HOW THE WTO ADDRESSES AND SETTLES GLOBAL TRADE CONFLICTS

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1. WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Framework and

Structure

A. Understanding on Rules and Procedures

DSM of WTO is under the understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of

disputes generally known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding abbreviated as DSU. This

basic framework also acts as; the map for solving trade dispute among WTO member countries.

The DSU forms a formal process of handling trade complaints, underlining the need for the order

liberalization to enhance world stability (Jackson, 2019). Another advantage of the DSU is the

achievement of dispute settlement with reference to the favorable approach towards speed and

efficiency on the one hand and the fairness of the case on the other hand in relation to trade

issues. This is a process that is well-articulated by certain procedures such as consultations, panel

proceedings and the last stage of appellate review though these procedures are accompanied by a

timeline (Busch & Pelc, 2021). The DSU also contains provisions of transparency and member

involvement, the involvement of third party in the dispute and following provision of the panel

and Appellate Body report to all WTO members. Besides, this approach does not only improve

the legal status of the dispute settlement procedure but also helps build up the consistent WTO

case-law (Howse, 2018). However, the DSU being the ideal it is not devoid of criticism. Critics

have noted that its focus on legal worked at the same time might not foster more informal and

contractual forms of conflict settlement in trade. Further, the subjects that have been covered

during the negotiations to some extent complicated the operational mechanisms of the WTO

system and increased the number of members, which puts pressure on the effectiveness of

dispute settlement. Despite these challenges; the DSU has continued to be an integral facet of the

multilateral trading system; since it offers a stable and rule-based regime for trade talks’ defense.

It has achieved much having had success in dealing with many types of disputes over the decades

for the benefit of stability and growth of international business. The debate on the potential

reforms to the DSU that persists as the global trade dynamics are in a constant state of flux

speaks to both the strategic role of the system and the reappraisal necessary in an ever-changing

economic landscape (Wolfe, 2021).

B. Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) comprises a key facet of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement

System; responsible for maintaining panels, deciding the courses of action, and implementing the

recommendations and rulings. Like it comprises of members from all the WTO member states,

the decision-making principle of the DSB is the negative consensus- the decision is

automatically taken unless there are objections from the other party (Ehlermann, 2019). This new

system of decision making has improved the speed and the quality of the settlements; it has also

eliminated the problem of the veto power by some particular members in the progression of

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cases. The DSB has quite a broad role in its function and all sorts of responsibilities to maintain

the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. Others are formulation of panels responsible for the

hearing of disputes, adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, supervision of compliance

with decisions, and permission to engage in retaliation where compliance is not observed

(Meagher, 2019). It has been noted that; In fact, DSB’s role in surveillance and enforcement is

crucial most especially because it facilitates WTO rulings implementation significantly and

supports the credibility of the Dispute Settlement System. Nevertheless, the functioning of the

DSB also comes with some struggles. It is alleged that being a confederacy, its decision-making

process results in deadlock whenever contentious issues are involved; normally, this is good for

the confederation. This has been clearly seen especially in recent years with the controversy of

the crisis on Appellate Body appointments whereby objections from a single member have

prevented the providing of vacancies, which is pivotal in the functioning of the entire appellate

process as noted by Pauwelyn (2020). Also, the rising politicization of trade disputes has also

challenged the DSB’s neutrality and efficiency (Kern, 2022). Still; with all these challenges; the

DSB continues to be; central to the cooperation of the members in the resolution of trade

disputes and has a significant responsibility of upholding the integrity and efficiency of the

WTO’s trading structure. The feature of convening meetings in order to organize all WTO

members to supervise the dispute settlement process also plays a large role in the openness and

accountability of the system. When the WTO will continue being faulted for the need to change

and develop to match new forms of global trade, the role and workings of the DSB are likely to

retain focus when discussing the future of international trade regulation.

C. Panels and Appellate Body

These are the opportunity to be the part of the panels and the Appellate Body, which are the

adjudicative heart of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System; in its unexpected mission which is

to consider and review trade disputes and to provide the right interpretations of the WTO

agreements. They are usually made up of three members with each member acting independently

and carrying out a detailed assessment of all the evidence and the legal submissions provided by

the parties. They have to break down complicated trade data, interpret WTO provisions, and

scrutinize the conformity or otherwise of the measures being disputed with the WTO

requirements (Grando, 2020). The panel process is; objective rigorous and gives both parties a

chance to lay down their case and counterarguments. The Appellate Body, on the other hand,

concerns itself with legal aspects only, dealing with legal issues and interpretations arising out of

the panel reports and adding a layer of legal review to guarantee coherence in the WTO

agreements’ interpretation, (Van Damme 2018). The work and structure of these bodies have

been important to build WTO legal precedent as well as apply the rules agreed by the Members.

