Paternalism and Irrationality
Introduction
In “Paternalism” [1], Gerald Dworkin asks whether or not the state is ever
justified in restricting the freedom of a person strictly for their own good.
Dworkin thinks the state may be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. This paper examines this claim. I begin by defining
paternalism and provide a preliminary argument against it. I then examine
Dworkin’s proposed justification for paternalism and its implications. I end
by providing my own paternalistic principle, arguing that paternalism can
only be justified in a very limited set of cases. I believe the extent to which
paternalism can be justified is much more narrow in scope than what
Dworkin’s theory implies.
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
vv Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
Paternalism
Breatharianism is the belief that food and water are not needed for
survival. People adhering to this lifestyle believe that only spiritual forces
and sunlight are required to sustain life. A Swiss woman practicing
breatharianism recently starved to death [3]. Should the state be allowed
to stop people against their will from participating in self-destructive
lifestyles such as breatharianism? Such a law would be paternalistic.
Paternalism is the interference with a person’s liberty solely for that
person’s benefit. This does not include restrictions intended to protect
people from secondary harms. For example, restricting breatharianism to
prevent others from being encouraged to participate would not strictly be
paternalism. It would be paternalism if the only goal was to protect the
health of a person who wanted to try it. Deciding whether or not
paternalism is justifiable requires weighing the importance of allowing a
person to make their own decisions against the duty to protect a person’s
well being.
Paternalism does not include laws that require a person to be informed.
For example, requiring that a person be informed about current medical
opinion regarding breatharianism would not be a paternalistic law. Such a
law does not restrict the person’s liberty, but rather aims to provide
relevant information so the person can make an informed decision.
Anti-Paternalism
It can argued that paternalism is generally not justifiable. Arguments that
reject paternalism appeal to the importance of autonomy. Autonomy is a
person’s ability to act according to their own reasons without external
intervention. It encompasses the idea that each person is ultimately in the
best position to judge what decisions they should make. Paternalism
denies a person their right to autonomy. It is perfectly fine to inform a
person and persuade them to make particular actions. However, to require
an action is to disregard the value of rational free choice. In order to
respect a person’s autonomy, there cannot be paternalistic laws.
Exceptions can be made for actions that imply a loss of autonomy. Even
Mill, a strong believer in antipaternalism, believed the state could stop
people from selling themselves into slavery for example.
Dworkin’s Paternalism
Dworkin thinks paternalism can be justified in cases where the person is
acting irrationally. He uses the example of a paternalistic seat belt law. I
decide to not wear my set belt. I fully appreciate the risks and truly value
convenience above anything else. In this case a seat belt law cannot be
justified.
However, I may decide to not wear my seat belt because I am acting
irrationally. I don’t fully appreciate the potential harm involved and weight
it inappropriately when comparing it to potential convenience. If I were
given time to reflect, I would decide to wear my seat belt. Even if I do
realize that wearing my seat belt is worthwhile, I still might not wear it. In
this case I am ignoring what my rational mind tells me.
Dworkin believes that in the above cases, a paternalistic seat belt law is
justified and does not conflict with my right to autonomy. My rational self
would choose to wear a seat belt. That is my actual preference. The seat
belt law enforces my autonomy. The law allows me to fulfill my rational
autonomous desire to wear a seat belt.
Dworkin’s paternalistic principle can be summarized: Paternalism is
justified when a person makes a decision that imposes substantial risk
which they would not make in a completely rational and informed state of
mind.
The Pragmatic Argument
The easy response to Dworkin is to reject his claim on pragmatic grounds.
Dworkin says that the burden of proof lies with authorities. It is up to the
state to prove that the person being restricted is acting irrationally and in
a substantially risky manner. This leads to worries that people will have to
submit to the state’s concept of what is rational and what constitutes
substantial risk. Also, laws typically are not administered on a case by case
basis. Laws apply to a general class of people. In order for a paternalistic
law to be implemented, the state would need to prove that it is impossible
for any person to rationally act against the law. This seems theoretically
impossible.
This type of opposition to paternalism is common. Take the prohibition
of drugs for example. Typical arguments attacking paternalistic drug laws
claim that the state misrepresents harms and is oblivious to the fact that
many people find great moral value in drug use (especially with regard to
entheogens...or so I’m told...). It can be argued that a culture of safe use
does more good than absolute prohibition which encourages dangerous
practices and misinformation. These are all legitimate reasons to oppose
paternalistic laws in practice. In real life, the state does not have perfect
knowledge and cannot perfectly enforce laws. For these reasons, the state
should not be allowed to administer paternalistic laws.
Dworkin Revisited
Even though paternalism fails for pragmatic reasons, it is still worthwhile
to consider whether Dworkin’s justification for paternalism can be
challenged on theoretical grounds.
