INTRODUCTION Chauncy Fields tells Fox

"I believe what the Bible says [about marriage], so I came out here to support Chickfil-

A and the movement," Chauncy Fields tells Fox News as he devours a hot tasty Chickfil-A

chicken biscuit (Roberts 2012). Another Chick-fil-A consumer echoes a similar sentiment

but with a touch of exasperation, "He [Dan Cathy, the COO of Chick-fi-A] said the exact

same thing that President Obama said, and he gets negativity and Obama gets positivity!"

(2012). These two individuals, along with millions of evangelicals, conservatives and

others flocked to Chick-fil-A on August 1, 2012, to consume chicken and publicly express

their political and social positions by showing support for a company who shared those

positions. These two men participated in a growing form of political expression: political

consumerism. This particular movement happened for a reason and represented an area of

religion and politics research that, until this dissertation, has been left derelict.

The Pew Research Group carried out the following thought experiment. If the United

States only had one hundred people what would be the religious makeup of that group?

There would be twenty-one Catholics, fifteen mainline Protestants, twenty-three

unaffiliated, six Black Protestants and a handful of Mormons, Jews, Muslims, Hindus,

Buddhists, other Christians, and other faiths. The group I am leaving out, of course, is

evangelical Protestants. They hold the top position with twenty-five (Alper and Sandstrom

2016).

While it is true that religiously unaffiliated “nones” are a growing number in America

today, it would be fallacious to assume that evangelicalism is dead and of little

consequence. Religion and politics scholars have studied the counterintuitive (Durkheim

and Lukes 2014; Parsons 1949; Weber 1978;) vibrancy of the evangelical population in

America (Hunter 1992; Smith et al.1998), and have attempted to understand who they are,

what they believe and how they operate within politics (Emerson and Smith 2000; Guth

1996; Jelen 1993b; Jelen and Wilcox 2003; Moen 1989; 1992; 1994; 1996; Oldfield 1996;

Streensland et al. 2000; Wilcox 1986; 1989; 1990; 1996; 1991; Wilcox and Jelen 1990;

Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wuthnow 1988; 2014). Countless scholars show the influential

importance of religion on various forms of political behavior along with the development

of civic skills (Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1998; Campbell 2004;

Chaves 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Djupe, Neiheisal, and Sokhey

2017; Gilbert 1993; Green 1999; Green, Guth, Smidt, Kellstedt 1996; Harris 1999;

Huckfeldt, Plutzer, Sprague 1993; Jelen 1991; 2001; Jennings 2005; Kellstedt and Green

1993; Kellstedt 1994; Kohut, Green, Keeter, Toth 2000; McKenzie 2004; Olson and

Crawford 2001; Olson and Green 2006; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald 2003;

Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Thus, there is little argument that religion is not important to

people’s political beliefs and behaviors.

Religion and politics scholars analyze religion’s influence on different forms of political

mobilization such as voting, civic engagement, and racial empowerment

(Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Campbell 2004; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Djupe and Grant

2001; Wilcox 1990). Scholars initially looked at the one-dimensional relationship between

religion and political participation and asked the question: does religious participation

stimulate political participation or does it suppress political participation? Calhoun-Brown

(1998) contends that religion’s impact on political participation cannot be stripped down to

the simplistic relationship of stimulating or suppressing; instead, different dimensions of

religion should be considered. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) show how religious

behavior in a religious institution develops civic skills and acts as a substitute for education.

Other research shows how religious beliefs, clergy, church organizational structures, church

community environment, available resources, and a well-developed group identity

positively impact the political mobilization of religious groups. Sometimes these differing

religious variables act as opiates to political action, while in other cases they positively

influence individuals in ways that lead to political action (see Calhoun-Brown 1996).

Others find that the environmental context also influences political engagement (Djupe and

Gilbert 2006; Djupe and Grant 2001; Olson 2000).

This research provides insight into the multi-dimensional and nuanced world of religion

and political mobilization. However—though scholars such as Jasper (1997; 2008) in

modern social movement theory have acknowledged it—only a few scholars in religion

and political literature have realized that while rational behavior, resources, beliefs, group

identity, organization and environmental context are all central to understanding the

mobilization (or lack thereof) of the religious community, emotions cannot be ignored.

Early social movement theorists argued that a feeling of marginalization and alienation was

all that was needed to motivate a group into collective action (Arendt 1951; Buechler 1993;

1995; Kornhauser 1959). This simplistic view of collective action was soon replaced by a

more sophisticated understanding of the specific mechanisms needed to stimulate and

organize collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977) but the importance of emotion to

collective action should never be lost in the array of new, sophisticated variables. Social

movement scholars such as Jasper (1998; 2011) and Benford and Snow (2000) realized the

importance of emotion and framing to collective action and therefore introduced a new

theory, the theory of social constructionism. This theory maintains the rationality and

practicality promoted by the resource mobilization model, but also accounts for the impact

of emotion. Specifically, social constructionism contends that emotions are socially

constructed by movement elites in order to stir up desired political behavior. Therefore, in

this dissertation, I contend that emotion cannot be lost in the study of religion and political

behavior.

What emotions brewing in the evangelical community might we, as scholars, be

missing? Specifically, are evangelicals feeling a sense of marginalization by a changing

society? Evangelicals have held a dominant position in society, and yet recent research

shows that they are showing signs of perceived marginalization. What does it take for a

dominant group in society to feel as though they are oppressed rather than the oppressors?

Given the importance of marginalization to mobilization, if evangelicals are indeed feeling

marginalized, are they responding with mobilization? Further, what kinds of mobilization

are they willing to engage in as a result of these feelings?

Wong (2018a) finds that white evangelicals are struggling with demographic changes

within their ranks. She shows that the proportion of Black, Latinx and Asian evangelicals

have grown while the proportion of white evangelicals has decreased. She finds, however,

that despite these demographic changes within the evangelical community, white

evangelicals "appear to be supporting a political agenda that goes against the tide of

demographic change in the United States" (88). These findings coincide with those of

Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2016; 2017; 2018) who show that white Americans are

displaying signs of anxiety and even perceived marginalization because of demographic

changes in society. Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) call this anxiety the “white identity”

crisis and point out the uniqueness of a “white identity” crisis in a country that is primarily

white. They attribute the recent surge of a “white identity” rhetoric in politics to the racial

strain amongst whites in response to having an African American president coupled with

Donald Trump’s use of “us” versus “them” rhetoric during his presidential campaign.

The demographic changes occurring within the evangelical population are a microcosm

of what is happening in America at large. Further, there is a unique difference between

white evangelicals and evangelicals of a minority race/ethnicity (Wong 2018a). However,

it is important to note that social strain in the white evangelical population is likely

connected to this broader sense of anxiety present amongst white Americans as they

struggle with their looming “status loss” in society and loss of power in the political realm

as a result of shifting societal demographics (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; 2018; Tesler

and Sides 2016; Tesler 2016; Wong 2018a; 2018b). This literature finds that ethnic and

racial identities played a tremendous role in the election of Donald Trump. Sides, Tesler,

and Vavreck (2016; 2017; 2018) and Tesler (2016) found that divisions tied to race,

immigration and religion were exacerbated due to the “us” versus “them” rhetoric used in

the Trump campaign. Hence, Donald Trump’s election sheds light on an area of social and

status anxiety simmering in the ranks of white America.

Thus, current literature shows that in the general white population there is social strain

brewing, a strain that Trump was able to use to his advantage (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck

2016; 2017; 2018; Wong 2018a). Wong (2018a) points out that this strain is not associated

with economics—as many assumed—but rather to issues of race. White evangelicals are

experiencing an even more substantial demographic shift in their community than whites

in general. Their support for President Trump was substantially higher (80%) than that of

their non-evangelical white counterparts (31%), indicating an even stronger emotional

impetus for political mobilization (Wong 2018b). Wong (2018a; 2018b) explains that

evangelicals are feeling a sense of marginalization based on racial prejudice and societal

strain as their "us" versus "them" mentality is constructed and reconstructed for the benefit

of Republican elites. This does not mean that evangelical marginalization is based solely

on a "white identity" crisis but that it is a crucial factor that cannot be ignored.

Many other factors are likely also contributing to feelings of marginalization. I will

touch on these other possible influential factors throughout this dissertation. However, the

purpose of this dissertation is not to uncover and assess why evangelicals are feeling

marginalized but rather to look at how they are expressing themselves through

unconventional forms of political mobilization as a result of this emotional impetus.

Both social movement theory and theories of political behavior acknowledge the

importance of expression as a form of political mobilization (Jasper 1998; 2011; Theocharis

2015). Rojas and Puig-I-Abril (2009) explain that expression is the way that individuals

can publicly express their political orientations; thus, it is an essential part of the

mobilization process. Further, Charles Tilly (1978) calls this kind of expression "identity

claiming." It is the simple act of expressing one's identity, one's collective "we" to the

world. It is not an attempt to change the world as much as it is a form of expressing that

one's perspectives, values, and identity still exist and "constitute a unified force to be

reckoned with" (Tilly 1978, 184).

Evangelicals make up a sizable portion of the population and, as the Christian Right

Movement taught political scientists, should not be underestimated or understudied (Moen

1992). Elites construct a “marginalized” collective identity to stimulate evangelicals into

political participation. Given the latent civic skills (Campbell 2004) in the evangelical

community, evangelical churches are ripe with powerful and skilled individuals who, on a

moment’s notice, have the organizational capacity, civic skills, and resources to mobilize—

they just need to emotional stimuli to push them over the edge.

While emotion is an understudied causal variable in the “religion” and “political

behavior” relationship, there are some understudied forms of political behavior as well. The

Donald Trump presidential election showed that evangelicals are willing to mobilize

conventionally; however, conventional mobilization is not the only form of mobilization

available to groups who feel aggrieved. Throughout history, marginalized groups have

turned to extra-institutional forms of mobilization such as protests, marches, rallies, and

boycotting. Might we find evangelicals utilizing such forms of mobilization as they adopt

the marginalized label for themselves?

Expression is a form of mobilization. Are evangelicals motivated to express themselves

using unconventional, extra-institutional forms of political mobilization? What other ways

might evangelicals be expressing their feelings about society and politics? While voting

behavior, lobbying, political donations, founding and funding pressure groups, writing

members of Congress and any other form of conventional political participation are

essential to understanding the mobilization of the evangelicals, there are other forms of

expressive political mobilization that may be used to tell us more about the emotional

context driving these individuals to engage in conventional political participation.

Evangelicals are still highly involved in forms of conventional political participation

and continue to have an impact on the American political landscape (Wilcox and Robinson

2010). The Donald Trump presidential election is perhaps one of the most recent examples

of evangelical political participation and influence. In this dissertation, I do not argue that

forms of conventional political participation are irrelevant, nor do I contend that

evangelicals are disengaged from these forms of participation. In fact, I argue the opposite.

Evangelicals are quite willing to engage in conventional forms of political participation

when they feel the need (Fowler et al. 2013; Smith 1998). Religion and politics scholars

are keenly aware of this and the importance of understanding the ways that religion

influences and informs such participation. However, there is scant research that studies how

and why evangelicals engage in unconventional expressive forms of political participation

such as marches and protests, boycotting, or online media expression. While these

unconventional forms of political participation are by no means the only forms of

participation, nor are they even the most important, they are and have played an essential

role in many social movements in American history. Further, these forms of political

mobilization are highly expressive and usually indicate the specific issues of social strain

present in the aggrieved group.

Tilly (1978) discusses the “repertoire” of activities that aggrieved groups use to express

themselves and their desires. The repertoire changes with the times. Forms of expressive

mobilization are indicative of social strain and studying them provides a unique picture of

evangelical social strain or lack thereof. We can better understand some of the issues and

concerns present in the evangelical population by studying what kinds of issues they

express themselves for or against. Thus, studying unconventional political participation

informs our understanding of conventional participation.

I also believe the research in this dissertation can lead to more research and greater

insight into the political polarization literature and the presumed culture war (Layman

2001; Layman and Carsey 1998; Layman and Green 2005). Presumably, the more society

embraces socially liberal norms, the more socially conservative norms will stand out. This

is common sense, and would work in the opposite direction as well. The key here is the fact

that these norms must be publicly expressed as still existent for them to "stand out."

Evangelical expressive mobilization makes these views stand out.

There are only a select few groups left in the US who still hold certain "black or white"

positions on social issues. Abortion, homosexuality, and sexuality are all highly divisive

and invoke strong feelings (Hunter 1992). However, most groups, including evangelicals

have become more open and accepting of forms of sexuality or homosexuality present in

society (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). A subset of "traditional values still persists"

(Inglehart and Baker 2000). Thus, the idea that evangelical/conservative views on issues of

sexuality are outdated swells until some form of outdated social expression reminds people

that this view still exists. Hence, "there's still more work to do."

For example, the North Carolina school system recently removed the children’s book

“Jacob Wears a Dress” because of parental opposition. The authors of the book,

disappointed by the reaction, said “Our hope, when we wrote this book, was that someday

it would be considered quaint. We imagined future generations saying, ‘What was the fuss

about?’ Clearly, there’s more work to do.” (Mele 2017). “Clearly, there’s more work to do”

implies that since socially conservative perspectives on human sexuality still exist, these

authors’ job is not complete. This means that statements and expressions in favor of socially

conservative norms likely stimulate progressives to fight harder for their end goals. I

believe that this dynamic feedback loop between social perspectives is overlooked in

polarization literature. Therefore, my dissertation's analysis of evangelical expression

provides a critical missing piece for this otherwise complex puzzle of polarization.

Why should we care then about how evangelicals are expressively mobilizing in

support of their values and identity? Numerous scholars already agree that religion's impact

on political behavior cannot be overstated; thus, understanding the impact of emotions on

the expressive mobilization of one of the most significant religious populations in the

United States is essential to understanding political behavior in the United States. If we

choose not to care, we may yet again be blindsided by future election results or befuddled

when evangelicals engage politically in something we never saw coming.

These expressive forms of mobilization act as proxies for what is going on in the hearts

and minds of evangelicals and provide insight into their feelings of social marginalization.

I theorize that the higher their feelings of social strain, the more they will engage in these

forms of expressive mobilization. This allows them to, at the very least, express their

thoughts and feelings on issues they about which they feel strongly. Studying why and how

they maintain their religious vitality, or what kinds of evangelicals are out there, or even

studying the Christian Right's political participation, will never allow us to fully understand

the dynamics and nuance of the evangelical population and what levels, if any, of

marginalization they may be feeling. Further, it misses how this marginalization is affecting

their behavior now and may affect their behavior in future or current elections.

Summary

This dissertation is about perceived social marginalization and subsequent expressive

mobilization of evangelicals in America. Do evangelicals, regardless of ideology, race, age

or political persuasion, feel marginalized by society and/or government? Given the Donald

Trump presidential administration, is it possible for them to feel a sense of political efficacy

while still possessing a sense of marginalization? Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) show

that social strain was and is present among the ranks of white Americans surrounding issues

of race, immigration, and religion. Thus, if evangelicals do feel marginalized how does this

perceived marginalization cause them to express themselves through unconventional

political participation? The Donald Trump election is evidence they are willing to engage

in conventional political participation; but, in what ways have they attempted to relieve

their perceived social strain through alternative forms of political mobilization? Does an

increase in feelings of marginalization cause them to mobilize expressively? I argue that

evangelicals when they do mobilize, are counter-mobilizing since mobilization is the

attempt to change the societal status-quo and counter-mobilization is the attempt to stall or

maintain the challenged status-quo.

Evangelicals are just one of many groups in the United States fighting to make their

voices heard. All groups are important to the political and social process of any democratic

country, and every group uniquely influences society and politics. Evangelicals' zero-sum

understanding of morality is another reason I am interested in evangelicals in the USA.

They are one of only a few groups left in the United States that adamantly claim that their

way (belief system) is the only way, while the societal zeitgeist is that everybody’s way is

the right way. Given this current societal trend, I believe that it is important to understand

how evangelicals are feeling in response to societal change and if they are mobilizing in

kind.

Evangelicals are not a homogeneous unit. This means there is likely not one universally

shared feeling. African American evangelicals may be responding and/or mobilizing

differently than white evangelicals. Younger evangelicals may have different feelings in

than older evangelicals. These are differences that I intend to unravel and better understand

while writing this dissertation. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I cannot unravel the

answers to all these intricacies, but I can begin shedding light on them.

I expect to find that evangelicals are becoming increasingly frustrated with the direction

of the country and thus perceive themselves to be socially marginalized. Ergo, in this

dissertation, I theorize that, based on social movement theory, one-way evangelicals will

express their displeasure with the feeling of marginalization is by expressively mobilizing.

Assuming evangelicals believe they have lost some of their political and social influence,

I posit that they will use different forms of expression as their form of mobilization. I use

political consumerism and social media venting as indicators of this expression. These are

not the only two forms of unconventional political participation. Other forms of political

participation include protests, marches, picketing, violence, and rioting. I focus primarily

on political consumerism and social media venting for two reasons: political consumerism

is now one of the most frequently used forms of political participation (Michelleti 2003);

social media venting is a growing forum for political participation (Theocharis 2015).

In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature. I spend most of the chapter summarizing

the literature on evangelicals, their history, their philosophy and beliefs, their place in

society, and their relationship with marginalized groups such as African Americans and

those in the LGBTQ community. Much of the chapter is spent unraveling the many different

interpretations and definitions of "evangelical." I also use a good portion of this chapter to

review social movement theory and political efficacy.

I set up my theory and establish the assumptions for my theory of social marginalization

and subsequent mobilization in the third chapter. Broadly, my theory can be applied to all

groups who feel a sense of marginalization. However, since I am looking specifically at

evangelicals, I narrow my theory to fit some of their idiosyncrasies. I use the final portion

of Chapter 3 to spell out my hypotheses and the implications of my theory that I intend to

analyze in this dissertation.

Chapter 4 is the first of my empirical chapters. It is an exploratory chapter and focuses

primarily on the "marginalization" portion of my theory. I analyze findings from qualitative

field research. I discuss findings from interviews with different evangelical pastors from

three different states. These interviews provide much-needed insight into the individual

thoughts and reactions that evangelical clergy are experiencing in response to changes in

society. I can confirm my original assumption that evangelicals are indeed feeling

marginalized, while also uncovering some of the differing reasons for this feeling of

marginalization, across race, age, region, and denomination. The findings presented in this

chapter are insightful, while also, at times, surprising. I find that evangelical pastors, for

the most part, even though they displayed a high sense of societal marginalization, are not

expressively mobilizing individually or collectively.

In Chapter 5 I perform a case study analysis of collective evangelical mobilization

through political consumerism. Though evangelical elites and some evangelical

organizations have been very loud in recent history, there are limited instances of collective

evangelical political consumerism that do not stem from these organizations. I use this

chapter to analyze one organized boycott and one organized buycott. I use the rest of the

chapter to focus on what moving parts are sufficient to motivate evangelicals who are not

part of these organizations into collective action.

In Chapter 6, I analyze individual evangelical mobilization via Twitter. Twitter is a

handy source of individual public expression. I analyze the differences in how evangelicals

mobilize by looking at a little over 17,000 evangelical Twitter users and the proportion of

tweets that are political versus mundane or spiritual. Further, I analyze the sentiment of the

tweets and compare them to the sentiments expressed by a control dataset of randomly

selected Twitter users.

In Chapter 7, I conclude and establish this dissertation's place in the literature and

discuss plans for future research. This dissertation is just the starting point of a wealth of

further research that explores corporate politics, polarization and public opinion, and a

more in-depth analysis of evangelical marginalization and mobilization.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: EVANGELICAL WHO?

"If ideological leaders warn darkly of the dangers of the forces of liberalism, and stir

up hatred towards gays and lesbians, feminists, secularists, and others with whom they do

not agree, the movement will constitute a divisive force in America that threatens the

lifestyles of many citizens" (Wilcox 1996, 150). Wilcox, a prominent religion and politics

scholar, warns of the dangers of a healthy and unified Christian Right. Many religion and

politics scholars have studied the motivations and movements of the Christian Right

(Leinesch 1982). They delved into the psyche of its members and tried to understand the

motivations and reasoning behind their beliefs and political actions. However, most religion

and politics scholars who study evangelicalism focus almost exclusively on the Christian

Right.

While there is much to learn and understand about the Christian Right, there is also

much missed by focusing exclusively on this extreme ideological portion of evangelicals.

Evangelicals, in total, are much more nuanced and diverse than this ideological branch of

the Christian Right. Evangelicalism, at its core, is not a race, it is not a political ideology,

nor is it a political persuasion, it is a set of Biblical, theological beliefs. I am interested in

the perceived marginalization and expressive mobilization of evangelicals whether they be

conservative or liberal, black or white, young or old, southern or northern, rich or poor,

educated or uneducated. However, it behooves my research to briefly overview the

previous research, debates, definitions and findings on the Christian Right, or in rare cases,

all evangelicals.

Firstly, I am interested in understanding the inter-workings of one specific group; the

evangelical Christian base in America. They are an unconventional crowd, mainly because

of the division and disagreement amongst their members. Evangelicals tend to be content

not conforming to the social zeitgeist and many have been reticent to engage in overtly

political behavior (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell 2004; Djupe, Neiheisel, Sokhey 2017;

Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2000; Olson 2000)

even though they have chosen to engage in political behavior under specific circumstances

(Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Hill 1993; Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2000; 2003; Jelen

1991; Leinesch 1982; Wald 1989; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Evangelicals are steadfast

and devout in their adherence to their doctrines and beliefs regardless of the way society

may or may not be trending. Further, evangelicals baffle the minds of scientists who argue

that modernization should and usually does result in the extinction of religion.

There is quite an abundance of literature that says that religion and modernization

cannot and do not coexist. This is the secularization/modernization hypothesis. Emile

Durkheim and Steven Lukes (2014), Max Weber (1978) and Talcott Parsons (1949)

formulated the theory of modernization. Modernization posits that advances in technology,

education, communication and urban growth enlighten the human mind. These advances

convert society from beliefs in the spiritual to beliefs in science. This conversion is the

direct result of science answering previously unanswered life questions that were once

answered by spirituality.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1964; 2011) introduced a similar theory with their

class conflict model. They argued that members of society in power used religion to dumb

down the minds of the oppressed. They postulated that religion appeased minds and

provided an explanation for oppression and an escape from oppression. Thus, once

communism/socialism and modernization brought about an equal and fair society, religion

became unnecessary and irrelevant.

The modernization of European countries has affirmed these theories; however, the

United States, one of the leading industrialized and modernized societies, has not followed

suit. As one political scientist states, “American religion, like Mark Twain, has obstinately

refused to comply with reports of demise” (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2018, 8). Further

literature has shown that not only is religion still present, it is highly influential on political

behavior (Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Djupe and Olson 2007; Djupe and Gilbert 2008;

2006; Djupe and Grant 2001; Guth 2001; Guth, Kellstedt, Green, and Smidt 2002;

McKenzie 2004; Smidt 2016).

Against standing theory then, religion, and specifically American Christianity, is

relevant, both socially and politically. Despite Christianity’s persistent relevance, scholars

agree that the study of religion and its followers, in the context of politics, suffers from a

lack of scholarly attention (Vitz 1985). While there is a small niche within political science

that devotes attention to religion and politics, the niche is not a completed collection and

still has room for exploration.

Evangelical Vitality

There is a subset of religion and politics research that focuses exclusively on religious

vitality in America, specifically, evangelical vitality in America since evangelicalism has

maintained its vitality against the odds (Hunter 1981; 1992; Smith et al. 1998). There are

two primary schools of thought that attempt to unpack this evangelical anomaly. James

Davidson Hunter (1981; 1992) introduced the idea of a "culture war." He claimed that the

resurgence of conservative religion during the 1960s through the 1980s was a defensive

maneuver in response to the increasing forces of modernity. He states that religion has two

choices when faced with modernity: resistance or accommodation. He finds that

evangelicals have chosen to resist. They distance themselves from the “evil devices” of

modernity by creating social boundaries for themselves. This intentional distancing

preserves and strengthens their vitality (Hunter 1981; 1992). He concludes that evangelical

vitality is due to their geographic and social distance from modernity (Hill 2004).

However, years later, scholars began to reject the idea that modernity and secularism

were the leading causes of evangelical vitality and resurgence. One scholar, Smith et al.

(1998), posited the subcultural identity theory, which gives a different reason for religious

vitality. He found that self-described evangelicals were more highly educated than all their

religious and non-religious counterparts, save for mainline Protestants. Further, the

evangelical's average yearly income was higher than most every other form of Christianity,

and they were also less likely to live in rural America than other Christian persuasions.

Hunter's assertion that evangelical vitality is due to their geographic and social distance

from modernity is less plausible given Smith et al.'s (1998) findings about evangelicalism.

Smith offers his answer for continued religious vitality. He says that modernity, instead of

threatening to evangelicals, is stimulating to them. That is, secularism/modernity helps to

re-establish an in-group, out-group mentality for evangelicals (see Jelen 1991). This

mentality stimulates and re-invigorates them religiously. Thus, interaction with and

proximity to out-groups renews the groups’ distinction from other groups. He defines

subcultural identity: “In a pluralistic society, those religious groups will be relatively

stronger which better possess and employ the cultural tools needed to create both clear

distinction from and significant engagement and tension with other relevant outgroups,

short of becoming genuinely countercultural” (Smith et al. 1998, 118-119).

These two analyses on evangelical vitality agree on very little. However, one aspect is

similar between them; both studies use either the basic doctrinal definition of evangelical

or self-identification to select their evangelical subgroups. This is unique since much

research on evangelicals focuses on the Christian Right or the conservative aspect of

evangelicals. However, these two scholars only analyze how and what stimulates religious

vitality. That is secularism either drives evangelicals to create more boundaries to shut

themselves off from the world, or pushes them to a greater in-group homogeneity and

outgroup alienation. With this dissertation, I research the flip side of this. What stimulates

doctrinal evangelicals to interact and express themselves and their perspectives to the

world? Many scholars have answered this question, but few have addressed how emotion

affects unconventional expressive mobilization (see Christian Smith 2014).

The gap I intend to fill concerns all evangelicals and not just members of the Christian

Right. I endeavor to uncover truths about evangelical feelings and how those feelings

manifest in forms of expression. How do evangelicals feel about the trajectory of society?

Have these feelings affected their political and social involvement? How do the recent

trends in society towards secularization, especially in sexuality, cause evangelicals to feel?

Are evangelicals feeling a sense of marginalization, and if so, is this causing members to

engage in politics and society differently? Do they feel that they are experiencing a societal

attack on their convictions or are they more concerned with the possibility of a loss of social

status and power position in government (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018)? Based on

prominent research on mobilization and counter-mobilization, evangelicals, equipped with

a unique set of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Campbell 2004), if they

are indeed feeling marginalized, are likely to respond both conventionally and

unconventionally.

Is there a shared feeling of marginalization between African American evangelicals and

white evangelicals or is the marginalization felt by white evangelicals exclusive to white

evangelicals? According to the literature on race and religion, African Americans and

evangelicalism have a complicated past and present relationship (Day 2012; Harris 1999;

Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). The African American religious community has a unique set

of experiences that set them apart politically from white evangelicals (CalhounBrown

1996; 1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Harris 1996; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990); however,

Black and white evangelicals share the same perspectives on many social and doctrinal

issues. Are there any feelings of marginalization that are tied explicitly to the perceived

marginalization of religious values and if so, does this form of marginalization cross racial

lines? If these feelings of marginalization do cross race lines, does it invoke similar forms

of mobilization or varied forms of mobilization?

Evangelical Who?

According to the Pew Research Group, Evangelical Christians make up 25.4% of the

Christian population in American while Mainline Protestants make up 14.7% of the

Christian population in America (2015a). Evangelical denominations usually include the

Southern Baptists, Independent Baptists, Assembly of God, Church of God, and some

Presbyterians (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Goren and Chapp 2017).

While the research of religion and politics is a small niche in political science, there has

been a good deal of research done on Mainline Protestantism, Catholicism, the evangelical

Christian Right and their respective relationships to politics. However, most scholars’

struggle defining and identifying evangelical. Hence, one of the most researched and

debated topics in religion and politics research centers around what evangelical means.

There is no easy answer to this question, and there is no scholarly consensus or agreement

on precisely what evangelicalism is (Burge and Lewis 2018; Ethridge and Feagin 1979;

Hackett and Lindsay 2008; Hunter 1981; Streensland et al. 2000; Warner 1979). At their

core, evangelicals are a subset of Protestants who believe in the need to proselytize or

evangelize. The word evangelical is a derivative of the Greek word euangelion, which

means "gospel." Evangelicals are keenly concerned with spreading the "good news" of the

Christian gospel message. Further, it is reasonably safe to say that since evangelicalism is

a Protestant phenomenon, Catholics and Jews are automatically excluded (Hunter 1981).

Scholars agree that beliefs in the divinity of Christ and personal faith for salvation are also

vital to evangelicalism (Ammerman 1982). Beyond that, however, evangelicalism is poorly

defined (Hunter 1981).

Another, perhaps less agreed upon indicator of evangelicalism is biblical inerrancy.

While most scholars agree that biblical inerrancy is key to evangelicalism (Gorsuch and

McFarland 1972; Maranell 1974), others (Ammerman 1982; Quebedeaux 1974) question

its place within the operationalization of evangelicalism. Ammerman points out that the

inerrancy of the Bible (at least in the early 1980s) became a topic of contention within

evangelicals ranks. Biblical inerrancy, she explains, is where fundamentalism and

evangelicalism split. Fundamentalists have a unified belief in the inerrancy of the Bible

while evangelicals do not.

However, for this dissertation, I consider Biblical inerrancy central to my definition of

evangelical for two reasons. First, evangelicals tend to use inerrancy as a descriptor for

themselves when explaining why they are evangelical; second, the prevailing scholarly

opinion is that Biblical inerrancy is a crucial part of what makes someone evangelical

versus any other kind of Christian persuasion (Emerson and Smith 2000; Hunter 1981;

Wilcox 1996; Wilcox and Robinson 2010).

Scholars also disagree on the parameters used to define evangelicalism. Hackett and

Lindsay (2008) identify three distinct ways of defining evangelicalism: denominational

affiliation, identity, and beliefs. Using all three forms of evangelical measures, the total

population of evangelicals is scaled down from over 40% of the US population to 2% of

the population (2008). The benefit of using self-identification is that political scientists can

capture political movement adherents as well as doctrinal or denominational evangelicals

(2008). Some survey respondents may identify themselves with an "evangelical

movement" even if they would not fit into the doctrinal or denominational standards of

evangelicalism. However, I am not interested in individuals who identify with a movement

but rather individuals who theologically fall in line with evangelicalism (Smith et al.

1998).

Denominational categorization, when utilized correctly, simplifies the categorization

process. However, Ammerman cautions that in categorizing by denomination “we must be

extremely careful not to repeat past mistakes by trying to assume individual behavior or

attitudes from association with a larger structure” (1982, 171). Moen (1989) categorizes

fundamentalists, Pentecostals and charismatics separately, highlighting their slight

differences. Scholars provide no consensus whether to categorize fundamentalists,

Pentecostals and charismatics as mere versions of evangelicalism or as separate entities.

While Moen tends to conceptualize evangelicals, fundamentalists, Pentecostals and

charismatics as distinct from one another, other scholars conceptualize fundamentalists,

Pentecostals and charismatics as mere subsets of the “evangelical” Christian Right

(Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Hence, much of the difficulty inherent in defining

evangelicals is the lack of coherency in the group itself.

Burge and Lewis (2018), in a recent analysis of evangelicals and their support of Donald

Trump, find that self-identification and denominational identification end up identifying

approximately the same number of evangelicals. This means that these two measures may

not be as distinct from one another as previously assumed.

Wilcox (1991) addresses some of these conceptual issues inherent in defining

evangelicals. He divides evangelicals into three different categories: doctrinal evangelicals;

denominational evangelicals and denominational/doctrinal evangelicals. In his book God’s

Warriors, he researches the detailed intricacies that differentiate the three types of

evangelicals. Generally, he finds that doctrinal evangelicals are more religiously committed

and more politically conservative than denominational evangelicals. However,

denominational and doctrinal evangelicals are more nuanced. In some cases, these hybrid

evangelicals were more religiously committed and more conservative, while in other cases

they were not. The concluding assumption, then, is that doctrinal evangelicals are more

fervently committed than denominational evangelicals.

Hunter uses the doctrinal approach when analyzing evangelicals. His qualifications turn

up one of the lowest rates of evangelicalism available (Hackett and Lindsay 2008).

Hunter encapsulates the concept of evangelicalism with three conceptual requirements.

First, an individual must believe in the inerrancy of the Bible.3 Second, the individual must

believe in the divinity of Jesus Christ, and finally, he or she must believe that salvation is

only through faith in Jesus Christ and not of works. Doctrinal evangelicals are highly

focused on individual salvation and otherworldly concerns (Hunter 1981; 1992).

When possible, I use these doctrinal qualifications for my research data. Doctrinal, not

ideological, qualifications are essential to my research since I am not interested in studying

the Christian Right but rather doctrinal evangelicals. By using only theological and

doctrinal qualifications to define evangelicals, I can more clearly analyze the evangelical

base with all its diversity or lack thereof. I do not use any political or ideological

qualifications to select my evangelical base. Instead, I attempt to analyze how politically

engaged the evangelical base is by avoiding any political identifiers in my qualification

process.

These doctrinal evangelical groups all share the fundamental belief of the inerrancy and

supremacy of the Bible and profess a “born again experience”; yet, they still disagree about

additional details. These disagreements have led to significant divisions among professing

evangelicals. Fundamentalists and Pentecostals, specifically, have a unique relationship

within evangelicalism, one that is riddled with disagreement (Smidt 1988; 1989; Wilcox

and Robinson 2010). Beliefs in pre-millennialism and post-millennialism are at the at the

root of the disagreement. Pre-millennialists (primarily fundamentalists; their belief in

premillennialism is essential to the formation of fundamentalism and has a notable impact

on their identity) believe that the world is supposed to worsen socially and politically

before

Jesus comes back to take all the “born again” Christians home to heaven (Sandeen 1970).

This is in stark contrast to post-millennialism. Those who believe in post-millennialism

believe that Jesus will not come until a thousand years of peace on earth have passed.

These diverging beliefs have significant political consequences. If Christ cannot come

until after a thousand years of perfect peace, Christians have a meaningful and critical role

in politics to bring about perfect peace. Therefore, post-millennials possess a considerable

internal and spiritual motivation to involve themselves in politics to bring about peace on

earth. Pre-millennials do not own this same urgency since they believe the world is

supposed to perish and be in darkness before Jesus returns. In this case, the Christian's

calling is only to save as many, spiritually, as they can. Human and political involvement

is temporary and futile (Wilcox and Robinson 2010).

In sum, who evangelicals are and how they have maintained their vitality are areas of

research that are fraught with debate. I utilize different portions of Hunter's theory and

Smith et al.'s theory to build my theory about doctrinal evangelicals and their expressive

engagement. My concern is less how these evangelicals are still thriving; instead, what are

they doing with themselves since they are thriving?

The Historical Context of Evangelicals and Conservatism

Religious mobilization spans the centuries (Smith 2014) with every religion mobilizing

at different times and for different reasons. Fowler et al. (2013, 1) say "It would be very

difficult to understand American politics today without knowing something about

American religion." Since the inception of the country, religion has played an influential

role in American politics and society. Puritanism was central in shaping American civic

institutions and gave the United States a "sense of national mission" (2010, 2). Initially,

most colonies installed state churches that eventually devolved, but the tendency to include

religion in government persisted. Although the United States is growing in religious

diversity, with a growing percentage of Muslims and Jews, America remains decidedly

Christian, with one in four Americans identifying as such (2010).

There are four dominant forms of Christianity in the United States: Catholicism,

evangelicalism, mainline and African American Protestantism (2010). Mainline Protestant

clergy “have argued that Christians must address the world’s injustices not merely by

individual charity but by collective efforts to change societal structures” (2010, 37). This

“theological liberalism” has influenced Mainline Protestant clergy and parishioners

towards liberal political activism. During the mid-1900s, Mainline Protestant churches

were the dominant force in American religion and were “well entrenched” (2010). Mainline

Protestant clergy participated in and promoted many of the social movements during the

1960s and embraced issues such as poverty, racism, sexism, and oppression (2010). They

lent their voices, their money, and their activism in support of righting these “unjust

structures” (2010, 38).

In recent decades Mainline Protestantism has faced a steep decline in membership.

Fowler et al. (2013) contend that despite this decline in numbers, "mainline churches still

possess a wealth of inherited capital in the form of buildings, institutions and endowments,

as well as the loyalty of lay members. Local churches continue to operate a host of food

banks, meal programs, homeless shelters, clothing closets, and day care centers, and

national organizations operate large hospitals, charitable agencies, and highly respected

international development organizations" (39). In short, Mainline Protestants have been

and still are publicly involved with "the world." They are willing to engage in conventional

and unconventional political participation and tend to do so in support of "theologically

liberal" issues.

Catholicism is also closely connected to politics. Throughout world history,

Catholicism has played a pivotal role in many governments, particularly in Europe where

the church was “deeply enmeshed in statecraft”(Fowler et al. 2013, 41). However, some

Americans tended to look at the Catholic church with suspicion. In time, the Catholic

church evolved into a bridge of sorts between evangelical Protestantism and mainline

Protestantism because of its uniquely liberal and conservative positions on critical political

issues in the United States (Fowler et al. 2013).

Evangelical Protestants' relationship with government and public activity is different

from both mainline Protestants and Catholics, and, as I address in another section of the

dissertation, African American Protestants. While Catholics and Mainline Protestants are

happy to engage in political participation and public action, evangelicals' otherworldly

orientation and concern for individual salvation have made subsets of evangelicals

politically and socially reticent (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Djupe, Neiheisel, and Sokhey 2017,

Campbell 2004; Green 1999; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Green, Roxell, and Wilcox

2000, 2003; Olson 2000; but see Jelen 1991; Chaves 2004). However, portions of the

hitherto politically inactive coalition of evangelicals have mobilized (Burge and Guth

1996; Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Moen

1989; Oldfield 1996; Steensland et al. 2000; Wilcox 1991; Wilcox and Robinson 2010;

Wuthnow 1988).

Evangelicals have entered the world of politics on some occasions. The "crusade against

slavery" was one of the most notable religiously motivated movements in American history

(Fowler et al. 2013). Religious revivals in the North awakened the Christian consciousness

against slavery while white southern evangelicals came to the defense of slavery, their

institutions, and their way of life (2010). Hence, the Bible becomes both a beacon of hope

for slaves and a justification for slavery (Noll 2010).

It was not until the prohibition era that evangelicals again mobilized on a national scale.

Fowler et al. (2013) explain that the Temperance movement “provides some important

practical lessons for religious partisans today” (14). The Anti-Saloon League, founded in

1895 by Rev. Howard Hyde Russell, was a compilation of various protestant clergy from

different denominations. The league was incredibly effective as it used education, lobbying,

and electioneering to establish its message. The ability of the league to pull together

religious groups across varying denominations and to appeal to a variety of people through

messaging rather than pure political pressure sets the Temperance movement apart from

other religiously motivated movements (2010). Those involved in the movement began

their campaign in states and slowly moved their way through each state. Fowler et al.

(2013) say that “Prohibition represented the high water mark of the popularity and political

clout of evangelical Protestantism” (15).

The Temperance movement engineers were effective and strategic. They constructed

and pulled on the emotions of Americans throughout the country. Too many times men had

come home drunk or never came home at all. People lost their jobs, their money, their

homes because of drunkenness. These experiences primed the public for the voice of

change that the evangelical elites presented through the Anti-Saloon League. However,

despite initial success, the Temperance movement failed as the country came to grips with

the reality that law cannot mandate morality. Evangelicals withdrew from public politics

for the better part of the 20th century until the late 1970s when new issues arose that seemed

to call for their activation (Fowler et al. 2013).

In the late 19th century, Mainstream Protestants began shifting their understanding of

faith in relation to the "outside world" in response to the modern scientific and social ideas

(Wilcox and Robinson 2010). With this change, Protestant churches started preaching a

new "social gospel," one that put more focus on outward changes in behavior to alleviate

social ills (2010). Fundamentalism was the direct reaction to the new "social gospel." Those

who held more conservative religious beliefs felt the new "social gospel" threatened the

Christian's fundamental focus of simply "saving souls" (2010). In the earlier 20th century,

the fundamentalists were moderately active in politics as they engaged in anticommunist

crusades. In the 1950s these crusades devolve and were followed by the charismatic

movement, prevalent amongst Mainline Protestant churches and Catholic churches. It was

not until the late 1970s that a new fundamentalist movement began.

The fundamentalists began showing signs of potential politicization during the 1970s

since they mobilized in response to local political issues and in support of "born-again"

presidential candidate Jimmy Carter (2010). It was because of this mobilization that

evangelical and political elites realized that evangelicals could be mobilized. It was not

until the late 1970s and the early 1980s that latent evangelicals began to fully engage in

political mobilization through the emergence of the Christian Right (Fowler et al. 2013).

Guth (1996) states that “Few political movements have enjoyed as much notoriety in recent

years as the ‘New Christian Right’” (7).

Wilcox and Robinson (2010) explain that portions of the Christian Right movement

were aimed solely at returning America to "a sound moral footing" (46). Green (1999) finds

that during the rise of the Christian Right, their moralism began to transition from concern

about general societal moral decay to specific policy goals such as restrictions on abortions

and gay rights. The Christian Right movement showed that religion could generate strong

collective identities that can serve as a basis for political action (1999). These collective

identities, as Smith's subcultural identity theory explains, are strengthened by outgroups.

Jelen (1991) contends that antagonism toward cultural minorities—namely, atheists,

Blacks, homosexuals, feminists, liberals, and religious minorities---fueled the Christian

Right. Individual congregations were sources of religious and political cues used to mold

the political and religious identity of the Religious Right (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Jelen

1991).

The Christian Right movement started for a variety of reasons. Moen (1992) attributes

much of the fervor to moral outrage. He even condemns scholars for pigeonholing members

of the Christian Right into a specific framework. He says, “The concerns of Christian Right

supporters were explained as the by-product of authoritarian personalities or symbolic

crusades, rather than taken at face value. One unfortunate result of pigeonholing the

Christian Right was that scholars circumscribed their research agendas” (349). Secular

trends during the late 1970s, such as the removal of religion from schools, abortion, and

the sexual revolution all contributed to a growing unease in the evangelical population

(Moen 1992). Therefore, it is crucial, in any research of evangelicals to acknowledge the

religious versus secular paradigm in the country and its effect on evangelicals.

However, many others scholars have found that evangelical unease also stems from an

embedded antagonism for outgroups (Jelen 1991; Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2016; 2017;

2018; Wong 2018a; 2018b). As Smith et al. (1998) assert with their subcultural identity

theory, these outgroups help to stimulate and cultivate a tighter, more exclusive "in-group"

amongst the evangelicals. This is particularly prevalent amongst white evangelicals. While

white evangelicals tend to share some socially conservative views with minority

evangelicals, white evangelicals more are highly conservative in all other issues in

comparison to minority evangelicals. This difference in political perspectives speaks to an

underlying racial component influencing the politics of white evangelicals (Wong 2018a).