Their function does not stop at the mere legal interpretation and enforcement; they help maintain

the stability of the trading environment, by providing for certainty and fairness in the

interpretation of rules governing trade (Mavroidis, 2020). Nevertheless; it has reached some

critical challenges in recent years; especially with the crisis on the Appellate Body. Due to the

reluctant of the United States to nominate new members to the Appellate Body arguing that it

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violates the American judicial system and other issues that surround the independent judiciary

the Appellate Body as at now has no adequate number of members to constitute the body that

hears appeals (Charnovitz, 2020). This has led to uncertainty in the dispute settlement process as

it allows parties to essentially appeal panel reports meaning they can be filed to be null and void

with no possibility of adoption and enforcement. This problem cannot be considered other than

as the crisis of the existence of the dispute settlement system on the one hand, and the need to

respond to the concerns of the member states on the other. Nevertheless, the panel and Appellate

Body system has been used as a very effective tool to solve many difficult trade disputes and

also in the formation and evolution of international trade law (Mavroidis, 2020). It is so complex

that it includes a detailed fact and legal analysis, then, if necessary, an appeal, which has played

a critical role in the formation of trade legal precedents that are helpful to future cases as well as

member states’ trade policies and practices (Grando, 2020).

D. Implementation and enforcement process

The attractive part of the implementation and enforcement process is that it forms part of the

WTO’s DSB as it provides a means by which the rulings on trade disputes can be transformed

into distinct practices among the member states. When a panel or an Appellate Body report is

adopted, the inconsistent measures are notified and, usually within a specified period, the

offending member’s measures must be adjusted to suit WTO obligations (Evans & Wilson,

2021). The duration of this period is usually a matter of mutually agreed understanding between

the parties or the arbitrators taking into consideration of the policy changes and the practicality

of compliance. It is a process of reaching compliance not just through dictation but with

understanding the intricacies of working in a policy based environment and the non-compliant

member’s operations. The only institution that is used frequently for monitoring the compliance

through active surveillance of implementation activities is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).

Members who are in breach are expected to submit progress report as to their implementation to

the WTO obligation BBC (Liu, 2019). When one fails to meet the set deadline then the

benefiting side may claim for damages or seek permission to take a vindictive action. Such

actions consist of self-help measures such as halting concessions or other undertakings to the

non-complying member, as a way of compelling it to obey and also reaffirm the force of WTO

decisions (Evans & Wilson, 2021). However, this structured method is not immune to

enforcement difficulties especially when handling powerful countries which may refrain from

implementing unfavorable decisions. The absence of retroactive actions in the WTO system has

been treated as a detriment that may result in the usage of procrastinating strategies by the

current members who violate the terms of the agreement (Guzman & Meyer, 2021). Also, the

efficacy of retaliation has been brought into question given that compliance is less likely to be

driven by the threat of retaliation especially for the small economy that does not possess the

capacity to unleash significant penalties to larger trading partners. Such issues raise questions

over the ease of compliance and the problems associated with enforcement of laws as practiced

today. However; the process of implementation and enforcement is one of the vital features of

the WTO’s quasi-judicial system. It helps to maintain the non-appeal character of the

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international trading system due to the presence of a framework for the resolution of the dispute

and imposition of compliance (Wolfe, 2021). It is noteworthy that attempts to deal with

enforcement problems remain continuous, as the credibility and efficacy of the WTO dispute

settlement system depends on such actions.

2. Types of International Trade Disputes Addressed

A. Tariffs and quotas

Tariffs and quotas are still the primary or major causes of trade frictions within the WTO’s

structure because they are a direct gateway to the market and volume of trade. All in all, since

the start of the GATT period, the WTO parties have recorded reductions in the levels of tariffs;

nonetheless, controversies as to tariff classifications, rates and applications remain frequent

among the WTO member countries (Bhagwati & Panagariya, 2020). Such controversies mostly

concern the following issues: whether certain measures relating to tariffs can be qualified as

WTO-consistent or as unreasonable trade restrictions. Due to complications of modern tariff

schedules such as compound and mixed tariffs, problems of interpretation are opened which may

result in accusations of disguised protectionism. Consequently, the questions of classification or

the application of tariffs are literally the questions of controversy when major debates are

launched as regards whether tariffs violate the countries’ obligations that have been undertaken

under the WTO agreements. Whereas, quotas are generally anti-WTO, it is not completely

forbidden and may be applied occasionally like safeguard measures or the tariff-rate quotas of

agricultural products. It results in the controversy of its justification and thereof (Zhao, 2019).

