NAVIGATING THE PANDEMIC COMPARATIVE ANALYSES AND THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION DURING COVID-19

NAVIGATING THE PANDEMIC: COMPARATIVE ANALYSES AND

THEORETICAL INSIGHTS IN POLICY-MAKING AND

IMPLEMENTATION DURING COVID-19

CHAPTER 1 NETWORK GOVERNANCE IN CHINESE LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

1.1 Chapter Overview

Combining the network governance model with knowledge of emergency management, this

manuscript analyzes the performance of Hubei and Sichuan provincial governments in

response to COVID-19 in early 2020. This study reveals that network governance, as seen in

the Chinese response to COVID-19, does not closely resemble any of the three well-known

forms of network governance in the literature. Instead, although the prevailing governance

structure mimics some elements of the Network Administrative Organization form, it exhibits

some uniquely Chinese characteristics. This manuscript also argues that core leaders’

characteristics, mass media roles, and path-dependent adherence to systems created earlier

significantly affect the resulting network governance. This manuscript also provides

suggestions for improving the effectiveness of network governance of emergency

management in China’s centralized system. These suggestions are specifically designed to

complement the unique characteristics and requirements of China's governance structure,

ensuring a strategic, resilient, and responsive approach to managing emergencies effectively

within the country's distinct administrative framework.

Keywords: COVID-19, network governance, provincial government, Chinese characteristics,

comparative studies

1.2 Research Question and Significance

In early January 2020, COVID-19 became China's major public health emergency. One after

another, provincial governments carried out emergency management policies in response.

Due to varied performances in pre-disaster preparation and response stages, epidemic

prevention and control, and the speed and effect of local economic recovery, they differed

across the provinces. This manuscript raises the following research questions: RQ1a: Did the

Chinese response to COVID-19 adhere to existing network governance forms as depicted in

the literature? RQ1b: If not, how did network governance differ for the Chinese context?

RQ2: How did the response vary between Hubei and Sichuan provinces, and what are the

implications for a Chinese network governance model? Moreover, RQ3: If China's general

political and administrative environment remains unchanged, what strategies can be more

effective for government leaders to fine-tune network governance to accommodate the unique

Chinese context and improve public health emergency management? According to Hofstede

(2001), differences in governmental and societal systems are sometimes described as the

result of different cultures and other times represented as the result of different emergent

institutional systems (North, 1991); I suspect the differences in network governance in China

are primarily because of institutional differences including centralized system and top-down

mechanism of governance.

Based on the characteristics of a strong government’s unique administrative model, this

manuscript explores how two Chinese provinces performed their respective functions,

mobilized public resources, and cooperated with external organizations. Thus, my

comparative cases examine how public and private hospitals, social media, private

enterprises, and tried to universities responded to this public health crisis, safeguarded public

interest, and reduced economic losses. Hubei and Sichuan Provinces provided valuable

information for emergency managers and researchers to look for differences in responding to

the outbreak.

1.3 Literature Review and Background of Response to COVID-19 in Hubei and Sichuan

1.3.1 Literature Review: Form of Network Governance

A network consists of a set of nodes, or actors, and the ties between these nodes (Borgatti et

al., 2013). These nodes can be persons, teams, organizations, regions, countries, and so on

(Borgatti et al., 2013). These ties, which connect actors in networks to each other, can

represent relations among the nodes, such as friendship, knowledge exchange, advice

seeking, competition, collaboration, and so on (Carpenter et al., 2012). Compared with formal

hierarchies and pure-form markets, networks have advantages in promoting learning,

enhancing organizational legitimacy, and producing economic benefits (Podolny & Page,

1998).

As for network governance, some researchers define it as a form of governing where public,

nonprofit, and private sectors are involved in collective action and consensus-oriented

decision-making (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; Kapucu, 2012). It is also

defined as “the use of institutions and structures of authority and collaboration to allocate

resources and to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole” (Bryson et

al., 2006;

Isett & Miranda, 2015; Kapucu, 2012; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Network governance can

advance understanding of “the internal mechanics of collaborative governance instances”

(Kenis, 2016, p. 155). In particular, the network approach to governance addresses how

“specific cases of governance develop, function, and perform” by focusing on “how the

governance, leadership, and management of relationships between the actors involved are

structured” (Kenis, 2016, p. 155).

Milward and Provan (2006) suggested three types of network governance structures:

participant-governed networks or shared governance, which is the simplest and most common

form of network governance and depends exclusively on the involvement and commitment of

its members; lead organization-governed networks, which are highly centralized and brokered

with asymmetrical power; and governance structures led by a Network Administrative

Organization (Hereafter NAO). With the NAO framework, a separate administrative entity is

set up expressly to govern the network and its activities.

Specifically, network effectiveness is how a network achieves its organizational, community,

or network-level goals (Kapucu & Hu, 2020). There are four critical predictors for achieving

effectiveness in the three network governance forms: Trust, number of participants, goal

consensus, and the need for network-level competencies (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Based on

these four key predictors, Provan and Kenis (2008) also pointed out how each network

governance form can most effectively achieve network-level outcomes. The shared network

governance model will be most effective when trust is widely shared within the high-density

network and among its decentralized and relatively few participants. The shared network

governance model also requires high network-level goal consensus but a low need for

networklevel competencies. Lead organization governance models can be effective even

when trust is narrowly shared among a moderate number of participants. The lead

organization model will likely have low network-level goal consensus and a reasonable need

for network-level competencies. The NAO network governance can be effective when trust is

moderately to widely shared among the network’s participants and there is a moderate to

large number of participants. Also, within the NAO model, network-level goal consensus is

usually moderately high, and the need for network-level competencies is high. This

manuscript suggests that from a macro-level perspective, when the number of network

participants keeps increasing and the jurisdiction of the network’s responsibilities expands,

the NAO governance model becomes the most effective form. This configuration permits

network governance operators to satisfy most participants' needs and handle complicated

issues effectively.

As for the NAO form, four critical predictors of the effectiveness of network governance can

be interpreted as follows (Provan & Kenis, 2008). First, trust can be interpreted as one

relationship characteristic that reflects “the willingness to accept vulnerability based on

positive expectations about another’s intentions or behaviors” (McEvily et al., 2003). Within

the NAO form, trust can be lower compared with the shared governance model, for its

members are called upon to collectively monitor the actions of NAO leadership (Provan &

Kenis, 2008). Even so, NAO needs to develop trust and good working relationships with the

member organizations for effective knowledge sharing (Huang, 2014).

Second, as for the number of participants, the NAO form can facilitate many diverse

participants due to its unique administrative structure (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The NAO

form is likely to be most effective in networks with the most significant number of

participants. Because it has its unique administrative structure, it will be able to handle more

significant numbers of diverse participants and the complexity brought by social issues and

increasing numbers of various participants.

Third, the NAO form requires more significant involvement by at least a subset of network

members. These participants are typically committed to network-level goals and are

strategically involved with the network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). NAO leaders and staff must

work with participants daily and cope with potential conflicts, enhancing commitment to the

network and its goals. Thus, goal consensus can be moderately strong in the NAO form.

Lastly, when it comes to the network competencies, with an NAO, although there may be

significant size and resource constraints, it is the job of the network-level staff to develop the

skills needed for network-level action (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The NAO form requires more

significant involvement by at least a subset of network members. These participants are

typically committed to network-level goals and have a strategic involvement with the

network.

1.3.2 Background: Chinese Context

China is a country with the largest population and largest governmental structure in the world.

To operate this considerable vessel effectively, governance in China needs a complex form of

network governance that can effectively respond to the challenges and promote economic and

social development. Within the framework of state-society relations, China adopts a

centralized “state-centered top-down approach” (Sellers, 2011). Some observers describe the

government of China as an authoritarian political system under the political leadership of the

Chinese Communist Party (hereafter: CCP) (Minzner, 2011; Wang, 2015). Following

Minzner (2011) and Wang (2015), Chinese provincial governments are under the jurisdiction

of the central government, and, in turn, they supervise the municipal governments within their

jurisdictions. Because of their robust governance mode, all levels of government are

dominant in public resource mobilization and organizational capacity. Thus, local officials

manage social affairs through top-down policies. This is especially evident in the face of

large-scale disasters, for which governmental leaders claim advantages of “nationwide

systems.”

