POLITICAL ISLAM IN GLOBAL POLITICS: A RESEARCH
AGENDA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS STUDIES
Introduction
One of the impacts of the Cold War in the global political arena is the
renewed strengthening of the role of religion. Although in perspective, most
scholars of global political studies see the Cold War as a war between two major
visions of the forms of global economic-political relations at the time; Western
democracy and market capitalism versus communist economy or state socialism,
but others see the Cold War as a war between various religions that claim the
existence of God against Godless Communism.
Flashbacks in history, religion has played a significant role in the
international political arena several times. We can read how the rivalry that
developed between Christian and Muslim armies in an effort to 'liberate' the Holy
Land of Jerusalem in the Middle East and exercise domination over the
geographical region. In the 17th century, there was also a 'civil war' in the British
colonies which was triggered by religious issues between Protestant supporters
and Catholics in order to compete for political influence over their colonies
scattered in various parts of the world. Not only that, in
In 1978-1979 there was an Islamic Revolution in Iran which marked the rise of
Shi'a Islamic power over Iranian territory that was previously dominated by
Sunni Islamic forces, which were affiliated to the forces of global capitalism that
were centered on the capitalistic relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia.
In its development, religion is often considered to be the cause of the
spread of fear through the enactment of certain religious laws on certain groups
of people globally. At one time, through the association of certain religions with
"terror", with various extreme political actions. At other times, through various
activities of denying the existence of other religious teachings, which are often
seen as a representation of the forces behind Samuel Huntington's idea of a "clash
of civilizations"1.
The interesting thing about these various global events or phenomena is
that they all occur in different cultures, political systems, and economic
foundations. To support this statement, the Brittanica Book of the Year 1997
provides relative data on religions and their adherents in the world in the figure
below:
Sumber: Brittanica Book of the Year 19972
The image above seems to state to us that the rise of religion in the global
political arena, has some obvious implications
Opposite3. First, transnational organizations such as the Roman Catholic
Church, the World Council of Churches, and the Islamic Da'wah Society and
other faith-based transnational organizations, seem to play a more significant role
as their population grows. Globalization that spreads using the internet and other
modern communication technologies has allowed these organizations to spread
their messages and even establish global religious networks across national
borders. So it is not religion in this case that benefits the most, but the smaller
elements in it. Second, transnational religious movements and their followers,
reinforce the development of transnational identities that ignore state boundaries,
so that by some quarters, religious identities are more important than national
identities. Third, if the global trend continues, the implications for the possibility
of global conflict will become increasingly uncertain. On the one hand, religious
movement groups spread peace movements and fight for universality, human
rights, and justice, on the other hand, religious movement groups display inter-
identity conflicts.
Thus, deductively, the three contradictions mentioned above have been
the subject of discussion and research in the study of global politics in the last
few decades. However, using a more inductive method, the author wants to
further explore some possibilities, by setting a starting point from Islam, more
precisely through some ideas about Political Islam or Political Islam, which are
related to its position on the global level.
A. Building a Global Understanding of Political Islam
Attention to Islam as an important force in global politics has been
increasing lately. The problem is that these concerns are often confused with
fears of terrorism and extremism, especially after the September 11, 2011
tragedy. Therefore, for some circles, especially in the West, Islam is considered a
threat. Of course, it can be said that this fear is the fruit of political and
intellectual prejudice against Islam that has indeed lived for a long time since the
days of classical orientalists to contemporary journalists. The diversity of the face
of Islam is reduced only to the figure of Usamah Bin Ladin. In addition, the
prejudice also appears as a result of inability to understand global politics itself.
The world is changing so fast. Globalization has penetrated into almost all
aspects of life, so the traditional boundaries between the West and the East, for
example, are challenged in such a way. On the other hand, migration flows have
led millions of people, including Muslims, to cross national national borders,
forming transnational communities and diasporas, so that identity affiliation to a
particular geographical unit can no longer be permanently maintained4.
In the context of global politics, Islam and Muslims are not entities that
are completely isolated from the context outside of it. They are part of a
particular citizen on the one hand and part of the international community on the
other. With the astonishing achievements of information technology, various
individuals and communities are virtually connected to each other in an intention
that almost resembles the previous type of traditional communication. In this
situation, the best way to understand Islam and Muslims is to put it in the
conversation of modernity. However, it is precisely at this point that we will soon
see that modernity is always plural, so the word 'modernity' actually means
'modernities'5. In other words, there is no single path to modernity. To some
extent, each entity has a distinctive historical experience, so the references and
the way they respond to modernity are certainly different from one another.