Thus, the Christian Right movement was both a reaction to a secularizing society and a

pushback against demographic changes in society.

Motivated for a number of reasons, the newly activated evangelical political force in

the late 1970s birthed several organized and politically influential groups starting with the

Moral Majority. Jerry Falwell, the pastor of Thomas Road Baptist Church in Lynchburg,

Virginia, started the Moral Majority in 1979 (Hunter 1992; Leonard 1987; Moen 1992;

Post 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wilcox 1986; 1989). Other evangelical

conservative Christian groups such as the Religious Roundtable, The Christian Voice, and

the Christian Coalition followed the Moral Majority. Some scholars posit that these

groups greatly influenced politics and society at the time---some even called the political

activation of the evangelical base waking a sleeping giant (Moen 1989; 1992).5 Others

find that the Christian Right Movement’s influence was limited when compared to other

major social movements such as the Civil Rights Movement or the Feminist Movement

(Rozell

1997; Wilcox and Robinson 2010; Wilcox and Wolpert 2000)

The Christian Right of the 1970s was “shaped by the nature of its evangelical

constituency” (Oldfield 1996, 28). While evangelicalism and its adherents

(fundamentalists, neo-evangelists, and Pentecostals) grew, Liberal Protestant

denominations stopped growing (Oldfield 1996, 28-29). At this time, evangelical

Christians began to align with the GOP (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Green and Guth 1988;

Green, Guth, Smidt, and Kellstedt 1996; Green, Guth, and Wilcox 1998; Lambert 2010;

Moen 1996). The alignment of evangelicals with the GOP produced the sustained

alignment of evangelicals with conservatism and the GOP, while secular members of

society began aligning with liberalism and with the Democratic Party (Brint and Abrutyn

2010; Moen 1996; Lambert 2010).

politics because they saw it as dirty, corrupt business...by convincing these people that political involvement

was a God-given responsibility” (Zwier 1982, 9-10).

5 Not all scholars agree. Some scholars contend that in fact, the Christian Right had little impact on

government or policy (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). In fact, some argue that the political mobilization of the

Christian Right may have instigated and caused a change in the opposite direction of their desired change

(Jelen 1993a; Fetner 2008).

Before these alignments, evangelicals were not automatically assumed to be

conservative. However, in time, partisan politics adopted vital religious components, with

the GOP becoming known as the party of the evangelicals and Democratic Party becoming

the party of secular society. Scholars predict that the more evangelicals use the GOP as

their vehicle for access, the more the GOP will be identified with traditional values and

religion and Democrats with secularism. It is from this that “sharper partisan conflict will

ensue” (Green and Guth 1988, 162).

Brint and Abrutyn (2010) show that adherence to traditional moral standards is the

crucial link between religiosity and conservativism across a broad range of issues (345).

Traditional moral standards are the pivotal link between religion and conservatives rather

than traditionally conservative issues such as government assistance and/or environmental

policies (1988). “In this respect, commentators have frequently overstated the support of

religious people for the broader conservative movement. They have failed to see how

narrowly focused this support has been on issues like abortion, gay rights, and end-of-life

care” (Green and Guth 1988, 345). Further research shows that the Republican Party started

appealing to the evangelical base by stressing the importance of traditional moral values

and that this began to draw evangelicals to the Republican base. The GOP found a reliable

voting base in evangelicals because of moral issues and took advantage of the base by

intentionally exaggerating these issues (Wilcox 1990). Thus, intentional elite framing is

highly responsible for the marriage of religion and republicanism. This elite framing is a

form of social constructionism, a theory I explain later in this chapter. Based on social

constructionism, the GOP engaged in a sophisticated form of collective identity framing

with the use of emotionalism to garner evangelical followers.

The politically active evangelical conservatives became known as the Christian Right

and were uniquely evangelical and distinct from mainline Catholics and Protestants (Moen

1992; Wilcox 1991). In interviews with these Evangelical Christian Right activists,

Oldfield found that members knew they were “objects of ridicule in the broader society,”

but were more concerned about the values and culture being ridiculed (Oldfield 1996, 39;

Moen 1992). Thus, evangelical "values" are critical to an evangelical's identity and key to

my theory.

Evangelicals adopted a group consciousness during the rise of the Moral Majority under

this Republican collective identity umbrella (Jelen 1991; Wilcox 1990). This development

is significant because individuals feel marginalized if they feel the group they identify with

is marginalized; for this to happen, individuals must have a conscious awareness of the

group in which they associate. Research shows that denominational affiliation has an

independent effect on partisanship and political attitudes (Kellstedt and Green 1993; Olson

2000; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Wilcox 1990, 28) as does religious doctrine (Wilcox

and Jelen 1990). Both affiliations create a group consciousness, one that significantly

influences individuals’ political perceptions, values and beliefs (Conover 1984; Conover

and Feldman 1984; Goren and Chapp 2017; Wilcox 1990, 29).

Wilcox says that scholars have developed a consensus that “group consciousness is an

important part of group mobilization, and that group identification is an important

prerequisite for group consciousness” (1990, 29). This group consciousness has developed

over time for evangelicals. Televangelists, pastors and political elites attempted to mobilize

the evangelical voting base intentionally by stoking and constructing this group

consciousness (Wilcox 1990). The idea of a "group consciousness" or an awareness of one's

personal identity and the group of people they are then associated with, is called "collective

identity" by social movement theory scholars. A "collective identity," we will find moving

forward, is an important condition for evangelical collective action.

Evangelicals and the Influence of the Christian Right

Generally, scholars disagree on how influential the Christian Right was at its peak.

Moen (1989) argues that the Christian Right was relatively successful at influencing policy,

especially at the congressional level. However, Wilcox and Robinson (2010) argue that

while the Christian Right had some influence, it was not unified enough or large enough to

win most political battles. In fact, Wilcox and Robinson detail the many political and

judicial losses that the Christian Right suffered over the recent decades. They agree that, at

times, the Christian Right can influence elections but rarely does their candidate ever enact

the desires of the Christian Right since their policy preferences are usually too radical for

the candidate implement once in office (2010).

This finding supports Prothero’s (2016a) theory that liberals win all culture wars.

Prothero (2016a) details the different societal and political wins that liberals secured over

American history He concludes that conservatives push an agenda for a period before it is

eventually phased out by the liberal agenda which eventually becomes the American

agenda. Given that the Christian Right is a subset of the right, Wilcox and Robinson’s

conclusion about the Christian Right is reinforced. Evangelical influence can and has only

gone so far and is not likely to go much further anytime soon.

Jelen (1993a) details why he believes the Christian Right movement of the 1980s failed.

After interviewing evangelical clergy, he finds three prominent reasons for the failure of

the Christian Right to fully mobilize. The first reason he notes is that evangelicals are

individualistic. He is not the only scholar to find that evangelicals are highly focused on

individual salvation and otherworldly issues (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Campbell 2004;

Djupe, Neiheisel, Sokhey 2017; Green 1999; Green, Guth and Wilcox 1998; Green, Rozell

and Wilcox 2000; Olson 2000). Salvation (which was the most important thing to the

evangelical clergy interviewed, not policy change) is an individual experience and

relationship that exists only between the individual and God. Jelen (1993a) says:

The evangelical pastors simply would not accept systematic explanations for

adverse political developments, nor would they integrate macro level accounts into

their own theological thinking. Such matters as homosexuality, abortion, and drug

use were regarded as evidence of individual moral railings, which could be handled

by individual conversions. Even communism (which had been prominently

featured in the demonology of the Christian Right) is simply a bad idea, rather than

a manifestation of evil on earth...The idea that either sin or salvation can be

collective matters represents a cast of thought alien to Evangelical Clergy. A

political response to matters of individual piety would involve an enormous

perceptual shift for a majority of the evangelical clergy (132).

He found that the mindset of the evangelical clergy is micro, not macro. Thus, the

macromobilization of the Christian Right to combat a problem that they consider to be an

individual issue between God and man is not enough to stimulate sustained political action.

Further, he says that the emphasis that evangelicals have on individual conversion limits

the scope of their impact on political agenda. Policies, regarding religion, beyond the scope

of individual morality, were considered irrelevant to the evangelical clergy.

Second, since evangelicals are highly concerned with doctrine, unity amongst different

sects of evangelicals becomes more difficult. This lack of unity is yet another inhibiting

factor. Doctrinal differences tend to be highly divisive and are even prevalent within

sharing theological families (Jelen 1993a). Without being cohesive and somewhat unified,

evangelicals were never able to create a legitimate force for long-term change.

Finally, he argues that political participation itself may play a role in undercutting the

Christian Right’s movement. “It may be that the aggregating characteristics of a political

party, which is not identified with a particular theological tradition, make the assertion of

specific religious doctrines inappropriate” (134). He concludes by saying that a strong

enough move of secular humanism and a strong enough feeling of threat could be enough

to mobilize evangelicals, at least for a short time (Jelen 1993a).

These findings do not mean, however, that evangelicals have not and do not have any

influence. The Temperance movement alone is sufficient enough evidence that

evangelicals have been active and can have significant influence. Evangelical influence has

waxed and waned over the decades, with its arena of influence also shifting. Many times,

the disagreements amongst evangelicals themselves that has been the biggest roadblock to

continued evangelical success (Jelen 1993a). Recall that a growing sense of "collective

identity," predicated upon an "us" versus "them" mentality, contributes to evangelical

influence. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) assert that Donald Trump's "us" versus "them"

rhetoric stimulated a "white identity" crises in America. Given that evangelicals supported

Trump at a much higher rate than their non-evangelical white citizens, this rhetoric appears

to be resonating with them and is likely stirring up a missing sense of "collective identity."

Evangelicals and Race

Evangelicals are not a homogeneous unit doctrinally nor are they a homogeneous unit

demographically. While a significant portion of doctrinal/denominational evangelicals are

white, a sizable number are African American and Latino. However, scant research has

been done on the experiences and concerns of white evangelicals in contrast to the

experiences and concerns of African American or Latino evangelicals. Most research,

except for a few works (Calhoun-Brown 1996; 1998; Emerson and Smith 2000; Fowler et

al. 2013; Harris 1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Wadsworth 2012) detailing religion and

race have focused on "religion" and race rather than "evangelicals" and race.

Statistics and research show that African American Protestants are generally socially

conservative even though they overwhelming vote Democrat (Fowler et al. 2013; Harris

1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Wadsworth 2012). Black Protestants and white

evangelicals share similar theological belief systems. Jones and Francis (2012) show that

measures of religious belief and practice, across five standard measures (salience of

religion, biblical literalism, a certainty of God's existence, and frequency of prayer and

church attendance), were almost entirely identical and markedly different from the rest of

the public. However, while white evangelicals tend to vote Republican overwhelmingly,

Black Protestants vote Democrat (Jones and Francis 2012).

Wong (2018a) studies some of these racial differences in political perspectives and

attributes the difference to racial anxiety among white evangelicals. She finds that white

evangelicals are significantly more conservative on immigration than their black, Latinx

and Asian counterparts. Latinx and Asian evangelicals are the only sources of growth

occurring in the evangelical community in 2018 (2018b). Despite growing racial diversity,

Wong finds that white evangelicals are growing more Republican (2018a). Thus, Wong

believes that the growing demographic changes in the evangelical community have

triggered racial and religious anxieties (2018b). She explains that “white evangelical

conservatism strongly correlates with their perceptions of anti-white discrimination”

(Wong 2018b).

Harris (1999) looks at the differences between white evangelical mobilization and black

evangelical mobilization. He contends that there is a fundamental difference between how

black churches approach their political engagement and how white evangelical churches

approach their engagement with politics. Historically, black Protestants remained

politically aloof, for both theological and social reasons (Fowler et al. 2013; Harris 1999).

African Americans and have a unique relationship with evangelical Protestantism (Harris

1994; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Noll 2010). Harris (1994; 1999) studies white and black

religion and mobilization and finds that religion, though at times used as an opiate for the

masses (particularly during slavery), now acts as a mobilizer for most African Americans

(also see Calhoun-Brown 1996). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) and Harris (1994)

show that religion can be a tremendous political resource. Harris (1994) shows that the

three political resources that religion provides are motivation, organization, and social

interaction. In some ways, religious motivation acts as an opiate because of theological

passivism; however, moral issues are likely to stimulate action (1994). Harris posits,

"Organizational participation as a political resource provides individuals not only with

communication networks and opportunities to interact with others with shared goals but

with organizational skills that can be nurtured through involvement, thus promoting

political action” (1994, 53).

Harris contends that these three political resources have different effects on political

mobilization based on demographic and SES factors (1994). He finds that church

attendance has a more significant impact on political participation than education for Black

and white Protestants (also see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Church attendance has

a more significant impact on white mobilization than black mobilization. He finds that civic

attitudes are important to white mobilization while group identity and consciousness are

essential to black mobilization (1994). Church activism has a more significant influence on

black voter participation than on white voter participation. Overall, as Lincoln and Mamiya

(1990) also show, churches are essential communal, political institutions for all races but

particularly for blacks.

Thus, the literature that does exist on black and white evangelicals is still growing.

There is very little research available on other evangelical racial minorities. Wong's (2018a;

2018b) research has opened a door for a deeper understanding of black, Latinx and Asian

evangelicals but is only the beginning of research on evangelicalism in the Latinx and Asian

communities. The literature on race and evangelicalism presents a puzzle for religious

scholars and this dissertation. Thus far, the literature has not profoundly engaged with the

religious and doctrinal beliefs that blacks and whites share or do not share. Instead, the

historical backdrop, assumptions, and findings all point to the conclusion that blacks and

whites who share the same religious and doctrinal beliefs are politically divergent. This

disparity is attributable to racial resentment within the ranks of white evangelicalism, but

there is still room for more exploration on this topic. Is there a theological difference,

perhaps even an interpretation, that scholars have missed? Do white evangelicals possess a

stronger or weaker sense of antagonism towards Asian and Latinx than they do black

evangelicals? These are a few areas that still need fine-tuning.

A few scholars investigate evangelical perceptions of issues of race and racism.

Emerson and Smith’s (2000) book is perhaps the seminal work in religion and politics

research investigating evangelical racial relations. They examine the diverging perspectives

on race between white evangelicals and evangelicals of other races. The white evangelicals

interviewed possessed a limited knowledge and acknowledgment of race and racial

problems. Intuitively, the Native American and African American individuals interviewed

felt racial issues were alive and thriving. White evangelicals focused more on the individual

(as Harris (1994) would predict) by claiming that prejudiced individuals (not institutions)

are the leading cause of racism. They conjecture that the United States does not have a race

problem, per se, but rather individuals in society have race relation problems (2000, 74). In

fact, the focus on individuals was so severe that some respondents would not even answer

the race questions because the questions seemed to be about groups rather than individuals.

These findings re-establish Jelen’s (1993a) findings that evangelicals focus almost

exclusively on salvation at the individual level.

Emerson and Smith investigated these findings more deeply. Contemporary white

American evangelicalism is one of the primary carriers of the accountable

freewillindividualist tradition (Emerson and Smith 2000, 77). Under this belief set,

individuals are accountable for their actions regardless of the structures and institutions

surrounding them. This belief starkly contrasts the progressive view of individuality and

free-will. The progressive conception of freewill posits that social structures and

institutions prevent humans, who by nature are good, from acting out their free-will. This

difference in beliefs is key to understanding evangelicals and their individualistic view of

humans and human nature.

Emerson and Smith (2000) explain that the difference between progressive freewill and

freewill-individualism is an important factor explaining why white evangelicals and Black

evangelicals (and even white evangelicals who have more interracial connections) have

highly diverging perspectives of the "race problem." Black evangelicals, possessing a more

progressive freewill perspective (likely because of their experiences with institutional

racism) are quick to acknowledge the race problem and quick to give examples. White

evangelicals (perhaps avoiding the acknowledgment of their responsibility in the

institutional racism), typically free-will individualists, may acknowledge the problem but

only at an individualistic level and are hard-pressed to provide any specific examples of

racism. This disparity in perspective, Emerson and Smith say, is the result of racism itself.

Even if the white evangelical community is not intentionally being racist, they are part of

its perpetuation by not acknowledging its real and prevalent existence beyond

individualism (Emerson and Smith 2000).

Key to understanding evangelicals and race relations is this: “The white evangelicals we

interviewed do not want a race problem. They want to see people get along, and want

people to have equal opportunity. They see these as essential to living out their faith. In

short, they yearn for color-blind people” (2000, 89). White evangelicals are not distinctly

racist; in fact, Emerson and Smith find that many of them seem to be particularly opposed

to racism. However, by refusing to acknowledge or understand the characteristics of racism

itself, evangelicals contribute to the racial divide (2000). This unique disparity in racial

acknowledgment between African American evangelicals and white evangelicals is

essential to my study. Emerson and Smith's findings enlarge our understanding of the

evangelical experience and open the door for more research on these diverging perspectives

and the feelings and actions they produce.

Historically, evangelicals and racism have been connected, especially in the South (Cross

2014; Calfano and Paolino 2010; Noll 2001). Some research shows that fervent

evangelicals tend to be less racist than their other Christian counterparts (Jelen, Kellstedt,

and Wilcox 1990). In fact, Wilcox and Jelen (1990) find that evangelicals are typically

intolerant of both ideological extremes. Calfano and Paulino 2010 found that ideology was

more important than race to white evangelicals when voting between Black and white

candidates. In other words, research has shown that evangelicals are intolerant of fascists,

racists, communists, homosexuals and other belief systems. The irony of this, of course, is

that many consider the evangelical belief system itself to be extreme. However, these

findings do not negate the research on Christian Right activism and racial prejudice (Jelen

1991; Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2018; Wong 2018a; 2018b) nor does it mean that racial

anxiety is not relevant to the feelings of marginalization of white evangelicals in 2018

(Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018). African Americans and other racial minorities may be

fulfilling the sub-cultural identity theory by acting as "out-groups" to white evangelicals.

Evangelicals and The LGBTQ Community

A scant few scholars have researched homosexuality and evangelicalism. Sherkat et al.

(2011) find that, over the past thirty years, Americans have substantially increased their

support and acceptance of LGBTQ Americans and LGBTQ rights. Evangelicals and

Protestants alike have also begun to accept homosexuality and LGBTQ rights over the past

thirty years (Bernstein and Jakobsen 2010; Olson, Cage, and Harrison 2006; Pew Research

Group 2016; 2017). Recent data show a dramatic shift in perceptions among young white

evangelicals. In 2017, the Pew Research Group published that young evangelicals (those

born after 1964) went from 29% favoring same-sex marriage in March of 2016 to 47%

favoring same-sex marriage in June of 2017. This is a marked increase and demonstrates

some of the dramatic changes happening in the evangelical community.

Even with these changes, evangelicals are still one of the few groups left in America to

overwhelmingly disapprove of same-sex relations (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). The

LGBTQ community and evangelicals have operated at odds for decades; conservative

evangelicals have been one of the gay community’s staunchest opponents (Jelen 1991;

Lewis 2005; Lewis and Gossett 2008; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Fetner 2008).

Olson et al. (2006) find that religion, even above race, is the primary influencing variable

shaping attitudes towards same-sex marriage. Citizens who listed values as one of their top

two priorities were also more likely to oppose gay marriage (2006). Further, during the

presidential election in 2004, Republicans found gay marriage and moral values to be key

mobilization variables in the election (2006).

The relationship between evangelicals and the LGBTQ community is much more

fraught with tension than the relationship between mainline Protestants and the LGBTQ

community. Olson and Cadge (2002) interviewed 62 mainline Protestant pastors and found

that none of them took a hard and fast stance against homosexuality. While I do not

explicitly ask the pastors that I interviewed their opinions on homosexuality, you will find

that these evangelical pastors were much more willing to take a stand against

homosexuality than the mainline protestants Olson and Cadge interviewed.

Other research shows that conservative and Republican elites have found the perfect

framing device to stir up against and frustration amongst evangelicals and thereby increase

mobilization (Jelen 1991; Miceli 2005; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006). Stokes and

Schewe (2017) posit that “the Religious Right often builds upon societal homophobia that

places LGBTQ people as the societal scapegoat, and, especially with rhetoric combatting

AIDS, the Religious Right further stigmatizes LGBTQ individuals by comparing them to

a deadly plague” (63, see also Barton 2012; Diamond 1989; Tranby and Zulkowski 2012).

Evangelical elites frame a subcultural in-group, out-group identity for their evangelical

constituents/church members because evangelicals need a reason to feel attacked and

marginalized to keep them active and involved (Stokes and Schewe 2017).

The subcultural identity theory (Smith et al. 1998) posits that "conservative religious

groups, thrive, rather than dwindle, amidst secular society by constructing a strong

community identity that can be activated to motivate political action" (Stokes and Schewe

2017, 61). Smith et al. posit three essential components of the subcultural identity theory.

First, there must be a defined conflict with an out-group. This out-group must be perceived

as a threat to the religious norms of the community. With this threat comes an increased

sense of group identification and attachment to the in-group. Elites use the culmination of

these symbolic and ideological boundaries to "mobilize movements, resources and

membership" (Wellman 1999, 187). The essence of Smith's theory is identity maintenance

through boundaries and distinctions from the "hostile" out-group (Stokes and Schewe

2017). Thus, the LGBTQ community has become the perfect "out-group" for the

evangelical elite to frame in the current zeitgeist.

Fetner (2008) contends that for the past thirty years the religious right and the LGBTQ

community have “flowed in concert with each other, the actions of one affecting the choices

and repertoire of the other” (119). She analyzes how the gay community has responded to

Christian Right activism and claims that the Christian Right’s fight against homosexuality

mobilized the gay community in ways it would never have mobilized without the Christian

Right. Theoretically, groups feed off each other. When one group mobilizes, the other

counter-mobilizes (Zald and Useem 1983). In some cases, a movement can generate a

counter-movement and shape the tactics and structure of the counter movement (Zald and

Useem 1983). Then these two groups enter a “loosely coupled tango of mobilization and

demobilization” (1). The LGBTQ movement is part of the current cultural zeitgeist of

acceptance, tolerance and sexual freedom and has won many cultural and political battles

recently (Wilcox and Robinson 2010), causing evangelicals to feel defensive. Therefore,

the "loosely coupled tango" theory and the subcultural identity theory are vital to

understanding how evangelicals are acting and reacting today and essential to my theory.

Tanya Erzen (2006) found that the relationship between religion and the homosexual

identity is fluid and ever-changing. Through extensive field research in the evangelical

“exgay” community, she finds that evangelicals use the message of “real change” in the

gay community through conversion to Christianity as their weapon against the gay identity

(2006). However, she posits that her findings demonstrate that this evangelical argument

falls flat in the face of reality.

Again, most of the research detailed above looks primarily at conservative evangelicals,

or the Christian Right, or mainline Protestants; it does not look at evangelicalism from its

core doctrinal principles. Jonathan Hill, in his Masters' thesis from the University of Notre

Dame, tests the real-world application of Smith's subcultural identity theory. He postulates

that evangelicals should display higher levels of religious fervor as they become

"geographically and subjectively ‘nearer' relevant outgroups" (2004, 21); however, he finds

this is not the case. Smith's subcultural identity theory that evangelical interaction with

outgroups strengthens and increases the fervency of the in-group could not be empirically

supported. However, Hill's research was still preliminary and only draws attention to an

area of research that needs more analysis.

Changes in Society

There are other reasons, outside of growing anxiety about societal or racial

displacement, for evangelicals to feel a sense of marginalization. Social liberalism plays a

significant role in today’s current cultural context. Examples include liberal political

changes such as Obamacare, the legalization of same-sex marriage, increasing transgender

rights, and other social moves towards increasing tolerance and acceptance (e.g., illegal

immigrants) (Hunter 1992; 2007; Moen 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Recent data

from both the Pew Research Group and Gallup polls show that Democrats and Republicans

are increasingly adopting new liberal social norms. In 2015, 42% of Republicans identified

as socially and economically conservative (Jones 2016a; 2016b). This is the lowest number

of social conservatives in the Republican Party ever recorded in Gallup history. The

increase in social liberalism is likely correlated with the rapid growth in the number of

Americans who claim no religious affiliation, otherwise identified as "nones." Since 2007,

this group of Americans has increased from roughly 19 million to 56 million as of 2014

(Lipka 2015).

Studies show that since 2008, the entirety of the United States electorate has shifted in

the liberal direction on every social issue (Jones 2016a). Further, many of the citizens

shifting to the left on the social dimension are religious conservatives (Jones 2016a). Some

evangelicals (for example, the influential California evangelical Rev. Rick Warren) are

embracing a slightly more socially progressive set of values. In conjunction, the Christian

share of the U.S. population has been declining.

One reason for the dramatic increase in “no religion” is that political moderates and

liberals were driven away from religion when they saw organized religion attach itself to a

conservative social agenda (Hout and Fischer 2002). This finding is unique given that one

of the theories regarding religion’s persistence in the United States is that up until recently,

it did not attach itself to any political party. Much of the decline in religion can be attributed

to a rejection of politicized religion rather than a complete rejection of all things spiritual

(Hout and Fischer 2002). The more that religion attaches itself to a conservative or

Republican agenda, the more society assumes that being religious means being

conservative or Republican. This attachment causes those who are religious but are not

conservative or Republican to reject or throw off their religious identity to avoid identifying

with a mistaken political identity (2002). Hout and Fischer conclude, "If the identification

of religious affiliation with political conservatism strengthens, then liberals' alienation from

organized religion may become, as it has in many other nations, fully

institutionalized" (189).

The modern cultural context is merely an outgrowth of movements and trends that

started years ago and that spurred evangelicals into political action. It was the political

awakening of the Christian Right in the 1970s and 1980s that propelled social scientists to

theorize about a "culture war" or a "war of values" (Hunter 1992). Inglehart (1977) claimed

that a modernized society cares more about non-materialist items than materialist items. He

theorized that Americans were transitioning from economic and security concerns to

concerns about the quality of life (1977) such as the environment, democracy, and human

rights. Broadly, Americans, in the post-WWII era, care more about value issues than other

issues (e.g., economics, industry, international affairs). According to Inglehart,

postmaterialist concerns only exist in an economy that is doing well. A society that is

struggling to survive economically has no time to devote to issues of morality and values;

however, a society that is economically stable is more likely to begin to fracture on value-

oriented issues (1977). Hence, Inglehart's theory gave credence to the idea of a "culture

war" emerging over values in America in the 1980s.

Prothero (2016a; 2016b) examines what he claims are centuries of culture wars between

conservatives and liberals. He argues that conservatives always begin the war, direct the

war and eventually lose the war. In fact, liberals are hardly even a part of the war. What he

finds most surprising is that conservatives do not usually start these culture wars until the

cause they are fighting over is virtually lost (Prothero 2016a, 17). He says, “the fight is

fiercest when the cause at hand is already well on its way to being lost” (17). For example,

conservatives only attack same-sex marriage when attitudes toward homosexuality have

gravitated toward acceptance (2016a). He claims that, essentially, conservatives “choose

for their rallying cries causes that are already on the verge of being lost” (2016a).

I present a different interpretation of this "lost cause" anomaly. It is possible for cultural

norms to shift but not enough for a group to feel the need to become outspoken against the

change. However, as the change increases and permeates society, those who are not fond

of the change are more and more likely to react publicly. Prothero's argument that liberals

never really "do" anything in these culture wars does not make sense when compared with

social movement theory of a "loosely coupled conflict" (Zald and Useem 1983). The theory

of loosely coupled conflict contends that all sides of the ideological spectrum are engaged

in a political and social dance, affecting change and action in each other. Therefore, in the

case of Prothero’s conservative “lost cause” anomaly, it could be that as society accepts

some new liberal social norms, conservatives and evangelicals are reacting to the change,

not starting a last ditch “culture war” over a lost cause.

Prothero’s reasoning, of course, is about conservatives, not evangelicals. However,

given that many evangelical values are conservative values, are evangelicals feeling that

their cause is a “lost cause”? The Christian share of the U.S. population has been declining.

The Pew Research Group found that the percentage of Americans who claim to have a

religious affiliation dropped eight percent from 2007-2014 (2015a). However, the number

of Americans who affiliate with a religion other than Christianity has increased over the

past seven years.

The Christian share of the population is declining and the religiously unaffiliated

share is growing in all four major geographic regions of the country. Religious

“nones” now constitute 19% of the adult population in the South (up from 13% in

2007), 22% of the population in the Midwest (up from 16%), 25% of the population

in the Northeast (up from 16%) and 28% of the population in the West (up from

21%). In the West, the religiously unaffiliated are more numerous than Catholics

(23%), evangelicals (22%) and every other religious group (Pew Research Center

2015a; Hout and Fischer 2002).

This dramatic change in the religious distribution of the U.S. population is nationwide and

follows the general trend of secularization. However, while the Christian share of the

population is declining in many respects, the one group increasing in proportion to the rest

of the Christian population is evangelical Protestants.

While the mainline Protestant share of the population is significantly smaller today

than it was in 2007, the evangelical Protestant share of the population has remained

comparatively stable (ticking downward slightly from 26.3% to 25.4% of the

population). As a result, evangelicals now constitute a clear majority (55%) of all

U.S. Protestants. In 2007, roughly half of Protestants (51%) identified with

evangelical churches (Pew Research Center 2015a).

Hence, the religious vitality that Hunter (1981) and Smith et al. (1998) both grappled with

is still a present and relevant trend.

A growing portion of evangelicals are joining the rest of society and inching leftward

in their socio-moral views. This is evidence that the progressive position is winning in the

aggregate, much as Prothero (2016a; 2016b) predicts. This does not mean, however, that

the evangelical population is “dead” or no longer influential. While the U.S. may not be as

overwhelmingly Christian as it once was (either culturally or numerically), it still houses a

substantial number of Christians than any other nation (Pew Research Group 2015a).

Further, the evangelical population is growing relative to the rest of the Christian

population. Religious actors might not have as much political or social clout as they once

did, but we cannot fully understand the inter-workings of American politics and collective

action today without understanding the views and reactions of the evangelical base.

If evangelicals believe they have lost some of their national political and social

influence and the Christian population en masse has diminished, might we find a tighter,

more homogeneous evangelical base today? Smith et al. (1998) would argue this would be

the case. That is to say, the more the evangelical population interacts with and encounters

threatening out-groups—be it racial minorities or gender minorities—the more cohesive

and unified the “in-group” becomes.

However, what Smith et al., do not research is what evangelicals are doing about these

out-groups and the perceived threats. Evangelicals are politically involved in the traditional

sense but there is limited research on evangelicals’ use of expressive mobilization. Are

modern evangelicals sticking to their tried and true forms of political and social

participation or are they also inserting themselves into the political and social conversation

through expressive mobilization? Any feelings of evangelical social strain are most likely

being engineered and exploited by elite entrepreneurs who want to mobilize evangelicals

by stirring up feelings of marginalization. Tilly (2006) posits that incremental “changes in

the dispersion of power, the openness of political institutions, the instability of political

arrangements, the availability of allies and supporters, and regime repressiveness” lead to

incremental changes in the repertoires of influence that a group uses (2006, 45). Guth

(1996) argues that the Christian Right began to respond defensively in the 1970s because

of the cultural changes that ultimately triggered the rise of the Moral Majority and the

broader political engagement of the Christian Right. I conceptualize the rise of the Christian

Right in the 1970s as an offensive movement because the Christian Right used public and

political platforms to try and force a change in government. However, their tactics backfired

to an extent with the subsequent rise of the “nones” (Hout and Fischer 2002; Putnam and

Campbell 2012) and evangelicals today have a different world in which to operate.

Social Movement Theory

Social movement theory, though more prevalent in comparative and international

politics, can still inform us about social and political mobilization in the United States.

Social movement theory stems from theories of "collective behavior." Research of

collective behavior flow from theories of mobilization. These theories are helpful to

understanding the political and social action or inaction of the evangelical community,

whether their mobilization is collective or individual.

Several theories attempt to explain the how and why of collective action. The mass

society theory is one of the first and oldest theories of collective action. The mass society

theory is rooted in psychological reasoning and sees social conflict and collective action as

an irrational and emotional reaction to the feeling of social destabilization or threats to

entrenched social identity (Aslandis 2015). Frequently, these social movements occur

because of strains from dramatic changes in society such as industrialization. This theory

reasons that individuals are driven to participate in a social movement because of feelings

of marginalization and alienation; thus, marginalized individuals are the primary actors in

social protest. Arendt (1951), Buechler (1993; 1995), Kornhauser (1959) McAdam (1982)

all contribute to this literature.

Around the same time, other scholars (Turner and Killian 1957; Smelser 1962)

developed and introduced the theory of collective behavior. They recognized the

importance of the psychological motivations stressed in the mass society theory but

conciliated them with specific social conditions. In other words, marginalization and

alienation are key to collective action but only under a set of specific social circumstances

that trigger these emotional and irrational reactions. Smelser (1962) contends that societal

upheaval is frequently to blame. He posits four “determinants” of collective behavior:

structural conduciveness, structural strain, growth and spread of a generalized belief and

precipitating factors (1962, 15-16).

The theory of relative deprivation is another seminal yet obsolete theory of collective

action that originated around the same time as mass society theory and the theory of

collective behavior. Gurr (1970) was the primary scholar to spearhead this theoretical

contribution to the literature. With his theory, he attempts to explain the counter-intuitive

reality that social unrest and action tends to emerge from affluent individuals rather than

from the impoverished ranks. Relative deprivation asserts that these affluent individuals

who are acquainted with success are hastier to activate collectively than their impoverished

neighbors. Hence, discontent is still the ultimate reason for collective action but the reasons

behind this discontent are given more thought than previous theories cared to admit

(Aslanidis 2015).

Aslanidis (2015) explains the problematic issues facing these collective behavior

theories. He explains that within these theories “strategy and deliberate, organized action

never grew to become part of their rationale: collective action was almost exclusively a

quasi-metaphysical, grassroots, spontaneous phenomenon which came and went in

automatic outburst and equally rapid declines” (4). The collective action theories saw social

movements and collective action as therapeutic for those involved but they never

considered collective action a political operation (McAdam 1982; Aslanidis 2015).

These collective action theories were soon considered jejune and a new set of scholars

(Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1983; Kerbo 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1977;

Olson 1965; Oberschall 1973), experiencing a new social paradigm during the 60s and 70s,

introduced the resource mobilization theory. Using Olson’s theory of collective action and

conceptualization of individuals as rational beings able to make decisions based on a

costbenefit analysis, scholars introduced the resource mobilization theory. Proponents of

this theory emphasized the need for resource availability and mobilization as well as

organization and networks (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973). Aslandis (2012)

describes the theory: "Protest, they claimed, is not an automatic response to social and

psychological strain: it requires an organization mindset which can facilitate the successful

allocation of resources required for mobilization" (6). These scholars accepted that citizens

feel marginalized, alienated and frustrated and in fact, they consented that societal

grievances are pervasive. Given this then, why is society not in a constant state of

mobilization (Aslanidis 2015)?

Resource mobilization theory stresses the importance of resources. Resources include

but are not limited to money, time, labor, social networks, friends and connections in

government and the media, and members themselves (2015). One of the most critical

resources needed to translate shared feelings into action is a mastermind to lead, organize

and mold the movement efficiently and responsibly (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Thus,

marginalization and alienation are not sufficient for collective action and must be paired

with the appropriate resources to bring about collective action.

The theories described so far work as building blocks to my theory. Grievance with

society and government is important but can only go so far in mobilizing a group of

individuals into collective action. For this to happen, rational actors must utilize available

resources and organize accordingly. However, these theories lacked an acknowledgment of

politics, which a new set of scholars have claimed play a central role in collective action.

McAdam (1982) and Meyer (1999) contend that the resource mobilization model

overemphasizes the importance of resources and the power of elites to manipulate and

shape mobilization while completely missing the political context surrounding the

grievances, resources, and opportunities (Aslanidis 2015). Therefore, a new group of

scholars introduced the political process theory and the political opportunity structure.

This theory conceptualizes mobilization as an expression of politics, binding together the

hitherto divided concepts of politics and mobilization (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn

2003; Meyer 2004; Useem 1998; Jenkins 1983; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978; Giugni 2011).

Aslanidis explains: “Movements are not irrational mobs, but they are not the mere outcome

of entrepreneurial calculation of resources, either. They provide yet another link between

the people and political institutions (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) – they are

politics” (2015, 7, emphasis by the author). These theories emphasized opportunity as the

key to successful collective action. The key explanatory variables being a political

opportunity and the "nature of the institutionalized political systems" (Aslanidis 2015, 8).

McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) introduced the idea of "mobilizing structures" in

which individuals engage in rational political action mediated by the appropriate

opportunities, resources and networks (Aslanidis 2015). However, empirical findings do

not support the emphasis that this political process theory put on political opportunity

(Meyer 2004; Jasper and Goodwin 1999; Useem 1998).

These theories mentioned above came full circle in recent years with the realization that

social psychology and the way individuals feel is and must be part of the structure and

theory of collective action. Though rationality and organization are indeed important to

social movements and collective action, they should not be considered at the exclusion of

emotion and culture (Morris 2000). The macro-approach of some of the theories lost the

importance of the individual and his or her feelings about whatever issue is being protested

or acted against (Klandermans 1984; Aslanidis 2015). Further, many of these theories did

not account for religious motivations, which are not always pushing for institutional change

but instead personal change (Jenkins 1983). Identity, culture, emotions, and framing are all

essential to this new theory.

Thus, the theory of social constructionism was born. This theory is foundational to my

approach and theory in that, scholars (Oliver, Cadena-Roa, and Strawn 2003; Jasper 1998;

2011; Gamson 1995) of this persuasion argue that “grievances need to be skillfully

constructed in such a way to bring about action” and further, these grievances need only to

be perceived, not reality (Aslanidis 2015, 13). Hence, the construction of perceived

marginalization can lead to social movements.

Emotions are a vital element to the theory of social constructionism. They are useful if

framed appropriately and coupled with collective identities (Jasper 1998; 2011). They can

be used by “social movement entrepreneurs who know how to construct them, bring them

to the surface and manipulate them” (Aslanidis 2015, 13). Part of this manipulation is

through framing. Snow and Benford (1992, 137) define a frame as:

An interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” by

selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and

sequences of actions within one’s present and past environment.

Snow and Benford (1988) construct a three-step process of mobilization through the

framing lens. First, entrepreneurs engage in diagnostic framing, which is the interpretation

and creation of a problem and a culprit to blame. Following this, the entrepreneurs suggest

a remedy for the existing problem. This is called prognostic framing. Finally, the

entrepreneurs engage in motivational framing, in which they provide a rationale for action

to stimulate constituent mobilization by explaining why collective action is indeed going

to help solve the perceived problem. Thus, a feeling of “strain” or “marginalization” or

“grievance” plays an essential role in collective action, even if, left to itself, it is not enough

to stimulate collective action. Smelser (1962) said, “Some form of strain must be present

if an episode of collective behavior is to occur (48).

The other theoretical elements of identity and culture are straightforward. For collective

action to occur, and emotions and framing to matter, the group of interest must possess a

sense of “we-ness” or attachment to an in-group, usually strengthened by the construction

of an “out-group” (Friedman and McAdam 1992). This collective identity helps to convince

members that their individual involvement will make a difference. Hence,

“injustice and identity have to be framed in ways that lead to actual mobilization”

(Aslanidis 2015).

Culture is also important. Ann Swidler (1986) posits that within every culture is a

"toolkit" that social movement entrepreneurs can utilize as they construct their social

movement frames and collective identities. It consists of "symbols, icons, traditions,

narratives, habits, styles, social norms or even heroic figures and events" (Aslanidis 2015).

All framing, collective identities and emotions function within this cultural context. This

cultural context then, limits or expands the "strategies of action" available (Swidler 1986,

276). Hence, Aslanidis explains that a successful strategy and repertoire of action in the

United States cannot be "just copied and pasted into the French context and be expected to

work out of the box" (17). Thus, every strategy, slogan, or repertoire utilized within a

specific cultural context must be in line with the accepted societal norms of the recipient

group (Meyer 1999; Aslanidis 2015).

To conclude this section on collective action literature, it is important to note that

theories on collective action and mobilization are ever changing and ever-adapting. The

influx of social media and the internet have fundamentally altered mobilization and

collective action. I argue that collective action is not the only form of mobilization; instead,

individuals can also mobilize. Multiple individuals mobilizing creates a type and form of

collective action. In the proceeding chapters, I utilize the theory of social constructionism

as the foundation for my theory as it applies to evangelicals.

One final note regarding religion and social action: Svensson (2007), in his studies of

conflict in various countries, found that conflicts involving a religious group fighting a non-

religious group over attempts to separate religion and government are far less likely to

reach a compromise than conflicts between two non-religious or even two religious groups.

Members of a religious community are fighting for spiritual and sacred intangible values

that cannot be appeased materially or economically (Svensson 2007). This scenario creates

a far more volatile and impassioned conflict than a conflict where compromise is easily

reached. Thus, in the context of the U.S., any sort of cultural disagreement involving a

religious group, whose members are fighting for spiritual and sacred intangibles, is also

likely to be more volatile and impassioned---which accounts for the introduction of various

social and political theories about the supposed raging culture war in the United States.

Indeed, research shows that moralized attitudes lead citizens to oppose compromises,

punish compromising politicians and even forsake material gains (Ryan 2017).

Political Efficacy

Political efficacy is also relevant to my theory. External political efficacy exists when

someone feels they can impact politics and government; further, they also feel government

officials are responsive to their desires. Internal political efficacy is the belief that one is

personally politically competent. Therefore, an individual can have a high level of internal

political efficacy and a shallow level of external political efficacy. An individual may

believe that he/she is politically competent and educated and at the same time believe

he/she has little to no influence on the government and political system at large. Internal

efficacy influences voting but is not an effect of voting while external efficacy both causes

voting and is an effect of voting (Finkel 1985, 903). Research shows that political

participation has a positive effect on external political efficacy (Finkel 1985). There is a

strong relationship between external political efficacy and political turnout, explaining the

recent declines in feelings of external political efficacy (Finkel 1985).

However, as Weissberg (1975) accurately points out, efficaciousness is not always

based on reality. Someone can feel highly efficacious while their influence on government

policy is virtually nonexistent and someone can feel highly inefficacious when in fact they

do have more influence and access than some other people. Therefore, the reality of one's

efficaciousness is not the issue; rather their belief in their efficaciousness is the issue. If

one's feelings of efficaciousness are low then they are less likely to want to try influencing

government and participating in politics.

