PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS A DESTINATION, PUBLIC AND GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A DESTINATION, PUBLIC AND

GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have long been suggested and analyzed as

organizational solutions to pressing social problems that can yield comparative advantages to

government, business, and civil society. However, ongoing questions remain on how to

design, manage, and assess PPPs. The large literature on PPPs suffers from conceptual

imprecision, and is weakly integrated. This article seeks to address these issues. It offers a

discussion on the definition of partnership and builds a framework that examines the features

of PPPs that are related to achieving specific objectives: policy, service delivery,

infrastructure, capacity building, and economic development. This article summarizes the

contributions to the symposium: Social enterprise PPPs targeting poverty reduction, health

service delivery partnerships with faith-based organizations, diasporas as partners for

international development, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In examining

cross-cutting themes, the analysis focused on publicness and the potential to promote

international norms related to good governance. Conclusions address the role of new partners

in PPPs, the difficulties in reconciling the balance between different interests and incentives

between partners, the implications of realizing and promoting international good governance

norms and values, the different sources of authority operating within PPPs, and the trade-offs

between PPPs' services.

Keywords good governance; international norms; public-private partnerships; public

spreading and implementation of global norms and liberal values, such as human rights, good

governance, and 'Freedom' associated with economic development (Sen, 1999). This is the

dual focus of this symposium issue and the individual articles that comprise it. Pursuing this

analytic agenda to achieve a better understanding of the reach and potential of PPPs in this

context calls for clarifying the concept and developing an organizing framework that allows

us to draw conclusions and lessons across an increasing diversity of experiences. The

literature on public-private partnerships (PPPs) is vast, yet remains confused and

inconclusive. Among the reasons are conceptual vagueness, multiple definitions, ideology-

based advocacy (both pro and con), and different research traditions (Wettenhall, 2003;

Weihe, 2006; Hodge and Greve, 2008).

This article sorts through some of the debates, and summarizes our understanding of the

rationale for, and contributions of, PPPs. We offer a framework based on partnership

objectives, building on Bovaird (2004), that characterizes each objective in terms of dominant

organizational structures and processes, key performance metrics, and normative dimensions.

Further, we discuss the challenge of ensuring the 'public' in PPPs, i.e., it must be balanced

against the vested interests that drive private sector actors to join PPPs. Our research will shed

light on PPPs in the context of introducing policy government that international standards.

The next section summarizes contributions to specific issues on some key issues. We close

with some observations and conclusions drawn from our examination of PPPs.

Literature Review

Definition of Public-Private Partnership (PPP)

In the literature we have discussed the term, partnership, from various perspectives,

including references to partnerships as contracting-out (Johnston and Romzek, 2005), NGO-

government alliances (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002), and local community government

cooperation (Krishna, 2003; World Bank, 2005), just to name a few. Contributing to the

analytical cacophony associated with PPPs is the multiplicity of arguments, some based on

empirical studies and others promoting partnerships based on normative agendas, making it

difficult to sort out rhetoric from reality (Brinkerhoff, 2002b; Wettenhall, 2003).

PPPs have a long history in urban infrastructure and urban services, and are addressed

by a substantial literature (see, for example, Ghobadian et al, 2004; Grimsey and Lewis,

2007). A dominant thread in the definition of PPPs concerns infrastructure financing,

construction, operation, and maintenance. For example, Koppenjan (2005:137) defines PPP as

'a form of structured cooperation between public and private partners in the

planning/construction and/or exploitation of infrastructure facilities in which they share or

allocate risks, costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities' This de definition is echoed in

that of Grimsey and Lewis (2007:2.). 'PPPs can defined as an arrangement whereby the

private sector participates in, or provides support for, the provision of infrastructure, and PPP

projects result in contracts for private entities to deliver public infrastructure-based services'.

More specifically, mutuality refers to interdependence, and entails the rights and

responsibilities of each actor vis-a`-vis the other. Embedded in mutuality is a shared

commitment to the goals of the partnership, and their alignment to be consistent with the

mission and goals of each partner organization. Mutuality also means some degree of equality

in decision-making, as opposed to domination by one or more partners. All partners have the

opportunity to influence their shared goals, processes, outcomes, and evaluation.

Whereas organizational identity captures the distinctive competencies and capabilities

of individual partner organizations, organizational identity can be examined at two levels.