Islam is an entity that is very plural in itself6. Disagreements have arisen
since the beginning of his birth. Therefore, the Muslim response to modernity
rooted in Western philosophy is certainly not the same between one Muslim and
another. Some refuse, some accept, others reject and accept. In contemporary
times, it is certain that no Muslim can escape the reach and influence of
modernity, at least in the form of material culture. Even the so-called most
remote circles, who openly voiced war against the West, in fact still had contact
with technology that came from the industrial world of Western countries. In the
literature of Islamic studies, Muslims' responses to the situation of modernity are
called Islamic reform. This is interesting because although it covers a wide range
of aspects, including the most esoteric such as Sufism, the Islamic renewal
movement was originally born as a form of response to Western modernity.
The question is, in the face of contemporary globalization and the
internal complexity of the Muslim world, is it still relevant to talk about Islamic
reform? This question is a cliché, but it's always not easy to answer. Although the
roots of dissent in Islam can be traced back to the classical period, the Islamic
reforms that will be discussed in this paper have a character born from the
context of the encounter between Islam and the modern West. In the
contemporary context, however, the question is no longer whether Islam fits into
the modernity that is considered inherent in Western traditions, but how both
Islam and the West respond to modernity. This emphasis is important because
global politics after September 11, 2001 has undergone significant constellation
changes towards Islam and Muslims7. Security discourse dominates the
perspective of Islam and Muslims, including in the academic world8. From here,
various categorizations were born, such as fundamentalism, radicalism, and
Islamism.
Since its inception, differences of opinion have been inherent in Islam.
However, when the Prophet Muhammad was still alive, the difference of opinion
could be resolved quickly. Serious problems arose soon after the Prophet died.
Dissent turned into political divisions. Three of the four companions of the
Prophet (Khulafah al-Rashidin) died tragically because they were killed by
Muslims themselves9. Since the death of Ali Bin Abi Talib, political divisions
among Muslims have been seen no longer as a shameful division, but as a
sociological reality. Therefore, it is not surprising that in this classical period of
Islam (7th to 13th century AD) various madhhabs of thought were born, both in
the fields of law, theology, as well as philosophy and tasawwuf10. In the field of
law, in that period were born great figures such as Imam Malik, Imam Abu
Hanifah, Imam Shafi'i, and Imam Hambali. The four became the founders of the
fiqh madhhab – Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi'i, and Hambali—which exists until now. In
the field of theology or kalam science, various schools were born such as Sunnah
wal Jama'ah, Mu'tazilah, Shia, and so on. These streams in certain moments
attack each other sharply, even to the point of bloodshed. Meanwhile, in the field
of philosophy and tasawwuf, thinkers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Al-
Ghazali, and others appeared.
However, the intellectual achievements of the classical period are not
called Islamic renewal. At that time, Muslims still saw themselves as the center,
or at least one of them, of world civilization. Europe was still asleep in the Dark
Ages. It was not until the end of the 18th century, when Napoleon occupied
Egypt in 1789, that the Islamic world became fully aware that they were already
in decline and even decline both politically and intellectually11. Since then, the
idea of the need for Islamic reform has emerged. The initial question was how
did the Muslim world rise from its lagging behind Europe? This question
resonates loudly and gives birth to diverse responses.
There are at least two important responses to the idea of Islamic renewal
in this modern period12. First, it came from what is now Saudi Arabia, where
Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahab (1703-1787) developed his ideas that would later
become known as Wahhabism. Most of his thoughts refer to a 12th-century
Hambali madhhab fiqhist, Ibn Taymiyah, but with a more literal and dogmatic
reinterpretation than Ibn Taymiyah himself. Wahhabism argues that the decline
of Islam occurs due to the spread of local traditions and beliefs that tarnish the
purity of Islam. Wahhabism invites Muslims to return to the religious practices
of the as-salaf as-shalih (pious predecessors), namely the first three generations
of the Prophet's companions: the companions, tabi'in, tabi' at-tabi'in. On this
basis, Wahhabism is also known as Salafism, its followers are called Salafists.
The second response came from Egypt. Since the classical period, Egypt has
been known as the political and intellectual center of Islam. In the late 19th
century and especially the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt was a gathering
place for prominent Islamic intellectuals, such as Jamaluddin al-Afghani, Rashid
Ridha, and Muhammad Abduh. These three thinkers, especially al-Afghani,
voiced the importance of solidarity among Muslims around the world, which at
that time were largely under the power of European colonialism. In addition,
there are also thinkers such as Hasan Al-Bana who founded the Brotherhood
Muslim in 1928. This movement is more salafiyah. Radical Islamic movements
in contemporary times generally take inspiration and even working methods from
this Muslim Brotherhood.
