The United Nations Training of the Liberia National Police Effec

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Introduction

In the past 2 decades, the United Nations (UN) has increased its involvement in

international security reforms through police training in countries transitioning to

democracies. Zanotti (2004) stated, “Starting in the 1990s, the United Nations has

increasingly been mandated to bring about international security by intervening in failing

states through complex operations which include institutional reform projects” (p. 1). The

UN Security Council has mandated more than 69 peacekeeping missions, including

police assistance operations (Bayley, 2006; Franke & Warnecke, 2009).

International police assistance to nations transitioning from conflict to state

building is not a new phenomenon. To establish order and provide basic services in

occupied Germany and Japan, postwar international police assistance programs were

initiated by the United States following WWII. With the deployment of Ghanaian and

Nigerian police contingents, international police assistance under a UN mandate first

appeared in the Congo in 1960 (Bayley, 2006; Durch, 2010; Furuzawa, 2009). The UN

peacekeeping and police reform interventions also occurred in Cyprus in 1964 and

Namibia in 1989 (Krasno, 2004). The mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period

and security challenges in re-establishing legitimate national authority in fragile states

impelled the reintroduction of international police assistance as a component of

postconflict peacekeeping. Because of the emphasis on respect for human rights and the

rule of law, contemporary international police assistance and reform requirements are

different from those of the Cold War era. Police reform advocates stress the importance

of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency in

publicizing information on police operational activities, and responsiveness to the

security needs of ordinary citizens (Bayley, 2006; Furuzawa, 2009).

Postconflict peacekeeping and police reform initiatives have not always been

successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs are often hampered by

varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance, and reluctance

to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict security (Mobekk, 2001).

Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) argued that some police reform programs fail or become

less effective because the interventions fail to consider local political and social realities

of the reform environment. In addition, the antagonistic relationships between the

military, police, and other security institutions, punctuated by poor justice and

correctional systems, impact peacekeeping and police reform initiatives (Zanotti, 2004).

These issues pose challenges to postconflict international police reform interventions.

Police reform has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping

and state building operations (Furuzawa, 2009; O’Neill, 2005). Contemporary

international police reform interventions are led by industrialized donor nations such as

the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal democracies. The

overarching objectives of international police reform interventions are to build stable

democratic regimes in postconflict fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to

support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order

(Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010).

For the citizens of Liberia, the fear of conflict recurring after the United Nations

Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) leaves makes the issue of effective policing one of their

most pressing security concerns (Call & Wyeth, 2008; McDonough, 2008; Sawyer,

2005). Liberia needs a well-trained, professional police force dedicated to upholding the

rule of law and one trusted by the population. An effective police force capable of serving

as an instrument for public safety and maintaining law and order is essential to

sustainable statebuilding and democratic governance in Liberia (Alemika, 2009;

Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 2005).

In this study, I focused on the UNMIL’s police reform intervention activities

during the period from 2004 through 2010. It was during this time that the organization

recruited, trained, and deployed officers of the reorganized Liberian National Police

Force. The manner in which the UNMIL’s police training has affected public safety,

maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police was

investigated.

Background of the Study

On December 24, 1989, Liberia, the only country in Africa founded by freed

slaves from the United States, plunged into one of Africa’s bloodiest civil wars. Internal

political instability culminated in armed conflict between the government of Liberia and

the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel opposition faction. In later years,

other rebel opposition groups organized warring factions opposed to the NPFL. These

factions included the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), United

Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), Liberia Peace Council,

(LPC), Liberians United for Reconstruction and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement

for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL; Gadagbui, 2005). The armed conflict lasted 14 years

(1989–2003) and brought death, destruction of life and property, and genocide. It is

estimated that out of the nation’s population of 3.2 million, 250,000 thousand men,

women, and children were killed and 1,000,000 were displaced (Jaye, 2008; Sawyer,

2005). By the time the civil war ended in 2003, the nation had become a failed state

(Kraxberger, 2007).

The Liberian conflict became a concern for countries in the West African

subregion, and later for the international community of nations. In order to bring an end

to the civil war, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the

UN brokered a peace agreement that was signed between the warring factions in Accra,

Ghana in 2003 (Adibe, 1997; Gadagbui, 2005; Saikal, 2000). The Comprehensive Peace

Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 called for its implementation to be led by the UN.

The UNMIL was established on September 19, 2003 by UN Security Council

Resolution 1509. The mission was given the mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement,

provide national security protection, and implement security sector reforms including

restructuring of the Liberian National Police (LNP) and other security institutions in

Liberia (Jaye, 2008). This included taking charge of organizing and rebuilding Liberia’s

police force and other paramilitary security institutions until Liberian officers are judged

capable of taking over and managing them. The UNMIL was set up and deployed in

Liberia in 2003 (Muller & Sauvant, 2009). The UNMIL’s police training, restructuring

programs, and other security sector reform activities are implemented through the United

Nations Police (UNPOL), which is also an integral component of the UN Department of

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The UNPOL’s involvements in peacekeeping

operations vary according to the mandate of the UN Security Council. In the case of

Liberia, the Security Council Resolution also mandated the UNMIL:

To assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and

restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic

policing, to develop a civilian police training program, and to otherwise

assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), international

organizations, and interested States. (Malan, 2008, p. 47)

This provision of the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 provided the legal

basis for the UNPOL’s operations. The UNPOL had authority to maintain law and order,

provide security, and train and restructure the Liberia National Police. According to the

UN Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Document (2006), the

UNPOL was given additional responsibilities under the DPKO’s disarmament,

demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program. These additional responsibilities

included improving public confidence through controlling crime; maintaining law and

order and security; and conducting police reforms through training, restructuring, and

development of the national police. The DDR approach to postconflict policing and

police reform focuses first on ensuring security through the maintenance of law and

order, crime control, and postconflict police restructuring. In Liberia, UNPOL has been

engaged in all aspects of police work and in the training and restructuring of the Liberia

National Police (Malan, 2008).

Liberia’s constitution affirms a centralized system of governance and public

administration. The security sector legislation that created the police force in 1975

provides for one centralized police force organization for the entire country, the LNP.

The political subdivisions including municipalities do not operate any separate police

systems. Candidates are recruited and trained at the National Police Academy located in

Monrovia, the nation’s capital, before deployment throughout the country (Jaye, 2008). It

was within this legal and political context that UNMIL operated in implementing its

security sector reform programs.

Problem Statement

If the police training and reform programs currently underway do not sustain

public safety and social stability, the country could regress and conflict could return. The

UN Security Council Resolution 2190 (2014) extended the mission of the organization

currently charged with peacekeeping and police reform in Liberia, UNMIL, to September

30, 2015. Policing issues such as inadequate responses, political suppression, corruption,

and abuse of human rights before and during the civil war were central to the dynamics of

the conflict in Liberia, and render a country-specific police reform strategy integral to

sustainable democratic statebuilding (Kromah, 2007; Olukoshi, 2008; Sawyer, 1992).

The process of reform of police structures and administrative arrangements are also

central to ensuring fair, effective democratic policing and sustainable impact on civil

society (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). International police reform efforts have not always

been successful (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006).

Against this backdrop, UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia provide an

opportunity to assess how it has used international police reform standards to recruit,

train, equip, and deploy the LNP force to effectively maintain law and order and gain

public confidence.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the

UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP

to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The findings

contributed to understanding the dynamics that influence training outcomes and inform

stakeholders and decision makers about any possible changes that might be needed to

improve police effectiveness and public confidence. The objective of this study was to

identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an

effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the citizens. The knowledge

of the dynamics of a country-specific police reform program is useful for policymakers in

Liberia and for the UN in planning and designing police reform programs for future

postconflict states.

Nature of the Study

In this exploratory case study, I used a mixed methods approach to data collection

and analysis. From the qualitative perspective, I reviewed documents and records and

used open-ended and semistructured interview questions as primary sources of data

collection. I also used the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured

numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement. I developed a questionnaire to

evaluate police performance of graduates already working in the field and the public

confidence of civil society. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for the research,

objectives, and methods selected is presented in Chapter 3.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is that it filled the gap in the literature on the impact

of the UN’s training of the LNP. No earlier study exists on the impact of the UN’s police

training on the effectiveness of the LNP to maintain law and order and gain public

confidence in postconflict Liberia (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007;

Olukoshi, 2008). The goal is to contribute knowledge to the establishment of an effective

police force capable of maintaining law and order, and one trusted by the citizenry. In

this study, I examined the effectiveness and results of international police training and

reform interventions in the context of the Liberian situation. Despite various international

police training and reform efforts in postconflict states in Africa, professional policing

and citizens’ trust in the police forces remain elusive (Alemika, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).

Because international police reform in different postconflict situations reflects varying

country-specific realities and experiences of each society, I sought to understand how

UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions affect the capacity of the LNP force to

effectively and professionally carry out its duties, maintain law and order, and gain public

confidence. I sought to understand the dynamics of UNMIL’s police reform efforts and to

generate knowledge that will contribute to the establishment of an effective police force

that gains the trust and confidence of Liberians. The lessons learned from this Liberian

case study are important for planning and designing future police reform programs for

postconflict police building. The study, therefore, has important social change

implications such as the protection of human rights, crime reduction, a safer investment

climate for businesses, economic growth, and social stability for Liberian government

policy makers, for other governments in the community of nations, and for the UN in

planning and designing police reform programs for future postconflict states.

Research Questions

The overarching research question that guided this investigation was the

following: How has police training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected

police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to

maintain law and order? This question was expanded by two qualitative questions and

one quantitative question.

Qualitative

Research Question 1: What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police

training?

Research Question 2: What reforms are required to improve the quality of

policing and insure a reliable police security force in Liberia?

Quantitative

Research Question 3: What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training

made relative to the maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s

police force?

1: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of

law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.

1: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law

and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical frameworks that served as a foundation for this study were social

contract theory, public choice theory, liberal democratic theory, and the theory of

community policing. Social contract theory provides the rationale for the formation of

civil society, considering that humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn

by what they desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of

life and property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to

political authority or governments (Kathrani, 2010). Public choice theorists define police

security as a public good in which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state

to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing irrespective of their contribution (Stiglitz,

2000). Liberal democratic theorists justify the necessity of an effective police force as it

is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic

processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to

maintaining stability in a democracy (Mulcahy, 1998). Proponents of community policing

theory emphasize the participation of local citizens for effective public safety. Increasing

criminality and rising public protests against police forces around the world, as seen in

the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in countries in

transition from conflict to democratization, all signal the need for including community

policing training and practice in international police reform interventions. The traditional,

reactive way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates

and a lack of public confidence in the police (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999). The aim of

the community policing is to approach policing more from a problem-solving perspective

by building partnerships between the police and the population (Bayley, 1999; Pino &

Wiatrowski, 2006).

Assumptions

The study was based on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the

participants who were selected for the study were knowledgeable about the subject

matter. The second assumption was that the participants would be open in their

discussions and that they would answer the interview questions truthfully and to the best

of their knowledge and ability. Factors such as past police culture of withholding

information, pressure from ranking officers, and political influence did not inhibit

objective comments from participants. These assumptions were necessary to the extent

that participants were public officials of the Liberian government and the leaders of

community-based civil society organizations. They represented the population that was

the intended beneficiary of the program. Other key informants were ranking officers of

the LNP force and ranking members of UN mission in Liberia who were the key decision

makers of the police reform program.

Limitations

There were three limitations of this study. The first limitation was that the study

involved a qualitative exploratory component with me as the main instrument for data

collection, analysis, and interpretation. My bias and subjectivity were recognized in the

process. To minimize this possibility, I remained self-aware and conscious about the

likelihood for bias and exercised neutrality at all times in the process (Creswell, 2007).

The second limitation was that I used purposive sampling. Purposive sampling depends

on the availability of respondents who are knowledgeable about the phenomenon under

study. It should be noted that I worked on location in Liberia, was conversant with the

local target population, and could make informed decisions about recruiting

knowledgeable participants. During the course of the research, I discovered that ranking

officers of the UNMIL, who participated in making key recruitment, training, and reform

decisions, had left Liberia for missions in other countries and could not be contacted.

UNPOL declined to participate in the study. The third limitation was that literature on

postconflict police reform in Liberia is scant and limited in scope (Call & Wyeth, 2008;

Fallah, 2011; Kromah, 2007). Although opinions about the Liberian police were obtained

from government functionaries, civil society, and the citizenry at large, there exists little

independent research data that can validate such opinions. The media have published

various stories, reports, and articles on police reform challenges resulting in alleged

ineffectiveness and a lack of professionalism of the LNP force. The incidents most

frequently cited are rape, sexual violence, drugs, theft, extortion, and involvement in

armed robberies (Nation Times 08/18/09:4; New Democrat 06/12/11:18; Daily Observer

06/20/12:14; National Chronicle 07/11/12:18). The Government’s Poverty Reduction

Strategy (2008) also cited widespread dissatisfaction with, and a lack of citizens’ trust in,

the new police force. Additionally, a recent UN assessment mission’s special report of

the UN Secretary-General (2012) described the security situation in Liberia as “generally

stable but fragile” and acknowledged the inability of the LNP to maintain law and order

without the support of UNMIL (p. 8 ). However, there is limited independent research

done specifically on the results of UNMIL’s police training and its impact on police

effectiveness and public safety in Liberia.

Scope and Delimitations

Participants who were selected for this study resided on location in Monrovia, the

capital city of Liberia. They fell in three categories. In the first category, I used

homogenous purposive sampling of 18 actors and decision makers in the UNMIL’s

reform program. In the second category, I used random sampling of 60 police officers

who were trained and deployed by UNMIL and were active in the field. I also conducted

a random sampling of 60 actors who were male and female leaders and members of

community-based civil society organizations including the Federation of Liberian Youth,

Institute for Research and Democratic Development, Liberia Marketing Association,

New African Research and Development Agency, Action for Genuine Democratic

Alternative, and the National Coalition of Civil Society Organizations of Liberia. These

key informants were individuals who had past and current knowledge of police behavior

and practices in Liberia. This was a representative group of the population that was the

targeted beneficiary of the reform program. I learned about their real life experiences,

including their confidence in the new police force and the overall security reform

program in Liberia.

Definition of Terms

Conflict: As used in this study, the term refers to armed conflict characterized by

civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic, cultural and political

interests, or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent disagreements from

perceived threats which trigger armed rebellion and war. The conflicts discussed in this

study refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e., army, police and paramilitary

forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil wars in Africa were rooted in

cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call & Wyeth, 2008; Wezeman, 1999;

Sawyer, 2005).

Democratic policing: As used herein, the concept embodies the idea that policing

is a service with a primary focus more on protecting the human rights and security of the

individual than the state. Democratic policing is the application of the law in a manner

that is professional, impartial, and effective for the protection of all citizens regardless of

their ethnicity, age, gender, political opinion, or religious belief (Bayley, 2001; Celador,

2005; Mulcahy, 1998).

International police: The term was used to refer to an organization of police

officers representing various countries that are brought together to assist in providing law

and order, public security, training, and stabilization in war-torn countries (Hume &

Miklaucic, 2005; Krasno, 2004).

Police: In this study the definition provided by Bayley (1999) was adopted.

Bayley defined police as “people authorized by a group to regulate interpersonal relations

within the group through the application of physical force” (p. 7). The authorization to

apply physical force to affect behavior, including respecting the rights of others,

preventing human rights abuses, and providing security for all is the distinguishing

characteristic of the police. Bittner (as cited in Bayley, 1999) stated, “The policeman, and

the policeman alone, is equipped, entitled, and required to deal with every exigency in

which force may be used to meet it” (p. 8).

Liberia National Police: In this study, the LNP refers to Liberia’s current police

force trained and deployed by the United Nations Mission in Liberia.

Postconflict: This term is used to describe the period following the cessation of

hostilities. This period is characterized by the signing of a formal peace agreement by

which the warring factions give consent and agree to end the conflict and commit

themselves to the process of national reconstruction. The Geneva Center for Democratic

Control of Armed Forces (2009) described the postconflict environment as characterized

by an unstable security situation which necessitates the provision of security as a priority

for international actors.

Police reform: For the purpose of this study, police reform refers to international

response assistance to a nation’s police building program of which training is an integral

component. A program of postconflict police security reform is a reflection of a

dysfunctional police system and, therefore, the need for change and a clear break with the

past. The Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (2009) summarized

the goals of police reform as prioritizing the equal protection of human rights as primary

objective: producing a humane, accountable, responsive, and capable police force.

Statebuilding: In this study, the term is used to describe international efforts to

strengthen weak postconflict states by rebuilding public institutions; fostering renewed

sociocultural cohesion within a geopolitical boundary; and establishing a legitimate

internationally recognized functioning central authority having the ability to provide

security, maintain peace, enforce state laws, and maintain a minimum level of economic

development to support democratic transition. The process also involves political

collaborative efforts between local political elites and international actors to ensure that

the outcomes are in accord with the norms of liberal democratic statehood (Dobbins et

al., 2007; Miller, 2010).

Stateness: In this study, the term is used to refer to a situation where, within a

geopolitical boundary, there exists some level of sociocultural cohesion, and a legitimate

functioning central authority has the ability to maintain peace and enforce state laws tp

maintain minimum level of economic development to support democratic transition and

is internationally recognized. The police are an embodiment of state authority and that

stateness is as much a function of state authority as it is a function of effective policing

(Dobbins et al., 2007; Kraxberger, 2007).

The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL:). The UNMIL was set up and

deployed in Liberia in 2003 under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1509.

The mandate authorized UNMIL to maintain law and order, provide security, train, and

restructure the Liberia National Police (Jaye, 2008; Muller & Sauvant, 2009).

Summary and Outline of the Study

Liberia was a fragile state in transition from a protracted civil war to peace and

democratization with assistance from the UN and the international community at large. A

critical component of this statebuilding process was security sector reform with a focus

on police building. Liberia needed an effective police force capable of serving as an

instrument for the protection of human rights, public safety, and the maintenance of law

and order.

This study comprises five chapters. In Chapter 1 of the study, I presented an

overview of the research problem, the background of the study, including the increasing

role of the UN in responding to international crises. I discussed the purpose and

significance of the study. I also posed questions about the UNMIL’s police training and

public safety reform interventions that have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous

works. In Chapter 2, I position the study within a broader contemporary scholarly context

on the subject of international postconflict police reform. I review scholarly literature that

is relevant to security sector reform and the UN interventions in postconflict police-

building. The international state building interventions in the last 2 decades have had

more challenges and setbacks than successes, as security and peace remain elusive. Both

local and international actors are in search of policy options. In this chapter, I provide an

overview of the conceptual basis of international interventions in police reform in post

conflict countries and the accomplishments, challenges, and dilemmas associated with

these reform efforts. The history of the Liberian police force and its operations before and

during the civil war are highlighted; three selected case studies are presented to

demonstrate their similarity to police reform activities in Liberia. I also discuss the

rationale for police security reform as a prerequisite to sustainable statebuilding and

democratization. I compare and contrast the views of scholars on the outcomes of various

statebuilding initiatives undertaken in the last decade. The theories of social contract,

liberal democracy, public choice and democratic policing, and community policing are

discussed. The perspectives of international public policy practitioners on statebuilding

interventions as a means of persuading weak states to abide by the norms of stateness

were presented.

In Chapter 3, I discuss and examine the theoretical methods of inquiry that

grounds the research. The detailed discussion on the research design used in the study

include the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research sample and population, method of

data collection and procedures, data analysis and issues of quality and ethical

considerations, the researcher’s role, and participants’ protection. The independent

variable in this study was the UNMIL’s reform training strategy. The UNMIL’s training

served as an indicator of whether or not the police was well-trained or poorly trained.

Factors considered included effective policing, issues of ethics, and police behavior. I

used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of

the Liberian police. Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and

during the civil war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I did multiple year

comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time

the UNMIL deployed trained police officers. The other intervening variables that are

discussed revolve around police preparedness and how they affect effectiveness of, and

public confidence in, the LNP. The dependent variable in this study was the outcome of

the training. This outcome was measured against the UNMIL’s reform mandate and

standards of recruitment, training, and deployment strategies employed considering the

context of the country-specific situation of Liberia. The dependent variables for this study

also included citizens’ confidence. I measured citizens’ confidence in the reformed police

force. Hypotheses were developed to test citizens’ confidence. In Chapter 4, I analyzed

the data and presented the findings of the study. The data analysis include a summary of

the data instruments, a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of

participants, and the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views,

and responses that answered the research questions. In Chapter 5, I presented the

conclusions and recommendations of the study based on my findings and the critical

lessons learned.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature that is relevant to the study. The goal was to

synthesize the literature on international police reform in the context of international

statebuilding interventions in postconflict states. The chapter is organized into four

sections. In the first section, I discuss the dynamics of postconflict statebuilding,

including the roles, responsibilities, and challenges facing the UN. In the second section,

I define police reform and provide a conceptual basis of police reform for democratic

governance in the context of states undergoing transitions from conflict to

democratization. An historical background of the LNP is presented. The behavior of the

police and citizens’ perception of it as an instrument of repression and terror before and

during the conflict is discussed. In the third section, I review police reform tools and

research works on international police reform interventions with selected cases as

illustrations. In the fourth section, I provide a summary of the chapter highlighting the

theoretical framework and strategies of international statebuilding through police security

reform.