Freedom House (2020) suggests that in countries with highly centralized governments, social

organizations and people outside the government rarely express ideas and behaviors that go

against the government, and they do not question the government’s claims, even when their

strategies are realistic. Organizational power and centrality depend on the nature and the

context of the participants in network governance (Hoffman et al., 1990; Keast et al., 2004).

Under these conditions, one can see that Chinese governments can quickly mobilize and

concentrate the required public resources to accomplish a series of significant actions. This

may also present a potential problem: the government directly implements the evaluation of

government decision-making. Under these circumstances, lack of supervision, power

rentseeking, and corruption may occur. Thus, one might question fairness and impartiality

towards some network participants.

This manuscript will extend our understanding of Provan and Kenis’ (2008) key factors that

influence the effectiveness of network governance forms by examining the governance forms

implemented by the Chinese government in response to COVID-19. Specifically, the

governance and actions of two Chinese provinces will be studied and compared to each other

and Western countries.

1.3.3 Historical Precedence for Chinese Characteristics Network Governance of Public Health

Emergencies

China experienced the impact of SARS in 2003. To deal with the virus effectively, China

passed the Regulations on Emergency Response to Public Health Emergencies on May 7,

2003, which was officially implemented two days later. After SARS was effectively

controlled, on August

28, 2004, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, passed on February

21, 1989, and implemented on September 1 of the same year, was revised again. At the same

time, the Emergency Response Law was passed on August 30, 2007, and implemented on

November 1 of the same year. In 2009, the H1N1 influenza pandemic caused 120,498

confirmed cases and 648 deaths in China (Tang, 2010). Since then, China has revised the

Regulations on Public Health Emergencies on January 8, 2011, and the Law on the

Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases on June 29, 2013, to improve the response

level to public health emergencies. These suggest that, guided by relevant laws and

regulations, the Chinese government has continuously strengthened the governance of the

epidemic prevention network to improve its management capabilities in early warning,

decision-making, resource allocation, treatment implementation, and post-pandemic recovery.

Article 3 of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases classifies infectious

diseases into Types I, II, and III. Type I refers to plague and cholera. Type II includes

infectious atypical pneumonia, AIDS, viral hepatitis, avian influenza, etc. Type III has

influenza, mumps, rubella, etc. Article 4 of this law stipulates that among the Type II

infectious diseases, SARS, pulmonary anthrax, and highly pathogenic avian influenza,

prevention and control measures for Type I contagious diseases should be taken. For sudden

infectious diseases of unknown cause, where prevention and control measures for Type I

infectious diseases as referred to in this Law need to be taken, the health administrative

department of the State Council shall promptly report to the State Council for approval and

announce and implement them.

1.3.3.1 Core Government Leaders’ Characteristics

Leaders are expected to be flexible and adaptable to the changes in their environments

(Kapucu & Hu, 2020). However, under a centralized system, the core leaders are compelling

and have dominant roles in public affairs, especially in public health emergencies. March

(1994, p.141) defined power as “the capability to get what you want or to fulfill your

identity.” I suggest that China’s centralized government and provincial magistrates (provincial

party secretary and governor) tend to dominate, which means that independence for external

organizations and individuals is limited, for they need to conform to government orders.

Organizations with more resources in the network might have more power, control, and

authority in decision-making (e.g., Kelman et al., 2013; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Pfeffer &

Salancik, 1978). In this situation, an organization that is more central in the network will have

more power (e.g., Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Choi & Robertson, 2014; Scott & Davis, 2007).

Following Nohria (1992), the characteristics of Chinese governmental leaders can also be a

significant predictor for the effectiveness of the network. These may include charisma,

expertise, gender, education, formal role or position, control of critical resources and

information, and potential gatekeeping function. Due to the characteristics of strong

government and the lack of external monitoring from citizens, social groups, and other

branches of government, the competencies of individual leaders are more crucial to ensure the

effectiveness of network governance.

1.3.3.2 Mass Media’s Roles and Effects

Media can convey knowledge sharing and information exchange, critical elements of

effective network governance. Knowledge management aims to identify, extract, and capture

knowledge-based assets to utilize them best to achieve goals (Agranoff, 2008). Knowledge

sharing and management provide participants access to others’ information and knowledge

and can help public organizations respond to environmental uncertainty and complexity

(Dawes et al., 2009). These ideas suggest that information exchange is a crucial function for

interorganizational networks. Organizations utilize existing ties or build new connections to

access helpful information or distribute information in networks (Kapucu & Hu, 2020). A

wellconnected network fosters smooth communication processes and allows timely

information exchange (Koliba et al., 2010; Milward & Provan, 2006). Also, effective

exchange of information and knowledge management should be emphasized to obtain

information and respond to emergencies promptly because these are indicators of high-

performing networks (Popp et al., 2014).

In public health emergencies, social media has become significant. Some media provide

platforms for content production and communication based on user relationships on the

Internet. Some media can facilitate interpersonal communication, information sharing, and

cooperation (Fung et al., 2015). For an increasing number of people, social media should be a

ubiquitous tool and support administrative, private, and professional use, such as a source of

information, news, entertainment, or networking (Ventola, 2014; Vraga et al., 2018). In the

field of public health, social media can facilitate informative communication of disease risks

and intervention and dissemination of healthy lifestyles and public health policies. Some

media can also serve as potential data sources for public health testing to complement

traditional disease surveillance and be valuable for tracking epidemics (Li et al., 2020).

China’s mass media comprises institutional, market-oriented, and online media (Tian & Zhu,

2015). Institutional media are organized and led by the CCP, which include central and local

press and official new media, which contribute to the purpose of governance and play a role

in organizing and guiding public opinion (Guo et al., 2005). Market-oriented press emerged

in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s (Shirk, 2011), changing from the sole proprietorship

of government agencies to today’s increasing role for private ownership (Xu & Albert, 2017).

In the early 1990s, the Chinese government authorized these media to undertake private

revenueraising (Guo et al., 2005). Online media include business news websites and other

outlets created by private citizens. After obtaining an “Internet News Information Service

License” issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), commercial news

websites can engage in specialized news reporting, editing, publishing news reviews, etc., to

attract readers and generate income. Privately created media consists of content creators,

including Weibo, WeChat public accounts, and other forms, and have become minors' primary

source of news information (Ji et al., 2018).

1.3.3.3 Path Dependence

Path dependence (Arthur, 1989) may also relate to how network governance unfolded in

response to COVID-19. Path dependence means that past policies determine the future

development of economic systems or policies. At a broad level, path dependence refers to the

fact that what happens at an early stage affects the outcome of subsequent events (Sewell,

1996). In a narrow sense, path dependence means that once a country or region starts to

embark on a particular “track,” the cost of reversal will be very high. Even if there are other

options, various factors make it challenging to achieve easy reversal (Levi, 1997). A distinct

yet closely related concept to path dependence is the concept of imprinting, which captures

how initial environmental conditions leave a persistent mark (or imprint) on organizations

and organizational collectives (such as industries and communities), thus continuing to shape

organizational behaviors and outcomes in the long run, even as external environmental

conditions change (Marquis, 2013).

1.4 Methods

This study conducts a comparative case analysis (Hamel, 1993; Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1995;

Yin, 2018) between Hubei and Sichuan Provinces in their COVID-19 responses. I sought data

for significant indicators, such as the number of COVID-19 cases, as a valuable measure of

policy effectiveness. This study uses multiple data sources, including media reports,

government archives, and datasets summarized by the Health Commissions of these two

provinces. This study compares the performances of these provinces during pre-disaster

preparation, response, and post-disaster recovery phases. These three phases derive from the

U.S. Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) created by FEMA leaders (Federal

et al., 2010; Giuffrida, 1985). I identify the foremost provincial leaders, specialized

bureaucrats, social organizations, and individuals and their roles and impact in performing the

COVID-19 response. This study also highlights the critical events concerning different

strategies the two provinces took under the same political system.

There are two reasons why this manuscript chooses Hubei Province and Sichuan Province.

On the one hand, Hubei Province is widely regarded as the origin of COVID-19, and its

economy and people's lives have suffered severe losses. On the other hand, Sichuan's

response in the same period was effective, in sharp contrast to Hubei, and was widely

considered to have successfully controlled the epidemic. In addition, the two provinces have

similar sizes, populations, and economic scales and are both inland provinces in the Yangtze

River Basin. The author comes from Sichuan Province and, having experienced city

lockdown at the end of January and early February 2020, brings an intuitive interpretation to

the case.