There are a variety of different influences on one’s internal political efficacy. Being

involved in a politically active community, learning the smaller skills of political action,

engaging in political discourse, and inclusion in collaborative pluralist contexts are all

shown to increase feelings of internal political efficacy (Beaumont 2011). However, feeling

like one is capable and knowledgeable enough to participate in politics (internal efficacy)

does not mean that they feel like those is politics will listen (external efficacy). The

evangelical community provides some of the variables necessary for high internal

efficaciousness. A community of believers who share political beliefs provides a ripe

environment for internal efficacy and is known to be a very influential and powerful form

of political community (Campbell 2004; Calhoun-Brown 1998; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990;

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988). Internal efficaciousness

is vital to understanding the mobilization of the evangelical community because they armed

with a comprehensive set of civic skills which enable them to, on a moment's notice,

quickly and powerfully organize (Campbell 2004).

It is of little consequence whether evangelicals have access and influence on

government; what matters is whether they feel like they have access and influence. As

Weissberg says, one’s perception of efficacy is not always aligned with the reality of their

potential efficacy (1975). I theorize that evangelicals, given the Donald Trump presidential

administration, possess heightened levels of political efficacy. However, increases in

political efficacy are not the same as alleviated social strain. Evangelicals feel strongly

enough about the issues they care about and feel threatened enough by society and standing

law, to be moved to action, but the kind of action is likely mediated by the level of external

efficacy they feel.

I believe that evangelicals still possess moderately high levels of both external and

internal efficacy. This does not mean that they are not feeling marginalized. A group can

feel marginalized, socially and even politically, while still feeling somewhat efficacious.

Evangelicals may feel that they have access to government officials, and may even feel that

their votes count but still feel marginalized by the policy outputs of government. Select

scholars conclude that though evangelicals can sometimes impact the election process, their

influence does not go much further because of the extremity of their policy preferences

(Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Thus, evangelicals likely believe they have political

influence and access while at the same time feeling incredibly unhappy with the policy

outcomes of the government.

Further, evangelicals can feel marginalized by society while still feeling like they have

access to government officials. I explain this paradox in more detail in the next chapter, but

it is important to understand that society and government are not the same things. If societal

norms change in a way that upsets evangelicals, they are likely to feel socially

marginalized. Further, elites manipulate and use media coverage to paint a dire image of

society for evangelicals, tying social changes to possible political changes, motivating them

to more passionately go to the polls and vote for a candidate whom they feel is not caving

to the new upsetting societal trends. This understanding of evangelical strain and

mobilization falls more in line with some of the older social movement theories that keep

politics, and social movements separated. I explore this in more detail in Chapter Three.

Conclusion

In this literature review, I explored and explained two very distinct fields of literature:

religion and politics literature, specifically on the Evangelical Christian Right; and social

movement theory literature. Both fields are fraught with conceptual and theoretical

disagreements as they attempt to explain empirical and real-life anomalies. However, until

now there has been little cross-over between the two fields of research. Religion and

politics scholars tend to stick with their basic understandings of political behavior and focus

most of their research on the make-up and motivations of the Christian Right, sometimes

exploring the reasons for political activism during the years of the Moral Majority. These

scholars also show great interest in the reasons behind evangelical vitality in such a

modernized society. They also show an interest in understanding the connection between

religion and politics. What skills does the church institution instill? What ways do religious

belief systems affect political behavior? How do the church's surrounding communities

affect their political mobilization? There is also a burgeoning field within religion and

politics literature detailing the relationship and interactions between the religious

community and the LGBTQ community. However, there is still scant literature analyzing

race and evangelicalism.

The social movement theory portion of the literature suffers from similar omissions.

Social movement theory still provides limited research on evangelicalism and collective

action. Social movement theorists tend to forget religiously motivated collective action and

have been critiqued for such oversights. Little has been done to remedy these gaps in the

literature (but see Smith 2014 and Wald, Silvermank and Fridy 2005).

I intend to begin filling these gaps by first acknowledging them. Evangelicals are not a

homogeneous block of conservative white southerners whom all adhere to the Christian

Right stance and attitude. Further, while it is empirically and theoretically interesting to

study the reasons for evangelical vitality, perhaps scholars should move on from this line

of research. Given there is vitality and this vitality is in some way shaped by feelings of

marginalization or threat (Hunter 1992; Smith et al. 1998), how are evangelicals, not the

Christian Right, expressing these feelings? Additionally, what emotions are needed to

stimulate the evangelical population to collective action and mobilization? Also, given the

Donald Trump presidency and evangelical political access, what kind of marginalization is

being felt and acted upon? Are evangelicals merely feeling marginalized because of a

perceived loss of status and power as a result of changing demographics? In other words,

are evangelicals simply displaying a stronger version of the racial anxieties that scholars

have found simmering in white Trump supporters (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2016; 2017;

2018) or is there more to the story? With this dissertation, I am going to analyze one of the

few occasions of evangelical collective action in the past few decades as well as analyze

social media to see if any mobilization is happening in this forum.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: TO MOBILIZE OR NOT TO MOBILIZE?

Using social constructionism's theoretical assumption of collective action, I build my

theory of mobilization with a few addendums. I believe that groups can feel they have

political access while also feeling a sense of social and political marginalization and that

this marginalization, coupled with social constructionism's theoretical requirements, is

enough to stimulate expressive mobilization. Theoretically, if a group feels politically

accepted, and possesses a high sense of internal and external efficacy, they are less likely

to use expressive mobilization (e.g., marches, boycotts/buycotts, social media expression)

and more likely to stick with conventional forms of political action (e.g., voting, writing

Congressmen, attending town hall meetings).

However, I argue that, since groups can feel they have political access while also feeling

a sense of social marginalization, this marginalization stimulates expressive mobilization

through "identity claims" (Tilly 2006). I do not argue that this form of mobilization happens

at the exclusion of conventional political participation even though, throughout history,

many groups who engaged in unconventional "expressive"

mobilization lacked access to conventional participation. That these groups usually lacked

direct access does not mean that all groups who engage in expressive mobilization and

conventional participation lack access. The LGBTQ movement has been highly expressive

even though members of the LGBTQ community can vote. Social movement entrepreneurs

have had to learn how to make groups who do have direct access feel like they do not have

access. Emotions and elite manipulation are vital to this type of social construction and are

even more essential to analyze and understand when looking at a group who possesses

conventional political access and yet still engages in expressive mobilization.

Expressive mobilization is key to understanding the modern day political and social

dynamics occurring in America today. Feelings of social marginalization affect political

mobilization. Therefore, if we are to understand better why specific groups mobilize

politically, we must understand the story behind the expressive forms of mobilization and

their indication of social strain that no doubt speaks to future and past political

mobilization.

In this dissertation, I analyze one group within the United States who fits my theoretical

dynamic. They have political access but also seem to possess a sense of social, and to a

degree, political marginalization. I perform both qualitative and quantitative analyses to see

if there are indeed indicators of social strain manifesting through alternative forms of

individual and collective mobilization. I find that these alternative forms of mobilization

are dependent on catalyst events that stimulate emotional reactions.

Theoretical Foundations

Theorists, starting as far back as Aristotle to Dahl have all wrestled with the concept of

political participation in a democracy. They all agree that political participation is necessary

for the maintenance of a democracy. Active political involvement by the citizenry is not

only essential to the democracy but also to the citizens abiding in the democracy. It is

imperative, then, to know and understand what makes a citizen, and subsequently, a group

of citizens, express themselves politically and socially.

Scholars have found that, in America, a decrease in political participation correlates with

a decrease in mobilization activities (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The more that the

public is involved and mobilized the more individuals will want to participate in the

political process. Hansen (2015) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) focus much of their

work on elite mobilizers. They argue that to mobilize the masses politically, the masses

need stimulation from political candidates, political parties, campaigns, interest groups or

social movements. Mobilization acts as a political stimulant. This means that since political

participation is essential to democracy and political mobilization is vital to political

participation, political mobilization is important to democracy. Therefore, understanding

how and why different groups mobilize is important to understanding political participation

and democracy.

I detail various social movement theories in the previous chapter. Tilly (1978) explains that

most of these theories originate from Millian (2002), Durkheimian (2014), Weberian

(1978), Marxian (2018) and Tillian (1978; 2006) theories of political participation and

democratic theory. Both Weber and Durkheim posit that widespread social change is a

crucial stimulator for collective action while Mill conceptualizes collective action as an

intentional pursuit of individual interest. Tilly (1978) focuses on the resources that are

available to groups as they mobilize. He defines mobilization as the “acquisition of

collective control over resources, rather than the simple accretion of resources” (78).

Mobilization is costly (Tilly 1978). Collective action by any group requires collective

resource. This means that groups must be highly motivated to assume the effort and cost

that it takes to mobilize. Further, he breaks social movements into three forms of

"claimmaking." The first form he describes is called "identity claiming" which is when a

group attempts to establish their continued existence in society (Tilly 2006). They are not

necessarily calling for changes in society as much as expressing an identity’s continued

existence and relevance. They are still a force with which to be reckoned.

These few descriptions exemplify how these foundational theories paved the way for

theories like the theory of social constructionism or collective behavior. Most of these

theories provide different ways to uncover how groups mobilize while a few theories,

namely rational choice theory, begin to uncover the why of mobilization (Aslanidis 2015).

A portion of social movement theory is dedicated to counter-movements. Zald and

Useem (1983) posit that movements of any kind with moderate visibility and impact create

the condition for the mobilization of counter-movements. Movements and

countermovements adapt and update their tactics to account for changes in their interactions

with the opposing movement. Zald and Useem say,

Central to M/CM [movement/countermovement] analysis is a description of the

strategies and tactics and forms of conflict, how and where they interact. A wide

range of forms of battles exists, from direct confrontation, to 1obbying authorities,

to speaking to disparate audiences, to debating the shadows of previous

generations. Moreover, they have a wide range of strategic goals and tactics. They

attempt to inhibit each other's mobilization, as well as persuade authorities and

bystanders.

(10)

Movements must employ a variety of strategies and techniques to both combat the opposing

movement and to persuade others (government or society at large) to side with their

position.

A movement is conceptually not the same as a counter-movement. Mottl (1980) defines

a countermovement as a “particular kind of protest movement which is a response to the

social change advocated by the initial movement” (620). A social movement is “a

conscious, collective, organized attempt” to bring about social change while a

countermovement attempts to stop this social change from happening (Mottl 1980, 620).

Hence, social movements are centered around social change; however, many of these social

movement groups fight for political as well as social change.

The critical difference in a movement and a counter-movement is their perception of

the status quo. When a group is upset or unhappy with the current status quo they are more

likely to mobilize to change the standing status quo. Scholars call this a social movement

(Wilson 1973; Mottl 1980). A counter-movement is a movement of individuals who are

happy with the status quo and are resisting change (Mottl 1980). “Countermovement

participants develop strategies (institutional resistance, non-violent direct action, violence)

for the overall conduct of the movement in reaction to the successes of the initial movement

and to the amount of social control exerted against them” (Mottl 1980, 624; see Snyder and

Tilly 1972; Turner and Killian 1972; Wilson 1977). Counter-movements use specific tactics

(lobbying, letter-writing, sit-ins, boycotts) to promote their cause (Mottl 1980). Counter-

movements are mobilized into different forms of political engagement to defend and uphold

the status quo. 

I include this philosophical difference because I am more interested in how groups that

want to maintain a status quo are mobilizing. I am not analyzing what causes a fully

developed counter-movement per se. Instead, I am interested in analyzing the signals of

social strain that manifest through individual mobilization and instances of collective action

as a group attempts to maintain or protect their preferred status quo.

Moving forward then, my theory rests on a few assumptions. First, it assumes that feeling

marginalized is important to mobilization. This has been confirmed by multiple different

social movement theories (Arendt 1951; Buechler 1993; Gurr 1970; Kornhauser

1959; Jasper 1998; Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1982; Morris 2000; Smelser 1962; Snow and

Benford 1992; Tilly 1978). Further, I assume that groups can feel social marginalization

while still possessing a high level of external and internal political efficacy. I call this high

sense of political efficacy, political access. These feelings of social marginalization, while

mediated by their feelings of political access, will manifest themselves via expressive

mobilization as "identity claiming." I am interested in groups who, theoretically, want to

maintain the standing societal status quo through expressive mobilization. Moving forward

then, anytime I refer to mobilization or collective action, I mean counter-mobilization, or

only that the mobilization being referred to is attempting to stop change and preserve the

status quo rather than promote change and replace the status quo.

Identity

Oliver et al. (2003) split the social constructionist milieu into four distinct areas:

emotions, framing, collective identity, and culture. The social constructionist theory

contends that for individuals to act collectively, they must possess a shared identity. Tilly

(1978) defines it as “a population which has some common structure and shared belief”

(8). Identity influences individual action and collective action (Campbell et al. 1960).

Kauffman (1990, 67) said that identity politics is “the belief that identity itself—its

elaboration, expression, or affirmation—is and should be a fundamental focus of political

work." Identity politics politicizes areas of life such as “sexuality, interpersonal relations,

lifestyle and culture” (67). If an individual identifies herself with a group that she believes

to be on the margins of society or government, she behaves differently than if she identifies

with a group she believes to hold a pre-eminent role in society and government. Brown

(1995) argues that “marginalization forms the basis for the culture of identity politics”

(Bernstein 2005, 50).

Taylor and Whittier (1998) argue that "to understand a politicized identity community

it is necessary to analyze the social and political struggle that created the identity" (352).

Throughout history, identity has shaped and influenced social movements. Before the

1960s and 1970s, most identity politics were seen as economic rather than social. In other

words, one's economic status defined them and was the reason for their unrest and protest.

However, with the onset of the Civil Rights and Women's movements in the 1960s and

1970s, scholars were forced to step back and reassess their conception of identity. Scholars

promoting the New Social Movement (NSM) literature explain that there is a difference

between some social movements and others. For instance,

Touraine (1998) makes an ontological distinction between identity politics and

NSMs. He does not regard movements such as the women's and lesbian movements

as identity politics because they have radical and inclusive tendencies and have

themselves criticized identity politics. In contrast, he does consider conservative

social movements as identity politics because they respond to economic

globalization and the decline of a national culture (Touraine 1998, p. 131) by

forming movements based in ethnicity, religion, or nationalism, such as political

Islamism or Serbian nationalism. (Bernstein 2005, 55).

This distinction between conservative movements based in identity and exclusion versus

liberal movements based on inclusion and rejecting identity shows the importance of

identity to social movements and collective action. In both cases, identity was central but

is essential to note the difference between those motivated by including identities and

excluding identities. This is particularly important to note in the current political

environment where identities, such as the "white identity," are formed as a result of more

diversity in the United States and a need to exclude these new identities (Sides, Tesler, and

Vavrek 2017).

Individual identities are not the same as collective identities (Pollenta and Jasper 2001).

Individual and collective identities do regularly interact, but collective identities are not

merely the aggregation of individual identities (2001). Rather, collective identities are

"imagined as well as concrete communities" and they involve "an act of perception and

construction as well as discovery of preexisting bonds, interest and boundaries" (298).

Collective identities are fluid and relational and create the lens through which individuals

can make sense of the world (2001).

Alberto Melucci (1988) contends that developing a well-constructed collective identity

is one of the most pivotal tasks for agents of mobilization. He says that the construction of

collective identity is “a process in which the actors produce the common cognitive

frameworks that enable them to assess the environment and to calculate the cost and

benefits of the action" (343). There are two dimensions of collective identity. Individuals

who ascribe to a certain collective identity participate either to help the group achieve some

goal or because they simply enjoy feeling a part of the collective group (Gamson 1992).

The social constructivist theory contends that politically relevant identities are the only

identities that can lead to social movement. This is problematic since many significant

identities are not necessarily political (Aslanidis 2015). Klandermans (1984; 2001)

contends that even more important than a political identity is the existence of an "outgroup"

that allows the "in-group" to develop and gives the "in-group" a "they" to fight against.

Bernstein (1997) defines the concept of identity as it relates to social movements by

breaking it into three levels. First, for any social movement to mobilize, there must be a

shared collective identity. Second, “expressions of identity can be deployed at the collective

level as a political strategy, which can be aimed at what are traditionally thought of as

cultural and/or political goals” (59). Third, identity can itself be a goal of social movement

activism, “either gaining acceptance for a hitherto stigmatized identity or deconstructed

categories of identities such as “man,” “woman,” “gay,” “straight,” “black,” or white” (59).

The activists within each group must formulate strategies (Hartsock 1983; Collins 1998;

Haraway 1988) to combat the power structures and establish or promote their identities.

When enough people share a similar identity and feel the need to make their voices heard,

the collection of these various individuals takes on an identity of its own. This shared

identity can lead groups to mobilize when trying to promote or defend this identity.

Theoretically then, a group must possess a solid sense of identity for them to feel

marginalized enough to act. Perceived societal marginalization of an individual's identity

or the values with which they identify leads to a sense of social strain. Further, scholars

stress the importance of collective identity to stimulate mobilization. Without an "us"

versus "them" mentality, individuals are less likely to mobilize. Thus, a strong sense of

individual identity and a sense of collective identity is essential to my theory of

mobilization.

Marginalization Conceptualized

While I do not directly examine what makes a group feel marginalized, I do believe it

is important to conceptualize marginalization and present some theoretical assumptions

about what causes it. The basic Merriam-Webster definition of "marginalize" is "to relegate

to an unimportant or powerless position within a society or group.” Another more specific

form of marginalization is alienation. Political alienation can be categorized into four

categories: political powerlessness; political meaninglessness; political normlessness and

political isolation (Finifter 1970). Extrapolating from the concept of alienation, some

individual feels marginalized when they feel that they and their opinions, knowledge,

expertise, experiences or anything unique to that individual or group are pushed to the

periphery of society and/or politics and considered unimportant or unnecessary. This is

what I mean by marginalized.

To reiterate, the only thing that matters is that the group perceives or feels marginalized

(not if they are). The creators of the social constructionism approach introduce and support

the idea that what matters is not the reality of marginalization but somewhat the

construction and perception of marginalization (Gamson 1995; Jasper 1998; 2011; Zurcher

and Snow 1981; Benford 1997). For the group, what they perceive about themselves, about

society, and about how society views them, is the reality. Thus, the group operates and

interacts with society from the viewpoint of that reality.

What makes individuals or a group of individuals feel such a way? Emotions play an

important role in social constructionism's theory of mobilization and are therefore

important to discuss. Feeling marginalized and aggrieved by some societal or political ill

is nothing new to society (Jasper 1997). In fact, these feelings are so common that many

social movement scholars began to abandon their importance altogether. However, Jasper

(1997) contends that the emotional context of a movement is relevant and should be

addressed. Marginalization is most commonly felt by demographic minorities, whether the

minority is based on gender, race or religion. The systemic oppression of women over the

course of human history is perhaps one significant aberration in that women make up half

of the human population. In short, marginalization is the feeling, usually sensed by these

minorities, that they are on the margins of society and lack influence and access to

government (1997).

However, it is pertinent for this dissertation not only to acknowledge the

marginalization of demographic minorities, but the perceived marginalization of those who

marginalize the demographic minorities. Recent research shows that shifting power

structures and demographic shifts cause those who hold power, both socially and politically,

to feel threatened and anxious (Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2016; 2017; 2018; Tesler 2016;

Wong 2018a). This feeling of threat and anxiety creates a feeling of marginalization that

can and does lead to mobilization. Scholars such as Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2018) find

that these feelings of threat and anxiety, stimulated by racial and demographic changes,

were essential in mobilizing white Americans to vote for Donald Trump. Thus, it is essential

to understand that feelings of marginalization can stem from systemic, societal or

governmental oppression or from feeling that the power to oppress is in jeopardy. In other

words, it is possible for the oppressed and oppressors to both feel marginalized.

The marginalization of the oppressed (or oppressors) sometimes stems from a perceived

stigma about one’s culture. For instance, societal expectations likely caused LGBTQ

individuals to feel marginalized. Standing laws in government that stipulated that marriage

is only between a man and woman influenced them to feel that their perspectives and their

voices were marginal and unimportant to society at large. Perhaps a macro-level, they

sensed that the unspoken but understood prevailing Judeo-Christian values of American

culture were against them. In fact, the LGBTQ movement had a very interactive

relationship with the Christian Right, one that spurred the LGBTQ community into forms

of action that they may never have tapped into absent the stimulation of an opposing group

(Fetner 2008). Broadly, the accepted or understood morality of the culture did not line up

with their understanding of values and morality. Thus, feeling or perceiving this friction of

values is likely another reason for feeling marginalized. Ultimately, the creation of an “us”

versus “them” mentality worked simultaneously with a feeling of marginalization about

their culture and values to stimulate and mobilize the LGBTQ community in ways it had

never mobilized before.

As I mentioned earlier, a key component of marginalization is the feeling of alienation.

Olsen (1965) explains that "External social conditions are extremely important in

producing these feelings, but alienation occurs only when a person consciously experiences

discomfort or discontent in his social relationships. Because of inadequate or undesirable

ties with his social world, the alienated person feels cut off or separated from society" (202).

Hannon (2011) explains that feelings of alienation tend to be higher amongst conservatives

because they are more likely to feel that their values are being ignored or under attack

(Weakliem and Borch 2006). Alienation tends to increase support for expressive forms of

political participation such as demonstrations or boycotts (Southwell 1985; Opp 1990;

Weakliem and Borch 2006).

The social construction of these negative emotions is perhaps the leading cause of

feelings of marginalization. Jasper (1998; 2011) calls emotional manipulation motivational

framing and frame alignment. In other words, elite entrepreneurs construct and manipulate

these emotions to bring them to the surface. While the emotions may not be constructed

from scratch, as all the previous examples demonstrate, "a certain amplification procedure

is nonetheless employed in most cases" (Aslanidis 2015).

Moving forward, I refer to a group that perceives itself to be on the margins of society,

who feel a sense of societal strain or emotion-laden injustice, as marginalized. I will not

always say perceived marginalization because reality does not matter if a group feels

themselves to be marginalized, they are marginalized. My theory and social

constructionism are predicated on the assumption that all that matters is the feeling or

construction of marginalization, not the reality of marginalization.

Social and Political Marginalization

Building off the social constructionist theory, I theorize that there are two dimensions

of emotional marginalization: political marginalization and social marginalization. This

inevitably leads to the following question: can a group feel politically marginalized but

socially accepted, or vice versa, politically accepted while feeling socially marginalized?

In short, can oppressors feel marginalized? I contend that, confirmed by current research,

individuals and groups with power and access can feel marginalized.

I conceptualize political marginalization as having low levels of political efficacy and

low political access. As I discussed in the literature review, when someone has low levels

of external political efficacy they feel they cannot influence government (Finkel 1985).

This feeling may stem from seeing few people in power who share their ideological

convictions, racial or gender identity, or even their economic status. These emotions can

stem from real life experiences, but they are most likely framed and socially constructed

(Aslanidis 2015). The essence of what I conceptualize as political marginalization is

feeling like one cannot influence government or government institutions for or against

something they care about. Groups that feel that they are on the margins of government are

groups that feel themselves to be politically marginalized.

Craig (1980) posits that a poor sense of external efficacy is the strongest determinant

of “popular mobilization” in democratic settings (191). This is directly related to my theory

as I argue that individuals who possess a high sense of external efficacy can still be

motivated to mobilize expressively because of perceived societal marginalization.

Social marginalization is distinct for a few reasons. Both the oppressed and the

oppressors can feel a sense of social marginalization. To feel social marginalization, a group

might believe that society does not accept them or that accepted social norms do not align

with the group’s social norms. Ultimately, society misunderstands them. A socially

marginalized group may feel that portions of the mainstream media are against them and

that many people on social media do not understand them. They may feel that institutions

are predisposed to be against them. They believe that society looks down on them, their

way of life, their culture. They may believe they experience institutional discrimination.

They may feel that their way of life, their status in society, and their ability to access

government or power is being jeopardized by changes in society.

They may also feel that society stereotypes them wrongly and judges them for this

stereotyped existence. For example, “rednecks” in the South may feel that society at large

thinks of them as stupid, poor, uneducated, inbred and worthless, based upon the way elites

and the media have portrayed them. These types of experiences lead someone to believe

that society is somehow against them, or wrongly judging them—which leads to perceived

social marginalization. Social entrepreneurs then take and exploit these feelings and

experiences for their benefit and to stimulate collective action (Snow and Bedford 1992).

To build upon the feeling of threat, social marginalization can come from feelings of

racial anxiety or status loss (Conover 1983; Crawford 1980; Lorentzen 1980; Wald 1989).

When individuals feel their lifestyle or their power status in society is being threatened,

they may begin to feel a sense of social marginalization. Their identity, their values, their

perspectives are all being threatened by new values, identities, and perspectives. Whites

during the Civil Rights Era may not have had any reason to feel marginalized except that

they felt their power in society was threatened by allowing African Americans equal footing

in society. In other words, innate prejudices against an out-group stimulate feelings of angst

and anxiety when perceived “out-groups” appear to be gaining power.

Sometimes, if a group identifies with a set of beliefs, and they feel that these beliefs are

becoming taboo in society, they will start feeling socially marginalized. In this instance, the

feelings of marginalization are not about some tangible aspect of the individual as much as

the feelings about the individuals’ belief system. Individuals who practice polygamy

believe in the usefulness and virtue of having more than one wife. However, if they feel

that society at large does not agree with this way of living and this belief system, they likely

will feel marginalized by society. They feel that they cannot have a voice in society; they

cannot influence or cause society to view them differently or more favorably because

society has already put them in their predetermined and judged position. Mainly, they feel

they have no power or influence in society to be popularly accepted by society.

This feeling of social marginalization is inextricably tied to politics, however.

Polygamists, for instance, may feel that societal acceptance will give their perspective more

of a voice to speak into and influence government policies about their lifestyle. If the

government did make marriage to more than one person legal but society still shunned

polygamy, the polygamists would still feel a sense of societal marginalization even if their

political access and representation had been rectified (see Jasper 1997). These feelings of

societal martyrdom are just affirmed and re-affirmed by the community, news, and social

media with which each group surrounds itself. Individuals in groups that feel this kind of

societal marginalization feed off each other’s experiences and stories that affirm the

perception of societal marginalization. This is part of the “cultural” context requirement

mentioned in the social constructionist theory.

The Two Levels of Marginalization

Political and societal marginalization are intricately connected. In this next section, I

set up a full generalized image of reality to paint a picture. My broad over-generalized

assumptions do not mean that in all circumstances they are what happens but rather that in

many circumstances they have happened and may continue to happen.

Historically speaking, sometimes societal acceptance is a necessary condition to bring

about political acceptance. In other words, members of society must come to a point where

they feel the need to change their judgment or stance on a particular group of people, and

in doing so pressure government also to change its institutions and laws to treat the

individuals better. The LGBTQ movement is an example of societal acceptance that

eventually led to political acceptance.

Social movement entrepreneurs advanced and framed the LGBTQ movement in a way

that caused a shift in social mores and understandings that caused society to take the first

jump. These entrepreneurs used value framing to shape collective opinion about gay rights

(Brewer 2003). Scholars agree that individuals use their core values to inform their political

positions (Feldman 1988; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Rokeach 1973). Value framing

entrepreneurs found that equality and traditional morality were the two most effective

frames by which to frame LGBTQ issues (Brewer 2003). These values are an important

part of public opinion more broadly, not just about LGBTQ rights (Wilcox and Wolpert

1996; 2000). Using the pro-gay right’s equality frame, entrepreneurs slowly shifted public

opinion of gay rights in their favor (Brewer 2003). Eventually, government policy caught

up with public opinion, most notably with the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) ruling. I do not

assume causation here, but I do assume correlation.

Sometimes, the government must act first (usually through pressure from members of

the group advocating for political and societal acceptance). Government policy sometimes

affects societal acceptance. The Civil Rights movement is an example of this kind of

change. The government, in response to social and political activism, made legal changes

to accept African Americans; however, large portions of society did not want to capitulate.

Almost every law was contested socially and politically. Eventually, society did capitulate

and, at least in the areas mandated by government, moved past a portion of their social and

institutional prejudice.

These are just two examples. I use them to paint a picture. These two dimensions are

correlated. Thus, if members of society shift their position on a specific group, it is likely

that portions of government are soon to follow; and, if government shifts its position

towards a certain group, members of society are more likely to follow.

The Oppressors

What happens when those in power begin to feel threatened, feeling like they may lose

this power and status? Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017) argue that unexpected waves of

political participation such as in the election of Donald Trump in 2016 are the result of

pent-up racial and status anxiety over the potential loss of power. Snow and Oliver (1995)

find that “individuals who were accustomed to a stable increase of their wellbeing are the

first to take to the streets when deprivation kicks in, not the ones who have nothing to lose”

(Aslanidis 2015).

Naturally, society and government cannot change positions towards specific groups

without also shifting their positions on other groups (Zald and Useem 1987; Tilly 1978).

For instance, while the Civil Rights Era brought about great advancements and positive

changes for African Americans, it completely shifted the autonomy of business owners and

school boards. Business owners, in this case, the oppressors, were no longer allowed to

discriminate by race in whom they hired, whom they fired, whom they served, how they

served and so on. Regardless of the rightness or wrongness of the situation, it is necessary

to understand that a change in the social and political position of one group resulted in a

change in the social and political position of another. This is true in all countries and

circumstances. Zald and Useem (1983) call this "loosely coupled conflict." In other words,

actions and positions by one group stimulate and effect actions and positions of another

group.

Sometimes these losses are merely perceived moral losses. For instance, while there

was a practical change for business owners during and after the Civil Rights Era, the moral

loss was likely what many racist whites felt after the change. Racist whites felt a figurative

sense of loss and marginalization. Society at large no longer accepted their racist views and

perspectives, nor were they condoned or promoted by the government anymore. They

experienced a perceived moral loss.

Do those in power react to feelings of marginalization differently than the oppressed?

Presumably, the oppressors engage in politicking and social advocacy in a particular way,

a way that they had come to accept, appreciate, and believe worked. In other words, they

cultivated and built a repertoire of useful and effective tactics to maintain and promote their

accepted position in society and government (Tilly 2006). These tactics likely included

lobbying politicians, campaigning and promoting candidates sympathetic to their cause,

voter suppression and discrimination, and in some cases violence and intimidation.

Theoretically, a group that does not feel marginalized and feels a strong sense of

political efficacy and social dominance does not feel the need to engage in peripheral and

expressive forms of political and social activism (Mottl 1980). In other words, they may

not feel the need to march on Washington or in the streets of their town. These are forms

of political and social activism that marginalized groups engage in since they feel that they

do not have the same clout or access as the accepted group (Jasper 1997; Mottl 1980).

Oppressors are not going to feel the need to make symbolic stands for their position,

nor are they going to feel the need to promote or convince the public of the virtue of their

position; they believe society already accepts their position. For example, people who

believe that alcohol should be legal have nothing to grandstand about; Society already

accepts the consumption of alcohol and the government has also accepted it.

However, what is true for all groups is that they must shift and adapt with the times,

with the current and prevailing zeitgeist. What once worked for one group, may no longer

work. This is especially true for those groups who hold a position of dominance in society

but are now feeling threatened or marginalized. For instance, consider what people may do

if, for some reason, they began to feel that legal alcohol consumption was being threatened.

Even if there was no way that alcohol would be made illegal or hindered, for some reason

alcohol retailers began feeling like the social zeitgeist was turning against them, how would

they respond? It is the threat or perceived threat that would spur a once dormant or settled

group into action. Hence, this is an example of a counter-movement. A group who

previously held the status quo attempts to defend themselves against movements attempting

to change the status quo.

The dominant group, who feels that their dominance is being threatened, will likely turn

to unconventional forms of mobilization to express their concern. They feel the need to use

the unconventional forms of mobilization that the oppressed groups have used throughout

the centuries. This does not mean the dominant group does not still use all of their

conventional institutional access, but if a once-dominant group begins to engage in

unconventional mobilization, this is a sign that this group is feeling threatened and

concerned that their station in society is in jeopardy.

Social movement entrepreneurs have to rush to figure out ways to frame and activate a

collective identity for a dominant group that has not had to rely on such things before. This

is what Donald Trump's campaign did. They promoted and constructed a "white identity"

and stirred up feelings of marginalization in the dominant group in society. They used the

"us" versus "them" mentality to help strengthen a collective identity and feeling of threat.

Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) quote the philosopher Charles Mills as they attempt to

explain the uniqueness of "white identity." Mills says, "The fish does not see the water, and

whites do not see the racial nature of a white polity because it is natural to them, the element

in which they move" (1997, 76). Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek (2017) explain that since whites

have always had the numerical majority in the United States, and have been afforded a

disproportionate share of the political, economic and social resources, their

“white identity” has been hampered.

What then are the mechanisms that cause dominant groups to mobilize using

unconventional forms of expression? The social constructionist theory contends that a

collective identity, an effective frame, a ripe cultural context, and emotional strain are all

necessary to produce collective mobilization. I contend that these are true but that the

emotional strain need only be social. In some countries, groups who fit this model have

resorted to violence to be heard; other groups have formed coups to try and use force to

change the government; others have gone to the streets peacefully and violently (Mottl

1980). In this dissertation, I look at the mechanisms that produce expressive mobilization

in one “dominant” group.

Expressive Mobilization Defined in Modern Society

Accepted scholarly conceptualizations of mobilization define mobilization as the

“deliberate activation of social networks as a method of diffusing awareness about a social

or political problem or of exerting social and/or political pressure for its resolution”

(Theocharis 2015, 5; see also Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hansen 2015; and Brady

1999). There are different manifestations and forms of mobilization (Craig 1980;

Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hansen 2015). Mobilization can be conventional (voting,

lobbying, writing Congresspeople) or unconventional (boycotting, sit-ins, marches,

rallies). Understanding the ways that a group engages in conventional mobilization is

relevant to political science because it informs us about how and why citizens directly

influence the political system.

However, unconventional "expressive" political mobilization is also relevant for many

reasons. First, expressive mobilization disseminates a message and/or an identity to the

broader public. It draws attention to an issue. By doing so, it can place the issue and/or

identity on to the political agenda. This form of manifestation allows for the person or group

of people to raise awareness about a social or political problem and/or exert social and

political pressure to solve this problem. Without such forms of expression, underprivileged

members of society such as women, racial minorities, LGBTQ people, and people with

disabilities, may not have had the opportunity to be heard by elites or their identities

socially validated/accepted.

Expressive mobilization also indicates for society and government that the group

engaging in such mobilization feels aggrieved, and indicates what issues are perceived

problematic for this group. It also indicates for society and government the potential for

conventional political action. In other words, expressive mobilization acts as a clue to the

broader public that there are areas of concern within the ranks of some collective group

that, if ignored by state and federal governments, could potentially result in a backlash at

the polls.

While expression may not fit the formal definition of conventional political

in the age of digital participation (Theocharis 2015). “Digitally networked participatory acts are thus often

inseparable from a conventional understanding of participation --- even by the standards of the narrowest

definitions” (Theocharis 2015, 5).

mobilization, it is important to the political process. Scholars argue that expression is a

crucial part of political mobilization (Theocharis 2015; Rojas and Puig-I-Abril 2009).

Expression is the way that individuals can publicly express their political orientations

(Rojas and Puig-I-Abril 2009); thus, it is an essential part of the mobilization process. How

they express themselves can vary, but when an individual or a group of individuals

mobilizes, it is with the intent of expression. Since expression is mobilization, then how

expression manifests itself is irrelevant.

Since this dissertation focuses primarily on extra-institutional means of political action,

it is essential to discuss some historical context of such protests. Jasper (1997) explains that

moral protests present themselves in different ways. The commonly used styles of protest

today include massive public rallies, marches, occupations at specifically targeted sites,

"provocative verbal and visual rhetoric," and mainstream lobbying and electioneering

(Jasper 1997, 7). Boycotting, mass petitions and urban rebellions began around the time of

the French Revolution. These forms of mobilization were used primarily by groups who

were not afforded full human rights such as political participation or economic protections.

Jasper explains, "They were movements demanding full inclusion for these collectivities,

including industrial workers, women, and later ethnic and racial minorities" (1997, 7). He

calls social movements motivated to gain basic human rights, citizenship movements. Only

in the 19th century did “post-citizenship” social movements begin to spread across the

United States and other countries. Post-citizenship social movements consist of groups who

already integrated into the political, economic and educational systems, but desire to see

injustices done to other groups or entities (animals, the environment, lifestyle protections)

rectified (Jasper 1997).

American social movements have consisted primarily of "post-citizenship"

mobilization except for a few key movements such as the Women's Suffrage movement

and the Civil Rights movement. In the 19th century, “the United States was filled with post-

citizenship movements concerned with drinking and other sins, health foods, the

environment, spirituality, and other ‘lifestyle’ issues sometimes pursued by today’s

postindustrial movements” (Jasper 1997, 8).

Thus, social movements are not always aimed at merely gaining legal or institutional

rights. Many movements also attempt to "rework cultural meanings and tolerance for

diverse lifestyles" (Jasper 1997, 8-9). For example, women or LGBTQ people may now be

afforded certain legal rights but are still fighting to change cultural stigmas or disadvantages

they face in the private sphere due to cultural norms and attitudes (1997). Therefore, those

engaging in expressive mobilization through extra-institutional methods are not always

attempting to change government policy but also to reframe cultural norms they perceive

as damaging to their group and/or society.

Jasper (1997) admits that most social movement literature is not equipped to explain all

forms of social movements and collective actions. Specifically, the literature is not

equipped to explain movements of privileged groups compared to oppressed groups.

Theoretically, I do not attempt to fully explain this difference either; instead, I start to shed

light on the mechanisms and emotions necessary for one privileged group to engage in

forms of extra-institutional mobilization.

Jasper (1997) explains that every group attempts to come up with new, innovative spins

on traditional forms of extra-institutional protest. He gives the example of the “kiss-ins”

that gay and lesbian activists have begun to use in response to entities that oppress them.

Animal rights activists have broken into research laboratories to “liberate” the animals

(Jasper 1997). Anti-abortion supporters have bombed abortion clinics or picketed outside

them. Women in the Temperance movement came together and knelt outside a saloon in

protest of alcohol consumption (A Nation of Scofflaws: Prohibition--A Film by Ken Burns

and Lynn Novick). Recently, anti-gun activist students from the Marjory Stoneman Douglas

High School in Parkland, Florida, the site of a recent school shooting, promoted a "Die-in"

at the local Publix grocery store to protest the funds the company donated to a politician

who backed the National Rifle Association. The method of expression varies, but all of

these forms of expression are done outside the institutions of government and are therefore

not conventional forms of political participation. They draw attention to an issue or identity

that is causing unrest in some portion of the population and therefore should not be

dismissed. If unrest is happening, this unrest may eventually influence the aggrieved to

conventionally participate in more politically impactful ways.

There is now a growing debate regarding what counts as political

participation/mobilization— precisely because of the inception of technology, the internet,

and social media. Traditional forms of political participation and mobilization are now

being joined by an entirely new array of political engagement and expression. Political

participation must now be categorized as either offline participation or online participation.

Does political engagement on social media platforms (online participation) count as

political participation? Is expression via online forums a form of political mobilization?

The scholarly consensus is that political engagement on social media platforms has

developed into its own form of political mobilization (Feezell 2016; Oser, Hooghe, and

Marien 2013; McCosker 2015; Sormanen and Dutton 2015; Theocharis 2015). Theocharis

(2015) says that "the act of (digital) communication as a form of mobilization …[is]…

understood as integral to political participation" (6). This mobilization is a form of

selfexpression and identity (Theocharis 2015). Some argue that digitally networked

participation is merely an expressive form of engagement that has no real impact on social

change (Morozov 2009). Social media engagement creates the illusion of participation and

influence, but it has little real-world implications (Morozov 2009).

However, scholars have found this negative interpretation of social media political

involvement to be untrue. Social networking and engagement on digital networks can and

has had a critical impact on social movements, mobilization and collective action (Bennett

and Segerberg 2012; 2013; Castells 2007; 2012; Diani 2003; Earl and Kimport 2011). The

overwhelming evidence seems to be that online political engagement is its own form of

independent engagement; it is relevant, and it can have an impact on the political process

and mobilization (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013). Theocharis (2015) provides perhaps the

most succinct definition of online political mobilization: it is “a networked media-based

personalized action that is carried out by individual citizens with the intent to display their

own mobilization and activate their social networks in order to raise awareness about, or

exert social and political pressures for the solution of, a social or political problem” (6).

Political and social expression, therefore, is a form of political mobilization and has become

an essential part of the political and social process. Thus, I would expect to see a group,

feeling socially marginalized, to utilize such forms of self-expression and mobilization. I

conceptualize mobilization that is expressive, with the intent of drawing attention to a

problem or to one's identity, expressive mobilization as distinct from conventional

mobilization, which generally means voting, lobbying, writing letters to members of

Congress and using all the conventional forms of political participation available.

As I mentioned earlier, there have been different social movements throughout history

that have used these forms of expressive mobilization. The Civil Rights movement, the

Women’s Suffrage movement, and the LGBTQ movement are all examples of movements

that engaged in unconventional expressive forms of mobilization in an attempt to make

their identity known and their voices heard (Freeman and Johnson 1999). The Christian

Right movement was also a part of many of the mid-to-late 20th-century movements

sweeping the United States. These movements used different forms of protest, namely,

marches, boycotts, books/articles, interest groups, and sit-ins. Most recently the Black

Lives Matters movement, and the #MeToo movement have begun to utilize new forms of

expressive mobilization such as kneeling during the national anthem and Twitter hashtags

and other forms of online media expression. The #MeToo movement spread primarily as

an online phenomenon, indicating the present day importance of online media expression.

There are a variety of ways that groups can expressively mobilize. In this dissertation,

I chose to look at political consumerism (boycotting and buycotting) and Twitter expression

as indicators of social marginalization. Both forms of expression are highly relevant in

today’s society, with political consumerism being one of the most commonly used forms

of political mobilization and online media expression growing exponentially over the past

decade.

Evangelicals

I am interested in understanding evangelicals in America as they are an ideal test group

for my theory. Globally, evangelicals are a small but significant portion of the population.

Evangelicals in the United States have enjoyed a rather comfy level of perceived societal

and governmental acceptance throughout American history (McLoughlin 1968; Coleman

1980; Smidt 1988). In fact, evangelicalism permeated American culture and values so much

so that it can be said that “the story of American evangelicalism is the story of

America itself in the year 1800 to 1900” (McLoughlin 1968, 1). In short, evangelical

Protestantism has enjoyed a dominant position in both political and social life throughout

most of American history (Wong 2018a, 94).

Evangelical Christians have enjoyed an accepted and pre-eminent position in American

society and government (Oldfield 1996). Feminists argue that patriarchy is a highly

JudeoChristian value, and patriarchy has been and continues to be a staple in American

society (Foucault 1990; 1995). Nominal evangelicals have been in some of the top

positions of political power and have also had a monopoly on societal definitions of virtue

and morality (Marsden 2006). Further, there is new evidence of a growing and well-

connected evangelical elite who hold pre-eminent positions in government, corporations,

academia, Hollywood and more (Lindsay 2008). Wong (2018a) says that the white

evangelical voting block today “is buttressed by several structures that reinforce its

advantages, enabling it to resist the challenges to its strength posed by demographic

changes” (89). These are examples of past social and present political acceptance afforded

to evangelicals in the United States.

