transactional and conditional. In the UK, PM Johnson embraced and enacted the

disintegration from the European Union—especially after his two predecessors failed to do so.

Similarly, the Chinese president is shifting away from the peaceful rise adopted by leaders since

Deng. Instead, he is embracing a strategy of confrontational and assertive rise.

Besides this, these leaders are distinguished from their predecessors by being outsiders.

For instance, the three leaders arise from outside traditional circles of political power. President

Trump and PM Johnson are associated with a class of celebrities (Worthy and Stafford 2019,

Schneiker 2020). The rise of President Xi also represents a break from traditional mechanisms of

succession (Brown 2017). These leaders also share similar personal characteristics including

opportunism, impulsiveness, and defiance. For instance, President Trump and PM Johnson have

capitalized on discontent against globalization to push toward withdrawal and disintegration

(Schneiker 2020, DeLanglade 2020). Similarly, President Xi has seized domestic discontent to

purge rivals, consolidate power, and escalate on foreign fronts (Ruthven 2020, Bennett 2020).

Furthermore, these leaders exhibit impulsiveness—exemplified in terms of President Trump’s

controversial positions (Nai and Maier 2019), PM. Johnson’s push for Brexit (White 2019), and

President Xi’s escalatory decisions (Anderlini 2013). Finally, these three leaders exhibit defiance

of established political norms (Fitzduff 2017, Brown 2017, Pienaar 2019).

Research Design and Methodology

This dissertation explores the reorientation of foreign policy towards nationalism using a

multiple case study design. Case studies are generally characterized as detailed and in-depth

examinations of cases within contextual conditions (Gerring 2004). Usually, they report and

interpret a single measure on any pertinent variable (Eckstein 1975). In some cases, case studies

provide descriptive rather than explanatory accounts. In doing so, they avoid the deterministic

nature that is associated with causal inferences (Gerring 2004). In others, case studies provide

explanatory accounts and identify causal mechanisms of a specific phenomenon (Gerring 2004,

Mahoney 2000). Case studies are valued for providing extensive knowledge about the studied

cases (Gerring 2004, Polit and Beck 2010). They can also yield extensive knowledge about other

cases through comparison or generalization (Gerring 2004). In the context of this research,

multiple case study design helps develop extensive knowledge about the considered cases—

exploring continuity and change in their foreign policies. It also provides knowledge about the

domestic conditions that have contributed to the contemporary foreign policy reorientation

toward nationalism. This design also establishes knowledge through making comparisons across

the considered cases. Such a process yields knowledge about similarities and differences with

respect to foreign policy reorientation in such cases. At the same time, multiple case study design

helps develop a general theory about the reorientation of foreign policy. It makes a general

expectation that states are more likely to reorient their foreign policies when the specified

domestic conditions are present.

Under a multiple-case design, this dissertation employs the analytical method of

structured and focused comparison. Generally, the method is characterized in terms of asking

questions that reflect the objective of research about each of the studied cases (George and

Bennett 2004). It is structured to ask the same questions about the same aspects in all cases. It is

also focused on certain aspects of the examined cases (2004). The logic of the method lies in

making systemic and guided comparisons across the cases. Hence, it renders an analysis that is

based on standardized data collection and conclusions (2004). By asking the same questions, this

method makes cases more comparable and determines if the cases yield similar outcomes

(Kachuyevski 2014). Besides this, structured and focused comparison hinges on accumulating

findings along the asked questions. It provides useful generic knowledge about political

phenomena (George and Bennett 2004). It is also useful in formulating explanatory ideas that

help identify areas that require further research (Kachuyevski 2014). Combined, these functions

are critical for this research. On one hand, the method provides systemic and standardized

comparisons between the considered cases. It also provides extensive knowledge that does not

only address a single question about the contemporary foreign policy reorientation toward

nationalism. Instead, it responds to different questions that pertain to the systemic and domestic

factors in such a phenomenon.

Within the context of this research, the application of the multiple case designs and the

structured and focused comparison is focused on providing a domestic explanation of the

contemporary foreign policy reorientation toward nationalism. It also identifies the systemic

factors (political and economic shocks) and domestic factors (domestic pressures and activating

agents) that have contributed to such a reorientation. It develops a causal mechanism that

connects both sets of factors to the reorientation of foreign policy.

Time Frame

This dissertation advances that the reorientation of foreign policy from globalization

toward nationalism occurs in the span of thirty years from 1990 to 2020. Beginning in the 1990s,

the considered cases exhibited foreign policies that are associated with globalization. Such

policies manifested in terms of active involvement in international affairs, commitment to

multilateral engagement, and preference for cooperation over confrontation. In the post-2000s,

these states experienced systemic shocks including the attacks of 9/11 and others, the 2008

economic recession, the 2015 immigration crisis, and escalating regional conflicts and tensions.

In the post-2010s, these cases began to exhibit increasing domestic pressures that pushed toward

a reorientation of foreign policy. These cases also began to exhibit shifts within the governing

coalition or parties toward an anti-globalization direction. Combined, these conditions

culminated with the rise of national leaders who have initiated a reorientation of foreign policy

towards nationalism.

Figure 1: identifying the systemic shocks and when states begin to reorient foreign policy toward nationalism

Research Question

This dissertation asks: What explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign policy

from globalization toward nationalism?

Variables And Causal Logic

As noted in the theoretical argument, this dissertation explores the contemporary

reorientation of foreign policy from globalization to nationalism. It provides a domestic-based

explanation that highlights how such a reorientation is entrenched with the configurations of

domestic politics. This domestic explanation advances that the reorientation of foreign policy

occurs in three parts including systemic shocks, domestic pressures, and activating agents. The

Points of departures

Systemic shocks

first entails that considered cases were hit by systemic political and economic shocks that are tied

to globalization. Such shocks have then been perceived by the public and elites—hence

generating domestic pressures toward foreign policy change. However, both factors need an

activating agent that amplifies the effects of such shocks and capitalizes on domestic pressures.

At the same time, these activating agents would exhibit an orientation that aligns with and

reflects domestic pressures. These activating agents become the nationalist leaders who rise to

power within the context of the national reaction to systemic shocks and amid shifts within the

governing coalition or parties. These leaders amplify the costs of the systemic shocks and

consolidate their association with globalization. They also present alternative nationalist

proposals that constitute bases for the reorientation of foreign policy. Based on this, this

dissertation establishes a causal link between the three following variables:

- Independent variable: National leaders and their orientation.

- Contextual variables: Systemic shocks, domestic pressures, and shifts within governing

coalitions or parties.

- Dependent variable: Reorientation of foreign policy towards nationalism.

Figure 2: identifying the different variables and causal logic

As seen in the diagram, the systemic shocks (First contextual variable) have shocked the

international and national systems—driving both out of the post-Cold War equilibrium. Such a

condition occurs as these shocks inflict political and economic costs on these states. As these

shocks are perceived by the public and the elite, they generate domestic pressures toward change.

They are also accompanied by shifts in the direction within the governing coalition or parties

(Second and third contextual variables). The thick arrow that flows from the shocks to the

Systemic Shocks to the Post-Cold

War International Order (2008

Recession – Terrorism 9/11 – the

Tiananmen Square events, the

Arab Spring, and escalating

regional conflicts ..etc..)

Domestic Pressures: Perceived

domestic costs of globalization as

reflected in public and elite

opinion.

National leaders: These

leaders rise amid shifts within

the governing coalitions or

parties. They exhibit an

orientation that aligns with and

amplifies the domestic pressures.

Reorientation of foreign

policy towards nationalism:

National leaders translate the

effects of systemic shocks and

domestic pressures into

foreign policies.

domestic represents the relations between the different contextual variables. The systemic shocks

(First contextual variable), the domestic pressures (Second contextual variable), and the shifts

within the governing coalition or parties (Third contextual variable) provide the context for the

reorientation of foreign policy toward nationalism. The thin arrows between domestic pressures

and domestic pressures represent the alignment between these leaders’ orientation and such

pressures. They also represent the mobilization process where these leaders amplify the costs of

the systemic shocks and present alternative nationalist proposals that constitute bases for the

reorientation of foreign policy. Finally, the flow of causality links the nationalist leaders and

their orientations (Independent variable) to the reorientation of foreign policy towards

nationalism (Dependent variable). There is potential causality that flows (following the thin

arrow) from the systemic shocks directly to the nationalist leaders who then carry the

reorientation of foreign policy. However, this dissertation’s primary flow of causality goes

through domestic politics which becomes a prerequisite for this domestically driven foreign

policy reorientation.

Selection of cases

As noted earlier, this dissertation explains the contemporary reorientation of foreign

policy from globalization towards nationalism in three cases including the United States of

America under President Donald Trump (2016-2020), the United Kingdom under PM Boris

Johnson (2019-2022), and the People’s Republic of China under President Xi Jinping (2012-

present). The selection of these cases is based on the following reasons:

- First, these cases represent states with a different ranking of power—with the US and

China being global powers while the UK is a major power within Europe. Such selection

allows for examining the reorientation at global and regional levels as well as at different

parts of the world. Besides this, these cases have been key to furthering globalization and

integration—with the US establishing the post-Cold War order, China abandoning Mao’s

isolation and integrating into the international order, and the UK integrating into the EU.

Hence, a reorientation away from globalization from such key actors has been

unexpected and is significant.

- Second, these cases are selected to explore the reorientation in democratic systems (The

United States of America and The United Kingdom) and autocratic systems (The

People’s Republic of China). Current literature on regime type and foreign policy

assumes that different regimes exhibit different foreign policies. Hence, it would be

important if this reorientation towards nationalism is exhibited across political systems.

- Third, these cases are selected to explore the reorientation across different systems

including the presidential system in the U.S., the parliamentary in the UK, and the

Chinese single-party authoritarianism. While these cases may formulate foreign policy

differently, it would be important if they all exhibit a general reorientation towards

nationalism.

Analytical Questions

Using the structured and focused comparison, this dissertation develops four questions

that apply to all cases. These questions are expected to standardize the analysis and accumulate

the findings to represent the objective of research—namely explaining the reorientation of

foreign policy towards nationalism. Based on this, this dissertation asks the following questions:

- What are the expressions of foreign policy under globalization? This entails a review

of the foreign policies under globalization in each case including the policies of

international engagement, multilateralism, and cooperation.

- What are the indicators of the domestic-driven foreign policy reorientation toward

nationalism? This explores the systemic shocks experienced by each case and the

domestic pressures that include public and elite perceptions of such shocks and opinions

towards globalization.

- Who is the nationalist leader and what is his orientation? How have these leaders

risen to power and directed domestic politics toward a foreign policy reorientation?

This explores the changes within the governing factors that preceded the rise of the

nationalist leader. It also explores how these leaders align with and reflect domestic

pressure. It also explores how these leaders amplify the effect of the shocks and mobilize

the public toward a reorientation of foreign policy.

- What is the emerging foreign policy—i.e. nationalist foreign policy? This is how the

nationalist leaders initiated the reorientation of foreign policy toward nationalist and the

substantive nationalist expressions of the emerging foreign policy including limited

engagement, unilateralism, and conflict.

Expectations and outcomes

This dissertation expects the three cases to exhibit a similar reorientation of foreign

policy from globalization to nationalism. It is also expected that these cases exhibit a variation in

such reorientations—with democratic systems taking major steps such as the U.S. multiple

withdrawals and negotiations of multilateral arrangements and the UK disintegrating from the

EU. On the other hand, China is expected to exhibit less dramatic departures from the premises

of globalization. Besides this, these cases are expected to exhibit variation in terms of the aspects

of globalization they push against. For instance, the U.S. and the UK are expected to respond to

economic aspects such as free trade and multilateral agreements whereas China is expected to

respond to political aspects such as democracy and regional integration. Besides this, this

dissertation expects the following outcomes:

- This dissertation expects that the systemic shocks have inflicted political and economic

costs across the cases. Such costs are expected to have precipitated and increased over the

years—leading to the reorientation of foreign policy in the post-2010s.

- This dissertation expects that the elite and the public in these cases have become

increasingly critical of globalization in response to the systemic shocks. In the U.S. and

the UK, they are expected to have become critical of military interventions, reserved in

terms of issues that pertain to national security, economic integration, and free trade. In

China, the public and the elite are expected to have become opposed to democratization

and reserved about national security and economic integration.

- This dissertation expects the three national leaders to amplify the effects of the shocks

and capitalize on domestic pressures. These leaders are expected to align their beliefs and

positions with the public in a way that establishes a direct link between the public and

foreign policymaking. These leaders are also expected to mobilize the public toward a

reorientation of foreign policy.

Data and Sources

This dissertation relies on primary sources comprising books and scholarly articles. Such

sources provide data for the literature review on globalization and nationalism. It also relies on

books and scholarly articles that identify each component of the developed argument including

domestic approaches to foreign policy and sources on international crises, public and elite

opinion, and leadership orientation. Along with this, this dissertation relies on secondary sources

that include articles that offer accounts of the three cases and the three national leaders, and

report on the measures that constitute expressions of foreign policy. In the analysis, this

dissertation relies on sources that explore the public and elite opinion in each case including

direct quotes and speeches by prominent members of the political elites as well as surveys that

are carried out by prominent polling institutions such as Gallup Pew Research British Social

Attitudes (BSA), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and the Washington

Institute report the public opinions on globalization-related issues. This dissertation also relies on

formal speeches and statements by the three leaders to explore their beliefs and positions on

globalization-related issues. It also relies on books that are written by these leaders as well as

interviews with such leaders.