The strategy that I used in searching the literature included using literature

relevant to postconflict international police reform. I used the Walden University library

and other libraries of local universities both in the United States and Liberia. I used

Academic Search Premier and Business Search Premier, ProQuest Dissertations, and

Google Scholar. I explored the websites of the United Nations and the Government of

Liberia, including websites of government ministries and agencies in Liberia. I used

books and articles published within the last 5 years.

Policing Statebuilding: International Interventions

UN peacekeeping interventions, including police reform assistance operations,

have increased in the post-Cold War period. The UN Security Council has mandated

more than 69 peacekeeping and statebuilding operations since the end of the Cold War to

help strengthen fragile states to transition from conflict to reform and democratization in

countries such as Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon

Islands, and Sudan (Durch, 2010; Franke & Warnecke, 2009). There have been more than

100 armed conflicts around the world since 1989. More nations around the world

continue to endure civil unrest characterized by confrontations between police and

citizens and culminating in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. In 2011 for example,

scenes of demonstrators clashing with police became the defining images of ongoing

insurgencies in Arab nations such as Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen (West,

2011). The “Arab Spring” signaled the relevance of international police reform

intervention and how it has become a critical standard for the protection of human rights,

upholding the rule of law, and improving government-citizen relations in the global

context. A well-trained police force can promote postconflict democratization and

societal stability (West, 2011).

The term conflict as used in this study refers to insurgencies and armed conflict

characterized by civil war. Conflict results from disagreement over socioeconomic,

cultural, and political interests or concerns that culminate in grievances and violent

disagreements from perceived threats, which ultimately trigger armed rebellion and war.

Most of the conflicts discussed herein refer to civil wars between government forces (i.e.,

army, police, and paramilitary forces) on the one hand and rebel forces on the other. Civil

wars in Africa were rooted in cultural, economic, ethnic, and political factors (Call &

Wyeth, 2008; Sawyer, 2005; Wezeman, 1999). In 1995, 14 countries in sub-Saharan

Africa were emerging from complex political emergencies or conflicts and were facing

challenges of postconflict statebuilding and democratization (Green & Ahmed, 1999).

The term statebuilding as used in this study refers to international efforts that enabled

fragile states to build capacity, reconstruct their institutions, and regain stateness and the

authority to govern effectively in the delivery of public goods and services. Miller (2010)

said, “International statebuilding is thus an attempt to spread norms about what states are,

what they should be, and how states govern; it is an attempt by great powers to compel

weak states to abide by norms of statehood” (p. 6). In the process, however, police reform

has become recognized as an integral component of peacekeeping and statebuilding

interventions (Furuzawa, 2009; Olukoshi, 2008).

Contemporary international police reform assistance led by the UN and

industrialized donor nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other

Western liberal democracies has occurred largely in postconflict settings. The

overarching objectives of international police reform interventions in postconflict

situations are to build stable democratic regimes in fragile states and to secure conditions

necessary to support the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world

order (Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). The development of strategies by the UN to

reform postconflict police organizations and enhance their effectiveness often involves

varying perspectives and alternative approaches to police reform. Call (2003) identified

five alternative perspectives that bear on how local policy makers, the UN, and other

donor partners determine priority areas in the police reform process under specific

country conditions: (a) human rights perspective, (b) peacekeeping/military perspective,

democratization perspective. The human rights perspective focuses on police behavior in

the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators

from the ranks of the police and the military (Call, 2003). The peacekeeping/military

perspective emphasizes the maintenance of law and order and the prevention of any

possible return to conflict, especially in the periods that immediately follow the cessation

of hostilities and periods of peacebuilding (Call, 2003). The law enforcement perspective

emphasizes local crime control and professional policing with a focus on the protection

of human rights and facilitating the processes of democratization (Call, 2003). The

economic development perspective supports disarmament and demobilization and favors

police reform efforts through broad security sector reforms (Call, 2003). This perspective

also reflects interest in removing impediments to foreign investment and enhancing

peaceful environment for overall economic development. The democratization

perspective emphasizes adherence to the rule of law, justice, and overall security as the

basis for fostering institutional development. This perspective also emphasizes economic

rationale for police reform in the broader context of a linkage between security, economic

development, and democracy (Call, 2003).

There are many challenges that confront national decision makers, the UN, and

other donor partners in international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski

(2006) argued that most of the international police training strategies offered to

postconflict and developing countries by Western democracies prove less effective

because they do not adequately address issues such as conflict resolution, importance of

citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human rights, and citizens’ engagement in

crime control strategies. Call (2003) also described other challenges or tensions. The first

challenge is that police reform often takes place exclusive of other auxiliary institutions.

Call (2003) underscored that if a police reform program is to be successful; it must be

holistic and must consider building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the

justice system that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. These

institutions include the courts, prosecutors, and civil society organizations that advocate

accountability of the government. Another challenge is that international police reform is

relatively new and there are fewer credible models of policing (Bayley, 2006). This

creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local realities, such as culture and

political realities. Reformers also tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own

models of policing, or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere. The

goal must be to ensure local ownership of the reform program. Furuzawa (2009) argued

that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be

based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. Pino and Wiatrowski

(2006) recommended that police training programs must be implemented in ways that

enable individual states “ to be able to create their own versions of policing based on

standards embedded in democratic principles while tailoring their reforms to their own

socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9). A third challenge identified by Call is the

difficulty in promoting merit-based recruitment in the reform process. While merit-based

criteria serve as the best yardstick for recruitment, the process of recruitment have often

involved pressure from local decision makers to cater to the interests of particular

political or ethnic groups outside of merit. Call argued that police reform programs

should seek to exclude those who have committed human rights abuses or violated

international laws irrespective of such special interests. The challenge here is that the lack

of records resulting from the conflict can result in unintended recruitment of abusers

(Call, 2003).

The overarching goal of international police training to ensure the effectiveness of

postconflict police forces is to help fragile states to regain their stateness (Kraxberger,

2007). Stateness is defined as a situation where there exists within a geopolitical

boundary, some level of sociocultural cohesion and legitimate functioning central

authority having the ability to maintain peace, enforce state laws, maintain minimum

level of economic development to support democratic transition, and is internationally

recognized (Kraxberger, 2007). Stateness is also a function of security and a condition

under the social contract theory. Hansen (2000) stated that “security is the key to a ‘new

social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the

population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into

government hands” (p. 35). Social contract theory provides a rationale for the formation

of civil society. Humans are by nature self-interested beings and are drawn by what they

desire or perceive to be in their interest (i.e., personal security, protection of life and

property, freedoms, equal distribution of resources) for which they submit to political

authority or governments. It is from this social contract theory perspective that the state

must develop and strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social

contract and deliver security protection and such other public goods to the citizenry

(Kathrani, 2010; Kraxberger, 2007; Miller, 2010).

The concept of stateness implies that there has existed a situation where a state

has collapsed, and where state structures and legitimate authority for maintaining law and

order have disintegrated. Contemporary literature on stateness also infer various

perspectives of the state, such as weak, strong, failed or failing states depending on the

particular circumstances and conditions of the given geopolitical boundary. Stateness is

as much a function of authority as it is a function of effective policing. Effective policing

is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and

sustainable (Ellison, 2007; Green & Ahmed, 1999; Olukoshi, 2008). Peace and

socioeconomic and political stability are cardinal to liberal democracy, which also places

a premium on the protection of individual liberties and rights including the rights of

minorities. Liberal democratic theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as

it is an embodiment of state authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic

processes (i.e., investments that provide jobs, elections, etc.) that are crucial to

maintaining stability in democratic political systems. A police force is a representation of

state authority. The citizens should look up to the state and therefore to the police to

provide security, maintain law and order, ensure free movement of people and goods,

also with a sense of security, and to “provide protection for the social and political

processes that are critical to democracy” such as free and fair elections (Mulcahy, 1998,

p. 33). Police and “stateness” for a transitioning liberal democracy such as Liberia, are

also tied together from the perspective of public choice theory.

Public choice theory considers the state or government as an agent and its

institutions and policies as public goods (Stiglitz, 2000; Mulcahy, 1998; Kraxberger,

2007). A police force is, therefore, a public good to the extent that it is an embodiment of

state authority. Public choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public

good which benefits are expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their

protection and wellbeing, irrespective of their individual contribution (Stiglitz, 2000). An

effective police force is one that is effective and efficient in performing its mission of

providing security, safety, and justice to all citizens. Police failure or lack of effectiveness

reflects on the broader issues of national security and political stability. This is why states

transitioning from protracted internal conflicts are haunted by the well-founded fear that

police failure makes the state susceptible to the kind of crises that has the potential to

escalate into a total breakdown of law and order, sociopolitical instability, and a dreaded

return to conflict (Goldsmith & Dinnen, 2007). Sawyer (2007) argued that “The

postconflict state must be a different type of state if it is to meet new challenges. It must

be capable, responsive and participatory” (p. 22).

Community policing theory emphasizes participation from local citizens for

effective public safety. By the 1970s, police administrators, especially in the United

States, recognized that the traditional reactive method of policing had inadvertently

eroded the citizens’ sense of community and concern for one’s neighbors (Kappler &

Gaines, 2012). Moreover, people were becoming estranged from their police because

they feared the police and criminals alike. They no longer trusted the police enough to get

involved in reporting criminals in their neighborhoods. Community policing therefore

evolved from the theory that a grateful public will gladly provide needed information and

assistance to the police in contrast to one of an adversarial approach. Therefore,

harnessing collaboration from law-abiding citizens in their neighborhoods was also

critical to long-term sustainable change and peace-building (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Trojanwicz and Bucqueroux (1998) defined community policing:

Community policing is a philosophy and an organizational strategy that

promotes a new partnership between people and their police. It is based on

the premise that both the police and the community must work together as

equal partners to identify, prioritize and solve contemporary problems

such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder and

overall neighborhood decay, with the goal of improving the overall quality

of life in the area. (p. 8)

Increasing criminality, and rising public protests against police forces around the

world, as seen in the case of ongoing insurgencies in Arab nations and particularly in

countries in transition from conflict to democratization (West, 2011), all signal the need

for including community policing training and practice in international police reform

interventions. The rationale for this new way of policing is that the traditional, reactive

way of policing is increasingly ineffective, resulting in low crime-solving rates and a lack

of public confidence in the police. The aim of community policing is to approach

policing more from a problem-solving perspective by building partnerships between the

police and the population (Alemika, 2009; Bayley, 1999; Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Baker (2006) also argued for example, that the Government of Sierra Leone may have to

harness community policing groups because despite achievements in the country’s police

reform program, delivering effective police services in most parts of the country remains

a significant challenge for the government. In Liberia, the relevance of community

policing to UNMIL’s police reform intervention and to policing practices was

acknowledged in the Government of Liberia’s social and economic development plan

referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008):

Given that the history of police-citizen relationships is one characterized

by fear and mistrust, a new emphasis on involving local communities and

adoption of more citizen-friendly policing methods will improve police-

citizen relationships. The LNP and other security agencies will formulate

policies to reduce the incidence of corruption, police brutality, and other

ethical violations. (p. 54)

The PRS also recognized the need to train the police to cooperate with local governments

through district-level security committees in order to improve human and economic

security.

Defining and Conceptualizing Police Reform

Police reform as used herein refers to international response assistance to a

nation’s police building program characterized by the construction of an entirely new

police force from bottom-up under conditions of total collapse resulting from violent

internal conflict (Ellison, 2007; Goldsmith & Sinclair, 2007; Labonte, 2003). Police

reform is also used to describe international efforts to achieve sustainable postconflict

public safety and maintain fairness in the operational behavior of local police through

rebuilding police capacity and restructuring police institutions. The process involves

providing institutional support that focuses on transformational activities including

mentoring, vetting, training and rebuilding services, providing operational security and

support and establishing new structures of public policing to help the local force break

away from its past (Baker, 2006; Bayley, 2001). Contemporary international police

reform requirements are different from those of the Cold War era because of its emphasis

on the respect for human rights and the rule of law. Police reform advocates stress the

importance of policing practices that adhere to standards of accountability, transparency

in publicizing information on police operational activities and responsiveness to the

security needs of ordinary citizens (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009). Police reform has

become recognized as a critical and essential prerequisite for successful postconflict

peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions in states that are transitioning from

complex political emergencies or conflicts to regain their stateness (Celador, 2005;

Furuzawa, 2009). The overarching objectives of international police reform interventions

led by industrialized donor nations are to build stable democratic regimes in postconflict

fragile states and to secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an emerging

new socioeconomic and political world order (Marenin, 1998; Wiatrowski & Goldstone,

2010).

Postconflict international police reform initiatives have not always been

successful (Ellison, 2007). International police reform programs have often been

hampered by varying national agendas, limited resources, the lack of strategic guidance,

and reluctance reform missions to engage in the local politics of providing postconflict

security. These issues often pose enormous challenges to postconflict international police

reform interventions (Ellison, 2007). Durch (2010) noted:

Summarizing the 1990s record in UN “Policekeeping,” one might say that

great ambitions were not matched by great strategies, great competence, or

great success. Mandate drafters seemed to assume that the presence or

moral authority of UN police would be adequate to stabilize post-war

public security or to tame war-tainted police forces; these presumptions

were invalidated nearly every time they were put to the test. (p. 7)

In the case of Haiti for instance, the UN police reform interventions through

training and institutional restructuring of the Haitian National Police (HNP)

produced

less successful outcomes for periods that followed the interventions when measured

against crime rates (Ho, 2006). Crimes against the person (i.e., murder and sexual assault

of teen age girls) increased, and some of these crimes were committed by some members

of the police and other security forces (Ho, 2006; Mobekk, 2001). Despite successive UN

missions in the 1990s, reformers in Haiti failed to focus on taking factors such as local

policing traditions, and country-specific sociopolitical realities into account. The

antagonistic relationships between the military, police, and other security factors such as

poor justice and correctional systems impacted negatively on UN police reform initiatives

(Cockayne, 2009; Zanotti, 2004).

Several researchers have written about postconflict statebuilding and police

reform similar to the UNMIL’s police reform interventions in Liberia. These researchers

include Baker (2008), Bayley (2006), Durch (2010), Ellison (2007), Furuzawa (2009),

Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007), Jones (2008), Kraxberger (2007), Labonte (2003),

McDonough (2008), and Miller (2010). One such study which is relevant to the Liberian

situation was a case study conducted by Glebbeek (2001) on police reform program in

Guatemala. The study examined the strategy applied in the recruitment and training of

aspirants. In that police reform program, members of the old police forces were

deactivated and the old police institution was abolished to establish the new National

Civil Police force. Glebbeek (2001) concluded that the process had not succeeded and

faced significant challenges on account of the recruitment decisions. In contrast, a similar

police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El Salvador found that the

strategy for building a new police force from the bottom-up was successful because it

provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by the inclusion of some

members of the old military-controlled police. It also included members of armed

factions, although it was significantly dominated by recruits from the civilian population

who had had no record of involvement in the armed conflict. The two case studies on El

Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate sharp similarities to the security sector reform

program in Liberia.

Another notable study was done by Goldsmith and Dinnen (2007) focusing on

police building in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. The authors examined police

building in the context of peace building and state building. They focused on two case

studies in arguing that despite its importance to the restoration of law and order, police

building has been a relatively neglected dimension of post-war peace building in

international police security reform programs, and that this neglect is primary the cause

of failures in reforming police institutions especially in postconflict states. Emerging

literature on effective international postconflict police reform emphasizes participation

and ownership of reform programs by local stakeholders. The authors’ conclusions were

critical to understanding the challenges of the UNMIL’s security sector reform initiatives

in Liberia. In his essay on peace and stability in states transitioning from conflict to

democratization, McDonough (2008) argued that despite years of statebuilding

interventions by the international community, postconflict stability remains an elusive

goal for many African nations such as Liberia. This is so because the socioeconomic and

political conditions that culminated in protracted civil wars still prevail to date, and these

conditions are the primary factors that continue to frustrate regional and international

efforts at peace building. Attempts at mitigating these conditions do not by themselves

play any determining role in the success or failure of statebuilding efforts.

McDonough(2008) recommended that sustainable conflict resolution is possible only in

the presence of peace building efforts that deal significantly with those socioeconomic

preconditions that lead to conflict in the first place.

A program of postconflict police security reform is often a reflection of a

dysfunctional police system which creates the need for change, and a clear break with the

past. Jones (2007) argued that implementing change in police institutions have often been

unsuccessful due to the failure of the administrators or the agents of change to understand

or appreciate the organizational environments in which they operate. Jones (2007)

explained this failure from the perspective of the theory of complex adaptive systems.

Jones (2007) argued that administrative systems that succeed are systems that adapt to

new realities and conditions. Olson (2007) provides an overview of an organization

theory-based approach to the study of public administrative behavior, institutions, and

developments within the context of democratic governance. Administration takes place in

an environment of diversified structures and social relationships. Activities are organized

around well-defined boundaries, rules, and practices. Olson (2007) argued that in the

context of globalization, the ideal public administrator is one who advocates the

emerging view in public policy that supports participatory forms of decision-making. The

points raised by Olson (2007), and Jones (2007) about understanding and managing

change bears strong similarity to this study in the context of interventions by international

actors in police reform programs such as those in the UNMIL. Implementing change with

assumptions that are nested in some international police reform template has the potential

to pose challenges. Atkinson (2008) argued that while liberal intervention in Liberia has

contributed to the process of peace building, the “deficiencies of the intervention” such as

insufficient commitment from the government and the international partners, continue to

pose challenges. Similarly, Sawyer (2005) described the shortcomings in various reform

activities spearheaded by the United Nations and other international nongovernmental

organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005) acknowledged that part of the implementation

challenges are due to problems emanating from resource constraints. However, Sawyer

(2005) emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of various reform

programs are lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, and

the lack of effective coordination amongst implementing agencies and their failure to

engage Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs.

The liberal democratic theory on establishing an effective police force is that as

an embodiment of state authority, an effective police force strengthens democracy by

making society safer. A successful police reform program will enhance state authority,

make the society safer, and strengthen democracy in Liberia. Effective policing is a

benefit of liberal democracy because it protects freedoms, rights, and happiness such as

enjoyment of enhanced public safety as a public good (Stiglitz, 2000). Postconflict police

reform is more critical to and definitive of democracy. It is central to democratic self-

governance defined as the process of governing that involves both government and

citizen stakeholders working together as equal participants in finding solutions to public

problems such as police security reform (Zanotti, 2004). A strategy for postconflict police

reform ought not only to be directed at improving performance effectiveness or

delivering better services, but the strategy should also focus on a process of regaining

legitimacy from the citizenry. This is also why the liberal democratic model of policing

maintains that policing should be practiced in the context of community consent

expressed through respect and public reception and perception of the police both as law

enforces and protectors of peace. It is from this liberal democratic view of policing that

concepts such as police-community relations and community policing emerged as central

to quality public safety (Mulcahy, 1998).

The Liberia National Police: An Historical Background

Understanding the history of the Liberia National Police (LNP) and its

organizational culture is critical to implementation of a successful police reform program

design. Until it was legally established in 1924, policing functions in Liberia were

performed by the Liberia Frontier Force (LFF). The LFF was a military defense force that

was set up by the government with the mission primarily to patrol and protect Liberia’s

borders. In time, it became an integral part of the central administration of the hinterland

and its functions were expanded to include protection for government officials, forced

recruitment of unpaid laborers for public and private works, and enforcement of tax

collection in the hinterland. The LFF was undisciplined, corrupt, and notorious for its

brutal methods of tax collection (Liebenow, 1969; Sawyer, 1992). In 1924, the

Legislature passed an act establishing the first police force in Liberia. It was a small 15-

man police force known as the Monrovia City Police with a mission limited to protecting

life and property in Monrovia, the capital city of Liberia. In time, the numerical strength

of the force increased from 400 in 1965 to more than 1000 in 1971. In 1975, rising urban

and rural population, crime, and increasing political and national security concerns

caused the Legislature to amend the original police act and officially establish the

Liberian National Police Force enabling the force to take over national public safety and

law enforcement duties with police detachments deployed throughout the country (Jaye,

2008; Sawyer, 1992).

The fundamental duty of any police force in a state is to ensure the security of the

citizens and their property. The security of citizens also means protection of human

rights, prevention of crime, and the detection of crime for the purposes of prosecuting

those who violate the social contract (Bayley, 2001; Furuzawa, 2009). In contrast,

the

Liberia National Police had a long history of bias, corruption, intimidation, suppression,

and brutality. The LNP behaved in similar manner as did the Liberia Frontier Force

before it. From the outset of its formation, the Liberia National Police Force was largely a

dysfunctional institution that catered more to serving the social, economic, and political

interests of the wealthy and those with political power while it provided little protection

for the majority of the citizens.