First, an individual organization has its own mission, values, and constituencies towards

identification for which it is responsible and responsive. Maintenance of organizational

identity is the extent to which an organization remains consistent and committed to its

mission, core values, and constituencies. Second, from a broader institutional view,

organizational identity also refers to the maintenance of service characteristics especially

comparative and effective in the sector or type of organization to which the partner

organization belongs. A key driver for partnerships is accessing key resources needed to

achieve objectives, but lacking or inadequate in any one actor's biosphere reserve. Such assets

can entail hard resources of money and materials, as well as important soft resources, such as

managerial and technical skills, information, contacts, and credibility/legitimacy.

Based on these two dimensions, PPPs, in practical terms, can be defined as a matter of

degree. The ideal type would maximize organizational identity and togetherness, including

equality of decision-making. Since supporting and respecting partner identity inevitably

requires compromise, and exact equality of decision-making power is unrealistic, partnership

becomes a relative practice. Nevertheless, this dimension can be used to contrast partnership

(high organizational identity, high mutuality) from other types of inter-organizational

relationships, such as contagion (high organizational identity, low mutuality), extension (low

organizational identity, low mutuality), and cooptation or gradual absorption (low

organizational identity, high mutuality) (Brinkerhoff, 2002a).

As such, our definition recognizes cross-sectoral collaboration that represents the full

picture of a partnership including: shared goals, collaborative and consensus-based decision-

making, non-hierarchical and horizontal structures and processes, trust-based and informal as

well as formal relationships, synergistic interactions between partners, and accountability for

shared outcomes and results.

Partnership Rationale

Partnerships have most often been promoted as a means to improve government

effectiveness; this is most evident, for example, in New Public Management - NPM (see

Osborne, 2000; Bovaird, 2004). Partnerships are also value-laden ventures, and can be

promoted for the purpose of maximizing appeal to stakeholders and voters, representation,

and conflict resolution. In general, each actor chooses to partner for one or more of the

following four reasons1 :

 To increase efficiency and effectiveness through reliance on comparative advantage, a

rational division of labor, and resource mobilization2 This combination can lead to

incremental (though perhaps dramatic) improvements in the goals these partnerships are

designed to achieve.

 To provide multiple resources, where integrated resources and solutions are required by

the scope and nature of the problem being addressed. In some cases, partnerships are

pursued for compliance reasons where legislation has determined that cross-sectoral

solutions are required.

 To move from an unfavorable situation between multiple actors to a compromise and

potential win-win situation (i.e., in response to collective action issues or the need for

conflict resolution). It is possible to proceed without partnership, but stakeholders will

remain dissatisfied and continue to experience losses.

 To open up decision-making processes to promote the wider operationalization of the

public. The normative dimension seeks to maximize representation and democratic

processes; the pragmatic perspective views this as a means to ensure sustainability.

In addition to these general reasons, the government may choose to partner with certain

types of actors for more specific reasons relating to the substantive objectives of the

partnership. However, these reasons may reflect false or non-representational stereotypes that

contribute to naïve expectations about whether and how partnership objectives can be

achieved. For example, NGOs can provide a comparative advantage in trust-building and

outreach (see, for example, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff et al, 2007.), yet

due to sector blurring, despite rhetoric to the contrary, many NGOs have lost these services

through their participation in 'alms bazaars' (Smillie, 1995).

The rationale for public-private partnerships is better3 , instrumental, and normative. In

terms of the instrumental perspective, partnering with the private sector enables government

access to technical expertise and builds networks to share complementary resources. For

infrastructure PPPs that access private funding, public-private risk sharing is one driver, both

as a means of increasing investment in public goods and providing performance incentives.

As Hodge and Greve (2007) point out, however, the track record of PPPs as risk management

vehicles is mixed; they cite a variety of assessments that raise questions about value for

money reasons, and governance documents and regulatory failures.

On the incentive side, PPPs may have the explicit goal of importing 'straightforward'

practices and thinking, including bottom-line enforcement mechanisms and competition.