Chapter Three

The United States of America

This chapter explores the reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy from globalization to

nationalism. It begins an overview of the U.S. foreign policy which manifested, especially in the

post-Cold War era, in terms of commitment to collective security and multilateralism,

commitment to promoting democracy and human rights, and commitment to free trade and open

borders. It follows with exploring the effects of two systemic shocks including the 9/11 attacks

and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 as well as the

2008 financial crisis. This chapter explores how these shocks have contributed to domestic

pressure—exhibited in terms of shifts in the U.S. public and elites’ opinions. It follows with

exploring the shifts within the Republican party in response to the shocks including the rise of

the Tea Party, the Christian Right, and White Supremacists. Then, this chapter explores the rise

of President Donald Trump amid this climate of tension and opposition to globalization. It

follows with exploring how President Trump exhibited an orientation that aligns with and

reflects domestic pressures. He also amplified the effects of the shocks and mobilized the public

toward foreign policy reorientation. Finally, this chapter concludes with a review of the U.S.

foreign policy under nationalism—i.e. nationalist foreign policy. Such a policy manifested—in

the period between 2016 and 2020—in terms of withdrawal from multilateral arrangements,

military withdrawals and limited engagement, and the shift toward economic protectionism and

increasing anti-immigration hostility.

Globalization and American Foreign Policy

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States found itself in the position of global

leadership multiple times. The rise of the U.S. was associated with the end of world exploration

and the beginning of global management. Such a condition was also accompanied by the flow of

industrial and technological developments toward the U.S. (White 1989). Besides this, the rise of

the U.S. was also associated with the end of global conflicts including the two World Wars and

the Cold War. While the U.S. emerged as a dominant economic power after the First World War,

it emerged as a military and economic superpower after the Second World War. Wielding its

military and economic power, the U.S. established the international order and multilateral

institutions (Sargent 2015). Such a condition was facilitated by the absence of rivals—exhibited

in the decline of Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (White 1989). Eventually, the

rise of the U.S. began what became known as the “American century.”

Under such favorable conditions, the U.S. committed to political and economic

globalization—especially in the post-Cold War era. Under globalization, the U.S. foreign policy

manifested in terms of commitment to collective security and multilateralism. Such commitment

was built on the U.S. role in affirming the power of multilateral institutions such as the UN and

the UN Security Council. It was also built on affirming collective security—represented by

NATO as well as global military deployments (Kugler 2002, Sargent 2015). Besides this, the

U.S. foreign policy under globalization manifested in terms of the promotion of democracy and

human rights. It also manifested in terms of the U.S. commitment to free trade and liberalized

Also referred to as the “American century” or “Pax Americana”—replacing the Pax Britannica and ending the

interwar interregnum during which Britain had struggled to sustain its hegemony and Washington had disdained to

claim it (Sargent 2015)

policies on immigration—especially during the 1990s. Combined, these elements consolidated

the U.S. global power and defined its national interests in global rather than national terms. They

also reflected the U.S. commitment to interdependence, multilateralism, and cooperation (Kugler

2002, Sargent 2015).

Collective Security and Multilateral Commitments

A primary manifestation of the U.S. foreign policy under globalization pertained to the

U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism. Generally, collective security entails

arrangements that protect the security of a group of states (Macmillan 2015). The notion of

collective security emerged in response to the two World Wars. Seeking to avoid another world

war, the U.S. urged states to join in collective action (Hannigan 2002). The notion also emerged

from realizing the danger of appeasement in the Second World War. Hence, the US mobilized

states to defend against potential threats (Miller and Yetiv 2001). Besides this, the U.S. also

realized the need for collective action to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. Hence, the U.S.

rallied states to commit to peaceful settlement of disputes and collective defense. The U.S. also

rallied states to commit to the peaceful use of nuclear power (Spanier and Hook 1998).

Along with the two World Wars, the U.S. commitment to collective security and

multilateralism manifested in terms of establishing multilateral institutions

. Such institutions

were inspired by Wilsonian idealism and liberal internationalism which hinges on promoting

world peace, democracy, and human rights. It also supports collective security, open diplomacy,

and freedom of the seas. Based on such principles, the U.S. established the League of Nations in

Before the First World War, the early attempts to develop international security arrangements manifested in

terms of the Roosevelt Corollary—mapping the US spheres of influence regarding Europe (Mariano 2011). Other

attempts include the early forms of Anglo-American relationships in the 1900s (Hughes 1985)

1920 to set the basis for the post-war arrangements (Gourevitch 2000)

. Although the U.S. did

not join the League, it expressed its commitment to interstate cooperation (Mariano 2011). The

League of Nations was committed to peace, freedom of navigation, and trade. As characterized

by President Wilson:

“A general association of nations … [that maintains] … open covenants of peace…

absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas… the removal, so far as possible, of all

economic barriers…” (Miller Center N.d.).

After the Second World War, the U.S.—in a joint effort with the UK—established the United

Nations and the UN Security Council in 1946

. As in the case of the League of Nations, the

establishment of the UN represented the U.S. continued commitment to the principles of

Wilsonian idealism and liberal internationalism. It also emphasized the U.S. commitment to

collective security and advocacy for self-determination (Sargent 2015). The UN Security Council

was given the power to establish peacekeeping operations, enact sanctions, and authorize

military actions. Such power manifested as a collective response to potential threats and acts of

aggression. As established in the United Nations Charter:

“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,

breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide

what measures shall be taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security”

(United Nations. N.d.).

It was founded on 10 January 1920—with many of its divisions incorporated into the UN (Mariano 2011)

The formation of the UN was a product of a historical meeting between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at the

Yalta Conference in February 1945.

Besides establishing multilateral institutions, the U.S. commitment to collective security and

multilateral arrangements manifested in terms of military alliances and deployments. Generally,

these arrangements were part of establishing a balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet

Union. In this context, they were meant to contain Soviet influence and limit its power in

Europe. They were also meant to mobilize European states in defense of global and collective

security. Primarily, the U.S. military alliances and deployments manifested in terms of

establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Sargent 2015). NATO was meant to prevent

the Soviet Union from dominating Europe or attacking the U.S. It was also meant to safeguard

the rule of law and the protection of democracy and individual freedoms (2015). The

establishment of NATO represented a shift from containment toward confrontation with the

Soviet Union. Furthermore, it also represented the U.S. commitment to the use of force in

response to any attack on Europe. Under the North Atlantic Treaty, the U.S. and other members

consider an attack on one as an attack on all members (2015). As stated in Article Five:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or

North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they

agree that… each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense”

(NATO 1949)

Along with establishing NATO, the U.S. furthered its commitment to collective security

through global military deployments (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris 2008). Such deployments were

part of formal pacts that were established during the Cold War. For instance, the U.S. established

Part of the Atlantic Charter that was issued on 14 August 1941.

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954

. Comprising the U.S. and other

European and Asian countries, the SEATO was meant to prevent communism from gaining

ground and threatening internal stability in Asia. In 1955, the U.S. also established the Middle

East Treaty Organization (METO)—comprising the U.S., the UK, and Middle Eastern

countries

. As in the case of the SEATO, the METO was also meant to contain Soviet influence

in the region. It was also meant to form a line of strong states along the Soviet Union's

southwestern frontier. The U.S. global military deployments also covered regions in Europe and

Africa. They also included navy deployments in the seas including the Persian Gulf, the Indian

Ocean, and the Pacific Ocean. Combined, these deployments were meant to safeguard the U.S.

national and global interests. They also represented the U.S. commitments to critical regions and

its allies including Japan, Korea, and the Middle East.

Over the years, the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism contributed to

maintaining global order. During the Cold War, the U.S. along with NATO members utilized

such arrangements to balance against the Soviet Union. Prominent examples include proxy

conflicts between the two sides during the Vietnam War in 1949 and the Korean War in the

1950s. After the Cold War, the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism

facilitated Great power cooperation between the U.S., Russia, and China. The U.S. managed to

incorporate both states into the international order (Miller and Yetiv 2001). At the same time, the

U.S. managed to push for liberalization in both states and their surrounding regions. The U.S.

Also known as the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the Manila Pact, it was signed in September 1954

in Manila to ally with the U.S. France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan.

SEATO was dissolved on the 30th of June 1977.

The METO, also known as the Baghdad Pact, was signed on 24 February 1955 to ally with the U.S., the United

Kingdom, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. It was dissolved on the 16th of March 1979.

also furthered its commitment to NATO by providing financial contributions and military

equipment (2001).

Besides this, the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism helped resolve

several international security crises such as the Gulf War in 1990. It also played into mitigating

conflicts in cases such as Kosovo in 1999, Somalia in 1992, and Haiti in 1994. In the post-2000s,

the U.S. commitment to collective security and multilateralism was directed toward combating

terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks, NATO invoked Article Five to defend the U.S. and its allies

against terrorist organizations. Collectively, the U.S. and NATO members carried out military

operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The U.S. and NATO members also carried

out counterterrorism operations in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean, and Central

America. Aside from protecting U.S. national security, these operations were directed at

maintaining global stability. As Characterized by President George W. Bush:

“This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s

freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who

believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” (The White House 2001).

Democracy Promotion and Human Rights

A second manifestation of the U.S. foreign policy under globalization pertained to the

promotion of democracy and human rights. Along with establishing multilateral institutions, the

U.S. pushed for democratization and the adoption of universal human rights (Kugler 2002). Both

objectives were guided by the principles of Western democracy and Western liberalism (Hughes

1985). They were also part of the U.S. commitment to promoting political and cultural

globalization. The U.S. promotion of democracy hinged on an association between democracy

and global stability. Based on the premises of the Democratic Peace Theory, the U.S. believed

that the spread of democracy furthers global stability as democracies tend not to engage in

conflicts with each other (Meernik1996). The U.S. promotion of democracy also hinged on

associating democratization with economic growth. Economic reforms were assumed to further

political reforms and vice versa (Brinkley 1997). As characterized by President Bill Clinton:

“We seek to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions. For

our dream is of a day when the opinions and energies of every person … will be given full

expression, in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with each other and live in

peace” (The U.S. Department of State 1993).

Similarly, the U.S. protection and promotion of universal human rights hinged on an

association between universal values and global stability. Such a condition rested on holding

states accountable to the same standards that transcend cultures and political ideologies (Akkad

2012). It also hinged on claiming moral responsibility to deter aggression and protect its victims.

Under such a claim, the U.S. resorted to several means including military force to end violence

and maintain international stability (Tziampiris 2002). As characterized by President Clinton:

“Our objectives in Kosovo are clear and consistent with both the moral imperative of

reversing ethnic cleansing and killing and our overwhelming national interest in a

peaceful, undivided Europe” (Cottman 1999).

The origins of the U.S. promotion of democracy and human rights date back to the two

World Wars. It was also associated with the U.S. conflict with others power—beginning from

the fight against German militarism in the First World War, Nazi Germany in the Second World

War, and finally the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In the wake of the First World War, the

U.S. promoted the idea of universal values through President Roosevelt’s “four freedoms”. Such

freedoms include freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from

fear (Inazu 2012). Following the Second World War, the U.S. promotion of democracy and

human rights became more focused and institutionalized. Such a condition manifested in terms

of adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Sargent 2015). It also manifested in

terms of the Marshall Plan—extending economic aid to Western Europe. Aside from aiding

economic recovery, the plan hinged on pushing toward embracing democracy and human rights

(Fossedal 1993). During the Cold War, the promotion of democracy and human rights became

part of the U.S. conflict with the Soviet Union. Initially, the U.S. applied diplomatic pressure to

promote democracy and deter human rights violations. Examples include ending support of

regimes in Africa and Latin America in response to human rights violations (Kaufman 2008).

Under the Regan administration, the U.S. shifted towards forceful democratization—exhibited in

terms of aiding the insurgency in cases such as El Salvador, the Philippines, and South Korea

(Pach 2006).

In the post-Cold War era, the promotion of democracy and human rights became part of the

U.S. fight against religious extremism. It was also part of the U.S. commitment to prevent

aggression and end humanitarian crises. The U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights

was based on a domestic bipartisan consensus. The Republicans and the Democrats support the

U.S. active promotion of both objectives across the world (Muravchik 1993). Furthermore, the

U.S. claimed the right to use force in support of such objectives (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris

2008). In practice, the U.S. promotion of democracy and human rights manifested in terms of

military interventions and support of pro-democracy factions. For instance, the U.S. intervened

in several Latin American countries including Haiti in 1994, Venezuela in 2002, and Honduras in

2009. The U.S. also carried out humanitarian interventions in Kosovo in 1999, Somalia in 1992,

and Haiti in 1994. In the post 9/11 attacks, the U.S. interventions shifted towards the Middle East

including the military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003

. As for support for

democracy, the U.S. launched several initiatives that support pro-democracy factions (Carothers

1995). As noted earlier, such initiatives manifested in terms of economic liberalization in Eastern

Europe and Latin America. Beyond this, the U.S. democracy initiatives included the Middle East

Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002 and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative

(BMENA) in 2004. Along with the “Arab Spring” and “Color Revolutions,” the U.S. expressed

support for the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and others. The U.S. also pressured the new

regimes toward economic liberalization and the establishment of civil society (Kimball 2010).

Commitment to Free Trade and Open Borders

A third manifestation of the U.S. foreign policy under globalization pertained to the

commitment to free trade and open borders. The U.S. believed both objectives to be key to

global peace and development. Concerning free trade, the U.S. commitment to free trade began

with establishing international economic institutions

. Following the Second World War, the

U.S. established several institutions including the International Monetary Fund which ties the

global economic system to the U.S. Dollar. The U.S. also established the World Bank which

finances development projects across the globe. At the same time, the U.S. supported efforts to

The US had refrained from pushing for democratization in the Middle East based on concerns that such a process

may allow the rise of radical factions (Carothers 1994). However, the U.S. shifted its position in the wake of 9/11 to

prevent radicalization and terrorism and maintain global stability (Dalacoura 2001).