Prior to the civil war, the LNP was also perceived by the

citizenry to be one of the most corrupt government institutions in the country. The most

notorious bribe takers were the traffic police, investigators, officers on patrols, officers at

traffic check points or road blocks, and officers at report desks (Olukoshi, 2008; Opolot,

2008). The LNP also operated more as agents of state security, insofar as the “state” was

defined as the government in power

(Sawyer, 1992; Liebenow, 1987). By 1970, the

security network in Liberia comprised the Liberia National Police (LNP), and a host of

secret police networks including the Special Security Service (SSS), National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), Executive Action Bureau (EAB) and the National Intelligence and

Security Service (NISS) (Sawyer, 1992). From the 1950s onward, the Liberia police was

the instrument of political oppression executing orders of successive autocratic

governments and military dictatorships. It carried out countless cases of arbitrary arrests,

detention and torture of students, civil servants, and the murder of members of the

political opposition. By the onset of the civil war in 1989, police brutality had deepened

as some members became part of the government’s secret death squads. Sawyer (1992)

described the use of police force for political repression in Liberia:

By the time of Tubman’s death in 1971, the security network was in

virtual control of Liberia. At least three celebrated treason trials had been

held. In addition, countless instances of arbitrary arrest, detention, and

torture of students, civil servants, and others had taken place under a

veritable reign of terror as suspicion and fear gripped the society. (p. 282)

According to Sawyer (2005), the LNP intimidated and suppressed ordinary citizens and

political opposition leaders to protect the regime during the war. The LNP became

politically biased, militarized, and ethnically divided. Many officers of the LNP

arbitrarily committed human rights abuses and participated in atrocities committed

against unarmed citizens. In its strategy for consolidating peace and security, the

Government of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) acknowledged that:

Security in Liberia has been a major concern since independence. Security

forces have been used to intimidate and at times to terrorize the population

and intervene in the political process without respect for the due process of

law. The security forces contributed to a system in which economic

benefits and political power accrued to the elite, leaving the majority of

Liberians in insecurity and poverty. (p. 35)

Sawyer (2005) argued that past political leaders in Liberia did not value the primary

mission of the police. The mission, to protect the social practices and political processes

that make society safer, included protection of human rights, freedoms, happiness, and

free and fair elections, all of which are critical to strengthening democracy.

Acccording to Kromah (2007) the lack of appreciation of the importance of the

police was reflected in recruitment processes, training, and conditions of work and

promotion practices during the period leading to the civil war. The feeder class of recruits

was from amongst the poverty stricken, demoralized population comprising elementary

and junior high school dropouts mainly from urban neighborhoods. The recruitment

processes and promotion were characterized by a culture of bribery, nepotism. Training

programs placed little emphasis on lessons in policing ethics, accountability, and linking

the protection of life and property to basic human rights and rule of law values (Dunn &

Tarr, 1988; Liebenow, 1987; Kromah, 2007). Officers deployed were poorly paid

compared to other civil servants. They had no benefits, and no housing allowances. They

were underfunded and poorly equipped. They regularly transported themselves in

commercial vehicles to their assignment stations. All of these factors impacted on the

operations of the Liberian police. Throughought the history of the LNP, policing issues

have revolved around the lack of professionalism, low morale, corruption, and extortion

as officers harassed civilians to augment their meager wages (Olukoshi, 2008). These

conditions also left the society under secured and made police service unattractive to

qualified high school and college graduates. Throughout its history, the LNP has been

haunted by a crises of public confidence and distrust. By the time the civil war ended in

2003, the country’s police system had lost all credibility as a legitimate organization for

public safety and had collapsed. This all accounted for why policing issues were central

to the dynamics of the conflict and why any postconflict security interventions in Liberia

required radical reformation of the police institution, police forces, and their conduct.

In the postconflict context, sustainable statebuilding and socioeconomic

development depend to a large extent on building a police force that can break away from

its discredited past history of corruption, bias, intimidation, and brutality. UNMIL’s

police training process is taking place in a new global environment under country-

specific realities and conditions that inform how training intervention for the LNP must

happen in order to ensure sustainability and ownership.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra,

Ghana called for security sector reforms to build and maintain effective national security

institutions based on the rule of law, including the restructuring of the LNP. The focus on

police reform was to develop a professional police force that is effective and capable to

protect and serve the citizenry, build safe communities by respecting their human rights,

and responding to crime, corruption, and abuse (Jaye, 2008). Given the tragic history of

the LNP, the issue of how best to restructure the police organization and its operations

and move it away from undue political influence has been a central concern of ordinary

citizens and government leaders in the postconflict democratization process. The

lingering questions are what an effective police force is and what type of police security

force is appropriate to meet the needs of the people of Liberia. How should the LNP be

organized to be effective in providing the police security needs for the people of Liberia?

The evolving debate appeared to favor the view that police accountability to citizens is

central to public order and to effective policing (Fayemi, 2004; Sawyer, 2005). The

national debate called for a kind of community policing in which local people actively

participate in providing police protection. Sawyer (2005) recommended that the local

people must actively participate as co-producers of their own security protection but in

ways that do not militarize their communities. In 2008, Liberia’s social and economic

development plan referred to as the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) upheld that:

The LNP will be the primary operational agency responsible for internal

security and will be restructured to ensure greater effectiveness and

efficiency. In particular, the LNP will reassess its recruitment and vetting

practices, before being expanded to address shortages of personnel across

the country. They will be better trained to address personal crime, to

reduce incidents of corruption, and police harassment and to strengthen

the confidence of local communities in the police. (p. 52)

Postconflict Police Reform in Liberia

The United Nations police reform program in Liberia (2003-2011) was

implemented through the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) forces under the

direction of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNCIVPOL’s police-

building and peacekeeping experiences were rooted in UN peacekeeping mandates

implemented in previous postconflict states such as East Timor, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands (Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006).

Formerly called United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), but now called United

Nations Police (UNPOL) the organization’s mission in Liberia was similar to those of its

previous missions: restore law and order, and provide security and public safety for all

persons regardless of their ethnicity; train, restructure, and strengthen the local police to

ensure its capability to uphold the rule of law and operate effectively in accordance with

international policing standards, and the principles of democratic policing including

respect for human rights (Kumar, 2010; Mobekk, 2001). By the time UNPOL arrived in

late 2003, policing in Liberia had long collapsed and the country was without any

effective rule of law. Police stations had been plundered, destroyed, and abandoned. The

remnants were controlled by rebel factions who also manned roadblocks. In rural Liberia,

informal policing functions were performed by intrusive individuals who called

themselves “police volunteers” but were neither recruited by the interim National

Transitional Government of Liberia, nor approved by their local communities (Jaye,

2008; Friedman, 2011).

UNMIL’s police reform strategy began in 2003 with the establishment of a group

that was responsible to make key police reform decisions. This group comprised ranking

officers of UNPOL and ranking Liberian police leaders of the then interim National

Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). This group organized the Rule of Law

Implementation Committee which jointly guided the implementation of the police reform

program. Members of the committee were comprised of ranking officers of UNMIL and

ranking police leaders and officials of the government. It included the UNMIL Police

Commissioner, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of National Security, and the interim

Director of Liberia National Police. The first approach was to respond to the urgent need

to restore law and order. According to the UN Secretary General’s Report to the UN

Security Council (2004), UNPOL and Liberian police leaders established a local police

presence in early 2004. They recruited, vetted, and deployed an initial interim force of

400 former local police officers to work alongside UNPOL in its efforts to drive out

former combatants and reclaim police stations in Monrovia. They also implemented

“quick impact” projects which included the reopening of police sub-stations, taking over

roadblocks, and constructing new mini-stations (Friedman, 2011).

Recruitment and Vetting

According to Friedman (2011) the next strategy of the Rule of Law

Implementation Committee was to decide on the number of police officers to be trained

both in the context of the population of the country and the long term funding capacity of

the government to maintain the new Liberia National Police in the long term. Based on

UN police standards, the Committee recommended that the target size of the new Liberia

National Police would be 3,500 officers by the year 2007. That would amount to a police-

citizen ratio of about 1 police officer per 1,000 citizens given an anticipated population of

about 3.6 million when a national population census is conducted in 2008 (UN Security

Council S/2007/479, 2007). The Committee’s first action regarding issues of recruitment,

vetting, and training was to decide on the qualifications and recruitment standards. A

primary consideration was the need to attract qualified applicants from amongst the

population, while avoiding individuals who had been involved in various crimes during

the war. The Accra Peace Agreement had specified that all conflict-era militias including

paramilitary and police-like forces at the country’s international airports and public

corporation facilities such as the National Port Authority, Liberia Telecommunications

Corporation and the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company, should be dissolved (Jaye,

2008). This challenge was made more difficult when the hundreds of former self-styled

“police volunteers” from around the country flooded to Monrovia and presented

themselves for recruitment. Thousands of former police officers from the pre-war Liberia

National Police force also wanted to maintain their positions as part of the new police

force (Friedman, 2011). According to an International Crisis Group Report (2009), the

Committee decided and formally dissolved the old pre-war police and paramilitary

organizations. All police and paramilitary officers were deactivated along with all self-

styled “police volunteers” who had roamed rural Liberia. The Committee then asked all

interested individuals to apply, be subjected to the entire recruitment and vetting process,

and undergo basic training. Ex-combatants and individuals under the age of 18 or over 55

were ineligible to apply. UNPOL’s restructuring and recruiting section conducted the

vetting. Local Liberian staff did not participate. The recruitment standards included

possession of a high school diploma, good reputation and character in one’s local

community, no war crime history, physical fitness, and successful completion of a written

examination. The names of recruits were published in newspapers for approximately a

week, requesting the public to come forward with information that might disqualify

applicants. The Rule of Law Implementation Committee also sent names of recruits to

leaders and members of community-based civil society organizations and human rights

groups (Friedman, 2011; Malan, 2008).

The International Crisis Group (2009) reported that the recruitment and vetting

process was controversial and marked by dissenting opinions especially over the decision

to deactivate former police officers. Many local police leaders were concerned that this

decision undermined institutional memory because many senior officers with decades of

valuable policing experience had been relieved of their positions. Citizens and civil

society organizations were concerned that the process made it possible for some

applicants to give false information about their identities or hide information about their

pasts. Liberian police leaders and local nongovernmental organizations such as the

Liberia National Law Enforcement Association held the view that had the Committee

included Liberian officers on the vetting team, this situation may have been avoided

because local officers were better situated to verify the authenticity of applicants’ claims

(Friedman, 2011). According to the report of the International Crisis Group (2009), there

were also internal disagreements within the ranks of the UNMIL brass over the

recruitment and vetting process. As early as 2005, UNMIL’s own human rights

protection unit described the process as a failure, although others vehemently defended

the process (Friedman, 2011).

Training

According to Friedman (2011), training of the first recruits began in 2004 at the

National Police Academy. Initially, trainers at the academy were international police

officers. Later in 2006, efforts were made to build local support by employing local

Liberian trainers although these efforts were hampered by earlier decisions to deactivate

former ranking LNP officers who possessed significant experience to serve as trainers.

The new LNP officers lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers and

largely relied on the assistance of their international counterparts. The trainers used

materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training situations

in Kosovo and later in East Timor. Initially training was largely fast tracked and lasted

about 3 months. Later, it increased to 6 months for both training at the National Police

Academy and field training. In 2006, some training coordinators determined that the

curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that it favored producing large number

of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum was more suited for training of

interim police officers than for the development of a sustainable long-term police force

(Friedman, 2011). Moreover, the training materials did not cover subjects such as ethics,

discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training. The curriculum

was revised in 2006. It included use of manuals on policies and procedures, report

writing, and statement taking. It also covered subjects on police administration, ethics,

discipline, democratic policing, criminal investigation, and community policing concepts

and reflected best practices in other West African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria.

By that time, however, more than 2000 police officers had already been trained and

deployed. They did not benefit from the contents of the new curriculum (UN Security

Council S/2006/958, 2006).

According to the Special Report of the Secretary General on the United Nation’s

Mission in Liberia (2012), UNMIL had vetted, trained, and deployed a new Liberia

National Police force of more than 4,200 officers to date. UNPOL had trained 3,661

regular police, and more than 1,000 officers had received specialized training. UNPOL

has also set up specialized units within the new LNP organization. The Professional

Services Unit (PSU) comprised 300 officers who received specialized training in crowd

control in Nigeria. The unit serves as first line response to civil unrest such as riots and

mob violence. The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) serves as the only armed counter-

insurgency response unit. The ERU will deal with crime situations which may require the

use of firearms in the arrest of armed criminals, hostage situations, and violent crimes in

progress (International Crisis Group Report, 2011). The end of UNMIL’s mission is near

and its scheduled date of departure from Liberia is September 30, 2014. Liberians still

remain genuinely concerned about what needs to be done to ensure police effectiveness

and public confidence in the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and

order after UNMIL’s departure.

Objectives of International Police Reform

This subsection describes the objectives of international police reform in

postconflict states. The international community is increasingly involved in implementing

police reform programs, especially in nations destabilized by political confusion and

lawlessness, or weakened by civil wars. A review of the literature on the specific

objectives of police reform and the strategies required to achieve them is critical to

understanding how a successful reform program can contribute to an overall national

reform agenda, particularly from the perspective of strengthening the process of

democratization. Police reform in a postconflict situation is unlike reforms within police

organizations in countries with stable, functioning governments such as in the United

States and much of Europe. Police reform in a postconflict situation is haunted by a pre-

conflict experience under which instead of upholding the law, the police force is highly

politicized and discredited because it was controlled by an unpopular regime that used the

force as an instrument of political repression (Downes & Keane, 2006; Mulcahy, 2008).

Alemika (2009) argued that in most African countries, pre-conflict police practice is

characterized by regime protection and reactive policing. Police forces lack independence

and policing is characterized by protection of the regime in power. The protection of

rulers often culminates in violations of the rights of citizens thereby leading to open

conflict.

According to Alemika (2009) reactive policing is the form of policing by which

laws are enforced after they are violated. Reactive policing is in contrast to proactive

policing whereby laws are enforced before they are violated. Proactive policing involves

law enforcement by the prevention of general public insecurity and crime through

surveillance, intelligence gathering, and promotion of cordial relations with local

communities (Alemika, 2009). The reactive enforcement is manifested through

investigations, apprehension, detention, and prosecution of those suspected of the crime.

Here, the problem is that policing relies on victims to report crime, but victims are

reluctant to do so because they perceive the police as ineffective. The experience of past

police aggression and brutality under unpopular regimes raises the bar in determining the

objectives and requirements of a sustainable police reform program in a postconflict

situation. Understanding the key factors that lead to open conflict in a postconflict state

can link to how a police reform program should be structured to enable a reformed police

force to become more responsive and effective in policing when those factors recur

(Alemika, 2009).

The goal of a transitional, postconflict police reform program must be structured

so as to enable the new reform police force to break away from the illegitimate

institutional practices of its discredited past. A reformed police force must be one that

embraces democratic policing principles and values and plays its critical role as an

integral component of democratization. This is defined as the process by which the rules

and procedures for citizen participation in governance are applied to institutions that were

previously governed by coercive control (Mulcahy, 1998). An effective democratic police

force is critical to the character of the postconflict security provided. This makes police

reform an integral part of the democratization process in a postconflict state. Here, the

emphasis is on how to create an effective democratic police force that adheres to the

requirements of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The goal is also to support

expansion of democratization and ensure a safe environment that is conducive for

investment and the development of market economies (Bayley, 2001; Alemika, 2009;

Celador, 2005). Bayley (2001) described the following as characteristics of an effective

police force that supports a sustainable program of democratization:

• A democratic police force caters to the needs of individual citizens; it is

impartial in its exercise of police authority and serves the needs of the

citizens. Such a police force is not one that is controlled by the government

and does not cater to the orders of public officials. In other words, the citizens

should expect that their police force will respond effectively to their

individual and community needs;

• A democratic police force is one that serves the interest of individual citizens

and their communities and demonstrates daily, that it is there to serve their

interest; that its policing powers and protective capacity will be utilized to

protect the citizens;

• A democratic police force is accountable to the law and not to the

government; here, police actions are guided by the rule of law. In other words,

the policing authority should not be controlled or directed by the arbitrary

actions of those in the government. This will avoid the likelihood of abuse of

power and abuse of the rights of the citizens; and

• A democratic police force is one that protects human rights. The protection of

human rights also means that policing operations must at all times be impartial

at all times. It must provide protection for individuals, groups and all of the

processes and activities that are essential for the exercise of individual rights

in a democracy. These activities include the exercise of rights such as freedom

of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of movement and freedom to

associate with others. The police must also protect the citizens from attempts

by government functionaries to execute arbitrary arrest, and illegal detention.

The police must also remain impartial in the administration of justice; and its

operations must encourage citizens to pressure government for their rights. (p.

51)

The democratic policing characteristics outlined above are also expounded by the

Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF). According to the

DCAF (2006), emphasis on the goals and objectives of police reform have shifted from

prioritizing technical training and skills such as in investigation and evidence gathering in

the 1990s, to include a focus on upholding human security, basic human rights, equal

protection of all citizens without discrimination against illegal acts under the law,

exercising restraint in the use of force except to achieve a necessary result, equal

treatment and equal access to justice, equal protection of potentially vulnerable groups

such as children, the elderly, women, refugees, displaced persons and members of

minority groups; and community policing. Community policing is the strategy by which

the goals of policing are redirected towards service to communities and responsiveness to

their needs. Community policing ensures effective police–community engagement

through consultations and feedback and the integration of the concerns of the citizens and

their communities into policing policies, management, and delivery of security services.

This shift in emphasis is the result of increasing international involvement in

peacekeeping operations and postconflict democratic governance reforms. The DCAF

also emphasizes the development of a police force that is transparent and accountable in

its operations. A police reform program must also emphasize the principles of ensuring

equal treatment and access to security and justice, inclusiveness or an ethnically

integrated new police force, professionalism in the exercise of police powers, effective

chain of command structure, and availability of requisite resources such as equipment. A

successful police reform program should take place in an environment where there is a

strong judicial framework and a civil society that can exercise independent oversight. The

reform should be one that fosters cooperation between the reformed police and other

security institutions and actors that are both local and international. DCAF links effective

democratic policing to poverty reduction, sustainable social and political stability, and

economic development.

International Police Reform: Selected Cases

Since the 1990s, the international community has devoted substantial efforts to

police and security sector reforms in many postconflict nations. The postconflict police

building program is conventionally regarded as a key process of transition to

democratization particularly from the perspective of the protection of human rights

(Bayley, 2001; Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). This section briefly describes reform

strategies of three police reform programs in Bosnia/Herzegovina, East Timor, and the

Solomon Islands. The cases were selected because they bear similarity to ongoing police

reform program in Liberia.

The public safety and security mandates of the United Nations mission in each of

the three postconflict states cited above were twofold: (a) restore law and order and

provide security for all, and (b) restructure the local police force to ensure that they can

effectively operate in accordance with international policing standards, principles of

democratic policing and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Day, 2000;

Celador, 2005, Vetschera & Damian, 2006; Dinnen et al., 2006). The restructuring

strategies and certification processes employed by each of these missions were also

similar. They included recruitment of candidates, vetting, screening, and investigation for

previous human rights abuses. Training was provided to all officers (Hood, 2006; Lemay-

Hebert, 2009; Dinnen et al., 2006). At the time that each of these missions ended, they

had achieved their mandate of restoring law and order. In East Timor for example, the

mission achieved a number of other successes including the monitoring of parliamentary

and presidential elections in 2007 (Hood, 2006). However, all of the missions failed in

their mandate to establish effective functioning local police force in each of the three

postconflict states (Celador, 2005; Dinnen et al., 2006). In the cases of East Timor and

Bosnia/Herzegovina, the failure to establish effective police force led to extended periods

of operation with redefined mandates (Day, 2000; Hood, 2006; Celador, 2005). The

various reasons cited for the failure included political interference in the process, ethnic

rivalries, ill-conceived police reform mandates, and failure to design country specific

restructuring strategies (Furuzawa, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Strachan, 2009).

Lessons Learned

The lessons learned from the case studies above attest that police reform is a

critical component of any successful postconflict statebuilding program. In the three

cases discussed above, police reform was not successful despite successes in restoration

and maintenance of law and order (Dinnen et al., 2006). What all three cases also have in

common with the Liberia National Police is that in all situations, the police were part of

the problem. They were corrupt, ethnically divided, militarized, and politically

manipulated. They abused the human rights of those they were trained to protect, lost

public confidence, and were ineffective at providing security for all citizens (Celador,

2005; Lemay-Hebert, 2009; Sawyer, 1992). The other lesson learned is that donor-driven

reform program designs tended to be over-prescriptive, and non-consultative. The

programs were not locally owned or planned in the context of local realities. This was the

rationale for unsuccessful outcomes such as in the case of reforms in the Solomon Islands

with a history of ethnic rivalries. The police restructuring programs were more complex

and difficult to achieve. This led to the periodic replacement or extension of mandates of

the reform missions. In Liberia, for example, UNMIL’s mission was extended in 2008,

2012, 2013, and again in 2014 all on account of security sector reform concerns.

Odugbemi and Jacobson (2008) argue that governance reform interventions in political

societies must ensure country ownership. No reform program can succeed without

participation of all stakeholders including the citizens who are ultimately the intended

beneficiaries. To the extent that the local context of policing varies from one country to

another, the design and implementation of any international police reform assistance

program must be based on context-specific knowledge and expertise in order to be

successful. Many of the problems experienced in the missions in the three case studies

raise questions about UNMIL’s approaches to police security reform in Liberia (Celador,

2005; Dinnen et al., 2006; Strachan, 2009; Lemay-Hebert, 2009).