While presented as In addition to efforts to improve efficiency and effectiveness, such goals

are also based on the normative belief that the private sector is inherently 'better' at

management than the public sector. Such a normative orientation led to an appreciation of the

dramatic understanding of the unique role government has to play in the provision of public

services. The trumpeting and purportedly more lucrative arrangements under the rhetoric of

PPPs has significantly reduced the capacity of many governments to participate effectively in

and oversee these arrangements and to ensure they are responsive to citizen demands and

contribute to a broader, more strategic vision of public goods (see Rhodes, 1997). In other

words, we have not adequately responded to the question (Provan and Kenis, 2007: 229)

'effectiveness for whom?'. For this reason, we think it is timely to more explicitly examine the

publicness of PPPs and how different types of PPPs address the balance between private and

public impacts and benefits (see below).

Discussion And Discussion

Partnership Framework

No single analytical framework can capture the diversity, relevant parameters, and

quality of PPPs. We propose a goal-based framework here that examines the defining

expressions of the features of the partnerships identified above that relate to achieving specific

goals. These objectives to some extent reﬂect the analytical rivers and related bodies of

literature, although not completely. We use this as our organizing principle because in many

cases the decision to pursue a PPP stems from the desire to achieve a specific goal. Thus this

framework maps relatively closely to the application of PPPs in the real world, and facilitates

the pursuit of relevant policy and practice analysis.

Policy PPPs seek to design, advocate, coordinate, or monitor public policies of various

types: sectoral, national, and/or global. Partnership structures can vary from looser and

informal issue-specific networks to more formal cross-sectoral committees, task forces, or

specialized commissions. Such PPPs can focus on technical aspects of policy, but they are

often caught up in politics as well (see Rhodes, 1990)4 . These policy networks have emerged

as important transnational structures for engaging governments on global policy issues (see

Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

Performance metrics for policy PPPs mingle technical issues, such as improving the

quality of solutions to policy problems at hand through combining expertise and experience of

the partners, with political considerations, such as the intermediation of state-society interests

and the responsiveness of the policy to specific societal groups, the ability to build consensus

among policy constituencies, and the legitimacy and 'standing' of the partners (e.g., who are

they speaking for and with what authority?). Second consideration Examples of normative

principles are often used to assess PPP policies. These include concerns about equity and

pluralist representation; opportunities for, and commitment to, participation; and transparency

(related to various operational aspects of the partnership as well as policy outcomes).

Service delivery PPPs engage non-state actors in delivering public services through

separating payments for public services from their provision. Governments (in the case of

poorer countries, assisted by donors) retain responsibility for funding and payment, and

outsource service provision to the private and/or not-for-profit sector. The true partnership

component of PPPs for this purpose is often debated, as the most common mechanism linking

partners is some form of contract, which again impacts on low levels of mutuality. To the

extent that PPPs operate with shared commitment and accountability, and joint planning and

consultation on the service mix, the relationship exhibits more of the features (as opposed to

just the language) of partnership. Moving towards long-term relationships based on trust and

commitment shifts the contractual basis of PPPs from a traditional contract to a relational one

(Bovaird, 2004). Both the performance metrics and normative dimensions of PPP services

reflect their origins in NPM and the push for public sector streamlining, deregulation, and

reliance on market mechanisms (see Rosenau, 2000). The metrics driving government-NGO

extended service partnerships reach underserved populations with specialized services.

Infrastructure PPPs, as mentioned above, bring together the government and the private

sector for finance, build, and operate infra-structure such as ports, highways, sewage and

treatment plants waste facilities, telecommunications, power generation, and so on (Sansom,

2006; Grimsey and Lewis, 2007; Andres et al, 2008). Infrastructure PPPs use a variety of

structures and processes, such as joint ventures with both national and multinational

companies to obtain technology and capital, build- operate-transfer (BOT) agreements of

various types, and loan funds or trusts (e.g., housing credit funds). As with delivery services,

the metrics and norms for infrastructure PPP performance derive from the privatization and

deregulation principles underlying NPM: market mechanisms that promote efficiency and

quality, an emphasis on value for money, and the creation of sustainable capacity for public

infrastructure operations and maintenance (see, for example, Koppenjan and Enserink, 2009).

Infrastructure PPPs are not without controversy: there is debate over whether indeed

outsourcing to the private sector through joint ventures or BOTs results in the cost savings

and deficiencies for taxpayers that governments advertise, and whether long-term PPPs lock

in arrangements that limit government flexibility (Hodge and Greve, 2007). This debate

concerns the instrumental value of infrastructure PPPs; another controversy comes from the

normative side. When the provision of public goods, such as water and electricity, is

outsourced to private providers who seek to recover their costs through user fees, some critics

consider that such PPPs deny those who cannot pay the poor and marginalized basic rights to

public goods.