Two scholars, Hunter (1981; 1992) and Smith (1998) were aware of this dynamic. Each

claim that societal changes and/or the identification of villainous out-groups play an essential

role in bolstering evangelical vitality. In other words, the more evangelicals feel threatened

either by modernity or out-groups, the more they thrive. Where these scholars differ is in the

ways that evangelicals maintain this vitality. Hunter (1981) argues that retreat, boundaries

and social distance from modernity have kept evangelicalism alive while Smith et al. (1998)

contend that direct interaction with opposing groups stimulates evangelical vitality. Social

movement research shows that direct interaction with opposing groups should also instigate

mobilization. It creates an environment of collective identity by establishing an “us” versus

“them” mentality.

Jelen (1991) affirms these findings when he shows that members of the Christian Right

were motivated primarily by antagonism for minority groups. These "out-group" versus

"in-group" emotions have become more evident in recent history for many hypothesized

reasons, most specifically the advent of an African American president being elected. Sides,

Tesler, and Vavreck (2016) find racial and status anxieties were more influential on support

for President Trump than education or income. Where evangelicals fit in the overall

emotional reaction to changing demographics and power structures is not completely clear;

however, what is clear is that their support for Donald Trump was high and the reason for

such staunch support is strongly associated with racial and partisan attachments.

The question concerning evangelicals then is what emotions might they be feeling?

Jasper (1997) and his fellow social movement scholars admit that there is no shortage of

grievances for groups to feel. Given that "white" evangelicals are and have been a dominant

force in American society for most of American history (Fowler et al. 2013), what methods

are elites using to stir up anxiety and a feeling of marginalization in a group that holds

political access and power (especially in the Trump era)? As my theory explains, there are

two dimensions to marginalization, social and political. These dimensions are connected,

but social movement entrepreneurs are more likely to find success in motivating

evangelicals on social and political grounds than simply political grounds. They need to

stir up a moral "outrage" in the community (Jasper 1997).

White evangelicals are a part of a broader paradigm shift happening in the ranks of

white Americans. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck (2017; 2018) explain the phenomenon as

"white identity politics." "Trump showed that appeals to white grievance have the power

to resonate in a multicultural America where whites increasingly feel like an aggrieved

minority” (22). They claim that this is part of a broader global phenomenon. Perceptions

of discrimination against whites were strong predictors of support for Brexit (2016). Tesler

(2016) argues that Barack Obama’s presidency may have inflamed this white identity

phenomenon by intensifying by drawing attention to the relationship between race and

politics. Hence, white Americans’ growing feeling of being an “aggrieved minority” is

likely connected to increased feelings of marginalization amongst white evangelicals.

White evangelicals, in particular, are displaying signs of social strain and threat (Jardina

2014; Wong 2018a). Wong (2018a) attributes this feeling to diversifying demographics

within the evangelical population. Looking at white, Black, Asian and Latinx evangelicals,

Wong found that they all demonstrated more conservative perspectives on moral issues

such as abortion and gay marriage. However, on issues such as immigration, reparations

for slavery, support for Black Lives Matter, and welfare, white evangelicals are

dramatically different from their racial minority counterparts (Wong

2018a; 2018b). Generally speaking, white evangelicals are far more conservative on issues

than are Asian, Black, or Latinx evangelicals. Wong (2018b) shows that 50% of white

evangelicals believe immigrants hurt the economy, and she articulates that the difference

shown between white and non-white evangelical policy preferences is in how they define

"us" versus "them" (Wong 2018a). She explains:

Stemming from dominant perceptions among white evangelicals about community

boundaries and ‘who we are’ may be feelings of anxiety and a sense of peril about

external threats to those boundaries and the identities they maintain. I show in this

book that part of what underlies white evangelicals’ more conservative policy

attitudes compared with the attitudes of nonwhites is the belief that whites face as

much discrimination as outgroups, such as Muslims, or even more (95).

She found that at least half of white evangelical respondents felt discriminated against,

which paints a clear picture of “white embattlement against a changing world” (2018, 95).

Thus, racial and demographic changes are likely a principal source of marginalization in

the white evangelical community. They are feeling displaced and feeling like they are

losing their grasp on social norms and political policies that benefit them as a result of

demographic changes. Elites have been able to manipulate and use this growing unease to

their advantage as they emphasize the “us” versus “them” rhetoric. As Smith et al. (1998)

find, this sub-cultural identity unique to evangelicals makes white evangelicals the perfect

target for amplified marginalization.

With this status, power, racial and identity dynamic as a backdrop, another point I intend

to drive home in the succeeding section is the importance of social and religious values to

evangelicals. Moen (1994) says of scholars during the Christian Right’s era that “The

concerns of Christian Right supporters were explained as the by-product of authoritarian

personalities or symbolic crusades, rather than taken at face value. One unfortunate result

of pigeonholing the Christian Right was that scholars circumscribed their research agendas.

They neglected fruitful lines of inquiry…” (347-348). It is important to look at evangelicals

from an open perspective and acknowledge that many possess a strong sincerity for their

belief system. Racial prejudice, white identity politics, and status anxiety may all be a part

of why evangelicals are feeling increasing marginalization, but these feelings are all shared

by the white population more broadly (Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2017; 2018). When

analyzing white evangelicals as a part of this phenomenon, it is important not to miss the

theological and religious aspects unique to evangelicals that may also be affecting their

perceptions of social marginalization.

The social mores, norms, and Biblical values are unique for evangelicals because these

values are not just what evangelicals believe but quite literally represent who they are

(Keeter 2007; Moen 1992; Wilcox and Robinson 2010). Thus, any aspersions cast on these

values is digested as disrespect directed to them. This makes the situation simple. All it

would take for evangelicals to begin to feel an increase in social marginalization would be

for society to appear to embrace values that are opposite the traditional evangelical or

Judeo-Christian values. In this situation, evangelicals would feel that they are the ones

being rejected. However, as Oldfield notes, they might not even be concerned with feeling

rejected as much as they are concerned with their values being rejected for their value’s

sake (1996).

Of course, the caveat to this “value-oriented” understanding of evangelicals is that

white evangelicals and Black evangelicals who share similar “values” engage in politics

differently (Harris 1996). This is not true for all Black and white evangelicals but for the

majority of them, and historically speaking, Black and white evangelicals share theological

beliefs but not political beliefs. In fact, for much of American history, white evangelicals

have used their faith to justify their suppression of Blacks while Blacks used their faith to

justify their right to freedom and every other “God-given” right (Noll 2010). The

complicated relationship between evangelicalism and race informs our understanding of

the political disparity between white and Black evangelicals now. Racial angst and

resentment within the ranks of white evangelicals may be one of the key differences

between the two groups.

Every group is unique; this is true of the evangelicals. One critical area of theological

uniqueness specific to evangelicals and one that I believe is relevant to this dissertation is

the evangelical's understanding of human nature grounded in their view of biblical

teaching, which colors his or her reaction to changes in culture and society. Evangelicals

believe in the inerrancy of the Bible, and the Bible states explicitly that men’s hearts are

deceitful and desperately wicked, above all things (Jeremiah 17:9). Based on the Biblical

understanding of the fall of human-kind by Adam and Eve after having eaten the fruit of

the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, all humans are fallen. This is not the only time

the Bible states that man’s heart is darkened by sin and has no good in it. In fact, the entire

message of the Bible and of a Savior revolves around the need for a Savior. Specifically,

because man is wicked and without hope, man needs a Savior to change the wicked nature.

The Bible says that there is none good, no not one (Romans 3:10), and given that

evangelicals believe in the inerrant truth of the Bible, they believe this statement to be true.

Thus, all worldviews, political systems, or anything else, that are based on the premise of

human goodness hold no merit for evangelicals.

Given that evangelicals believe in the wickedness of the human heart, it comes as no

surprise to them when they see changes in society that do not align with their Biblical

worldview. According to their beliefs, man is already corrupt, and an increase in corruption

is and should be expected. It is likely customary to hear evangelicals say that they believe

society is “getting worse” but that they are not necessarily rattled or shocked by this;

instead, it only confirms their Biblical understanding of human nature, which is that it is

tarnished and darkened by sin. As time passes, more of this fallen nature begins to fester

and grow and manifest itself in new and various ways.

Thus, for the average evangelical, changes in societal moral norms (such as abortion or

gay marriage) that, according to them, do not align with Biblical principles are not all that

shocking. In fact, many evangelicals would likely expect these changes. Other issues, such

as growing racial tension or sexual harassment issues, are just further evidence to support

their understanding of a Biblically fallen and decaying world. However, a lack of shock to

the changes in society is not the same as a lack of discomfort or displeasure with the

changes in society. Hunter (1981; 1992) and Smith et al. (1998) both acknowledge and

utilize the assumption that current societal changes are real and antithetical to evangelical

values, thereby disrupting their comfort level.

The formation of an “out-group” identity is essential then to evangelical collective

identity (Smith et al. 1998). Groups antithetical to evangelicals are groups whose values do

not align with evangelical “values” and are therefore the ideal villain needed to create a

coherent evangelical collective identity. One outgroup to form recently is the LGBTQ

community. Fetner (2008, 120) researches the "loosely coupled" political game played

between the LGBTQ community and the Christian Right. She attributes the rise and success

of the LGBTQ movement to the Christian Right. Hence, the Christian Right served as the

necessary "out-group" for the LGBTQ community's collective identity.

Fetner (2008) explains that the size and scope of the Christian Right movement was much

bigger than the LGBTQ movement. Members of the LGBTQ community perceived

themselves as marginalized by society and government. The homosexual community

experienced a great deal of oppression and discrimination during the McCarthy era because

of claims that they were communist perverts and a threat to the country (D’Emelio 1983, 41-

43). This claim led the federal government to fire and dishonorably discharge hundreds of

homosexuals from their government positions (D’Emelio 1983, 44-45). This is just an

example of the different manifestations of marginalization that the LGBTQ community

experienced.

The Christian Right movement was far more powerful than some of their opponents,

specifically the LGBTQ community (Fetner 2008). With radio, TV, film and print media

outlets, along with a much heavier purse and substantial access to and influence within the

Republican Party, the Christian Right was a “movement of size and strength that dwarfs

the resources, access, and constituent base of the lesbian and gay community” (Fetner

2008, 120). However, Fetner’s (2008) research shows that even with the difference in

access and influence, the gay and lesbian community made notable gains in both society

and politics. Many of their gains were a direct result of pressure from the Christian Right

that mobilized the LGBTQ community into political and social action (2008).

The LGBTQ community has won many important social and political battles recently.

Wilcox and Robinson (2010) explain that the speed with which the LGBTQ social

movement swept across the nation was nothing short of astounding. They won a major

battle when the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage. Further, they are making gains

socially. Members of the society are far more favorable toward gay marriage today than

ever before (Pew Research Group 2016; 2017). Ninety-two percent of homosexuals say

society has become more accepting of them in the past decade (Pew Research Group 2013).

However, evangelicals are one of the few groups in the United States that still disapproves

of homosexuality.

Evangelicals, coming from a Biblical perspective, struggle with the societal and

political acceptance of homosexual norms. In other words, society's acceptance of values

as opposed to their conception of Biblical values is a loss for them and causes them to feel

socially marginalized. Thus, in terms of homosexuality, evangelicals perceive that their

position in society has shifted from accepted to marginalized which causes them to feel

socially marginalized as a group. Scholars explain that evangelical elites use the LGBTQ

community to create an in-group/out-group mindset amongst evangelicals and to stir up

feelings of societal marginalization (Barton 2012; Diamond 1989; Miceli 2005; Olson,

Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Stokes and Schewe 2017; Tranby and Zulkowski 2012).

The LGBTQ movement is just one example of a broader change in society, or as Hunter

calls it modernization, that stimulates the ideal environment for the creation of Smith’s

theorized subcultural identity. The shifting societal and political positions of racial and

religious minorities and the resurgence of white identity politics is likely a result of elites

stoking the fires of marginalization for evangelicals (Sides, Tesler, and Vavrek 2017).

However, my theory goes a step beyond Smith's theory of societal "out-groups." I assume

that social marginalization also increases the more that society embraces certain activities

or lifestyles that evangelicals find opposed to Biblical principles. The perception that

society is disrespecting Biblical principles is troubling at the individual level. As this

perception of disrespect grows and is propagated by elites, the more evangelicals

personally—and as a group—feel marginalization and strain. They feel that their values

and value sets are being marginalized and therefore believe that they are being

marginalized. They feel that society looks down on them, considers their way of life, their

standards of morality and their understanding of right and wrong to be out of date and not

in line with the current trends and zeitgeist in society. I say this with the acknowledgment

that there is a difference between the "moral" concerns of white evangelicals and African

American evangelicals (Noll 2010). While I cannot speak directly to this difference in this

dissertation, it is something to be noted and studied in the future.

Over time, and as a result of a variety of social movements and expressive mobilization,

society has progressed to new levels of acceptance to which the evangelical message does

not conform. In fact, evangelicalism, as I have defined it here, is highly exclusive in that it

proclaims that there is only one truth, that there is only one way to God, that there is only

one God, and that there are concrete rights and concrete wrongs. There is no compromise

in the evangelical message regarding eternal and Biblical truths. This very premise is

anathema to secular and even mainline orthodox Christian society.

Thus, in a society that is now embracing different kinds of truths, different types of

rights and wrongs, different kinds of religions and gods (or lack thereof), I contend

evangelicals are feeling increasing social marginalization for saying otherwise. They

perceive that their position is progressively seen as the outlying position or the position that

is hindering the current progress being made by society to be more accepting and open and

equal. The headline in an opinion piece written for the Huffington Post declared,

“White evangelical Christians are America can’t have nice things” (Tannehill June 13,

2017). The recent victory by the LGBTQ community is just another notch in a belt of

acceptance and justice that has been slowly getting longer with time. These are some of the

reasons I believe that evangelicals are feeling social marginalization.

Based on Inglehart’s (1977) theory of post-materialism, and Hunter’s (1992; 2007)

conception of a "culture war of the body," I can safely assume that, at least in the past few

decades, social issues have taken precedence over economic issues for most individuals.

The interpretation of these statistics is contingent upon one’s conception of morality when

answering the question. According to Hunter, liberals and conservatives build their

conceptions of morality from two different worldviews. This means that what a

conservative might consider immoral, a liberal might consider moral. The evangelical

message is exclusive and not tolerant of actions the Bible calls sin. Liberals would find this

exclusivity to be part of the problem with society. Issues like abortion, gay marriage, and

prayer in schools are more important to many evangelicals than justice, tolerance and civil

rights (Moen 1989; 1992; 1996; Hunter 1992). Ergo, the more society embraces the left’s

moral values, the more society rejects the moral values of the evangelicals and vice versa.

While evangelicals may not feel they have a powerful influence on social and political

norms, Wuthnow (1988) points out that government has an impact on evangelicals. He

posits that almost every new policy or judicial ruling impacts religion in the United States.

Rarely have new governmental policies or legal decisions been neutral concerning

American religion. Therefore, evangelicals (and/or their values) are consistently being

affected with almost every new law or new court ruling. The effect that government has on

religion plays a vital role in shaping evangelical perceptions of marginalization.

The media is also sending evangelicals signals about their place in society. Newspaper

articles, internet reports, TV news segments and more decry the Christian Right and predict

its eventual extinction (Beaty 2017; Gobry 2017; Kivisto 1994; Posner 2016; Rubin 2016

Tannehill 2015). With titles like “This is the last spastic breath from the Religious Right

before its overdue death” (Hansen 2016), members of the media argue that the United

States is progressing, so ideas like “homosexuality is sin” are outdated and people who

refuse to move away from such ideas will have to change or die off.

Media coverage of the “culture war” has shifted over the past fifteen years toward a

new assumption— the left has won the culture war. News stories such as "The Left Won

the Culture War. Will they Be Merciful?" (Swaim 2016), “White Christian America is

Dying” (Sides 2016), “They’ll Always Lose the Culture Wars: The Right Loves Fighting

Lost Causes—But Liberals Keep Winning” (Prothero 2016b), “Is this the End of the

Religious Right?” (Posner 2016), “Evangelicals and Politics: The Religious Right (Born

1979, Died 2000)” (Forster 2012), and “The Religious Right: A Eulogy” (Dreher 2016) are

examples of some opinion leader’s belief that the culture war is indeed ending, or at least

that the Christian Right is breathing its last breaths. The Christian Right may indeed be

dead, but that is not the focus of this study. Evangelicals are not dead and still make up a

solid voting bloc in elections. As Oldfield said, people who say that the evangelicalism is

“declining, ultimately doomed, anti-modern movement” need to recognize that, if this

group is doomed to extinction, “they show no inclination to accept their assigned fate”

(1996, 41).

There has been an increase in religious “nones” over the past few decades. Religious

“nones” are individuals who answer “no religion” on the religious preferences

questionnaire. Putnam and Campbell (2012) posit that following the cementing of the

alliance between religious conservatives and the Republican Party, society experienced a

new aftershock of Americans (primarily young people) turning away from religion (2012).

This new group of secular individuals is commonly referred to as the "nones" (Hout and

Fisher 2002). The "nones" have continued to grow while many of the Christian Right

organizations of the 1980s and 1990s have become obsolete. The Moral Majority ceased

operation in 1987. It was immediately followed by the Christian Coalition and the

presidential run of an evangelical Christian, Pat Robertson. However, Pat Robertson never

got elected, and the Christian Coalition eventually faded into irrelevance (Vaughan 2009).

These are all reasons that evangelicals may have begun to feel a sense of loss and

marginalization. Data from the from a survey done by the Public Religion Research

Institute in 2017 show that white evangelical Protestants in America are the only Christian

group to feel that they are more discriminated against than Muslims in America.

Additionally, the Pew Research Group reported an increasing number of evangelical

Protestants who say it has become more difficult to identify as an evangelical protestant in

America, increasing from 34% in 2014 to 41% in 2016 (Lipka 2016). This report contrasts

the 31% of “nones” who say that having no religion has become easier in the past decade

(Lipka 2015).

A global survey of evangelical Protestant leaders show that members who live in the

Global South (71%) expect that the state of evangelicalism in their countries will be better

in five years, while evangelical Protestant leaders in the Global North (primarily

secularizing nations) believe the state of evangelicalism in their countries will either stay

the same (21%) or get worse (33%) over the next five years (Pew Research Group 2011).

Further, a majority (66%) of evangelical leaders in the Global North feel that evangelicals

are losing influence in their societies (Pew Research Group 2011). In the United States, this

number is much higher, with 82% saying evangelicals are losing influence in society.

To add to evangelicals’ downbeat outlook and perception of threat, a recent report

showed that Christians are the most persecuted religious group in the world—according to

a study done by the Centre for the Study of Global Christianity (Chiaramonte 2017).

Around 90,000 Christians were killed for their faith in 2016, amounting to one every six

minutes and 900,000 over the past ten years. This is a staggering number. While Christians

are not killed for their faith in the United States, these numbers do not likely inspire

confidence in evangelicals. Perhaps evangelicals see the current secular social and political

trends in the United States and, rational or not, fear that the persecution they see outside of

the country may start manifesting inside the country.

There are other religion-related reasons why evangelicals may feel social

marginalization. Theoretically, when fighting a war with no apparent winner, both sides

stand their ground. Only when one side begins to gain an advantage do members of the

losing side start surrendering to avoid worse consequences. In other words, a war has been

effectively won when members from one opposing side begin to surrender and assimilate

with the opposition, or wars have been won when members of the losing side begin to use

desperate and risky techniques as a "last ditch" effort to fight for the cause. Current data

show that this surrender is happening in the United States. In the past few decades, social

liberalism has increased. Gallup polls on "key moral issues" reveal that along with every

social dimension, the American population has shifted to the left in the aggregate (Newport

2016). This includes a sizable portion of religious conservatives (presumably not as many

evangelicals). Data averaging from 2005-2016 reveal that 61% of Protestants believe

divorce to be morally acceptable (up from 53% in 2001), 50% found premarital sex morally

acceptable and 41% found same-sex relationships morally acceptable (Newport 2016).

While this data does not show that evangelicals are transforming at the same rate or in the

same way, it is still substantively important to acknowledge the change in Protestants at

large.

I discuss different causes for feelings of marginalization, but I do not measure these

causes. Thus, based on the social constructionist theory of collective action, elite

entrepreneurs are using everything I just described above as ammunition to increase

emotional marginalization in the evangelical population. Research shows that elites, the

media, campaigns and other organized interests, use different methods to coerce citizens to

mobilize (Hansen 2015). These various entities attempt to convince citizens that their

situation is so dire that the cost of mobilizing is lower than the cost of not mobilizing

(Hansen 2015; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Not only are elites trying to stoke the fires

of societal marginalization but also frame issues in a way that creates more strain and

feeling of threat. Further, they identify certain outgroups to evangelicals to stimulate and

develop a collective identity. Hence, much of the marginalization that evangelicals are

feeling is likely due to elite coercion and framing.

However, I am interested in the intervening variable in the relationship between elite

framing and mass mobilization. Hansen and Rosenstone (1993) and Hansen (2015) argue

that elites trigger mobilization by influencing how people feel, whether that is by

spotlighting opposition, inflaming polarization or by drawing attention to the poor

treatment of one's personal identity group. The purpose is to manipulate people's feelings

in a way that mobilizes them into action. If someone feels strongly enough about

something, (whether it is simply anger at the opposing party or worry for the future of their

children or job), they are willing to pay the cost of mobilization. This is an accurate

simplification of the social constructionist theory of mobilization.

I am interested in these feelings of social marginalization. These feelings of social

marginalization may be a result of elite manipulation, or fed by the media, campaigns, and

interest groups; however, that does not change the fact that feelings of marginalization still

exist and that these feelings are key to motivating evangelicals into action. How and why

evangelicals feel marginalized is not central to my question. Evangelicals may feel

marginalized from personal experiences that have left them feeling like they cannot speak

about their beliefs or they may feel marginalized because they are avid Fox News followers

and the storyline on Fox News is that of persecuted evangelicals. Regardless, if they feel

marginalized, I hypothesize that one way they will respond is by engaging in expressive

forms of mobilization.

I argue that groups can feel socially marginalized while still feeling that they have a

level of political acceptance. Wilcox and Robinson (2010) conclude that while evangelicals

have had an influence on elections, their influence all but disappears after elections because

of the impracticality of their policy preferences. Therefore, evangelicals never see their

policy preferences enacted once their preferred candidates are elected (2010). Wilcox and

Robinson (2010) argue that to predict the influence of the Christian Right in the future,

scholars must consider their successes or failures in the past. “On some of its core issues,

the Christian Right has experienced significant defeats” (191). Prothero (2016a)

corroborates these assertions when he submits that conservatives always end up losing the

major social and political battles. Theoretically then, it is possible for a group to feel they

have access to members of government, and yet still feel that their views and preferences

are marginalized in policy and in society.

A group can feel that they have political access and possess high external political

efficacy and yet feel marginalized by society and the policies that are currently in place.

For example, during the Obama administration, African Americans may have felt that they

had more access in the federal government while at the same time feeling increasingly

socially marginalized.

I assume that the two spheres, social and political, work in tandem; thus, feelings of

social marginalization may lead to feelings of political marginalization. I expect that

evangelicals will express feelings of social marginalization but maintain a relatively high

sense of external political efficacy. However, I also expect to find low expectations

regarding their place in government and politics in the future.

Evangelical Response

Given that I theorize evangelicals are socially marginalized, I predict that one form of

responsive mobilization will revolve around social issues and issues of morality in society

rather than government. I expect that they will demonstrate some frustrations with

government, specifically with standing policies such as abortion, gay marriage, and no

prayer in schools. However, their frustration is not necessarily with the current government

but instead with the policies that are indicative of the problems they perceive in society. By

this I mean, evangelicals are aware that abortion would never have been legalized had

members of society not put it on the agenda, and the same goes for gay marriage and prayer

in schools.

Evangelicals’ feelings of social marginalization manifest less in mainstream political

participation and more in peripheral forms of expressive participation that are socially

visible. I theorize that the method of mobilization is contingent on the sphere of

marginalization. If a group feels marginalized by society, they will rely more on social

avenues to express their displeasure with society and the reasons they feel marginalized.

Therefore, because I argue that evangelicals are feeling socially marginalized, I expect to

find increased expressive mobilization. Direct implications could include social media

expressions, boycotting companies that support social values they are against, and/or public

demonstrations (marches or rallies).

Evangelicals, feeling socially marginalized will not only mobilize conventionally but

will also engage in different forms of political and social expression, voicing their

frustrations and attempting to maintain and protect their valued status quos. Social

constructionist theory posits that if a group possesses a sense of marginalization, a

collective identity—coupled with the appropriate framing for the target culture—they will

collectively mobilize. I am not testing all aspects of this theory, but rather a simplified

version. I am more interested in forms of expression rather than social movements. The

participation of evangelicals in traditional forms of mobilization and expression—voting,

donating to campaigns, and so forth—in the 2016 elections underscores the fact that

expressive mobilization is but one of many forms of engagement.

Based on the previous theory then, I hypothesize that evangelicals, when they have a

clearly constructed collective identity with constructed emotional strain framed

appropriately for their cultural norms, should be engaging in collective action and

individual mobilization.

H1: If evangelical clergy exhibit a feeling of social marginalization and strain, they will

also engage in various forms of expressive mobilization.

H2: Feelings of social marginalization in the evangelical community stimulate

individual “identity claims” through expressive mobilization.

H3: Feelings of social marginalization, conditional upon collective identity, elite

framing, and cultural context, will stimulate political consumerism, a form of

expressive mobilization.

H4: Feelings of social marginalization lead to expressive individual mobilization.

These are broad and extensive hypotheses that I break down into specific testable

hypotheses as they relate to evangelicals in each distinct chapter. The indicators I use to

test the broad hypotheses speak to an aspect of each hypothesis and my theory more

broadly.

Conclusion

Evangelical Christians are my group of interest. Evangelical social marginalization and

mobilization are what I analyze. I theorize that if evangelicals, as a group, are feeling

socially marginalized, one way that this feeling of marginalization will manifest is through

expressive extra-institutional mobilization. Forms of political expression and mobilization

have evolved over time and are now categorized as either offline participation or online

participation. Therefore, a valid study of political mobilization analyzes both forms of

expression. My hypotheses are direct implications of my theory. The independent variable

in my study is marginalization, and the dependent variable is mobilization. The more

evangelicals feel marginalized, the more likely they are to engage in expressive

mobilization; thus, specific catalyst events and framing are more likely to instigate

mobilization. I intend to draw a line connecting these feelings of social marginalization for

evangelicals and their subsequent activities of mobilization.

CHAPTER 4

THE PERCEIVED MARGINALIZATION AND EXPRESSIVE MOBILIZATION OF

EVANGELICAL CLERGY

“One of the most extraordinary things about our current politics—really, one of the most

extraordinary developments of recent political history—is the loyal adherence of religious

conservatives to Donald Trump. The president won four-fifths of the votes of white

evangelical Christians. This was a higher level of support than either Ronald Reagan or

George W. Bush, an outspoken evangelical himself, ever received."

- Michael Gerson The Atlantic

Perhaps the first question to answer at the outset of this chapter is, why clergy? There

is a sizable and continually growing number of works that study clergy and their importance

as political elites (Beatty and Walter 1989; Cavendish 2001; Crawford and Olson 2001;

Djupe and Gilbert 2002; 2003; 2008; Djupe and Grant 2001; Djupe, Olson, and Gilbert

2005; Guth et al. 1997; Olson 2000; Olson and Crawford 2001; Smidt 2016). Scholars

agree that clergy have played and continue to play an important role both in religion and

politics (Jelen 1993a). Guth et al. (1997) find that evangelical clergy are much more willing

to engage in political leadership and activity than previously found. They split their findings

into a two-party system of conservative and liberally minded pastors—where the

fundamental division is not ideological but rather theological (1997). Other scholars find

that this ideological division is usually split between clergy who are concerned with social

justice and clergy who are concerned with evangelicalism (Wuthnow 1988). Beatty and

Walter (1989) find that conservative clergy have the potential to mobilize but usually only

mobilize around the narrow area of moral issues.

Djupe and Gilbert (2008) measure how clergy "have multiple venues through which

they can engage members' political interests, although their efforts to influence members'

decision making can create tensions within the congregation" (7). When a pastor discusses

a political topic with his congregation, he is able to stimulate interest and action (2008).

Further, the topics that clergy discuss publicly with their members can shape the political

agendas of their members. Djupe and Gilbert (2008) show that in these particular ways,

clergy are incredibly influential on the political activities and civic abilities of their

members. However, not all clergy are equal. Evangelical clergy have a different level of

influence and authority than mainstream Protestant clergy, who also possess a different

level of influence compared to Catholic Priests and Bishops.

Therefore, perhaps most relevant to my dissertation and to the research done in this

chapter is the consistent finding that evangelical pastors, in particular, hold the most

influence over their parishioners (Jelen 1993a; 2001). While mainline Protestant pastors

struggle to find a theological basis for claiming authority as religious or political leaders,

evangelical Protestant pastors have many sources from which to pull to establish their

position of authority and influence in the congregation (Jelen 1993a). The steadfast belief

in Biblical inerrancy serves as a basis for evangelical clergy to proclaim unambiguous

political messages (1993a). However, Jelen (2001) explains that the “otherworldly”

orientation of evangelical clergy and their narrow focus on individual salvation have

usually served to undercut their ability to influence and mobilize politically. Not all scholars

agree, however; Guth et al. (1997) found that in recent years evangelical clergy have begun

to embrace the legitimacy of political activism (2001).

Evangelical clergy are “opinion leaders” influencing evangelical parishioners (Katz and

Lazarfeld 1955). They are not the only opinion leaders influencing evangelical action,

however. Political elites who espouse "evangelical" messages, such as Ted Cruz or Jimmy

Carter, and evangelical public figures, such as Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson, influence

evangelical action. As I addressed before, elites must construct a narrative by which to

stimulate action from their target base. This is no different for evangelical elites outside of

local clergy except that their voices must contend with the voices of the local clergy. Given

the effect these outside opinion leaders can have on evangelical parishioner action, these

outside voices may be a plausible explanation for why parishioners of evangelical churches

would be more politically mobilized than their congregational minister. In fact, Moen

(1992) contends that it was the religious parishioners rather than the religious institutions

that were key to the success of the Christian Right movement. Hence, evangelical churches

were the place to recruit movement activists, but the churches themselves were not the

organizational block (Moen 1992). This shows that opinion leaders outside of clergy can

also have a dramatic effect on evangelical political action.

Harris (1994) postulates that, while religion has been used as an opiate for the masses,

it can also be used as a mobilizing force. It provides the needed community and resources

for mobilization (1994). Djupe and Gilbert (2008) lay out the many ways that the church

structure, including small groups, informal contacts and the link between the clergy and the

congregants, play an important role in the politicization (or lack thereof) of the church.

The leadership of the church then is pivotal. If a pastor treats the church as a political

resource, then it will be a political resource, but if a pastor believes that the church and

politics should be separate, it will be separate. Thus, it is empirically enlightening to speak

directly with evangelical clergy. What do they think about today's society, the church's role

in society and what their own Christian identity is? I am able to learn about current

perspectives on evangelicalism, from evangelical clergy themselves, while also learning

about how they feel about society and how they think society feels about them. I am able

to dig a bit more into the convoluted realm of race and religion. I cannot generalize the

findings in this chapter, but the findings provide an original and unique glimpse into an

area of research that needs more careful evaluation.

As I discuss in the literature review, evangelicalism and race is still an understudied

area in religion and politics; however, scholars have found that Black and white

evangelicals share similar spiritual beliefs while holding differing political perspectives

(Harris 1994, 1999; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990; Fowler et al. 2013). In this dissertation, I

look for implications of evangelical perceptions of marginalization and the use of

expressive mobilization as a reaction to this perceived marginalization. However, I am

aware that white and Black personal and religious experience and history are unique from

each other and may lead to differing forms of mobilization and differing reasons for

perceived marginalization. When analyzing political consumerism and Twitter, I am unable

to uncover many of the racial differences present; however, I am able to uncover some

racial differences and similarities in this chapter by interviewing both white and Black

evangelical pastors. I am interviewing Black and white evangelicals, based on theological

convictions alone; thus, I am interviewing theological evangelicals, I am not interviewing

Black Protestants and white evangelicals.

I expect to find the following differences between white and Black pastors: white

evangelicals will focus more on individual salvation while Black evangelicals will focus

on community; white evangelicals will demonstrate concern for moral issues of sexuality

and express a sense of social marginalization regarding these issues while Black

evangelicals will show less concern for moral issues of sexuality but give more attention to

issues of social justice; finally, I expect white evangelicals to demonstrate a stronger sense

of political efficacy than Black evangelicals.

In this dissertation, I theorize that if 21st-century evangelicals feel socially

marginalized, this feeling of social marginalization---coupled with a clear collective

identity and powerful elite framing---leads evangelicals towards expressive collective

mobilization. However, I also contend that evangelicals will individually mobilize in

response to a feeling of social marginalization. Thus, to better understand the feelings and

thoughts of individual evangelicals and to assess how or in what ways their leaders might

be mobilizing them, I conducted interviews with evangelical clergy in three different states.

The fundamental question I intend to answer is this chapter is, how are Black and white

evangelical clergy feeling and responding to the social changes in American today? Are

they feeling socially marginalized? If so, are they responding to this marginalization with

expressive mobilization? Specifically, this chapter is designed to uncover some unique and

original data regarding the difference between how white evangelicals feel and respond to

social changes and how African American evangelicals feel and respond to social changes.

Data Collection

I conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with evangelical pastors in three

different states. I selected evangelical pastors from three cities in different parts of the

country: Columbia SC; Winston Salem NC; and Rochester NY. I chose these cities because

they have a similar population size. Columbia has 133,114 residents, Winston Salem has

244,605 residents, and Rochester has 208,046 residents (US Census Bureau). The locations

of these cities provide regional variation. The religious makeup of the cities also vary.

Fifty-four percent of Winston-Salem residents affiliate with a religion. The largest

religious group in Winston-Salem are the Baptists with 16% of the total religious

population. City-data.com shows that evangelical Protestants are the largest religious group

in Winston Salem, followed by mainline Protestants and a small portion of Catholics and

Black Protestants. Religious "nones" make up the majority. Evangelical Protestants hold

the top spot as well in Columbia, South Carolina; however, there are fewer evangelical

Protestants in Columbia than in Winston Salem. In Columbia, mainline and Black

Protestants hold the second and third spots, respectively, followed by Catholics. Making up

48.8% of the population, the majority of Columbia residents are not affiliated with any

religion making. Evangelical Protestants and religious "nones" have both grown in numbers

since 2000 in both cities (city-data.com).

Rochester's religious makeup differs from the other two cities because of its Catholic

population. Catholics are the largest religious group at 25.7%, followed next by evangelical

Protestants and mainline Protestants at a distant second and third. The religious "nones"

make up the bulk of the population with 53.6% of the total population. Interestingly the

Catholic population has decreased since 2000 while the evangelical population has grown.

Unsurprisingly, the "nones" have also grown dramatically (city-data.com).

I base the partisan makeup of each city on the 2016 presidential election results.

Winston-Salem reported that 53% of the population voted for Clinton, and 43% voted for

Trump. Columbia reported that 64% of the population voted for Clinton while 31% voted

for Trump. Finally, 54% of the population of Rochester voted for Clinton while 39% voted

for Trump. All three cities lean Democratic.

After selecting the cities, I went through a Yellow Page search of churches in each city

and selected every 10th church. I then compiled a list of these randomly selected churches

from each city and narrowed down the list to churches that fit the general definition of

evangelical. I did this by analyzing the statements of faith on the websites of the churches

or relied on denominational cues. Some churches only had Facebook pages, that did not

contain much information, while other churches did not have a website at all. In cases such

as these, for churches in South, if the church was Baptist or Pentecostal, I automatically

assumed it was evangelical. However, for churches in Rochester, I did not include the

church unless the information I gathered from websites fit the definition of evangelical. We

cannot assume Baptist churches in the North are all evangelical; the American Baptist

Churches, U.S.A. denomination is affiliated with mainline as opposed to evangelical

Protestantism. After identifying and discarding the non-evangelical churches, I randomly

selected churches by selecting every third church in Rochester, every fourth church in

Columbia, and every fifth church in Winston Salem. This left me with a total sample of

forty-three churches.

I then sent each church a formal letter requesting an interview with their pastor. I heard

back from the first few pastors within a week. I followed up with all the pastors the next

week by phone, calling each church to speak directly with the pastor. A sizeable number of

churches were closed or no longer in the location provided in the Yellow Pages. However,

I did connect with over twenty pastors, and successfully interviewed a portion of them.

Unfortunately, some of the pastors agreed to the interview, but I could never get in touch

with them after the initial interaction. I recall three pastors saying no, while around half of

the 43 churches were simply unreachable. In total, I interviewed 16 pastors, three of which

were pilot interviews with pastors not originally on my list. I formally interviewed 13

pastors. Six of the pastors lived in Columbia, four lived in Winston Salem, and three lived

in Rochester. Three of the thirteen pastors I interviewed were African American pastors.

One African American pastor from each different city responded. The average age of the

pastors was fifty-three, with the youngest being thirty-six and the oldest being sixty-seven.

I interviewed the four North Carolina pastors in person. I conducted the other interviews

via Skype and phone: four via Skype and the rest on the phone. I recorded each interview

with the pastor's acknowledgment and permission. I asked each pastor a series of thirteen

questions. I never asked them directly whether they feel marginalized; rather, I asked them

questions about how they feel about society and the direction they perceive it is heading. I

also asked about how they feel society views them and people like them. The answers to

these questions provide plenty of insight into their feelings about society and about their

place in society. Further, I asked them about what they and their church are doing politically

and socially and then asked them directly whether they boycott or use Twitter to engage

politically and socially. I also asked a question about President Trump and whether his

election has changed anything for them.

Almost all the pastors seemed excited about participating in the interviews. Many of

them, prior to agreeing to the interview, after hearing about my own Christian persuasion,

were even more excited and open. A few pastors did not know about my religious

convictions until partway through the interview, but I did inform them all. This knowledge

seemed to lead many to be more conversational and curious about me and my project and

studies. I was open to answering questions regarding me personally but kept information

about the project minimal so as not to bias their answers. The pastors were friendly and

easy to converse with. Many offered me coffee or tea as we talked. The ones I talked to on

the phone or over Skype were equally friendly. They all appeared quite interested in the

project by the time the interview was finished. Many of them seemed reinvigorated about

life and their ministry at the end of the interview and talked about how the questions I asked

were challenging and caused them to think about things in ways they had not had to

previously. Apparently, they enjoyed the challenge.

Most of the clergy I interviewed expressed interest in reading my dissertation once it is

finished. Many of the ones I interviewed on the phone or Skype expressed a desire to meet

in person if I was ever in their area. One pastor from South Carolina contacted me months

later to ask how I was. While a few of them seemed a little skeptical at the start of the

interview, all of them seemed open and trusting by the end of the interview. More times

than not, after the interview ended, our conversation continued for fifteen minutes to an

hour.

Those I interviewed in person were eager to show me around their church after the

interview and introduce me to people. I think the excitement stemmed from being

interviewed by an academic who shared their religious beliefs--- to whom they could finally

express their frank opinions on controversial issues. Further, they all showed a keen interest

in the subjects discussed. They wanted to continue to discuss more things after the close of

the interview; they especially wanted to hear more from me.

I first asked them to tell me about themselves and their ministry. Sometimes their

answers to the question lasted thirty minutes. I would usually ask for more information or

clarification on things as they would give me their life story but forget to tell me anything

about their current ministry, or vice versa. Most of the information provided by this

question is not relevant to the research and theory of this dissertation, but it was a good

icebreaking first question.

Part 1: Marginalization

Evangelical Identity

I use Hunter’s definition of “evangelical” since his conception is purely doctrinal. It

includes the following: the inerrancy of the Bible, the divinity of Jesus Christ and personal

conversion or being “born again” through faith in Jesus Christ, not of works. As I step

through the answers to this question of evangelical identity, this definition should be used

as a comparison or baseline.

As a follow up to my opening question, I asked, “Do you consider yourself to be an

evangelical?” and “Do you believe this term can also be applied to your congregation?”.

I asked these questions for several reasons. Primarily, I wanted to know whether the pastors

adopt or internalize an evangelical identity. How they identify themselves helps me to

understand better if evangelicals who do identify as such might be more likely to feel social

marginalization than those who do not identify as such. I also asked this question because

I want to see how evangelical pastors understand and interpret the term evangelical. If they

do identify as such, how and why is this the case? Are there commonalities or differences

among the pastors’ different conceptions of the term evangelical?

Five of the thirteen pastors interviewed gave me some sort of dictionary definition of

the word, evangelical. Specifically, most of these five pastors referenced the Greek word

“euangelion” and its meaning. Beyond the specific definition, many of the pastors

discussed the historical context and meaning of the word evangelical. Almost every pastor

gave some sort of explanation or description of the way they wanted me to perceive them

in the context of the term evangelical. Most of them balked a bit at the term as if it had a

negative connotation. Many felt the need to shed some perceived or assumed negative

connotation and teach me the “correct” definition of evangelical, after which they were

willing to adopt the identity. All but two listed their expected doctrinal standards of

evangelicalism as their understanding of evangelical, even if they used different words or

phrases to explain.

I do…Labels change over time. What is considered to be defined one way in one

period of history it suddenly starts taking on new names…it’s become fairly broad.

I think originally evangelical would be a way to describe someone who believes

the Biblical gospel and the need to be born again, and saved by the Lord in order to

be forgiven of your sin…to be justified…There would be groups that would call

themselves evangelicals that…we would not be a part of. We believe in the Biblical

gospel and the need to proclaim the Biblical gospel and that it is the only way for

people to be saved from their sins, then yes, we are evangelical.

This pastor shows a strong grasp of the basic tenets of evangelicalism but also wants to

clarify that not everyone who claims to be evangelical is what he would define as

evangelical. He concludes by saying that yes, he and his congregation are evangelical if

what is meant by evangelical is what he defined. He was uncomfortable giving a clear yes

or no answer without defining for me what he meant by yes or no. This defensiveness was

mild compared to some of the other answers, however. If you notice, the pastor quoted

above does immediately give an affirmative response and then proceeds to define and

clarify.

Not all of the pastors were so quick to take on the evangelical label. This pastor, a thirty-

eight-year-old African American pastor in South Carolina who pastored another

independent, non-denominational church, says:

Um, I heard about thirty different definitions of that. By basic definition,

evangelical is just of or pertaining to, you know, the teaching of the Gospel which

we take very seriously. Sharing the Gospel with different people is something we

take very seriously. For me, the Bible says that we should be fishers of men and a

fisherman goes where the fish are, they’re intentional about going where the fish

are biting.