For instance, safeguard measures are meant to offer undertakings for a limited duration and are

instruments used to prevent imports deemed as harming, or potentially capable of harming, a

domestic industry. Nevertheless; controversies often arise on the appropriate use of these

measures and their legal conformity with the WTO. Equally, agricultural TRQs, which permit a

specific amount of the agricultural products to enter at a preferential tariff rate, cause disputes

that are associated with their management and effects on trade. Moreover, owing to the

continuous application of cross-haul tariff policies, their correlations with other trade policies

like ‘rules of origin’ or preferential trade agreements gives an extra dimension to tariff associated

disputes. Due to the emergence of digital trade new questions has emerged in the classification

and imposition of tariffs on electronic transfer and digital goods (Wu, 2020). Since the WTO

countries progressively rely on tariffs and quotas as tools of trade policy, frequently due to

internal economic reasons or in the context of geopolitical conflicts, the questions arising from

the application of these measures continue to be essential to the WTO’s system of dispute

settlement. The fact that, on one side, the tendency towards the liberalization of international

trade remains constant, while, on the other hand, there are calls to support local industries creates

the guarantees that tariffs and quotas will remain relevant sources of trade friction in the

foreseeable future (Lester & Mercurio, 2019).

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B. Subsidies and dumping practices

Subsidies and dumping practices are other major types of trade issues; that constitute a subject of

the WTO’s dispute resolution. Subsidization is not generally banned by international trade

policies though it is widely known that it has the effect of distorting world trade by making

indigenous industries appear artificially more competitive than they would otherwise be

(Kawase, 2019). As to legal issues, controversy exists as to whether certain forms of government

assistance constitute actionable subsidies within the meaning of the SCM Agreement to such an

effect or measures and whether the latter cause adverse effects to the interests of other members.

Subsidy matters are further complicated by the fact that identifying these subsidies from

bureaucratic interference and trade protectionism can at times be a herculean task. For example,

export contingent subsidies or the use of domestic over imported goods are analyzed to establish

whether they prejudice the trade of other country’s business. Another frequently discussed

practice is dumping, which happens when products are exported into the foreign market at prices

lower than their normal value. WTO member states may use anti-dumping measures to counter

dumping, but differences occur over the assessment of dumping margins or the demonstration of

harm to exporters’ domestic industries and the process of conducting anti-dumping

investigations (Zhang & Liu, 2020). Being a technical profession; the problems presented in such

cases require extensive application of economic principles and these issues are usually the

subject of debate over their interpretations of the available market data. For instance, issues may

arise as to whether one methodology used in the calibration of dumping margins is correct or not

in reflecting the normal value of the product alongside whether or not injury incurred by a

domestic industry is traceable to dumping (Zhang & Liu, 2020). Subsidies and dumping are

among the most contentious issues due to the technical nature of the cases as well as the large

scale economic impact they have; these cases are also usually politically sensitive. Namely,

developing countries have expressed certain concerns on utilizing anti-dumping measures

pointing to the fact that such practices serve as disguised protectionism; the action that may be

particularly detrimental within the export-promoting strategies named by such countries (Bown,

2019). The exhaustion of the search for the correct balance between the right of a country to

shield its industries from fictitious trade practices and the potential abuse of trade remedies

remains a significant factor that defines the tendencies of WTO dispute settlement in this sphere

(Bown, 2019).

C. Intellectual property rights violations

Concerning the WTO; intellectual property has emerged as one of the most vigorous arenas of

conflict; which is a sign of the growing significance of industries based on the sale of ideas in

world trade. These will have elements of law that will be implemented under the WTO’s

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which prescribes

minimum standards for various forms of protection for intellectual property, but the

implementation and interpretation of TRIPS have led to many controversies (Ding, 2019). In

general the main topics which are at debate typically involve matters such as the patents of drugs

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and medication, issues relating to piracy in relation to products such as music and films, and the

protection of names and symbols used to identify specific regions that produce special products.