Capacity building PPPs may in some cases address service needs, but they explicitly

focus on helping to develop the skills, systems, and capabilities that enable the groups or

organizations targeted for assistance to help themselves. International donors are the main

source of support for such PPPs, and they can be found in a variety of sectors: health,

education, environmental management, community development, and agriculture. Wescott

(2002) offers global, regional and national examples of partnerships for capacity building in

integrated coastal management that combine government, universities and local communities.

Some are knowledge and research partnerships, such as the Australian Marine and Coastal

Community Network; others offer training courses and/or behavioral demonstration projects,

such as the Regional Partnership in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia

(PEMSEA). Capacity-building PPPs may take the form of loose knowledge networks,

organizational twinning, MOUs, or formal contracts. They often have a normative orientation

that highlights autonomy and group institutions are assisted to implement their new capacities

as they see fit. Ownership and empowerment are valued as enhancing independence and

agency.

Capacity is a broad concept, and not easy to characterize in terms of performance

metrics. PPP capacity development is assessed using several measures, including (possibly

simple) skills and knowledge transfer, the creation of organizational systems posited as

connected to the ability to perform (e.g., planning, budgeting, human resources, monitoring

and evaluation), intellectual capital (demonstrated use of skills and knowledge), and social

capital (skills and knowledge plus communication networks and trust).

Economic development PPPs are cross-sectoral collaborations that promote economic

growth and poverty reduction. In the US, Europe, and the UK, such partnerships are common

at the city, county, and country levels, with a combination of local, state, and federal funding;

for example, the Mainstreet USA program. In this category fall many of the partnerships born

on the private sector side of corporate social responsibility programs and commitments to the

bottom two or three rows. Government and international donor partners often play a

brokerage role, both in terms of financing and matching private companies with NGOs and/or

local communities. The USAID Global Development Alliance (GDA) is one example.6

Economic development PPPs can take the form of joint ventures, contracts, or MOUs. At the

global level, PPPs aim at resource mobilization, often for sector-specific contributions to

economic development in poor countries (see Bull and McNeill, 2007). Examples of the latter

are the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Global

Environment Facility (GEF), and the Financing Facility for Remittances. Performance

Metrics focus on poverty reduction measures, profitability and sustainability Driving norms

include empowerment and self-determination, equitable distribution of benefits, and attention

to the inclusion of marginalized economic or social groups (e.g., women, indigenous peoples,

and excluded castes).

This perspective can also extend the role of PPPs beyond national governance systems

to the international realm (see Bo Rzel and Risse, 2005; Bull and McNeill, 2007). Thus,

internationally recognized good governance principles and norms can be incorporated not

only in the operationalization of PPPs but in their objectives.

Government Issue Cases

PPP and PPP Services

As the review above shows, despite their original rationale, in practice many PPPs may

lack public services, either due to poor implementation (including inadequate government

regulation) or skewed incentives; and/or they may produce unintended consequences, such as

long-term 'draining' of government capacity (see Rhodes, 1997). Benefits to the private sector,

such as reputation and profit, as well as benefit sharing (e.g., cost/risk sharing and

innovation), necessary for incentives that motivate actors to form and participate in PPPs.

However, this is not always in line with the main social objectives for which PPPs are

designed. For example, PPPs can limit competition and choice, increase costs for consumers,

and restrict access to innovation. These risks are well known in the practice and literature on

intellectual property rights, with documented cases on pharmaceuticals, and in the computer

industry computer industry, for example, Microsoft's philanthropic programming in Africa

(Jual, 2009).

All PPPs, to justify public sector participation, seek to generate at least some public

benefit and incorporate norms that in many cases are reflective of the principles of good

governance, as the above typology summarized in Table 1 explains. However, empirical

evidence suggests that their practice can fall short of the ideal. Figure 1 illustrates the benefit

distribution matrix of ts (intended and/or realized). From a good governance perspective, an

ideal PPP would generate more significant public benefits, and would fall in either Quadrant 2

or 4. For private partners, Quadrant 2 - both high public private and high benefits - would be

desirable, but Quadrant 1 could hold some appeal as well. One aspect of the debate regarding

infrastructure PPPs is whether or not they fall into Quadrant 1 or 2. PPPs in Quadrant 3 would

be unlikely to be initiated, or if launched would not be sustained for long, as they would be in

both the government and private actors' interests.