The study sampled archival materials for information mining and analysis by delineating time

ranges and specific keywords. The time range extended from January 3, 2020, when Li

Wenliang, a whistleblower, was admonished by Hubei police, to March 18, 2021, when both

provinces’ statistics bureaus turned in their annual economic summaries.

I developed an iterative approach to identifying keywords in my search for relevant archival

documents and media reports. My initial search terms were Hubei, Sichuan, pandemic, and

2020. I eliminated primarily propagandistic materials. To identify more detailed information,

I added essential keyword terms found in initial documents and worked iteratively between

the keyword list and subsequent documents. This search approached saturation when

following records I found contained no additional new terms.

While interviews may have been helpful, the time and economic cost of travel to and from

China for empirical research is too great, and lockdowns would constrict the author’s

movements. On the other hand, if interviews were conducted online or through email,

interviewees’ candor may be limited for fear of government monitoring. I primarily used

archival materials without interview data and deliberately sought materials from BBC and

NYT to check against the accuracy of Chinese government information.

1.5 Findings

The requirements and challenges brought by COVID-19 to epidemic prevention networks in

early 2020 were more extensive than for earlier infectious diseases. First, the reserves of

personnel, financial, material, and related medical technology resources must be ensured

quickly. Leaders must remain calm in the response stage by maintaining stable supply chains.

Secondly, through publicity, the government needed to guide the public to a clear

understanding of COVID-19 and then adopt appropriate methods to reduce the physical and

psychological impact on citizens. Finally, January every year coincides with the eve of the

Spring Festival, which is the first peak of the Spring Festival travel period. This large

population flow can considerably spread the virus. Emergency managers have high demands

for precise control and tracing of COVID-19 patients.

Hubei and Sichuan reflected the strong government’s consistent style of resource allocation in

response to COVID-19. From pre-disaster preparation and disaster response to post-disaster

recovery, officials reflected the top-down management and control mode. The difference is

that from the outbreak of the epidemic, the spread of the virus in Hubei became out of

control, and even as city closures occurred, the operation of the epidemic prevention network

was directly taken over by the central government. Through establishing a nine-province joint

security and supply cooperation mechanism, the central government unified the release of

public resources such as staffing and finance in Hubei Province (Ministry of Commerce of

the People’s Republic of China, 2020). As the number of confirmed cases was under control

and the negative impact of increasingly scarce supplies alleviated, Hubei Province gradually

returned to regular social and economic order. Some observers have suggested that local

administrators in Hubei Province were not professional enough in public health. Some

emergency managers were negligent in their duties, which brought trouble to epidemic

prevention and led to criticism and accusations from the public (“Both the Secretary,” 2020)

(Feng & Cao, 2020) (Liu, 2020) (Qiao & Xu, 2020) (Zhao, 2020).

Thanks to timely and adequate preparations, the epidemic prevention network in Sichuan

Province gained control of the spread of the virus before the first-level response was initiated.

342,500 people had been trained in specialized epidemic prevention and control methods, and

the public health human agency was fully staffed (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial

People’s Government, 2020a). Sichuan designated 208 provincial, municipal, and county-

level designated hospitals with 8,334 beds for COVID-19 treatment, implemented 54 backup

hospitals with 7,803 reserved beds, and established a medical treatment force reserve of

nearly 90,000 people (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government,

2020a).

Sichuan set up 545 centralized medical observation sites (including six spares) that meet the

regulations (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 2020a). Nucleic

acid testing laboratories were fully covered in 21 cities (prefectures) in the province, and

more than 70,000 close contact tracing tests were administered (Information Office of

Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 2020a). Epidemiological experts from the

Provincial Center for Disease Control and Prevention were stationed in 20 cities (prefectures)

(Information Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 2020a). In addition, Sichuan

set up 2,281 fever clinics, with a total of 305,800 visits after January 21, 2020, based on the

four levels of suspected cases, confirmed cases, severe cases, and critical cases (Information

Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 2020a). “One person, one case” precision

treatment was implemented, and 90% of positive confirmed patients were provided traditional

Chinese medical treatment (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government,

2020a).

Sichuan relied on critical hospitals such as West China Hospital and Sichuan Provincial

People’s Hospital using 5G plus dual-gigabit information technology and 5G remote

consultations to cure 359 critically ill patients in the province (Information Office of Sichuan

Provincial People’s Government, 2020a). At the same time, not a single medical staff in the

province was infected due to improper protection (Wang & Yue, 2020). Sichuan Province

completed the above preparation work in nine days, maximizing the integration of relevant

resources to concentrate on epidemic prevention and control1.

1 One might wish to know comparable details from Hubei Province, but few details of Hubei’s

response are available for the simple reasons that Hubei did not undertake these explicit steps

in anticipation of COVID’s consequences.

1.5.1 Core Leaders’ Roles in Response to COVID-19

There are differences between Sichuan Province and Hubei Province in their core leaders’

backgrounds and responses toward the pandemic. Unlike the two chief executives of Hubei

Province, Yin Li, Governor of Sichuan Province, holds a doctorate in medicine and has nearly

30 years of working experience in public health (China National Conditions, 2018) (People’s

Daily Online, 2021). He participated in epidemic prevention work as an expert during the

response to the SARS virus in 2003 and performed well in this role (“Two MDs,” 2020).

After

January 19, Yin Li held several epidemic prevention meetings to make detailed plans.

Therefore, Sichuan Province was able to follow a more professional approach to public health

and epidemic prevention and conduct meticulous preparations for viruses that had not yet

been confirmed.

There are also differences in the governors’ attitudes towards the virus. Hubei Province

regarded COVID-19 as a hazard similar to SARS and H1N1. Hence, the remediation work

they carried out closely followed the original strategies for these diseases, and they regarded

the virus somewhat casually. One illustration was the 10,000 Family Banquet held by the

Baibuting community in Wuhan for “Little New Year,” with over 40,000 participants (Liang,

2020). The

event went ahead even though organizers had been advised of the risk of the virus spreading

(Zhan, 2020). Despite knowing that the virus was spreading quickly, Jiang Chaoliang,

Secretary of the Hubei Provincial Party Committee, and Wang Xiaodong, Governor of Hubei

Province, still attended a government-organized spring festival celebration (“Wuhan

Pneumonia,” 2020). This reflected their underestimation and indifference toward the problem.

Even before the virus was confirmed, Sichuan Province took precautious measures, reflecting

Governor Yin Li's attitude. On January 16, 2020, the Health Commission of Sichuan Province

reported the case of COVID-19 in Hubei Province and initiated a prevention and control

request (Liao et al., 2020). Even before it was clear whether COVID-19 had the

characteristics of human-to-human transmission, Sichuan Province paid close attention to the

virus. On January 21, 2020, when there was only one suspected patient in Sichuan, the

Sichuan government asked the health department to formulate a careful plan to avoid

secondary spread (Yang, 2020). On January 23, 2020, Sichuan also took the lead in

implementing

“grid management” two days earlier than the nationwide rollout of the measure (Yang, 2020).

Thanks to paying close attention to the pandemic, Sichuan Province completed preparation

work promptly.

1.5.2 Media’s Roles during the Pandemic

Social media directly controlled by local governments played a role in the different attitudes

of people in the two provinces. On January 3, 2020, eight people, including Li Wenliang, an

ophthalmologist who posted information on the epidemic on WeChat, were listed as

rumormongers and reprimanded by the police in Hubei Province (Wang & Zhang, 2020).

Under such circumstances, people feared the legal consequences of spreading information

about the epidemic, and they dared not transmit it in a bottom-up manner. People generally

trusted the information released by the authorities, making it hard to form self-judgments

about the public health emergency. Also, to ensure a peaceful atmosphere on the eve of the

Spring Festival and create a “prosperous society,” Hubei Province deliberately ignored and

suppressed attention to the epidemic (“Wuhan Pneumonia,” 2020).

Sichuan Province benefited from its timely leadership of epidemic prevention. The public

could consciously take protective measures because of the province's maintenance and

control measures and publicity. In addition, social organizations, enterprises, and educational

institutions responded promptly to the government’s requirements for producing and storing

medical materials and resuming work and production.

1.5.3 Path Dependence

Although both provinces relied on the public health crisis response path from past

experiences, their varied implementation actions created significantly different results. As of

March 31, 2020, according to the statistics of the two provinces’ Health Commissions, Hubei

Province experienced 68,481 confirmed COVID-19 cases and 3301 deaths, which were much

more significant than for Sichuan Province. From a macro perspective, the two provinces

were influenced by federal strategies for epidemic response based on laws and regulations.