For instance; differences on ownership of patents in drug manufacture have raised concerns on

the dichotomy between proprietary knowledge and peoples’ health. Emerging markets tend to

question the ‘elasticity’ and admissibility of IP protection and exceptions, especially for the

worldwide concerns of public health and transfer of technology (Ding, 2019). Further complexity

is brought about when these controversies relate to IP rights’ interaction with other areas of

WTO law, including TBT or S services. As the conflict between intellectual property rights

increases, it is not restrained to the traditional sectors and industries; with evolving digital

economy, new problems are arising which is associated with piracy in the internet world,

protection of data, and enforcement of rights in cyberspace (Zang, 2018). The emergence of

technology ownership has also been an annoying factor as ownership can easily be replicated

hence a challenge of legal enforcement (Zang, 2018). The balance between strong protection of

the IPRs; that helps promote innovation on one hand and access to knowledge and technology in

particularly by the developing nations on the other hand; has been a subject of a lot of debate in

the WTO’s dispute mechanism. Pharmaceutical patents and the access to medicines are among

the most contentious issues that illustrate how trade rules, IP regimes and policy goals interact

with each other (Voon et al. , 2020). Such disputes tend to portray how competing rights and

interests of IP owners and the general health and welfare of society and the economy it belongs

to can be hard to reconcile. Due to an increasing globalization through technological innovation

that fuels the economic growth and international competition, issues concerning intellectual

property rights have emerged and will likely continue to remain a dynamic subject of the WTO’s

Dispute Settlement System (Voon et al. , 2020).

D. Non-tariff barriers and regulatory issues

NTBs are another form of barriers to trade which tend to be difficult in definition, qualification

and mitigation due to their subtle nature but whose impacts could be very enormous as they are

mostly the subject of WTO dispute. These barriers entail; technical barriers, which include;

technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, licensing procedures and, customs

valuation practices. These are usually adopted in the form of fulfilling legal policy goals, for

example, with the aim to protect the population’s health or ensure the safety of products, but at

the same time, they can be applied as measures that are disguised as a restriction of trade; thus,

their admissibility under WTO agreements also raises issues (Swann, 2019). In WTO disputes on

this area, the adjustment measures are often questioned whether they are in conformity with the

relevant WTO agreements or if they constitute trade barriers. The technicality of many non-tariff

measures makes these cases challenging as the WTO’s dispute settlement consists of ensuring

the liberalization of trade while also addressing the objectives of other policies (Mitchell &

Heaton, 2020). The decline of the significance of the conventional external tariff as the result of

the extended globalization and liberalization has shifted focus to the new non-tariff barriers

hence calling for a continuous improvement of the WTO law and precedents to cater for these

barriers (Mitchell & Heaton, 2020). In addition; the emergence of bilateral regional trade

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agreements has compounded the current state of affairs concerning non-tariff barriers. Some of

these arrangements contain regulatory cooperation and convergence stances that go beyond

WTO regulations’ undertakings, causing more levels of regulatory interaction and possibly

tension (Lester & Mercurio, 2019). Non-tariff barriers have been enhanced by the development

of the global value chains because small distinctions in regulations can translate into major

disruptions of the production networks and flows in international trade. The WTO’s function in

dispute settlement; in regards to non-tariff measures is paramount in fostering transparency in

regulation standards and eliminating the use of domestic regulation as protectionism tools. The

alleviation of these barriers makes a positive input to the preservation of fair trade policies and,

therefore, little or no preclusive barriers to market entry (Gao, 2018). Considering that the sphere

of international trade is constantly changing, the capacities of the WTO to address these

sophisticated challenges will be essential in ensuring further balanced and liberal trade policies.

3. Consultation and Negotiation: Initial Dispute Resolution

Phase

A. Request for consultations process

The consultations request is an official start of WTO dispute settlement procedure and it is an

essential document that contains the complaint’s allegations and history which defines the

following procedure. This document is important because it defines the subject of the measure in

controversy, and gives a brief background of the legal grounds for the complaint under the WTO

laws and regulations believed to have been breached (Howse, 2018). This requirement also

enables the responding party to be well equipped for the consultations to be made as well as

getting acquainted with the legal/vexing details of the matter on dispute. After the request for

consultations has been submitted it is notified to all the WTO members and this exposes the

complaint to the WTO where third parties interested in the dispute due to substantial trade

impact can seek to join the consultations (Busch & Pelc, 2021). This sharing of information; not

only helps in informing the membership but also offers the other members an opportunity to

contribute to the dispute in case they have a lot to lose or gain. The nature of the consultations

can be highly dependent on the specificity of the request provided by the parties in the dispute

because the clarity and detail of the request may affect the efficiency of consultations and even

impact the character of any proceeding in the panel. The relation thus also has the potential to

require the action of the request before the final determination of the issue through the assistance

of an official adjudicator is made. Also, the request for consultations is not only an opportunity

to continue the dispute and to find the solution for it but also is the diplomatic means that may

contribute to the respondent country’s will to start negotiations in a good faith in order to solve

the case. It is especially significant for this aspect since it supports one of the WTO’s main

principles of dispute settlement namely; negotiation and settlement rather than judicial decision.