PPPs and norms of good international governance

Especially for KPS whose purpose is addressing global policy issues or pursuing economic

development goals, transnational actors often figure among the partners; for example, multi-

national corporations, global advocacy coalitions, and multilateral institutions (e.g., Keck and

Sikkink, 1998; Waddell and Khagram, 2007). The extent to which such PPPs can reinforce or

advance international good governance norms varies. A factor contributing to that variation is

the type of authority that PPP members have access to and can mobilize. Avant et al. (2010:

11) identify five bases of authority for what they call 'global governors': institutional,

delegated, expert, principled, and capacity. PPPs most often function with delegated

responsibility, where authority is 'borrowed' from other authoritative actors, in this case

national governments and/or multilateral institutions (e.g., EU, UN, World Trade

Organization). This obscured territory opens the door to promoting inter-national norms that

may not be the explicit intention of participating state actors, even when they may ostensibly

ascribe to specific PPP rhetoric. Non-state PPP participants may augment delegated power

with Expert-based authority and capacity to achieve the desired goals of the PPP. At the same

time, they may utilize principles-based authority to enact, disseminate, and promote certain

international norms of governance - such authority may resonate more for state actors than for

non-state actors. They are actors who share these goals, rather than governments who may

only have a nominal or limited commitment to these norms.

Framework authority This suggests that PPP participants can utilize their delegated,

expert, and capacity authority to promote international governance norms with resistant

and/or low capacity governments, while using principle authority to garner further support

from like-minded partners and stakeholders. These norms may include liberal democratic

values such as basic freedoms (e.g., speech, religion, and assembly), human rights, and related

good governance behaviors.

Symposium Contributions

This section overviews and comments on the contributions to this book. The discussion

considers the purpose of the PPP examples, and explores how the partnership cases illuminate

the questions of provision of public benefits and promotion of/compliance with the

international good governance norms introduced above. While each of the articles has

implications for these two objectives (publicness and international norms), their relative

emphasis varies.

Public Service Provision

In discussing specific PPP actors, three of the articles explicitly address publicness.

Two of the contributions to this book address the comparative advantages of new private

actors as partners, and how the defining features of, and reasons for, partnership condition

their involvement in PPPs. J. Brinkerhoff explores the prospects of organizations diasporas as

partners for international development. Migrant diasporas that maintain connections, psycho-

logical or material, to their countries of origin represent a great potential to contribute to the

development of their home countries. They do so through informal associations such as

internet-based communities, non-profit philanthropic organizations, businesses, and advocacy

associations (see, for example, Brinkerhoff, 2009). his article offers various lessons from the

experiences of NGOS to inform the strategies of diaspora partnership organizations.

He cautions the donor community regarding the unexamined assumption that the

purpose of diaspora contributions to their home regions can be neatly co-opted in the service

of national development, both public and private. While the private interests of diaspora

organizations should be carefully weighed against the common shared objectives of such

partnerships, the issue he highlights is less one of public versus private interests, and public

benefits will diminish over time. The absorption of diaspora members into donor-established

or government-dominated partnerships can reduce the very services that home countries and

donors seek to utilize. Over time, the capacity of such partnerships to generate a stream of

public benefits risks deteriorating without attention.

Similarly also, Lipsky explored the service potential of faith-based organizations

(FBOs), specifically for partnerships targeting health service delivery in Africa. FBOs have

been delivering public services to those in need globally for some time, but often operate

relatively independently. They in certain service arenas - such as healthcare - are receiving

renewed attention, for several reasons. First, because of their track record in serving hard-to-

reach populations, they may be important partners in efforts to meet health-related MDGs.

Second, current concerns with sustainable service delivery have led to interest in integrating

FBOs more closely into national health systems. Lipsky compares and contrasts FBOs and

secular NGOs as partners, and illuminates the services and weaknesses that characterize

FBOs.