Known as the Bretton Woods System, these institutions emerged after the Second World War as a result of a

historical meeting between the Allied nations in July 1944 which agreed on establishing an interdependent

economic system.

rebuild Germany after the destruction that accompanied the Second World War. At the Potsdam

Conference in 1945, the U.S. and its allies began a program to reconstruct Germany and

eliminate the influence of Nazism

. Similarly, the U.S. and its allies extended financial support

to Western Europe—exhibited in terms of the Marshall Plan. Aside from rebuilding and

development, the plan was also meant to balance against the influence of the Soviet Union.

Along with these efforts, the U.S. also committed to promoting international trade as in the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Such an agreement represented the U.S.

commitment to reducing trade barriers and contributing to global growth. As established in the

GATT, economic relations:

“Should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full

employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective

demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the

production and exchange of goods” (WTO 1947).

In the 1990s, the U.S. expanded the international economic system by establishing the World

Trade Organization

. The WTO facilitated the integration of Russia and China into the

international order. It also aimed at helping developing countries to build and expand their trade

capacity (Dumbrell 2002). Besides this, the WTO provided a platform for its members to

negotiate trade agreements and resolve trade disputes. It also aimed at facilitating the flow of

ideas and goods across the globe. As characterized by President Bill Clinton:

The Potsdam conference was held at Potsdam in the Soviet occupation zone from July 17 to August 2, 1945, to

set the postwar arrangements and the rebuilding of Germany.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on 1 January 1995 to regulate and facilitate an agreement

that replaces the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

“We must build … a modern WTO ready for the 21st Century… Redoubling our

efforts to tear down barriers to trade will spur growth in all our countries. It will create

good jobs and boost incomes… And it will advance the free flow of ideas, information,

and people that are the lifeblood of democracy and prosperity” (WTO 1998).

Under the post-Cold War economic system, the U.S. commitment to free trade manifested in

terms of establishing intergovernmental organizations and outsourcing national industries.

Examples of such efforts include the establishment of the G7 in 1975 which represents the

world's largest IMF advanced economies and liberal democracies. The G7 has facilitated trade

and economic cooperation among the world's major industrialized countries including the U.S.,

the UK, the EU, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Another example is the

establishment of the G20 in 1999 which comprised the world's largest economies including

industrialized as well as developing nations. It has also addressed issues that relate to

international financial stability and sustainable development. Along with establishing

intergovernmental organizations, the U.S. allowed its companies to search for outside resources

and conduct operations that are traditionally within national boundaries (Mullin 1990). The U.S.

also allowed its companies to move across national borders—mainly to China and other

developing countries. Such efforts aimed at faster access to goods and services and lower costs

of production (Chang 2012). At the same time, the U.S. signed major multilateral trade

agreements such as NAFTA which was meant to facilitate trade and economic cooperation

between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. In 2004, the U.S. also signed CAFTA which promotes

trade between the U.S. and Central American countries

. Aside from facilitating trade, both

agreements provided the basis for international law and common commercial policies (Weiler et

al. 2000). In the post-2000s, the U.S. signed more than 14 multilateral and bilateral trade

agreements with twenty countries across the globe (International Trade Agreements N.d.). A

prominent example is the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement or the TPP which facilitated trade

between the U.S. and other countries in Asia and the Americas (The White House 2016).

Along with the commitment to free trade, the U.S. also committed to open borders—

exhibited in terms of immigration. Amid global conflicts, immigrants found the US more stable

than countries of their origin. Besides this, the US became a destination for multiculturalism and

economic growth (Takaki 1993). Before the 1990s, the U.S. immigration policies were largely

shaped by the Cold War—with the U.S. allowing migrants from Communist countries. At the

same time, the U.S. also facilitated immigration from Asia and Latin America. Exhibited in the

Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1965, the U.S. abolished the national-origin quotas that

favored those from northern and Western Europe

. Instead, immigration began to flow from

other parts such as Asia and Latin America. In fact, the 1965 Act began an era of increasing the

immigrant share of the U.S. population that continued through the next decades. In the 1990s, the

U.S. adopted a more liberal policy toward immigration. Exhibited in the Immigration Act of

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed on the 17th of December 1992 and was enforced

on the 1st of January 1994 to create a trilateral trade bloc in North America. On the other hand, the Dominican

Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) was signed on the 5th of August 2004 to promote

trade between the U.S. and Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and

Nicaragua. It was renamed CAFTA-DR after the Dominican Republic joined the agreement.

Also known as the Hart–Celler Act, the act was signed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to remove the National

Origins Formula which discriminated against non-European immigrants. It also created a seven-category

preference system that gives priority to relatives and children of U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents,

professionals, and refugees.

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1990, the U.S. introduced several types of immigration visas family-based immigration visas and

employment-based visas. It also aimed at increasing immigration to 700,000 per year for the

fiscal years 1992–94, and 675,000 per year after that

. As characterized by President George H.

Bush:

“Immigration reform began in 1986 with an effort to close the "back door" on illegal

immigration through the enactment of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act

(IRCA). Now, as we open the "front door" to increased legal immigration, I am pleased

that this Act also provides needed enforcement authority” (George H. Bush Library 1990)

The U.S. followed the 1990s Act with programs that address illegal and undocumented

immigrants. Examples include amnesty acts such as the Development, Relief, and Education for

Alien Minors (DREAM) Act which was introduced in 2001 to provide a pathway to legal status

for undocumented people who came to this country as children. Another example is the Deferred

Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was introduced in 2012 to allow individuals who were

brought to the US as children to receive deferred action from deportation and become eligible for

an employment permit. Both programs represented a continuation of the U.S. liberalized

immigration policies. Despite rising public concerns, the U.S. continued a tradition of

accommodating large flows of immigrants (Issitt 2018). As affirmed by President Obama:

“Our tradition of welcoming immigrants from around the world has given us a

tremendous advantage over other nations. It’s kept us youthful, dynamic, and

entrepreneurial” (The White House 2014).

It was a national reform of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965—signed into law by President Bush on

November 29, 1990. The effect of the act was short-lived as the 1995 IIRIRA Act established more restrictions.

Similarly, the US laws before the 1990s have been mostly restrictive such as the Immigration Act of 1882 and the

Immigration Act of 1924

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Systemic Shocks and the Costs of Globalization

In the post-2000s, the U.S. experienced systemic shocks that shocked that included the

9/11 terrorist attacks, the subsequent military interventions, and the 2008 financial crises. As

established in the theory chapter, these shocks represent the first factor that explains the

reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy toward nationalism. Such an effect arises from the

alleged link between these shocks and the U.S. commitment to the post Cold War order and the

premises of globalization. While the 9/11 attacks delivered a blow to the U.S. commitment to

global integration and open borders, the subsequent military interventions became linked with

the U.S. commitment to collective deterrence and the promotion of democracy. On the other

hand, the 2008 financial crisis became linked to the U.S. commitment to free trade and global

economic interdependence. Combined, these shocks inflicted significant political and economic

costs on the U.S. national system. They were perceived by the public and elites as costs of

globalization and global integration. At the same time, they were also amplified by President

Trump to push toward a foreign policy reorientation. In this context, these shocks provided the

context for the reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy toward nationalism.

The 9/11 Attacks and Subsequent Military Operations

On the 9th of September 2001, the U.S. was shocked by a series of coordinated terrorist

attacks. The attacks involved hijacking four commercial planes, targeting the World Trade

Center and the Pentagon. The 9/11 attacks were not the first terrorist attacks against the US

However, they are considered the largest and deadliest attacks—causing mass causalities and

According to the Global Terrorism Database GTD), the number of terrorist attacks in the US between the 1990s

and the post-2000s amount to 3004 attacks, carried out by different propagators within as well as outside the US.

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lasting global effects. For hours, the American public watched the fallout of the attacks on live

TV—especially the collapse of the Twin Towers. As for the costs, the human cost of the attacks

amounts to 2977 deaths and more than 6000 injuries. Besides this, the immediate physical

damage cost the U.S. $60 billion (Roberts 2009)

. Beyond immediate costs, the attacks

expanded the U.S. security apparatus—exemplified by the establishment of the Department of

Homeland Security and the introduction of strict measures on Air transportation and immigration

(Time 2021). Such measures entailed constraints on free movements and civil rights. They also

impacted immigration processes such as visa attainment (2021). In the social sphere, the scenes

of the collapse of the Twin Towers shocked the American public. Such a shock was maximized

by the fact that the attacks were the first large-scale attacks since Pearl Harbor. The attacks also

created a general state of anxiety and fear—with Americans avoiding airline transportation,

skyscrapers, and crowded places (Galston 2021). They also exacerbated psychological conditions

that relate to PTSD, suicide, and deliberate self-harm (Mountclare University 2021).

Furthermore, the attacks stirred up domestic violence and xenophobic sentiments against

Muslims. According to an FBI report, the number of hate crimes against Muslims jumped from

28 incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001 (Mountclare University 2021). Such anti-Muslim actions

were also carried out by governmental agencies—with a total of 1000 Muslims being profiled

and detained in the months following the attacks (Time 2021).

Part of the effects of the attacks manifested in terms of the war on terror—exemplified in

the U.S. operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Although achieving their immediate

The attacks have also inflicted costs on the US economy including a 0.5% decline in the U.S. GDP and a 7.1% fall

in the stock market (Roberts 2009). The attacks have also a total of 598 thousand people their jobs (Roberts 2009).

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objectives, both operations were among the deadliest U.S. interventions. According to a report

published by Icasualties.org, the war in Iraq killed over 4,586 U.S. soldiers and wounded 32455

others. As for Afghanistan, the number of casualties amounts to 2465 deaths and 20662 injuries

(Icasualties.org 2022). Politically, both operations became linked to the Republican party’s loss

of election in 2008 (Condon 2013). They also resulted in a shift towards limiting executive

power over military operations (Time 2021). Furthermore, both operations resulted in domestic

discontent over military interventions and the promotion of democracy (LaFranchi 2011, Miller

2020, Shortridge 2021). They also fueled international resentment against the U.S. and have

negatively affected the reputation of the U.S. military (E-International Relations 2011).

Economically, both operations became linked to a $42.1 billion drop in the U.S. GDP (Institute

for Economics and Peace 2015)

. They also induced a significant increase in the US debt—

especially in the later years of both wars.

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Besides this, both operations cost the U.S. $2.4

trillion—averaging out to $7,973 per citizen (Teslik 2008)

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. Such costs add up to

reconstruction and training which amounted to $88 billion in Iraq and more than $100 billion in

Afghanistan (CNBC 2018, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 2021).

The 2008 Financial Crisis

In 2008, the U.S. was shocked again by the most serious financial crisis since the Great

Depression (Wharton 2018). Known as the 2008 global recession, the crisis resulted from the

Initially, the operations had a positive impact on the U.S. GDP—increasing spending and creating jobs (Baker

2007). Besides this, the borrowing associated with both operations has created an economic boom (Farrell 2015)

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Unlike the case of previous wars such as the Gulf War, the US bears most of the costs of both operations (Tyler

and Stevenson 2002). The Bush administration resorted to borrowing to avoid domestic political costs and

maintain public support for the war (Institute for Economics and Peace. 2015).

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Other reports and studies cast such estimates as conservative and are not inclusive of all types of costs. After

accounting for such costs, the estimated cost of the operations in Iraq amounts to $3 trillion (Stiglitz 2008) while

the estimated costs for the operation in Afghanistan amount to $2.3 trillion (Watson Institute 2022)

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burst of the housing bubble and the subsequent fall in U.S. home prices. Such conditions

manifested in terms of mortgage delinquencies and devaluation of housing-related securities. It

also manifested in terms of a series of bankruptcies of major banks and businesses (2018)

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Politically, the crisis contributed to the Republican Party’s loss in the 2008 election (Bartels

2013). More importantly, the crisis resulted in domestic discontent against the government

bailout of major banks and businesses. Such discontent manifested in terms of a decline in

approval for the Congress actions—recording historical lows at 25%. (Deaton 2012). It also

materialized in the formation of the Tea Party which calls for fiscal conservativism and pushed

against free trade and economic interdependence (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Along with

this, the 2008 crisis ended the era of self-regulation in the U.S. and led to more governmental

supervision over the banking system. (Federal History Reserve. 2007). In the wake of the crisis,

banks and financial institutions resorted to tightening credit standards including higher down

payments, higher credit-score requirements, low debt-to-income ratio, and lower levels of risk-

taking. Combined, these measures significantly impacted the ability of Americans to get loans

and manage their finances (Wharton 2018).

Economically, the crisis resulted in a decline in economic growth and a collapse in the

stock market. In one year, the U.S. GDP fell by 4.3 % —marking the deepest and longest

recession since the Second World War (Federal History Reserve 2007)

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. The crisis created a

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The vulnerability of the US economy has been attributed to the 1980s wave of deregulation—relaxing

conditions on housing-related loans (Marie 2021). It has also been associated with the fragility of the banking

system in the US caused by weak supervision and excessive risk-taking (Bernanke 2018).

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According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), such a decline, measured by the differences between

forecast and actual economic performance between 2008 and 2009, is estimated at a $648 billion loss (2007).

Here, the crisis created a permanent gap between forecast and potential estimates (Center of Budget and Policy

Priorities 2019).

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permanent gap between forecasts and actual economic performance (Center of Budget and

Policy Priorities 2019). As for the stock market, the crisis resulted in a 40% drop in the S&P 500

Index from its all-time high in 2007 (Deaton 2012). Along with these costs, the crisis also caused

several banks and corporates to file for bankruptcy including Lehman Brothers, Washington

Mutual, General Motors, Chrysler, and others. While some were bailed out by the government or

acquired by other companies, others collapsed and sold their assets (Merle 2018). Besides this,

the crisis also resulted in a decline in growth and activity in several sectors including

construction and manufacturing—especially in the housing industry (Merle 2018, Bls Spotlight

on Statistics 2012). Finally, the crisis inflicted costs on individuals and households across the

U.S. For instance, the collapse of the housing market cost millions their homes while leaving 4.4

million homeowners underwater on their mortgages (Merle 2018). Besides this, the crisis also

cost every American a loss of about $70,000 loss in lifetime income (Merle 2018). Furthermore,

the crisis caused the loss of 8.7 million jobs between December 2007 and early 2010 (Deaton

2012). It also caused a decline in living standards for most Americans across different ages and

ethnic groups (2012).