Literature Analysis and Conclusion

Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues regarding

international postconflict police reform assistance led by the UN and industrialized donor

nations such as the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and other Western liberal

democracies. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain stateness, foster

stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support the stability of an

emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger, 2007; Wiatrowski &

Goldstone, 2010). Mounting conflicts of the post-Cold War period and security

challenges in reestablishing legitimate national authority in fragile states signal the

increasing relevance of international police training interventions as a critical standard for

the protection of human rights, upholding the rule of law, and improving government-

citizen relations in the global context (Ellison, 2007; Furuzawa, 2009; West, 2011).

International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful owing to

factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local commitment to

ownership. Call (2003) identified alternative perspectives that focus on police behavior in

the context of upholding international human rights standards and removing violators

from the ranks of the police force, maintenance of law and order, and the prevention of a

possible return to conflict as well as facilitating the processes of democratization. Many

challenges also confront national decision makers, the UN, and other donor partners in

international police reform processes. Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) argued that most

international police training strategies offered to postconflict nations by western

democracies prove less effective because they do not adequately address issues such as

conflict resolution, importance of citizens’ trust and confidence, corruption, human

rights, and citizens’ engagement in crime control strategies. Call (2003) underscored that

if a police reform program is to be successful, it must be holistic and must consider

building the capacities of other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts,

prosecutors, civil society etc.) that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of

the police. Another challenge is that international police reform is relatively new and

there are fewer credible models of policing. This creates the need for the reform program

to adapt to local realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas,

replicate their own models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked

elsewhere. Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform

strategies must vary from one country to another and be based on country-specific

conditions in order to be successful.

There is a well-founded fear amongst Liberians that conflict can return in the

future if the UNMIL’s police training and reform programs do not yield effective results.

What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and future

implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN Mission in

Liberia. UNMIL’s police training interventions provide an opportunity to assess how the

UN has responded to the global challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of

recruiting, training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break

away from its discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public

confidence as a professional force.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 2, I examine the contemporary scholarly literature on international

postconflict police reform. I provide the conceptual basis of international interventions in

postconflict police reform. The overarching objectives are to help fragile states regain

stateness, foster stable democratic regimes, and secure conditions necessary to support

the stability of an emerging new socioeconomic and political world order (Kraxberger,

2007; Wiatrowski & Goldstone, 2010). According to Kathrani, (2010), stateness is a

function of security and a condition under the social contract theory. The state must

strengthen its capacity to apply legitimate force to uphold the social contract and deliver

security protection as a public good for which the citizens surrender responsibility for

personal security and protection of life and property to government. Liberal democratic

theory justifies the necessity of an effective police force as an embodiment of state

authority for protecting the political and socioeconomic processes (Miller, 2010). Public

choice theory offers an explanation of police security as a public good which benefits are

expected by all and provided by the state to all citizens for their protection and wellbeing

(Stiglitz, 2000; Kraxberger, 2007). Community policing theory emphasizes participation

from local citizens for effective public safety (Kappler & Gaines, 2012).

Many authors provide a comprehensive overview of the issues. Effective policing

is a minimum requirement for making postconflict democratic transition successful and

sustainable. International police reform initiatives have not always proved successful

owing to factors such as absence of country-specific reform strategies and local

commitment to ownership (Pino & Wiatrowski, 2006). Call (2003) underscored that if a

police reform program is to be successful, it must consider building the capacities of

other relevant institutions in the justice system (i.e., courts, prosecutors, civil society etc.)

that have the potential to strengthen the effectiveness of the police. Another challenge is

that international police reform is relatively new and there are fewer credible models of

policing (Bayley, 2006). This creates the need for the reform program to adapt to local

realities. In contrast, reformers tend to draw more on external ideas, replicate their own

models of policing or insist on applying models that may have worked elsewhere.

Furuzawa (2009) argued that international police training and reform strategies must vary

from one country to another and be based on country-specific conditions. Lessons learned

from the case studies are that police reform programs must be context-specific, and be

grounded in local participation.

What is absent from the literature is an analysis of the effectiveness, results, and

future implications of the police training and overall reform program by the UN mission

in Liberia. UNMIL’s police training provides an opportunity to assess how the UN has

responded to the challenges of postconflict police reform in the process of recruiting,

training, and building a new Liberian National Police Force that can break away from its

discredited past, effectively maintain law and order, and gain public confidence. Chapter

3 describes the method of inquiry that grounds the study.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the research design applied in the study. I provide a

rationale for selecting the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry that grounds the

study. I also describe the theoretical tradition of inquiry, research setting, sample and

population, and process of data collection. I discuss issues of ethical considerations. I

describe the role of the investigator and the steps taken to contact and protect participants

in this study. The purpose of this study was to provide a deeper understanding of how the

UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP

to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The overarching

research question was the following: How has police training by the United Nations

Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public confidence in the ability of the

Liberia National Police to maintain law and order? The mixed-method model of inquiry,

which combines both qualitative and quantitative methodologies, was used as the most

suitable method of inquiry for the study (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007;

Trochim & Donnelly, 2008). The independent variable in this study was the training by

the UN mission in Liberia. The dependent variable was the impact of the training on the

effectiveness of LNP to maintain law and order and gain public confidence.

Research Design and Approach

The LNP was chosen as a case study in order to carry out an in-depth study and to

be able to assess the effects of the UNMIL’s police reforms on the organization. The

defining characteristic of a case study approach is its focus on one instance of the

phenomenon that is to be investigated. There may be insights to be gained from looking

at one case, which can have wider implications that may not be realized by trying to

cover a wider scope. The goal is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular

(Denscombe, 2005). In this exploratory case study, I combined both qualitative and

quantitative methodologies. According to Creswell (2012), the planned mixing of the

methods is a procedure for collecting, integrating, and analyzing both quantitative and

qualitative data in a single study to understand a research problem. Rudestam and

Newman (2007) also described the mixed model as

A pragmatic approach in which questions of method are secondary to the adoption

of an overriding paradigm or worldview guiding the investigation. Thus, it might

be possible to mix research hypotheses of a confirmatory nature with general

questions of an exploratory nature, structured interviews and scales that are

quantitative with open-ended interviews and observations that are qualitative, and

methods of analysis that draw on both traditions to expand the meaningfulness of

the findings. (p. 51)

The mixed model brings balance to data analysis and affirms interpretation.

According to Creswell (2007), qualitative research is a process of inquiry through which

the researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyzes words, and reports detailed

information. The qualitative exploratory case study method of inquiry often is

recommended for studies where the research requires exploration and there is a need to

present a detailed account of the topic. The researcher needs to learn about the topic in

order to provide a narration and the viewpoint of participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam

& Newton, 2007). The method focuses on the study of real life situations, places,

organizations, events, and concepts. It is preferred because of the type of data that are

required and the purpose of the study, which is how the UNMIL’s police training and

reform interventions have affected the maintenance of law and order and public

confidence in the LNP. In this study, the qualitative method of inquiry was employed

because international police reform under postconflict conditions is an emerging

phenomenon. This methodology enabled the discovery of how the UNMIL administered

its police reform program and what happened in the process. The objective was to

determine whether any change might be needed to develop a police force that is effective

for maintaining law and order and is legitimate in the eyes of Liberians.

Quantitative research is based on the idea that information about a social

phenomenon can be quantified or measured. It can be expressed numerically and

analyzed by statistical methods (Creswell, 2012). From the quantitative perspective, I

developed a competency skills level questionnaire and used the Likert rating scale to

collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and

disagreement levels. I also developed a questionnaire to evaluate police performance and

the public confidence of graduates already working in the field. I reviewed documents

and records and used open-ended and semistructured interview questions. The primary

sources of data consisted of the following: (a) documentary sources such as reports, mass

media, and archival sources; (b) individual semistructured interviews with open-ended

questions; and (c) a survey questionnaire. The methods of analysis under the mixed-

model strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings (Rudestam & Newton,

2007). There was difficulty in identifying comparative baseline measures because prewar

factual data do not exist because police records and documents were destroyed during the

civil war (Jaye, 2008; Kromah, 2007; Malan, 2008). However, I used existing research

(Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003) on the behavior of the Liberian police which measured

citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war. I also did multiple year

comparisons of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time

UNMIL deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables that were

considered included police preparedness and response to crime, riots, and natural or

human made disasters and how they impact the effectiveness of, and public confidence

in, the LNP.

Setting and Sample

In qualitative research, sampling is the process of selecting a subgroup of the

population. The sample is the representative group of potential participants who are

relevant given their understanding of the phenomenon under study (McNabb, 2008). In

this section, I describe the population, sampling procedures, sample size, and the

approaches that I used in selecting and accessing potential participants for the study. The

research was done in Liberia. The target research population consisted of participants

who have resided in Liberia before and after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement between the warring factions in Accra, Ghana in 2003.

Sampling Procedure

In this section, I describe the procedures used to contact participants. According

to Rudestam and Newton (2007), providing a detailed description of steps taken to gain

access to participants is crucial in the research process. Walden University’s Institutional

Review Board (IRB) approved both my dissertation proposal and my IRB application

under approval #07-30-13-0065268 and authorized the use of the research instruments to

conduct the research. Following the IRB approval, I submitted separate recruitment

letters to my community partners for the survey and the interview. The recruitment letters

provided information and criteria for participation in the study and how interested

individuals could contact me to express their interest. The recruitment letters were

displayed on the information boards of my community partners. My community partners

also authorized me to use their public premises to conduct the research. For this study,

my community partners were the UNMIL, LNP, the Ministry of Justice, University of

Liberia, Federation of Liberian Youth, Institute for Research and Development, and the

National Civil Society Council of Liberia.

Potential participants first contacted me by phone to express their interest. I

arranged meetings with interested participants who met the qualifications for

participation at scheduled dates and times during which I gave them the consent forms.

Initial contacts began with informal conversations about the research being undertaken

and how important the result of the research might be for participants and for Liberia as a

whole. I developed rapport and built participants’ trust by explaining the purpose and

importance of the study, particularly why participants were targeted to participate in the

study. I attempted to persuade participants that their knowledge about UNMIL’s police

training program and their opinions about its outcome were important to the building of

an effective police force in Liberia. I explained the consent forms and informed

participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study and that

their participation must be based on their voluntary informed consent. Participants were

given the assurances that they were free to cancel their participation at any time.

Participants were also assured of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout

the study and long thereafter (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I conducted

the research from December 2013 through August 2014.

Sample Size

The sampling practice most frequently applied in sampling procedures is to

randomly select a sample size that is representative of the population, study it, and then

generalize the findings from the sample to the whole population (Creswell, 2007;

Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). According to the report of the population and housing

census conducted by the Government of Liberia (2008), the population of Liberia was 3.4

million. There were also 1,566 registered community-based civil society organizations in

Liberia (Civil Society Organizations Directory for Liberia, 2012). I drew a sample size

from these community-based civil society organizations because they are a representative

group of the population that is the beneficiary of UNMIL’s police training program. I

drew a sample size from among the police officers who had been trained and deployed.

According to the Report of the UN Secretary-General (2012), UNMIL had trained and

deployed 4,200 police officers since the inception of its police training program in 2004. I

also took a sample size from decision makers in government and in UNMIL.

For this study, the selection criterion was experience as the unit of analysis. Here,

experience meant experience as an actor having either participated in the process of

administering UNMIL’s police training, or as an officer trained and deployed by UNMIL.

It also meant experience as a decision maker or an observer and a targeted beneficiary

from civil society of the outcome or impact of UNMIL’s police reform program. Random

sampling and purposive sampling were utilized for the three categories of population

based on experience as the criteria for selecting potential participants who are key

informants. Key informants were participants who were knowledgeable about the

phenomenon to be studied and who had the ability to provide information useful in

drawing meaningful conclusions (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I

proposed a sample size of 70 participants comprising 10 to 15 decision makers, 20 to 30

police officers, and 15 to 25 members of civil society organizations to guide the research.

However, after recruitment letters were posted, many police field officers and civil

society members called and expressed interest to participate in the study. According to

the literature, key informants should be recruited until the aim of the research is

accomplished (Creswell, 2012; McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

I increased the sample size to 136 participants because of the diversity of data

sources (Creswell, 2007). For the interview protocol, I used homogenous purposive

sampling of 16 actors and decision makers. Key informants in this category included

leaders of community-based civil society organizations, ranking officers of UNMIL’s

Civil Affairs Division, the LNP, and former ranking officials of the Liberian Government

as policy level decision makers who participated in, and were knowledgeable about the

police training process. Their experiences as actors in the police training program

purposefully informed the research problem. UNMIL’s police division, UNPOL, initially

consented to participate in the study but later declined. For the survey questionnaire, I

used random sampling of 60 police officers and supervisors who were trained and

deployed by UNMIL and were actively in the field. I also did random sampling of 60

members and leaders of major community-based civil society organizations. Their

experiences as civil society beneficiaries of UNMIL’s police training program

purposefully informed the research problem. Sampling is the purposeful selection of

potential respondents that are relevant for the study (Creswell, 2012; Singleton, 2005).

Participants who responded to the survey questionnaire were leaders and members of

community-based civil society organizations and police field officers and supervisors.

Participants who responded to the interview questions were leaders of community-based

civil society organizations, ranking officers of the LNP, officials of the Civil Affairs

Division of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, and officials of the Liberian

government. The community-based civil society organizations included the Federation of

Liberian Youth, Liberia Marketing Association, Center for Transparency and

Accountability in Liberia, New African Research and Development Agency, Action for

Genuine Democratic Alternatives and the National Coalition of Civil Society

Organizations of Liberia. These organizations were a representative group of the

population that was the anticipated beneficiary of the police training and reform program.

I learned from their real life experiences and their perceptions about the new police force

and about the overall police security reform program in Liberia. Table 1 below shows the

category of participants in the sample size.

Table 1

Category of Participants

Population

Sample Size

Interview

Questions

Survey

Questionnaire

Total

participants

Liberia National Police:

Police Ranking officers 4 4

Police Field Supervisors 1 10 11

Police Rank-and-File 50 50

UN Mission in Liberia: UNMIL

Civil Affairs Officials 4 4

Government of Liberia:

Ranking Officials of Government 3 3

Civil Society Organizations:

Leaders - Civil Society 6 6

Members – Civil Society 60 60

Total number of participants 18 120

138

Data Collection

I collected data for this research on location in Liberia. This was because UNMIL

was still actively involved in police reform efforts in the country, and also because all of

the other actors and prospective participants were in Liberia. A limitation in the

collection and analysis of the data was the difficulty in identifying comparative baseline

measures because pre-war factual data did not exist as police records and documents

were destroyed during the civil war. However, I used existing research (Kromah, 2007;

Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer, 1992) on the behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted

by Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil

war and served as a comparative baseline measure. I also did multiple year comparisons

of police effectiveness covering four 2-year periods beginning with the time UNMIL

deployed trained police officers. Other intervening variables considered included police

preparedness and response to riots and natural or manmade disasters and how they affect

the effectiveness of, and public confidence in, the LNP.

Pilot Test

Following the IRB’s final approval, I conducted a pilot test. According to

Rudestam and Newton (2007), a pilot test is appropriate because it can help strengthen

the validity and reliability of the instruments. The pilot test was administered in

Monrovia, Liberia with a sample size of 15 respondents who did not form part of the

main study target group members. They possessed the characteristics similar to the main

target audience. A response pattern to ensure an understanding of the questions was also

studied. As a result of the pilot test, I determined that a modification of the instruments

was needed. The one rationale was that one set of questions sought information that only

police officers could provide, while the other rationale was that some of the survey items

were written in ways that were not clear and did not solicit the appropriate responses. I

filed a Request for Change in Procedure Form with the IRB to revise the language in

some of the items and to prepare separate survey questionnaires for the Liberia National

Police. The IRB granted my request and the revisions were made. The revisions did not

change the original content of the questionnaire. The data collection instruments I used in

this study consisted of a set of 13 individual interview questions, a separate survey

questionnaire which comprised 31 items for community-based civil society respondents,

and a survey questionnaire which comprised 40 items for officers of the LNP. Other data

sources utilized were public documents and observational field notes.

The four sets of data analyzed were the folllowing: (1) survey questionnaire; (2)

interview questions, (3) documents, and (4) field notes. I dsigned a survey questionnaire

to collect quantitative data using a Likert rating scale (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim &

Donnelly, 2008). The questionnaire consisted of two types with one specifically for

participants from the LNP and the other for members of community-based civil society

organizations. This rationale was that some of the survey items were specific only to

police participants who participated in the UNMIL police training and were deployed in

field as officers. I used the interview questions to collect qualitative data (Creswell,

2012). Participants in the interview protocol were ranking officers of the LNP, officials

of the UNMIL, officials of the government of Liberia, and leaders of community-based

civil society organizations. The documentary sources included public documents or

archival sources, institutional reports, and reports from mass media including local and

international newspapers on the Liberian National Police (McNabb, 2008; Rudestam &

Newton, 2007). I also used existing research (Kromah, 2007; Ngaima, 2003; Sawyer,

1992) on the condition and behavior of the Liberian police. Research conducted by

Kromah (2007) measured citizens’ perception of the LNP before and during the civil war

and served as a comparative baseline measure. I maintained meticulous records of

observational field notes and used good quality recording tapes which aided in the

transcription and analysis of the data (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

The data for this study was collected from multiple sources, namely interviews,

survey questionnaires, documents, and field notes. I utilize three sources of data for the

qualitative component of the research. These sources were interviews, documentary

sources, and the field notes. For the quantitative component, I applied survey

questionnaires utilizing the Likert rating scale to collect quantitative data that measured

numerical indicators of agreement and disagreement levels.

Qualitative Data

Interviews

The survey interview is one of the main sources of data collection in a qualitative

study. In this study, the interviews consisted of prepared, semistructured questions that

focused on the purpose of the research. I used the individual, in-depth interview

technique because it was intensive and flexible, and it allowed me to solicit detailed

information about the phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly,

2008). I prepared open-ended questions for all categories of participants. The interview

technique was individual one-on-one interviews. I conducted face-to-face, individual, in-

depth interviews with informants to solicit key information and to explore the subject

matter of the interviews in detail (Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I took care not to engage

participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews and ensured that the questions

were answered in appropriate sequence. I also probed for details and sought clarifications

to avoid ambiguities ((McNabb, 2008). There was one case in which 3 key informants

who were ranking officers in the LNP preferred not to be recorded. The informants

signed the consent form and responded to the interview questions in writing.

Documents

According to Singleton and Straits (2005), documentary sources include public

documents, reports, mass media, and archival sources. In this study, I used available

documentary sources which included public documents from UNMIL, LNP, and the

Ministry of Justice reports and literature reviews. Other documentary sources that I used

included the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra, Ghana in 2003 between

Liberia’s warring factions, relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and

mandates, and reports from local and international newspapers on the LNP.

Field Notes

The final source of qualitative data for the study was my recorded field notes.

According to Creswell (2007), the researcher’s observational field notes are a credible

source of valid data. I maintained meticulous records of observations in the field and kept

a journal of the notes that I took on a daily basis during the interviews and throughout the

study. These notes formed part of the data analysis and the findings of the research.

Quantitative Data

Survey Questionnaire

In order to focus on the research objective, I prepared and used semi-structured

and open-ended survey questionnaires using Likert scales for two separate sets of

participants (Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). I used the Likert rating scale

to collect quantitative data that measured numerical indicators of agreement and

disagreement levels. On the scale items, I asked respondents to rate each item on a 5 item

response scale of disagreement and agreement levels where 1=strongly agree; 2=agree;

3=disagree, 4=strongly disagree; and 5=neutral (Passmore et al., 2002; Trochim &

Donnelly, 2008). I also developed the questionnaire to evaluate police performance and

public confidence of graduates already working in the field. In Chapter 4, I analyzed the

data, conducted comparisons, and validated the findings through triangulation (Creswell,

2012).

Issues of Ethics and Quality

My primary responsibility as a researcher was to behave in an ethical manner and

uphold ethical standards throughout the study. The ethical issues involved in data

collection include requirements for ensuring informed voluntary consent, protecting

confidentiality of participants, and being careful in clearly communicating information

about any benefits of the research to participants. Additionally, I concerned myself with

the possible risks of their involvement as participants and the need to communicate with

participants before and after the research. The main ethical issues were the need for

informed consent of participants and the need to ensure that participants did not

experience harm or were not placed at some disadvantage as a result of their participation

(Creswell, 2007; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Ethical concerns of quality also revolved

around the need to establish the credibility of the research. The requirement for

credibility was to ensure validity and reliability. Reliability is the extent to which

research is dependable or has the potential to produce the same results when replicated

under similar circumstances. Strategies to improve reliability include maintaining

meticulous records of fieldwork, using good quality recording tapes, and documenting

the process of analysis. I applied these strategies during the course of data collection.