He describes and explains his idea of evangelicalism definitionally and talks a great deal

about what it means to reach out to the community and be a “fisher of men”; however, he

never officially says, yes, he is an evangelical. He seemed almost afraid to associate himself

with the term. He proceeds and says:

Go into the nations. It wasn’t about the geographical nations which change every

one hundred to two hundred years…that word is pertaining to the different people

groups, and so that we should go to white people, and go to Black people, and go

to Hispanic people and to go Asian people, with the emphasis being on going to

them. Many people we deal with…you know…church has put a bad taste in their

mouth, we try to prove that differently…are we lining up with scripture, are we

truly going? Scripture says [to go] despite the fact that 85-89% of all churches are

90-95% one ethnicity. Even Dr. King referred to the church as being the most

segregated time of the week, Sunday morning. Are we going to the nations? Not

just people who look like you?

It was finally at this point that I asked this pastor if he considered his congregation to be

evangelical. He said:

I would say yes…doing what the Bible says. By definition, evangelical is just about

of or pertaining to the teaching of the gospel. Are we doing that? I would say we

are. Church growth, as well as the diversity, is … proof that we're not only doing it

but doing it according to scripture.

At this point, he does accept the term evangelical for his congregation but based solely on

his definition. Earlier in the conversation, I asked him whether he was uncomfortable with

or wanted to avoid other interpretations since he seemed so adamant about clarifying his

own definition. He said no, and that it is not about avoiding interpretations. He then

proceeded to talk about how many of the people he ministers to have a bad taste in their

mouth from other churches about what “evangelicalism” means. Ergo, he does seem to

want to establish himself and his ministry as unique from other ministries. It was also clear

that he was keenly aware and concerned about ministering to all people out of a perception

that not all churches do that. He believes that the Bible is clear about evangelizing all

nations, meaning all ethnicities. This is something I would expect a pastor representing a

racially mixed congregation to be sensitive about.

Another pastor from South Carolina, a white sixty-seven-year-old pastor of a small

Pentecostal church, says: "Yes, depending on the definition exactly. We definitely would

consider ourselves evangelical in the sense that we believe in the Bible; all of the doctrine

comes solely from the Bible…". As we were talking, he brought up the definition of

evangelical on his computer and then proceeded to say: "… ‘emphasize the authority of the

Bible,' ‘personal conversions,' yes, ‘doctrine of atonement’...may have a

different interpretation of what salvation doctrine really is.” His understanding of salvation

is based more on what he called a "fuller faith system"; however, this difference was one

of doctrine and did not change his acceptance of the evangelical label. He also gave a

conditional “yes”: he is evangelical if the doctrinal definition [that he looked up online] is

in line with his doctrinal standards.

A sixty-four-year-old white pastor from Rochester, New York, pastor of a

nondenominational church, gave one of the most unusual answers. His first response was,

“Ha.

That is a huge loaded question. I don’t ever use that term anymore. I did forty years ago,

but evangelical meant something different. Now it’s a political term and uh especially what

we saw the Judge Roy Moore and the whole explosion of evangelicals…”. He shows a keen

awareness of the political connotations associated with the term. He proceeded to tell me a

story about how his daughter, in her twenties at the time, came to him asking if they were

a “born again church.” She had been challenged by someone that if she was not “born

again” she was not Christian. Being unfamiliar with the term but believing herself to be

Christian, she asked her father for clarification. He told her:

…yes, we are a born-again church but we don't use that term a lot because it is

jargon, it's an insider term and when people say ‘yeah, I've been born again' now

they have this entire loaded view that all comes cascading in that it's a certain view

of scripture, a certain view of inerrancy blah blah blah…the problem is the

Christian life is not as simple as that…we're not a catchphrase church.

He proceeded to say: “We would be in the line of evangelical with personal conversion, a

foundation of knowledge that scripture is the Word of God, it is reliable for the course of

our daily lives and as a source of truth without error.” Thus, he lays out the three

fundamental tenets of evangelicalism.

However, his entire discussion of this concept was colored with shadows of disdain, as

if it pained him to take on the label “evangelical” even though in some sense of the word

he did seem to believe that he and his congregation were evangelical. He discussed issues

of biblical inerrancy and said that the problem with that doctrine is that it only applies to

original manuscripts, so, inerrancy is great in theory but not always in reality. He said,

passionately, of being called evangelical, "…it's a catchphrase. So, what happens then is,

‘I know exactly what you believe because you use this term,' you know, you have no idea

what I believe, it all depends on what you mean by evangelical".

He then proceeded to reference the “euangelion” root of the word and ended by saying

that based on that Greek definition, “...I’m evangelical yeah, I don’t use the term, no I’m

not.” His entire discussion regarding this term was contradictory. I followed that up by

asking whether his congregation was evangelical and he said yes since they follow him,

and he's been their pastor for forty years (again identifying as an evangelical). He then said

that a good number of people in his church would say that they were evangelical.

Two other pastors from Rochester demonstrated a similar hesitance to identify with the

evangelical label. One, a fifty-one-year-old African American pastor of a

nondenominational church, said:

Uh, I would consider myself to be an evangelical, yes. You know, I’m always afraid

of terms and labels because other people might consider themselves to be

evangelical that I might not what to be uh [associated with them] …so I’m always

reluctant when I hear those terms…I’m always leery of using those terms because

I think people immediately then in their minds assume that you are…they check off

certain boxes. Certainly, in terms of evangelical belief, those would be my

convictions, reformed evangelical I guess…[I] hold that salvation is by faith alone

through Christ’s finished work, the scriptures are the inspired Word of God, in their

original writings they’re infallible. That the scriptures are our guide for faith and

practice and those things. Certainly, an imminent return of Christ, I am still a

pretribulation believer.

Again, he is cautious when taking on the name evangelical even though he was relatively

quick to say yes and then explain himself. The third pastor from Rochester demonstrated a

similar hesitance to say he was evangelical. He, a thirty-six-year-old white male and pastor

of an independent “Bible” church, said: “Define evangelical, and I'll tell you." When I

would not define it for him, he proceeded to say the following.

Let’s start with history ok. Evangelical has been around for hundreds of years. And

I’m pretty sure that the term started in Scotland and the evangelicals were people

who had an unwavering belief in the foundations of our faith, the authority of God’s

Word, the exclusivity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the cost of discipleship, that we

are not just Christians by name, but we are followers of Jesus Christ…belief in a

miraculous faith, that Jesus Christ literally raised from the dead, that Jesus Christ

was virgin born, that Jesus Christ did heal the sick, that Jesus Christ was a literal

human being and not some kind of figurative teacher, that He did come from God

and went back to God…so all these foundational beliefs is what the beginning of

evangelicalism was. That got rolled into fundamentalism back in the early

1900s…as…a defense against liberal Christianity.

Thus, he sets the stage, explaining the historical context and whom he believes evangelicals

used to be. The point of this explanation, of course, is to make sure I understand the

definition he wants to be defined by versus the one he wants to avoid. He continues and

says:

Then fundamentalists became Bob Jones University, right? Like Blacks and whites

are separated, and you've gotta walk on different sidewalks for boys and girls, and

all that garbage, KJV-only stuff became what fundamentalism is, like NO, at that

point NO, I’m not a fundamentalist. Now, an evangelical is anywhere from Benny

Hen to Donald Trump, and when I hear about the evangelical voting block I just

say, what the heck is that? So, I’m trying to defend myself before I even answer

the question. So, from a historical perspective I would call myself a historical

evangelical, uh from a contemporary political perspective I would say no to that

question because I don’t know what the person asking thinks is an evangelical and

I want to make sure we’re going to define our terms. Fundamentals of faith---yes,

a political voting block—no. (emphasis added)

This pastor demonstrates obvious defensiveness even though I made it apparent to the

pastors that I considered myself to be Christian as well. This grounding should have created

a solid foundation for them to feel free to answer my questions honestly. Perhaps the

connection he had with me on a human level allowed him to express defensiveness more

freely. Perhaps he was feeling attacked by society and the stereotypes and social

marginalization he felt and finally had an avenue of expression? Further, I do not believe

that he or the other pastors demonstrated as much defensiveness about themselves

personally as they did about their values and a desire to keep them undiluted with politics.

A forty-two-year-old white pastor in South Carolina demonstrated a similar hesitance

to adopt the evangelical label. He said,

You know that's a good question these days, isn't it? That's kind of a hot topic. You

know, in the way I would define it I would say yes. That's such a loaded word these

days…whenever I think of evangelical, I think of someone who views the Bible as

authoritative, who would argue that the only way to heaven is to trust Jesus as your

Savior, those sorts of things.

So, in those terms, you know, the word ‘euangelion’ that’s a Biblical word, evangel

is good news, so gospel. So that’s where that word comes from, so in the gospel

sense of the word, absolutely I’m an evangelical; but, that question was on the

survey too and, you know, as far as me filling out the little boxes, I didn’t check

the box though. I was going back and forth on whether or not I wanted to check

the box cuz in our context that word is so politically loaded where it's, uh, people

will tend to think ok that means you must be an old white Republican and, you

know, if you think about our context, it's been hijacked for political purposes, and

I hate that. Really, I need to do some more thinking whether or not this term is one

worth fighting for and redeeming…

This pastor demonstrated a similar level of defensiveness in that he would not even select

“evangelical” on my survey because of the stereotypes and assumptions associated with

that term. While he admitted to being evangelical Biblically, he clearly felt a need to

distance himself from the label politically.

Some of the pastors were more readily willing to label themselves as evangelical. A

Columbia pastor of an independent non-denominational church said, “Evangelical? Yes, of

course.” After which, as all but one of the pastors did, he defined what he meant.

Yeah, evangelical in the sense that we want to be as understandably close to

apostolic era church doctrine. The gospel as given by the Lord, by the Holy Spirit

to the apostle Paul and others by revelation and was delivered to the saints once and

for all. We don't want to stray from the original intent of the Holy Spirit for the

redeeming plan, the plan of redemption for man. If we mess up on that, if we dilute

that in any way, we're not gonna have the desired effects for our church, and for the

community and for the culture, as a matter of fact, as we'd like to and that is very,

very important.

He proceeded to give more details by what he meant but never demonstrated fear of being

wrongly identified nor did he show that he understood or was troubled by political

implications of “evangelical” in the way that some of the other pastors did.

One pastor's answer was simply, "Yes. Yes. It's pretty straightforward for me I guess,"

and that was all. This pastor, a pastor of a Southern Baptist church affiliated with a national

denomination, was also from South Carolina and relatively young at age forty-five. He was

the only pastor who simply said yes and did not feel the need to explain.

Another pastor, from North Carolina, also a Southern Baptist, was also more willing to

adopt the identity of evangelical. He said,

I do. Yeah, I consider myself, and I've actually turned myself old fashioned. Very

evangelical. Our church is very, very mission oriented. I'm a firm believer in where

the Lord said that you know, we're to reach our Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria and

the utter parts of the world. And I take that in a literal fashion.

This pastor, in answering this question, at first came across as somewhat unaware of the

political connotations and stigma associated with the term evangelical. However, later in

the interview, he seemed to demonstrate a clear understanding of this stigma. His

interpretation of evangelical was very mission-and outreach-oriented. When I asked

whether he was evangelical, he did not seem to identify with the term politically or even

socially but based on the word’s theological meaning. “Is he evangelical?” Of course, he

is, his church's mission is to be evangelical.

Later, when I asked a question about what society thinks of people like him, he showed

a clear internalization of the “evangelical” identity evincing both a sense of pride in his

religious commitment and a rather clear sense of social marginalization. He was one of a

handful of pastors who did not seem preoccupied with the political implications associated

with the word evangelical; they simply understood it as a definition of outward mission

work. A Reformed Presbyterian pastor from South Carolina said, “Yes. And I would qualify

that. The word evangelical is built on the word from the work in the Greek euangelion, the

good news, the good news is it’s all about Jesus…”. He does qualify what he means by

evangelical but does not seem to balk at the idea that he would be called an evangelical.

Two pastors did not say they were evangelicals. One was the pastor of a Moravian

church in North Carolina. This comes as no surprise to me. He said, “I consider myself to

be a mainline Protestant. If you had to identify Moravians, we are a mainline Protestant

church”. He went on the explain what a Moravian is and their ecumenical relations with

other mainline churches. Later he explained that in terms of outreach, his church is

evangelical, but, it is not so in terms of a "political persuasion, or a certain identifiable

cultural context or being white or being Anglo-Saxon. Moravians have always been

mission-minded, so in that sense they were evangelical.” While he did eventually get

around to finding a way to be evangelical, I believe the first response is the most telling.

He immediately said no, and that he was a mainline Protestant.

A fifty-year-old, Winston Salem African American pastor of a non-denominational

church also said no. He said:

Not really. I choose to stay away from that. I consider myself as nondenominational

or basically as someone who loves God and someone who understands that God

will meet anyone where they are. I think nowadays many people sometimes

associate evangelicals with party affiliations or certain affiliation towards certain

beliefs and I don’t pertain to that. I don’t believe that God is neither Democrat or

Republican. I believe He supports what is best for humanity. If you are an

evangelical and you’re Republican what if God’s telling you to vote Democrat

…you could miss God because of you not being open to the voice of the Holy Spirit

because God knows what’s best for the nation and what’s best for the country and

even for the world nowadays...everything’s connected … so that’s the reason I

don’t, per se, connect myself to one group because a stigma comes with that.

‘Political stigma’ yeah, political and even some of the other issues, my belief is that

He will meet people where they are I don’t believe that uh everything is always

Black and white in some situations.

He has some similar reasons for not identifying as evangelical as the previous pastors; he

was one of two to immediately answer negatively to the question.

These answers can be categorized in three ways: rejection of the term overall;

rejection of the political implications of the term but acceptance of the theological

implications; and complete acceptance of the term. The majority of the pastors (8)

rejected the political label evangelical but accepted the theological label evangelical. Two

pastors rejected the label completely, and three pastors adopted the term completely

regardless of any political or theological implications they associated with it or perceived

others to associate with it.

Social Perceptions of Evangelicals

One aim of my project is to learn about the way these pastors feel society views them,

and more broadly how they feel society views evangelicals. For this reason, I ask the

following question: “How do you feel society views you or people like you?”. I do not

define what I mean by “people like you,” but rather allowed them to interpret the idea for

themselves and respond accordingly.

Each pastor had a different take on what this question meant and subsequently how to

respond. Many of them did interpret the question as “how society views evangelicals,” but

quite a few gave other varying answers. Almost all of them demonstrated a sense of

marginalization, at least in terms of being stereotyped. They each had different experiences

regarding stereotyping, but all seemed to be trying to avoid or refute some stereotype. For

some of them, the stereotype was less about their Christian identity and more about their

racial identity; however, even for the African American pastors, race was not the only

identity they internalized since it was wrapped up in their evangelical identity. For instance,

the African American pastor from South Carolina said,

…as far as being a pastor, I would say that pastors have, you know, gotten a bad

rap and there's a negative connotation right now. You have people who are involved

in scandals, and you know, you see the stuff on the news...I would say that there's

a negative connotation right now.

I would also say a very close second to that, being a young Black man also carries

a negative connotation and I'm working against that as well. Most people, when

they think about a young, Black man, integrity is not what comes to mind… A lot

of young Black men by the way that they carry themselves and their life pursuits,

they have earned a reputation that's not positive…I would say of pastors, that

reputation hasn't been earned, you're talking about a few who are deciding the

image of many, and most pastors I know are great men whether they be Black or

white, I would say that that image… shouldn't be earned…

The first thing to notice about this pastor’s response is that he immediately took my

question to mean “how does society view pastors?” In other words, the identity that first

came to mind for him, perhaps because of the nature of the interview, was his position as a

pastor. Thus, he did not lead with a sense of being evangelical. He more profoundly

internalizes being a pastor and the stereotypes he feels because of that, while also

identifying himself as being a Black man; both identities are clearly important to him and

essential to his worldview. However, he does not seem to display a strong sense of societal

marginalization regarding either his religious identity or his race. Both identities seemed

like a part of life to him, and the stereotypes and hardships involved are just something to

work through and hopefully prevail against. He told me that on multiple occasions he had

been harassed by police officers for no apparent reason. He attributed this to his race;

however, even in discussing these clearly disturbing run-ins with police officers, he never

showed a sense of anger or frustration, but rather an acceptance of it being the way life is

(see Gaventa 1980 for an explanation of this sentiment that he calls “quiescence”)

Instead, his focus seemed to be on reaching out into the community and helping other

Black men, specifically, overcome challenges they face. He indicates that he’s “…trying to

show young Black kids, hey, …you can carry yourself intelligently and, you know, you

don't have to look like and act like what you see on TV, you can stand tall and be proud of

who you are and... intelligence is sexy anyway”. He goes on to talk about how he wants to

show other young Black men that it is possible to only be with one woman and have kids

with one woman because he has done that. He said that most young Black men, even in the

church setting, are floored when they hear that about him. He hopes he can provide a

tangible alternative for them so that they can prove the social stereotypes wrong. Here we

see an African American pastor balancing his evangelical and Black identities by reaching

out into the community to help people one individual at a time. This is how he tries change

culture, and his focus on individuals embedded within culture is profoundly evangelical.

The Reformed Presbyterian pastor also answered my question from the perspective of

a "pastor." He internalized his identity as a pastor and discussed how society sees him and

other pastors. He says,

That’s easy. It’s the last thing I ever tell people that I’m a pastor, ok. It really is.

Because I’ve grown to expect that people will not trust me if they knew I was a

pastor. Because they're a lot of charlatans, there are a lot of people who call

themselves ministers of the gospel and are some of the biggest hypocrites…I'm a

broken, sinful man, I need Jesus just as much as anybody probably more so it's

troubled me when that title, that title evokes a sense of awe…

He identifies the same stereotype the South Carolina African American pastor identified:

one of a hypocritical, false pastor. He shows a sense of humility and an unwillingness to

fully embrace the label “pastor” because of stereotypes.

Two pastors responded by identifying society as their immediate community. They

detailed the positive image they have developed for themselves and their churches in the

community. For instance, one pastor in Rochester said, “Around town [his church name]

and [name] kids is very very highly regarded…”. Another pastor in South Carolina said

something similar: “… we're well accepted and well viewed here in our community, yes

we are...we, we've helped so many people." Both pastors therefore identified with their

"evangelical" identity but identified society as their immediate surrounding. However, both

did talk of how society, in general, viewed them and their churches. In fact, the Rochester

pastor gave one of the clearest examples of a feeling of social marginalization in my

interviews.

The African American pastor from Rochester did not once mention his race throughout

the course of answering my question. He started by saying he had never really thought

about this question before. He then proceeded to give a vulnerable and deeply personal

answer. He says,

I think society, and wrongly so, I think society believes…been lead to believe, that

Christians hate people who are not like them. That because, say, for instance, the

position I would have with regards to abortion or homosexuality or even for that

matter, drug use, that because we would take a particular position toward these

things, that that, in turn, means that we hate the people who do these things and

nothing could be further from the truth....you know, starting from the back forward,

I don't hate drug addicts, I was a drug addict, and I just want to see people who are

on drugs liberated from that because I recognize the bondage that drugs bring into

people lives…

He continues by giving detailed examples about each group of people he mentions: drug

addicts, women who have had abortions, and homosexuals. He explains how he does not

hate these people but rather cares for them and desires to help them. He states that the view

society might have of him or people like him is inaccurate.

Such attempts to rectify false conceptions of evangelicalism seem to stem from a few

sources. Pastors and evangelicals feel they represent something bigger than themselves,

namely God. Thus, the way that society sees them is how they see God, and representing

God truthfully is perhaps the evangelical’s greatest concern. Thus, it seems part of the

exasperation demonstrated by these pastors comes from this concern.

The challenge of representing God was a common theme throughout all the interviews.

Most of the interviewees spent a great deal of time disputing some societal perspective of

them that they had internalized. Many felt the need to either defend or distance themselves

from a certain meaning of evangelical. Whatever societal marginalization they had

internalized was so real to them that when given the chance to defend themselves to

someone who was willing to listen, they did so readily. I do not believe that they were

always defending themselves or even their personal identity per se, but more so, their faith.

They were attempting to rectify a false image of who God is.

One pastor from Rochester gave a personal example of an interaction that displayed

one societal perspective of him and his beliefs that he had internalized. He said,

A couple months ago I was in a coffee shop, and I was doing some work, and this

guy started talking to me and asked me what I do. I told him I was a pastor, kinda

rolled his eyes, and we started talking about the Bible and he starts bringing up all

sorts of scientific questions that he thinks that God's Word does not answer or that

he thinks that is contrary to the Bible and as best as I could to tell him, no, you're

coming with assumptions that I don't have, you're assuming a lot of things about

me and about my faith that aren't true, you're closing yourself off from an actual

conversation. So, I guess I dunno, I guess people come to the table thinking that

we're dumb, that we haven't thought things through, that faith is opposed to reason,

and that faith is opposed to science and it kind of starts our conversations from a

bottom rung of a ladder rather than at an equal spot.

It is these sorts of experiences and interactions that contribute to an internalized feeling of

social marginalization as expressed by this pastor. Such internalizations create a feeling of

isolation and inability to connect or explain oneself to others, as well as a helpless feeling

that one has no recourse or way to shed incorrect stereotypes.

Another Rochester pastor (we will call him Pastor Rob for the purposes of this example)

shared a similar experience about interacting with some auto mechanics. In conversation,

one of the mechanics mentioned knowing a friend of Pastor Rob. This friend also happened

to be a pastor. Pastor Rob says he asked why the mechanic liked this other pastor so much,

to which the mechanic responded, “…he was not a Bible thumper, he never thumped his

Bible in my face.” Pastor Rob said of this answer, “That was his first statement. I said,

‘that's an interesting description of this guy, I don't know why you say it that way". The

mechanic replied, "I've met those Bible thumpers before, and they're always trying to hit

you over the head with the Bible…” At that point, Pastor Rob says he informed the

mechanic that he is a pastor as well and received the following response: "You're not one

of them, are you? You're a pastor. You're kidding! Do you thump people with your Bible?".

Pastor Rob, clearly miffed by this type of stereotype describes for me how he felt about this

whole experience:

That was the only thing he wanted to talk about…The other two guys were very

silent, but they were very much in agreement. I think in terms of a prejudicial view

when they don't actually know anybody…the view is basically negative. Here in

the Northeast, the view of people in the Bible belt where you live is there's Bible

thumpers on every street, and all the churches are after everybody to save their souls

and get them into heaven. That's not really true, but it's a view based on a

prejudgment…that allows them to sit comfortably and evaluate the world in terms

they understand…I never wack people over the head with that stuff even though I

know it, I took a very different approach. I would say when people actually know

me the regard is very high, if they have a prejudice, it’s probably pretty low.

This is an excellent example of an individual experience, likely not the only one, that led

to feelings of social marginalization. Nothing speaks as powerfully to or influences as much

as the direct interactions that feed feelings of marginalization. Thus, the two experiences

described above are likely indicative of experiences other evangelicals have had. Therefore,

it is presumptuous to assume that all feelings of social marginalization within the

evangelical community stem from elite and media frames. We cannot discount personal

experiences and their influence as well.

While the pastors from the North did show a heightened sense of social

marginalization, some in the South did as well. The intensity with which they expressed

feelings of marginalization varied but was apparent in almost every case (this is not entirely

true for the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical). The South Carolina Southern

Baptist pastor said:

You know, in the mainstream culture that you would see on television news, on an

average show I guess, most Bible-believing Christians are probably thought of as a

little bit behind the times, or a little bit less than intellectual. I guess I'll leave it at

that. I guess that's how we are portrayed in the mainstream culture. Most Christians,

Bible-believing Christians, are portrayed like that, a little bit dumb, insecure, a little

bit backwards.

This pastor was the least interactive of them all, but he still gives a clear indication of the

stereotypes he perceives in his daily life. Take note that he uses collective identity language

when describing the way he think he or people like him are viewed. He says, “that’s how

we are portrayed." While he does demonstrate some sense of marginalization, the North

Carolina Southern Baptist pastor takes this perspective to the next level, saying:

I think that I'll just say the past 15 years, I think the way society views evangelical

Christianity has taken a downward turn…it seems like, to me, like the most

persecuted bunch in the United States today are the Christian people. If Christianity

says something like homosexuality is bad, and yet what they've done, they've kinda

turned that around to say that all Christians hate the homosexual community which

is not true. I have sat down and had face to face talks with those in the homosexual

community and pointed these things out and said you know you've come in very

militant, you know, in wanting to try to squash me like a bug and you say I hate you

and the thing about it is I don’t hate you, I don't agree with your lifestyle because

of ... what the Bible says about it.

So, if we take the Bible and we believe in the Bible we have a world and a society

that doesn't want that because it puts restrictions on them, you know, we're in a

society that doesn’t want any authority over them…I think that society in and of

itself no longer views church and Christianity with the same value and respect that

it did even as much as it did 10-15 years ago.

This pastor demonstrates a strong sense of marginalization verging on martyrdom. He says

that he believes “Christian people” are the most persecuted people in the United States and

proceeds to vehemently defend that claim. He talks of the society’s refusal to accept the

“Christian” perspective that homosexuality is Biblically wrong and then couches this

challenge in a deeper problem he sees in society. Society does not want authority or

restrictions, and because “Christianity” is predicated on authority, society rejects it and has

lost respect for it. According to this pastor, this change has been happening over the past

ten or fifteen years. This perspective is not an anomaly either. One Rochester pastor says:

So, faith in our culture is very much to the point where you can think what you

want to think and it's supposed to be accepted; and I think a lot of times that is true

for everything but Christians. Where, if we stand up for what we believe God's

Word says, we're going to get persecuted for it. Let's just take, for example, the

Christian baker in Colorado…what happened? You had a Christian saying, this is

against my beliefs, and I can't support it, I love you, and I would love to have a

relationship with you, but I don't want to participate in what you are doing because

I think it is wrong…

Another pastor in North Carolina echoed a similar sentiment regarding authority, he says:

What you're really talking about is the issue of authority. That is the issue, at the

end of the day, is the issue of authority. What is somebody's authority for what they

believe and why they believe it? I believe the Bible is completely true, inspired by

God and without error, everything we believe and practice and do is based on the

scripture. That might lump me in, in their minds, with some groups that I probably

wouldn’t want to be associated with…

This idea of being persecuted or an anomaly for standing on an unyielding authority became

a familiar refrain during the interviews. The prevailing logic is that American society does

not want anything restricting freedoms or desires. According to many of the pastors, the

more society moves in relativist direction, the more obsolete or outdated the idea that there

are set boundaries and a final authority outside of oneself becomes. This thought process is

one of the major reasons for the feelings of marginalization and displacement cited by the

pastors. Most of the pastors echoed the sentiment that they felt they and other evangelicals

were viewed as behind the times, or an oddity. Earlier in our conversation, the pastor from

North Carolina said:

…well I would believe each day that goes by we’re viewed more and more as an

oddity, out of step with the culture, out of step with the times. If they find out what

we really believe (they may think we’re just a social organization), I think they

would probably call us narrow, unloving. What else would they wrongly think

about us? Maybe even a cult?

Notice the language here. He says, “what else would they think wrong about us?” The first

thing to note is his assertion that the beliefs he thinks society has about him and his church

are wrong. Secondly, he clearly identifies with an "us." The way this pastor answered my

questions and presented himself leads me to believe that by "us," he does not mean

evangelicals as a whole, but is more specifically referring to himself and his church. He

demonstrated one of the most individualistic worldviews I encountered among the pastors

and thus, I do not believe he has adopted a broader "collective identity" outside of his own

church identity.

One pastor from Rochester, humorously, but to make a point, says of the Christian

bakers, who are the plaintiff’s in the high-profile Supreme Court case, Masterpiece

Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), and of evangelicals in general,

…and obviously, there's an uproar in society saying that those people are bigoted,

that those people are nasty, that those people are unloving and unkind and behind

the times and… they're dinosaurs; you know what I mean? That they're on the

wrong side of history, and I think that is, for the most part, the way that our society

would see me and my church.

The tone in which he said this was as impactful. He is dripping with sarcasm as he lists the

various stereotypes and sweeping assumptions made about evangelicals, as if to insinuate,

naturally, evangelicals are seen in this way, because it is just how things are.

These pastors all seem to be internalizing a societal perspective of themselves that they

are "dinosaurs," behind the times, or prejudiced and hateful. These are stereotypes they

disagree with and refute. Yet, peculiarly, at the same time, they seem to agree that there is

some group of evangelicals out there that fit this stereotype. Hence, they want to make clear

that they are not part of those people. In other words, many of the pastors believe there is

some amorphous group of evangelicals out there that is bigoted, prejudiced, and hateful,

but they are not those people. On numerous occasions, the pastors say in various ways that

they are lumped into “this group” of people simply because they agree with and espouse

some of the same religious beliefs.

The pastors also made clear that the stereotypes stem from their unwillingness to

compromise on Biblical truths, sin, and right and wrong. Thus, there is an implicit

suggestion of a radical group of “evangelicals” out there misrepresenting real evangelicals,

but also a resignation to the fact that their perspectives, as they are, are going to be

considered hateful, bigoted and behind the times. Further, the pastors show a resignation to

the assumption that this perspective of them is set no matter what they contend otherwise.

They do not, however, necessarily treat this situation as a problem. They have come to

expect, both from experience and what the Bible says, that society will treat them as

outcasts. One pastor from South Carolina, a self-proclaimed optimist, says;

…a hotbed topic would be same-sex marriage if you look at our church's website

and our church's statement of faith, you'd see that we believe marriage is for one

man and one woman. Up until the past thirty years that's been…not all that

controversial of a statement. The speed in which the conversation is changing on

that, and particularly if I was to say I hold marriage to be one man and one woman,

if I was to say that in a different context there's the chance I could be looked at as

kinda like, uh, almost akin to the Civil Rights movement, almost as someone who’s

prejudice or discriminatory and that’s definitely not our church’s heart, not my

heart, but then again it could be viewed that way.

He knows his views are considered prejudiced and bigoted even though he contends his

church is not that way. Almost all the pastors acknowledge that there are evangelicals out

there with whom they do not want to be associated. They also acknowledge that their

Biblical beliefs are the main reason society calls them hateful or bigoted and prejudiced.

This specific pastor goes on to say that in his context, in Lexington, South Carolina, he and

his church do not experience the kind of stereotyping he talks about; however, he says that

if it does get that way for them personally, “then so be it."

Three of the pastors, at some point in the conversation, mentioned the Masterpiece

Cakeshop bakers in Colorado. Though the pastors were not directly experiencing what the

bakers are experiencing, as parties to a high profile court case, they seemed to identify with

the bakers and use them as a symbol. For the pastors, the bakers’ situation symbolizes

something sinister happening in society that somehow underlines the pastors’ feelings of

social marginalization. The bakers’ situation provides a concrete example the pastors could

utilize to support their argument that society is no longer embracing evangelicals but rather

castigating them for living by their religiously based worldview, as illustrated by the bakers’

refusal to create a wedding cake for a gay couple.

The two pastors who did not identify as evangelical had a slightly different take on how

society views them or people like them. Both pastors identified with their church’s identity

or denomination more than anything else. The African American pastor from North

Carolina said,

I wish sometimes people would judge ministries not by their names but by the

content of their character as well, just go visit the church, see what’s it’s like, just

because it’s a Baptist church doesn’t mean that they’re all the same, just because

it’s a Pentecostal church doesn’t mean that they’re all the same, you can go down

the line….sometimes people think all Black churches are the same, I don’t like

saying the word church because I believe there’s one church but different

congregations. The body of Christ is one church, but we have different

congregation…

Here he shows a sense of marginalization and of being stereotyped but by other churches.

His own community struggles with stereotyping each other’s denominations. This makes

sense, given that he is pastor of an African American church and likely experiences negative

or wrong assumptions about the way his church operates because outside observers fail to

appreciate the diversity inherent in African American Protestantism. He tells me that just

because his church is primarily Black does not mean they sing all the same songs people

might assume they sing and then lists the various types of music they play there.

The Moravian pastor also answered from a denominational approach. He talked about how

other more contemporary churches or today's society might think his church is a bit too

traditional or old-fashioned. He said,

I think society at large would view mainline churches as being an acronym as being

somewhat out of touch with reality, no praiseathon, but I think we see that because

since the 1960s mainline churches have gone down so …. You’re not getting it,

you’re out of touch with reality or want to have a monumental light show. We’re

kinda more the liturgy.

His form of Christianity then might be considered out of date since Moravians are not

engaging in contemporary ways of practicing Christianity. He identifies as a Moravian and

a mainline Protestant; thus, his answer stems from how society views mainline Protestants.

His answer was markedly different than answers of the pastors who did identify as

evangelicals, as he makes no mention of Biblical standards, authority, or values. Rather, he

talks about society's perspective on his style of church.

Where Is Society Headed?

While the point of my dissertation is not to uncover why evangelicals are feeling

marginalized, the interviews do provide insight on this front. I asked the pastors: “What do

you think about the direction society is headed in both socially and politically and how

does it make you feel?” I asked this question specifically to find out whether these clergy

are feeling socially marginalized which is relevant to my project because I assume social

marginalization. As I have shown above, the answers to the first few questions set a tone

of social marginalization; however, this question gets at these feelings more directly and

also, to a degree, uncovers why the pastors feel the way they do.

Across the board (save for the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical), all the

pastors said that society is headed in a bad direction. One pastor says, “…the culture will

constantly find more ways to express their hatred of God and hatred of truth, and so we get

better and better at expressing our depravity…" while another says, "It breaks my heart. As

a society, we're broken people, and we need God to change our hearts." Each pastor had his

own understanding of why society is heading in the wrong direction, but most of the

explanations all boiled down to one central problem with one central solution: the problem

is sin, and the solution is Christ. The ails of society are just the outward manifestations of

individual inward darkness.

Some of the pastors expressed concern about the future, especially for their own children.

One pastor’s concern was centered around safety. He bemoans his perception that society

has become far less safe. He talked about how his wife does not feel she can do the same

things that she could do thirty-forty years ago because of how dangerous the world is. He

believes things have changed due to the moral breakdown in society, and specifically a lack

of moral boundaries. In his view, American society began demanding more moral liberties

to do whatever they wanted but in doing so brought upon themselves more dangers. He

says,

…our society has granted people the loss of moral fiber, the failure to hold up, ‘No,

this is wrong, we don’t do that, that’s not ok, that’s not how you treat women, that’s

not how you treat men, which seems terribly limiting and all that, but you know

what? It’s like the fence around the playground; yes, it’s limiting but doggone

there’s tremendous freedom when you don’t have to worry about kids running into

the street to chase a ball. So, God’s Word is very limiting, but it's freeing! Stay

inside the fence; you'll be fine. Yeah, you're gonna miss a whole lot but thank God

for that.

Breakdown of moral boundaries was a common theme throughout the interviews. The

pastors all expressed a sense of societal moral degradation that all of them attributed to sin

and felt the solution was individual and personal salvation. The North Carolina Southern

Baptist pastor communicated a similar sentiment when he said,

I think that socially and politically our country is going in a wrong direction. For

me, as an evangelical Christian...I think they're going away from Biblical principles

on both a social level as well as a political level. Our society today doesn't want

any absolutes, because if there are absolutes, then that will make somebody wrong.

If you look at things socially, the uptick, (and I'm just taking some of the social

things that we have seen on the forefront) homosexuality, that's one of those things,

transgenderism...

He sees a trend in the wrong direction both socially and politically. He then draws the issues

of “homosexuality” and “transgenderism” back to what he believes is the root cause of the

problems he perceives, a rejection of absolutes.

The use of words like "boundaries" and "authority" and "absolutes" set the tone for

what the pastors believe sets evangelicals apart from society. As I have argued above,

evangelicals may feel social marginalization because of their unwillingness to compromise

on matters of theology in a society that no longer values the idea of one single "truth."

These pastors acknowledge this societal shift by claiming that society no longer has moral

boundaries or respect for values and authority due to the root problem of sin.

Another pastor, one from Rochester, expressed concern regarding the future of his family

and his safety as a pastor and evangelical. “…so, I don't like the way society is heading. I

wonder what it's gonna look like for my kids. I look at the secularization of Europe and

how ostracized Christians are becoming in Europe, and that's the way that we're going to

go so you know I don't like the trajectory." He proceeds to say that he is praying for

religious revival and for people to have a face-to-face encounter with Jesus and be changed

by Him; however, he does expect that circumstances could get bad for him and his family.

He says, "I've believed for a long time that I'm probably gonna spend some time in jail at

some point for preaching the truth of God's Word. I've wondered if that's going to happen

if that's going to affect my family. I would hope that it doesn't, but that's the trajectory that

I see in our culture." He is representative of most of the pastors in this viewpoint that

emerged in response to my question about where society is headed.

Societal division and divisiveness was another common theme. The same pastor

referenced above says, “Our culture is becoming one where if you are not extremely on one

side then you are extremely on the other, and we can't have conversations." He proceeds to

give examples of this phenomenon. He says if he claims to understand, empathize with and

appreciate the conversations being started because of NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick’s

protest action of kneeling during the National Anthem, then suddenly he is seen as hating

police, veterans, and America itself. However, if he says he thinks

Kaepernick should not kneel then suddenly he is considered racist without a heart of

compassion for the African American community. I ask him to clarify this as he had used

this for an example of something he experiences spiritually. He explains by connecting this

example to how he, as an evangelical, feels in today’s divisive culture.

When that comes to the way that we talk about different societal and cultural issues

whether it's gay marriage or it's abortion, we just can't have a conversation anymore,

and I just think that's a terrible loss. The exclusivity of the gospel is a big deal if we

say to somebody that Jesus Christ is the way, the truth, the life, I instantly hate all

Muslims and … I think all Muslims are terrorists. I do believe that there's one way,

and I do believe that Muslims are wrong, but I want to have a compassionate

conversation to be able to say, ‘This is what is I believe the truth is'; but if I say that

I'm instantly ostracized as a hater and as closeminded and bigoted and an

Islamophobe, and you know, why can't I just keep my own beliefs to myself?

The frustration this pastor feels is rooted in his perception that society is so divided that no

one can empathize with the opposing perspective. If anyone says they support or understand

one political or ideological perspective, they automatically are lumped in with all the

extremes associated with that perspective.

What causes this division? One pastor says that the division in society is the work of

the devil, society itself, and the media. He says, “…society is inciting division. I can say

that it's like our society wants us divided …or at least the media does, because of what's

promoted.” He (an African American pastor living in South Carolina) expressed frustration

with how the media seemed to be intentionally inciting division as if their goal was to create

anger and frustration across races. He says, “…it’s almost as if everyone's not going to be

happy until we've gone forty years back in time and schools are again Black or white and

restaurants are too, and it's like maybe then everybody will be happy, it's like they just want

to be in their corners...”.

This frustration with polarization shows up in many of the interviews. The reasons and

causes for the perceived divisions vary, but the pastors were similar in their overwhelming

sense that the country is painfully divided and their sense that they are on the losing side

of cultural change.

Further, there seemed to be an assumption, primarily among the African American

pastors, that polarization was intentional and in some way conjured up by elites. The

African American pastor from Rochester says, “…socially it seems that society is

becoming increasingly divided and I think that's intended. I think that there's great political

advantage in dividing people and the society has followed suit, it has embraced that. We

see a lot of divide going on in society”. He goes on to say that society is not as divided as

the “world” would have us believe, but that there are only two types of people in the world:

those on the narrow path to heaven and those on the broad path to destruction. He truly

believes that division in society, especially racial divisions, are somehow being

intentionally conjured up and promoted. He reiterated this belief multiple times in the

conversation. The African American pastor from South Carolina echoed the same

sentiment.

Many of the pastors shared the belief that the politics of our times is just a reflection of

society. In their view, the worse society gets, the worse the political realm gets. This finding

supports my understanding of political marginalization and social marginalization. These

pastors seemed more concerned with society than with government. They saw problems

with government as simply a symptom of greater problems originating from the collection

of individuals that make up American society. One African American pastor said,

"politically I think that's a reflection of what we see in society, I think that the political

divide is becoming greater." He believes divisions in government are simply a reflection of

the divisions in society, rather than society reflecting and being shaped by elites in

government. Another pastor echoes this sentiment and gives a more detailed explanation:

…moral issues etc. that I think are very wrong and have progressed in a wrong direction

uh, and politically likewise. Politically, …I think is just a lot of times … reflecting what is

happening socially. People that get elected have to please their constituents, have to identify

with their ideals, so I think politics a lot of times is just a reflection of what's happening

socially.

Yet another pastor, the North Carolina Southern Baptist, said the same thing in his own

words, "society is actually dictating polity…that's kinda scary as well because essentially

it appears that society is dictating the politics of our generation." He said that if he had to

put a one-word title on how all of this makes him feel, he says it would be "overwhelmed."

This finding speaks directly to my assumption that evangelicals are feeling socially

marginalized and concerned about society. I ask about the direction of both society and

politics; however, most of the pastors focused on the “society” part more than the “politics”

part.

Political Efficacy

I found that the pastors’ feelings of marginalization do not seem to be associated with

any lack of political efficacy or access to government. I ask the pastors this question. “Do

you, as an individual and as a congregation, feel that you have or can have, an impact on

the political process?” Surprisingly, or perhaps unsurprisingly given the current

presidential administration, almost every pastor responded with an immediate yes. They

demonstrated a strong sense of efficacy and trust in the system. Many of them talked about

how they encouraged their congregations to vote or felt they could write their member of

Congress if they needed to express their concerns about something.

I use one pastor from North Carolina as an example of the other pastors. This pastor

said: “We encourage our people to stand for the truth and contact your representatives

contact your senators for any law that's coming up…be a good citizen and be a good

Christian stand for the truth…let's hold our leaders accountable…". He and many others

said they pray for their leaders, vote, and are happy with their level of political participation.

“Our approach is to encourage Christians as individuals to get involved…” This pastor felt

that an evangelical who has impact on the political process was the same as one who has

an impact on any other social section. Someone can try to impact the institution they work

for by urging it to operate with integrity and Biblical values, but any change they might

effect is temporary. Thus, the impact he is more concerned about is glorifying God.

Towards the end of the interview, the same pastor says of impacting government: “I’m

not under illusion of thinking that what we’re trying to do is create a Christian nation with

a Christian government…no I don’t believe that’s what we’re called to do… That’s not

what the government was founded upon...but I think we can glorify God by being salt and

light”. He concludes by saying he thinks Christians can have a “Measured temporary

impact in the political process and it will never be more than that … I think that’s

scripture…”.

This answer is representative of many of the others. Many pastors' answers were shorter

than his, but almost all demonstrated a similar refrain. Some pastors felt that they can have

an impact. Others felt less so, but they all demonstrated a solid sense of external political

efficacy. Their priority was teaching their congregants to love, to be good citizens, to vote

their conscience, and train their children up "in a Godly way." If people do these things,

according to the pastors, they can have an impact. Moreover, their focus tended to be on

the individual. Most of the pastors made it clear they were not interested in holding rallies

or protests, but instead wish to encourage individual congregants to live quiet Godly lives,

love their neighbors, vote and passionately pursue whatever career (government or not)

they are interested in pursuing.