Domestic Pressures

Over the years, the shocks contributed to the buildup of domestic pressures and a

pushback against the U.S. commitment to the post Cold War order and the premises of

globalization. As established in the theory chapter, domestic pressures represent the second

factor that explains the reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy toward nationalism. Such pressure

arises in response to the costs of systemic shocks. It also manifests in terms of increasing public

and elite hostility and opposition toward globalization. In the U.S., the American public and

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elites began to associate the systemic shocks with globalization. These shocks became perceived

as costs of the U.S. commitment to collective security, the promotion of democracy and human

rights, and the promotion of free trade and open borders. As noted earlier, the 9/11 attacks

became linked to the U.S. commitment to open borders and global integration. Free movement of

people, information, and capital facilitated the recruitment and finance of terror activities

(Murphy 2002). Terrorist attacks were also linked to global disparities and resistance to the

imposition of Western values on non-western societies (Stapley 2006, Nassar 2010). Similarly,

the costs of the subsequent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were also linked to the

U.S. commitment to collective security and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

These commitments entangled the U.S. in costly overseas conflicts and contributed to the revival

of transnational terrorism (Hendrickson and Tucker 2005, Cordesman 2020). Finally, the 2008

financial crisis was linked to economic interdependence which had been accompanied by

excessive deregulation (Bernanke 2018). The crisis became also linked to fragile investments

and over-dependence on imports and exports (Zhang 2009, Hindmoor and McConnell 2015).

Based on these associations, the American public and elites became increasingly critical

of globalization. In particular, the public and elite discontent was directed toward issues that

pertain to national security, economic interdependence, and immigration. Consequently, this

discontent manifested in terms of pressure toward foreign policy reorientation. At the same time,

such pressure provided support and justification for President Trump to initiate such a

reorientation.

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Public Opinion

In the wake of the systemic shocks, the American public became increasingly critical of

globalization. Such positions emerged as a mass rather than an elite-based phenomenon.

Examples include the 1990s WTO protests and the labor unions’ push against economic

globalization (Della Porta et al. 2015). In the post-2000s, the American public expressed positive

views about globalization—with the majority of Americans (64%) believing, in 2004, that

globalization was good for the U.S. A similar majority (65%) still expressed positive views of

globalization in the lead to the 2016 election.

Figure 3: The American public views on globalization from 1990 to 2016 (Source Younis 2021)

However, the public support of globalization became marked by changes over time and

differences regarding different aspects of globalization

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. For instance, high trends of public

104

Also, the public support for globalization is conditioned by party affiliation. A high level of support for

globalization is associated with Democrats rather than Republicans and independents. According to a 2010 poll by

the Chicago Council, only 52% of Republicans support globalization while Democrats support remains at 66%

(Smeltz et al. 2016).

1990 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR

GLOBALIZATION

Overall public support for globalization

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support were exhibited between the 1990s and 2006. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the

overall public support for globalization dropped from 60% early in 2008 to around 55% in 2010.

Although recovering in the following years, the level of American support for globalization

remained within the highs of the early 2000s (Smeltz et al. 2016). Along with this, the American

public support for globalization became limited to specific aspects rather than supporting the

general process. In other words, Americans have begun to condition their support for

globalization by whom they trade with rather than the principle of free trade with all. For

instance, the American public became selective when it came to free trade with a competitor

such as China. Here, the majority of Americans view trade with China as determinantal to the

U.S. security and economy (Smeltz et al. 2021). Furthermore, the American public became

divided on the nature of the U.S. involvement in the globalized order. In 2019, only 26% of

Americans preferred military-based involvement in international affairs. On the other hand, the

majority of Americans (73%) preferred diplomacy and limited engagement (Pew Research

Center 2019). Such views marked a dramatic change from the 1990s views that backed the U.S.

active and assertive role in maintaining global stability and the rule of law (Gallup 2001).

Along with general views, the shocks made the American public more reserved in terms

of national security. Such views emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and subsequent military

operations. According to a 2002 Gallup poll, 47% of Americans regarded terrorism as the most

important problem facing the nation. In another poll, 34% of Americans believed, according to a

2013 poll by Pew Research, that terrorists can still launch attacks like 9/11 (Desilver 2014).

Besides this, the majority of Americans reported that the attacks have changed their lives

permanently (Pew Research Center 2016, Jones 2021). In response to the military operations in

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Iraq and Afghanistan, the American public initially expressed support for both operations.

According to a Washington Post/ABC poll conducted after the 9/11 attacks, 93% of Americans

expressed support for military action against the perpetrators (Shortridge 2021). Furthermore, the

American public accepted that the war on terrorism is likely to be a long one (Pobst 2002, Smith

and Lindsay 2003). However, the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have gradually

pushed the American public towards opposition to what became known as “never-ending wars.”

According to a Gallup poll, the percentage of Americans who view the war in Afghanistan as a

mistake increased from only 9% in 2001 to 48% in 2014. Such an increase marks a significant

change in the positive and supportive attitudes that surged at 89% in the wake of the 9/11 attacks

(Brenan 2021).

Figure 4: The American public views on the war in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016 (Source: Gallup 2021)

Similarly, the American public became increasingly negative about the U.S. war in Iraq.

According to a 2019 Gallup poll, only 39% of the American public thought that the war in Iraq

2001 2002 2004 2008 2012 2014 2016

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC VIEWS ON THE WAR

IN AFGHANSTAN

Percentage of Americans who view the Iraq War as a mistake

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had made the U.S. safer. Such a percentage marks a significant change from 51% who had

thought that the Iraq war made the U.S. in the early months of the invasion (Gallup 2019).

Furthermore, only one-third of Americans thought that the war in Iraq was still worth fighting in

2020 (Smeltz and Kafura 2020).

Figure 5: The American public views on the war in Iraq from 2003 to 2019 (Source: Gallup 2019)

Beyond the negative attitudes towards both wars, the American public became supportive

of military withdrawals from both operations. According to a poll conducted by Washington

Post-ABC News 2011, the majority of Americans (78%) expressed support for the decision to

withdraw troops from Iraq (Craighill 2011). Another poll by CBS News in 2010 found that

(58%) of Americans wanted the U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan within one or two

years. Only 2% of Americans thought the U.S. troops should stay for more years (CBS News

2010). Furthermore, the American public also became generally averse to military interventions.

In a poll by J. Wallin Opinion Research in 2018, more than 86% of Americans stated that the

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2019

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC VIEWS ON THE WAR

IN IRAQ

Percentage of Americans who think the Iraq war has made the U.S. safer

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American military should be used as a last resort. In fact, the majority of Americans began to

support congressional oversight over the use of military force (Carden 2018).

Along with national security, the American public also became more reserved towards

immigration. According to polls conducted by Gallup since the 1990s, the majority of

Americans—as high as 58% in 2002—expressed support for a reduction in immigration. In the

following years, the potions of Americans demanding a reduction in immigration did not go

below 35% (Gallup. N.d). Notably, this demand for a reduction in immigration spiked along with

the shocks including the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, the percentage

of Americans who demanded a reduction jumped from 38% in 2000 to 58% in 2002—one year

after the attacks. Similarly, the percentage of Americans who demanded a reduction also jumped

to 45% in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis (N.d).

Figure 6: The American public views on immigration from 2000 to 2016 (Source: Gallup N.d.)

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC VIEWS ON

IMMIGRATION

Percentage of Americans who think that immigartion should be decreased

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Along with this, the American public also began to exhibit anti-immigration and

Islamophobic sentiments. According to a 2011 poll, the majority of Americans (61%) expressed

unfavorable views of Muslims (Telhami 2015). In 2017, other polls reported that one-quarter of

U.S. adults (25%) think half or more of Muslims in the U.S. are “anti-American.” Furthermore,

many Americans view Islam as a religion that encourages violence (Pew Research Center 2017).

In response to the 2008 crisis, anti-immigrant attitudes shifted toward immigration of European

and Latin origin. Such a condition occurred as these attitudes formed based on economic

reasons—especially among those who felt financially threatened (Ybarra et al. 2016). According

to a national survey during and post the crisis, anti-immigration sentiments toward immigrants of

European and Latin origin increased by 6.36 points and 4.48 points increase respectively. The

public also followed the crisis with support to anti-immigration and punitive policies (2016).

Finally, the American public also became more reserved toward economic

interdependence and free trade—mainly in response to the 2008 crisis. Early in the 1990s, the

American public expressed positive views toward foreign trade. In a Gallup poll between the

years between 1992 and 2016, the percentage of Americans who view foreign trade positively

remained above 40%. However, such support dropped to low points along with the 9/11 attacks

and the 2008 financial crisis. Although it recovered along with the economic recovery from the

2008 financial crisis, such support remained within the range of previous levels (Younis 2021).

In fact, the American public shifted from 44% saying in the 1990s that free trade was good for

the U.S. to the same percentage saying it was bad in 2010 (Rosentiel 2010).

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Figure 7: The American public views on foreign trade from 1992 to 2016 (Source: Gallup 2021)

The American public also expressed initial support for multilateral trade agreements such

as NAFA. In 1999, 44% of Americans thought that NAFTA was good for the U.S. (Polling

Report. N.d.). A higher percentage of Americans 46% reported in 2005 that NAFTA could be a

good agreement (Aguila 2012). However, the public support for these agreements began to drop

in the wake of the 2008 crisis. According to several Pew polls conducted between 2006 and

2010, 45% of Americans stated that free trade agreements made wages lower for U.S. workers

while 43% said they slowed the economy (Rosentiel 2010). Another poll by CBS News reported

that 48% of Americans think that NAFTA is bad for the U.S. economy (Polling Report. N.d.).

Furthermore, the American public also became supportive of economic protectionism. As noted

earlier, the American public became selective when it came to free trade with a competitor such

as China. In 2021, the majority of Americans regarded trade with China as determinantal to the

U.S. security and economy (Smeltz et al. 2021). The majority of Americans (65%) also began to

express support for restrictions on foreign goods to protect American jobs (2021).

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC VIEWS ON FORIEGN

TRADE

Percentage of Americans who think foreign trade represent an opportunity of economic

growth

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Elite Opinion

Along with the public, the systemic shocks pushed the U.S. political elites toward more

reserved positions on globalization. Such positions added momentum to the public discontent

with foreign policies under globalization (Walter 2021). Besides this, the elites’ pressure,

although defined by partisan division, morphed into a consensus on the need for foreign policy

change

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. Initially, the U.S. elites—represented by prominent Republicans and Democrats—had

expressed support for globalization and the premises of the post-Cold War order. For instance,

President George H. Bush linked interdependence to peace and stability. In an address to

Congress in 1990, he noted that the world “enters a new world order … freer from the threat of

terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace” (George H. Bush

Library 1990). Similarly, President Clinton expressed the U.S. commitment to economic

interdependence and the promotion of democracy. In a speech at the World Economic Forum in

1995, he noted that “democracy and free markets can give all people the opportunity to live out

their dreams” (Govinfo 1995). However, leaders from both parties began to shift positions in the

wake of the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, President Clinton noted in

2001 that globalization is accompanied by “terrorism, organized crime and narcotrafficking, the

spread of deadly weapons and disease” (The White House 2001). Along the same lines, President

George W. Bush also acknowledged an association between global interdependence and

terrorism—noting that terrorists “view the entire world as a battlefield” (The White House 2002).

President Barack Obama also followed with a reference to economic and social challenges. In

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Both parties have begun as averse to globalization and international involvement. The Republican party has

historically tended to identify as isolationist and protectionist. Although less intensive than Republicans, the

democratic party has also preferred a less active role for the US (Patterson and Darilek 1967). In the 1990s, leaders

from both parties have become supportive of globalization (Golombek 2018).

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2008, he noted that “jobs and industries can move to any country … [and U.S. kids] grow up

facing competition… from kids in Beijing and Bangalore” (YouTube. 2008). Other prominent

members from both parties have voiced similar reservations on different aspects of globalization.

For instance, Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney associated globalization with the

outsourcing of jobs and businesses. In 2011, he noted that “the source of that high quality

[Chinese products] is American innovations stolen by Chinese companies” (The Washington

Post 2011). Similarly, Democratic presidential candidate Hilary Clinton acknowledged the

problems of globalization—noting that “I think we haven’t organized ourselves for the twenty-

first-century globalization” (Packer 2016).

Along with general views, the U.S. elites became more reserved in terms of national

security and military intervention. As in the case of the public, the U.S. elites had traditionally

supported the general principle of intervention. For instance, President George H. Bush

characterized the U.S. intervention in the 1990s Gulf War as a moral obligation—noting that

“We have before us the opportunity to forge a new world order … where the rule of law, not the

law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.” (The History Place 1990). Following the 9/11

attacks, prominent leaders from both parties continued similar support. For instance, President

Bush characterized terrorism as a major threat to the U.S. political and social systems. After the

9/11 attacks, he stated that “Terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way

of life” (The White House 2001). President Bush also characterized the U.S. intervention against

terrorism as preemptive and preventive of future attacks. In 2003, he stated “We are now acting

because the risks of inaction would be far greater” (The New York Times 2003). However,

prominent leaders and members from both parties became more reserved about military

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interventions. Such a shift occurred along with the increasing costs in Iraq and Afghanistan. For

instance, President, President Obama expressed in 2011 his support for the withdrawal from

Iraq—vowing “to bring the war … to a responsible end for the sake of our national security and

to strengthen American leadership around the world” (The White House 2011). President Obama

also refrained from deploying troops in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2013. He justified “We

cannot resolve someone else’s civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq

and Afghanistan” (The White House 2013a). Along the same lines, Republican presidential

candidate John McCain noted in 2018 that the Iraq War “can’t be judged as anything other than a

mistake” (Hirsh 2018). Similarly, Democratic presidential candidate Hilary Clinton noted “I

thought I had acted in good faith [on Iraq] …but I still got it wrong. Plain and simple” (On the

Issues. N.d.).