These strategies aided in transcribing and analyzing the data and establishing the stability

of responses from the participants (Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001). Validity is

the extent to which the research findings are accurate and well-founded and are in

consonance with participants’ perspectives and beliefs. Acceptable measures of validity

recommended by the authors include prolonged engagement with participants to build

trust, persistent observation and learning, checking for misinformation, using field notes,

memos, and multiple researchers, using multiple sources of data, peer review, clarifying

researcher’s bias, member checking, providing rich thick description, and external audits

(Creswell, 2007; McReynolds et al., 2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

In this study, I attempted to deepen my knowledge and understanding by building

trust through personally visiting participants and spending extensive time with them in

the field. I used a tape recorder to record interviews, probe and check for misinformation.

I maintained thorough records of field work, and documented the process of analysis. I

took care to delineate what was salient and relevant to the purpose, interest, and focus of

the study. The findings were peer reviewed by professionals in the field. Additionally, the

preliminary findings were also shared with selected participants for their feedback to

ensure that they conform to the participants’ experiences, perceptions and beliefs. These

measures enhanced accuracy and the quality standard of the study (McReynolds et al.,

2001; Rudestam & Newton, 2007; Trochim & Donnelly, 2008).

Researcher’s Role

I personally conducted the research and managed the processes involved at all

stages from data collection, data analysis, and report writing. I recruited potential

participants for the interviews through use of cell phones and visits to participants’

offices or locations. I served as the primary instrument for data collection. During the

interviews, I used good quality voice recorders and took written notes, all of which I used

in transcribing and analyzing the data. I collected all relevant documents. I utilized my

technical training and skills in conducting interviews which were achieved while working

as a hiring services analyst with the City of Philadelphia. I also utilized my longstanding

public service experience as an economist, lawyer, and public administrator, as well as

my knowledge as a newspaper columnist and author on socioeconomic and political

governance issues on Liberia.

Avoiding Researcher’s Bias

I avoided bias in the research because doing so was critical to credibility and

trustworthiness. I remained conscious of my role as the researcher and the main

instrument of data collection to avoid bias in the data collection process. According to

McNabb (2008), there is likelihood that a researcher being the main source of data

collection can be tainted by bias given his proximity with the data and its sources. I

maintained a high degree of consciousness about the possibility of bias and I was

objective in the process at all times. In order to enhance credibility and trustworthiness, I

took care not to engage participants with a fixed agenda during the interviews.

Participants’ Protection

Protecting participants by maintaining confidentiality and anonymity was critical

to the success of this study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their voluntary

informed consent. I explained the purpose of the study and how the information they

gave would be used in the research. I explained the consent form and informed

participants that they could decide to participate or not to participate in the study,

reminding them that their participation was based on their voluntary informed consent.

Before starting the interviews and survey questionnaires, I gave participants the

assurance that they were free to cancel their participation at any time that they wished to

do so. I assured participants of complete confidentiality and total anonymity throughout

the study. I demonstrated respect for the privacy of the participants by asking them to

decide where they should be interviewed. After the interview data was collected, the

identity of participants was sealed by use of codes in the data analysis presentation

(McNabb, 2008; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). A detailed description of actual ranks and

positions of the key informants, especially for the qualitative interview data, cannot be

cited because doing so may reveal their identification. Participants in qualitative

interviews consisted of ranking officers of UNMIL Civil Affairs Division, leaders of key

civil society organizations, heads and former heads of the Liberia National Police

directorate, police field supervisors, career trial lawyers, former solicitors-general, a

former Judge of the Civil Law Court, and ranking government officials, including a

former minister of justice and a former minister of labor. I coded the names of participant

interviewees in letters and numbers to maintain confidentiality. I coded the UNMIL

respondents as UN with the first respondent on the list as UN1, followed by UN2 and so

on. I coded leaders of civil society organizations as CSO1, followed by CSO2 and so on.

I coded ranking police officers as PO1, PO2, PO3, et cetera. I coded ranking officials and

former officials of government including judges, lawyers, solicitors-general, and

ministers as G1, G2, G3 and so on. All respondents demonstrated interest in the research

and considered it necessary and timely considering the looming UNMIL drawdown.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 3, I described the theoretical method of inquiry and design that

grounds the study. I used the mixed-method model combining both qualitative and

quantitative methodologies as the most suitable theoretical method of inquiry. From the

quantitative perspective, I developed a survey questionnaire and used the Likert rating

scale to collect quantitative data. From the qualitative perspective, I used open-ended and

semistructured interview questions. I also reviewed documents and records. The primary

sources of data consisted of documentary sources such as reports, mass media, and

archival sources, as well as individual semistructured interviews with open-ended

questions for stakeholders. The methods of analysis under the mixed-model approach

strengthened the meaningfulness of the research findings. The number of participants for

both the interview and survey questionnaire was 138. Participants were purposefully

selected utilizing experience criterion as unit of analysis. I coded and analyzed the data

through detailed description, direct interpretation, and the establishment of patterns. I

examined the impact of UNMIL’s police training on the effectiveness of, and public

confidence in, the ability of the Liberia National Police to maintain law and order. I

validated the research findings by using multiple sources of data, rich thick description,

member checking and peer review. The methodology yielded information that

contributed to my understanding of the context of international postconflict police reform

as a critical tool for postconflict state building. In Chapter 4, I analyze the data and

present the findings in response to the research questions.

Chapter 4: Results, Data Analysis, and Findings

Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the data and present the findings of the study.

Participants in the sample were asked to indicate their views on how the UNMIL’s police

training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP to effectively

maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The data analysis was divided into

three sections. In the first section, I summarize the data instruments used in the study.

The second section provides a descriptive analysis of the demographic characteristics of

participants. In the third section, I present the results of the statistical analyses of

participants’ perceptions, views, and responses that answered the research questions.

Summary of Data Instruments

The survey and interview items were used to measure competencies that were

arranged in three defined categories and subcategories: (a) recruitment strategy, (b)

training, and (c) effectiveness on job performance. Recruitment strategy was used to

measure procedures applied by UNMIL in the recruitment and vetting of applicants for

the new LNP. Training was used to measure the nature and content of knowledge and

skills imparted, inclusive of country-specific policing guidelines, and citizens’ perception

of training acquired based on demonstrated police performance. According to McLellan

(1998), the benefits derived from police training are not easily measured and are often

realized in the long term. However, they can be reasonably assessed by the targeted

beneficiaries. In the case of Liberia, the targeted beneficiaries of the UNMIL police

reform are the citizens who also comprised members of civil society organizations. They

were in the position to make a before-and-after comparison and gauge the relation

between police training acquired and their effectiveness on job performance.

The effectiveness on job performance was used to measure the ability of the

police to apply knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations

and maintain law and order. Subcomponents of effectiveness on job performance were

the following: (a) public confidence, and (b) police conduct. Public confidence was used

to measure the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the ability of the police to provide fair,

impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the exercise of police authority and to

respond effectively and timely to crime. Police conduct was used to measure behaviors

and practices of police officers which impact on police integrity. Table 2 below shows

how each category was defined and the competency that was measured. Table 2 also

shows the items assigned from both survey and interview instruments. In the case of the

interview protocol, several probing questions were posed to respondents in addition to the

items cited in each category.

Table 2

Competency Category

Competency Category Survey & Interview Items

Survey

Items:

Interview

Items:







Recruitment Strategy:

Measured procedures established and

thoroughness applied in the

recruitment and vetting processes to

ensure that only applicants who had

not committed human rights abuses

and who had demonstrated good

behavior in the local communities

were recruited.

Civil Society

Participants:

Item #s:

5, 6, 7

LNP: Police

Participants

Item #s:

8, 9,10, 11,

12, 13, 14

Interview

Participants:

Item #s:

1, 10, 12, 13

II. Training:

Measured nature and content of

knowledge and skills imparted

inclusive of local content and

international policing principles; and

citizens’ perception of training

acquired based on demonstrated

performance by police.

8, 9

15, 16, 17,

18, 19, 20,

21, 22, 23, 24

5, 6, 8

III. Effectiveness on Job

Performance:

Measured the capacity of the police

trained to respond effectively in

conducting policing operations; to

maintain law and order and gain the

confidence and trust of the citizenry.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12,

13, 14, 15, 16,

17, 18, 19, 20,

21, 22, 23, 24,

25, 26, 27, 28,

29, 30

25, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30,

31, 32, 33,

34, 35, 36,

37, 38, 39, 40

2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9,

10, 11, 13

Effectiveness Subcategory:

3a. Public Confidence

Measured citizens’ self-assurance in

the ability of the police to respond

effectively and timely to crime; and

public perception of fair and

impartial treatment in the exercise of

police authority.

9, 10, 11, 12, 13,

14, 15, 16, 17,

19, 21, 25, 34

25, 26, 27,

28, 29, 30,

32, 33, 34, 40

3, 7, 10, 11,

12, 13

3b. Police Conduct

Measured behaviors and practices of

officers that impact on police

integrity and public confidence.

6, 17, 22, 23, 24,

26, 27, 28, 29

32, 33, 35,

36, 37, 38, 39

4, 9, 10, 12, 13

Demographic Characteristics

In this section, I describe the demographic characteristics of police officers and

civil society actors who responded to the survey questionnaire. I present the data in two

parts. The first part is about the demographic characteristics of civil society actors. The

second part is about the demographic characteristics of police officers.

Demographic Characteristics of Civil Society Participants

The data shows that 33 (55%) of the civil society participants were females and

27 (45%) were males (Table 4). A majority of the civil society participants were between

35 and 59 years of age, indicating that they were middle-aged people (constituting 52%).

This was followed by youthful citizens between 18 and 35 years, constituting 43.3%

(Table 3). The percentage of the civil society participants aged 60 years and above was

small (5.0%). The ratio of those participants were married or single (Table 5). A majority

of the civil society participants were college students representing 43.3% followed by

college graduate and those attending graduate school, representing 37% (Table 6). The

participants concurred with the police officers that background checks were important in

recruiting police officers. The participants also concurred that the background checks by

UNMIL were not thorough (Table 16).

Table 3

Age of Civil Society Participants

Age Frequency Percent

Between 18-35 Years 26 43.3

Between 35-59 Years 31 51.7

60 Years and Older 3 5.0

Total 60 100.0

Table 4

Gender of Civil Society Participants

Gender Frequency Percent

Male 27 45.0

Female 33 55.0

Total 60 100.0

Table 5

Marital Status of Civil Society Participants

Marital Status Frequency Percent

Single 25 41.7

Married 27 45.0

Divorced 4 6.7

Widow 2 3.3

Total 58 96.7

Missing 99.00 2 3.3

Total 60 100.0

Table 6

Educational Level of Civil Society Participants

Frequency Percent

Did not go to school 2 3.3

Junior high school 5 8.3

High school 5 8.3

College 26 43.3

Graduate/Post graduate school 22 36.7

Total 60 100.0

Demographic Characteristics of Police Officers

The data shows that 23 (38%) of the police participants were females, and 37

(61%) were males (Table 8). A majority of the police participants were between 18 and

35 years of age, indicating that they were youthful law enforcement officers. Thirty-seven

(62%) were married, and 22 (37%) were single (Table 9). A majority of the police

participants were high school graduates, indicating that they met the recruitment criteria

regarding educational level (constituting 63%). Approximately one-tenth of the police

participants were college students (Table 10). Regarding the police training program, all

of the police participants (100%) indicated that they graduated from the police training

academy (Table 11). A majority graduated in 2007 (28.3%) followed by 2005 (18.3%).

The third group graduated in 2006 and 2009 with the same number of graduates,

constituting 13.3% (see Table 12). Most of the police described their professional area of

concentration as criminal investigation representing 35% followed by multiple areas of

assignment representing other as 32% (see Table 13). Traffic control constituted 15%.

The police described education as important for recruitment with the mean (M = 2.95

with SD = 0.22); followed by background checks (M = 2.88) and by physical ability as

well as honesty (M = 2.82 and M = 2.81 respectively).

Table 7

Age of the Police Participants

Age Frequency Percent

Between 18-35 Years 31 51.7

Between 35-59 Years 28 46.7

60 Years and Older 1 1.7

Total 60 100.0

Table 8

Gender of the Police Participants

Gender Frequency Percent

Male 37 61.7

Female 23 38.3

Total 60 100.0

Table 9

Marital Status of Police Participants

Marital Status Frequency Percent

Single 22 36.7

Married 37 61.7

Divorced 1 1.7

Total 60 100.0

Table 10

Police Training: Education of the Police Participants

Educational Level Frequency Percent

Junior high school 1 1.7

High school 38 63.3

College 18 30.0

Graduate/graduate school 3 5.0

Total 60 100.0

Table 11

Police Training: Did you graduate from the Police Academy?

Did you graduate from the police training academy? Frequency Percent

Yes 60 100.0

Table 12

Police Training: In what year did you graduate from the Police Academy?

Frequency Valid Percent

2000 1 1.7

2002 1 1.7

2005 11 18.3

2006 8 13.3

2007 17 28.3

2009 8 13.3

2010 4 6.7

2011 2 3.3

2012 4 6.7

2013 1 1.7

2014 1 1.7

1995 1 1.7

1979 1 1.7

Total 60 100.0

Table 13

Police Training: Please indicate your professional area of concentration

Frequency Percent

Valid

Criminal investigation 21 35.0

Traffic Control 9 15.0

General Civil Protection 9 15.0

Other 19 31.7

Total 58 96.7

Missing 99.00 2 3.3

Total 60 100.0

Results of Data Analysis

In this study, I used the survey and interview instruments to determine

participants’ perception of the ways in which, if any, the UNMIL training made a

difference in police effectiveness and public confidence in the context of recruitment

strategies, training, and effectiveness on job performance. I used the data instruments also

to determine whether there were challenges that required reform. In this section, I

present the results of the statistical analyses of participants’ perceptions, views, and

responses that answered the research questions. I present the results and analyses by

category and subcategories of the variables being measured in the context of answering

the research questions.

Research Question 1

What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?

I sought to assess the strategy or procedure applied by UNMIL in recruitment and

vetting of applicants for the new LNP. This included any possible participation of the

local population in the recruitment process to ensure that only applicants with good

character, who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good

behavior in the local communities, were recruited. The UN international police reform

mandates for postconflict states require that restructuring strategies include a thorough

process of recruitment, vetting, and investigation of candidates for previous human rights

abuses (Day, 2000; Celador, 2005; Vetschera & Damian, 2006).

I analyzed the responses from the survey questionnaire, interview transcripts,

documents, and field notes. Police respondents agreed that conducting background

checks was important for recruitment of applicants to serve in the new LNP (Table 15:

M=4.77); and civil society respondents also agreed with the police assessment (Table 16:

M=4.77). However, while police and civil society respondents all agreed that that

conducting background checks was important for recruitment, they concurred that

background checks conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and that the vetting process

did not prevent applicants who had committed human rights abuses from being recruited

into the police force (Tables 15: M=2.75; and 16: M=2.18). Interview respondents also

agreed with this view. Responses from participants in the interview indicated that the

UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting processes from the onset were less organized and less

thorough, and that this situation caused criminals and former combatants to be recruited

especially in the years between 2004 and 2007.

Table 14

Police Perception of UNMIL Recruitment Criteria (n = 60)

UNMIL Recruitment Criteria Low High Mean* SD

Education 2.00 3.00 2.95 0.22

Tribe 1.00 3.00 1.07 0.32

Physical Ability 2.00 3.00 2.82 0.39

Honesty 1.00 3.00 2.81 0.44

Background Check 1.00 3.00 2.88 0.37

Trauma Healing/Counseling 1.00 3.00 1.21 0.59

Membership in old LNP 1.00 3.00 1.15 0.52

Not being a former combatant 1.00 3.00 1.89 0.82







5. Mean values: 1= Not Important, 2= Important, 3= Very Important

Table 15

Police Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n = 60)

Survey Items

Low High Mean* Std.

Deviation

Backgrounds checks are important

for the recruitment of applicants to

serve in the Liberia National Police.

1.00 5.00 4.77 0.77

Background checks conducted by

UNMIL were thorough and

prevented former combatants from

being admitted for training.

1.00 5.00 2.75 1.65

Applicants recruited for training

were given trauma counseling

before starting training.

1.00 5.00 1.98 1.41

Liberian Government officials

were involved in the recruitment

and selection of applicants for

police training.

1.00 5.00 2.75 1.49

Liberian Government officials

exercised oversight to ensure that

police training content was country-

specific.

1.00 5.00 2.18 1.23

During the recruitment if a

citizen knew an applicant who had

committed human rights abuses he

or she would not complain to

UNMIL for fear of revenge.

1.00 5.00 4.00 1.24







5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4=

Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

According to interview respondents, the UNMIL’s recruitment process from the

onset began by UNMIL officers calling interested persons through loudspeakers to come

and join. The UNMIL police recruiting officers mounted on vehicles with loudspeakers

went into the communities around Monrovia and started randomly calling on interested

persons to come and join the police. According to CSO5, during the civil war, more than

60% of Liberian youth took up arms. The war lasted 14 years and most of these youths

grew up knowing only about the use of arms. By the time the UNMIL recruitment

started, most of these people were the ones who first rushed to get recruited. They felt

that being in the police was the way they could protect themselves in the communities

because they knew that residents in these communities knew about their involvement in

atrocities against them during the war.

On the question of whether UNMIL applied due diligence to ensure that former

combatants were not recruited, UN1 argued that:

“It was not written in black and white, but former combatants certainly were

exempted from the process. But again given the number of combatants in the

country nobody can say they know all their former ex-combatants but then that’s

why the thing was open also to the public because the public would be able to

identify ex-combatants who had some kind of human rights issues.”

Table 16

Civil Society Perception of Background Checks conducted by UNMIL (n=60)

Survey Items

Low High Mean* Std.

Deviation

Background checks are important for

recruitment of applicants to serve in the

Liberia National Police.

1.00 5.00 4.77 0.621

The behavior of the Liberia National

Police show that background checks

conducted by UNMIL prevented former

combatants from being admitted for

training.

1.00 5.00 2.18 1.19

During recruitment if a citizen knew an

applicant who had committed human rights

abuses he or she would not complain to

UNMIL for fear of revenge.

1.00 5.00 3.90 1.13







5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree, 4=

Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

However, the theme which emerged was that the recruitment process was arbitrary and

compromised due diligence in favor of recruitment of large numbers of candidates. G3, a

former solicitor-general in the Ministry of Justice observed that:

“UNMIL recruitment process, I believe was wrong. They came and just took the

microphone, the loud speakers went around in the communities in their pickups

and saying “who all want to join the police come!” without giving the Liberian

people the opportunity to say look this man participated in the war; or he did this,

he did this. So they recruited people on their own and their vetting standards were

different; their vetting requirements were different from if Government had to do

it itself. You see, so they came and said well we just have to take anybody we can.

And as a result, the police force does have an integrity problem where people who

participated in crimes around the country are in the security services, and it is

known.”

Interview participants G2, PO1, PO2, PO3, CSO1, CSO4 and CSO5 all concurred

with this view. They argued that in the years especially between 2004 and 2007,

candidates who were recruited were not investigated with due diligence regarding their

previous human rights records to ensure that only applicants who did not commit human

rights abuses were enlisted. CSO5 maintained that “We saw at the beginning of the whole

recruitment and training of new police that there was not sufficient due diligence done in

terms of going and engaging communities.” Citizens in the local communities were not

consulted regarding prior behaviors and character of candidates. G1 also concurred with

this view:

“At the time I served as Minister of Justice, I felt that there were some lapses in

the process in that many of the recruits that UNMIL hired were people who were

perpetrators of heinous crimes during the civil crisis. We even argued that we

don’t have any issue that these people should come and may be rehabilitated. But

you need to have people with more experience; some old hands in the business to

be here to serve as mentors of these people. But UNMIL refused. They recruited

people entirely new; many of them young people who had been involved into all

kinds of things. UNMIL did not listen to what we were telling them. So you know

many times you see today police officers are being disrobed because of this crime

and that crime and turned over for prosecution. It doesn’t tell very well for a force

that was trained by people such as the United Nations.”

Participants argued that UNMIL should have done more radio communication in the

country’s local vernaculars to inform residents in the local communities that police

applicants should be people who have good character and good human rights

backgrounds.

Similar themes emerged over the vetting process. Police and civil society

participants in the survey strongly agreed that conducting background checks were

important for the recruitment of police applicants. However, they acknowledged that the

recruitment and vetting processes conducted by UNMIL were not thorough and did not

prevent some applicants who had poor human rights records from being recruited.

Interview participants UN1 and UN2 argued that the vetting process was open to the

public throughout the country. According to UN1, pictures of candidates were posted at

various locations including marketplaces throughout the country because the public

would be able to identify ex-combatants and other applicants who had some kind of

human rights issues and then pass the information to UNMIL. UN3 explained:

”We used that method because we felt that the citizens were trusting UN as

impartial body to convey their messages without any fear. Whenever a name or

information was given to us about applicants, we confidentially provided them to

the recruiting officers and there were no cases of retaliation.”

