Bibby complained of sexual
orientation discrimination to the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations
(PCHR). Id. Bibby filed a lawsuit in federal court after the PCHR sent a right-
to-sue letter, claiming, among other things, that he had been sexually harassed
in violation of Title VII. Id. Because Bibby was harassed "because of his sexual
orientation," which is not cognizable under Title VII, rather than "because of
sex," the district court gave the corporation summary judgment. 260–61 in Id.
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
This Court upheld the decision on appeal, concluding that Bibby had not
provided enough proof to back up a Title VII allegation of same-sex
harassment. We clarified why Congress decided not to include sexual
orientation harassment under Title VII, even though it acknowledged that such
harassment had no place in a just society. 261, 265 (Id.). However, in
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse, we said that
workers may file a Title VII gender stereotyping claim if they can show that
"the[ir] harasser was acting to punish [their] noncompliance with gender
stereotypes." Id. at 264; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256
F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); and Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757,
762 (6th Cir. 2006). However, Bibby was unable to win on that basis since he
did not assert gender stereotyping. In dicta, we also came to the conclusion that,
even if we had interpreted Bibby's claim to be about gender stereotyping, he had
not shown enough evidence to support the argument against summary
judgment. 260 F.3d at 264-65, Bibby.
Given the explanation above, we reject the claims made by both sides that
Bibby controls the case's result. Since the plaintiff in that case did not bring up a
gender stereotyping issue, as Prowel has done here, Bibby does not win for
Wise. However, Bibby does not require us to overturn the District Court's
summary judgment just because we said that a gender stereotyping claim is
cognizable under Title VII, as has been the case since the Supreme Court's
ruling in Price Waterhouse. This is in contrast to Prowel's reasoning. We must
instead examine whether there are enough facts in the record, when interpreted
in Prowel's favor, to lead a reasonable jury to find that he was harassed and/or
retaliated against "because of sex."