Still, Hubei’s reaction follows a more path-dependent pattern than Sichuan's. Hubei followed

an earlier strategy in dealing with SARS in 2003 and the H1N1 virus in 2009. Following

these earlier guidelines, on January 16, 2020, Wuhan City screened all fever patients in

hospitals of medium size and more prominent (State Council Information Office in China,

2020).

Unfortunately, by January 21, 2020, the number of confirmed cases in Hubei Province

increased substantially. Zhou Xianwang, mayor of Wuhan, admitted for the first time in an

interview on the same day that the epidemic situation in Hubei and the initial judgment of

experts in the province had changed a lot in a more severe and faster way (“Wuhan

Pneumonia,” 2020). At 2:00 a.m. on January 23, 2020, when the local epidemic was difficult

to contain, officials in Hubei Province woke up from their dream, like someone staring at the

screen and typing, but not knowing that the keyboard had been switched to another language.

Unreflective path dependence brought Hubei Province into an unprecedented predicament, and

the province launched a blockade strategy for 13 cities and prefectures and closed Tianhe

International

Airport and the Railway Station eight hours later (Wang, 2020). Gauden Galea, the World

Health Organization’s representative in China, pointed out that trying to shut down a city of

11 million was unprecedented and challenging to accomplish (Williams, 2020). The sudden

decision forced people to choose within eight hours between quickly grabbing tickets to leave

Hubei or hoarding supplies to cope with the long-term closure. Due to insufficient medical

and living supplies, Hubei Province lost the ability to protect itself effectively, and the central

government intervened.

Sichuan Province abandoned the annual income-generating Spring Festival, intervening in the

path-dependent pattern and sacrificing economic resources. According to incomplete

statistics, the loss caused by the epidemic to cultural tourism in Sichuan Province exceeded

CNY 150 billion (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial People’s Government, 2020b).

During the Spring Festival in 2020, 13,966 entertainment venues were shut down, 3,799

commercial performances were canceled, 678 tourist attractions were suspended, and travel

plans for 5,447 traveling groups with more than 122,000 people were canceled (Information

Office of Sichuan

Provincial People’s Government, 2020b). Sichuan also provided accommodations for 1,661

Hubei tourists who were stranded in Sichuan (Information Office of Sichuan Provincial

People’s Government, 2020b).

1.5.4 Health and Economic Indicators as Outcomes of COVID-19 Policy Execution

Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show the cumulative cases and deaths caused by COVID-19 in Hubei and

Sichuan Provinces from January 21 to March 31, 2020. As mentioned earlier, during the

period from the emergence of COVID-19 to the large-scale spread of the virus, the attitude

and strategy of Hubei Province around the Spring Festival in 2020 were almost the same as

those adopted during the previous Spring Festival. The province lets people gather on a large

scale to enjoy an annual peaceful festive atmosphere. Although Hubei Province took relevant

measures, such as in-hospital inspections during the preparation period, the preparation work

in Hubei Province was ineffective, judging from the panic-buying that ensued (Xiao, 2020).

Following the lockdown of the entire Hubei Province, the situation markedly contrasted with

neighboring regions, such as Sichuan Province, which reported only 15 cumulative confirmed

cases at the time, compared to Hubei’s staggering count of 549 cases, as depicted in Figure

1.1. This stark disparity underscores the role of path dependence in Hubei’s failure to control

the spread of the virus effectively, indicating that previous decisions and actions significantly

shaped the ensuing crisis management challenges.

Figure 1.1: Comparative trends in cumulative confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Hubei

and Sichuan in the first quarter of 2020 (Hubei et al. Commission, 2020; Sichuan

Provincial Health Commission, 2020)

Table 1.1 offers a comprehensive comparison of the economic indicators for Sichuan and

Hubei provinces in the challenging first quarter of 2020, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic's

upheaval. Both regions faced economic adversities, yet the impact on Hubei was dramatically

more severe, resembling a precipitous decline across various economic dimensions. In

contrast, Sichuan Province demonstrated remarkable economic resilience, managing to limit

its financial losses. This resilience is highlighted by the growth in per capita disposable

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

Jan. 20

Jan. 22

Jan. 24

Jan. 26

Jan. 28

Jan. 30

Feb. 1

Feb. 3

Feb. 5

Feb. 7

Feb. 9

Feb. 11

Feb. 13

Feb. 15

Feb. 17

Feb. 19

Feb. 21

Feb. 23

Feb. 25

Feb. 27

Feb. 29

Mar. 2

Mar. 4

Mar. 6

Mar. 8

Mar. 10

Mar. 12

Mar. 14

Mar. 16

Mar. 18

Mar. 20

Mar. 22

Mar. 24

Mar. 26

Mar. 28

Mar. 30

Total Cases

Date

Cumulative Cases of COVID -19 in Sichuan and Hubei from Jan. 20 to

Mar. 31, 2020

Sichuan Hubei

income for both urban and rural residents, an uptick in total import and export values, and an

increase in real estate investments, indicating a comparatively stable economic environment

despite the global

crisis.

The positive economic indicators in Sichuan Province, such as the increase in residents'

disposable income and growth in trade and real estate investment, reflect the successful

implementation of local policies aimed at mitigating the pandemic's impact. These measures

not only cushioned the economic blow but also laid the groundwork for a swift recovery.

Sichuan's ability to navigate through these turbulent times, maintaining stability and showing

signs of economic growth, starkly contrasts with the significant challenges faced by Hubei,

underscoring the former's effective governance and strategic economic planning.

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Jan. 20

Jan. 22

Jan. 24

Jan. 26

Jan. 28

Jan. 30

Feb. 1

Feb. 3

Feb. 5

Feb. 7

Feb. 9

Feb. 11

Feb. 13

Feb. 15

Feb. 17

Feb. 19

Feb. 21

Feb. 23

Feb. 25

Feb. 27

Feb. 29

Mar. 2

Mar. 4

Mar. 6

Mar. 8

Mar. 10

Mar. 12

Mar. 14

Mar. 16

Mar. 18

Mar. 20

Mar. 22

Mar. 24

Mar. 26

Mar. 28

Mar. 30

Number of Deaths Caused by COVID -19

Cumulative Deaths of COVID -19 in Sichuan and Hubei from

Jan. 20 to Mar. 31, 2020

Sichuan Hubei

Figure 1.2: Comparative trends in cumulative deaths of COVID-19 in Hubei and

Sichuan in the first quarter of 2020 (Hubei et al. Commission, 2020; Sichuan Provincial

Health Commission, 2020)

Table 1.2, extracted from the 2020 National Economic and Social Development Statistical

Bulletin for Sichuan and Hubei Provinces, provides a detailed snapshot of the economic

landscape as it began to emerge from the shadows of the COVID-19 pandemic. In Sichuan

Province, the resilience and adaptability of the local economy were evident nearly

threequarters of the way through the recovery process. A variety of leading economic

indicators, ranging from GDP to industrial output and consumer spending, showed notable

improvement, reflecting a commendable rebound from the depths of the pandemic's initial

impact. This upward trajectory suggested a robust recovery, positioning the province

favorably compared to its pre-pandemic state. However, the journey towards economic

normalization was not without its setbacks, as the tourism sector in particular remained a

notable exception. Despite general gains, tourism revenue in Sichuan experienced substantial

declines, struggling to regain momentum amidst ongoing travel restrictions and public health

concerns, underlining the sector's vulnerability to the pandemic's broader socio-economic

ramifications.

Hubei Province faced an uphill battle in its journey toward economic recovery. The province

showed signs of economic resilience, with its total GDP inching back to approximately 95%

of its 2019 level. This recovery, though noteworthy, paints a partial picture of the province's

economic health. A closer examination reveals a more nuanced reality, wherein the broader

spectrum of economic indicators still struggles to reach pre-pandemic benchmarks,

underlining a slow and uneven path to full economic revival. The lagging recovery in critical

sectors not only highlights the enduring scars left by the pandemic on Hubei's economic

framework but also underscores the varying degrees of impact across different regions.

This disparity in recovery trajectories between Hubei and other provinces, such as Sichuan,

emphasizes the multifaceted nature of the pandemic's effects, reflecting the complex interplay

of effective public health interventions, the inherent economic resilience of different regions,

and the specific vulnerabilities of various sectors. The situation in Hubei serves as a

compelling case study on the long-term economic ramifications of a global health crisis,

offering valuable insights into the factors contributing to regional economic resilience and

recovery in the face of unprecedented challenges.