In contrast, the themes that surfaced most was that during the vetting process, citizens

feared retribution and avoided reporting combatants of former warring factions and

known criminals from their neighborhoods to UNMIL, especially in first four years of the

recruitment. Because security was fragile at that time, UNMIL did not provide immediate

protection for people in the local communities. For fear of retribution, citizens in the local

communities avoided giving information to UNMIL on any candidates especially, those

who were ex-combatants, former soldiers of the old disbanded army, police, and known

criminals from the neighborhoods. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO3 all concurred with this

view. According to PO3, there was fear of the unknown and the people did not feel safe

or free to give information to UNMIL. PO1 argued that:

“They would not report to UNMIL as to the person’s past abuses and criminal

record. Primarily because they didn’t feel that the system in itself actually was

strong enough to provide them the kind of protection that they needed if they

provided such information.”

G2 also explained that:

“People were afraid that there could be reprisals because especially from the

beginning when they were recruiting at the time that right after the war police was

not present everywhere and even UNMIL was not present everywhere and they

were putting pictures of these people on bulletin and asking people to come and

report. People were afraid to report. And number two, the publicity was poor.”

The lesson here was that as the result of these lapses in the recruitment and vetting

processes, former combatants known to have committed human rights abuses, and

individuals who exhibited bad behavior in the neighborhoods were recruited into the new

police force. CSO2 and CSO5 concurred with this view, and cited examples:

CSO5:

“I used to live on the Old Road during the period of the crisis. One of the fighters who

really terrorized us in the community became a big person in the police. Yes, when I

moved to where I am now, I saw him again in that neighborhood. I got terrified because

he knew how he terrified us.”

CSO2:

“There is a young lady who is now in the police. When she lived before in our

community, she went and took feces and put it in the community’s well, you know out of

anger. They had to close the well because of that. That woman got recruited in the

police.”

Apart from feelings of insecurity and fear of retribution, other social and

economic factors such as high unemployment also impacted negatively on the vetting

process. UN4 acknowledged that there were “isolated cases” in which people would

avoid reporting individuals who had demonstrated bad behaviors in the communities:

“I wouldn’t say people would fear retribution. I would say most people would

consider that if I did this, I would be harming somebody who wants to earn a

living. So this is more on the social consideration rather than on understanding

human rights and the need to pay for human rights abuses.”

G1 and CSO5 argued in contrast that such cases would not apply to known criminals and

former combatants. By the time UNMIL determined in 2006 that its recruitment and

vetting processes had been compromised and needed to be revised, more than 2000 police

officers had been recruited, trained and deployed (Freidman, 2011).

Research Question 2

What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the

maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force?

Through this question, I sought to assess police training and effectiveness on job

performance. Training measured the nature of knowledge and skills imparted inclusive of

local content or country-specific policing guidelines and methods applied. The Geneva

Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (2006) emphasized that the new

focus of international police reform interventions in addition to technical training and

skills such as criminal investigation and evidence gathering in the 1990s, included

upholding human security, basic human rights, equal protection of all citizens without

discrimination, exercising restraint in the use of force, equal access to justice, and equal

protection of potentially vulnerable groups. The citizens’ perception of training acquired

was also assessed based on demonstrated performance by police trained and deployed.

The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to apply

knowledge and skills acquired to effectively conduct policing operations and maintain

law and order.

Research Hypothesis

For the quantitative component, the statistical package for social sciences (SPSS)

was used to analyze the data collected. The data collected was coded and entered into

SPSS current version (V 20). A frequency was run to clean the data. Data entry errors

were corrected since all questionnaires were coded prior to entry. Restating the

hypotheses:

: UNMIL’s police training made no difference relative to the maintenance of law and

order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force.

1: UNMIL’s police training effected change related to the maintenance of law and

order, and public confidence in the Liberia National Police Force.

The UNMIL training began in 2004. Police respondents agreed that they acquired

technical knowledge and skills during the UNMIL training through various courses

ranging from criminal investigation, civil protection and the rule of law to international

policing principles such as upholding human rights, equal protection of all citizens

including protection of potentially vulnerable groups (Table 17). Correlations and

regression were used to evaluate the hypotheses. There is a moderately significant

correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained during UNMIL

training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35). However, the

relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained increases, the job

performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The implication is that

as more resources were being used in training the police, limited resources were used for

on the job performance which also formed the basis for a reduction in police

effectiveness.

In research question 2, I also explored issues revolving around the UNMIL’s

training decisions and coordination challenges that impacted on program results. The

issue of the need for psychological trauma counseling to police recruits was raised. The

findings show police respondents indicated the view that UNMIL did not consider trauma

healing or counseling important (Table 14: M=1.21). However, interview respondents

expressed the view that some level of psychological counseling should have been

provided by UNMIL as an integral part of the training strategy. Respondents emphasized

that counseling was needed because the country was just emerging from conflict, and that

former combatants and criminals had found their way into the rank-and-file of the new

police force and some had even become supervisors. PO2, Commandant and Deputy

Director for Training at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this view

and stressed that because the training was against the backdrop of the civil war, “there is

a need for psycho-social counseling for officers of the LNP. They need to tell their stories

in order to get healing. They need reconciliation too amongst themselves as some of their

supervisors were perpetrators of violence as members of the several belligerent forces.”

The earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program in addition to the

recruitment challenges were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the

training. Trainers at the Liberia National Police Academy were international police

officers of contributing countries from around the world including Bangladesh, China,

Ghana, Great Britain, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kosovo, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan,

Russia, Sweden, Ukraine, United States, and Zimbabwe. After 2006, member countries

of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also continued to

provide trainers from its member countries. Early in the program, Liberian officials

voiced their concerns over the diversity of trainers from different policing jurisdictions.

G3, a former Solicitor-General and now a Judge who earlier taught at the Liberia

National Police Academy, narrated his experience in response to the research question on

100

whether or not the UNMIL training was coordinated and followed country-specific

guidelines:

“I am not sure of what it is today, but when the training started, it was not

coordinated. It was disjointed. For example, you have a group of trainers coming

from Ukraine; you have another group coming from Israel; you have another

group coming from Malaysia; you have another group coming from UK . . . so

our people were confused in the early days. They were taking training and

instructions from different people. . . . For example some trainers will tell our

people the way we march, the kinds of steps we take is wrong; that we should

take steps the other way like the British do: they hold their steps and throw it, they

hold their steps and throw it; unlike the US you take marching steps in beat. . .

some trainers trained to salute like the US do with your arm across your eyebrow;

some other trainers trained like the British do with your palm exposed above your

forehead . . . So they confused our trainees. One week or two weeks the people

from Russia will train them; another two weeks the people from Great Britain will

train them; another two weeks the people from Zimbabwe will train them . . . and

each of these came with their own methods of training. . . I know for a fact that

the discipline aspect was a problem also because one group of trainers were

telling police officers they are not supposed to greet or salute their seniors;

another group telling them no you must greet your seniors and pay respect to them

and it confused our people.”

101

Table 17

LNP: Knowledge and Skills Competency of Police Officers (n= 60)







5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=

Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

Knowledge and Skills Competency Low High Mean Std. Deviation

As a Police Officer who underwent the

UNMIL training, the content of the training

received was understood and comprehensive.

1.00 5.00 4.45

0.67

As a Police Officer,

I acquired knowledge and

skills in civil protection during the UNMIL

training.

2.00 5.00 4.57 0.59

As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and

skills in crime scene investigation and

prevention.

4.00 5.00 4.60 0.49

Training facilities and materials provided by

UNMIL were adequate and appropriate.

2.00 5.00 4.28 0.64

UNMIL training emphasized that fair and

impartial training of citizens is important in the

exercise of police authority.

1.00 5.00 4.67 0.65

As a Police Officer, I acquired skills in case

file management and report writing.

4.00 5.00 4.83 0.38

As a Police Officer, I acquired knowledge and

skills in international police training principles

that all police officers must uphold basic human

rights and equal protection of all citizens

against illegal acts under the law.

2.00 5.00 4.80 0.51

The UNMIL training emphasized that police

operations must encourage citizens to pressure

their government for their rights under the law.

1.00 5.00 3.41 1.37

During the UNMIL training, I acquired

knowledge that police power must be guided by

the rule of law, not orders from public officials.

1.00 5.00 4.63 0.74

During the UNMIL training, I acquired

knowledge about the major role of police

officers during national political elections.

4.00 5.00 4.63 0.49

102

G2, a human rights lawyer and also former Solicitor-General of Liberia who later

taught criminal procedure at the Liberia National Police Academy, concurred with this

view and observed that the trainers came from various legal jurisdictions with different

policing traditions. For instance, in some of these jurisdictions, “police observance of

human rights and the rights of the accused is of lower standards than others.” He also

pointed out for example that the application of the Miranda Rights principle is not

something that is universal, and some countries do not observe it. They do not observe it

decidedly because Miranda came from the American jurisdiction and not all of the

common law countries practice it. Moreover, policing practices in some jurisdictions are

influenced by their political traditions. He pointed out that at one point for instance, the

head of UNMIL’s training program at the Liberia National Police Academy was a

Ukrainian woman and Ukrainian trainers were part of UNMIL’s core team of trainers.

However, “their political tradition come from the communist rule of the Soviet Union and

many of them were trained in the Soviet police tradition.” This was one of the major

confusions in the training program because the Liberia National Police “have not been

trained under a uniform criminal justice system and tradition.” UN4 supported this view

and acknowledged that the policing jurisdiction in Liberia is historically patterned after

the American model and the UNMIL’s intervention should have recognized that reality:

“I believe that many of these trainers who come have British police training; and

only few countries in the world have American training. So this for me is the

conflict. For me, mentors should understand that this area is America-specific

because of history and they should adapt and not force you any other way.”

103

On the issue of the nature and course content of the training, two interview

respondents expressed the view that training was limited in content. For example,

according to PO2, “The UNMIL’s curriculum did not cover subjects like discipline and

courtesy, city and county geography, diplomatic immunity, forensics and defensive

tactics.” This view is shared by Friedman (2011), who argued that the UNMIL trainers

used materials and format that the UNPOL had utilized in other postconflict training

situations in Kosovo and later in East Timor. According to Freidman (2011), the training

manuals used by the UNMIL between 2004 through 2006 also did not cover subjects on

ethics, discipline, crime investigation, defensive tactics, and specialized training.

Respondents also stated that subjects covered were not discussed in-depth because the

training periods were short. From the onset, the training was largely fast tracked and

lasted about three months. On the average, trainers from different police jurisdictions

took turns conducting training on a bi-weekly basis.

Another critical theme that emerged was that the UNMIL’s training lacked

country-specific policing guidelines for Liberia. Respondents expressed the view that the

diversity or broadness of the base of trainers also diminished training content and police

on the job performance. According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the

Government of Liberia’s police administration to develop training contents and to

identify specific local skills, policing principles, culture, and guidelines, around which

UNMIL’s training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. Furuzawa (2009) argued

that international police reform programs must vary from one country to another and be

based on country-specific conditions in order to be successful. This view is shared by

104

Pino and Wiatrowski (2006) who argued that international police training programs must

be implemented in ways that enable individual states “to be able to create their own

versions of policing based on standards embedded in democratic principles while

tailoring their reforms to their own socially determined goals and needs” (p. 9).

Responses from police participants also revealed that the Government of Liberia was less

involved in the recruitment (Table 15: M= 2.75) and in exercising oversight (Table 15:

M=2.18) to ensure that training was coordinated and its content was country-specific. The

training was conducted with little coordination between UNMIL and Government of

Liberia or between trainers from the various contributing countries who provided training

to recruits at the academy. However, the interview participants argued that UNMIL alone

should not take responsibility for this situation, but rather the Government of Liberia.

They argued that the Government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to take

ownership of the training program and did not provide much needed leadership and

direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. The idea was

that first they needed to conducting training needs assessment based on the country’s own

policing principles, guidelines and code. PO1, a former Commissioner of Police for

Administration and Professional Standards underscored this point:

“The Government does not see the LNP as its responsibility. It sees the LNP as a

responsibility of the international community, because it’s the international

community that started this whole idea of restructuring and reform and then they

put the money into it . . . the Government of Liberia through the Liberian National

Police had to accept whatever was provided to them based on the funding

105

available by the donating country; and in most cases they sent their own experts.

And so if you look at the Liberian National Police today, the entire force received

different trainings – some received Jordanian training, some from Nepal, some

from Pakistan, some from Nigeria, Ghana, some from America, it depended on

whatever fund was available.”

After 2006, different trainers continued to conduct training based on the values of

their own police jurisdictions. UN2 acknowledged that values are important and vary

within the police force of each jurisdiction. He argued however, that although trainers

brought their own set of values from their various jurisdictions, they used police training

manuals based on the Liberian Penal Code. G1, G2, G3, and CSO4 disagreed. They

argued that while the Liberian Penal Code was used, manuals produced and utilized on

the various topics covered were not Liberia-specific because to that date, UNMIL had not

involved the Ministry of Justice in the development of a comprehensive training manual

for the Liberian National Police. G2, made the following observations about UNMIL

police training manuals:

“I was trying to teach from a material produced by UNMIL on criminal procedure

and like they just took it from the Internet. Somewhere there I saw “federal” and I

said we don’t have federal here. So the training manual needs to be properly

developed with the aid of the Justice Ministry . . . because at the end of the day

police work affects what the lawyers, and the prosecutors do. The collection of

evidence is based on the kind of training they received from different people who

come from different police jurisdictions and traditions. So it’s better for the

106

Ministry of Justice to develop training manual . . . We are a common law country

but we have a different jurisdiction so we need that because some of the capacity

problem in the police is based upon the nature of the training that they receive. I

think it is a fundamental issue that the justice system has to get over. We have to

have a uniform training manual.”

UN1 concurred with the view that Liberia did not have its own set of local policing

principles and guidelines, which would identify specific skills around which UNMIL’s

training activities, would revolve and be coordinated. He cautioned that:

“My experience in other missions and in Sierra Leone where we had police

reform is that when police come from different parts of the world, they are

influenced by different doctrines and how that is coordinated locally to deliver

their training is something that maybe needs to be looked at carefully; and if the

country also does not have its own policing principles and guidelines it could

create the room for controversies and in the end it may lead to Liberia not having

a kind of unified code for police.”

CSO4, CSO5 and CSO6 concurred with this view and reiterated that acquisition and use

of local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and needed to be captured

and taught. CSO4 maintained that:

“I think this is what has been absent in most of the interventions not just the

interventions with the police, of course we are talking about police now. I think in

most of the interventions how we did things here before, the real use of local

knowledge and managing local knowledge really have been absent in most of

107

what we have seen coming from the UN and the international circles. Most of the

lessons learned have to come from outside. That’s true we want standards but we

also supposed to recognize our uniqueness as a country. We have a particular

context and a particular history and that should be the basis upon which we should

do all of these interventions.”

In 2006, UNMIL determined there was a need to revise its approaches to police

reform interventions in Liberia. According to Freidman (2011), some of its training

coordinators had resolved that the curriculum compromised quality for quantity and that

it favored producing a large number of officers quickly. They argued that the curriculum

was more suited for training of interim police officers than for the development of a

sustainable long-term police force. Since 2006, UNMIL revised and updated its training

curriculum with manuals that covered subjects on democratic policing, human rights and

international policing principles, criminal investigation, community policing concepts,

case file management, and report writing. It also covered subjects on police

administration, policies and procedures, ethics, and discipline reflecting best practices.

Before that time however, UNMIL had trained and deployed 2000 police officers who

did not benefit from the contents of its revised training curriculum and other new

program approaches (Secretary General’s Report to the UN Security Council S/2006/958,

2006).

Interview respondents also argued that even some of the revised program

approaches that UNMIL had determined to implement after 2006 were hampered by its

earlier decisions. For example, UNMIL decided to build the local capacity of the police

108

through the training of Liberian trainers. However, the new officers trained and deployed

by UNMIL lacked the practical experience to serve as effective trainers. According to

G1, UNMIL’s efforts were also hampered by decisions it had made from the onset to

deactivate all former ranking officers of the old LNP, although many of them had not

committed human rights abuses, and they possessed significant experiences to serve as

future trainers. G1 explained:

“We even argued that . . . you need to have people with more experience; some

old hands in the business to be here to serve as mentors of these people. But

UNMIL refused. They recruited people entirely new; many of them young people

who had been involved into all kinds of things.”

The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices improved and became more thorough

between 2006 and 2013, although its overall reform program was also still not locally

owned. The training manuals still did not include materials specific to policing operations

in Liberia. Trainers still came in from the West African region and from different

policing jurisdictions around the world.

The impact of the UNMIL’s training on the LNP was also assessed in the context

of citizens’ perception of training acquired based on demonstrated performance including

fair and impartial treatment of all citizens. Police and civil society respondents in the

survey agreed that an effective national police force was crucial for maintaining law and

order (Table 18: M=4.6). However, the perception of civil society respondents regarding

police training was that the performance of the UNMIL trained police did not reflect

training acquired (Table 19: M=2.56).

109

Table 18

Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Police Participants (n= 60)

Low High Mean* Std.

Deviat

ion

An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial for maintaining

law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. 1.00 5.00 4.67 0.86

Crime rates are still high today 1.00 5.00 2.98 1.17

Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia National Police

do not respond to crime scenes effectively. 1.00 5.00 2.78 1.21

The Liberia National Police are not able to respond timely to crime

scenes. 1.00 6.00 4.32 0.98

The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police

is more related to the lack of authority to bear arms. 1.00 5.00 2.95 1.41

The problem with effective response of the Liberia National Police

is more related to the lack of equipment. 1.00 5.00 4.70 0.65

Residents of the local communities do not trust the LNP 1.00 5.00 2.75 1.19

A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a complaint

against a police officer to his or her superiors. 1.00 5.00 2.43 1.23

The Liberia National police used excessive force during the

elections incident involving some members and supporters of the

CDC political party on November 8, 2011.

1.00 5.00 2.72 1.34

Some members of the Liberia National Police were involved in

some of the crimes committed today in the country. 1.00 5.00 4.37 0.66

The Liberia National Police today are corrupt. 1.00 5.00 3.83 1.12

Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than Police before

the civil war. 1.00 5.00 2.20 1.04

Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than the Police before

the civil war. 1.00 5.00 3.48 1.00

The problem of corruption in the police is more related to poor

salary and lack of benefits for officers. 2.00 5.00 4.78 0.61

The Liberia National Police today is not effective and capable to

maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. 1.00 5.00 3.68 1.49







5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=

Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

110

Table 19

Police Job Performance as Perceived by the Civil Society Participants (n= 60)

Low High Mean* Std.

Dev

iati

An effective Liberia National Police Force is crucial

for maintaining law and order after UNMIL leaves

Liberia

1.00 5.00 4.50 0.81

The performance of the UNMIL trained police

shows that they acquired the needed knowledge and

capacity for effective police work.

1.00 5.00 2.56 1.28

Crime rates are still high today. 1.00 5.00 3.67 1.23

Crime rates are still high today because the Liberia

National Police do not respond to crime scenes

effectively.

1.00 5.00 4.00 1.07

I trust that the Liberia National Police are able to

effectively respond to crime in my neighborhood. 1.00 5.00 2.07 1.09

If I noticed a crime being committed in my

neighborhood, I prefer to call my neighbor first before

I call the Liberia National Police.

1.00 5.00 4.40 1.03

I feel more secured in the community in which I live

because of the professional job the Liberia National

Police is doing.

1.00 4.00 2.05 0.82

The Liberia National Police are not able to respond

timely to crime scenes. 1.00 5.00 4.50 0.83

The Liberia National Police today are likely to

protect the government more than the citizens. 1.00 5.00 4.18 0.98

The problem with effective response of the Liberia

National Police is more related to the lack of authority

to bear arms.

1.00 5.00 2.95 1.42

The problem with effective response of the Liberia

National Police is more related to the lack of

equipment.

1.00 5.00 4.33 0.91

111

Low

High

Mean*

Std.

Dev

iati

Residents of the local communities do not trust the

Liberia National Police. 1.00 5.00 3.87

1.17

A citizen cannot get a fair redress if he or she files a

complaint against a police officer to his or her

superiors.

1.00 5.00 4.02 1.10

The Liberia National Police Officers do not treat all

citizens fairly and impartially when they investigate

cases.

2.00 5.00 4.30 0.77

Some members of the Liberia National Police were

involved in some of the crimes committed today in the

country.

2.00 5.00 4.53 0.65

The Liberia National police used excessive force

during the elections incident involving some members

and supporters of the Congress for Democratic Change

political party on November 8, 2011.

1.00 5.00 3.38 1.11

The Liberia National Police today are corrupt. 1.00 5.00 4.50 0.68

Liberia National Police today are more corrupt than

Police before the civil war. 1.00 5.00 3.44 1.18

Liberia National Police today are less corrupt than

Police before the civil war. 1.00 5.00 2.54 1.16

The problem of corruption in the police is more

related to salary and lack of benefits for officers. 1.00 5.00 4.57 0.74

The Liberia National Police today is not effective

and capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL

leaves Liberia.

1.00 5.00 3.90 1.33







5. Mean values: 1= Strongly Disagree, 2= Disagree, 3= Neither Disagree Nor Agree 4=

Agree, 5= Strongly Agree

112

Table 20

Police Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference Point

Low High Mean* Std.

Deviation

a) Do you believe that the crime rate

today is higher, lower or about the

same than in the years between 2004-

2005?

1.00 3.00 2.03 0.32

b) Do you believe that the crime rate

today is higher, lower or about the

same than in the years between 2006-

2007?