As for the criteria in terms of public services (Figure 1), the application of their services

to partnerships for routine ministry or the provision of services in emergency situations (long-

standing roles for FBOs) is on occasion controversial. For example, in the U.S., the Bush

administration relaxed rules prohibiting FBOs that receive government funding to provide

emergency relief from proselytizing among the recipient population, provoking concerns in

some quarters of blurring the lines between church and state. Some FBOs place limitations on

the provision of HIV/AIDS services based on religious beliefs and strictures that ignore

medical best practices. In other words, FBOs have private faith-based goals alongside

ministry goals. As such, FBO-government partnerships face different interpretations of their

desirability and appropriateness, and will require negotiating common ground and

organizational identity issues to achieve intended public service outcomes.

Goldsmith's article challenges the public-private service balance The interests and

benefits in partnerships that enlist private enterprises in reducing poverty and enhancing

economic development. He reviewed the experiences of a range of social enterprises, looking

at microfinance institutions, pro-poor 'base of the pyramid' consumer marketing, equitable

supply chains for both agricultural and non-agricultural products, appropriate technologies

(e.g., mobile phones), and social venture capital investments. These social enterprises

typically create partnerships with multinational and/or national corporations, governments,

NGOs, and community associations. His analysis notes that while the theoretical rationale for

social enterprises argues that reaching the poor (notably an advantage for developing

countries) can be more efficient compared to what would be sustained through private

investment alone. In practice, PPPs that launch social enterprises rely heavily on contributions

from public sector and civil society partners. He concluded that for social enterprise PPPs to

continue to generate public benefits in the form of poverty reduction, sustainable public

resources are required.

The Aaronson and Wetter-berg cases magnify publicness beyond national boundaries

national boundaries to reveal how their PPPs contribute not only to public services in their

respective countries, but also to the production of global public goods, embodied in

international norms (discussed more fully below). The EITI explicitly seeks to set a ceiling on

private benefits - especially those derived from corruption - and the EITI's approach to public

disclosure through promoting transparency in extractive industry agreements with

governments, using national civil society and validators from the international community as

watchdogs. BFC partnerships incorporate labour rights into public operations.

International Standard Governance

The EITI and BFC are examples of partnerships that seek to improve compliance with a

set of international norms related to good governance: transparency, reducing corruption, and

respecting human rights. Aaronson's discussion of the EITI notes a mixed record of progress

in establishing PPP countries despite the supported commitment of a wide range of partners.

His analysis reveals a diversity of motivations between partners, which highlights the

difficulty in achieving the comity that characterizes the full expression of partnerships. A

positive factor is the increasing worldwide acceptance of international norms around

transparency regarding resource exploitation, which has helped to drive what is a voluntary

compliance process. PPPs include authority delegated authority of the World Bank and other

supporting international actors, the authority of expert validators, and, at least in theory, the

authority of civil society's capacity as watchdogs. He observed that an important additional

objective in EITI is building capacity for civil society engagement in the governance of

natural resource exploitation, which holds promise for a fuller expression at the country level

of the international norms that EITI seeks to effect. He warned, however, that civil society

remains a weak partner in PPPs, where the power imbalance favors governments and

multinational companies.

The partnership's BFC illustrates how authority-based principles, combined with market

incentives, can achieve behavior change in accordance with This PPP case links the

enactment of international norms with a public service product; in Cambodia, factory working

conditions were improved and the abuse of organized labor was curtailed. Wetterberg

examines the BFC in terms of the interplay between the distinctive competence, interest, and

authority of the three partners (the government, the garment industry, and the International

Labour Organization), which enabled the PPP to enforce internationally mandated labor

standards that no member of the partnership could achieve individually. Thus, the BFC

exemplifies how the twin characteristics of partnership - mutuality and organizational identity

– can combine to produce synergistic results shows that the success BFC has achieved has

been heavily influenced by global economic forces; the decline in demand from developed-

country consumers for fashion items reveals the vulnerability of PPPs' dependence on a single

industry. Nevertheless, several other countries have shown interest in the BFC partnership

model.

The specific resources referred to in this article also address the potential for promoting

international norms. Diaspora has the potential to promote norms and values experienced and

acquired through migration experiences and in their newly adopted country of international

residence. In their understanding of both country of origin and country of residence cultures

and norms, they may be particularly well situated to act as broadcasters of norms (Brinkerhoff

and Riddle, 2011). Faith-based organizations, by virtue of their comparative advantage in

achieving the poor and their moral and ethical standing, contribute to the enactment of

international normative targets and governance, such as the Millennium Development Goals.