Along with national security, the U.S. elites became increasingly reserved towards

immigration. Such views were prompted by the shocks of the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial

crisis. Traditionally, U.S. presidents have emphasized the role of law in dealing with

immigration. On different occasions, President Bush as well as President Obama stated, “We are

a nation of immigrants, we are also a nation of laws” (The New York Times 2006, The White

House 2014). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, prominent leaders from both parties became more

supportive of measures to curb illegal immigration. For instance, President Bush proposed

measures to strengthen border security. In his SOTU in 2008, he stated “America needs to secure

our borders. We're increasing worksite enforcement, deploying fences and advanced

technologies to stop illegal crossings.” (The White House 2007). Similarly, President Obama

expressed in 2011 his support for stricter measures such as border fences—declaring that “the

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border fence is now basically complete” (Politifact 2011). Along the same lines, Republican

presidential candidate Mitt Romney expressed opposition to amnesty programs—noting that

such programs “encourage more people to come here illegally” (NPR. 2012) Democratic

presidential candidate Hillary Clinton followed by expressing support for deporting

unaccompanied children at the border. In a 2014 interview, she noted “We don't want to …

encourage more children to make that dangerous journey” (Price 2017).

Finally, the U.S. elites also became more reserved about economic interdependence and

free trade. In the 1990s and the early 2000s, prominent leaders from both parties expressed

support for free trade and multilateral agreements. For instance, President Bill Clinton also

expressed support for NAFTA for creating “the world’s largest trade zone and create[ing]

200,000 jobs” (The American Yawp Reader 1993). Similarly, President Bush expressed support

for CAFTA—noting that “CAFTA is a signal of the U.S. commitment to democracy and

prosperity for our neighbors” (The White House 2005). After the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S.

elites began to push toward more constraints on trade. In 2008, President Obama linked to crisis

to the lack of regulation over Wall Street—noting that pre-crisis regulations had favored “Wall

Street over Main Street.” (The New York Times 2008). Echoing the public discontent, President

Obama had also proposed renegotiating NAFTA to include labor and environmental protections

(On the Issues N.d.). Similarly, Secretary Clinton opposed the deal, noting in her campaign in

2008, that “NAFTA did not do what many had hoped. NAFTA was a mistake” (Phillips 2018).

On the Republican side, presidential candidate Ron Paul expressed in 2011 opposition to free

trade agreements—noting that they represent “managed” rather than free trade (James 2011).

Presidential candidate Mitt Romney followed with support for protectionist measures on trade

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with China. In the Republican debate in 2011, he noted that China has “to play by the rules”

(Romney 2011).

The Rise of Nationalist Leadership and its Orientation

The systemic shocks along with domestic pressures have created the context within

which occurred the rise of nationalist leadership. As established in the theory chapter, the rise of

such leadership constitutes the key independent variable that explains the reorientation of foreign

policy toward nationalism. It occurs in the context of the national reaction to the systemic shocks

and their costs. It is also facilitated and accompanied by shifts within the governing coalition or

parties—exhibiting the rise of anti-globalization factions. The effect of such leadership lies in the

alignment that emerged between these leaders' orientation and public and elite pressures against

globalization. It is also strengthened by how these leaders amplified the effects of the shocks and

linked them to globalization. In the case of the U.S., the rise of President Trump was preceded by

the shocks that have inflicted political and economic costs on the U.S. It was also preceded by an

increase in domestic pressures that push against globalization in terms of national security,

military interventions, and free trade and economic integration. As noted earlier, the American

public and elites have become increasingly critical of globalization and its premises. Along with

this, the rise of President Trump occurred amid shifts within the Republican Party

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Traditionally, the Republican party had been supportive of globalization including the U.S.

commitment to collective security and multilateralism, military interventions, and free trade.

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Generally, the Republican party is divided into conservatives, moderates, and liberals. During the Cold War, the

party was divided between the conservative Regan coalition which advocated for a confrontational posture against

the Soviet Union. On the other hand, moderate factions supported a more pragmatic approach (Critchlow 2007).

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Although more conservative than the Democratic Party, the party had also been less assertive in

terms of immigration.

However, the shock of the 9/11 attacks, the subsequent military interventions, and the

2008 financial crisis have pushed the party away from its commitment to globalization. Mainly,

the shocks sidelined the neoconservatives who had emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to

advocate for military interventions and the war against terrorism (Critchlow 2007). Instead, the

party became divided between the establishment conservatives and anti-establishment

movements such as the Tea Party. While the establishment conservatives became more

restrained than the neoconservatives in their support of military interventions and the war against

terrorism, anti-establishment movements supported avoiding unnecessary conflicts and limiting

economic integration (Skocpol and Tervo 2020). At the same time, the party experienced the

return of the Christian Right which supports projecting rather than exercising the U.S. military

predominance (Miller and Schofield 2008). The party also experienced the rise of a radical wing

that exhibits racial prejudice, anti-democracy, anti-science, and pro-conspiracy positions. Such

radicalism has made the Republican Party increasingly authoritarian with less emphasis on the

promotion of democracy and human rights (Chait 2015, Milbank 2022).

Leading up to the rise of President Trump and the 2016 election, the Republican party

became increasingly influenced by three groups including the Tea Party, the Christian Right, and

White Supremacists. The Tea Party was formed in 2009 as a fiscally conservative movement that

challenges economic interdependence and interventionist foreign policy (Mead 2011). More

importantly, the movement formed in response to the 2008 financial crisis which was attributed

to globalization and the U.S. promotion of free trade (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Initially,

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the Tea Party was expected to be a short-lived movement—emerging as a backlash against the

2008 financial crisis. Besides this, the Republican party was expected to embrace moderate

positions after the fallout from the Bush Presidency and the election of President Obama

(Skocpol 2013). However, the election of President Obama strengthened the movement—given

its enmity towards the elites and its prejudice against African Americans (Kivisto 2017). Besides

this, the movement exerted influence over Republican officeholders and candidates (Skocpol

2013)

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. In 2008, the movement was represented by Sarah Palin who ran for the vice presidency

on the Republican McCain-Palin ticket. In 2012, the movement was represented by Ron Paul

who ran for the party’s presidential nomination. Although unsuccessful in both bids, the

movement maintained influence by establishing the Freedom Caucus in 2015. Aligning with

other conservatives in the caucus, the movement pushed the Republican party to the right on

many domestic issues. Mainly, the caucus called for a reduction of the national debt and federal

budget deficit through decreased government spending (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). On the

foreign front, the movement exhibited reservations towards economic globalization and

immigration (2012). The movement also exhibited reservation towards military interventions—

supporting abstentions from unnecessary interventions while maintaining the U.S. military

predominance (Mead 2011)

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Along with the Tea Party, the Republican party experienced the resurgence of the

Christian right—comprising Evangelical Protestants and Roman Catholics (Himmelstein 1990).

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Although the Tea Party lacked central authority, it gained power and influence through grassroots and

organizational work that mobilized votes and pressured candidates to embrace certain policies (Skocpol 2013).

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On the issue of interventions, the Tea Party divided into “Palinites” —named after the Governor of Alaska Sarah

Palin—who support avoiding engagement in unnecessary conflicts and the “Paulites”—named after Texas

Congressman Ron Paul—who support abstention from all forms of interventions (Mead 2011).

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Emerging as the New Christian Right, the right pushed for more conservativism and morally

driven positions on domestic and foreign issues (Williams 2010)

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. Throughout the 1980s and

the 1990s, the right backed the Presidency of President Ronald Regan and that of President Bush.

Both presidencies exhibited positions that appealed to the right—especially regarding militarism

and support of Israel (2010). In the early 1990s, the right was alienated by the party’s

establishment and pro-business Republicans. However, it made a return in the late 1990s and

early 2000s along with the salience of religious and cultural issues (Miller and Schofield 2008).

Such a return was also facilitated through local leadership and grassroots activism (2008). As in

the case of the Tea Party, the right had representative presidential candidates. In the 1990s, the

right backed Patrick Buchanan who ran for the presidential nomination in 1992 and 1996. In

2012, the right was represented by Newton Gingrich who ran for the presidential nomination.

Both candidates took positions that are similar to those of the Christian Right—especially on

domestic and cultural issues. While both were unsuccessful in their bids, these candidates—

especially Newton Gingrich—furthered the party’s move toward the extreme right (Zelizer

2020). Domestically, the Christian right embraced fiscal conservative positions that entail tax

cuts and limited government role in the economy. It also called for reintroducing Christian

values into public life (Williams 2010). On the foreign front, the right expressed opposition

toward policies that undercut conservative values and lifestyles. It also expressed opposition to

immigration and the influence of the UN and agreements such as NAFTA on American domestic

politics and economy (Williams 1999). Alternatively, the right called for a Christian-orientated

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Historically, the Christian right emerged in the 1940s along with the salience of contentious cultural issues such

as abortion, pornography, gambling, and homosexuality. The right also emerged amid debates over the role of

Christianity in the U.S. Constitution and public life (Himmelstein 1990).

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approach to foreign policy that stresses Christian nationalism and preserves the conservative way

of life (Williams 2010).

Finally, the Republican party exhibited an increasing influence of White Supremacist

groups such as the KKK. As noted earlier, such a rise has represented the resurgence of

radicalism, racism, anti-democracy, anti-science, and pro-conspiracy (Chait 2015, Milbank

2022). Historically, most of these groups date back to the Civil War when they were part of the

Confederate army. Then, these groups became more active and violent in the 1940s and 1960s—

especially along with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Steinberg 2018)

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. Unlike the Tea Party

and the Christian Right, these groups had no official platforms within the Republican Party.

however, they have managed to exert influence over policymaking and exert pressure on

officeholders and candidates. During the presidencies of Regan and Nixon, these groups

contributed to the increase in prejudice against immigrants and African Americans (Serwer

2019). Besides this, the KKK endorsed the candidacy of President Regan (King 2016). Then, the

KKK presented David Duke as a presidential candidate including in 1988 and 1994. In the post-

2000s, white supremacist groups became aggravated by the election of former President Obama

(Berlet 2020). Besides this, these groups became more aggressive in their opposition to

globalization and mass migration. These groups e claimed that both have affected native-born

white Americans (McVeigh and Estep 2019, Geary et al. 2020). These groups also embraced

radical positions including support for racial segregation and ending immigration (Howard-

Woods et al. 2019).

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During these periods, white supremacist groups resorted to using political as well as violent means to exert

influence on national politics. Such means ranged from murders and bombings to exerting influence on political

candidates and officeholders (Horowitz 1998).

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Combined, the Tea Party, the Christian Right, and White Supremacists created the base

that President Trump inflamed and empowered towards his presidency. In fact, these groups had

arguably developed the framework of the Trump presidency long before the rise of President

Trump. Such a framework was presented during the candidacy of several republican candidates

including Ron Paul, Pat Buchanan, and Newt Gingrich. For instance, Congressman Ron Paul

paved the way for President Trump’s support of limited military engagement. He also expressed

opposition to global interdependence, criticism of the U.S. traditional allies, and affinity towards

authoritarian regimes (Martin 2016). Similarly, the Christian Right candidates such as Buchanan

had paved the way for anti-immigration and anti-establishment discourse. During his candidacy,

he expressed opposition to established norms and nostalgic sentiments towards a past of cultural

and political conservativism (Hemmer 2022, Kabaservice 2022). The Tea Party candidate Sarah

Palin had primed voters for the inflammatory rhetoric of President Trump (Gervais and Morris

2019, Palmer 2022). Nevertheless, the power of these groups remained limited and fragmented

until the rise of President Trump. Early in the 2016 primaries, none of these groups regarded

President Trump as a representative candidate. Instead, they backed candidates such as Senator

Ted Cruz and Senator Marco Rubio as more viable choices (Weigel 2014, Burton 2018). Aside

from skepticism about his chances, the early resistance to Trump’s candidacy was linked, for

groups such as the Christian Right, to inconsistency between Trump’s character and the

Christians’ values (Scala 2020)

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. Similarly, the Tea Party and white supremacists have found

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These groups’ resistance to the Trump candidacy is attributed to inconsistency between Trump’s character and

their values—especially those of the Christian Right (Scala 2020). After his rise as the presumptive nominee, the

Christian Right resorted to casting President Trump as a “redeemed sinner” and “prophecy” candidate. His

positions on cultural and social issues are claimed to compensate for his personal “sins” (Denker 2019 Berry 2020).

Others within the right have cast President Trump as a modern “King David” and “King Cyrus.” His presidency

represents an instrument for Christians to exercise control over public affairs (Burton 2018, Burke 2018).

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other candidates such as Senator Ted Cruz more aligned with their positions (Gervais and Morris

2019). However, the divisions among these groups over candidates offered President Trump an

opening to rise as the Republican nominee (2019). At the same time, President Trump’s

proposals began to resonate among these groups—especially on globalization, immigration,

military interventions, and cultural threats (Gervais and Morris 2019, Henson 2020, Berry 2020).

Hence, these groups eventually backed President Trump as the Republican nominee. During the

primaries, the Christian Right endorsed the Trump candidacy—expressing trust in his ability to

deliver on his promises (Goodstein 2016). Similarly, prominent leaders of the Tea Party such as

Sarah Palin expressed support for the Trump candidacy (Rappeport and Haberman 2016).