1.00 3.00 2.03 0.32

c) Do you believe that the crime rate

today is higher, lower or about the

same than in the years between 2008-

2009?

1.00 3.00 2.02 0.43

d) Do you believe that the crime rate

today is higher, lower or about the

same than in the years between 2010-

2011?

1.00 4.00 1.60 0.67







5. Mean values: 1= About the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher

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Table 21

Civil Society Views About Crime Rates Over the Years Using Today as a Reference

Low High Mean* Std.

Dev

iati

a) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is

higher, lower or about the same than in the years

between 2004-2005?

1.00 3.00 2.17 0.56

b) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is

higher, lower or about the same than in the years

between 2006-2007?

1.00 3.00 2.10 0.66

c) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is

higher, lower or about the same than in the years

between 2008-2009?

1.00 3.00 2.02 0.70

d) Do you believe that crime the crime rate today is

higher, lower or about the same than in the years

between 2010-2011?

1.00 3.00 1.78 0.74







5. Mean values: 1= about the same, 2= Lower, 3= Higher

The effectiveness on job performance measured the ability of the police to

effectively conduct policing operations and maintain law and order. The regression based

on the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a significant relationship between

knowledge gained and police job performance (Table 22). This meant that police job

performance is the result of the training acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police

training effected some relative changes related to the maintenance of law and order. This

significant relationship further implies that police effectiveness would be higher if their

capacity regarding logistics and materials for job performance were adequately provided.

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Table 22

Relationship Between Police Knowledge, Skills Level and Job Performance

N Mean

(SD)

R p(2

tail)

Police Knowledge and skills level

Police Job Effectiveness Perceived by Police

60 4.50 (.31)

3.31 (.44)

-.35** .008

** Correlation is statistically significant at p ≤ .01

Table 23

Analysis of Variance (

ANOVA

Model Sum of Squares

Df Mean Square F Sig.

Regression 1.426 1 1.426 7.587 .008

Residual 10.522 56 .188

Total 11.948 57

a. Dependent Variable: Police Job performance perceived by police

b. Predictors: (Constant), Computed police knowledge and skills competency

Effectiveness of job performance was measured in the context of (a) the ability of

the UNMIL trained police to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia; (b)

Police protection of citizens and government; and (c) Citizens’ trust of police to bear

arms in order to effectively fight crime. Police survey respondents neither disagreed nor

agreed (Table 18: M=3.68) that the UNMIL trained police was capable to maintain law

and order when UNMIL leaves Liberia at the end of its mission. Civil society survey

respondents also neither disagreed nor agreed (Table 19: M=3.90). However, a majority

of interview respondents expressed the view that they did not believe that the Liberia

National Police was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. They

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point to challenges in UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting process, need for psycho-social

counseling, additional training to increase the size of the police to the population and to

improve the character of the police, resources and improved conditions of work, and the

need to build a people-oriented police force as preconditions to ensure performance

effectiveness after UNMIL leaves Liberia. UN4 emphasized that the question of the

capability of the LNP to take the place of UNMIL:

“Means that you need to build a people-oriented police . . . . For example if you

recruit me into the police, send me to the community I came from, it is very

difficult for me to halt people in my community. Because they know me . . . and I

want to prove to them that I am here to serve you, but . . . I am going to be firm,

and they understand that . . . So that’s one approach to make the police more

people oriented, more people focused. For this I don’t think they have achieved.

So before UNMIL leaves, if they can cover that gap, then to a large extent there

will be respect for the police, and the police will also respect the citizens. Number

two, I still believe the number of the police to the population is still small.

Number three I think equipment is very, very vital, not necessarily weapons,

because weapons have a way of providing false confidence to the carrier . . .”

On the issue of police protection, civil society respondents agreed that the police

are likely to protect government more than citizens (Table 19: M=4.18). PO2 expressed

the view that the culture by which police power is applied in the interest of the state or on

orders of public officials for political ends (Sawyer, 1992) has not changed: “Nothing has

actually changed. We still have and continue to maintain the colonial state structure,

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which is state-centric and not people-centric. So the police will protect the government

more than the people.” G2 cited an example in which high school students staged a

peaceful protest on March 22, 2011 in solidarity with their teachers who were on strike

for lack of payment of their salaries. Attempts by police to quell the protest resulted in

use of excessive force by which several students were brutalized, leaving some students

with serious injuries. According to G2, “one of them, a handicap student took fifteen

stitches on her head.” The Commission set up to investigate the incident recommended

that several senior police officers who were involved should be dismissed and some

should be suspended. G2, who chaired the Commission that investigated the incident and

made the recommendations, said that when the President of Liberia received the report,

“she thought that the recommendations were harsh.” G2 took the President’s expression

to mean that “at the highest level, the President must have felt that the police acted in the

interest of the government, to protect government’s image; because protests of students in

the streets shouting ‘pay our teachers’ was an anti-government protest.” UN4 expressed

the view that the behavior of the police is often impacted by a fear of consequences:

“One must first understand and be trained to that level that if I stand on the

citizens’ side, the state will support; the citizens will support. What are the

consequences of me supporting the citizens rather than the state? So the fear of

consequences alone is a deterrence to make the police more on the government

side.”

PO4 concurred and explained that “most police officers are afraid of losing their job, so

they work in the interest of the government and not the public as required.” UN3

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expressed the view that there have been cases in which the police have been seen taking

the side of the government when the situation involved citizens from different political

parties other than the ruling party. CSO2 argued that “The Police Director and most of

the people in the police force are appointed by the president and can be dismissed by the

President . . . so that keeps the police tied to the Chief Executive . . . and they are going to

protect people in the government more than the they will protect the citizens.”

The sub-components of effectiveness on job performance were public confidence and

police conduct. Public confidence measured the extent of citizens’ self-assurance in the

ability of the police to provide fair, impartial, and equal treatment to all citizens in the

exercise of police authority, and to respond effectively and timely to crime. Police

conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which impact on police

integrity.

On public confidence or the fair and impartial treatment of citizens in the exercise

of police authority, civil society respondents agreed (Table 19) that they do not get fair

and impartial treatment from the police: (a) when they investigate their cases (M=4.30);

(b) when they file complaints against police officers to their superiors (M=4.02). These

views were corroborated by interview respondents. However, they also argued that most

often this was the result of interference from superior officers. CSO6 expressed the view

that it depends on who is involved:

“if it is between a government official and you, it is not fairly done because they

prioritize. But if it is you against your colleague, because I have witnessed some,

they investigate fairly and even sometimes some of the police can be very rigid ...

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but sometimes there is interference by calls from somewhere above telling them

to let that person go; calls from above from senior police officers in the central

office or sometimes from higher cabinet ministers.”

The extent of public confidence in the police was also measured in the context of

police responses to crime. Police officers who participated in the survey agreed that

despite the knowledge and skills acquired as the result of the UNMIL’s training, they

were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes and crime scenes (Table 18:

M=4.32); although they disagreed that crime rates are still high today (M=2.98); and they

linked this problem to lack of equipment (M= 4.70). Civil society survey respondents

strongly agreed with the police assessment that the police do not respond effectively to

crimes and crime scenes (Table 19: M= 4.50). They did not link this problem to the

police’s lack of authority to bear arms (M= 2.95) but rather to the lack of equipment (M=

4.33). However, interview respondents G1 and CSO5 argued that the issue of the lack of

equipment does not apply in all cases and should not be used as an excuse. G1 stressed

the point that “You can’t say for such a crime as murder, that because I don’t have a

vehicle so I can’t go to investigate . . .” CSO5 concurred, arguing that “So everybody just

sit down and make that excuse about equipment. Yes, we know equipment is very key . . .

to do evidence gathering, forensic and all of that . . . but what were we doing in the past?

So we shouldn’t just use it as excuse to cover up for our inefficiencies.” UN4 concurred

and made a distinction between police roles. He argued that while some police roles

require equipment, there are most other roles “that require just presence, policemen

everywhere and just surveillance. You know where those criminals are. You don’t need

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all the weapons in the world. You just need the numbers and people carrying out shifts;

so you need human resources there.” G3, CSO6, and PO1 argued that when you train a

police force and deploy them to undertake the task of maintaining law and order,

equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the

support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, “you must give them the

tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of

the training that support effective performance in the field. According to G3,

“The police have been trained in forensic investigation; but they do not have the

equipment to carry out those forensic investigations . . . some travel abroad and

train in properly equipped laboratories; they come back to Liberia, there are no

laboratories . . . if you transfer police officers from one county to another, they do

not have barracks where to stay. They have to go and pay rent; and the rent is

coming from their basic salary. There is no rent allowance; there is no housing

allowance; there is no transport allowance. They have to beg to take car to get to

work. It is unfair to the police.”

Civil society survey respondents also agreed that crime rates are lower today compared to

earlier years, but agreed that crime rates today are still high because police do not

respond timely and effectively to crimes in their neighborhoods (Table 21: M=4.00). In

the event of a crime in progress, respondents also agreed they prefer to call their

neighbors first before they call the police (Table 19: M=4.40). The majority of interview

respondents agreed with this view. They point to the development of neighborhood watch

groups as community responses to the problem of ineffective police response. According

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to UN3, however, poor organization and lack of control over these groups also led to

proliferation of mob actions or “street justice” in the neighborhoods.

G2 also reasoned that the value in calling one’s neighbor first is also that your

neighbor “provides your first line of evidence, at least somebody will see something

happening to you so when the police comes later on, whenever they get to you at least

you have someone to corroborate what you say happened to you.” Respondents, who

indicated the view that they would call the police first, reasoned that the police are

responsible to enforce the law. According to CSO6,

“Your neighbor will do it family way. And if for instance I found somebody

raping my child, I call the neighbor, they will say let’s settle it the family way.

But the police will be able to apprehend that person, put that whole case under

control and see how best they can take your case to court”.

The issue was also raised on the need for the police to be authorized to carry arms in

order to carry out effective police operations. On this issue, civil society respondents

agreed that the problem with effective response of the police is related to a lack of

equipment (Table 19: M=4.33). However, equipment did not include arms. Respondents

disagreed that police should bear arms in order to do effective police work. Police

respondents concurred with this view (Table 18: M=2.25) that they did not need arms in

order to do effective police work. Interview respondents agreed with the views of police

and civil society respondents. They also indicated that they did not trust their police to

bear arms because of the vetting process which allowed former combatants and criminals

to be recruited into the police force.

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Police conduct measured behaviors and practices of police officers which

impacted on police integrity and public confidence. Police conduct was measured in the

context of corruption and crime. Interview respondents defined corruption as unethical

behaviors and practices such as drinking, taking of drugs while on duty, collection of

bribes from motorists, parties to investigations and to court cases involving presentation

of evidence by the police, all of which have negative impact on police integrity and

public confidence. The police has not broken away from its discredited past. Analysis of

responses from the survey questionnaire, interviews, documents, and field notes revealed

that the UNMIL training had no impact on police integrity. On the issue of crime, police

respondents agreed that police officers have been involved in some of the crimes

committed around the country (Table 18: M=4.18). Civil society respondents agreed with

the police assessment (Table 19: M=4.53). Police and civil society respondents linked

this result to UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting practices. On the issue of corruption,

police and civil society respondents agreed that the Liberia National Police are corrupt. A

culture of corruption is sustained by a culture of unfavorable conditions of work.

However, police and civil society respondents linked police corruption more to

unfavorable working conditions such as poor salary, lack of transportation, and benefits

such as housing, medical care, and pension programs for officers.

The analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between

knowledge gained and police job performance, meaning that the police job performance

is the result of the training acquired (Table 23). The implication is that the UNMIL has

conducted the theoretical training in relation to police field work in classroom settings

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and field locations. However, this does not necessarily imply that the LNP have adequate

logistics and other resources needed to enable them perform effectively. Other conditions

of service, complementary to training, include salary, benefits, equipment, and resources.

These are fundamental factors of effective performance that enable the police to respond

effectively to crime scenes and to calls from communities for protection. Respondents

G1, PO2, and CSO6 argue that better conditions of service including salary and benefits

is one of the fundamental factors of motivation, especially in Liberia where poverty is on

the increase.

Research Question 3

Are there current challenges that require reform to improve the quality of policing and

ensure a reliable police security force in Liberia?

This question sought to assess the critical lessons learned from responses to

Research Questions 1 and 2 regarding the UNMIL’s training program and how the

findings point to challenges that require reforms in order to improve the quality of

policing in Liberia. Question 3 also explored challenges perceived by the citizens about

their new police force and what respondents believed must be done to build a

professional police force capable of providing equal protection to all citizens, while

upholding their basic human rights and maintaining law and order. The findings in

Research Questions 1 and 2 point to several internal and external challenges in UNMIL’s

training program. These challenges were examined from two perspectives: (a) The

UNMIL; and (b) The Government of Liberia.

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From the perspective of the UNMIL, challenges that required reform were

examined from three angles: (a) recruitment decisions; (b) local content; and (c) training

methodology. The key findings in the UNMIL’s recruitment decisions are that it failed to

observe established UN mission standards for recruitment and vetting, to communicate

the message to the population that the new police being organized was for individuals

with good character, and that policing is for individuals with records of good conduct and

behavior. UNMIL failed to consult the population in the local communities in the

recruitment process. Although it posted pictures of candidates around the country and

asked citizens to speak out and point individuals who had committed human rights

abuses, UNMIL did not provide the needed security protection to encourage their

participation in the vetting of candidates. Moreover, the UNMIL’s preference for quantity

in recruitment of large numbers of candidates compromised quality in the context of

establishing a sustainable long-term police force. All of these were the additional adverse

impacts on the outcome of the training program.

I found that the majority of respondents emphasized their concern about the

UNMIL’s controlling influence over the program from the onset. According to G1 and

PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training

program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions.

They cited as an example, the decision taken by UNMIL to deactivate and disband the

entire old Liberian National police force and to build a police force that is entirely new.

The challenge that this created was the absence of institutional knowledge and memory

and the absence of experienced police leadership that would have provided mentoring to

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new officers. All of these were the additional adverse impacts on the outcome of the

training program. The UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts had argued unsuccessfully in

favor of retention of some of the ranking officers in the old disbanded force. They had

argued that some of the ranking officers of the old police force who had not committed

human rights abuses should be retained to serve as mentors for the new recruits. The

challenges from these lapses were: (1) individuals who committed heinous crimes against

the population were recruited and are now serving in the new police force with some

serving as ranking officers, and this also impacts on the morale of the rank-and-file; (2)

some police officers trained and deployed have been involved in crimes around the

country for which the citizens do not trust their police; and (3) there was a lack of

effective leaders in the new police force who can provide leadership by example. The

rank-and-file admittedly engaged in corrupt activities, while some senior commanders

frequently interfered in investigations for social, financial and political ends. Still, others

are caught engaging crimes such as drug trafficking.

On the issue of local content, respondents indicated their concern that courses

taught by UNMIL at the academy did not include country-specific contents for Liberia.

According to them, UNMIL did not collaborate with the government’s security sector

regime to develop and include course contents that have specific local skills and policing

guidelines around which UNMIL’s training activities would revolve. Training manuals

used in earlier missions and brought to Liberia were not revised to adapt to the country’s

policing context and history.

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Another critical theme that emerged was the UNMIL’s training methodology. The

earliest concerns about the UNMIL training program, in addition to the recruitment

challenges, were the diversity of the trainers and the nature and content of the training.

Trainers came from different countries with diverse social and political backgrounds and

contrasting policing jurisdictions. The research found that as the result of the broadness

of the base of trainers and the restricted course content, the overall output of the

UNMIL’s police training was not country-specific to Liberia and that police trained and

deployed have different policing orientations and values.

From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, challenges that required

reform were examined from three angles: (a) UNMIL-GoL coordination challenges; (b)

GoL support to police reform and capacity challenges; and (c) political interference in

policing operations. Analysis of the survey results, transcripts from the interviews,

documents and field notes revealed that the support of the Government of Liberia is

complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure effectiveness of

performance. However, the findings reflect that the government’s direct support in this

regard had been minimal, instead it had relied on international donor support. On the

issue of political interference, respondents expressed concern over the government’s

continued control over the administration of the police through political appointment of

ranking officers. The President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals

appointed are most often not from within the organization. Internal promotions have also

followed no set criteria for merit based on performance, experience, and tenure. All of

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these factors have historically demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded

motivation, and adversely impacted on the development of a professional police force.

Chapter Summary

In Chapter 4, I analyzed the data, discussed the research results and presented the

findings. The overarching research question that guided this study was: How has police

training by the United Nations Mission in Liberia affected police effectiveness and public

confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order? This question was

expanded by two qualitative questions and one quantitative question. In Research

Question 1, I assessed the UNMIL’s strategy for recruitment and vetting of applicants for

the new LNP, in the context of thoroughness applied in the process to ensure that only

applicants who had not committed human rights abuses and who had demonstrated good

behavior in the local communities were recruited. The UNMIL’s recruitment and vetting

procedures were not thorough and did not adhere to United Nations international police

reform standards. In Research Question 2, I assessed training and citizens’ perception of

training based on observed police performance. The training was not uniform and did not

include a country-specific context for Liberia. The broadness of the base of trainers from

diverse and contrasting police jurisdictions diminished training effectiveness and

undermined the effectiveness of performance of the police. Participants’ responses to

Research Question 3 affirmed that there were current challenges that required reform to

establish a professional police force that is in synch with its policing jurisdiction and is

effective and capable of maintaining law and order in Liberia. The LNP currently faces

several challenges that impede effective performance. These challenges require reform

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and re-orientation interventions by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia. In Chapter 5,

I briefly discuss the conclusions and present my recommendations for positive social

change based on the findings.

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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

In this chapter, I present the conclusions based on the findings, critical lessons

learned, and the recommendations. I conducted the on location in Monrovia, Liberia. I

conducted the study in the wake of the country’s fight to eradicate the Ebola epidemic

under conditions of emergency management public policy challenges never before

experienced in Liberia nor in the West African subregion. Participants in the study were

from the government, community-based civil society organizations, the LNP, and the UN

mission in Liberia. The mixed-model research method was used to collect and analyze

the data. The purpose of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of how the

UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions have affected the capacity of the LNP

to effectively maintain law and order and gain public confidence. The objective of the

study was to identify the underlying contexts and to contribute knowledge to the

establishment of an effective police force that gains the trust and confidence of the

citizens of Liberia.

I can conclude, based on the findings, that the UNMIL’s police training program

has yielded mixed results and impacts on the effectiveness of police performance in

Liberia. The deficiencies in the UNMIL’s police training and reform interventions reflect

a broader problem of shortcomings in various reform programs implemented by the UN

and other international nongovernmental organizations in Liberia. Sawyer (2005)

emphasized that the greater shortcomings in the implementation of reform programs are

lack of guidance of a long-term larger vision for a postconflict society, the lack of

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effective coordination amongst implementing agencies, and their failure to engage

Liberians as stakeholders in designing and implementing these programs. In the case of

UNMIL, the police training program took place in a new global environment under

country-specific realities and conditions that informed how training intervention for the

LNP ought to have happened in order to establish a country-specific professional police

force that gains local ownership. In an analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire,

interview transcripts, and field notes, I found that the UNMIL training of the LPN was

impacted by what Durch (2010) referred to as a “crisis of strategy” from the onset (p. 8).

Respondents emphasized that UNMIL was not well-informed about its mission

environment in Liberia and did not seek much needed guidance from the local security

sector regime.

The adverse impacts, however, are not entirely training related but result also

from negative externalities emanating from the behavior of the government of Liberia

towards its police force. Policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an

entrenched centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not

place a premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and

administration even in its postconflict state. The future implications of the results are that

the UNMIL and the government of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a

comprehensive program of professionalizing the police before the UNMIL’s departure

from Liberia. They must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and

reorientate the LNP and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice

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system and policing tradition, which is specifically patterned after that of the United

States.

The conclusions and recommendations are presented in two parts based on

Research Questions 1 and 2. Question 3 was a restatement of the critical lessons learned

and the challenges that informed the recommendations. In each part, the findings are

summarized to provide the basis for the conclusions and the recommendations for

positive social change based on each research question from the perspectives of (a) the

UNMIL and (b) the government of Liberia.

Research Question 1

What strategies were used to recruit applicants for police training?

The UNMIL Perspective

In the findings for Question 1, I found that the UNMIL’s approach to recruitment

and vetting of candidates was adhoc. Candidates were not investigated with due diligence

regarding their character and previous human rights records. The UNMIL’s recruitment

and vetting practices were not exhaustive. The procedures were not thorough and did not

adhere to the standards applied in other UN police reform missions such as in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo. Citizens in the local communities were not

consulted in the vetting process regarding prior behaviors and character of applicants. In

conclusion, UNMIL’s failure to apply due diligence in the recruitment of candidates

resulted in the admission of known criminals and former combatants of the warring

factions who had committed human rights abuses during the civil war. To date, they

continue to serve in the rank-and-file and leadership of the new LNP.