The answers to my question about political efficacy show that it is possible for someone

to feel highly efficacious while also demonstrating a strong sense of marginalization. These

two feelings seem contradictory. How can someone possess a high level of political efficacy

and yet also feel marginalized? I theorize that there are two dimensions of marginalization

at play here: social marginalization and political marginalization. Individuals may feel as

though they have access to government and that they can impact it through their votes and

other forms of participation, yet at the same time feel shunned and marginalized by society.

This is exactly the dynamic these pastors demonstrated.

Some of the pastors articulated a feeling of political displacement. One pastor says, "I

feel like there's really nowhere to go in terms of a side when it comes to being a Christian."

This statement concludes a small rant about how he feel he cannot say he is a conservative

Republican because people will assume he does not have compassion for the poor.

Likewise, he thinks that if he says he is a liberal Democrat, he cannot hold to the exclusivity

of his faith because he would be expected to have compassion for everyone. At this point,

he exasperatedly says, "So, as a whole, politics is a joke. I think it's broken. I don't think

anything is going to change our society but the power of Jesus Christ, so as long as we can

preach I could care less who’s in power and that’s about it”. This pastor clearly

demonstrates a frustration with politics, as if he wishes he could participate more; however,

he feels that, as an evangelical, he does not fit in on either side. Neither side allows him to

fully live out who he is. Also, note that he said he could care less what government officials

are in power “as long as we can preach”; thereby insinuating, if something threatens or

appears to threaten his ability to preach he would care about who is in power. This is

something to keep in mind moving forward.

Notice also that this pastor says he thinks politics is broken and a joke and immediately

transitions to saying he does not think anything can fix society but Jesus Christ. A logical

upshot of his thought here would be that the only thing that can fix or change politics is

Jesus Christ since it was politics that he just stated was broken. This means that he was

thinking in terms of politics being the answer to the ails of society. Many want to look to

government and politicians for a remedy for ails in society. However, this pastor and many

others say that politics and government is not that answer and cannot do anything for

society; therefore, he cares little about politics. There is nothing that politicians can offer

as a cure for what ails society; only Jesus Christ has that cure.

The pastors’ perceptions of marginalization did not necessarily originate from their

identity, but rather from their values: a particular set of Biblical values, or what they

consider “traditional” values. Many of the pastors, when discussing the direction society is

headed, bemoaned a move away from their own Biblical social values or, as one pastor put

it, mores. One pastor from North Carolina said,

Through the centuries…what happens is, the world stays out here and does its thing,

and it comes up with rules and laws and regulations…but through the centuries the

world has started, and the government has started, encroaching into more and more

of the things that the Bible addresses...the more that it starts saying things that are

the opposite of what the Bible says the more Christians are gonna get

concerned…you’re dabbling now in moral things that the Bible addresses and

speaks strongly about and we cannot remain silent…we must stand against things

and preach the truth.

His language sounds more activist than he says he is. He uses the phrase, "stand against

things," but he does not mean through corporate or public displays. He made that point very

clearly later in the conversation. I believe he is referring to a position of standing against

things as an evangelical pastor whose job it is to preach the Gospel.

Most of the pastors do not seem surprised by the downward trend they see in society;

Many of them expect this trend because of the worldview that human nature is depraved

and sinful. However, this belief does not equate to any lack of frustration, sadness, or in

some cases, fear. One pastor says, “My perception is that our society in America is probably

moving, you know, further and further away from Christian beliefs, um, you know that

makes me sad. At the same time, you know, Biblically, I think that we are kinda told that

things will get worse." Another pastor claims that society is moving away from Biblical

principles, while others claim society does not want boundaries, society no longer has any

morals, and society hates authority and absolutes as the North Carolina Southern Baptist

pastor says, “Our society today doesn't want any absolutes, because if there are absolutes,

then that will make somebody wrong… I think that's why people are so adamantly against

the Bible is because there are absolutes”.

Some pastors say that the way they see society going makes them feel more

evangelically missional. They have a job to do and seeing the depravity of society only

stimulates them to more missional activity. One pastor says, “…there's a weight of

responsibility that you feel to help society or to stop that downward flow or just reach any

individual that you possibly can to bring them to a point of salvation from all that." The

sense of mobilization expressed here and by most of the pastors was religious in nature

rather than political. This is somewhat counterintuitive to my expectation that evangelicals,

feeling socially marginalized, are mobilizing politically to express themselves and defend

their values. Even though these pastors are feeling marginalized, the increased

marginalization and concern for society instead makes them feel more spiritually missional.

This standpoint, unsurprisingly, originates from a belief that the only thing that can change

humanity and subsequently society is individual conversion; therefore, no amount of

change in government would be able to cure the root problem.

While all the pastors express a gloomy outlook on society, their faith has built into them

an innate expectation of moral and societal decay. Therefore, they all give a similar

response when discussing how they feel about the way society is trending. One pastor

explains, "I'm not shocked and dismayed when I hear reports of somebody doing this or

that. I don't expect anything to be different because we live in a fallen world and sin is a

terrible thing, and sin devastates people's lives, and if people don't know Christ there's no

telling what they'll do". Others echo a similar sentiment by saying that the Bible says to

follow Christ without fear. The most recently quoted pastor later says, “My hope is not in

this world, so I don't feel fear over all…now I'm not gonna lie to you and not say there's

never an anxious moment. I'm still in my fallen body…so, of course, I have those moments

where I'm tempted to be anxious and fearful, but I've come to a place where those

movements are few and far between." Another pastor more confidently says, "… Jesus is

on the throne, so I don't have any fear, I don't have any anxiety".

Given that pastors are admitting reasons for fear, what is going on in the evangelical

community at large? Presumably, average evangelicals who are not pastors deal with these

emotions and probably do not handle them the same way---which paints the picture of an

unsettled, fearful, stereotyped, repressed, and marginalized group of individuals.

Therefore, if these pastors’ answers are in any way representative of the general population,

it supports my belief that evangelicals are indeed feeling socially marginalized.

Part II: Mobilization?

For the past thirty pages, I presented answers to questions intended to illustrate, albeit

in a small sample, how the evangelical community is feeling. The answers paint a picture

of social marginalization. The descriptions vary, but the overall feeling that emerged from

all the interviewees was one of marginalization and trepidation about the future. The

feelings of marginalization manifested in the following ways: an overall hesitance (in some

cases a disdain) to ascribe to the evangelical label; a feeling of being stereotyped; feelings

a martyrdom and prejudice because of their “old or outdated” values; a defensive need to

explain or defend oneself; expectations of eventual persecution; personal experiences of

prejudice; and finally, an overall gloomy outlook for the future of the society and

Christianity in society. They also displayed a sense of repressed frustration with society

and the way they feel their values have been stereotyped. They universally expressed

concern and frustration with government, but usually in the broader context of society. In

other words, they seemed to believe that the problems they see in government are just a

reflection and result of corruption in society.

The social constructionist approach to collective mobilization posits that emotion is an

important variable needed for collective mobilization (Jasper 1998; 2011; Snow and

Benford 1988; 1992; see also Goodwin, Polletta, and Jasper 2001). Mobilization is “the

deliberate activation of social networks as a method of diffusing awareness about a social

or political problem or of exerting social and/or political pressure for its resolution”

(Theocharis 2015, 5). Based on this definition, and based on the theory that marginalization

is an important pre-condition for mobilization, I expect to find these pastors mobilizing, at

least to some extent, to combat the social problems they see in society. Further, I would

expect to find their congregations mobilizing, as mobilization is the deliberate activation

of social networks (Harris 1994). A pastor’s most immediate social network is his

congregation, which sometimes reflects and participates in the political or social activities

a clergyperson promotes (Crawford and Olson 2001; Djupe and Gilbert 2008). I also expect

to see individual mobilization among clergy; specifically, individual public expressions

against the social values they feel are unrepresentative of their faith. Many pastors said

things like, "we must take a stand," implying some kind of individual or collective

expression.

There is a story to tell here. I interviewed a group of people who, for the most part, all

shared a sense of social marginalization because of their beliefs and values. How strongly

this marginalization was felt varied; however, even across states, regions, and races, social

marginalization was present. I detail how they respond to this feeling in this next section.

I attempt to answer the “mobilization” portion of my theory with the second half of my

interview questions. I devote this next section to answering this question: how, if at all, are

the pastors responding individually and/or collectively with their congregation to these

feelings of social marginalization.

A comment one pastor made about mobilization works to tie together many of the

pastors’ attitudes about political activity, social activity, and feelings about Donald Trump.

This pastor, who is from South Carolina, said of all these external actions and activities,

“You know, those things amount to nothing more than rearranging the deck chairs on the

Titanic." The message here is clear: American society and government are the Titanic,

headed towards imminent destruction. Sure, being politically or socially active may help a

few temporal things, but in the end, those activities amount to nothing more than putting

Band-Aids on a lethal gash. They may slow the bleeding, but they cannot prevent the death.

The pastors’ recurrent concerns were much more “eternal” than temporal; therefore, doing

something individually to see people come to know Christ one at a time was far more

beneficial and effective than any external political or social activity.

Donald Trump

How important is politics and government to these evangelical pastors? I asked a

question about Donald Trump to get a clearer picture of the evangelical sentiment and

thoughts about Donald Trump. This is relevant for a few reasons. First, 81% of white

bornagain/evangelical Christians voted for Trump (Smith and Martinez 2016). This is a

staggering percentage and one that scholars are still struggling to fully grasp and begin to

understand. It is also important because the pastors' satisfaction with this administration

sheds light on feelings of political efficacy. Also, this question helps shed light on how

important these pastors think government and government officials are. Are these pastors'

worldviews in any way shaped or affected by who is in political office? Finally, it is

important because it can help us understand more clearly what the draw to Donald Trump

was. As certain pieces of literature say, Donald Trump's "us" versus "them" rhetoric

appeared to strike a chord with white evangelicals, given the demographic changes

happening within evangelicals themselves (Wong 2018a; 2018b).

My interview question is: Has Donald Trump’s election or his presidency so far had

any effect on your answers to my previous questions? The answers varied, but most of the

pastors said no. Indeed, many of the pastors seemed almost eerily aloof toward the specifics

of American electoral politics. The attitudes towards Donald Trump and other political

officeholders was one of willingness to pray for whoever is in office, but disengagement

from – almost disinterest in – who actually is in office.

One pastor says, "I don't think anything is going to change our society but the gospel

of Jesus Christ, so long as we can preach that, I could care less who is in power and that is

about it." Another pastor, the African American from South Carolina, said, “whether you

like the guy or not, whether he believes what you believe or not, our response should be

the same, we should just pray for them…". Another pastor said, "I vote and certainly have

a desire that a certain kind of person be elected, but if they aren't in any given election I

don't lose sleep… if Hillary Clinton had won the election, I would have answered those

questions the same way". Most of the other pastors answered in a similar fashion, with a

similar reasoning. Candidates, elected officials, and Supreme Court Justices are far less

important than eternal issues.

Earlier in the interview, the African American pastor from South Carolina talked about

how important it is for him and for all Christians to always wave their Christian banner

higher than all other banners. He says everyone has multiple banners; he personally has

banners for basketball, for being Black, for being a Democrat, and for being a believer in

Christ. Without knowing it, he is listing elements of his social identities. He stresses that

no single component of identity, or in his words, no banner, should ever be waved higher

than the banner of Christ. He expressed frustration with believers he has seen who wave

their political or racial banners higher than that of Christ. He says:

...You know there's nothing wrong with being a Democrat or Republican. It doesn't

matter whether you like Obama or you like Trump, that’s fine, but like, none of that

is more important than your relationship with Christ and that you represent more

avidly that than you represent anything else. I've even caught slack about not

waving my Black banner high enough but I'm not gonna alienate other people ...

the only banner that I have that I want you to look at and be jealous because you

may not believe what I believe is that of Christ, and if you look at my Black banner

and you're not Black you can't be Black. I’ve just condemned you for no reason or

made you feel condemned for no reason, but if you look at my Christian banner and

you feel Godly sorrow and think, man, I don't know the Lord, and I see how he

does, and I want to know the Lord, then that's great, then let's talk about it in love

and I can introduce you to Him! To wave anything higher than that, I’m not gonna

do that.

These pastors identify with their evangelical Christianity decidedly and completely. It is

not just a way of life or a list of rules or principles to follow; it is who they are. This hearkens

back to my claim that an attack on evangelical Christian values is perceived by evangelicals

as an attack on them personally because of how strongly they identify with their religious

identity. This Black pastor knows and understands the significance of his race and even

admits that he has been accused of not prioritizing his race above other banners yet his race

is not what he claims is most important for him to promote about himself. His answer

illustrates just how unconcerned some of these pastors really are with politics, especially

since racial identity is so politically charged in American culture. They say they acquiesce

to whoever is in office because eternally, politics is not the answer to the problems they

perceive in society. All that truly matters is that individuals meet Christ. A few pastors

seemed to find a silver lining in the Trump presidency. One pastor says:

[My] hope would be just to stay off the downward motion of these moral issues...be

it deterioration of the original traditional definition of the family … a stronger voice

in the White House against (abortion)… just there would be more of a traditionally

wholesome environment along the lines of morality... you see America going down

the tubes, slouching towards Sodom...you then would see a conservative president

who would veto certain legislation that might tolerate more, you just see that as

more hopeful than someone in the White house who purposefully wants everything

to go in a downward... a more liberal direction... so I think that's the hope... America

could remain as a good wholesome family culture than what seems to be trending at

this point.

Some religion and politics scholars (Hunter 1992; Jelen 1993a; 1993b; Smith et al. 1998;

Wilcox and Robinson 2010) would expect to hear an answer more along these lines from a

traditionally religious white evangelical. However, this pastor still did not put much stock

in Donald Trump’s victory. Perhaps it provides a reprieve of sorts from political liberalism,

but it is still temporal. The result of the 2016 presidential election is still a chair on the deck

of the Titanic. This same pastor said,

Yes, it has. I think that one of the biggest things that he actually said on the

campaign trail…he said that…evangelical Christians are the most persecuted group

of people in the United States right now. That tells me that he has seen that based

on what is taking place and what is going on.

This pastor, like many evangelical Trump supporters, appreciated being recognized having

someone in power who he sees as being on his side. He went on to say he is not sure where

Trump stands spiritually but perhaps that does not matter because society, in his view, has

become blatantly anti-Christian that even non-Christians notice. He proceeded to discuss

some of the specific policy priorities he appreciates from the Trump administration as well

as his sense that Trump has kept his word and is trying to make good on enacting his

campaign promises. He criticized Trump for the way he says things and explains that he

wishes Trump would express himself differently. However, he still appreciates what he says

even if he has a problem with how he says it.

Unsurprisingly, one of the African American pastors, the one who does not identify as

evangelical, was one of the few to say Trump’s election and presidency have affected his

answers to my previous questions in a negative way. He said,

Yes, it has. His mannerisms, misunderstanding that as a leader you have the power

to influence…the things that he says and does, whether he’s aware of it or not,

influences others to walk in light or to walk in darkness…darkness is racism,

sexism, any injustice…it’s denial of things that are not as they really are.

After this comment, he said little more about Trump or his presidency; however, he did talk

more about the “darkness” he used in reference to Trump’s presidency and what it means

to him. It is interesting that the two African American pastors who did identify as

evangelical said the Trump election had no or little influence on their previous answers,

while the one African American pastor who did not identify as an evangelical did say the

Trump election affected his answers. The African American pastor from Rochester said,

No, he's just another president. No, not at all. No, he hasn't had any effect on any

of those answers. If our worldview is shaped by the world, then every change that

comes about in the world, our views change, but if our views are shaped by

scripture…the way I look at the world doesn't change. Every leader is actually put

in place by God for His own purpose. God put them in place for His own purpose.

I just bow to His sovereignty. Whoever's in charge I obey the governing authority.

I don't bad mouth them. I pray for them because that's what the Bible says we're

supposed to do. So, my view doesn't change because the Bible doesn't change. If

my worldview came from CNN or Fox News, then my view would be constantly

changing.

The African American pastor from South Carolina said he thinks the political and social

division in the U.S. have gotten worse since Trump’s election. He believes some of the

things Trump has said have instigated more division. However, this pastor moderated his

response with the following statement: "…so I would say it has affected some of these

things that we've talked about today, but those things were already happening." He seems

to be saying Trump’s presidency has not helped anything and in some cases, has

exacerbated the problems and issues that were already there.

Answers to the Trump question were more varied than many of the other answers though

most pastors seemed unaffected by the Trump presidency. My sample is admittedly small

and may not be representative of the evangelical population at large. Further, since I only

interviewed clergy, it is possible that evangelicals in the pews think and feel differently

about Donald Trump.

Marginalization to Mobilization?

Thus far, we have seen that many of the evangelical pastors demonstrated indifference to

the Trump election, and we know they possess a sense of social marginalization; however,

what I have yet to show is their response to this perceived social marginalization. Are they

responding with action, and if so in what ways? Have they changed their political tactics at

all over the past few years because of this perceived social marginalization? Are they

mobilizing in any way?

The short answer to all of these questions is no. They are not responding socially or

politically nor have they changed their political tactics in recent years (primarily because

most of them admittedly have no political tactics). Save for one evangelical pastor, the

North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor, the only two pastors who indicated they were

politically active were the two pastors who did not identify as evangelical.

A few quotations summarize this narrative about mobilization. One pastor says, “We

express ourselves politically only through voting and as a congregation, you know, praying

and living our lives in light of the truth that we believe…”. Another says, “I would say

probably we are as engaged in the quiet side of society as best we can… some people go to

town board meetings or school board meetings and voice their opinion…”. In the words of

another, “We don’t. We don’t. We’re very, very intentional not to ever bring that into the

picture”. With the metaphor of the chairs on the Titanic still in place, another analogy from

the African American pastor from South Carolina is instructive. He says,

The Bible talks about…the fiery darts of the enemy…in those days, …the thought

was that you had the arrow…you shoot it, and there's this little point that's on fire,

and the thought was that this little small point that is on fire would hit the target and

it would only hit a very small space on the target but …the idea was to catch the

whole thing on fire through hitting a point... the goal wasn't to catch that point on

fire it's to catch the whole thing on fire...and so we believe as far as acting politically

and those things... what we're doing in regards to promoting Christ and drawing

people to God and encouraging community… getting people to have a responsible

relationship with God …we believe if we are accurate and are able to, through the

Holy Spirit, hit that, well, then, the change that that would incite would, like a fire,

spread to politics... does that make sense? …So we want to, it's not that we don’t

care about politics, but it's our method, we're not trying to hit politics, you

know?...and so we just have a different method as far as causing the change.

For him, as with many other pastors, politics is not the priority. Changing politics is not a

bad thing. Though many of pastors would like to see government operate in a certain way,

it is only temporal. The eternal things are what matter. So, if the church can create change

in individual lives, this change eventually will spread and affect things across sectors,

including politics and government. Another African American pastor says, “Politically I

mean we vote. We don't make any tremendous effort to be political, you know, we're called

to be Biblical." Earlier in the conversation, he spoke about why he and his congregation are

not concerned about political or social involvement. Much of what he says is just a different

version of the fiery darts analogy. His quote is key to understanding the perspective

presented by these pastors. It is an excellent proxy for how many of the pastors regard

political and, to an extent, social involvement. He says,

The scripture is very clear that the gospel is offensive to man...and we have to accept

that. …The message we bring is offensive because the message we bring tells man of

his complete inability to save himself, it tells him of his desperate self, it tells him that

there's nothing he can do in himself to repair that condition and that his only hope is in

the mercy and grace of God to save him through the sacrifice of another and that's an

offensive message to the pride of man. But if the church tries to mask the message with

social activism or getting involved too much in political things and those types of

things, then we lose the one thing that the world truly needs…no one else has the

gospel. Only the church has the gospel...there are tons of agencies that can provide food

for people...clothing...shelter…but nobody else can do what the church can do; the

church can bring the gospel of Jesus Christ to the world which is the only remedy for

man's condition.

This is what the pastors believe sets them apart. Spreading the Gospel is their primary

mission. Though political and social change might be nice, it simply amounts to rearranging

chairs on the deck of the Titanic. Further, by preaching the Gospel and reaching people

individually, it is plausible that these individual changes may indeed spread.

Social and Political Mobilization

With this “not of this world” point of departure worldview as a backdrop, let us now

consider, “How, if at all, do you and your congregation express yourselves politically and

socially?” One pastor says, “…Just being the, um I guess you could use the word ‘best’

Christian you can be...to be the nicest, kindest, most forgiving grace-filled person out in

the community doing ministry and to have an impact on the world primarily that way".

Another says, "So politically none, I have no interest in that. Again, we're a young church;

we want Rochester to be different because we're here. So socially, not marching in a rally

but socially filling needs that need to be met, we want to do that, so that's how we're gonna

make a difference in that sense.”

A pastor from South Carolina says, “Well, again, by voting…by encouraging one

another...we do discuss political things...bolster and encourage one another, anyway that

could trickle down to other family members, friends…”. He proceeds to say that one of the

ways his church is politically and socially involved is through social media. Specifically,

he says, “Social media, that comes to mind, expressing ideas on social media... um, just

things like that, sharing about who you are with anybody you can by whatever means...”.

While only he and one other pastor mentioned social media before I later asked about

Twitter, this form of expression is the exact form I have predicted evangelicals would use.

It is a highly individualistic form of expression and one that scholars (Theocharis 2015)

have begun to consider a viable form of mobilization.

As I explain the answers to my interview questions about Twitter and boycotting, it will

become clear that neither avenue is something the pastors commonly use. However, a few

of them do mention that their congregations use social media and that they sometimes must

confront congregants for engaging in visceral political conversations on social media.

While pastors and religious leaders may not be highly active on Twitter (or at least active

around political topics) their congregants, not being held to the same standards, are more

willing to engage on Twitter.

The pastors answered the mobilization questions by focusing primarily on the role of

the individual. Ergo, these pastors were not interested in getting the church involved in

anything collectively as a congregation but were fine with individual members choosing to

be as active or inactive socially and politically as they chose to be. These answers are not

surprising given other scholars' similar findings (Emerson and Smith 2000; Jelen 1993a;

Smith et al. 1998).

The pastors who did not identify as evangelical had similar responses. They were

neither highly active themselves, nor did they promote collective action. The pastor of the

Moravian church said, "Well we are a voting place. Right here where we're sitting now, so

we support the political process…is to be supportive of the process but not come to the

point where we say we're going to shoot you if you are of a different political persuasion.”

The African American pastor who also did not identify with evangelicalism said, “we bring

people in from all spectrums...you choose…go by what you feel. We don’t let them get in

the pulpit…we feel that if you let someone who has a certain affiliation get in the pulpit

what you’re saying is this is what I endorse…”. These two pastors demonstrate a similar

refrain. They utilized traditional political participation as their means of mobilization, and

feel that politics and the church should be kept separate.

One evangelical, the North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor, did say he was mobilizing

in response to his sense of social marginalization. He also organizes congregational

mobilization. Most of the mobilization he is involved in is traditional, like voting for a bill

or a member of Congress as opposed to boycotting or Twitter venting, however. He said:

“I am not the guy who necessarily wants to preach a political agenda from the pulpit

because that’s where the gospel is to be preached.” However, he proceeded to say that he

led his congregation to support and promote North Carolina’s well-known Amendment

One, which defined marriage as being between one man and one woman. He said, "as a

pastor, I did lead us getting behind approval of Amendment One. We put signs out. We went

on record as saying we are supportive of Amendment One." He was the most politically

active pastor I interviewed. He did, however, stress the importance of not treating the pulpit

as a place for politicking but rather a place for preaching the Gospel and allowing the Holy

Spirit to direct how the spiritual turns into the political. His answer was an aberration from

the other evangelical answers and fell more in line with how the two mainline Protestant

(non-evangelicals) responded. His activism is the only real aberration from the

individuality espoused by the rest of the pastors.

Earlier in the interview, during his answer to the question “how does this [direction he

sees society and politics going] make you feel?" the North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor

explained that he was less concerned about causing actual change as much as simply

expressing his opinion and the opinions of the religious community to his local town

council. He gave this example after explaining that he believes no real change in society

can come until a majority speak up, but that does not stop him from still trying to

individually mobilize even if it does not always make a difference. He said:

I’m just gonna give you an example. In this particular community, there was a vote

here recently about whether or not to allow businesses to serve liquor two hours

earlier, and essentially, I wrote, … to not make that change, and I know people are

going to do what they’re going to do…but I said you know what, it’s a good tip of

the hat to say, ‘you know we still respect Christianity and we still respect religion

in our community not to make that change.' And I said we’re only talking about a

two-hour difference, but to take a stand and say that we’re gonna at least

acknowledge our community of religion…just give us the honor of leaving it like

it is to say that this is something that is still important. And once again it fell on

deaf ears, but nonetheless, I still did what I felt like I had to do…I also felt like I

would be doing a discredit and a disservice to my God to not at least express my

opinion in regard to that. …It didn't turn me against any of the town council, and

we still have a great relationship to this day, and my thing was I simply expressed

my opinion based on my beliefs on that regard.

This observation perfectly exemplifies the social marginalization I expected to observe

among evangelical pastors: the desire for society to still “respect” and give “honor” to

religious values and traditions. In his own words, this pastor wants government to at least

give a “tip of the hat” to Christianity. Many evangelicals have felt betrayed by social change

since at least the 1960s (Wilcox and Robinson 2010). The language he uses here originates

from a feeling that society and government no longer respects or values his religion.

Further, the importance of mere expression is confirmed in this example. All this pastor

hoped to do was, at the very least, express his opinion, even if he knew it was not popularly

accepted anymore. Further, his expression was less about any particular issue as it was

about the respect and honor of Christianity he felt was missing.

Quite a few of the pastors espoused the “vote your conscience” message. They were

not in favor of collective congregational politicking even though they were all in favor of

being good citizens. They were happy to vote, write members of Congress if or when

necessary, or hand out political pamphlets; however, they would not want any of these

activities to be turned into a congregational activity. They would rarely, if ever, even

suggest that the congregation should all vote for a particular candidate (of course, doing so

could cost their church its tax-exempt status) or participate in a church protest. One pastor

said, “what I tell them to do is vote according to their conscience and their world view…and

we have also created the climate here, do not judge somebody else because they have

concluded that they need to vote a certain way based on certain issues."

Many of the pastors supported and promoted social activity as a congregation. Social

outreach, in the form of benevolence to people who struggle, is a part of the church’s calling

even if it only temporal. Evangelicals believe God calls the church to meet temporal needs

as a means of spreading the Gospel.

Political Tactics

The next question I asked was “How have you changed your political tactics over the

past few years?” I asked this question to see whether the pastors might be increasing or

changing their political tactics because of my theory of social marginalization. As I explain

in my theory, extra-institutional forms of political participation can tell us a whole lot about

if and how evangelicals are feeling aggrieved. However, most answers went something like

this: “Well I don’t really have any tactics…so no. I’ve gone from nothing to nothing”.

Many of the pastors had no tactics, or if they did, they had gotten less active in their tactics.

One pastor says that he has not changed his tactics and that he has felt “this” way for a long

time. I asked him to clarify what he meant by this, and he said, “…that the answer, the

solution is not politically” changing things. Again, we see the focus on spiritual conversion

at the individual level as the pastors’ top priority.

The African American pastor from Rochester chuckled and said, "I don't have any

political tactics. Again, for me, it's business as usual. God raises up one, and he sets down

another." He then mentioned Nero and the persecution Nero wrought on Christians in the

Roman Empire during the Apostle Paul’s time of ministry. Yet, Paul still encouraged

Christians to submit, honor and pray for those in authority. Further, this pastor argues that

Paul’s views were not shaped by who was in power but by the throne of God, so "it's

important for me to maintain that as well."

There was one evangelical pastor from South Carolina who expressed excitement about

politics, especially with growth of political activities at the state and local level. He was

not hopeful about the federal government but was excited about political opportunities

locally. In context, he had changed his tactics. He had gone from being cynical about

politics to perceiving strategic openings at the local level. Here he clarifies that his church

does not engage in politics congregationally, but he personally has developed enthusiasm

recently because of some matters he was privy to at the local political level. He says, "I see

things like that [a member of his church running for local government office] I get

excited… in that sense, I've become more involved in the process … again we don't have

signs…". He explains he has increased his political involvement at the local level, but he

clarifies that is not involved in alternative forms of political expression such as boycotting

or Twitter venting.

The African American pastor from South Carolina said that he has changed his tactics

since becoming a pastor. He used another analogy to describe this circumstance. He says,

“There’s a certain way that you drive when you’re by yourself…You drive differently when

there’s people behind you…much more deliberate, much more methodical”. He said that

his activity has neither increased nor changed, but that he puts a lot more thought into what

he does say politically and how he votes because he now has a congregation to shepherd

and lead.

Another pastor from South Carolina said that he has not changed nor has his

congregation; instead, where he sees change is in the Democratic Party. He says,

The Democratic party has changed. At one time, they were a good party especially

down South here...they really were for the blue collar they were for the

worker...They wanted to look out for the little guy…but now the national Democrat

party...the past 30 years maybe has been on decline because they have been hijacked

by special interest groups that are the elite of our society…any party that promotes

abortion on demand and promotes homosexual marriage, I can't stand behind that,

it's not good for society.

I asked this pastor whether he has changed his political tactics recently and he explained

how the Democratic Party has changed their tactics. This tells me little about his tactics,

but it does give me an idea of his political opinions and indicates clearly where he stands

in the context of polarized American politics.

Another, the pastor of a Pentecostal church, said something I found particularly

noteworthy. He said that neither he nor his congregation have not made any changes other

than becoming more involved in social media. He says, “I can’t say I’ve changed unless it

would be just the new use of social media…I think that's another outlet or it’s another

means of expressing your view or sharing ideas, many of which could be political...I think

that might help get beyond your little sphere”. As I suggest above, he was the only pastor

to mention social media as a form of activism. This fits my theoretical expectation that

social media provides an ideal avenue for individual expression. It is an avenue that

previously did not exist, but now provides an outlet for evangelicals to mobilize without

having to physically “rally” or “protest” collectively.

The African American pastor in North Carolina who did not identify as evangelical was

very politically engaged. He described his time politically campaigning for President

Obama,

I get involved…I definitely get involved. I go to voter registration handouts…I did

it years ago when a certain individual was running for office… he was Republican.

I recently did it with President Obama…it was a voter’s registration volunteering

center, where people came and you…I thought he was gonna bring some change…I

felt that he was competent and capable. I felt that it was time for American possibly

to have someone of color in that position…it was fun. Everybody was excited, and

it was fun…there was no Black no white…it was a sense of the human race having

one objective...It’s [his political tactics] changed a little bit. It’s not like it was…

you know, with the family.

He mobilized during the Obama campaign, as well as for other campaigns in the past. This

is noteworthy because the pastors who identified as evangelical did not report being active

at all, other than voting.

Boycotting

After hearing broadly how each pastor acts politically and socially, I asked each pastor

specifically what they think about using boycotting and Twitter as a means of social or

political expression. The questions were worded as such: “Do you see boycotting (Twitter)

as an appropriate outlet for establishing political positions and/or expressing your feelings

about today’s society?” In sum, ten pastors said yes, boycotting can be useful, while three

said it cannot. Nine pastors said yes to the use of Twitter while four said no.

Figure 4.1 Is Boycotting or Twitter an Appropriate Form of Expression?

Each pastor offered different reasons for their answers. Most of them were not personally

engaged in either activity but spoke more generally about whether these activities were

useful ways to express frustrations with the current social or political environment.

The North Carolina Southern Baptist pastor said that boycotting can be useful

sometimes and in specific circumstances. He stressed the importance of being consistent

with oneself choosing to boycott. He gave an example, “I’m not a proponent of drinking, I

think that hurts your testimony but yet I still go to the grocery store and buy groceries, so

does that mean that if I buy a roast up at Lowes grocery store that I am supporting their

cause of selling alcohol?” He then said, “I’ve never actually stood up [in the pulpit] and

said we should boycott this.” He seemed fine with the idea of someone choosing on their

own to boycott but, he explains, they must be careful that they are consistent and not

hypocritical in their actions. He explains that many companies support or sell things that

someone may not appreciate or be against; the question then is, are they going to boycott

them all? He says that people must be careful in what they choose to make an issue and

boycott. He says, “You have to take each instance along the way and determine whether

that cause is really going to bring about an incredible amount of change to start with and I

think that if hypocrisy comes into play, then it's defeated…society will see right through

this." He ends by establishing that he has never done anything collectively in terms of

boycotting; however, he feels that if he sees a situation is bad enough or blatant enough, he

might consider it.

A North Carolina pastor gives a different explanation for individual boycotts versus

collective boycotts. He believes that boycotting is appropriate if it is used at the individual

level. He proceeds to explain a passage in the Bible from Romans 14. He explains how

Romans 14 defines the conscience, as well as the importance of individuals not violating

their personal conscience. He says,

…if you, before God, believe that it is offensive to you to use a certain cell phone

company because that cell phone company uses some of their money to support

Planned Parenthood then if that violates your conscience then I think you should

not violate your conscience.

If an individual feels their conscience is violated by patronizing a company with values

they dislike, then he believes avoiding that company is essential. However, he did not seem

to interpret this question with a political slant. If someone wants to boycott because they

cannot in good conscience spend money at some company, then so be it; however, this has

nothing to do with making a political statement or expressing oneself politically. He later

says of collective boycotting,

Would we as a church ever do some sort of corporate public…encourage our people

to boycott some sort of company? I'm not going to say never...I won't say never.

We might get backed into a corner, the way our culture is going, we might get

backed into a corner where it is so clear and so obvious, ‘listen guys we have got

to altogether make a stand here.' I think we would. I don't know of one …. A

corporate boycott maybe? Kinda where we are politically, the way that the world is

going I'm not gonna say that it would never come to a point that we believe as

pastors should not get up and say something publicly.

This specific pastor was perhaps one of the most individually oriented, least politically

concerned, most spiritually-minded of the pastors I interviewed. He could not care less who

holds political office and feels that all social and political activities are only important or

relevant in the temporal context.

Earlier in the interviews when we were talking about what his church does politically

and socially, he repeatedly expressed the importance of not taking collective action and

making sure instead that the church maintains respect for people who share or hold different

political positions or opinions. At one point he said, “…what we don’t do as a church is

take corporate stands or corporate actions like protests or things like that…we do not see

that as the role of the church to do…we don’t get involved as a church in trying to lobby

government.” He also invoked the importance of respecting individual’s conscience

and reason for voting the way they do.

However, in response to my question about boycotting, he admits there may come a

time when he would feel the need to do something corporately as a church to stand against

something blatant, something with which they so blatantly disagree that it must be publicly

addressed. Again, take note that he is still not evoking a political stance but rather a spiritual

and almost collective conscience. He uses more than once the phrase “the way our culture

is going” as the reason that he feels a collective response may eventually be evoked. This

idea of an eroding culture alludes to the idea that, while actions like boycotting are only

temporal and not really the focus of many evangelical congregations, expressive

mobilization such as boycotting and Twitter venting may one day be seen as necessary.

This means he believes society is getting so depraved that there may come a point when

even he would feel the need to take a public stand against it. This is key to my theory. Can

these spiritually minded evangelical pastors be pushed far enough that they eventually snap

into action, or were they ones that did snap into action during the 1980s and 1990s with the

emergence of the Religious Right? Portions of the evangelical population have become

politically active in response to certain events in society such as prohibition, abortion, and

prayer in schools; however, rarely does the literature speak to the percentage of the

evangelical base that was activated. Are these pastors part of the population that was

mobilized or are they still maintaining a sense of “separation” from society and politics?

If this pastor says, he may be willing to make a collective congregational stance on a

social or political matter, after demonstrating high levels of perceived marginalization,

what then might this mean for the average evangelical churchgoer? Presumably, it would

take more to push a pastor of his mindset to mobilize than it would to push an average

evangelical churchgoer into public action. Therefore, if an average evangelical churchgoer

feels the social marginalization these pastors display, the churchgoer is might be more

likely to have already been pushed to their limit (see Djupe and Gilbert 2002, 2003 and

2008 for more on the relationship between clergy and parishioners).

One of the Rochester pastors says that my boycotting question cannot be answered with

either a yes or a no. He then gives personal examples of boycotting companies as a younger

man. He boycotted because of clear racism and prejudice demonstrated by the companies.

However, he said he would never organize a boycott of Target (as some evangelicals have

done as a result of the transgender bathroom policy). He says of that type of boycott,

Ok, you can do that if you want, that, to me, is an irrelevant way of dealing with

that particular issue. But that doesn’t mean that boycotting of itself is the wrong

thing to do … so the answer? I think under certain circumstances that [boycotting]

would be appropriate. Are there places I don’t shop or won’t invest because of their

policies? Sure, but it’s a boycott of one.

Here he demonstrates a striking contradiction. Earlier in the conversation he talks of

boycotting companies that were clearly racist and seems to argue that this type of

boycotting is useful and the kind he would support. However, he would not organize a

corporate boycott against Target because he feels it would be an irrelevant means of dealing

with the issue. He ends by saying that boycotting is fine, individually, but it cannot do a

whole lot when it is a boycott of one. This is curious. On one hand, he says that his personal

boycotts at a young age were relevant to the issue, but does not see the relevance of

organizing a collective boycott. Yet, he ends by criticizing individual boycotting because it

is not effective. I interpret this progression of thought as his way of saying the same thing

the pastor above said: individuals can boycott because of personal conviction, but it really

has little ability to influence or promote change.

The African American pastor from Rochester said boycotting was not a useful tactic.

He says, “I am certain as a Christian that I have far more influence on my knees than I do

in boycotting." At first, he did not seem to be strongly against boycotting but rather saw it

as something trivial in the larger scheme of things. However, the more he talked about it,

the more he seemed to dislike it. He said,

You know that I don't know that I would want to...there are people that work there and

those people are counting on a paycheck at the end of the week to feed their families...if

I'm hurting that company at some point I'm gonna be hurting those people because that

company's gonna start laying people off...people are gonna start losing their jobs...I'm

not really interested in hurting people...so I'd rather pray and ask God to affect those

changes.

He believes that if all he is trying to do is make a political point or social statement by

boycotting a business, his actions could affect the people who work there and who have

nothing to do with the political or social stances the company has taken. Therefore, in his

mind, he would rather leave these changes to God and not get involved. His reasoning has

little to do with politics or mobilization or marginalization. His convictions and concern

for people’s wellbeing simply are more important to him than any political or social

statement. He did not seem to think about some of the angles other pastors had mentioned

such as violating one’s conscience by buying from a company due to questionable moral

stances. His mind was focused on the individual people around him whom his actions

would affect, and that was all that really seemed to matter to him.

Further, this Rochester African American pastor did not seem to think much about or even

consider the role that boycotting played for African Americans during the Civil Rights

movement. The African American pastors in South and North Carolina showed a clear

appreciation for the use of boycotts. Perhaps then, this lack of acknowledgment is simply

due to the fact that he lives in the North. Or perhaps his worldview is so shaped and molded

by his faith that he only sees two types of people in the world (as he said during our

conversation), those going down the broad path to destruction and those on the narrow path

to eternal life.

This particular Black pastor did not really conform to the generally accepted

understanding of what a Black Protestant should be like. Unsurprisingly, he possessed a

strong understanding of the tenets of evangelicalism, but surprisingly he demonstrated

feelings of marginalization similar to what the white evangelicals demonstrated. On his

survey, this pastor identified himself as Republican. Research would stipulate that this

pastor is simply an aberration.

Harris (1994) and Fowler et al. (2013) admit that there was a sizable portion of Black

pastors during the Civil Rights Era who did not want to involve themselves in political or

social activism. In fact, there were some pastors, such as Rev. Joseph H. Jackson, who

opposed the social action of the Civil Rights Era (Fowler et al. 2013). In fact, Day (2012),

explains that the majority of Black churches did not support the social and political

involvement of the church during the Civil Rights Era. These churches opposed such action

for both theological and social reasons. Day points out that theological beliefs of churches

such as the Church of God in Christ “interpreted justice issues as issues that would

ultimately be resolved by God in the coming eschaton” (2012, 8). Hence, there has been

similar theological motivations for political indifference between some white and Black

evangelical churches. This is not to say that the Black churches who stayed out of the social

and political realm because of social, political, institutional threat are similar to white

churches. Rather, it is simply important to note that where the theologies between the two

churches lined up, their political and social actions did as well.

Which leads to the question. Are there African American pastors who, like this pastor

from Rochester, still ascribe to the theological convictions of the latent Black churches

during the Civil Rights Era? If so, how can we uncover who these pastors and members

are? Thus far, the literature has predominately accepted the notion that Black Protestants

and white evangelicals should be categorized in two separate groups, and yet I contend that

there may be a small, yet important, overlap in the middle somewhere. I cannot, of course,

draw any conclusions from the data provided in this dissertation that could speak to or

answer this question but I am able to bring light to a new area of research.

In short, I found that the two African American pastors that demonstrated the closest

theological convictions to the white pastors also shared many of their political and social

convictions as well. Are there theological beliefs that transcend the historical and racial

components that have shaped religion for both Blacks and whites? In other words, are

issues of social justice, that seem to be missing from the list of concerns for most white

evangelical pastors, also affected by differing theological beliefs and not just racial

experience? If so, does this mean that Black Protestants who happen to share these

theological beliefs are somehow less concerned about social justice as well, despite their

racial experience? Or are white evangelicals simply harboring racial prejudice, which keeps

them from supporting policies that Blacks tend to support?

Previous research has convincingly shown that race and religion cannot be

distinguished from each other (Emerson and Smith 2000; Lincoln and Mamiya 1990). If

this were unequivocally true, I should have found evangelical Black pastors who

demonstrated a very different understanding of the church’s political and social

involvement, and strong sense of community within their own church and their own race.

Instead, I found the opposite of most of these expectations. The one African American

pastor who did not identify as evangelical, fulfilled my predicted answers and yet his beliefs

aligned more clearly with the beliefs of the one mainstream Protestant in my interviews.

Hence, the differences appeared to stem less from race and more from the fundamentals of

faith. These interviews show that evangelical African American pastors and white pastors

shared many similar concerns, specifically that of individual conversion and personal

outreach. Future research is required to better understand all the nuances that exist in the

evangelical population, specifically regarding race. Though some work has been done on

evangelicals and race, I believe this area of research nonetheless merits more attention and

care.

Twitter

Social media activity has evolved into a new form of political expression. Scholars now

agree that social media activism is indeed political activity (Oser, Hooghe, and Marien

2013; Feezell 2016; McCosker 2015; Theocharis 2015; Sormanen and Dutton 2015). If an

individual chooses to go online and express themselves—their feelings and thoughts about

a political/social issue in a public forum—they establish themselves as uniquely different

from someone who does not put the same time and effort into expressing those feelings or

thoughts publicly. Social media activity is a form of mobilization (Theocharis 2015) and

therefore should be treated as such. I choose Twitter to analyze evangelical political

expression because it is both a form of political mobilization and a highly individualistic

activity. Given evangelicals’ individualistic tendencies (Emerson and Smith 2000), Twitter

is an ideal form for political expression.