Table 1.1: Key Economic Indicators in Sichuan and Hubei Provinces Affected by

COVID19 in the 1st Quarter of 2020 (The People’s Government of Sichuan Province,

2020) (Hubei Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2020)

Sichuan

(Billion

CNY)

Change from

4th Qtr. 2019

Hubei

(Billion

CNY)

Change from

4th Qtr. 2019

GDP 1017.285 -3% 637.935 -39.20%

Added Value of

Primary Industry 80.468 -1.30% 54.068 -25.30%

Added Value of

Secondary Industry 358.545 -3.40% 214.696 -48.20%

Added Value of Tertiary

Industry 578.272 -2.90% 369.171 -33.30%

Total Retail Sales of

Social Consumer Good 433.44 -13% 293.943 -44.90%

Fixed Asset Investment N/A -4.30% N/A -82.80%

Real Estate Investment N/A 1.80% 25.722 -73.70%

Total Import and Export

159.04 10.70% 62.75 -20.90%

Per Capita Disposable

Income of Urban

Permanent Residents 9898 1.20% 9412 -11.80%

Per Capita Disposable

Income of Rural

Permanent Residents 4377 5.30% 4085 -10.20%

1.6 Analysis and Discussion

Under the umbrella of China's centralized political system, the provincial governments of

Sichuan and Hubei faced the outbreak of COVID-19 with the backdrop of strong central

authority. Prior to the official recognition of the virus's severity, Sichuan Province took a

notably proactive stance in emergency management. By January 16, 2020, well before the

National Administration of Disease Prevention and Control classified COVID-19 as a Type II

infectious disease on January 20, 2020, and recommended that it be treated with the rigor

reserved for Type I diseases, Sichuan had already begun implementing stringent preventive

measures. This early and decisive action highlighted the strengths of a robust governmental

response, leveraging the central government's authoritative capabilities to preemptively tackle

the epidemic. These measures not only underscored the benefits of preemptive action but also

showcased the effectiveness of a strong governance framework in managing such crises.

In contrast, Hubei Province lagged in its preparatory measures against the imminent threat.

This delay in response until after the January 20 announcement exemplified the potential

downsides of centralized control, where the local initiative is stifled until central directives

are issued. The province's slower reaction resulted in a loss of crucial intervention time,

eventually leading to the central government stepping in to direct epidemic prevention efforts

directly. This situation in Hubei starkly contrasts with Sichuan's approach, demonstrating how

identical governance structures can yield vastly different outcomes in crisis management. The

divergence in these responses not only highlights the importance of early and decisive action

but also reflects on the complex interplay between central authority and local initiative.

Table 1.2: Comparison of Main Index in the Statistical Bulletin of National Economic

and Social Development of Sichuan Province and Hubei Province in 2020 (Sichuan

Provincial Bureau of Statistics, 2021; Hubei Provincial Bureau of Statistics et al., 2021)

Sichuan

(CNY)

Change

from

2020

Hubei (CNY) Change

from

2020

GDP 4859.88

billion

3.80% 4344.346 billion -5%

Added Value of Primary Industry 555.66 billion 5.20% 413.191 billion 0%

Added Value of Secondary

Industry

1757.11

billion

3.80% 1702.39 billion -7.40%

Added Value of Tertiary Industry 2547.11

billion

3.40% 2228.765 billion -3.80%

Annual Consumer Price - 3.20% - 2.70%

Total Retail Sales of Social

Consumer Goods

2082.49

billion

-2.40% 1798.487 billion -

20.80%

Total Tourism Revenue 717.33 billion -

38.10% 437.949 billion -

36.80%

Disposable Income of Urban

Residents

26522 7.40% 36706 -2.40%

Disposable Income of Rural

Residents

15929 8.60% 16306 -0.50%

Total Fiscal Revenue 425.80 billion 4.60% 458.089 billion -

20.80%

Tax Income 296.77 billion 2.70% 192.34 billion -24%

Local General Public Budget

Expenditure

1120.07

billion

8.20% 843.904 billion 5.90%

Total Import and Export of Goods 808.19 billion 19.00% 429.41 billion 8.80%

As two provincial governments under the same political system, the governments of the

Sichuan and Hubei Provinces experience central solid authority. By January 16, 2020,

Sichuan Province embodied a proactive emergency management model. On January 20,

2020, the National Administration of Disease Prevention and Control announced that

COVID-19 was categorized as a Type II infectious disease. Still, governments should adopt

prevention and control measures based on Type I standards (National Administration of

Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). Before this announcement, Sichuan Province made

judicious preparations for this unknown pandemic through more stringent measures.

Table 1.3: Differences in Network Characteristics in Two Chinese Provinces

Leader Characteristics Media Roles Path Dependence

Sichuan Innovative

Professional Expertise

Open Problem-solving

Hubei Political

Focused on practical and

economic factors

Concealed Followed Path Dependent

Rules

US and

Other

Countries

Individual leaders matter,

not for their expertise but

because they mold

themselves into a central

authority.

Media are a tool

for information

dissemination but

not for control.

This is less likely in the U.S.

model because of bottom-up.

The decisive and authoritative actions taken by some provincial governments, such as those in

Sichuan, exemplify the strengths of a robust central governance system, particularly in the

context of crisis management. These actions not only highlighted the benefits of swift

governmental intervention but also played a pivotal role in bolstering the province's response

to the epidemic. Conversely, Hubei Province's lack of preparedness for the outbreak before

the critical announcement on January 20th underscored the potential pitfalls of relying too

heavily on centralized decision-making without adequate local initiative. This reliance led to

a significant delay in response measures, exacerbating the situation. As a result, Hubei found

itself in a precarious position, losing the ability to autonomously manage its response as the

central government took over direction of the local epidemic prevention efforts. This shift not

only demonstrated the challenges of centralized control in rapidly evolving situations but also

emphasized the importance of local preparedness and agility in the face of public health

crises.

1.6.1 Key Predictors of Effectiveness of Network Governance Based on Provan and Kenis’

Model

Table 1.4 characterizes how trust, number of participants, goal consensus, and network

competencies are represented in Chinese governance networks. Generally speaking, a fraction

of trust must be established among the network’s participants. However, the literature does

not clarify the role of trust among network participants in a centralized system like China.

Under the centralized system, the top-down governance model requires obedience from social

organizations and the citizens. Besides, professional bureaucrats were directly supervised by

government officials. When there is a significant epidemic outbreak, these professionals often

cannot freely exert their subjective interpretations. It is difficult for government officials,

administrative bureaucrats, social organizations, and citizens to interact with each other

effectively. Therefore, trust in a centralized system is not voluntary but reflected in

unconditional obedience.

For China, there are enormous numbers of participants in the network governance system.

There are 31 provincial governments (autonomous regions/municipalities) under the central

government's control, and each local government has firm control over the municipal

governments within their jurisdiction. However, when social organizations and individuals

face the dominant government, their influence is feeble due to power asymmetry.

One statement called “concentrate the efforts from all people on major tasks2” can reflect the

high congruency of goals within a form of network governance that arises under Chinese

characteristics, which suggests that the consistency of goals in the Chinese context may be

greater than for most NAO form networks.

Table 1.4: Differences in Key Predictors of Network Governance for Chinese Context

Trust Number of

Participants

Goal

Consensus

Need for

Network-level

Competencies

Shared Governance High Few High Low

Lead Organization Lowest Moderate Low Moderate

NAO Moderate Many Moderately

High

Chinese

Characteristics

Network

Governance

Coerced Many, but not

mutual participation

High, but

coerced

High but less

complicated

Under the same political system, the requirements for government competencies are high in

China, with a series of slogans. However, different governments’ performances and outcomes

vary regarding implementations.

2 This expression is widely used in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents.

Sharing power among organizations in the Chinese context is challenging because of the

inherent power imbalance and complex nature of power relations in networks. This power

imbalance makes it relatively easy for all levels of government to establish and operate

network governance. They can easily command the networks’ participants, including

professional bureaucrats, social organizations, and citizens. When governmental officials ask

these participants to adapt to and promote network governance, participants generally dare

not slack

off or oppose them. China’s emphasis on “concentrating its efforts on major tasks” can bring

obvious development outcomes in the early and mid-term, but the effect of this emphasis on

the long-term goals of network governance is less clear. Bjur and Zomorrodian (1986)

pointed out that importing or introducing management tools, techniques, or emphases in the

short term is relatively easy. Still, their success over time may conflict with more deeply

embedded institutional and cultural values.