Islamic reform in the modern period largely boils down to questions
about the relationship between religion and politics or Islam and the state. This
central question is actually ironic because at the same time Muslim countries are
under the grip of foreign nations. The creed that Islam is a religion and the state
is getting stronger in this period. This creed is more popularly expressed in the
jargon 'Islam kaffah'. The point is that Islam is expected to color all areas of life,
not only spirituality, but also social, economic, and political. The Muslim
Brotherhood founded by al-Bana, later further deologized by Sayyid Quthb, was
undoubtedly a movement that was very influential in the dissemination of this
idea13.
This paper views that the period of contemporary Islam began in the
second half of the 20th century, namely from the end of World War II until now.
This period of contemporary Islam is marked by two main events. First, the
decolonization of Muslim countries from the grip of European colonialism.
Second, the wave of Muslim migration to Western countries. The two events
have changed the geographical landscape of the Muslim world. The so-called
Muslim world is no longer synonymous with the Arab world, but encompasses a
wide range of national states spread across almost all corners of the world,
stretching from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Moreover, Muslims have since
become part of the demographics of Western countries.
However, in the early decades after World War II, Islam was not yet an
important subject in global politics. The main issue at that time was the Cold War
between the Western Bloc led by the United States with its liberalism jargon and
the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union with its communist jargon. The
ideological battle between the two blocs became the background for almost all
international political and economic events. In this case, the position of the Non-
Aligned Countries, in which Indonesia and several other Muslim countries are
included, is quite squeezed and in reality is only an object of struggle for the
influence of the superpowers.
The decolonization of Muslim-majority countries from the grip of
European colonialism has exposed Islam and Muslims to a new reality, namely
the modern nation-state. Exactly at this point, the claims
The universal religion of Islam inevitably has to work in the specific realm.
Modern nation-states normatively always assume the existence of limited
citizenship ties. The relationship between a citizen or individual and the state is
bound by a commitment that is to some degree secular. Modern nation-states
transcend their citizens from the shell of ethnic, religious, and other types of
communalism into a large container called the nation. The process of
transcendence is never easy, even in many places there is bloody violence. One
of the reasons for this is the disposition of the modern nation-state itself, which,
in Weber's perspective, is given legitimacy to use violence for the sake of its
territorial integrity.
In the context of the modern nation-state, Islam is one of the many
political ideologies that fight for place and influence in the formation of the state
and the structure of government. In other words, Islam in politics changed from a
sacred identity to a profane identity. Therefore, the existence of Islamic parties
does not automatically receive full support from Muslims. The main concern in
modern nation-state politics is the management of secular public spaces, not
surrender to God. Muslims are involved in various political parties and social
movements with diverse ideologies: liberal, socialist, to communist. Islamic
parties in Muslim countries did not get significant votes. In Indonesia, in the
1955 General Election, Islamic parties such as Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama
had to share a place with nationalist and communist parties. In Turkey, the
opposite is true. After decades of being ruled by a secular government regime
with a strong Kemalis ideological background, the Islamist Adalet ve Kalkmma
Partition (AKP) since 2002 won the general election and led the government14.
While some Muslims are active in various activities in their respective
homelands, others immigrate to Western countries in search of a better life15.
The background, both the so-called driving and pulling factors in classical
migration theory, is generally economic. At that time, Western European
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands had just emerged from the
wreckage of World War II.
But in a short time these countries bounced back with an impressive rate of
economic growth. New factories were built, old factories were renovated. To fill
job vacancies in these factories, thousands of workers were brought in. Most of
them are from Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Morocco. In Britain and
France, most of the migrants also came from Muslim countries of their former
colonies; Algerians in France, Indians and Pakistanis in England. In its
development, the migrant workers, who are generally men, bring their families
with them. The Muslim population in these Western countries has increased in
number until now.
Furthermore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, which was
followed by a 'third wave of democratization' in its satellite countries, the global
landscape underwent very significant changes, including on the issue of Islam.