Of the thirteen pastors interviewed, four felt Twitter was not an appropriate means for

expressing one’s thoughts and feelings about society and politics. The other nine offered

various reasons for feeling Twitter was appropriate. Only the African American pastor in

North Carolina who did not identify as evangelical, explicitly said he had a personal Twitter

account.

In response to the question about Twitter, one pastor said, "Sure yeah…I think it's a

great way to make your thoughts known… Twitter's not really meant for conversations it's

meant for statements. I think as a pastor I wouldn't have a problem posting something

politically, but I can't remember the last time I have, just because I just want to stay out of

the mess.” The “mess” he references, is the stereotyping that often occurs when making a

simple statement online. He expresses his frustration with the division and polarization he

personally experiences. It is for this reason he does not engage in politicking on Twitter.

If I say “Wow, look, Trump did something I really like!” … all the sudden, where’s

your MAGA hat? If I say "Man, Trump, you're a bonehead cuz you did this!"…all

the sudden I'm a flaming liberal. You just can't even have opinions. It's frustrating.

It's an appropriate way to express things; I just wish I was more witty and snarky

so I could have better opinions.

This pastor demonstrated a longing or desire to be able to express things via Twitter.

However, because of the vitriol, he perceives in society and the stereotypes he expects, he

avoids the situation altogether.

The African American pastor who did not identify as evangelical said, “Oh yeah. It’s

part of the culture we live in today. I believe if Jesus was living today, and Peter and Paul,

they’d be on Twitter. I’m on Twitter…I’m on Facebook”. The African American pastor

from South Carolina felt Twitter was fine to use but had never used it himself. He says, “I

mean, social media gives you a voice, a public voice, and so anytime you have a public

voice it can be used for good, but a lot of bad can come from it too." Another pastor agrees

with this same sentiment. He does not use Twitter himself but feels it can be used for good

or for bad. He says,

Twitter is a tremendous social network tool to send out a message…You have

multiple tens of millions of people on that list. Yeah, you can influence a lot of

things...Again, a car is good. But if you're gonna run over people, then that's no way

to use a car...Twitter is the same way...it's a good tool…

Many of the pastors who said Twitter can be a useful way to express thoughts politically

and socially expressed similar sentiments to those presented above. They did not have

personal Twitter accounts but felt that because of the large number of people who could be

reached, it could be a useful tool. However, it could also be a dangerous and harmful tool.

One pastor, the pastor who had already mentioned using social media a few times during

our conversation, seemed to appreciate Twitter more than most of the other pastors. Again,

he did not personally have an account, but he said, "I think it could be a format for sharing

to the world with whatever is on your mind, political, social…I think it's great; it does give

people a means of expression."

The pastors who were not keen on the use of Twitter shared similar reasons for not

appreciating it. They feel Twitter has taken away personal face-to-face interactions. One

pastor says, "No, no I do not. No, I don't…Communication is a challenge at best. So, the

further we get away from face to face conversations the more likelihood for

misunderstanding and misinterpretation…I don't think it's appropriate at all." Another

pastor says he does not find Twitter an effective means of expression for him personally,

but would not tell others not to use it. He reasons, “I don’t think it’s effective. I think that

sort of thing probably emboldens and encourages people to agree with you and antagonizes

people who disagree with you. You have to be really clever to change somebody’s opinion

or crack their armor through a tweet or something like that.” Both pastors agree that this

platform is simply not the platform use when engaging in sensitive conversations. Most

of the pastors had a limited knowledge of Twitter but enough knowledge to have a general

opinion of it and the benefits and downfalls associated with it. I entered these interviews

believing that Twitter would be a principal avenue of mobilization for evangelicals who

feel marginalized. However, this was not the case among the pastors.

While Twitter seemed fine in theory for some of them, only one (who did not claim to be

evangelical), had his own Twitter account. Apparently, the marginalization they feel has

not led them to use Twitter as a means of expression.

This does not mean, however, that no evangelicals are mobilized on Twitter. A few

pastors did mention that their congregants can be quite active on Twitter and other social

media platforms. Some of these pastors said they have challenged congregants because of

the poor “testimony” they thought their social media activity displayed. One pastor says,

"I'm not opposed to the use of technology whenever it comes to exercising your opinions I

just think you gotta do it in a decent way." At this point, he proceeds to say that his

congregants have been and can be very active on Twitter, but that he must keep an eye on

their online presence.

This tells me that although the pastors may refrain from tweeting for various reasons,

the perceived social marginalization apparent in their answers may be felt even more

strongly by their congregants. This leads me to believe that these congregants,

unconstrained by some of the existential pressures facing pastors (Crawford and Olson

2001), are more likely to publicly express themselves and mobilize for political action.

Since social media has become a significant avenue for this type of expression and

mobilization, we should expect to see more and more evangelicals using it in the years

ahead.

Conclusion

Although I was only able to interview a small selection of pastors, several key finding

emerge. Perhaps the most striking finding is that African American clergy have some

similar fears, concerns, and feelings of marginalization as white evangelicals. As much of

the previous literature confirms, they do not have to share political convictions with white

evangelicals to share their spiritual convictions. However, I also found that theological

differences, rather than racial differences, appeared more integral to each pastor's approach

to collective political involvement. Though the data is too limited in allowing me to

generalize these findings, I do believe that there is more work to be done in this area of race

and religion. Scholars, notably Emerson and Smith (2000), Harris (1999), Jones and Francis

(2012) and Lincoln and Mamiya (1990), show that race is unequivocally yoked with

religion. While I do not dispute these findings, I do contend that my research shows there

may be a yet unstudied "middle-ground." What of the racially mixed evangelical churches?

Are there vital theological differences between white and Black evangelicals that contribute

to their different political and social actions or, as most research shows, is race the only

variable causing a difference?

Again, as I said during a lengthy discussion of this very topic earlier in the chapter, I

was only able to interview three Black pastors. It is possible that these pastors are an

aberration from the norm. Alternatively, there may be an understudied and unrepresented

group of Black evangelicals in the United States, who perhaps go to racially heterogenous

congregations. Wadsworth (2012) noted the growing trend within the evangelical

population to engage in congregational racial blending. What contributes to this willingness

to attend these racially diverse congregations? Wadsworth notes various differing

motivations. One motivation she did not address was theological agreement. Some African

American evangelicals may feel that their theological beliefs are better represented in a

church that is not racially homogeneous. Would I find that these Black evangelicals

demonstrate similar feelings of marginalization and concern for society? They may not fit

what the media and society portray as evangelical (white, southern, poor, Republican), but

they also may not fit in with the typical African American Protestant (Black, Democratic).

I say this with the acknowledgment that these are mere musings that require much further

research to speak to with any authority.

My findings also provide support for my theoretical assumption that evangelicals today

are feeling socially marginalized. Most of the pastors I interviewed articulated such

feelings. Many of them seemed keenly concerned about the social stereotypes and

assumptions applied to them because of their religious beliefs. Many of the pastors

expressed concern about society because they see values and norms being changed. Most

of them conveyed consternation about the direction society is headed and the future. They

all pointedly drew the conversation back to their commitment to sharing the Gospel as their

central calling.

While I found that most of the pastors feel marginalized, I did not find evidence that

these feelings have led to any kind of sustained social or political action apart from voting.

All the pastors were happy to engage in the political process using conventional methods

of participation, such as voting or writing a representative. This finding is intriguing given

the perceived social marginalization I found; however, it also makes sense. These pastors

displayed relatively high levels of both internal and external efficacy. They believe

conventional political participation is useful since they believe such participation can have

an impact.

This finding provides support for my theory that evangelicals are feeling socially

marginalized while still possessing a sense of political efficacy and access. I believe this

perceived social marginalization is affecting them, and I believe it played a part in Donald

Trump’s election. They may feel that their last hope is a King Cyrus of sorts, an ungodly,

immoral individual whom God uses to protect His people. This "Cyrus" is being personified

in Trump (Gordon 2017). Few of the pastors seemed enamored with Donald Trump

personally, and none of them held him in high regard, but a few of them did express

thankfulness for some room to breathe socially and politically. Others felt they finally had

someone in office who could speak on their behalf, something that evangelicals have felt

about previous presidents such as Carter, George Bush, George W. Bush and to an extent,

Reagan.

I did not find evidence that these pastors are feeling marginalized because of racial or

demographic concerns. However, given the taboo nature of such feelings, feelings of this

nature are less likely to manifest in this form of research. I did not find as much difference

between white and Black pastors, however, which was unexpected. I did find that white

pastors were less likely to address race or racial issues as a significant concern in

comparison to Black pastors.

I think one of the most important takeaways from these interviews is this: if these pastors

are feeling marginalized, worried, and out of place, their congregants may well be feeling

similarly, and perhaps with a higher intensity. Quite a few pastors alluded to this possibility

as well. Scholars should be alert in the years to come for evangelicals mobilizing using new

tactics, especially social media and boycotting, despite the twin emphasis evangelical

theology places on individual salvation and skepticism of all things temporal. While there

is still much to be uncovered and discovered, these interviews provide some useful insights

into the mind of evangelical clergy in 2017/2018. The media’s portrayal of an “evangelical”

is not necessarily representative of all evangelicals. Instead, evangelicals are diverse in

many ways, as we should expect of a group that comprises at least a quarter of the U.S.

population (Pew Research Center 2015a; 2015b). Further, not all evangelicals are white.

There are Black evangelicals who share some of the same concerns about society as white

evangelicals. What does this mean moving forward? As a few of the pastors said, if they

think things get bad enough, which they emphasized was highly possible given the

direction they see society heading, they may be forced to take a collective, public stand.

Notwithstanding the still-existent Religious Right, there are many evangelicals who have

never mobilized publicly. The question then is this: what happens when the quiet, reticent

portion of the evangelical population begins to mobilize?

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL CONSUMERISM: THE NEW OLD TACTIC?

"[T]he market is turned into a powerful discursive terrain where commodities not only

embody but also mediate religious ideals and qualities."

--- Echchaibi, 2012, p. 33

When you hear the word “chicken” what do you think of? You probably think of a lot of

things: chicken wings, football, food, a bird, animal rights, KFC, Chick-fil-A, or an easy

dinner. You probably do not think of marginalization, evangelicals, LGBTQ rights, and

mobilization. Yet, chicken, or any other neutral commodity, can symbolize these concepts

and more. Research shows a growing trend of individuals expressing their values and

ideologies through what they consume (Hannon 2013; Holzer 2006; Michelleti 2003;

Michelleti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2008; Neilson 2012). In this chapter, I analyze how

“chicken” became a symbol of hate and discrimination, or alternatively a symbol of free

speech and Biblical values, and how this case represents an unstudied segment of

evangelical collective action. I also analyze the way that a popular supermarket became

involved in a war of values.

Political consumerism is the intentional buying of a product or the intentional rejection

of a product for political or social reasons. In layman’s terms, political consumerism is

boycotting or buycotting a company. Anyone can engage in political consumerism.

Boycotting is not, in and of itself, a collective act, even though it has been used as a form

of collective action. Individuals can engage in a boycott of one. This makes political

consumerism one of the most individualistic, and yet potentially collective, forms of

political participation available to citizens (Newman and Bartels 2011).

Micheletti (2003) creates an entirely new concept to categorize political consumerism:

individualized collective action. Micheletti challenges the long-standing assumption in

political science that political participation is group-oriented behavior. She distinguishes

between individualized collective action and "our more common notion of political

participation, here called collectivist collective action" (2003, 1). Scholars find that citizens

of Western societies are shifting away from the traditional forms of political involvement

to more “flexible, network-oriented, and applied” forms of political engagement (2003, 6).

Micheletti coins the term individualized collective action to capture these new forms of

political and collective, yet individualized, action. She defines it as “the practice of

responsibility-taking through the creation of everyday settings on the part of citizens alone

or together with others to deal with problems which they believe are affecting what they

identify as the good life” (2003, 7).

Political consumerism, then, is one form of individualized collective action. Micheletti

defines political consumerism as “actions by people who make choices among producers

and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices”

(2003, 2). Political consumerism provides a way for citizens to express their dislike of

policy issues or societal issues without having to use conventional political participation.

Consumption as a Political Act

Political consumerism, as defined by one of the leading scholars in this field, is merely

the "use of the market as an arena for politics" (Micheletti and Stolle 2008, 750). Micheletti

and Stolle (2008) contend that "shopping is now an established part of social justice

activism" (749). When people use the market to express their political concerns either

through boycotts or “buycotts” they are engaging in political consumerism (Micheletti

2003; 2010; Michelleti, Follesdal, and Stolle 2008; Stolle, Hooghe, and Micheletti 2005).

There has been some debate among academics about whether political consumerism is

truly a form of political participation. Micheletti (2003; 2010) argues that it is, and

Newman and Bartels (2011) find that political consumerism is an “individualistic” and

“high-initiative” form of political participation. Micheletti (2003) claims that this type--

political consumerism---of political mobilization is the result of increasing micro-level

politics and is a distinct form of political participation, or, as she calls it, individualized

collective action (2003).

Scholars agree that many countries are experiencing an increase in political

consumerism (Copeland 2014; Neilson 2012; Neilson and Paxton 2010; Friedman 1985;

Strømsnes 2009). Zukin et al. (2006) find that political consumerism is the most commonly

used form of political participation second only to voting. Inglehart’s (1977; 2015) theory

of post-materialism is cited as one leading explanation for the increase in alternative forms

of political participation (Copeland 2014). In a post-materialist society, citizens are more

concerned about promoting non-material, value-oriented issues, which generally fall within

the political spectrum (2014).

The three primary forms of political consumerism are boycott and buycott and

discursive consumerism. Hitherto, boycotting has been the primary form of political

consumerism and is the oldest form of political consumerism (Friedman 1999; Michelleti

2003; 2008). Boycotting is the deliberate rejection of a product for social or political

reasons. It is “an attempt by one or more parties to achieve certain objectives by urging

individual consumers to refrain from making selected purchases in the marketplace” or “the

intentional buying or abstention from buying specific products for political, social, or

ethical purposes” (Newman and Bartels 2011). Consumer boycotting has frequently been

used in the United States and other countries as a form of political activism and has been

“very important for people marginalized in conventional politics” (Micheletti 2008, 751).

Activists who organize and stimulate these boycotts find boycotts incredibly difficult to

frame and organize (Friedman 2003; Micheletti 2008). The financial impact of boycotts is

debatable (Micheletti 2008, see also Koku and Springer 1997; Smith 2003; Vogel 2005).

Political consumerism can only affect change if it is done collectively (Hannon 2013).

Individuals can engage in political consumerism but rarely if ever is their individual choice

to consume or abstain going to cause corporate change. Since boycotts are most successful

when done collectively, the media plays a crucial role in organizing and involving

individuals by making individuals feel like they are part of something bigger (Hannon

2013). Media helps frame an individual choice "as collective action, potentially motivating

participation either because boycotters would interpret the participation of others as

normative behavior, or because the participation of others would provide reassurance of a

boycott’s efficacy" (Neilson 2012, 216).

Buycotting is the intentional buying of a product for social and political reasons.

Hannon argues that buycotting is moving from the periphery to the forefront as a form of

activism. It is less contentious than boycotting and easier to mobilize (Hannon 2013;

Michelleti 2008). Proponents of buycotting say that it is a constructive way to show support

for an issue by allowing consumers to “consume and support causes at the same time”

(Micheletti 2008, 752). Also, buycotts are not as beholden to the media for collective

stimulation and action as boycotts. They can be organized through word of mouth, social

media and local networks (Hannon 2013).

Boycotting and buycotting are the same action with a different motivation. In other

words, in most cases, they are both the result of an individual purchase transference from

one place to another (Hannon 2013). Hence, boycotting a place means, by default,

buycotting another place (2013). "The key nuance is, therefore, going to reside in the intent

of the action: is an individual seeking to punish a company or reward it?" (62-63).

The third form of political consumerism is "discursive political consumerism"

(Micheletti 2008). This form of consumerism focuses on other vulnerable aspects of

business such as their brand name, reputation, and logo (2008). It uses a "variety of

noneconomic tools to convince the public and/or business leaders that social responsibility

is good for the corporate world" (2008, 753). I do not test this form of political consumerism

in this dissertation, though it could provide some interesting insight for future research.

These forms of political consumerism do more than push for corporate change or

justice; they also create an avenue of expression for individuals who want to make a

statement about themselves through consumption. Thus, consumption is as much an

extension of one’s identity as political action (Hannon 2013). Some argue that individuals

are consuming the label rather than the product (2013). However, "[the] bulk of mundane

consumption is normally outside the area for reflective choice" (Jacobsen and Dulsrud

2007, 478).

While Jacobsen and Dulsrud’s statement is true, Hannon counters: "a reflexive choice

is still being made to purchase one item over another. Even without reflection, one is

choosing to participate in consumption rather than to abstain and to consume product X

over product Y. Agency is being exercised, and in some cases, consumption can be moved

to inhabiting a reflective space" (Hannaon 2013, 58). Consumption, whether it is

intentional or not, makes a statement about who an individual is: an ice cream person or a

cake person, an Apple person or a Samsung person (2013). Political consumerism,

therefore, is just a step above mundane consumerism. It is the active choice between

products, not because of price or aesthetic appeal, but because of one’s political leanings

and their desire to affect change and express their identity through the consumption of one

product and abstention from another (Hannon 2013).

Thus, consumption has turned into a way for individuals to express themselves and

connect themselves to a public identity. “Consumption is … an external marker of internal

beliefs. What and how an individual consumes not only builds an image of who they are,

but how others should interact with them” (2013, 48). Where an individual consumes

creates an identity for who they are and places them in a pre-conceptualized community

while also serving as an “external declaration of belief” (48). Hence, political consumerism

provides the perfect environment of expression for those who possess a collective identity

and desire to express their connection to that collective identity through consumption.

Scholars find that a consumer’s religion is an important variable influencing individuals

to engage in political consumerism (Delener 1994; Lorentzen 1980; Hirschman 1991;

1982; Sheth 1981; Swimberghe, Flurry, and Parker 2011; Vitell 2009; Vitell, Paolillo, and

Singh 2006; Vitell, Singh, and Paolillo 2007; Wilkes, Burnett and Howell 1986).

“Consumption, therefore, provides the venue through which religious individuals can

outwardly declare their beliefs” (Hannon 2013, 48). Market goods have begun to take on a

religious meaning (Echchaibi 2012; Hannon 2013). Hannon distinguishes between goods

that are expressly religious, such as Veggie Tales or the Passion of the Christ, and those

goods that made for secular consumption but somehow imbued with religious qualities

(2013, 52). For example, Chick-fil-A, an organization founded and run by Christians, is an

emblem of traditional Christian values. Thus, individuals can make a public statement

about their values, their religious convictions, and identity, both collective and individual,

simply by eating a chicken sandwich. The assumption of religious value, bolstered by

media narrative, means consuming a product somewhere is now imbued with “reverent

quality and transform[s] a trivial act of consumption into a committed act of faith”

(Echchaibi 2012, 32). “Consumption, therefore, provides the venue through which

religious individuals can outwardly declare their beliefs” (Hannon 2013, 48).

Hannon (2013) posits that “consumption is a generative space in which individuals can

express religious belief within modernity” (1). She performs a case study of the Chick-filA

controversy with special attention given to Facebook posts regarding the controversy. She

argues that consumers make individual and communal identity construction through what

they choose to consume. Consumers express their values and identity through what they

consume.

The literature provides conclusive support that political consumerism is indeed a form

of political mobilization. Also, research shows that alienation, a key component of

marginalization, increases support for nontraditional forms of political participation such

as demonstrations or boycotts (Southwell 1985; Opp 1990; Weakliem and Borch 2006). I

chose political consumerism as an indicator for my theory because of its unique position in

politics and society. It is both political and social, collective and individual, expressive and

impactful. Since I am interested in expressive extra-institutional forms of political

mobilization in response to social marginalization, political consumerism is the ideal

indicator of marginalization because of social strain over politically charged social issues.

Political consumerism is not a conventional form of political participation (hence the

scholarly debate about its place in politics), which makes it an alternative form of

participation and a valid implication of my theoretical argument. Further, it provides the

ideal set of circumstances to test social constructionism's necessary conditions for

collective action. It is also a form of expression, and I am interested in evangelicals'

expressive mobilization as a form of identity claiming. Finally, I chose political

consumerism as an indicator for my theory because it allows me to examine whether

specific mechanisms are sufficient to stimulate evangelicals into collective action.

Data and Methods

How does an unpleasant feeling translate into social and political collective action?

What causal mechanisms are crucial to this transition? I contend that for evangelicals, a

catalyst event must present itself. This event acts as a catalyst for evangelical response.

However, without the appropriate elite framing within the cultural context to stir up a sense

of collective identity around a constructed emotion, evangelicals would merely grumble

and mobilize individually rather than mobilize collectively. There are, of course, more

moving parts here than a single case or a small number of cases will allow me to examine.

So the results that follow are suggestive at best of a causal chain.

What is a catalyst event? It is an event that stirs up emotions and reactions and draws

media attention, critique and support. The event can be purely political such as a Supreme

Court case or a new political policy. However, it can also be social—Starbucks hires or

fires a gay President. A corporation can publish a politically or socially charged

commercial, pull a product or introduce a product for political and social reasons, or make

a public statement for those very same reasons. These events can cause a reaction,

depending on how much of a reaction the media and elites want. Of course, in today’s social

media context, sometimes grassroots reactions on social media force elite and media

attention.

A catalyst event provides an avenue for response. Since evangelicals generally support

the status quo, incidents that threaten their preferred status quo (and perhaps their historical

social and cultural dominance) cause evangelicals to feel the need to mobilize. However,

just because an event occurs does not mean that evangelicals will automatically engage in

collective mobilization. Only under specific circumstances will evangelicals engage in

collective mobilization. Using the four elements of social constructionism, and Snow and

Benford’s (1988) three-step process to collective action, I set up the following chain: A

group feels socially marginalized and alienated  Catalyst event  Increasing

feelings of marginalization Social entrepreneurs frame the event, and the relevant

out-group  Social entrepreneurs stir up emotional strain using cultural symbols,

phrases, etc.  Entrepreneurs suggest a viable solution to the problem and

encourage participation and mobilization  Group engages in collective action in

response to elite mobilization.

I propose five different hypotheses which I test using two cases studies. I derive these

hypotheses from the social constructionist theory of social movements and the literature on

political consumerism.

HI: A catalyst event is a necessary condition for evangelical collective mobilization.

A catalyst event can be anything from a Supreme Court Case to a corporate statement—

the key attribute being the event draws attention to some social or political issue relevant

to evangelicals. The social or political issue need not be new, although it may be.

Regardless, the catalyst event, by drawing attention to the issue provides evangelicals with

the option of responding or remaining neutral and silent.

H2: Elite mobilization and framing according to the cultural milieu is a necessary

condition for evangelical collective mobilization.

Elite mobilization is a little easier to define. Elites are individuals who hold a position of

power in whatever domain in which they exist. This position provides them with a platform

to speak and influence, and resources to draw upon when needed. Lindsay (2008)

conducted an in-depth field research study of evangelical elites. He claims that elites

“provide critical resources, produce cultural goods, and facilitate the legitimation of a given

movement to external audiences” (64, see also McCarthy and Zald 1997; Peterson and

Berger 1975; Tilly 2006). Elites are respected by the community they speak for and

represent; therefore, their word means something. Elites can be individuals and/or

organizations that speak on behalf of evangelicals.

H3: A coherent collective identity, predicated upon an in-group/out-group frame, is

a necessary condition for evangelical mobilization.

A coherent collective identity provides members with a common goal and common

cognitive framework (Melucci 1988). Individuals feel a connection to and desire to be a

part of this collective membership. I add “predicated upon an in-group/out-group frame”

because of the difficulty of identifying a feeling of "collective identity" by assessing

boycotts. Thus, based on Smith's subcultural identity theory and his assertion that

evangelicals' collective identity grows stronger because of a clearly defined "they," the

presence of a clear "out-group" is a proxy for evangelical collective identity. If there is no

clear out-group in any example, I consider a coherent collective identity absent.

H4: Social marginalization is a necessary condition needed for collective action.

I am most interested in the presence and absence of this variable. Social marginalization is

a feeling of social threat and strain, coupled with frustration and feelings of societal

rejection. This is not predicated upon a feeling of low political efficacy or feeling like one

has no access to or influence on government policy; instead, it stems from the societal

marginalization of valued norms and issues. Though I cannot access the minds and psyche

of evangelicals to show indisputable evidence of these feelings, I am able to gain insight

into the motivations of their actions by assessing the frames and rhetoric used by elites (and

in a few circumstances the evangelicals themselves) to motivate the evangelicals into

action. If they utilize certain phrases and words, invoking any assumed social strain, this is

evidence of assumed societal strain in their culture. Further, I infer from events and the

societal trends at the time of the boycott the probable level of strain that evangelicals are

feeling at the time. Presumably, the higher the feeling of strain the more likely they are to

mobilize. I believe that collective political consumerism itself is evidence of feelings of

social strain/marginalization and am not alone in this assumption.

H5: All four hypotheses combined are sufficient for evangelical collective

mobilization.

This final hypothesis is simple and does not need to be defined since it is the combination

of the four previous concepts that I just defined. If the four previous variables are satisfied,

then I expect that evangelicals will indeed engage in political consumerism. My analysis

tests the veracity of these hypotheses based on real-world occurrences. Perhaps

evangelicals have collectively boycotted/buycotted in the absence of one or two of these

hypotheses; hopefully, my analysis can uncover such circumstances. Either way, this

analysis sheds new light on evangelical mobilization.

Data and Methods

Most research on political consumerism has been theoretical, qualitative and/or relies

heavily on survey data. Because of the lack of extensive empirical data, I rely on a variety

of different data sources that allow causal process tracing to test my hypotheses. Using the

General Social Survey (GSS) codebook, I first provide a descriptive snapshot analysis of

evangelical boycotting trends during the two years that GSS asked questions about

boycotting—2004 and 2014.

There are only a few cases of evangelical collective political consumerism available to

analyze, which, in and of itself says something. Most collective evangelical boycotts were

started, promoted and carried out by the same set of evangelical elites: The Southern Baptist

Convention and the American Family Association (AFA). I use process tracing to analyze

the mechanisms surrounding boycotts, in addition to more deeply analyzing the one

evangelical buycott launched in recent American history. These boycotting and buycotting

examples provide support for my theory of evangelical social marginalization and

mobilization while leaving the door open for future research and new questions. Using

process tracing, as well as an in-depth analysis of the cases through the lens of the

hypotheses, I can analyze the moving parts of the theory.

ANES and GSS Data

I believe, based on other scholar’s previous findings and on Micheletti’s conception of

individualistic collective action, that evangelicals are involved in political consumerism

primarily at the individual level (Shamir and Ben-Porat, 2007; Swimberghe, Flurry, and

Parker 2011; Lorentzen 1980; Sheth 1981; Vitell 2009; Vitell, Paollilo, and Singh 2006;

Vitell, Singh, and Paolillo 2007).

An ANES survey recently included two questions about political consumerism in a

2016 Pilot Study. The study asked 1200 people “In the last 12 months, have you bought a

certain product or service because of the social or political values of the company that

provides it, or have you not done that in the past 12 months?” followed by the same question

about boycotting. The unique aspect of this question is that it touches on values rather than

pure partisanship or political reasons. A recent study on political consumerism used this

dataset, in conjunction with two original datasets, to pinpoint the variables with the most

influence on one's propensity to engage in political consumerism. Endres and

Panagopoulos (2017) find that Democrats are more likely to engage in political

consumerism than Republicans and find that political knowledge, political interest, and

ideological intensity are all positively related to political consumerism. They did not,

however, include a variable for religion.

Using their same dataset but adding in a variable for religion, I assess some descriptive

characteristics of evangelicals and political consumerism. I use a question about being

"born again" as my proxy for evangelicalism. If the respondent answered yes to being born

again, they are considered evangelical, and if they answered no they are not considered

evangelical. The percentage of evangelicals in the whole group who also answered yes to

either boycotting or buycotting in the past 12 months is 10.8%. A total of 26.8% of the

evangelical respondents engaged in political consumerism, which is over 10% less than the

overall total percentage of participants at 39%. Evangelicals also made up 27% of the total

number of respondents who did engage in political consumerism.

There are some demographic differences in the boycotting evangelical population. As

the chart shows, whites make up the most considerable portion of the 10% of evangelicals

who did engage in political consumerism, followed by Blacks, Hispanics, and others.

However, proportionally Black evangelicals and white evangelicals engaged in political

consumerism at the same rate. For white and Black evangelicals, 37% of them engaged in

political consumerism, while members who identified as other were the most active at 41%.

Figure 5.1 Percentage of Evangelicals Who Engaged in Political Consumerism in 2015

Hispanic evangelicals were the least active with only 30% of them engaging in political

consumerism. After running a basic probit model with race and evangelicalism as the two

independent variables and political consumerism as the independent variable, the only

variable that showed any statistical significance was the "other" category in race. Thus, at

least for 2016, evangelicalism seems to have little statistical effect on the probability of an

individual engaging in political consumerism.

Figure 5.2 Evangelical Political Consumerism in 2015 by Race

The information provided in the figures is limited and supplies a mere snapshot of

evangelical involvement. Ergo, this chapter is not designed to analyze individual

expression but rather collective expression. I believe that evangelicals are willing to

mobilize collectively, given a specific set of circumstances; however, because of their focus

on the individual, occasions of evangelical collective action are few and far between. When

a group feels unappreciated and marginalized, they respond; however, this response is

contingent upon elite framing and elite manipulation (Dicsh 2011; Goffman 1974). Elites

are the glue that connect feelings of marginalization to mobilization.

Political Consumerism: Boycotts

Evangelicals have launched a few boycotts over the past few decades. I analyze a

boycott launched and carried out by the American Family Association (AFA). I analyze

boycott cases by the AFA because it is one of the only evangelical organizations to boycott

with media coverage consistently. I cannot analyze boycotts that did not receive notable

media coverage.

Using the Lexus Nexis (now called Lexis Uni) All News search, I searched for

keywords and phrases such as "boycott," "evangelical" and "political consumerism" to

assess the frequency of news articles discussing evangelical boycotts. Combing through

the articles, I discovered that there have been a few, though not an abundant, number of

evangelical boycotts. Launching a successful boycott is a strenuous and challenging

process for elites, given the amount of framing and stimulation needed to fully involve

enough people. I also learned that most of the evangelical boycotts launched in recent

history have been launched by the same few evangelical organizations. Namely, the AFA

and the Southern Baptist Convention. Neither of these organizations is explicitly political

but because of their stances on social (politically charged social) issues, have waded into

political waters through this form of expressive mobilization. These are not the only two

evangelical organizations in America, but they are the two that seemed most adamantly

involved in political boycotting instead of focusing exclusively on individual mission-

oriented evangelical work. That is not to say that these are the only two evangelical

organizations engaged in politics or political action; instead, these are the primary

organizations engaging in the expressive form of political mobilization that I am interested

in testing.

After further research, I found that the single Southern Baptist Convention boycott was

initially launched by the AFA. Thus, it became apparent that most of the nationally known

and media covered evangelical boycotts in recent history are and have been sponsored by

the AFA. In my analysis then, I overlay one AFA sponsored boycott against the social

constructionist theory to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions of evangelical

mobilization better. I select the only current boycott, which also happens to be their most

successful boycott ever. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am confined to the one

current boycott.

The American Family Association (AFA)

The American Family Association is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization, created in

1977 by Donald E. Wildmon, pastor of First United Methodist Church in South Haven,

Mississippi. It is not a political organization and promotes no overt political agenda but

does have a clear evangelical set of doctrinal values. The organization is engaged in various

kinds of activities. The AFA has its own radio show and online coffee shop that sells ground

coffee. The ad on the front of coffee shop webpage says, “When you purchase American

Family Coffee, you are supporting our parent organization, American Family Association

whose goal is to restore a strong sense of biblical values to American public life”

(Americanfamilycoffee.net). Hence, this otherwise mundane item is imbued with a sense

of morality and family values. I am not sure how purchasing this coffee accomplishes their

stated goals, but this is the sentiment presented nonetheless.

The AFA also has an online store, a journal and a studio. They started two tangential

organizations called One Million Moms and One Million Dads whose goal is to activate

and connect evangelical dads and moms across the country to speak out against "trash on

TV." The first lines used in the One Million Moms "who we are" page is telling. “Mom, are

you fed up with the filth many segments of our society, especially the entertainment media,

are throwing at our children? Are you tired of all the negative influences our children are

forced to contend with? If so, we urge you to become a member of

OneMillionMoms.com” (OneMillionMoms.com). The language is indicative of the

framing and emotional manipulation prevalent in the language assessed below.

Evangelicals, holding a historically dominant social and political position in society must

feel that their position is being threatened.

According to the parent organization (AFA.net):

The mission of the American Family Association is to inform, equip, and activate

individuals to strengthen the moral foundations of American culture, and give aid

to the church here and abroad in its task of fulfilling the Great Commission.

Their philosophical statement gives more insight into their motivations and focus:

The American Family Association believes that God has communicated absolute

truth to mankind and that all people are subject to the authority of God's Word at

all times. Therefore AFA believes that a culture based on biblical truth best serves

the well-being of our nation and our families, in accordance with the vision of our

founding documents; and that personal transformation through the Gospel of Jesus

Christ is the greatest agent of biblical change in any culture.

Note the culturally appropriated language used. The AFA stresses the importance of

personal transformation through the gospel and that this is the greatest agent of Biblical

change. The irony, of course, is that the AFA is not an organization engaged exclusively in

individual mission oriented evangelicalism. Thus, even though the AFA is dependent on

collective involvement and action, they cater to this mindset focused on individual

salvation by using keywords and phrases that assuage any skepticism of intent that their

individualist readers and potential members might have.

The AFA professes to use activism to preserve: "Marriage and the Family," "Decency

and Morality," "Sanctity of Human Life," "Stewardship" and "Media Integrity" (AFA.net).

This focus on evangelical moral doctrine rather than overtly conservative ideology is

important for my theory since I am interested in evangelical mobilization, not just Christian

Right mobilization. Further, they state that they intend to:

1. Restrain evil by exposing the works of darkness

2. Promote virtue by upholding in culture that which is right, true and good according

to Scripture

3. Convince individuals of sin and challenge them to seek Christ’s grace and

forgiveness

4. Motivate people to take a stand on cultural and moral issues at the local, state and

national levels

5. Encourage Christians to bear witness to the love of Jesus Christ as they live their

lives before the world (AFA.net)

Again, line three draws the attention back to the individual and personal conversion. This

continued focus on the individual is further evidence of the AFA’s evangelical persuasion

and of their keen knowledge of their base. Most of these goals are painted in a positive light

and with the attempt to instill hope and direction in an otherwise, potentially frustrated and

marginalized, population.

AFA activism, therefore, is done with the intent of trying to preserve (and promote)

what they perceive to be the status quo of marriage and family, decency and morality, the

sanctity of human life, stewardship and media integrity. They cannot preserve something

they believe does not already exist in some capacity. Hence, they feel they are preserving

the status quo from cultural and societal changes. The website explains why they engage

in activism.

We believe in holding accountable companies that sponsor programs attacking

traditional family values. We also believe in commending those companies that

act responsibly regarding the programs they support.

It is AFA’s goal to be a champion of Christian activism. If you are alarmed by the

increasing ungodliness and depravity assaulting our nation, tired of cursing the

darkness, and ready to light a bonfire, please join us. Do it for your children and

grandchildren. (AFA.net)

The AFA uses culturally specific language here. First, they call attention to their preferred

form of activism: political consumerism. They then frame their call to action by first

promoting the positive image of Christianity and then drawing upon assumed feelings of

social strain amongst their target population. Key phrases like "alarmed by increasing

ungodliness" or "depravity assaulting our nation" paint the picture of an embattled

evangelical population with nowhere to turn. They draw a broad picture of the problems

facing our country here. They then say, "tired of cursing the darkness" and "ready to light

a bonfire." This imagery is powerful, especially for their target population. They play upon

assumed feelings of frustration and angst that their constituency is feeling stuck as if their

only form of release for their frustration is to curse the darkness. They then answer the

problem with a solution of "lighting the bonfire" by joining their organization. Finally, they

end with perhaps the most powerful call to action, act for your children and your

grandchildren! Evangelicals, the ones I interviewed at least, express concern for the future,

specifically for their children and grandchildren. If indeed they feel a growing sense of

social strain, utilizing fear of the future to motivate evangelicals into action is a brilliant

move by the AFA social entrepreneurs.

The AFA also tries to alleviate any worries for the portion of their Christian base who feel

that boycotting is unbiblical. Their Vice-President, Mr. Vitagliano, writes a piece called

“objections answered” to assuage some of these concerns. He starts out by saying the

following:

Since it began in 1977, AFA has been known for its boycotts. However, some Christians

believe such a tactic is, well, not very Christian.

First, let me put forth a simple definition of what I mean by the word boycott. In

its simplest form, a boycott involves the intentional withholding of money from a

business of which you disapprove. It is usually used as an instrument of protest,

persuasion, or even economic coercion (Vitagliano).

This definition is helpful for my research in that the AFA defines boycotts in the same way

that I define boycotts. They are a form of expression and protest and potential means for

change. Mr. Vitagliano proceeds to explain why the AFA participates in boycotts. He, again,

invokes the individualistic mindset of personal evangelism so prevalent in his culture.

Christians are called to warn unbelievers that “the wrath of God comes upon the

sons of disobedience” (Eph. 5:6). Is there something wrong with indicating to

sinners what exactly constitutes their disobedience?

There are many ways for the church to carry out this assignment. AFA believes

boycotts are one of those ways. For example, when AFA initiated a boycott of

Movie Gallery more than a decade ago, it was triggered by the company’s practice

of renting and selling hardcore pornographic videos.

In any case, AFA merely asks companies to remain neutral on controversial cultural

issues. We aren’t asking them to side with us on abortion, for example, but we are

asking companies not to fund Planned Parenthood. We aren’t asking businesses to

uphold the biblical model of natural marriage, but we are asking companies not to

give money to gay activist groups that call Christians bigots.

Hence, the AFA sees their actions as "evangelical" in some way. They are helping point out

sin in people's lives, and therefore promoting the gospel by boycotting. They establish that

they are not trying to force corporations to support Christian values but rather to remain

neutral. Further, they add that they do not want companies giving money to the "outgroup,"

the gay activist groups, who are involved with calling Christian bigots. Hence, they are

protecting evangelicals from what they see as further social marginalization.

Mr. Vitagliano also defines what the AFA considers a successful boycott.

The fact is AFA does not primarily call for a boycott in order to hurt a company’s

pocketbook. This is why AFA goes out of its way to target huge corporations, not

the mom and pop grocery store on the corner. Disney. Pepsi. Ford. Home Depot.

Such behemoths are often impervious to financial damage from boycotts – and AFA

knows it.

This differentiation is essential. I spoke with the head of the activism division of the AFA,

and he was rather confused that I had found a decent number of AFA boycotts online. In

fact, he could only list a few of which he was aware. He warned me that many news reports

call a lot of AFA activism boycotting, when in fact there was no boycott. The AFA

frequently petitions its members to speak out or contact businesses with objectionable value

stances; however, it rarely calls on its members to intentionally boycott, and when it does,

it is only for those businesses that are big enough to remain relatively financially unaffected

by the boycott. Hence, there are only a few boycotts that the AFA has sponsored. This AFA

executive went on to inform me that when the AFA does sponsor a boycott, they try to do

so organically. In other words, they simply call on their members to boycott and let their

members disseminate or spread the message to others. They do not advertise the boycott or

promote the boycott outside of their member base. Thus, any involvement by non-members

in an AFA boycott is grassroots and stimulated by person-to-person contact. Mr. Vitagliano

proceeds to explain what a successful boycott is for the AFA.

We have had some tremendous successes with the use of boycotts, as the current

effort against Target demonstrates. Some of our boycotts were actually settled

behind the scenes and thus could not be publicly touted as victories. And some of

AFA’s boycotts met with far less success on the financial level.

Then why call the boycott? AFA uses the pocketbook to accomplish two things: (1)

Get the attention of the offending company in order to start a dialogue with the

decision makers; and (2) get the attention of the public in order to begin a dialogue

with our neighbors in the community over the main issue of contention.

The final paragraph explains that the AFA wants to start a dialogue to draw attention to

some problem by placing it under public scrutiny. Thus, the boycotts are motivated not only

by a desire to cause change but also to draw attention to an issue that evangelicals are

expressing concern about.

Since the central focus of this dissertation is not the way that evangelical organizations

collect members, but rather how and why evangelicals mobilize, specifically through

political consumerism, I am going to transition to the actual analysis. The information

above provides a clear context for the boycotts under analysis.

Boycotts

Every year, the AFA publishes a Christmas Naughty or Nice list. The list rates American

retailers as either nice, marginal or naughty based on how “Christmas-Friendly” their

advertisements are (AFA.com). This promotes the AFA as a good source for private and

individual level boycotting. Further, their members are encouraged and mobilized to

directly contact and appeal for corporate change when the need arises. The number of

small-scale protests and/or appeals that the AFA and their tangential organizations are

involved in is numerous; however, appealing for change is not the focus of this study

although it may be interesting to analyze at a future date. For the purposes of this

dissertation and this analysis, I only analyze the actual boycotts that garnered national

attention and generated notable collective involvement.

While I would like to provide a case study analysis of all the major corporate boycotts,

there is little to no information on the AFA’s website about any of those boycotts. Further,

the head of the activist department had nowhere to point me to on the website and no helpful

past documents or previous statements to provide. To accurately test my hypotheses, it is

imperative I have language written by the elites who framed and mobilized the boycott.

Therefore, I am confined to a case study of one, given that there is only one current AFA

boycott. The AFA introduced the Target boycott in 2016 because of Target’s bathroom

policy (AFA.net). I use The Associated Press and The Washington Post,

Breitbart, and the AFA’s official website as the primary sources for my data and

information.

The Target boycott is one of the most successful boycotts the AFA has ever sponsored

in terms of individuals involved. As of April 18th, 2018, the online boycott pledge has

1,527,832 signatures. The boycott was initially launched on April 20th, 2016. By May 2nd,

2016, the boycott had already received the bulk of its signatures with 1,137,000 (Riehl

2016). That means that within days a significant portion of AFA members and many

nonmembers (membership is not required to pledge) had already signed the petition.

Perhaps even more telling are the stock and profit losses that Target has experienced since

the boycott launched. The Washington Post reported that Target’s popularity dropped 4%

after their bathroom policy was first announced (Andrews 2016). The AFA reported that

Target’s stock fell 43% and their stock prices hit a two-year low after the start of the boycott

(Vitagliano 2017). This indicates that the individuals who first signed the pledge are indeed

holding up their end of the bargain.