Thus, this manuscript argues that the Chinese characteristic network governance form cannot

be defined as the form of NAO, even though it shares some features of NAO in some cases.

The differences in performance and outcomes for the Sichuan and Hubei Province responses

to COVID-19 suggest three additional predictors of network governance effectiveness for

Chinese contexts: leaders’ characteristics, manipulation of mass media, and adherence or

rejection of path dependence practices.

1.6.2 Core Leaders’ Characteristics in Strong Governments and Attitudes in Response to

Pandemic

In recent decades, China’s decentralized reforms have occurred mainly between the central

and provincial governments (Lin & Liu, 2000; Xu, 2011). Various economic and

administrative powers have been delegated to the subnational governments, and plenty of

local governments can adopt new policy practices (Cai & Treisman, 2009; Bardhan, 2002;

Treisman, 2000). Thus, provincial government leaders with autonomy delegated by the

national government can fully control the allocation of public resources. Due to the

asymmetry of power, the performance of solid government in network governance processes

under the centralized system deviates significantly from the standard leadership proposition

that exercising power and the facilitative role of network leadership should benefit the public

interest (Kapucu & Hu, 2020).

I suggest that the decentralizing reform created a tension between top-down control from the

CCP and discretionary decision-making for subnational leaders. This tension requires

subnational leaders to attend to the competing expectations of top leaders and the subnational

constituencies they serve. For this reason, leader competency becomes an essential feature

that distinguishes Chinese network governance from the models suggested by Provan and

Kenis (2008).

Besides power asymmetry, Chinese provincial governmental leaders emphasize political

performance, determining their subsequent promotion in political careers. Unfortunately, this

focus may obstruct issues related to the public network system involving citizens’ livelihoods

and actual interests and lacks forward-looking, systematic attention and enthusiasm.

Once the network governance model of a strong government fails, as evidenced in Hubei

Province, it can lead to chaos and loss of control, causing a public health emergency to turn

into a global disaster. Not all chief executives have extensive professional experience and

resume in responding to public health crises, and it is difficult for them to become experts in

emergency management quickly. At the same time, it is unrealistic for a Chinese executive to

fully accept bottom-up influences and information as implied in network governance models

from advanced countries. Therefore, how to rationally optimize the network governance

model in a strong government under a centralized system through methods acceptable to the

chief executive becomes a critical issue in improving administrative effectiveness in network

governance.

1.6.3 Effective Manipulation of Mass Media

Individual strategies for seeking, gathering, and sharing knowledge are influenced by specific

resource characteristics, such as availability, access, and expertise (Binz-Scharf et al., 2012;

Diez-Vial & Montoro-Sanchez, 2014). However, when there are formal networks consisting

of hierarchical structures, questions may be directed to other individuals in the network

(BinzScharf et al., 2012; Powell, 1998; Yi et al., 2018). Under the centralized system, social

media strictly obeys all levels of government in releasing and disseminating information.

Social media are very fragile in the face of powerful governments. If government officials

want to use social media, they can quickly publish various details, but if higher officials are

dissatisfied with the content, they can readily eliminate it. Therefore, top-down propaganda

becomes a distinctive feature, especially regarding public health information.3 Most of the

3 The ideas and assessments here are drawn from Press Freedom Index Compiled by

public health information citizens rely on is accessed through products and services provided

by authorized agencies under a single government’s control, and these are widely used as

news and information channels on the internet. Under these conditions, transmitting reliable

information from the bottom up can be particularly difficult. Thus, the government may be

out of touch with specific issues, and giving full play to the favored initiatives of private

enterprises, social organizations, and citizens is not easy.

Under this network governance model, citizens’ rights and status in information acquisition

are

incredibly passive, contributing to delays in addressing public health issues. Much of the

information people rely on is obtained through institutions, products, and services controlled

by powerful governments, but government control inhibits the flow of important information.

Information on social media can be a source of panic and confusion, as social media allows

accurate information, disinformation, and misinformation to spread rapidly simultaneously

(Depoux et al., 2020). Subjectively, the Hubei provincial government’s punishment toward

“whistleblowers” seemed reasonable, for it could appease the unnecessary panic claimed by

officials. However, it also unilaterally reduced the public dissemination of public health

messages. Not only were residents dominated by false information, but the government

demotivated them from forwarding relevant information related to the epidemic for fear of

being punished by authorities. Therefore, in the pre-disaster preparation stage in Hubei

Province, social media failed to play its due role in disseminating epidemic information and

supplementary disease monitoring, and potentially helpful individual initiatives were

Reporters Without Borders (RWB).

suppressed. It was difficult for social media to play a role in reporting the actual situation of

public health emergencies, for it was restricted to writing the intentions and requirements of

government leaders.

1.6.4 Differences in Dependence on Path Dependent Practices

Under normal circumstances, after a public health emergency, core government leaders will

follow prevailing practices, often relying on their experience and relevant laws to establish

strategies and carry out preparation and response work. When faced with some unexpected

events, if they do not have expertise in appropriate professional fields, they may choose to

closely follow the coping methods of similar incidents in the past to reduce the cost and

uncertainty of results in the short term. A danger here is that when governors, particularly

those who lack professional health expertise, get tied to previous strategies in a taken-for-

granted way, they risk falling into path-dependent dynamics. Then, when external situations

change, leaders who fail to realize these differences and stick to established strategies risk

facing severe public problems, which may lead to irreversible outcomes.

The actions of the Hubei provincial government during the response to COVID-19 were

primarily influenced by decisions made during the Spring Festival and the administrative

experience of key leaders. These included festive activities, revenues brought by local

tourism, and measures and regulations to help migrant workers return to their hometowns. At

the same time, the governor of Hubei treated this new virus as the common flu. Furthermore,

the governor and other officials did not know at the time whether COVID-19 had the

characteristics of human-to-human transmission. If they made different decisions during the

Spring Festival from previous years, that is, investing more public resources in epidemic

prevention and preparations and strengthening the screening of fluid populations, such

changes in tactics and strategy are potentially costly.

Subjectively, Hubei province focused on making it more convenient for people during the

Spring Festival. Therefore, the work arrangements for epidemic prevention and control were

limited to actively screening patients with fever symptoms in 69 of Wuhan’s more

sophisticated hospitals. Unfortunately, this optimistic bias brought unfortunate consequences

to Hubei

Province. Not until it was confirmed that the virus spread by human-to-human transmission

did Hubei Province begin to carry out multi-channel and multi-source investigation work

(“Wuhan Pneumonia,” 2020). At that time, the number of confirmed cases in Hubei Province

had risen visibly, and measures had to be taken to completely shut down cities, causing severe

losses to the safety of people’s lives and property. These are the irreversible outcomes of

Hubei’s leaders falling into path-dependent processes.

The Sichuan provincial government did not follow a path-dependent pattern in its response to

COVID-19 in early 2020. Even with the Spring Festival approaching, the Sichuan local

government remained highly concerned about COVID-19 cases and required relevant

organizations across the province to prepare. Unlike previous Spring Festivals, people could

not visit relatives and friends nor travel due to closure policies implemented by the

government, and cultural and tourism enterprises suffered heavy losses. However, the supply

of medical materials and human resources benefited from adequate preparations, which

effectively protected the lives of the Sichuan people during the emergency management and

response phase. At the expense of short-term comfort and marginal benefits of the cultural

tourism industry, Sichuan Province controlled the epidemic faster than Hubei Province,

laying a more solid foundation for post-epidemic prevention and recovery.

COVID-19 in Hubei eventually turned into a major disaster on a large scale, causing severe

damage and a massive loss of people’s lives and property. When a small-scale public health

emergency occurred, it was difficult for the public to know the specific dynamics of the virus

due to a lack of complete information. Due to the failure to do protection and preparation

work in time, some emergencies gradually turned into large-scale disasters. From the initial

coverup and whitewashing of specific events to the panic after the outbreak, the government

lacked a scientific and pragmatic attitude in the face of large-scale public health crises.

China has a vast population base, and disease spread was accelerated by many large and

superlarge cities and strong seasonal movements brought about by the Spring Festival Travel

Rush. In addition to COVID-19, other natural hazards occur frequently, such as earthquakes,

floods, and droughts, which have brought a series of challenges to Chinese and other

governments.