Suppose the state has a futuristic machine that gives it perfect
knowledge about the universe in every way. The state goes person by
person and consults this machine about whether the individual would
choose to carry out a particular act in a completely informed and perfectly
rational state of mind. When it is determined that the person would not
rationally carry out the action, a paternalistic law is created for that
individual. Is the state justified in applying these laws to individuals
against their will?
An Alternative Paternalistic Principle
Even under ideal conditions, Dworkin’s concept of paternalism is
objectionable. Consider the following example. I am playing a game of
chess. A chess master is sitting beside me. Occasionally, just before I am
about to make a rash move, the chess master will stop me and force me to
make another move. As the game progresses I realize that because of the
chess master’s interventions, the game has become extremely favorable for
me. If I had understood the motivations and perspective of the chess
master, I would have made the same moves. Even though I am winning the
game and am ultimately happy with the moves that were made, I find the
overall experience unenjoyable. This is because chess is about more than
making the correct moves. Chess is about making the correct moves
because I have a developed perspective and a deep understanding of the
game.
The chess master’s advice should be disregarded. If I end up in a game
state that is less than desirable, I can be content that it is authentic and
well deserved. The act of making poor moves, although immediately
negative, allows me to gain perspective and apply this perspective to future
moves. The consequences of my irrational moves contribute to my
understanding of the game and enhance my ability to make good rational
moves in the future.
This concept extends to the discussion of paternalism. It should not be
the rational decisions themselves that are valued, but the perspective that
produces them and the perspective that is gained from them. Even if it is
known that I would perform an action in a perfectly rational and informed
state of mind, requiring me to perform that action makes me do it for the
wrong reasons. There is no value in performing an action devoid of
understanding.
Forcing me to act in a way consistent with a hypothetical rational
perspective potentially interferes with my ability to develop and fully
realize that perspective. Mistakes are the best learning experiences. Once I
fully realize that perspective, the decisions I make with that perspective
have more integrity. Even if my place in life is undesirable and is the result
of irrational choices, it is genuine. The ability to make poor irrational
decisions gives meaning to the decisions that are rational and
advantageous. There is value in irrational decisions because they
contribute to my life experience and ability to make good rational
decisions for the right reasons.
This idea implies that paternalism is not justified even in cases where it
is known what the person would do in a completely rational state of mind.
Any action that develops the perspective of the individual cannot be
interfered with.
I should emphasize that not everyone needs to or even should value
irrationality in this way. I’m only claiming that it is reasonable for a person
to have these beliefs. If a person consented to paternalism from the state
because they wanted their rational desires to be enforced, that would be
perfectly acceptable. It is only the application of this type of paternalism
against a person’s will that is objectionable.
Implications
The above argument rejects paternalism in situations where Dworkin’s
theory endorses it. Take drug laws for example. Dworkin might think that a
law forbidding me to take heroin is justified if I would choose not take
heroin in a totally rational and informed state of mind. The addictive and
irreversibly destructive nature of the drug is more reason to think the law
is justified. Even if I am irreversibly addicted and become at risk for lethal
overdose, I might believe there is more value in the decision to use heroin
than in being restricted from using it. There is more value in my regret
than there could be in my oblivious well being. If my drug use leads to a
premature death, I can be content my life was the result of my (possibly
irrational) actions just as the chess player takes pride in not receiving
outside help even if the player loses the game quickly and might have
rationally made other decisions. Suppose I do manage to overcome my
heroin addiction. My sober state is so much more meaningful than if I were
simply adhering to the law. I am sober because I fully understand the
dangers of drug use and have a deep appreciation I could never achieve
through paternalistic laws.
This argument does not imply absolute anti-paternalism. An action
with either of the following properties may be paternalistically regulated
given that it is known that the action would not be made in a rational state
of mind:
• The intent of the action is to achieve death or severe irreversible
brain damage
• The action, regardless of intent, entails death or severe irreversible
brain damage
The reason these types of actions may be paternalistically restricted is that
there is no perspective to be gained from them. Using the chess analogy,
this is equivalent to purposefully sacrificing your king in an irrational state
of mind. Sacrificing the king means game over. An irrational will to end the
game forfeits any appeal that the decision is fulfilling and perspective
gaining. Similarly, there cannot be anything gained from irrational suicide,
so it is acceptable to paternalistically regulate it.
The above principles are purposefully vague. Any attempt at specificity
is bound to fail. The above need not even be interpreted as implying any
less amount of paternalism than Dworkin’s theory (although I think it
does). The primary goal is to create a concept of paternalism that accepts
irrationality as a value.
I believe this model fits well with our intuition. Irrational and risky
activities contribute profoundly to the life outlook of a person and are
instrumental in development. They should not be interfered with.
However, when a person seeks to irrationally end their life or cause severe
and permanent brain damage, intervention seems appropriate.
Conclusion
Dworkin makes a compelling case that paternalism seems reasonable in
the face of irrational action. However, there is value in irrational decisions.
Paternalism cannot interfere with the importance of perspective. Only