Previously, in 1979, a revolution led by the Khomaini succeeded in overthrowing
the secular Shah regime in Iran. The event, known as the Islamic Revolution of
Iran, has important implications both for the Islamic world internally and for the
international political constellation. Internally, the revolution hardened the classic
Sunni-Shia rivalry. Saudi Arabia, with its harsh Wahhabism character,
increasingly appears as the guardian of Sunni orthodoxy the holy city of
Haramain (Makkah and Medina). Competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in
fighting for influence in the Islamic world is inevitable. At the same time, the
United States entered the new map of competition by bringing its own
ideological and political economic interests. Elsewhere, in Afghanistan, the end
of the Cold War resulted in what some Western observers call the 'globalization
of Jihad'. The exponents of the mujahideen who had previously fought against
the invasion of the Soviet Union eventually dispersed. Some of them come from
Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. After the
war ended, they returned to their hometowns, but from here a network of
Islamism on a global scale was born. Their existence certainly adds complexity.
The tragedy of September 11, 2001 was an event that dramatically
opened a new chapter in the relationship between Islam and the West. For the
neo-conservatives who stood behind the Bush Jr. administration in the United
States, the event seemed to justify their view that Islam was indeed incompatible
with Western values. Since that event, Islam has become an important subject in
global politics. Meanwhile, in Muslim countries, democratization is increasingly
becoming a buzzword in politics, so that even the most authoritarian
governments
even though it claims to be a democratic country. In the late 1990s, the New
Order regime under General Suharto in Indonesia fell from power, leading
Indonesia to emerge as the largest Muslim democracy in the world. The most
astonishing and still ongoing today, with the death toll already in the thousands,
is the wave of reforms in Arab countries. After the fall of Hosni Mubarak from
the presidency in Egypt, demands for political change hit almost all government
regimes in the Middle East. Even the most conservative countries such as Saudi
Arabia are trying to open themselves up to similar demands. In short, the
contemporary Islamic world is part of a world that is changing very rapidly,
involving not only material aspects but also ideology.
After the September 11, 2001 incident that destroyed the WTC building
in New York, relations between Islam and the West must be admittedly strained.
Following the bombings in London and Madrid in 2005, the tension extended
further to Europe. As mentioned earlier, since then some people in the West
consider Muslims to be terrorists and extremists. The situation, which is more or
less obscured by often inaccurate media reports, certainly has a serious impact on
Muslims, especially for those living in Western countries. Loyalty to the country
in which they live is now questionable, even though many of them are already
citizens. Migration flows are tightened. At the same time, ultra-nationalist Right-
wing political forces are on the rise in several European countries, such as the
Netherlands, France, and Germany. Coupled with the economic and financial
crisis, Islamophobia and xeno-phobia sentiment are on the rise in Western
countries.
In academia, interest in Islam has also increased rapidly. However, the
greatest increase in interest has come from security analysts16. Actually, there is
nothing wrong with this phenomenon, but placing Islam as a factor in security
issues is of course problematic. Studies with this perspective often fall on
essentialism, which is to consider an entity as a complete identity in itself. If a
Muslim is involved in acts of terrorism, the reason for his participation is more
sought in his religious identity. Under the shadow of the perspective of security
discourse, the complexity of Islam and Muslims is reduced to a dichotomy:
Islamist and moderate. Islamists are radical Muslims who tend to agree, and
some are even involved, with acts of terrorism and extremism, and therefore
certainly anti-Western. On the other hand, moderates are Muslims who are
tolerant of foreign values, especially those coming from the West. At first glance,
there seems to be nothing wrong with this dichotomy, but Mamdani (2002) has
warned that such a dichotomy is problematic because it seems to ethically divide
Muslims into two camps: on the one hand there are "Bad Muslims", i.e. Islamists,
while on the other there are "good Muslims" ("Good Muslims")"), i.e. moderates.
In other words, the dividing line among Muslims is really based on their attitude
towards the West.
In reality, as mentioned above, Muslims have become part of the
communities that exist in Western countries. Therefore, thinkers such as Tariq
Ramadan (2004) have repeatedly voiced their views on 'European Muslims'17.
Hasan al-Bana's grandson, who now lives in France, said the Islamic-Western
dichotomy should be reviewed. He showed that both conceptually and
empirically Islam and the West can reconcile to form a common community in a
secular nation-state. Internally, he invited contemporary Islamic scholars to think
about a new model of Islamic renewal based on Muslims in the West. According
to him, almost all products of Islamic thought, from fiqh to theology, are based
on the experience of Muslims in Muslim countries. He gave an example of the
terms Dar al-Harb (enemy area) and Dar al-Islam (Islamic area) which are no
longer relevant because they were born in the context before the flow of
migration and globalization that deterritorialized Islamic territory as it is now. At
the same time, however, Ramadan also calls on Western governments and
societies to accept the sociological fact that Muslims are now part of them. Of
course, because of their different cultural roots, Ramadan and many other
thinkers and activists are calling on the government to acknowledge these
differences in cultural practices and even if possible accommodate them
politically as part of the European public sphere. The proposal, theoretically
known as multiculturalism, is seen as helping to bridge cultural differences
between Muslim migrants, most of whom are already citizens of the country, and
local indigenous communities.