Several former leaders of the KKK including David Duke also endorsed the Trump candidacy in

2016—noting that “Trump’s voters are their voters” (Domonoske 2016). On November 8, 2016,

President Trump became elected as the 45th president of the U.S.—marking the first return of the

Republican Party to the presidency since 2008 (Rosenfeld 2016).

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In effect, the rise of President Trump has caused significant changes that have continued

to shape the Republican party. For instance, the rise of President Trump signaled that the party

abandoned traditional conservativism which is associated with economic interdependence and

free trade. Instead, the rising conservativism has embraced protectionism and opposes

multilateral trade agreements (Cassidy 2016, Lang 2019). Besides this, the party has begun to

shift away from military interventionism. Instead, the party has embraced military restraint—

exhibited in the push toward withdrawal from ongoing operations and military deployments

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Before running for office, President Trump worked as a businessman—presiding over his father’s real estate

business which he named then the Trump Organization. He was involved in show business where he worked as a

co-producer and host of the reality show The Apprentice along with making appearances on several other shows

(D’Antonio 2015)

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(Cassidy 2016 Lang 2019, Barone 2020). Beyond this, the Republican party has subscribed to a

pessimistic version of conservativism. Such conservativism is defined by identity, ideological

grievances, and increasingly counter-majoritarianism (Kabaservice 2022). It is also characterized

by an increase in authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies. Motivated by setbacks and

electoral losses, the party has begun to push against democratic mechanisms. Motivated by

successive election losses, the Republican party has begun to push against elections (Milbank

2022). At the same time, the party has become increasingly critical of the foundations of civil

society and scientific consensus. Instead, the radical wing of the party exhibits dismal of the

legitimacy of its political opposition (Mann and Ornstein 2012). It also subscribes to alternative

characterizations of political and social reality (Milbank 2022). Finally, the party has become

preoccupied with racial and cultural anxieties. The influence of the white supremacists has

pushed the party’s positions on immigration towards a racist and xenophobic stance. In doing so,

the party has also become tolerant of racially charged positions against African Americans and

immigrants (Hawley 2017).

Beyond this, the rise of President Trump has caused changes in the Republican elites and

electorates. Traditionally, the Republican elites used to come from the ideological wing that is

interested in winning office and a regular wing that reflects the core coalition of the party (Noel

2016). However, the division between the two has given rise to non-ideological elites such as

President Trump (2016). Furthermore, the Republican elites used to appeal to the core

constituency of the party. However, the shifts within the party have also led to the rise of

candidates who employ populist and tribal appeals (Lang 2019). Besides this, the party’s elites

used to come from within the ranks—especially among traditional politicians and party

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members. However, the failure of the establishment has brought in candidates from non-political

backgrounds such as celebrities (Green 2016). As for the party’s electorates, the party has

traditionally been associated with an organized core constituency of business and social

conservatives (Barone 2020). However, the rise of President Trump has attracted working- and

middle-class voters. These voters include those of the Tea Party who exhibit anti-establishment

positions and those who were affected by globalization (Berlet 2011, Mutz 2017). Besides this,

the rise of President Trump has attracted Christian Right voters who are religiously and

culturally conservative. It has also attracted voters who exhibit anti-immigration proposals and

racial prejudice (Moore 2021). Combined, these voters represent an improbable coalition against

globalization and its foreign policy expressions (Gusterson 2017).

Presidency and Orientation of Donald Trump

Part of the rise of the nationalist leadership and its impact on foreign policy reorientation

pertains to these leaders’ orientations. As noted earlier, the effect of these leaders lies in the

alignment that emerged between these leaders' orientation and public and elite pressures against

globalization. It is also strengthened by how these leaders amplified the effects of the shocks

and linked them to globalization. On one hand, these leaders express beliefs and views that align

with and reflect domestic pressures—particularly the public views. Hence, the nationalist

leadership becomes the vehicle through which the domestic pressures translate into a foreign

policy reorientation. At the same time, these leaders amplify the effects of the shocks and

establish a link between such shocks and the premises of globalization. This occurs as part of the

mobilization process and the push toward change. In the U.S., President Trump exhibited an

orientation that challenged the U.S. commitment to the post Cold War order and the premises of

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globalization. Generally, President Trump was the first U.S. president to openly challenge the

post-Cold War liberal order. Unlike his predecessors who may have adjusted the U.S. embrace of

globalization in certain areas, President Trump proposed a wide array of anti-globalization or

nationalist policies that pertain to political, economic, and cultural areas. President Trump was

distinguished from his predecessors by his inflammatory rhetoric and nontraditional political

style. He was distinguished by his push against state institutions and his challenge of

conventional democratic norms. Overall, the rise of President Trump represented the severity of

ideological divisions and social tensions that emerged as a reaction to the loss of economic

opportunity and fear of cultural and identity devolution (West 2019). It was also an expression of

racial anxiety—especially among Christians and the white population (Ott and Dickinson 2019).

Combining both aspects, President Trump embodied a national backlash against globalization

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Amid his rise to power, President Trump expressed beliefs that aligned with and reflected

the domestic pressures. Through his campaign speeches and statements, he amplified the effects

of the shocks and mobilized support toward a foreign policy reorientation. Essentially, President

Trump’s beliefs developed before he made his bid for the presidency and continued while he was

in office. They were also informed by his views of the outside world and international politics.

Here, President Trump characterized the outside world as dangerous and threatening. In an

interview with CNN in 2015, he noted that “we are living in an unbelievably dangerous and

horrible world” (CNN 2015). President Trump also compared the current world to that of

medieval times—noting that “We are living in medieval times…We are in the most brutal period

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Other scholars characterize President Trump as devoid of firm principles or deep convictions. Instead, he rises

as an opportunist who has seized the moment of national discontent to initiate political change (Haar 2019). He is

also assumed to be driven by self-promotion. Following financial and social setbacks, his resort to politics aims at

reproducing the brand of Trump (Sherman 2017).

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of this world” (2015). President Trump also exhibited views that characterize politics as a zero-

sum game. This view of politics contradicts the positive sum characterization that had been

exhibited by his predecessors (Brands 2018). In his first campaign speech, President Trump

established that a win for other parties means a loss for the U.S. He also stated that “our enemies

are getting stronger and stronger and we as a country are getting weaker” (Time 2015). President

Trump also characterized politics in terms of bullying and exploitation. In his campaign speech,

he referenced several states including China Japan, and Mexico—noting that “They kill us

economically… They beat us all the time…” (2015). Such views have been framed with disdain

towards the post-Cold War order. Referencing a conflict between national and collective

interests, President Trump noted in 2016 “Our plan will put America first. Americanism, not

globalization, will be our credo” (Politico 2016, Auslin 2017). He also dispensed with the U.S.

global leadership and post-Cold War arrangements—noting that “We have no business, and

certainly no right, to intervene in conflicts just because we don’t like to see innocent people

being killed or dislocated” (Trump 2000).

Concerning the different aspects of globalization, President Trump expressed beliefs that

aligned with and amplified domestic pressures against collective security and military

interventions. For instance, President Trump expressed the same public and elite reserve toward

military interventions. As in the case of the public, these beliefs represented his perception of the

shocks including the 9/11 attacks and subsequent military operations. In his RNC speech in

2016, President Trump expressed his skepticism about the viability of military interventions. He

noted that “After fifteen years of wars in the Middle East…the situation is worse than it has ever

been before (Politico 2016). He went further to invalidate the strategic benefits of such a role—

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noting that “the U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else’s problems” (Politico

2016). In an interview with the New York Times in 2016, President Trump also questioned the

U.S. commitment to collective security. He cast the U.S. commitment to NATO as conditional

and transactional—noting that the U.S. was not “reasonably reimbursed” for its commitment to

NATO (2016). He also extended a similar position on defending other countries—noting that

“the countries that we protect, at a massive loss, will be asked to pay their fair share” (Politico

2016). Along with these views, President Trump also rejects the principles of the promotion of

democracy and human rights (Kehoe 2016). In a speech on foreign policy in 2016, he attributed

the fallout in Iraq and Afghanistan to the promotion of democracy. He noted that “It all began

with a dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries that had no

experience or interests in becoming a Western democracy.” (Time 2016). Aside from aligning

with and reflecting the domestic pressure, these beliefs represented a dramatic departure from the

U.S. traditional commitment to collective security and its strategic interests in regions such as

Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. They also became the basis for his foreign policy stances on

military interventions and military alliances such as NATO.

Along with national security, President Trump also expressed beliefs that aligned with

the domestic pressures against immigration. Mostly, these beliefs were inspired by the costs of

the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. They also were informed by his negative

sentiments toward immigration. In his first campaign speech in 2015, President Trump noted that

Mexico is “sending people that have lots of problems… They’re bringing drugs… [and] crime”

(Time 2015). Similarly, President Trump compared Middle Eastern refugees to Trojan horses—

noting that “we have no idea who these people are” (CNBC 2016). Besides this, President Trump

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expressed beliefs that link immigration to economic losses. In a speech on immigration in 2019,

he noted that “working-class Americans are left to pay the price for mass illegal migration

[including] reduced jobs, lower wages, overburdened schools, hospitals … increased crime, and

a depleted social safety net” (Rizzo 2019). President Trump followed by proposing to defund

sanctuary cities and enforce zero tolerance and immediate deportation of illegal immigrants

(Politico 2016, Reuters 2020). President Trump went further to propose more extreme solutions

including building a border wall and enacting a ban on Muslim immigrants. In his campaign

speech, he vowed “We will begin working on an impenetrable physical wall on the southern

border… and Mexico will pay for the wall” (Politico 2016). He also proposed a shutdown of the

U.S. borders before Muslims. In a press briefing during his campaign, he called for “a complete

and total shutdown … until our country representatives can figure out what the hell is going on”

(Tylor 2015).

Finally, President Trump expressed beliefs that aligned with the domestic views on free

trade and economic integration. As in the case of the public and the elites, these views have been

prompted by the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. For instance, President Trump cast free trade

as a zero-sum game that is skewed against the U.S. national interests. In an interview in 1987, he

stated “We don't have free trade right now, because if you want to go to… other countries, it's

virtually impossible for an American to do business in those countries” (CNN 1987). He also

believes that free trade causes the migration of factories and corporates. In his campaign speech

in 2015, he noted that “Mexico takes a company, a car company … then “sell [the cars] to the

United States zero tax” (Time 2015). Alternatively, President Trump believes in projecting

power through trade. In his book The Art of the Deal, he wrote “our trading partners would have

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to sit across the table from Donald Trump and I guarantee you the rip-off of the United States

would end” (Trump 1989). He also advocated for retaliation in trade dealing—noting that “if

somebody goes out of their way to hurt you, well, an eye for an eye" (1989). Besides this,

President Trump believes, in line with the public position, in embracing protectionist measures

such as tariffs and reversing corporate migration. In his first campaign speech, he noted the U.S.

should impose high tariffs on companies that refuse to return to the U.S. (Time 2015). He also

believes that the U.S. should renegotiate current multilateral trade deals such as NAFTA. In a

speech on free trade, he vowed “I’m going tell our NAFTA partners that I intend to immediately

renegotiate the terms of that agreement to get a better deal for our workers...” (2015). Such a

position was accompanied by a threat of withdrawal from the agreement upon unsuccessful

renegotiation (The Guardian 2016, Cassidy 2017).

Nationalism and American Foreign Policy

By 2015, the U.S. domestic politics became increasingly characterized by a pushback

against globalization. As noted earlier, the U.S. experienced the shocks of the 9/11 terrorist

attacks, the subsequent military interventions, and the 2008 financial crises. These shocks

inflicted significant costs on the U.S. political and economic system. At the same time, these

shocks were also perceived by the public and the elites in association with the U.S. commitment

to globalization. Hence, the American public and elites became increasingly reserved on issues

that relate to national security, immigration, and free trade. They began to exhibit an aversion to

collective security and military interventions. They also became increasingly supportive of

economic and cultural protectionism. While the public and elite pressure was building, the

Republican party was also experiencing internal shifts. As noted earlier, the party experienced

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the rise of three groups including the Tea Party, the Christian Right, and White Supremacists.

Despite their differences, these groups were unified by their push against free trade and

immigration. They were also averse to foreign policy positions that inflict costs on the domestic

economy and national culture. Eventually, the increasing domestic pressure and the shifts within

the Republican party provided an opportunity for the rise of President Trump. As noted earlier,

President Trump exhibited an orientation that challenged the U.S. commitment to the post-Cold

War order and the premises of globalization. Capitalizing on the effects of the shocks and

domestic pressures, President Trump became the vehicle through which the domestic pressure

factored into the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, President Trump

amplified the costs of the systemic shocks and consolidated their association with globalization.

He also presented his alternative nationalist proposals that constituted the basis for foreign policy

reorientation.

Upon his election in 2016, President Trump initiated a reorientation of the U.S. foreign

policy toward nationalism. As noted in the theory chapter, such a reorientation occurred as a

domestic-driven deviation that resulted from three factors including systemic shocks, domestic

pressure, and President Trump’s rise to power and his orientation. It also manifested in terms of

emphasis on independence and sovereignty, limited engagement and unilateralism, and

proneness towards confrontation. In the case of the U.S., this foreign policy was framed as

nostalgic and restorative. Embedded in his campaign slogan “Make America Great Again,”

President Trump implied that the solution to globalization problems lies in rea turn to the U.S.