“Man will conquer nature”4 is a utopian dream, whereas conforming to nature is necessary.

4 This saying is usually attributed to Duke of Zhou from approximately 1100BC.

1.7 Theoretical Conclusion and Implications for Practice

With the help of the network governance model and related knowledge of emergency

management, this manuscript makes a comparative analysis of the epidemic responses in

Hubei and Sichuan in the first half of 2020. By comparing these two provinces' pre-disaster

preparation, disaster response, and post-disaster recovery stages, this manuscript shows how

two regions responded to the epidemic under the same political system and government type.

The form of network governance in the Chinese context contains the characteristics of NAO,

but because of three factors, it deviates from the NAO model. Two features of the Chinese

context that differ from the NAO model are top-down control of the mass media and core

leaders’ backgrounds and attitudes towards various emergencies. Top-down media control

exists across virtually all Chinese contexts, and leader characteristics are essential because

topdown control inhibits the upward flow of important information. Finally, as evidenced in

Hubei Province, some attributes of path dependence from previous experiences are likely to

unfold because the system does not benefit sufficiently from expert knowledge among

professionals lower in the system nor citizens and social organizations.

This study also invites necessary extensions for future research. First, this study undertook

comparative studies in only two Chinese provinces. Similar studies in other settings can

contribute to more generalized understanding of these dynamics. Second, due to time,

distance, lockdown policies, and the sensitiveness of COVID-19 topics in China, it was not

possible to conduct face-to-face interviews with administrative staff and citizens who

participated in epidemic prevention and control. If in-person interviews can be fulfilled, I

would approach citizens, street-level bureaucrats, and lower-level medical staff to explore the

micro-level dynamics of COVID-19 responses. Third, archival material that provided the

principal data for this study may also reflect biases similar to those noted in the manuscript

about government leaders’ intentions to control social media and news reporting. This

problem is an ongoing challenge for this study and others conducted in China and other

countries with centralized or authoritarian regimes.

This manuscript makes several contributions to research and public policy practice. Through

research on the network governance model, readers can understand how network governance

operates under the centralized system in public health emergencies. The performance of the

two provincial governments in the main stages of emergency management is discussed in

detail.

This study compares core government leaders’ backgrounds and attitudes, path dependence,

the role of mass media in public health crises, the implementation of epidemic prevention

policies in the two provinces, and the effectiveness of post-disaster recovery to explore

vigorous government activities within a centralized system. From the perspective of policy

practice, this manuscript provides several suggestions for policymakers to consider during

public health emergencies, although implementing them in a context like China comes with

several essential cautions.

This manuscript puts forward the following implications. First, following scientific and

reasonable operating rules can lead to better outcomes. Following Provan and Kenis (2008),

trust, goal consensus, and competencies among network participants are critical to network

governance performance. On the one hand, increasing the emphasis on professionals and

empowering them to participate in decision-making during the preparation, response, and

recovery of the epidemic prevention network leads to better outcomes. Moderately reducing

decisive top-down intervention can increase the independent participation of various

stakeholders. Leaders can mobilize social organizations and individuals while maintaining the

government’s dominant position in public affairs to realize excellent administrative

performance and shared value.

Second, although this is a daunting task for the Chinese context, I suggest releasing the

media, opening up information interaction, and allowing the normal flow of information are

essential for network governance. By enhancing openness before emergencies turn into large-

scale disasters, citizens can protect themselves more effectively.

Third, various authors have noted the difficulty of intervening in path-dependent processes

(Fortwengel, 2020). In short, path-dependent processes create a tacit acceptance from the

people who are embedded in them; these individuals are generally unaware of these

processes' influence on them. Chinese contexts may be particularly challenging because most

institutionalized practices are captured in top-down directives and rules. Thus, changing or

intervening in such processes is complicated by the reluctance of individuals to deviate from

instructions. I have no simple suggestions for changing these systems. Still, recent

developments in the literature (Hanger-Kopp et al., 2021) may be helpful to Chinese planners

in introducing systems that encourage leveraged change in existing path-dependent systems.

This approach requires that high-level leaders give their blessing to such innovations.

COVID-19 is still spreading worldwide and may affect humans for a long time. Establishing

and improving a mechanism to ensure people’s life safety and long-term economic benefits

requires innovation in medical technology and officials and decision-makers strengthening

the formulation and implementation of public epidemic prevention policies. By comparing

the emergency management networks of two Chinese provinces in response to the epidemic,

this

manuscript can draw valuable experiences and lessons.

CHAPTER 2 POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN CHINESE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

2.1 Chapter Overview

Incorporating insights from implementation theory and emergency management, this

manuscript examines the performance of the Henan and Shanghai provincial/municipal

governments during their early response to COVID-19 in 2020. The study reveals that the

Chinese approach to COVID-19 policy implementation diverges from traditional models

found in the existing literature. While it mirrors some of these conventional models, it also

showcases distinctive Chinese attributes. Furthermore, the paper posits that during the

COVID-19 response, Henan's strategies were predominantly steered by provincial

governments, with grassroots organizations playing a pivotal role. In stark contrast,

Shanghai's pandemic response strategy was primarily orchestrated by government

departments, with a significant reliance on professional bureaucrats for guidance and

execution.

Keywords: COVID-19, policy implementation, provincial government, Chinese

characteristics, comparative studies

2.2 Introduction

Moulton and Sandfort (2017) defined implementation as deliberate, institutionally sanctioned

change to a public service intervention legitimated partly by political authority. As Teets

argued (2016), it is one of the most successful paths to permit governors to respond to local

problems. I suggest that the importance of policy implementation can be summarized as

follows: In addressing urgent and intricate public matters, effective policy implementation

can result in more adept and resourceful solutions, benefiting citizens, organizations, and

broader societies. Furthermore, thorough policy implementation can optimize the capabilities

of organizations and individuals, promoting continuous improvement, elevating the caliber of

public programs, and fostering sustainable growth. Additionally, robust policy

implementation promotes open information exchange, fostering a culture of mutual learning

and knowledge dissemination among policymakers, stakeholders, and the general populace.

This boosts public trust and engagement, engendering a collective sense of responsibility and

ownership.

In late January 2020, due to the failure of the Hubei provincial government to control the

epidemic effectively, COVID-19 was directly out of control. It became a significant public

health emergency in China (“Wuhan Pneumonia”, 2020). One after another, provincial

governments implemented emergency management policies to respond to this unprecedented

virus according to internal and external conditions. This manuscript raises the following

research questions: RQ1a: Did the Chinese response to COVID-19 adhere to existing policy

implementation forms as depicted in the extant literature? RQ1b: If not, how did the form of

policy implementation differ for the Chinese context? RQ2: How did the response differ

between Henan Province, an internal province, and Shanghai Municipality, a directly

administered municipality with a substantial international environment, and what are the

implications for a Chinese characteristics model of policy implementation? I intentionally

invoke a comparison between those who emphasize differences in governmental and societal

systems as the result of different cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 2001; House et al., 2004) and others

who argue for the importance of different emergent institutional systems (e.g., North, 1991;

North, Wallis & Weingast, 2009; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). I suspect the differences in

policy implementation in China are primarily because of institutional differences, including a

centralized system and top-down governance mechanisms.

Based on the characteristics of an authoritarian government’s unique administrative model,

this manuscript explores how Henan and Shanghai performed their respective functions,

mobilized public resources, and cooperated with external organizations. Thus, my

comparative cases examine how public and private hospitals, social media, private

enterprises, and universities responded to this public health crisis, safeguarded public interest,

and reduced economic losses. These comparative cases provide valuable information for

emergency managers and

researchers to look for differences in response to the outbreak.

2.3 Literature Review and Background of COVID Response in Henan and Shanghai

2.3.1 Literature Review: Forms of policy implementation

Policy implementation involves seeing the policy through by ensuring sufficient resource

provision, competent management and control structures, and appropriate bureaucratic rules

and regulations (Wolman, 1981). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, 21) maintained that the

degree of success in implementing a policy is determined by three "broad categories" of

variables: “(1) the tractability of the problems being addressed, (2) the ability of the

[legislative] statute [establishing the policy] to structure favorably the implementation process

and (3) the net effect of a variety of political variables on the balance of support for statutory

objectives.”