B. Political Islam and Its Implications in Indonesia
The study of Islam and politics in Indonesia is now one of the most
popular topics in the discipline of political science, Southeast Asian studies, and
Islamic studies. A series Discussions and discourses on various variations and
phenomena of political Islam in Indonesia, ranging from 'modernist,'
'traditionalist,' 'liberal-progressive,' 'fundamentalist,' to 'terrorist' are the main
themes in the study of Islam and politics in Indonesia. Until now, the perspective
used to see Indonesian Islam is a 'big narrative' in the form of the fact that
Indonesia, the country with the largest Muslim population in the world, has
successfully carried out the electoral democratization process and become a
democratic republic, which despite being challenged and threatened by a handful
of fundamentalist and terrorist groups in the name of Islam, has received
tremendous support from the moderate and progressive Muslim majority. which
is the pillar of the life of the nation.
Vedi R. Hadiz (2011), entitled Indonesian Political Islam: Capitalist
Development and the Legacies of the Cold War published by the Journal of
Southeast Asian Affairs, provides a new, or at least different, perspective in
exploring Islamic and political issues in Indonesia18. In his article, Hadiz
revealed some of the main arguments from his analysis. First, according to
Hadiz, instead of the result of the democratization process, political Islam
originated and was rooted in the New Order; Second, political Islam in Indonesia
is actually a populist response that is part of the rise of political Islam globally in
North Africa and the Middle East. Hadiz begins by arguing that the study of
political Islam in Indonesia is not enough to describe the various phenomena that
have emerged, especially after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center
building in September, 2011, which made security-oriented analysis a hot seller.
According to Hadiz, this reading tends to be simplistic, and forgets the diversity
of reality of various variations of Islam, Muslims, and political Islam. In the
Indonesian context, there are at least three things that need to be considered,
namely the pattern of political and state Islamic relations, the absence of left,
liberal-progressive, or social-democratic alternative opposition forces in
Indonesia's political history, as well as global political conditions, especially the
Cold War, which played a role in shaping the character of political Islam in
Indonesia.
Later, Hadiz reinforces the claim of political Islam as a populist response
to global capitalism by citing parallel examples from the Middle East and North
Africa, as a representation of the Islamic world. The root of the rise of political
Islam in the Middle East and North Africa is the political vacuum caused by the
absence of left-leaning and progressive parties in general. both communist,
secular-liberal-progressive, and social-democratic, which was caused by the
demands of the Cold War at that time which made a systemic undermining of the
aforementioned political forces and also the 'Arab Nationalism and Socialism'
project which tended to be authoritarian, so that dynamic political opposition was
not possible. It is also worth remembering that the bargaining position of the
Arabian Peninsula in the global economic and political arena at that time was
increasing due to the oil boom, the overflow of oil that supported the petrodollar
economy. However, it is this oil economy that has become a double-edged
sword. Along with the surge in demand for oil, neoliberal economic policies and
cuts to public budgets became rampant, not to mention the very limited channels
of political aspirations in authoritarian regimes. Social disparities, restrictions on
expression in public spaces, and the large number of young workforces, it is not
surprising that a combination of these factors leads to social frustration.
As a result, as Fareed Zakaria (2003) expressed, mosques became one of
the few places where people could express their uneasiness, a momentum that
was ultimately effectively seized by the fundamentalist elements of political
Islam, especially because mosques could not and should not be closed19.
Hadiz then returned to discussing Indonesia, and how the similarities
and differences between the patterns in the Arabian Peninsula and Indonesia can
explain the phenomenon of contemporary political Islam. Political Islam in
Indonesia in its various variants is also a source of inspiration for the spirit of
egalitarianism, social justice, as well as criticism of social inequality and
corruption, especially during the New Order period. Departing from this point,
Hadiz then explained the historical context of the rise of political Islam in
Indonesia from the colonial period to the present, especially in its fundamentalist
and vigilantist form, as well as its relation to the decline of leftist politics, the
dynamics of the relationship between political Islam and the state, and the role of
the middle class or Muslim middle class in politics.