“glorious” past (West 2019). In an interview, President Trump pointed to the 40s and 50s as a

model for such a restoration—noting that “we were not pushed around, we were respected by

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everybody” (CNN 2016). Under this framing, the Trump nationalist foreign policy entailed

changes to the U.S. global leadership, its commitment to collective security and the promotion of

democracy and human rights, and its use of force. Concerning the U.S. global leadership,

President Trump characterized the U.S. as an exploited hegemon that pays a significant cost for

its global leadership. Hence, the U.S. would redefine its role according to its national rather than

collective interests (Fujii 2018). Besides this, President Trump advocated for less emphasis on

democracy and human rights. In a speech at the UN in 2018, President Trump noted “We do not

seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example for everyone to

watch” (Politico 2018).” He also redefined the U.S. commitment to NATO as conditional and

transactional—noting that the U.S. was not “reasonably reimbursed” for its commitment to

NATO (Politico 2016). On the use of force and military interventions, President Trump

advocated for limiting the U.S. military engagement to defend against immediate threats. In one

of his speeches in 2016, he vowed “I will not hesitate to deploy military force when there is no

alternative” (The New York Times 2016).

Under these principles, the Trump reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy towards

nationalism manifested—in the period between 2016 and 2020—in terms of the U.S. withdrawal

from multilateral arrangements, the military withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the

U.S. embrace of economic protectionism as well as its increasing hostility toward immigration.

Withdrawal From Multilateral Arrangements

One of the primary manifestations of the Trump nationalist foreign policy pertained to

the U.S. commitment to multilateralism. As noted earlier, the U.S. joined multilateral

arrangements in areas that relate to deterring aggression and global problems. Key examples

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included the Iran Nuclear Deal—also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—which

was signed in 2015 to restrict Iran’s access to materials that may weaponize its nuclear program.

The agreement also facilitated UN supervision over the Iranian nuclear program (Bruton 2018).

Another example was the Paris Climate Accords which was adopted by 195 countries in 2016 to

cut carbon emissions and help states adapt to climate change. The agreement built on the UN

Convention on Climate Change and replaced the Kyoto Protocol that was signed in 1997 (The

White House 2016). Both agreements represented the U.S. traditional commitment to multilateral

arrangements and collective action (Deese 2017, Time 2018). However, both agreements also

became controversial at domestic and global levels. Domestically, members of the U.S. Congress

exhibited skepticism about Iran’s commitment to the nuclear deal. They also questioned the

economic costs of the Paris Accords and its enforceability over states such as China

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. Globally,

the U.S. allies in the Middle East contended the Iran deal was an abandonment of the U.S.

traditional commitment to regional security.

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. began to curtail its commitment to multilateral

arrangements. In 2017, the Trump administration declared the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris

Climate Accord. At one level, such a withdrawal came as a result of President Trump’s doubts

about the underlying causes of climate change. On different occasions, President Trump

questioned whether the phenomenon is caused by human behavior or natural changes

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. At

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The Republican party prioritizes economic competitiveness over the protection of the environment (New York

Times 2018). They also prefer a more aggressive and confrontational approach towards Iran.

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President Trump’s position on climate change has changed from denial to conditional support. After initial

denial, he acknowledged climate’s rapid and severe changes, yet noted “I am not a believer in man-made global

warming. It could be warming” (Mother Jones 2018)

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another level, the withdrawal expressed the U.S. economic concerns as well as skepticism about

the commitment of other parties. As characterized by President Trump:

“The Paris Accord would undermine our economy, hamstring our workers,

weaken our sovereignty, impose unacceptable legal risk, and put us at a permanent

disadvantage to the other countries of the world.” (The White House 2017)

In 2018, the Trump administration followed with a withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear

Deal. As in the case of the Paris Agreement, the U.S. withdrawal reflected President Trump’s

views on the deal which he referred to as a “disaster” and “the worst deal ever negotiated”

(Politico 2019). The U.S. withdrawal also represented skepticism about Iran’s commitment—

citing alleged violations. The withdrawal also cited concerns over the agreement’s effects on the

U.S. national interests in the Middle East. As characterized by President Trump:

“The deal allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium …. lifted crippling

economic sanctions… [and imposed] no limits at all on its other maligned behavior … we

cannot prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb under the decaying and rotten structure of the

current agreement” (NPR 2017).

Alternatively, the Trump administration resorted to unilateral actions on both fronts. In

terms of environmental policies, the administration rolled back several environmental and

climate policies that had limited the U.S. carbon emissions and environmental hazards. The

number of rolled policies ranged between 50 and 70 (Climate Action Tracker 2019, Brookings

2020). In terms of dealing with Iran, the administration resorted to the unilateral imposition of

economic sanctions on Iran’s major banks, oil exporters, and shipping companies (Landler

2018). Both unilateral moves appeared in contrast starkly with the global consensus on both

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issues. Against the backdrop of the U.S. withdrawal, all signatories remain committed to

multilateral action and the terms of both agreements.

Combined, both withdrawals occurred in the context of the U.S. national reaction to the

shocks of 9/11 and the 2008 financial crisis. On one hand, the Paris Accord added costs to an

economy that was still recovering from the effects of the 2008 crisis. On the other hand, the Iran

deal stocked fears of future attacks against the U.S. or its interests in the Middle East. Besides

this, both withdrawals were also backed by domestic pressures—exhibited in public and elite

opinion. For instance, the American public, according to a poll conducted by Pew Research,

became divided on whether climate warming is caused by human activity or due to natural

causes. Some aligned with the President in disputing the existence of evidence for such a

phenomenon (Pew Research Center 2016). On the Iran deal, the American public grew skeptical

of whether Iran was serious about addressing international concerns over its nuclear program

(Pew Research Center 2015). Upon signing the deal, the public continued such skepticism—with

the majority of Americans (48%) disapproving of the deal (2015). At the level of the elite, some

of the U.S. elites—especially Republicans—were either skeptical or ambivalent towards climate

change. For instance, Republican candidates such as Jeb Bush disregarded the urgency—noting

in 2015 that the “climate had been changing forever” (The New York Times 2015). Similarly,

the elites were skeptical about Iran’s commitment—with presidential candidates such as

Secretary Clinton noting “My approach will be to distrust and verify” (Brookings 2015). More

importantly, the two withdrawals were driven by President Trump’s orientation. As noted earlier,

President Trump expressed doubts about the underlying causes of Climate Change. On one

occasion, he referred to the phenomenon as a “hoax… [that is] “created by the Chinese to make

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U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” (Mother Jones 2018). On the Iran deal, President Trump

repeatedly referred to the deal, as noted earlier, as a “disaster” and “the worst deal ever

negotiated” (Politico 2019). He also associated both agreements with entanglement—vowing

that he “will never enter America into any agreement that reduces our ability to control our own

affairs” (The New York Times 2016).

Beyond this, the U.S. withdrawal from both agreements manifested as contentions against

the U.S. commitment to globalization. Here, the Trump contentions against both agreements

were not only about their effectiveness. Instead, President Trump characterized both agreements

as an infringement on national sovereignty and security. For instance, the Trump administration

contended that the Paris Accords prevented the US from controlling its domestic and foreign

affairs (The White House 2017). Similarly, the administration contended that the Iran nuclear

deal posed a threat to national security—especially since it did not include Iran’s ballistic and

cruise missiles (Bloomberg 2021). On the economic front, the administration contended that both

agreements inflicted costs on the U.S. economy and offered China an edge in its competition

with the U.S. (Bloomberg 2021). Based on this, the U.S. withdrawal from both agreements was

characterized as a reaffirmation of the U.S. national sovereignty and control over domestic and

foreign affairs. It also expressed the U.S. desire to prioritize national economic interests over

collective responsibility. Besides this, the U.S. withdrawal from both agreements represented a

departure from the U.S. traditional commitment to collective action and multilateral

arrangements. Such a condition became evident in the stark contrast between the U.S. and the

European position—with European states deciding to hold their deal with Iran (Atlas and

Davenport 2018). As noted earlier, other signatories continued to hold to their commitments to

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the Paris Accord. Furthermore, the withdrawals excluded the U.S. from active involvement in

global affairs. Instead, such withdrawals offered China and Russia an opportunity to expand their

influence over such affairs (Atlas and Davenport 2018, Jacobo 2020).

Military Withdrawals and Limited Engagement

Another manifestation of the Trump nationalist foreign policy pertained to the U.S.

commitment to collective security and multilateral military alliances. As noted earlier, the U.S.

continued its commitment to European security through NATO—especially after the end of the

Cold War (Aguirre and Fischer 1992). The U.S. also contributed to global stability through

global military deployments. It also used force to promote democracy, protect human rights, and

combat terrorism (Tziampiris 2002, Western 2004). However, the blowback from recent

interventions— particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan—had pushed the US away from the use of

force. Politically, these interventions raised questions about the purpose of the U.S. military

force. (Dunne and Mulaj 2010). In the legal sphere, such interventions also posed questions

about the U.S. compliance with international laws and norms (McGoldrick 2004). Initially, the

U.S. shift away from the use of force had manifested in terms of plans of withdrawal from

ongoing military operations. The U.S. declared its plans of withdrawal from Iraq in 2008 and

from Afghanistan in 2011 (The White House 2008, Priya 2021)

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. Both withdrawals were meant

to take the form of a gradual reduction of force. They also began as a military strategy to

transition from engagement to disengagement. In other words, these withdrawal proposals did

not necessarily impact the U.S. commitment to collective security and the use of force.

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The withdrawal from Iraq was initiated by an agreement between the Bush administration and the Iraqi

government—known as the U.S.–Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. The Agreement included a deadline of 31

December 2011 for a complete withdrawal from Iraq. As for Afghanistan, the US withdrawal was initiated by the

Obama administration in 2011—setting the end of 2014 as a deadline for complete US withdrawal.

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However, the U.S. military withdrawals became, under the Trump administration, part of a

grand strategy to redefine the U.S. global role and its commitment to collective security—

especially regarding Europe and the Middle East. They also reflected the growing U.S. aversion

to military interventions. Such a strategy manifested in terms of conditional commitment to the

collective security of Europe and NATO. In 2017, President Trump declined to affirm the U.S.

commitment to Article Five of the North Atlantic Agreement. As noted earlier, President Trump

had contended that the U.S. was not “reasonably reimbursed” for its commitment to NATO

(Time 2016, Gray 2017). Although he reaffirmed such a commitment later, President Trump

continued to press NATO over defense spending (Herb 2017, Diamond 2017). In 2020, the

Trump administration increased pressure on NATO and the U.S. European allies by withdrawing

troops from Germany. Such troops were stationed in Germany as part of the post-war

commitment to the security of Europe (Stewart and Ali 2020). As characterized by President

Trump, such a withdrawal came as a response to inadequate financial contributions of NATO

members:

“Twenty-three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be

paying and what they are supposed to be paying for their defense. This is not fair to the

people and taxpayers of the United States” (Diamond 2017)

Regarding the Middle East, President Trump began to condition the U.S. commitment to the

region by financial reimbursement. As noted earlier, he demanded that the U.S. allies in the

Middle East pay in exchange for U.S. support—noting in 2016 “the countries that we protect, at

a massive loss, will be asked to pay their fair share” (Politico 2016). In 2019, President Trump

began the U.S. withdrawal from the region by withdrawing the U.S. military from northern Syria

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in 2019. The Trump administration cited economic and human costs as the basis for such

withdrawal. Besides this, the administration framed such a withdrawal as part of a strategy aimed

at ending the U.S. “endless wars.” As characterized by President Trump:

“From the first day I entered the political arena, I made it clear that I did not want to

fight these endless, senseless wars — especially those that don’t benefit the United

States” (Superville and Burns 2019).

As in the case with other moves, these moves occurred within the context of the U.S. national

reaction to the post 9/11 military operations. As noted in the shocks, the operations inflicted

significant human costs—killing 7051 and injuring 55117 U.S. soldiers (Icasualties.org 2022).

The two operations also cost the U.S. more than $2.4 trillion which was spent on military as well

as post-military operations (Teslik 2008). Besides this, these moves were backed by domestic

pressures—exhibited in the public and elite reservations about military interventions. As noted

earlier, the early public support for the post-2001 operations turned into opposition—with the

majority of the American public supporting withdrawal from both operations (Craighill 2011,

Newport 2021). Similarly, the U.S. elites gradually became more reserved towards the use of

force. Such a condition was evident in the Bush and Obama proposals to end the U.S.

interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. More importantly, these moves were driven by President

Trump’s orientation and his beliefs about military interventions. As noted earlier, President

Trump characterized the U.S. commitment to collective security as an economic burden (Politico

2016). He also argued that U.S. interventions did not achieve their objectives—noting that “After

fifteen years of wars in the Middle East, after trillions of dollars spent and thousands of lives

lost, the situation is worse than it has ever been before (2016).

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Beyond this, these moves manifested as contentions against the U.S. commitment to

globalization—especially regarding collective security, democracy, and human rights. Generally,

such contentions reflected President Trump’s desire to redefine the U.S. global leadership and its

role in maintaining global stability. As noted earlier, the end of the Cold War had made the U.S.

guarantor of global stability. Instead, these moves signaled a departure from such commitments.

Such a departure was evident in President Trump’s conditioning defense of NATO by financial

reimbursement. The U.S. withdrawal from Germany also implied a break with the US post-war

commitment to the defense of Europe (Gordon 2020). In other words, the U.S. under the Trump

administration began to reconsider its role as “the policemen of the world” (Holland 2020). As

challenged by President Trump:

“It is not the duty of US troops to solve ancient conflicts in faraway lands that

many people have never even heard of. We are not the policemen of the world” (2020).

Besides this, these moves reflected increasing doubts about the viability of military

interventions and the principles of democracy promotion and protection of human rights. As

noted earlier, the Trump administration contended that interventions did not achieve their

objectives. The Trump administration also questioned the viability of the principles of

democracy promotion and protection of human rights. As characterized by President Trump,

both principles became associated with international instability. In 2016, he noted:

“It all began with a dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out

of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western democracy. We

tore up what institutions they had and then were surprised at what we unleashed” (Time

2016).