Finally, social enterprises, themselves, embody international norms relating to corporate

social responsibility; that is, the principle that private businesses have social responsibilities

beyond mere service decisions.

Conclusions

PPPs continue to capture the attention of policymakers, public administrators, and

academic researchers looking for promising concepts and mechanisms to (a) mobilize outside

resources available to public sector entities themselves, and (b) offer solutions to complex

organizational problems. Partnership 'currency' has been devalued by overuse of the term,

such that some consider it to be conceptually empty and merely political. However, the

premise behind the research workshop that led to this particular issue and the contribution to

this book is that the examination of PPPs remains both analytically valid and practically

valuable. Among the conclusions that can be drawn from our shared contributors and

explorations are as follows. First, public sector actors (national and transnational) seeking

new partners to contribute their unique resources and capacities to address global challenges

whose search has led to some uneasy 'bedfellows,' highlighting the importance of

understanding the comparative advantages and interests of actors coming together in

partnerships. This places emphasis on the mutuality dimension of partnerships if synergies are

anticipated to be derived from distinctive competencies derived from organizational identities.

This conclusion is crucial for diaspora engagement in international development partnerships,

as J. Brinkerhoff's article shows.

Second, while public sector dominance can undermine the anticipated benefits of

partnership, if the publicness inherent in PPPs is to be realized, it is not necessarily self-

interest that dictates the joint relationship. Goldsmith's analysis of social enterprise PPPs and

poverty reduction raises this question, as do others looking at private sector and international

development partnerships (e.g., Kolk et al., 2008). The potential for divergent interests is also

present in the use of FBOs for health services, as discussed by Lipsky.

Thirdly, the good governance aspect of partnerships, as partnership operating principles

and/or as explicit goals, adds a layer of complexity to partnership design and operations

beyond the metrics of efficiency, effectiveness, and synergy. Acting on These principles mean

that inclusion, equity, transparency, accountability and ethical behavior become integral to the

functioning of the partnership (Bovaird, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2007). The normative elements of

PPPs - arguably inherent to the PPP mechanism itself - have perhaps until now been under-

recognized. The potential of PPPs to embody and promote certain norms and values has both

instrumental and ethical implications in terms of heir and/or spouse self-determination and

ownership of PPP outcomes. In addition, because PPP functioning requires commitment and

trust, where the operating environment understates or undermines these core elements, such as

in developing countries where good governance is limited or lacking, the ability of the

partnership to produce the desired outcomes (either public goods/benefits, good governance,

or both) is put at risk. The high variation in progress that Aaronson documents with EITI

country-level PPPs is a clear demonstration of this threat.

Fourth, the use of partnerships to address transnational problems draws attention to the

different sources of authority that operate in combination within such partnerships (Avant et

al., 2010). Because partnerships according to Batley (2006) partner activities, for example,

note that many important non-state service providers, such as local entrepreneurs, individual

practitioners, and community-based organizations, are left out of PPPs, and may be overly

regulated without regard to common goals. In this case the organizational construct tends to

be far from hierarchical, with the standing of the participants being critical to the relationship

their power between each other. Multiple sources of authority add nuance and complexity to

the determination of powers and exercises in PPP time. Partners bring more than one type of

authority to the PPP, and may be relatively weak in one, while relatively strong in another.

Wetterberg's analysis for the Cambodian BFC demonstrates this factor.

The final conclusion that emerges from our examination of PPPs may be an obvious

statement, but one that remains subject to repetition. The permutations of partnership

objectives, structures, and processes are enormous. This fact limits the general applicability of

any set of conclusions, and suggests caution in transferring specific CS from one setting to

another. It also opens the door to considering that, for some types of public goods and

services, partnership may not be the most appropriate vehicle. The complexity and difficulty

in making PPPs work effectively suggests that they should be applied primarily to social

issues that call for specific service partnerships. Further, it suggests that there may be trade-

offs between their services; for example, the inclusiveness of services may add costs and

complicate accountability. Making such choices raises once again the facet of partnership

power embedded in Provan and Kenis' (2007) question of who will decide which benefits of

PPP partnerships are the most salient?