There are several important conclusions, according to Hadiz, in his
interpretation of political Islam in Indonesia. In terms of the economic base,
Hadiz argues that political Islam in Indonesia comes from the middle class, the
petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie in general. This can be seen in the colonial
period, where political Islamic movements such as Sarekat Islam (SI) were
dominated by merchants and the bourgeoisie. In the New Order period, as an
excess of the development of Orba capitalism, the class The Indonesian middle
class began to grow rapidly, especially among the Muslim middle class, which
would later be influential in determining the direction of political Islam. The
development of political Islam, according to Hadiz, cannot be separated from the
context of its international relations. In the colonial period, the emergence of
political Islam could not be separated from the development of nationalism in
Indonesia and the rise of the anti-imperialist movement of Third World
nationalism. In terms of identity, political Islam can also go hand in hand with
the ideas of the left at large, as evidenced during the colonial period when the SI
and its members, who were also the embryos of the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), promoted socialist agendas oriented towards social justice.
Furthermore, several conclusions were also drawn from the mapping of
the role of political Islam during the New Order period and afterwards. First, the
representation of the Muslim middle class in political Islam played a role in the
birth and formation of politics during the New Order period, as also explained by
Hefner (1993)20 and Robison (1995)21. Second, the tendency of vigilantism and
fundamentalism that smells of violence in political Islam stems from the
persecution of the aspirations of political Islam as well as the use of these pro-
violent elements by the New Order regime for the sake of the legitimacy of its
power – something that continued until the reform period where pro-violent
Islamic groups were maintained by the state. Third, and lastly, is the argument
that in the political vacuum of the Indonesian left after the eradication of the PKI,
political Islam plays an important role as a criticism of the middle class as well as
a populist criticism of the policies of the New Order, although according to
Hadiz, political Islam does not have a clear mission to transform or subvert the
repressive social order of the New Order.
Overall, Hadiz's article succeeded in providing a new perspective in the
study of political Islam in Indonesia: that the rise of political Islam, both in its
moderate-progressive and middle-class-based variants and the populist
fundamentalist-vigilantist ones, is part of the global trend occurring in the Islamic
world and the tendency of fundamentalism and vigilantism in political Islam, is
an excess of the 32 years of New Order authoritarianism. that came to the
surface in its populist form. Everything cannot be separated from the context of
the cold war and the influence of the development of capitalism neoliberalism at
the international level which also affects the development of political Islam.
C. Conclusion
As mentioned above, this paper wants to further explore some of the
possibilities of conducting a study on the relationship between religion and
political Islamic activity, which is related to its position on the global level.
From the above explanation, it can be seen how Islam and modernity are
involved in certain moments of encounter, from colonialism to the global
political situation after the events of September 11, 2001. The outcome of the
encounter varies, depending on the complexity of Muslims themselves, who have
indeed been deteritorialized to such a degree. The so-called Muslim world can no
longer be conceptually referred only to the Middle East or Arabia from which
Islam was first born, but to the world itself. The existence of Muslims stretches
across national countries from North Africa to Southeast Asia. In addition, not a
few Muslims who now live in Europe, have become an integral part of Western
society itself. This situation is certainly a challenge for both Muslim thinkers and
observers interested in Islamic issues to think of a new model of Islamic reform.
In the previous period, the assumption underlying the discourse of Islamic
renewal was the dichotomy between Islam and the West against the background
of colonialism and the very strong postcolonial trauma of the early
decolonization period. Now those old assumptions are partly irrelevant. The
contemporary model of Islamic renewal should take into account the fact of the
widening global interconnection on the one hand, but also the growing anti-
Islamic and anti-xenophobic sentiment in Western countries themselves on the
other.
In Indonesia, political Islam comes from the middle class, the petty
bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie in general. This can be seen in the colonial
period, where political Islamic movements seemed to be dominated by merchants
and bourgeoisie. During the New Order period, as an excess of the development
of Orba capitalism, the Indonesian middle class began to grow rapidly, especially
among the Muslim middle class, which would later be influential in determining
the direction of political Islam. The development of political Islam, according to
Hadiz, cannot be separated from the context of its international relations. In the
colonial period, the emergence of political Islam could not be separated from the
development of nationalism in Indonesia and the rise of the anti-imperialist
movement of Third World nationalism. Academically, these things are a
challenge as well as open up opportunities for the implementation of further
studies, which can be used as an intellectual offer for the discourse on the
development of mainstream Islam, which often limits the face of Islam to aspects
related to the issue of terrorism and extremism.