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On the issue of police integrity, I also found that psychological counseling was

needed as part of the training package because the country was just emerging from 14

years of conflict from which the people were traumatized. Former combatants, criminals,

and individuals with questionable character had found their way into the rank-and-file of

the new police force and some had even become supervisors. In Question 1, I further

concluded that the admission of former combatants, criminals, and individuals with

questionable character was partly responsible for the citizens’ lack of trust in the new

police to bear arms. It also bears on a crisis of public confidence in the integrity of the

police as an instrument for peace-building given that some of the UNMIL trained officers

were found to be involved in various crimes, such as armed robberies and drug

smuggling around the country.

The Government Perspective

From the perspective of the government, the participants also raised the critical

issue of the weak commitment by the government to its police training program. PO1,

PO2, and G3 argued that the government of Liberia did not put itself in the position to

take ownership of the UNMIL training program to provide much needed leadership and

direction in working with UNMIL to jointly develop a training framework. In the view of

respondents, taking ownership meant providing funding for the training or for some

aspects of it instead of relying entirely on the international community. Had the

government committed to taking ownership of the training program, it would have been

able to insist on country-specific training and orientation. That is, it would have been in

the position to decide on the direction of the training and also decide on which training it

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would accept for the LNP and which training it would reject. To the contrary, the

government compromised its position by failing to take responsibility for its police

training program. It had to accept whatever training was available based on funding

provided by any given country.

Recommendation 1

The United Nations must require future postconflict international police reform

missions to:

(a) Ensure that joint efforts in recruitment and vetting must go beyond consultations

with officials of the local security sector regime to ascertain participation of local

community-based civil society members in an inclusive process of postconflict

police and security sector reform;

(b) Emphasize participation of the local communities in the vetting of candidates for

the police force and provide immediate security and protection for the citizens as

the basis for their participation in the vetting of candidates;

the need for applicants with good character; inform residents in the local

communities that police applicants should be people who have good character and

good human rights backgrounds; and

(d) In the case of Liberia, UNMIL and the government of Liberia must jointly

implement a periodic and revolving program of psychological counseling and

rehabilitation for all members of the current police force. This should include the

rank-and-file as well as the leadership.

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A key component of any international reform intervention is a strong partnership

and effective coordination between the mission and the local authorities to jointly provide

program direction and support. In the findings to question 1, participants raised the issue

of the UNMIL’s controlling influence over the training program. According to G1 and

PO2, although there was a joint transitional working group collaborating on the training

program, UNMIL had insisted that as the experts, they had to make the final decisions.

For example, participants referred to the case of UNMIL’s decision to deactivate the

entire old LNP and to build a police force that is entirely new. On this issue, UNMIL’s

Liberian implementing partners had requested that some of the ranking officers of the

disbanded old police who had not committed human rights abuses should be retained to

serve as mentors for the new recruits. Respondents emphasized that UNMIL refused and

none of the ranking officers of the old disbanded police was recruited. However, the

literature supports the position of the UNMIL’s Liberian counterparts. A study by

Glebbeek (2001) on police reform in Guatemala showed that the process did not succeed

and faced significant challenges because it involved a decision to abolish the entire old

police force and to establish a new force bereft of members of the old institution. In

contrast, a similar police reform study done by Stanley (2006) on statebuilding in El

Salvador found that the strategy for building a new police force from bottom-up was

successful because it provided for continuity and grounded experience in the process by

the inclusion of some members of the old police force. In conclusion, I found in Question

1 that the recommendation for retention of some of the ranking officers of the old

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disbanded LNP to ensure continuity would have been a successful strategy. This strategy

was adopted by UN police training missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in East Timor

and yielded successful results. It should have been adopted by the UNMIL in Liberia.

The impacts of the failure to provide for institutional memory and organizational

continuity were reflected in leadership capacity gaps of the new LNP. Respondents

emphasized the point that as the result of this decision, the LNP lacked capacity in terms

of experience and the competencies associated with law enforcement leadership such as

administration of the police revolving around the ability to mentor subordinates, exercise

command and control, and providing overall leadership.

Recommendation 2

Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a

strong partnership and collaboration to integrate, rehabilitate and strengthen what is

found on the ground in the host country. The mission must collaborate with its local

counterparts to reform the institution it finds on the ground and to place it in synch with

contemporary international policing principles and standards. The overall police reform

goal need not be to disband the structure is found on the ground; but rather to rebuild and

strengthened it through a jointly developed program of integration, rehabilitation, and re-

orientation specific to the policing needs of the host country.

Research Question 2

What, if any, difference has the UNMIL’s police training made relative to the

maintenance of law and order, and public confidence in Liberia’s police force?

The UNMIL Perspective

135

A critical concern raised by respondents was the weak collaborative relationship

and coordination between the UNMIL and its local police administration counterparts in

the implementation of the training program. Although a joint transitional team for

designing and administering the training existed, I found that UNMIL made the final

decisions that were critical to the direction of the program (Freidman, 2011). In the

process, the UNMIL did not coordinate its activities with the other implementing partners

to ensure that the nature and direction of its police training intervention was country-

specific to the context and history of Liberia and to its criminal justice system. This is the

key challenge which points to the need for additional training, rehabilitation, and re-

orientation to exact this country-specific policing context. In Question 2 I also found that

course materials and contents were taken from earlier UN missions in other postconflict

countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor, and Kosovo and did not include

Liberian local content. UN1, CSO4, and G2 argued that UNMIL needed to collaborate

with the Ministry of Justice to develop a training manual for Liberia. It was important

that Liberia develops its own unified code and that the use of local policing principles

and guidelines and local knowledge in handling policing operations was critical and

needed to be captured and taught.

In the findings to Question 2, respondents raised the issue of UNMIL’s training

methodology and the nature and content of the training. The UNMIL used a diversity of

trainers from countries with different political orientations, criminal justice systems, and

policing methods and traditions. A majority of trainers, including those from Africa, had

the British police training orientation, and some trainers had the Russian police training

136

orientation originating from the policing traditions of the Soviet era. The challenge that

this broadness of the base of trainers posed was recognized in the “Brahimi Report” of

the United Nations Panel on Peacekeeping Operations (2000):

“The police component of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40

countries who have never met one another before, have little or no United Nations

experience, and have received little relevant training on mission-specific

briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may vary widely . . . All of

those factors make it extremely difficult for missions . . . to transform a disparate

group of officers into a cohesive and effective force.” (p.20)

In the case of Liberia, the challenges described in the panel’s report resulted in a training

outcome that lacked a uniform criminal justice orientation with a country-specific local

content. Respondents indicated the view that the diversity of trainers from diverse social

and political backgrounds and contrasting police jurisdictions compromised training

effectiveness and adversely impacted on the effectiveness of job performance of the

UNMIL trained LNP. It also failed to situate the training program within the context of

the country’s history and policing tradition. Liberia is a common law country with a

criminal justice system and a policing tradition specifically patterned after that of the

United States of America. Policing in Liberia is based on that particular context and

history which should have been the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training and

reform interventions was conducted. UNMIL’s failure in this regard affirmed a

significant failure to understand its mission environment. It resulted in the major

challenge of establishing a new police force that is estranged from its history and

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tradition. In Research Question 2, I found that the UNMIL established a police force that

is not harmonized with the policing tradition of Liberia. The LNP today has conflicting

performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank nomenclatures. This

failure presents another critical lesson learned for future UN police training missions. The

conclusion, based on the findings on this issue, is that the practice observed in the

Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of trainers is drawn from a variety of policing

jurisdictions based on available donors, should be abolished. Future UN postconflict

international police training and reform programs must not be donor-driven. Instead, the

programs must be driven by what is required to implement reforms specific to enhancing

a host country’s policing needs. That is, trainers must be recruited from countries whose

policing traditions and jurisdictions are the same as that of the host country. The training

program must be implemented to exact the outcome specific to policing in that country.

Recommendation 3

(a) The future UN postconflict international police training programs must not be

donor-driven. The programs must be driven by what is required to implement

reforms specific to enhancing a host country’s policing needs. The mission

must be guided by a standard of a strong partnership, and collaboration to

rehabilitate, integrate and strengthen what is found on the ground and not to

discard it;

(b) Training materials and contents of courses must be developed and reviewed

jointly by the mission and its local counterparts to ensure inclusion of local

138

content specific to the context of a country’s history, policing tradition and

jurisdiction; and

traditions and jurisdictions are the same or similar to that of the host country.

Recommendation 4

(a) Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and a policing

tradition specifically patterned after that of the United States of America. Policing

in Liberia is based on that particular context and history, which should have been

the basis upon which UNMIL’s police training, was conducted. The UNMIL and

the government of Liberia must embark on a program of retraining, rehabilitation,

and re-orientation to situate the police in its common law criminal justice system

and policing tradition with harmonized organization, structure, and rank

nomenclatures specifically patterned after that of the United States before UNMIL

departs Liberia;

(b) Integral to the new program of retraining and re-orientation should be a

collaborative effort to develop a training manual specific to policing in Liberia.

Liberia should have its own unified code that is based on its criminal justice

jurisdiction, and utilizes local policing principles, guidelines and local knowledge

in handling policing operations; and

highest ranking strategic positions under the watch of UNMIL for some time

before UNMIL mission ends.

139

The Government Perspective

From the perspective of the Government of Liberia, I found several externalities

not directly related to training but which impact on the effectiveness of job performance

of the LNP. I found that correlations and regression used to test the hypotheses showed a

moderately significant correlation between police perceived knowledge and skills gained

during UNMIL training and the job effectiveness perceived by them (r = -0.35).

However, the relationship is an inverse one, implying that as the knowledge gained

increases, the job performance cannot be associated in the same manner or direction. The

implication is that as more resources were are used in training the police, limited

resources were allocated to facilitate their job performance. This formed a basis of

reducing police effectiveness. Moreover, the regression based on the analysis of variance

(ANOVA) showed a significant relationship between knowledge gained and police job

performance. This meant that the police job performance is the result of the training

acquired, thus implying that UNMIL’s police training effected some relative changes

related to the maintenance of law and order. This significant relationship further implied

that police effectiveness would be higher if their capacity regarding questions of

equipment and resources were adequately provided by the government.

These findings provide useful insight into the effectiveness of job performance of

the UNMIL trained police relative to challenges in the context of the government’s

interventions in its police reform program. In the analysis of the survey results,

transcripts from the interviews, documents, and field notes I also found that although the

UNMIL had conducted the theoretical training in relation to police fieldwork, this did not

140

necessarily imply that the LNP had the logistics and other resources needed to enable

them perform effectively. Respondents emphasized that the support of the government of

Liberia was complementary to the UNMIL’s training and necessary to ensure

effectiveness of performance. However, the findings showed that the government’s direct

support in this regard had been minimal, and that instead it had relied on international

donor support. To the contrary, respondents emphasized the view that the government

ought not to rely on donor support. They expressed the view that the international

community is committed largely to providing funds for technical training and advisory

support, and much of its funding goes to that area. It is the government of Liberia that has

primary responsibility to provide the actual resources and the funding for the police

institution. The government’s failure to meet this obligation left the UNMIL trained LNP

as one of those institutions that was seriously underfunded and underpaid. A majority of

the respondents emphasized that the public’s lack of confidence in the ability of the

police to maintain law and order is based more on their perception that the government

had not been forthcoming in providing adequate support to capacitate the police to

perform its law enforcement duties. PO1, PO2, CSO6, and G3 argued that the

government of Liberia did not provide the needed support to the police as articulated in

its Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) and the Agenda for Transformation (2013), and

that its support was necessary to yield performance effectiveness. They argued that when

a police force is trained and deployed to undertake the task of maintaining law and order,

equipment and other needed resources and incentives must be provided as part of the

support that yields performance effectiveness. According to G3, “you must give them the

141

tools to work with” because equipment and resources are the complementary aspects of

the training that support effective performance in the field.

On the question of the ability of the police to maintain law and order after

UNMIL leaves Liberia, I found that civil society respondents did not believe that the

LNP was capable to maintain law and order after UNMIL leaves Liberia. Police and civil

society also agreed that police were not able to respond effectively and timely to crimes.

They linked these to the need for additional training and the lack of equipment and

resources. Moreover, other conditions of service that are complementary to training

include salary, benefits, and good working conditions and environment. These are

fundamental factors of effective performance. In postconflict Liberia where poverty is on

the increase, police officers are among the least paid with an average monthly salary of

about one hundred and fifty ($150.00) United States dollars. Out of this salary, they pay

income tax, transport themselves to work, relocate to distant areas of assignment, pay

rent, and care for their families.

In the responses to Question 2, I also found that the UNMIL training had no

impact on police integrity as evidenced by corruption and unfairness in the exercise of

police authority. However, police and civil society respondents linked this lack of

integrity to a culture of unfavorable conditions of work punctuated by factors such as

poor salary and a lack of benefits such as housing, transportation, medical care, and

pension programs for officers. This culture of unfavorable conditions of work was also

linked to low level of attention and handling of the police by the government in all areas

of police work.

142

Another issue which emerged as critical to the need for police reform was

political interference in police operations and the need to depoliticize the police.

According to Liebenow (1969), Liberia is a country where “politics is king.” Policing

takes place in a political environment of an entrenched centralized, imperial presidential

system. Political leaders do not place a premium on the mission of the police, and

therefore on its organization and administration even in its postconflict state. To date, the

state continues to regard the police organization more as an instrument for exerting state

control over the citizenry than for the enforcement of laws in the process of postconflict

democratic peace-building and state-building. According to G2 and G3, the state’s

control of the police is exercised primarily by its political appointments of all ranking

officers, and by its control over the finance and expenditure decisions of the police. The

President of Liberia appoints the top brass. The individuals appointed are most often not

from within the organization. Internal promotions also had no set criteria and promotions

are not based on performance, tenure, and merit. All of these factors have historically

demoralized the police rank-and-file, dissuaded motivation, and adversely impacted on

the development of a professional police force.

In Research Question 2, I also found that in the wake of UNMIL’s drawdown, it

was critical for Liberia’s political leaders to appreciate the need to place a high premium

on the mission of the nation’s police force and to act quickly to professionalize it. A

functioning professional LNP will reduce the risk of conflict and make society safer by

providing security for all, including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling

environment for investment and sustainable economic development, enhance state

143

authority and strengthen Liberia’s nascent democracy. The research also found that this

was the rationale for respondents’ call to depoliticize the police and its operations.

The call to depoliticize the police institution as much as possible emerged as a

major dynamic for professionalizing the LNP. G1, G2, G3, PO1, and PO2 all called for

restructuring the police such that the LNP becomes semi-autonomous with an

independent body exercising oversight responsibility over its operations. For example,

when a vacancy occurs within one of the strategic ranking offices of the police, the

Commission would vet candidates, establish an eligible list of three successful candidates

and submit same to the President from which list one candidate is selected to fill that

vacancy. I advance the following recommendations below based on the findings:

Recommendation 5

5.1 Organization

(a) Enactment of a new law establishing the new Liberia National Police must be

based on recommendations for rehabilitation, reorganization, and reorientation of

the entire LNP, officers, and rank-and-file alike;

(b) Depoliticize and restructure the police organization. By law, establish the LNP as

a semi-autonomous institution as far practicable;

operations of the Liberia National Police;

(d) Appointment of senior ranking officers of the LNP must be based on merit. Once

appointed by the President, senior ranking officers must have tenure to serve for a

144

definite period; they should be removed only by process of impeachment through

the Legislature;

(e) Line level officers must be promoted based on merit; consider education,

experience, tenure and meritorious performance; salary increments and

promotions must be based on results of performance evaluation.

5.2 Remuneration

(f) Establish a pay and grade system based on position classification that begins with

police entry-level pay and benefits graduated over time periods; consult the Civil

Service Agency on the position classification and pay starting with line level

oficers; and

(g) Abolish the income tax for line level officers earning monthly gross income

below USD$200.00.

5.3 Housing

(h) New LNP law to be enacted must have a provision requiring construction of

barracks for police officers throughout the country. Police barracks of

conventional standard (i.e., West Africa sub-region) must be constructed in all

county capitals throughout the country; and in populated cities and emerging

urban areas around the country;

(i) Housing allowance scheme should be put in place for line level officers assigned

to areas not having barracks.

5.4 Service benefits

145

(j) Education: Provide free education to children and dependents of line level police

officers up to completion of the 12

grade. Free education defined to include free

registration fees and books;

(k) Medical: Free medical care in government clinics and hospitals for officers, their

children and dependents. Free medical care defined to include free registration

and free laboratory tests; and

(l) Insurance: Establish a program to provide free life insurance coverage for line

level or rank-and file police offiers.

Implications for Social Change

UN Police Reform Missions

Future UN police training missions must be guided by the general standard of a

strong partnership, effective coordination and collaboration between the mission, and the

local security sector regime to jointly provide program direction and support.

Additionally, the practice observed in the Brahimi Report, by which a multiplicity of

trainers is drawn from a variety of policing jurisdictions should be abolished. Future UN

postconflict international police training missions should be driven by what is required to

implement training specific to a host country’s policing needs and not by donors.

The Liberia National Police

The government of Liberia must take ownership of the UNMIL training program

to provide much needed leadership and direction. It must recommit to the police training

program and place a high premium on the mission of the nation’s police force. The

146

government and UNMIL must jointly respond to the need to rehabilitate, retrain, and re-

orientate the police and to situate it in its original uniform common law criminal justice

system and policing jurisdiction, which is specifically patterned after that of the United

States of America. Another major dynamic of the findings of the research was the clarion

call for the Government to act quickly to professionalize the Liberia National Police and

to depoliticize its operations. Respondents emphasized the need to implement a merit-

based system for officers and the rank-and-file, and to restructure the police organization

as a semi-autonomous institution as far as is practicable before the UNMIL’s departure

from Liberia. The social change implications of all this is that an effective functioning

professional LNP will reduce the risk of return to conflict. It will make society safer by

providing security for all including ordinary citizens. It will create the enabling

environment for investment and sustainable economic growth, development, and social

stability and enhance state authority while strengthening Liberia’s nascent democracy.

Recommendations for Future Research

The LNP operates as a part of the larger criminal justice system of Liberia.

According to G2, the three tiers of Liberia’s criminal justice system include the police,

prosecution, and corrections. Police work involves pretrial detentions, evidence

gathering, and production of admissible evidence to protect the rights of parties in the

courts. According to the US State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights

Practices (2013), Liberia’s courts are laden with judicial inefficiencies. Liberia’s jurors,

judges, and magistrates are subject of influence and corruption. There is also the issue of

uneven distribution of human resource personnel, equipment, and resources throughout

147

the judicial system. All of these undermine effective police performance. The

effectiveness of job performance of the police is somewhat tied to the effectiveness of the

entire criminal justice system. However, there is no current related judicial reform

program in place that could be aligned with the ongoing UNMIL police training and

reform interventions. Additional research is needed to determine how police reform can

be implemented as part of a larger program of a holistic criminal justice reform in order

to enhance the effectiveness of performance of the police in the future.

Chapter Summary

This study examined how UNMIL police training affected effectiveness and

public confidence in the ability of the LNP to maintain law and order. A mixed methods

approach was used. Likert scales were used to collect quantitative data. Qualitative data

consisted of documentary sources and individual, semi-structured interviews with open-

ended and closed questions. Participants were officials of government, UNMIL, officers

of LNP, and leaders and members of civil society organizations.

The UNMIL’s police training yielded mixed results. To the extent that local

context of policing varies from one country to another, the design and implementation of

any international police reform assistance program should be based on context-specific

knowledge and expertise. In the case of Liberia, UNMIL was not well-informed about its

mission environment. This resulted in the repetition of errors made by earlier police

reform missions in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and East Timor. In Liberia, the

diversity of trainers from contrasting policing jurisdictions of different nations yielded a

program outcome that lacked a country-specific context of history and policing tradition.

148

Liberia is a common law country with a criminal justice system and policing tradition

patterned after that of the United States. Liberia’s history and policing context should

have been the basis upon which the UNMIL training was conducted in order to establish

a country-specific professional police force that gains local ownership. Instead, the

UNMIL established a police force that is not harmonized with its policing tradition and

has conflicting performance orientations, policing values, and even contrasting rank

nomenclatures.

I also found that the government of Liberia failed to take ownership of the

training program and to provide much needed leadership and direction due to its weak

commitment and inadequate resource support to complement the training. Respondents

emphasized the view that had the government been committed to taking ownership of the

training program, it would have been able to insist on country-specific training,

orientation, and program outcomes. Another issue which emerged as critical to the reform

was that policing in Liberia takes place in a political environment of an entrenched

centralized, imperial presidential system in which political leaders do not place a

premium on the mission of the police, and therefore on its organization and

administration even in its postconflict state. The administration and operation of the

police remained highly politicized.

The future implications of these results are that the UNMIL and the government

of Liberia need to heighten collaboration to implement a comprehensive program of

retraining, rehabilitation, and reorientation to professionalize and situate the LNP in its

original uniform common law criminal justice system and policing tradition. Liberia’s

149

political leaders should depoliticize the police, grant semi-autonomous status to it, and

provide adequate resource support. All of the transformation cited above must take place

with UNMIL trained officers serving in the highest ranking strategic positions under the

watch of UNMIL for some time before the end of its mission in Liberia. For the UN,

police training missions should be driven by what is required to implement training

specific to a host country’s policing needs and not by donors.

150

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