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Economic Protectionism and Anti-Immigration

A third manifestation of the Trump nationalist foreign policy pertained to the U.S.

commitment to free trade and open borders. As noted earlier, the U.S. had committed to free

trade through the establishment of international economic institutions and multilateral trade

agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA. In the post-2000s, the U.S. signed more than 14

multilateral and bilateral trade agreements with twenty countries across the globe (International

Trade Agreements N.d.). Besides this, the U.S. also facilitated outsourcing national industries

and companies' movement across national borders in search of cheaper costs and competitive

markets (Mullin 1990, Chang 2012). On immigration, the U.S. opened its doors to immigrants

from Asia and Latin America. Exhibited in the Immigration and Naturalization Act in 1965, the

U.S. abolished the national-origin quotas that favored those from northern and Western Europe.

In the 1990s, the U.S. committed to a more liberalized policy that aimed at increasing the annual

number of immigrants. The U.S. also offered pathways to legal status through programs such as

DREAM and DACA (Issitt 2018). However, the costs of the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial

delivered a blow to the U.S. commitment to free trade and open borders. As a result, the U.S.

began to reaffirm its national rights under international laws and call for other trade partners to

comply with such laws. Besides this, the U.S. also began to consider reviewing and reforming

the current trade agreements (Schott 2009). Besides trade, the issue of immigration became

increasingly politicized—with an alleged association between immigration and terrorism

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(Appollonia 2012). Furthermore, immigration also became increasingly blamed for economic

losses and high unemployment (Lecker et al. 2006)

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Under the Trump administration, the U.S. shifted towards a more restrictive stance on

free trade and immigration. On free trade, such a condition manifested in terms of proposing

withdrawals from established multilateral trade agreements. The U.S. also began to exhibit

reluctance towards other proposed agreements such as the deal with South Korea and the FTA

with Colombia (Ashbee and Waddan 2010). On the withdrawals, President Trump declared

during his presidential campaign that he intends to withdraw from NAFTA (The Guardian 2016,

Cassidy 2017)

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. In 2017, President Trump followed by withdrawing the U.S. from the Trans-

Pacific Partnership TPP (Solis 2017). Both measures were attributed to economic costs such as

job losses and rising trade deficits with the respective parties. Along with this, President Trump

followed by declaring a trade war against China. In 2018, the war began with the U.S. imposing

$34 billion worth tariffs on of Chinese products. In response, China retaliated by imposing 25%

tariffs on $34 billion worth of U.S. goods and products (Bown and Kolb 2022). In 2019, both

sides escalated the war by imposing another wave of tariffs. The U.S. also banned the Chinese

company Huawei from buying vital parts and components from the U.S. without special

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The association between immigration and economic losses in the public as well as the political discourse dates

back to the 1970s when immigration is linked to slowing U.S. wage growth and unemployment (Penn Wharton

2016.). Scholars are divided over the overall effect of immigration with some noting that immigration has a

positive impact on the overall growth of the economy. Others note that immigrants of low skills have a negative

effect on native workers and economic growth (Lecker et al. 2006, Borjas 2014)

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In 2018, the Trump administration reached an agreement—known as NAFTA 2.0 or New NAFTA—that is

claimed to favor the U.S. national industries in the dairy trade, automobile manufacturing, and others (Dangerfield

2018).

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approval (2022)

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. President Trump justified the trade war with China as a response to the

Chinese unfair trade practices. In 2018, he noted:

“These tariffs are being imposed to encourage China to change the unfair

practices identified in the Section 301 action concerning technology and innovation.

They also serve as an initial step toward bringing balance to our trade relationship with

China” (The White House 2018).

On the immigration front, the restrictive approach of the Trump administration

manifested in terms of a series of anti-immigration proposals. During his campaign, President

Trump called for instituting a national ban on Muslim immigrants (Tylor 2015)

120

. Upon

election, he signed an executive order to ban immigrants from several Muslim countries

including Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Iraq (CNN 2017)

121

. At the same time,

President Trump also outlined an “extreme vetting” process for incoming immigrants—an

attempt to establish whether applicants’ beliefs match US values (CNN 2016). Both measures

were presented as part of counterterrorism measures. As declared by President Trump:

“Donald Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering

the United States until our country’s representatives figure out what the hell is going on.

We have no choice.” (Tylor 2015)

119

During the G20 Summit in 2019, the two sides agreed to a truce and a reduction of tariffs (Bown and Kolb

2022).

120

The call for the ban was one of several proposals on Muslim immigrants including the President’s call for

surveillance over mosques and extreme vetting for Muslim immigrants (CNN 2017). Combined, these policies are

believed to be motivated by racial prejudice and islamophobia against Muslims. Similarly, the policies targeting

Mexicans are seen as part of racism and prejudice against Latinos (Canizales and Vallejo 2021)

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The Muslim ban was stopped by a decision from a federal judge in Seattle on the 3rd of February 2017 and the

ban then was revised until the Supreme Court decided in 2018 to uphold a version, Presidential Proclamation

9645, that specifies the application of the ban (Seattle Time 2017, NPR 2018).

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At home, President Trump declared his intention to end DACA and called on Congress to

act in support of his proposal. He also launched a deportation campaign to arrest and deport

illegal immigrants (NBC 2019)

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. Along with this, President Trump proposed erecting a

physical barrier at the U.S. southern border—known as the Trump Wall. Both measures were

also presented as counterterrorism measures in the context of protecting national security and the

economy. As characterized by President Trump:

“Americans are hurt by uncontrolled, illegal migration. It strains public resources

and drives down jobs and wages... thousands of Americans have been brutally killed by

those who illegally entered our country” (The Guardian 2019)

As in the case with other moves, the measures on free trade and immigration occurred in

the context of the U.S. national reaction to the 9/11 attacks and the 2008 financial crisis. As

noted earlier, the attacks had pushed the U.S. towards more reservations on national security and

immigration. On the other hand, the 2008 crisis had pushed toward a protectionist stance on free

trade. Besides this, these measures were backed by public and elite pressure. As noted earlier, the

American public became increasingly supportive of a reduction in immigration (Gallup. N.d).

The public also exhibited an increase in anti-immigration and Islamophobic sentiments (Telhami

2015). The American public also became opposed to agreements such as NAFTA and expressed

support for increasing restrictions on foreign goods to protect American jobs (Smeltz et al.

2021)

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. At the level of the elite, Republicans as well as Democrats became increasingly

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The DACA repeal was stopped with a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court on the 18th of June 2020 (NPR

2020).

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Aside from public and elite opinion, scholars are divided on the effects of NAFTA on the US economy—with

some affirming that the agreement has benefited the US economy and increased trade volumes (Burfisher et al.

2001). Others note that the agreement has increased the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and Canada from $17.0 to

$177.2 billion—costing the US more than 800 thousand jobs (Scott 2014)

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supportive of controls over immigration (NPR. 2012, Price 2017). They also became more

protectionist on free trade—especially regarding multilateral trade deals (On the Issues N.d.).

More importantly, these measures were driven by President Trump’s orientation and his beliefs

on both issues. As noted earlier, President Trump argued that free trade is skewed against the

U.S. economic interests (CNN 1987). He also alleged an association between free trade and trade

deficit, loss of jobs, and migration of factories and corporations (2016). On immigration,

President Trump expressed condescending and negative views on immigrants (CBS 2017). He

also associated immigration with drug-related crimes and terrorism (The Guardian 2019).

Beyond this, the measures on free trade and immigration represented contentions against

the U.S. commitment to globalization. As noted earlier, the U.S. had embraced a liberal stance

on free trade and immigration—especially after the Cold War. Instead, these measures

manifested as a reaffirmation of national sovereignty and national interests. They also were

presented by the Trump administration as a reclaiming national and judicial sovereignty over

trade (Yilmaz 2018). President Trump contended that deals such as NAFTA and the TTP limit

the U.S. control over the national economy and put the interests of other nations above those of

the U.S. (Stumo 2016). Furthermore, President Trump argued that these agreements had

transferred power from national to international domains. In 2016, he noted:

“The TPP would … give up all of our economic leverage to an international

commission that would put the interests of foreign countries above our own. It would

further open our markets to aggressive currency cheaters…while allowing foreign

countries to continue putting barriers in front of our exports” (Politico 2016).

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In terms of immigration, the Trump administration contended that open borders entail a

security risk—associated with smuggling drugs and illegal immigrants. Besides this, it argued for

a link between immigration and the loss of jobs, a decline in wages, and an increase in domestic

crime (The Guardian 2019). Hence, the anti-immigration measures represented an affirmation of

the U.S. sovereignty and control over its borders. They also were presented as protections of the

U.S. national and border security—exhibited in erecting a physical barrier at the southern border.

Economically, these measures reflected the increase of economic protectionism that aims at

ending the outsourcing of jobs and vacating immigrants’ jobs for American workers.

*****

This chapter has explored the reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy from globalization

to nationalism. Emerging after the two world wars as an economic and military superpower, the

U.S. had characterized its foreign policy in line with the premises of globalization including

commitment to collective security and multilateralism, promotion of democracy and human

rights, and commitment to free trade and open borders. However, the U.S. experienced two

shocks including the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

and the 2008 financial crisis. Such shocks resulted in domestic pressure—exhibited in shifts in

public and elite opinion. In the wake of the shocks, both became increasingly critical of

globalization and the associated foreign policy in areas such as national security and military

interventions, immigration, economic interdependence, and free trade. At the same time, the

shocks also contributed to shifts within the Republican party—exhibited in the rise of the Tea

Party, the Christian Right, and White Supremacists. Along with domestic pressures, the three

groups paved the way for the rise of President Trump who exhibited an orientation that

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challenged the U.S. commitment to the post-Cold War order and the premises of globalization.

President Trump also aligned with and amplified the domestic pressure. Upon his election, he

initiated a reorientation of the U.S. foreign policy toward nationalism—exhibited in terms of the

U.S. withdrawal from multilateral arrangements, the military withdrawals from Iraq and

Afghanistan, and the U.S. embrace of economic protectionism as well as its increasing hostility

toward immigration.

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Chapter Four

The United Kingdom

This chapter explores the reorientation of the British foreign policy from globalization to

nationalism. It begins with an overview of the British foreign policy under globalization that

manifested in terms of active involvement in international institutions, the special political and

military alliance with the U.S., and the integration into the European Union. This chapter follows

with exploring the effects of three shocks including the 2005 London metro bombing and

subsequent terrorist attacks, the 2008 financial crisis, and the 2015 immigration crisis. It explores

how these shocks have contributed to domestic pressure—exhibited in terms of shifts in the

British public and elites’ opinions. It also follows with exploring the shifts within the British

Conservative Party including the rise of hard Eurosceptics within as well as outside the party.

Then, this chapter explores the rise of PM Boris Johnson to power amid this national climate

tension and opposition to globalization. It follows with exploring how PM Johnson exhibited

beliefs and positions that align with and reflect domestic pressures. He also amplified the effects

of the shocks and mobilized the public toward foreign policy reorientation. Finally, this chapter

concludes with a review of the UK foreign policy under nationalism—i.e. nationalist foreign

policy. Such a policy manifested in terms of the withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit),

military abstentions and withdrawals, and unilateral and confrontational actions on the

international front.

Globalization and British Foreign Policy

Following WWII, the United Kingdom was confronted with two challenges. The first was

the increasing pressure to end the colonization of Africa and the Middle East. Hence, the UK

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declined from an empire to a European state with a second-level economy and a leading position

but not the leader of the Commonwealth (Reynolds 1991). Second, the UK also experienced a

major global setback—exhibited in the Suez Crisis in 1965. This crisis accelerated the decline of

British international power and influence. Rather than resistance and opposition, the UK was

forced to cooperate with the rising independence movements in its former colonies (Turner

2010). At the continental level, the UK was challenged by the rise of a Franco-German

alliance—exhibited in the ECC. Although opting out of the European project, the UK feared a

loss of influence and status within Europe. The UK also feared that joining the ECC would

consolidate its new position as a European rather than an imperial power (Turner 2010, Bratberg

2005).

Confronted with these challenges, the UK committed to political and economic

globalization. Under globalization, the British foreign policy manifested in terms of a political

and military alliance with the U.S. Under what became known as a “special relationship,” both

states have worked towards establishing the post-war international order and promoting

democracy and human rights. Such an alliance also helped the UK strengthen its position in

Europe and balance against its rivals (Douglas 2004, Turner 2010). The British foreign policy

under globalization also manifested in terms of active involvement in international multilateral

institutions. Such an involvement represented the British commitment to collective security and

global interdependence. It also represented the British commitment to preserving the post-world

war arrangements (Wallace 2005, Bratberg 2005). Finally, the British foreign policy under

globalization manifested in terms of integration into the EU. Shifting from its early reluctance,

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the UK pursued continental influence by joining the European integration in 1973. It also worked

with other European powers toward political stability and economic growth (Black 2017).

Military and Political Alliance with The U.S.

The early manifestation of the British foreign policy under globalization relates to its

alliance with the United States. Denoted as a “special relationship,” the UK relationship with the

U.S. represents its interdependence with the West

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. Dating back to the British colonization of

North America, both nations developed a shared history and culture. Both nations also developed

similar political values including a commitment to democracy and civil rights (Wallace 2005).

Besides this, the UK and the US share an interest in maintaining the post-war international

arrangements. Along with the U.S., the UK worked toward establishing international multilateral

institutions including the League of Nations in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945 (Douglas

2004). In the wake of the Second World War, both states also reaffirmed the premises of the

post-Cold War order including a commitment to collective security, globalization, democracy,

and human rights (Wallace 2005). The shared interests and commitments between the UK and

the U.S. provided the basis for a strategic military and political alliance. As characterized by

Winston Churchill, the U.S. represented one of three strategic venues for the UK influence:

“Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other

British Dominions and the United States play so important a part.” (Churchill

International Society 1948).

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The “special relationship” hinges on the ideas of what is known as Atlanticism or Transatlanticism, characterized

by political, economic, and defense cooperation between North American and European governments.

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