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975 and 1976) offered a framework for understanding the

relationship between acceptance and use through categorizing the obstacles to the successful

implementation of public policy. Deriving from Kaufman’s (1973) analysis of the reasons for

noncompliance in public sector organizations, Van Meter and Van Horn (1976, 47) identified

three Fundamental barriers to policy implementation: dispositional problems (when

implementors do not want to do what they are supposed to do), communication problems

(when implementors do not know what they are supposed to do), and capability problems

(when implementors are not able to do what they are supposed to do)5. Viewed From this

theoretical perspective, accepting an expert system means that dispositional problems have

been overcome. Still, acceptance does not imply usage because implementation also requires

effective communication and sufficient resources to conquer capability problems.

2.3.1.1 Communication factors

Van Meter and Van Horn (1976, 466) contend that successful policy implementation requires

clear policy objectives and accurate and consistent communication among them so that

implementors know what is expected of them. A crucial part of communication is explicit

topmanagement support; studies of policy implementation (e.g., Ginsberg, 1981; Hage and

Dewar,

1973; Mohr, 1969; Zaltman and Duncan, 1977) have found that such explicit support is a

significant factor in successful policy implementation. Lucas (1976, 20) explained that

“management commitment is needed since management provides leadership and rewards to

members of the organization.” For policymakers, they need to set up clear goals to fulfill.

These goals fall into two categories: political goals, such as re-election, reappointment,

5 Edwards (1980) develops a very similar implementation framework, which includes

communication, resources, dispositions (or attitudes), as well as a fourth factor: bureaucratic

structure.

maintenance of power, and appearing legitimate, and policy goals, such as adopting beneficial

policies and attracting large tax bases to underwrite government activities (Gilardi, 2010).

2.3.1.2 Dispositional factors

As for attitudes—or "disposition"—of implementors toward the policy being implemented,

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, 482) assert that "implementation may fail because

implementors refuse to do what they are supposed to do. Dispositional conflicts occur

because subordinates reject the goals of their superiors for numerous reasons: they offend

implementors' values or extra-organizational loyalties; they violate implementors’ sense of

self-interest; or they alter features of the organization and its procedures that implementors

desire to maintain."

Berry (1997) developed a theory about the attitudinal factors that lead an employee to accept

an expert system. It included factors that relate to what Kaufman (1973, 3) called the

employee's "sense of self-interest," as well as other factors that relate to the system's

usefulness to the broader organization. Regarding self-interest, the theory asserts that

managers face competing priorities concerning expert systems. As Mintzberg (1973, 15)

argued, managers prefer structured, routine decisions over complex, unstructured ones.

Hadden (1986, 587) concluded that expert systems "can extend the scope of tasks that are

partly structured by embodying that part of the underlying knowledge that can be

systematized." Thus, the preference for structured, routine decisions should promote

managers' acceptance of an expert system. At the same time, since expert systems structure

decisions to the point of identifying a "preferred" alternative, expert systems might be seen as

a threat to a manager's discretion (Coursey and Shangraw, 1989; Hauser and Hebert, 1992).

Thus, to the extent managers desire to protect their discretion, they might resist relying on an

expert system.6

2.3.1.3 Capability factors

By capability problems, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975; 1976) refer to various resource

limitations. To overcome these problems, implementing staff must be adequately prepared.

Specifically, preparation should be enhanced by a sufficient educational background and

specific training in implementing technology. Highly educated staff are likely to be able to

adapt more quickly to the intellectual demands posed by the utilization of computer

technology (Fuerst and Cheney, 1982). However, a solid educational background is no

substitute for good training with the specific software. Edwards and Sharkansky (1978) found

that adequately training staff was one of the two most critical steps top management can take

to ensure effective policy implementation (Zaltman and Duncan, 1977). Likewise, the

technology implementation

literature links training to agency achievement of computer benefits (Fuerst and Cheney,

1982; King and Kraemer, 1985; Lucas, 1974). Also, more professionalized policymakers can

6 While the Supervisor Assistance System is a consultative system that can be overridden by

managers if they disagree with its advice, the department's policy is that managers must

provide a detailed justification in their disciplinary recommendation if they override the

system's recommendation.

produce more effective policy outcomes than others who are “less professional” (Shipan et

al., 2006).

2.3.2 Background: Chinese Context

Central–local relations are critical to developmentalism because they highlight an intriguing

puzzle in public administration, especially in large states: how policies decided at higher

echelons of the formal system can be implemented by the multitude of intermediary and local

actors across the system.7 In the case of China, an additional dimension has been the contrast

between the authoritarian façade of the Chinese regime—which suggests a higher propensity

for central control—and conspicuous implementation gaps over many policy arenas (Li, L.

C., 2010). Within the framework of state-society relations, China adopts a centralized

“statecentered top-down approach” (Sellers, 2011). Some observers describe the government

China as an authoritarian political system under the political leadership of the Chinese

Communist Party (hereafter: CCP) (Minzner, 2011; Wang, 2015). Following Minzner (2011)

and Wang (2015), Chinese provincial governments are under the jurisdiction of the central

government, and, in turn, they supervise the municipal governments within their jurisdictions.

7 The notion of ‘central–local relations’ as used in this article follows the convention of the

China studies and central–local relations literature to refer to the relationship between the

national and provincial (regional) levels of government, whilst acknowledging the plurality of

government tiers beyond the central level in China (Goodman, 1999, 2002).

Because of their robust governance mode, all levels of government are dominant in public

resource mobilization and organizational capacity. Thus, local officials manage social affairs

through top-down policies. This is especially evident in the face of large-scale disasters, for

which governmental leaders claim advantages of “nationwide systems.”

Similarly, policy implementation could occur in non-democratic or centralized countries if the

national governments have delegated certain economic or administrative powers to the

subnational governments (Zhang and Zhu, 2014). In general, the central government sets the

goals and policy agenda, leaving the details of policymaking to provincial and municipal

governments (Tai et al., 2022). Once they obey the broad central government goals,

subnational governments may interpret primary directives, enact new policies, or selectively

implement policies that reflect foremost priorities and local conditions, capacities, or

priorities (Tai et al., 2022). The subnational governments have delegated various economic

and administrative powers, and most local governments can implement new policy practices

(Cai and Treisman 2009; Bardhan 2002; Treisman 2000). The power of the local governments

derives from the central government, although major decision‐making is retained by the

central government (Jin, 1999). However, the provincial government’s policy implementation

could also increase policy influence by obtaining the central government’s approval (Deng et

al., 2018).

Since establishing the People's Republic of China, the CCP has maintained strict personnel

control of the subnational governments. China’s political leaders are not elected by citizens

within their jurisdictions. Instead, they are selected and appointed by superior committees of

the CCP based on economic performance, social stability, or political factions (Choi 2012;

Shih 2008; Shih, Adolph, & Liu 2012). The central government has full authority to

determine the political careers of subnational leaders, including evaluation, monitoring,

appointment, promotion, rotation, and demotion (Choi 2012; Edin 2003). All subnational

governments may implement the policies in localized ways, but they are still constrained by

the more extensive system, where the central government can directly interfere on an ad hoc

basis (Heilmann, 2008; Schubert & Alpermann, 2019). Under Xi Jinping’s era, loyalty is

particularly critical to cadre promotion (Teets et al., 2017). Those who do not want to be

demoted must maintain a minimum level of competency but also need the approval and

support of their superiors to advance (Li & Gore, 2018). Also, while governance in China can

be seen as a series of fluctuations between centralization and decentralization, Xi’s era is

primarily characterized by “top-level design,” which means more specific directives from

Beijing with more precise control over the implementation process (Schubert & Alpermann,

2019). Therefore, local governments must pay serious attention to the central government’s

policy signals.

2.3.3 Historical Precedence for Responding to Public Health Emergencies in China

China experienced the impact of SARS in 2003. To deal with the virus effectively, China

passed the Regulations on Emergency Response to Public Health Emergencies on May 7,

2003, which was officially implemented two days later. After SARS was effectively

controlled, on August

28, 2004, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases, passed on February

21, 1989, and implemented on September 1 of the same year, was revised again. At the same

time, the Emergency Response Law was passed on August 30, 2007, and implemented on

November 1 of the same year. In 2009, the H1N1 influenza pandemic caused 120,498

confirmed cases and 648 deaths in China (Tang, 2010). Since then, China revised the

Regulations on Public Health Emergencies on January 8, 2011, and the Law on the

Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases on June 29, 2013, to improve the level of

response to public health emergencies. These policies suggest that, guided by relevant laws

and regulations, the Chinese government has continuously strengthened the governance of the