Target Boycott

On April 19th, 2016, Target released a statement that they would allow transgendered

people to use the bathroom of their choice. In their own words, “In our stores, we

demonstrate our commitment to an inclusive experience in many ways. Most relevant for

the conversations currently underway, we welcome transgender team members and guests

to use the restroom or fitting room facility that corresponds with their gender identity.”

(corporate.target.com). This statement satisfies the “catalyst” requirement of Hypothesis

One in that it drew attention to an issue that evangelicals feel strongly about.

Following this, the AFA called their members into action—asking members and

nonmembers alike to sign a pledge. By signing this pledge, individuals promised to take

their business elsewhere because of Target’s bathroom policy. The pledge says, "Until

Target makes the safety of women and children a priority, I will shop elsewhere." Then the

AFA specifically asked their members to share the Target pledge with others, their friends

and family and church members and to "politely" voice their concerns on social media. The

AFA "call to action page" also includes a list of links to stories about harassments that have

happened in Target bathrooms and changing rooms. This, of course, is supposed to instigate

evangelical concern and consternation. The page has a picture of a young girl looking

scared and alone with the words, “Men don’t belong in women’s restrooms and changing

areas. #BoycottTarget” inscribed on the picture. The AFA website says the

following:

This [Target bathroom policy] means a man can simply say he "feels like a woman

today" and enter the women's restroom...even if young girls or women are already

in there. Target's policy is exactly how sexual predators get access to their victims.

And with Target publicly boasting that men can enter women's bathrooms, where

do you think predators are going to go?

Clearly, Target's dangerous new policy poses a danger to wives and daughters. Over

1 million people agree with us and pledged to boycott Target stores until protecting

women and children is a priority.

One solution is a common-sense approach and a reasonable solution to the issue of

transgendered customers: a unisex bathroom. Target should keep separate facilities

for men and women, but for the trans community and for those who simply like

using the bathroom alone, a single occupancy unisex option should be provided

(https://www.afa.net/activism/action-alerts/2016/04/sign-the-boycott-

targetpledge/)

There is obvious framing here, as well as a clear invoking of an out-group, namely sexual

predators, who want to prey on women and young children. The unidentified but implied

outgroup is the LGBTQ community. This boycott is based upon the in-group/out-group

premise. As the literature on gays and evangelicals posits, the homosexual community acts

as the perfect villainous “they” in these boycotts (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006).

Hence, the homosexual community provides the threatening out-group for evangelicals to

respond to and coalesce against; this in-group/out-group dynamic, based on Smith’s (1998)

subcultural identity theory, strengthens and develops evangelical collective identity. The

existence of an out-group provides support for my third hypothesis that stipulates there

must be a collective identity to stimulate collective mobilization.

The language invoked here focuses less on values and marginalization and more on

issues of safety. The AFA assumes that their members share their traditional Biblical values

and already have a problem with the premise behind “open” bathrooms. Thus, it invokes a

direct sense of threat. The AFA uses words like "dangerous" and "danger" to invoke a sense

of fear. Elites organized and framed the issue. They first drew attention to the problem and

the out-group, presented a solution, and convinced their members that participation is

essential to the cause. This is evidence of the requirements needed to fulfill Hypothesis

Two.

The fourth hypothesis is the final hypothesis that needs to be satisfied. Do members feel

social marginalization? This is perhaps the most difficult hypotheses to assess given that I

am trying to extrapolate individual feelings from collective action; however, there are a few

key indicators that provide support for social marginalization. The first indicator, of course,

is that these individuals chose to be a part of the AFA and given the language used by the

AFA to inspire membership, these individuals were feeling enough strain to join. However,

this is not enough to satisfy hypothesis four.

The Target transgender bathroom policy is a product of the times. In other words, the

social zeitgeist that I spoke at length about in my theory in veering towards norms and

policies with which evangelicals are not as comfortable. This change creates an

environment or a feeling of social marginalization, if not of the individual themselves, then

of the values they hold in high regard. The social marginalization of their values then plays

an important role in stimulating them to action. They are not OK with something that goes

against their Biblical moral standards. Protecting and promoting Biblical values is why they

joined the AFA in the first place; therefore, any policy or event that threatens or

marginalizes those values must be spoken out against. Consequently, the very existence of

this out-group and the policies and values they represent engenders the social strain and

feeling of threat that Smith's subcultural theory posits. The issue frame then paints an even

more threatening picture and one that likely stirs up more strain. The framing likely intends

to make evangelicals respond with the following sentiment: “The homosexual agenda is

not only threatening our values but now also our personal safely!”

Beyond this, the fact that the Target boycott is one of the largest in the AFA's history is

telling. Many of the previous boycotts and appeals were in response to the same

"homosexual agenda." However, in 2016, the social zeitgeist had become increasingly

liberal socially and therefore, much more socially marginalizing. Thus, it is no surprise that

the Target boycott received the most support. This does not mean, however, that the framing

of the issue, as well as the other variables, did not also play an important role in the sizable

turnout. It is worth considering why this is that the largest response to a boycott and what

about today's social zeitgeist likely played a part.48

However, I cannot definitively show support for the social marginalization hypothesis

in the way that I can for the other three hypotheses. I can only analyze the context, language,

and reason for the boycott, along with the mission statement of the AFA, to get a sense of

the emotions behind the boycott. Most every boycott that the AFA has launched has been

in response to some new "homosexual agenda"; therefore, the Target boycott is no different

except that it is in response to a different aspect of the "homosexual agenda." Further, I can

assume, that with the presence of the homosexual "out-group," based on

Smith's theory, evangelicals are feeling threatened by the perceived out-group and feel the

need respond. Thus, I believe social marginalization was a necessary condition for

evangelical collective mobilization.

Political Consumerism: Buycotts

The Chick-fil-A buycott is a unique and so far, “one-of-a-kind” occurrence. A close

analysis of the moving parts of this event helps us better understand evangelical

mobilization moving forward. Buycotts are uniquely different from boycotts in that they

are predicated on supporting and rewarding a business rather than punishing a business.

Hence, buycotts require more active involvement since those involved must intentionally

go to the business and buy to express their support. Boycotting is the absence of activity

(or transference) while buycotting is activity.

Since there is only one example of an evangelical buycott in recent history, I spend

extensive time delving into the specific details surrounding the event. This event is not only

unique because of its singularity but also because it was not organized and promoted by an

organization with an already established following; instead, it was promoted by a few

evangelical elites via social media, allowing for all evangelicals, whether socially or

politically engaged or not, to mobilize.

Setting and Context

As of 2012, many major companies had begun to take a public stand on sexual politics.

Major brands like Google, Starbucks, Nike, General Mills, Apple, Goldman Sachs, Boeing,

amongst many others, took a public stance on the issue of gay marriage (Phillip 2012). The

first line of Phillip’s article says, "Gay marriage advocates have a new and powerful ally in

corporate America." She goes on to note that 48 companies signed a brief arguing that the

Defense of Marriage Act negatively affected their business. In 2011, 25 executives of major

corporations including Goldman Sachs, Viacom and Alcoa lobbied New York legislators to

approve same-sex marriage. Another 2012 news article proclaimed that “the last five years

have seen a significant increase in the number of companies deciding to embrace the reward

rather than the risk of voicing support of LGBT rights” (McPherson and Clise 2012). Many

companies, such as Apple, JC Penney, Macy's, Kraft Foods, and Oreo, started embracing

LGBTQ rights by using gay couples and imagery in their advertising. This uptick in

corporate support and promotion of LGBTQ norms coincides with the societal embrace of

LGBTQ norms. Gallup polls show that, in 2012, 63% of Americans thought gay marriage

should be legal while 54% thought it was morally acceptable. Though these are not

overwhelming numbers, they are high when compared to what they were ten or even five

years prior.

“Traditional marriage” has, for the most part, always been the socially-accepted status quo

and the norm in American society. Therefore, it is novel and noteworthy for a company to

run a commercial showing a boy with two dads, or to include a same-sex couple emoji on

an iPhone. The companies that are making these changes are moving away from the status

quo and starting to embrace and promote new norms. Still, even with this burgeoning

change in society and in corporate America, it is important to note that most commercials

and advertisements still conform to heterosexual norms while the commercial or

advertisement that does not is the aberration. The increase and promotion of these new

norms are distinctive given their scarcity.

These new norms are part of what stirs up a feeling of social marginalization. This

feeling of marginalization/alienation is made up of a mixture of feelings—including, but

not limited to: feelings of concern, fear for the future, feeling disrespected and feeling

frustrated and agitated. These are all the feelings that the evangelical community begins to

feel in response to the changes they see in society. Seeing outward evidence of what they

call "sin" only bolsters and increases their already negative perspective on society. Their

worldview dictates that man is innately sinful and evil and that everything slowly decays

and dies. Given this worldview, they already feel that society is naturally going to go in the

wrong direction; however, this does not make the practical ways they see this happening

less painful to them. This is the picture. Evangelicals are coming off long and hard-fought

social and political battles during the 1970s through the 1990s. They formed the Moral

Majority, the Christian Coalition, supported Pat Buchanan, fought against Roe vs. Wade,

and fought to keep prayer in schools. In the end, they lost most of these battles politically.

Entering the twenty-first century, from the perspective of the evangelical community,

things in society are not looking too promising. Church attendance has fallen to new lows,

religious "nones" continue to grow, Protestant churches are closing their doors in droves

and abortion is still legal (Lipka 2013; 2015). A few years into the twenty-first century, the

LGBTQ movement begins gaining traction socially and politically. As society begins to

embrace the LGBTQ cause, corporations respond and do the same. Soon, the LGBTQ

movement is a fully developed social movement calling for societal acceptance and

governmental validation via the Supreme Court. Some are starting to consider evangelicals

to be bigoted and hateful for continuing to hold to the pastime belief that homosexuality is,

in some way, wrong or sinful. I cannot say definitively that evangelicals are feeling socially

marginalized because of this context, but the chances are high that they are.

Chick-fil-A

As of 2012, many corporations had started to establish their support of same-sex marriage

publicly. No company had come out speaking against same-sex marriage. It is much easier

to advertise one's brand for something rather than against something. However, as the

Chick-fil-A example will show, saying you are for something implies that you might be

against something. The implication, in some cases, is enough.

On June 16, 2012, Dan Cathy, the president of Chick-fil-A, said on “The Ken Coleman

Show” that:

"I think we are inviting God's judgment on our nation when we shake our fist at

him and say, ‘We know better than you as to what constitutes marriage.' I pray

God's mercy on our generation that has such a prideful, arrogant attitude to think

that we have the audacity to define what marriage is about" (McGregor 2012).

There was little acknowledgment or coverage of this interview at first. Then in the July 7th

issue of the Biblical Recorder, Dan Cathy responded to the claim that some are critical of

his company's support of the traditional family by saying, "Well, guilty as charged." Then

he explained to a reporter for The Christian Post:

“We are very much supportive of the family—the biblical definition of the family

unit. We own a family business, a family led business, and we are married to our

first wives. We give God thanks for that … We want to do anything we possibly

can to strengthen families. We are very much committed to that.” (Collier 2012).

On July 2nd, Equality Matters released a study showing Chick-fil-A’s financial

contributions based on a 2010 tax return. In it, they found secondary donations to “antigay”

organizations. Not long after this, the Baptist Press published the Biblical Recorder

interview with a few minor grammatical changes (Hannon 2013). The next day, Advocate

published an article entitled, “It’s Official: Chick-fil-A COO Dan Cathy Comes Out as

Anti-Gay” (Garcia 2012). A slew of articles began to pop up all over the internet with

similar titles. Soon, the June 16th interview on “The Ken Coleman Show” is publicized and

thrust into the conversation, as are the findings about the Chick-fil-A donations. These new

reports sparked a social media firestorm. Hannon (2013) points out that prior to the July

16th article, the interview was entirely uncommented upon in social media (2013)

The reporter who wrote the initial story and conducted the interview for the Biblical

Recorder said that the interview with Mr. Cathy was “very positive” and unlike how the

rest of the media was portraying it (Hendricks 2012).

After BP re-posted the story, related articles soon surfaced in the Huffington Post,

Associated Press, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, Fox News, and other news agencies

– many of which ran articles with “anti-gay” in the headline.

Many of those reports “turned [the original story] into a negative,” said Blume,

adding the term “anti-gay” never came up in the June interview while Cathy was

speaking in the Raleigh area.

“He was not saying ‘guilty as charged anti-gay,’” Blume added. “[Cathy] never even

brought up that subject. Everything he stated was on the positive side … He never

stated anything negative” (Hendricks 2012).

For some, this is a clear example of media framing, framing that spurred many into action

and triggered a firestorm of reactions and condemnations by celebrities and politicians on

social media and eventually spurred politicians to speak out against Chick-fil-A and to

declare the organization unwelcome in their cities. The framing that the media and LGBTQ

community engaged in is a clear example of social constructionism. This framing, however,

ended up working against them as the critiques and anger towards Chick-fil-A just

solidified this LGBTQ community's out-group status for evangelicals and increased the

feeling of threat for evangelicals.

Quite a few major politicians took public stances against Chick-fil-A after news of Dan

Cathy’s comments hit the web. The mayor of Boston, Thomas Memino, told Chick-fil-A

that there was "no place for your company" in his city and stated that he would not allow

Chick-fil-A to open franchises in his city. Not long after, Chicago city officials declared

that Chick-fil-A’s values were not representative of Chicago’s values, after which,

Alderman Moreno stated his intentions to block any new Chick-fil-A stores from opening

in Chicago. A DC councilman tweeted that he does not support “hate chicken” (Bingham

2012). CNN reported that a city councilman in Philadelphia, James F. Kenney, said to

Chick-fil-A "Take a hike and take your intolerance with you." San Francisco Mayor Edwin

M. Lee tweeted: "Closest #ChickFilA to San Francisco is 40 miles away & I strongly

recommend that they not try to come any closer." (Gilgoff 2012). Twitter also broke out in

a firestorm because of the comments made by Dan Cathy. Ed Helms, the actor most known

for his role in The Office, tweeted, “Chick-fil-A doesn’t like gay people? So lame. Hate to

think what they do to gay chickens! Lost a loyal fan.” Eventually, Chick-fil-A posted a

Facebook statement saying that they strive to treat all people with respect, honor, and

dignity and intend to stay out of the political and social debate.

Not much later, Carly McGehee, a lesbian political activist in Dallas, introduced the

idea of protesting Chick-fil-A by holding a “kiss-in” at Chick-fil-A on a specific day (Walsh

2012). She called this day “National Same-Sex Kiss Day @ Chick-fil-A." She is quoted

saying, “I hope the visibility of the kiss-in helps LGBT youth who feel isolated and are

victims of bullying” (Walsh 2012; Laird 2012).

Without any elite framing, mobilization or organization, the frenzy of reactions would

likely die down, and people move on with their lives. Evangelicals may feel connected to

Chick-fil-A more than before and begin eating there more often, but little else changes.

Their feelings of marginalization and alienation slowly die down but remain raw and easily

stoked.

However, evangelical elites did respond. Leith Anderson, the president of the National

Association of Evangelicals, said, “Individuals have the right to decide whether or not to

‘eat mor chikin.’ But no government leader should restrict a business or organization from

expanding to their district based on the personal or political views of the owners” (Gilgoff

2012b). Evangelicals expressed exasperation with the politicians and leaders who began to

politically shun the franchise because of Dan Cathy’s comments. Anderson said, “Such

evident discrimination and attempts to marginalize those with religious convictions have

no place in American democracy” (Gilgoff 2012b).

Mike Huckabee, a well-known Baptist pastor, and politician, posted on Facebook and

Twitter a call for an organized counter-protest. He says:

I ask you to join me in speaking out on Wednesday, August 1 "Chick-Fil-A

Appreciation Day." No one is being asked to make signs, speeches, or openly

demonstrate. The goal is simple: Let's affirm a business that operates on Christian

principles and whose executives are willing to take a stand for the Godly values we

espouse by simply showing up and eating at Chick-Fil-A on Wednesday, August 1.

Too often, those on the left make corporate statements to show support for same-

sex marriage, abortion, or profanity, but if Christians affirm traditional values, we're

considered homophobic, fundamentalists, hate-mongers, and intolerant. This effort

is not being launched by the Chick-fil-A company, and no one from the company

or family is involved in proposing or promoting it.

This Facebook post satisfies Hypothesis Two and to an extent Hypothesis Three. Huckabee

first provides evangelicals with an organized and individualistic collective way to respond

to the criticisms of Chick-fil-A. He then uses culturally specific language to target and stir

up the evangelical population. He says, “willing to take a stand for the Godly values we

espouse." First, he frames the situation appropriately for evangelicals by stressing the

importance of "Godly values." He then uses the word "we" invoking a sense of the

"collective" we, as if he represents and is part of a bigger collective unit of people whom

all agree on what these "Godly values" are.

The media painted the picture that eating at Chick-fil-A is a statement to the world of

being a devout evangelical (Hannon 2013). “Once Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day was

established, it became the "in" thing for conservative politicians and pundits. It became,

briefly, a litmus test for if someone was really conservative and if they really supported

Biblical values or just gave them lip service. In this way, participation became a badge of

membership” (Hannon 2013, 46). There is a clear out-group and sense of a collective

“we”—even if evangelicals are still maintaining their individuality by showing up

individually for their own personal reasons. Hypothesis Three is therefore satisfied.

Huckabee went on to give a specific time and date for evangelical mobilization and

catered to their individuality by emphasizing that it is not a political act as much as it is just

a simple act of support and solidarity that can be carried out individually. He invoked this

same sentiment earlier in his post when he says, "no one is being asked to make signs,

speeches or openly demonstrate." He used these phrases intentionally. Evangelicals who

are not involved in much else than their church and personal outreach are likely not thrilled

(like the pastors I interviewed) about engaging publicly in protests. However, showing up

to support Godly values by eating food, along with other evangelicals who are also

supporting the same values, provides an excellent opportunity for evangelicals to mobilize.

The final portion of his post invokes those feelings of frustration, and social marginalization

that he assumes are already simmering in the evangelical population. He said, "Too often,

those on the left make corporate statements to show support for same-sex marriage,

abortion, or profanity, but if Christians affirm traditional values, we're considered

homophobic, fundamentalists, hate-mongers, and intolerant." He paints a picture of the

stereotypes evangelicals fall under and the frustrations they must have with those

stereotypes. Further, he lists all the negative attributes (same-sex marriage, abortion,

profanity) of the outgroup that are stimulating the feelings of social marginalization.

With this Facebook post, Huckabee attempted to stimulate and stir up already present

feelings of frustrations within the evangelical population. He paints a picture of a

marginalized, pitiful and unrepresented group that needs to come out and re-establish their

marginalized position. Without this feeling of social marginalization to stir up, he would

possess far less ammunition to stimulate the evangelical public into action.

I remind you of how the pastors I interviewed responded. They seemed so eager to

explain and justify their positions, their identity and what they stand. In the same way,

evangelicals, when given a chance participate in collective claim making (Tilly 2006) by

eating a chicken sandwich, seemed eager to do so. One New York Times article described

the Chick-fil-A controversy in this way, “For many, it comes down to this: Eating at

Chickfil-A supports heterosexual marriage and religious freedom. Refusing to eat there

supports same-sex marriage and equality" (Severson and Brown 2012). An article in The

Atlantic said that Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day was a sort of anti-boycott in response to

calls for an actual boycott (Martin 2012). Hence, I can safely say that, given the evidence

presented, Hypothesis Four, social marginalization, is satisfied.

This is also an obvious form of counter-mobilization in that evangelicals are countering

first moves made by the LGBTQ community. However, the primary reason I conceptualize

it as a counter-mobilization is because evangelicals are supporting and holding up what

they consider to the be status quo of marriage values.

Evangelical Response

After Huckabee, an elite, framed the embattled, marginalized storyline to the evangelical

community, how did the evangelical community respond? An article from The Huffington

Post reported the following quote from Steve Robinson, a Chick-fil-A executive of

marketing, “While we don’t release exact sales numbers, we can confirm reports that it was

a record-setting day” (Fox News 2012). Fox News called the turnout on Chick-fil-A

appreciation day unprecedented, with some reports saying that restaurants were running

out of chicken because of the overwhelming business. Huckabee told Fox

News that the turnout for Chick-fil-A had “gone beyond anything I could have imagined”

(Bingham 2012). CNN reported that the lines in multiple locations across the country were

tremendous and that Facebook was flooded with images of people holding up their

Chickfil-A bags in support of the movement. One Forbes writer who also attended the

Chick-filA Appreciation Day wrote of his experience:

I live in LA so, I was not expecting much in way of support but, I was not just

surprised, I was blown away. The Chick-fil-A in Northridge, California, had a line

that twisted throughout the parking lot. It was almost 100 degrees but, that didn't

seem to deter anyone. They were peaceful, and the demographic was wide-ranging.

Blacks, whites, teenagers, kids, Latinos and all other categories you could imagine. At

this location, there were no anti-Chick-fil-A protesters. (Broes 2012)

News reports say that lines snaked around the buildings at some stores, with people waiting

hours to get their chicken. There was a tremendous turnout and record sales. There is no

way to know the religious or political identity of those that did turn out; however,

Huckabee's call to action was a direct plea to Christians, most notably evangelicals. He

said, "Let's affirm a business that operates on Christian principles and whose executives

are willing to take a stand for the Godly values we espouse…”.

Who are the people who mobilized in this case? Are they really evangelicals? While it

is unclear how many of those who participated in Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day were

evangelical, the news painted the movement as an evangelical movement, and the call for

action was directed at evangelicals. There is no way to defend against the ecological fallacy

statistically; however, common sense dictates that this turnout was highly evangelical and

based upon the defense of typical conservative evangelical values.

The result is clear, evangelicals (and many others) collectively mobilized in support of

Chick-fil-A. All four necessary conditions were met, and therefore, collective mobilization

occurred. They would not have mobilized without the instigation and planning of Mike

Huckabee, who was aided in disseminating the message through conservative media outlets

and social media platforms. They would not have mobilized to the same extent without

feeling marginalized and alienated. They would not have mobilized without the “collective

identity” and desire to express that identity and their values through consumerism. In

conclusion, then, all four hypotheses were satisfied and thus suggest a potential sufficient

condition for evangelical collective mobilization.

News Reports and Interviews

In this section, I provide a few quotes from different individuals who were involved in

the buycott. This gives a more in-depth understanding of the individual motivations for

collective action, although I cannot say based on this evidence that it is representative of

the population of participants. Individuals within the evangelical community, as well as

individuals not associated with the evangelical community, mobilized for various reasons.

Some mobilized simply because they wanted to support “free speech” while others

countermobilized for religious reasons. CNN reports one person saying, “It’s really hard to

find people or leaders that stand for something good and stay firm” (Staff 2012). Another

man was reported saying “I think it is ironic that the so-called forces of tolerance and

inclusion are calling for the exclusion of Chick-fil-A from cities simply because of the

beliefs of their chairman... People that disagree with me have a right to their opinion, and I

have a right to mine," he said. Another posted on Facebook the following statement: “Good

job supporters for coming out in force. This company is going to make more money today

than any other day of the year. That's what happens when you put Jesus first." Another

person is quoted saying, “A lot of us I think, we believe that our country has made a lot of

poor choices and it's nice just to support someone who supports the same things that we do”

(CNN.com)

CNN published a comments article displaying a swath of comments made by different

readers weighing in on the Chick-fil-A debate (see “Overheard on CNN.com: Readers

Defend Chick-fil-A’s Stance on Marriage”). One commenter says,

Mr. C. is not trying to force you to do anything. He is merely stating his moral

standards in public, standards which you refuse to accept. That is not hate. That is

not discrimination. That is intolerance, but it's intolerance of evil behavior, and

that's laudable. If you are offended by that, then that's your fault. Admit it and stop

spewing hate.

Others were more concerned about the issue of free speech. One commenter said,

“Someone asked him his opinion. What, is he locked into only chicken-related discussion

because he runs a chicken place?”. A homosexual man is quoted as saying, "I'm gay. I don't

care. If I ceased buying products from companies that did things I didn't like, then I'd be

Amish…".

Many different organizations joined to support of Chick-fil-a, including Project 21, a

Black conservative activist organization. Fox News reported one of its members, Demetrios

Minor, explaining why their organization supports Chick-fil-A. He says, “I think liberals

are missing a vital point in their blind hatred of Chick-fil-A. Being against gay marriage is

not being anti-gay” (Roberts 2012).

There were at least two primary types of supporters, those who supported the specific

religious cause and those that supported free speech (Hannon 2013). Hannon (2013) also

found that amongst the evangelical population there was a debate on what real Christianity

is. Some argued that Christianity is about love and tolerance and that Dan Cathy was not

representing true Christianity while others disagreed.

Who Mobilized? The Individual or the Church?

Individuals mobilized in response to elite prompting, but did churches and

congregations also respond corporately? "Religious leaders make connections between

faith and political goals by impressing members with a sense that they should participate

in politics as part of the criteria of living 'like a Christian'" (Greenberg 2000, 381). Pastors

can use the community of the church to impress upon their members the importance of

supporting their Christian values by supporting Chick-fil-A. However, there is little

evidence available, that I can find, to show that this is how pastors or churches responded

in this instance.

While churches act as a network of association with opinion leaders generating and

stimulating discourse, as my interviews show, not all churches engage in corporate

behavior. In fact, based on my findings, very few churches engage in this behavior. This

leads me to believe that only a small number of evangelical pastors are responsible for

making most of the noise coming from the evangelical population. Perhaps most

evangelical churches keep their heads down and do not get involved? This does not mean

that many of the evangelicals attending church were not activated to participate in the

Chick-fil-A buycott, but it does mean that many of those participating were not likely

participating because of a church-wide movement instigated by the pastor.

However, some evangelical pastors and evangelical leaders feel the need to get involved

in political and social issues even if others, seemingly the majority, do not. Larry

Taunton, a prominent author and Christian activist, also the founder of Fixed Point

Foundation, a Christian think tank in Alabama, wrote an article about his experiences

regarding the Chick-fil-A controversy. Taunton used the article, published on a Fox News

Opinion page, to criticize pastors who do not get involved, claiming that they are simply

wimps. He says, "This event [Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day] marked the first time I could

remember Christians fighting back rather than meekly submitting to the media and special

interest bullies" (2017). He argued against the stance a fellow evangelical, John Piper, took

on the Chick-fil-A controversy. Piper discouraged evangelicals from participating in the

buycott and said that he would not be participating in the Chick-fil-A buycott. His reasoning

is as follows:

Convictions, especially political ones, will divide people. That is inevitable but not

desirable. The separation of believers and unbelievers, when it happens, must be a

last resort or an unavoidable result. Actions to the contrary, those that clearly

promote an ‘us versus them’ mentality, are most often unhelpful. There is a time

for Christians to engage in boycotting, such as when a business deals in obviously

immoral areas or is clearly unethical in its methods. But for a mass of Christians

to descend upon Chick-fil-A restaurants across the country tomorrow to support the

leadership’s view on this issue is, I believe, a bold mistake.

Taunton, miffed by this stance, writes in response, “…brother, if you can’t be relied on to

show up and order a combo meal in support of a company under attack for its commitment

to Christian principles, when exactly can we count on you?”. Taunton proceeds to lay out

what he believes a Christian’s duty is. He says it is not to be likable. Rather, Christians

should "push back against culture" and, in turn, be perceived as "divisive," "unloving,"

"bigoted" and "intolerant" for standing for what is right and moral. He draws his argument

to a conclusion when he says, "I fully believe that if they [evangelical Christians] were to

find their voices, their courage, and were to dispense of the candy-assed Christianity, that

we would see a Great Awakening in America. Indeed, we would see American become truly

great rather than superficially so. But it will, as I say, require courage because the forces

opposing us seem determined to burn this country to the ground" (2017).

There is a clear spiritual disagreement within the evangelical community about their

place in society and politics. I believe that the Chick-fil-A controversy draws attention to

this disagreement. Further, I presume that the Chick-fil-A case was one of the few occasions

that the hitherto latent evangelicals were willing to participate. Their involvement was not

part of a church-wide protest. It did not require a political stance or require becoming

deeply involved in a debate, nor did it require a well-oiled organization with millions of

members. Instead, all that was required was simply buying a chicken sandwich. In doing

so, however, they could make a statement about their individual values and establish

themselves as part of a certain community (Hannon 2013).

The pastors that I interviewed almost all seemed to fall into the “stay out of the politics”

camp. They did not mind forms of traditional political participation like voting. In fact,

they encouraged and supported traditional participation; but they would rarely ever

organize a church-wide protest or boycott or tell their congregants to vote for someone.

The focus on the individual was ever-present in their mindset. Every individual in the

congregation was entitled to their own opinion, conscience and political position. The

church was not interested in forcing its members to support a corporate position that the

member may not support. Each pastor seemed fine with the idea of individual members

engaging in whatever form of political mobilization they wanted, whether it be expressing

on Twitter on avoiding a certain company because of their position on some moral issue,

but corporate activity was avoided. Thus, it is fundamental to this chapter that the readers

understand the uniqueness of this Chick-fil-A buycott.

The “Kiss-In” and Homosexual Response

Two days after Chick-fil-A Appreciation Day, the LGBTQ community launched their

own protest, this time against Chick-fil-A. They held a “Kiss-In” in which gay members of

the community came to Chick-fil-A to kiss in public at the restaurant. The turnout was

surprisingly muted. News reports claim that there was a much smaller than expected turnout

for the “kiss-in” protest (NBCDFW 2012; Williams, Vives, and Xia 2012). Local TV

stations reported little to no turnout in some places.

This muted turnout in support of the homosexual community seems a little surprising.

At the time, LGBTQ rights were central in the cultural zeitgeist. In 2012, 3.5% of the

United States population identified as LGBTQ (Gates 2017). This is not a very large

number of people in the U.S., although if all 8.3 million turned out to kiss at Chick-fil-A,

there could have been a notable turnout. The LGBTQ population is smaller than the

evangelical population, which could be one explanation for lower turnout. However, they

had been very active socially and politically during 2012, and social and political activism

is not against the LGBTQ movement or worldview.

The LGBTQ population has been a marginalized population for centuries (Plummer

1996). “The significance of homosexuality in our society context within which the

homosexual can find has been minimized and obscured by the force acceptance as

homosexual and collective support of social taboo” (1996). However, clearly, an important

variable was missing in this instance of attempted LGBTQ mobilization. A hypothesis was

left unsatisfied.

Carly McGehee, a lesbian political activist, based in Dallas, Texas, posted a Facebook

post calling the LGBTQ community to action after Cathy's remarks. She said later in an

interview, “We live in a time where hate isn't acceptable anymore" (Murray 2012). Her

Facebook post received 15,000 likes. How elite and respected is Carly McGehee? It is hard

to say, and research shows little about what kind of activist she is. She does not represent

Gay, Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) a powerful and prominent gay rights

organization. Her "Kiss-In" did receive a sizeable amount of media coverage, and she was

interviewed by GLAAD about the boycott prior to the planned day of action. However, the

satisfaction of Hypothesis Two, elite framing, and mobilization, is hard to establish. The

framing was weak and the elite status questionable.

There is a clear sense of "collective identity" in this community, and the presence of the

evangelical "out-group" confirms this, which means Hypothesis Three is satisfied. Dan

Cathy's statements act as a clear catalyst event, satisfying Hypothesis One. A clear sense of

social marginalization brought on by Dan Cathy's comments is harder to support, however,

even if it appears supported at face value. The LGBTQ community has been marginalized

on many occasions; however, in this circumstance, the swath of media voices, political

voices, and social reactions supporting the LGBTQ community after the Dan Cathy

statements likely vindicated some of these feelings.

Further, Chick-fil-A made no public statement regarding its stance on homosexuality.

Dan Cathy spoke of his marriage values, but he did not say that he opposes gay marriage

or that members of the LGBTQ community are not welcome in his restaurant. Perhaps the

discovery of Chick-fil-A donations to “anti-gay” organizations is a stronger motivator; but

even that does not change the fact that many politicians and talking heads rallied in support

of the gay community, assuaging much of their social marginalization. For the feelings of

marginalization to matter, members must feel like society is not on their side and that they

are on the margins of society. The slew of reactions for the LGBTQ cause goes against this

marginalized premise then, making collective action harder to stimulate. There is no need

to make an “identity claim” or express a marginalized perspective when---as I showed in

the description of the backlash against Chick-fil-a---most of society is rallying in favor of

that perspective and identity. Hence, I cannot safely say that Hypothesis Four is satisfied.

This means that Hypothesis Five is not satisfied and is the likely explanation for such a low

turnout on the designated “kiss-in” day.

Conclusion

These case studies show that the combination of four necessary conditions potentially

creates the ideal sufficient condition for evangelical mobilization. Further, the unsuccessful

LGBTQ “Kiss-in” suggests the importance of a prominent elite voice, a powerful frame

and vibrant feelings of social marginalization.

There is much work to be done moving forward. This is not an exhaustive study, and there

are other cases to study. The two cases I have tested provide support for my theory that

perceived social marginalization, kindled by opinion leaders, may be a necessary condition

for mobilization. Further, they provide a clearer picture of evangelical motivations and

stimulation. They respond to language promoting Biblical values and family values;

further, they may feel threatened by the homosexual “out-group” and therefore respond to

language invoking this threat.

The findings presented in this dissertation are unique within political science and religion

and politics. Groups that feel marginalized and alienated are supposed to mobilize using

alternative methods of political and social involvement. However, I am finding that, for

evangelicals, they are for the most part content using mainstream forms of participation

such as voting and writing their congressman. A small subset certainly engages in deeper

ways as opinion leaders, media figures, and campaign donors. Further, many seem to be

entirely individualistic in their worldview. Therefore, it takes a unique set of conditions to

mobilize evangelicals. In other words, evangelicals do mobilize because of feeling

marginalized but only under a specific set of circumstances. This chapter shows that

collective mobilization is hard to come by for evangelicals and may only occur when the

stars align.

CHAPTER 6

TWITTER: THE NEW, NEW TACTIC

“The gospel doesn’t need gimmicks it stands on its own truth. Marketing ploys in the church

as if Jesus is a product is an insult to the cross & the redemptive power of God.

Implementing secular things or preaching a ‘desirable’ gospel other than the bible to win

souls is a no.”

Nefertari—@Rumbizlee, posted on Twitter April 1, 2018, at 1:42 pm

“The church cannot be both prophet and lobbyist. We must decide to whom are we

allegiant? In whom do we place our trust? If it is man, then we should lobby as if our lives

depended on it. But if our hope is in God, then we should speak truth. To power.

Regardless of consequence.”

Mark Charles---@wirelesshogan, posted on Twitter February 2, 2018, at 10:13 pm

“Federal lawsuit in Colorado against a Christian baker why not against a Muslim baker?

Double standards?”

Harry Hattigh---@HarryHattigh, posted April 5, 2018, at 8:50 am

“I don't spend a single moment fearing Muslims. White Republican Evangelicals, on the

other hand... now, they terrify me daily. #LoveAMuslim” John Pavlovitz---

@johnpavlovitz, posted April 3, 2018, at 4:00 pm

“YES. They frighten me too. Crazy. They actually believe in doing whatever they deem

necessary to bring on the apocalypse and therefore the second coming. Dangerous

Fools.”

NerdQueen---@Scarletthirty2, post on April 4, 2018, at 4:19 pm in response to

Pavolovitz's tweet.

The prominent author and blogger, Lauren Leto, said this of Twitter: “Twitter provides us

with a wonderful platform to discuss/confront societal problems. We trend Justin Bieber

instead” (Farfan 2017). She brings attention to the irony of Twitter. Twitter provides an

open forum for public political discussion and news in a way that has never been seen

before. Yet, most people tweet about nonsense or mundane topics. Research shows that

liberals tweet more about politics than conservatives and that their tweets are also more

negative (Preotiuc-Pietro et al. 2017); therefore, there is variation in Twitter usage, and this

variation allows us to garner some useful and interesting information about different groups

in America.

I use Twitter as a proxy for evangelical mobilization at the individual level. Twitter

provides a public forum for evangelicals to express themselves and their values; the

question is, do they? Rigorous analysis of the emotional makeup of the tweets requires a

level of statistical sophistication that even some highly skilled computer programmers

struggle to carry out. Therefore, I am unable to provide conclusive evidence about the levels

of perceived marginalization, or the lack thereof, expressed in evangelical tweets. However,

I do create a completely original dataset of evangelical Twitter users and a control dataset

of randomly selected Twitter users that allows me to compare the use of political language

by evangelicals and the general US population on Twitter. Further, I assess the basic

negative and positive sentiment displayed in evangelical tweets versus the control dataset.

I am also able to assess political Twitter use between the two groups regionally. This

analysis provides a narrow but enlightening and original starting point for religion and

politics scholars to understand how evangelicals are mobilizing online.

Twitter

Twitter has changed our world. It has become a new forum for public statements, a

new source of political and social activism, and a primary news source for many people

(Cresci 2016). As of January 1, 2018, there were 330 million monthly active Twitter users

producing about 500 million tweets a day (Aslom 2018). Seventy-nine percent of Twitter

users are based outside of the United States (2018). Demographically, 37% of Twitter users

are between the ages of 18-29, while 25% are between the ages of 30-49. Fifty-percent of

Twitter users make $50,000 or more a year. Twenty-nine percent of Twitter users have a

college degree or higher, while 25% have some college. Only 20% have a high-school

degree or less. Twitter is therefore more popular among the highly educated. Men and

women use Twitter at about the same rate. Twenty-four percent of all internet-using

Americans (68%) use Twitter (Greenwood, Perrin, and Duggan 2016; Smith and Anderson

2018).

Twitter has truly revolutionized the way the world works. However, as Lauren Leto

aptly stated, much of the discussion on Twitter has little to do with political or social issues.

In fact, Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) find that most of the political discussion on Twitter

comes from a small number of ideologically extreme members while most moderate

members use the site for immaterial conversations, comments, arguments, celebrity

following, and discussion. Demographically, Twitter does skew young, and users tend to

make more money than the world average; therefore, I realize that an analysis of Twitter is

not representative of everyone. However, because Twitter over-represents the educated and

wealthy it provides a key source of analysis to look at some of the more vocal members of

the population (Smith and Anderson 2018).

Twitter acts as an ideal proxy for individual-level mobilization. Are evangelicals

stimulated to express their “identity claims” (Tilly 2006) online after a politically or

socially relevant event stirs up feelings of social marginalization? The results of my case

studies in Chapter 5 show that without the necessary conditions of elite framing, collective

identity, a catalyst event, and a feeling of social marginalization, evangelicals are unlikely

to mobilize collectively.

However, in this chapter, I assume some evangelicals are mobilizing individually by

expressing their thoughts and positions on social media forums. Thus, all the variables

previously mentioned are not necessarily relevant. I believe each variable might at some

point influence online expression, but the combination of all the variables for sufficiency

is not required for individual expression on social media. I contend that the key influencing

factor for political expression on Twitter, for evangelicals, is a feeling of social

marginalization. In other words, if the counter-factual could be tested, we would find that

members who are politically expressive on Twitter would not have expressed in this way

were they not feeling social marginalization.

Expression is a fundamental part of political mobilization (Theocharis 2015; Rojas and

Puig-I-Abril 2009). Mobilization or counter-mobilization is simply an individual or a group

of individuals expressing themselves publicly. Citizens desire that their voices, for

whatever cause, be heard. Charles Tilly calls it "identity claims." Evangelicals simply want

to express their identity and their position on an issue without becoming overly involved in

the political or social process. Twitter allows for this kind of engagement.

While there is some debate about whether social media activity can be considered

political activity, scholars now agree that social media activism is indeed political activity

(Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013; Feezell 2016; McCosker 2015; Theocharis 2015;

Sormanen and Dutton 2015). Someone who chooses to go online and express their feelings

and thoughts about a political/social issue in a public forum is uniquely different from

someone who does not put the same time and effort into expressing those feelings or

thoughts publicly. While it is impossible to know whether the person who does not use

social media politically has the same feelings as the one who does, we can know that there

are some intangible variables pushing one person into online mobilization instead of

another.

The intangible mobilizing variable may be as simple as age. An elderly person may

have strong feelings and thoughts about political and social issues, but they are not inclined

or even capable of using social media to express those sentiments. Also, research shows

that certain personality types, such as extroversion and openness to new experiences, lend

themselves to increased social media usage, specifically for political reasons (Correa,

Hinsley, and Zúñiga 2013). Other psychological factors such as anxiety and emotional

instability also lend themselves to increased social media usage (Correa, Hinsley, and

Zúñiga 2013). While I cannot analyze the variables that differentiate Twitter users from

non-Twitter users, I can analyze the nuances differentiating Twitter users who express

themselves politically from those users who do not.

Some research has been done on the differences between conservative and liberal

Twitter users. Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) find that there are fewer very conservative

Twitter users than very liberal Twitter users. Very conservative Twitter users use more

religious language and demonstrate more positive emotion than very liberal Twitter users.

Liberal Twitter users’ language reflects more anxiety. Preotiuc-Pietro et al.’s analysis shows

that “…conservatives on Twitter [tend] to identify [with] like-minded individuals, as

extreme conservatives are a minority on the platform. Liberals, by contrast, use the platform

to discuss and popularize their causes” (734).

Their research shows then that liberals are far more likely to use Twitter for political

expression than conservatives, which means that any amount of political expression by

evangelicals is that much more unique. Preotiuc-Pietro et al. (2017) also find that

ideologically extreme Twitter users tweet about political issues much more frequently than

ideologically moderate users. Further, the overall sentiment of ideologically extreme

Twitter users is more negative. Ergo, the use of political terms in tweets is almost always

correlated with the ideological extreme groups. Given then that evangelicals usually hold

ideologically extreme views, they should be politically active on Twitter. However, as

Burge (2018) shows in his assessment of evangelical elites on Twitter; very few of them

used the platform for political expression. I believe that these pastors are restrained by more

pressures and expectations than average evangelicals, and therefore I expect to find a higher

rate of evangelical political expression on Twitter by non-clergy evangelicals.

Operationalization

The research for this chapter is two-fold. First, are evangelicals mobilizing? The

literature has established that social media political expression is a form of activism.

Therefore, the first question to answer is are they actually mobilizing. After I uncover the

answer to this question, I assess the negative or positive sentiment displayed in the tweets.

Given that mobilization is “the deliberate activation of social networks as a method of

diffusing awareness about a social or political problem or of exerting social and/or political

pressure for its resolution” (Theocharis 2015, 5) and that expression is a key means of

carrying this out, I choose to analyze Twitter. Due to data and coding limitations, I simply

analyze the number of tweets that contain political words. Using an extensive list of 240

political words or phrases such as "Trump," "Parkland," "Gun Control," "Gay," "Abortion"

and many others, I am able to identify political tweets. To achieve a more nuanced

assessment of political tweets, I divided the set of 240 words into social-political words

and non-social political words. Social-political words consist of words that deal with social

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