Nevertheless, new formation of trade disputes results in more precise and technically elaborated

consultation submissions. This may bring a new level of difficulties in the initiation of disputes

and could be a cause of concern to developing nations with limited pool of legal personnel, thus

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possibly hampering their ability to seek and avail the WTO dispute settlement mechanism

(Shaffer, 2021). Thus, the constant requirement is to make the system as open as possible to all

members of the WTO, especially developing ones.

B. Bilateral discussions and information exchange

Consultations, in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, are carried out through bilateral talks

and form the most important part of the process since it involves the opportunity for the

disputing parties to share information with a view to clearing misconceptions and possibly

resolving the dispute without leading to the next level of formal proceedings. Such talks

commonly involve officials from both ministries of trade, and sometimes, specialists engage in

the talks to provide technical details arising from matters like trade statistics or specific measures

(Davis, 2018). These talks are usually private, which creates an atmosphere suitable for the open

discussions during which the competing sides are able to discuss various approaches to reaching

a mutually acceptable solution without being hampered by the formalities, as well as the public

and official opinions. When consultations are conducted the parties are required to act in good

faith and to review the measures under consideration and their effect on trade relations. This

phase is important mainly because parties are able to express themselves, give proofs and

respond to issues which can result in reasonable understanding and, in turn, end the conflict

peacefully (Charnovitz, 2020). The exchange of information assists in defining the nature of the

disagreement and channeling it in a way that common-searching for solutions may be reached

thus eliminating the need for a legal resolution. However, there are secondary influences that

may influence bilateral trade negotiations such as the case of power relationship where

developed country and the developing country engage in the negotiation. Firstly, the capability

of developed nations is higher than less developed nations in terms of resources and hence, they

can control the bargaining power and deal making in a way that constrains the weak countries in

their bargaining power. Also, the subjects of trade investigations are becoming politicized more

often, and as a result, it is not unusual for political tendencies to impede negotiated solutions on

account of the parties independently of specific trade concerns (Kern, 2022). Nonetheless, the

consultation phase does not eliminate the hurdles that the parties face in the process of

negotiating to solve the conflict; however, it remains a critical stage in the WDTA process,

which gives the parties the chance to avoid panel proceedings due to political implications and

the financial repercussions of the case without unnecessary conflict.

C. Good offices, conciliation, and mediation

In situations where bilateral consultations do not help in the solving of the conflict, then parties

may proceed to residual components to the dispute such as the good offices, conciliation, or

mediation. The available choices discussed in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) are

characterized by a clear, predictable but at the same time rather unrestrictive character of the

procedures used to address the issues, with emphasis on the confidential nature of the undertaken

actions (Wolfe, 2021). Good offices usually require WTO Director-General or any third party to

help with the communication process between the disputing member(s). However, its purpose of

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this role is to make sure that bad discussions are kept alive and participate in the facilitation of

discussions without option of contribution conciliation, however, entails an even more active role

of the once-neutral third party in facilitating the dispute resolution process through assisting in

the settlement of the dispute through terms arrived at and agreed upon by the parties. Compared

to conciliation in which the third party identifies possible resolutions and tries to facilitate a

compromise between the parties, mediation also envisages direct involvement in the formulation

and recommendation of specific decisions. Both procedures are consensual and may be invoked

at any time during a proceeding or at the same time with a formal panel proceeding, which

testifies to the WTO’s preference for the diplomatic solution of conflicts wherever possible.

These other methods are meant to provide more innovative and acceptable by the parties

solutions which probably cannot be arrived at under very structured, rigid and highly legalistic

processes of an adjudication forum. They focus on the process of bargaining with the result that

it has the probability of yielding conclusions more durable and friendly than aim for a panel or

Appellate Body decision. Still, they require active participation of all stakeholders involved in

the process and a mediator’s capacity to manage interlocutors’ trade affairs and political

imperatives skillfully. However, these mechanisms are not very often applied, which can speak

about the potential for the WTO system’s members to promote them further (Porges & Roessler,

2020). The better use of good offices, conciliation, and mediation can be seen as adding more

potential forms of working out a dispute and promoting cooperation in trade relations.

D. Time limits for consultation phase

That mechanism (WTO’s dispute settlement process) is also provided with time limits for certain

steps in order to guarantee that the cases would be resolved rather quickly, while, at the same

time making consideration quite careful. The consultation stage of the Dispute Settlement

Understanding has to take a maximum of 60 days from the decision of consultations by the

requested party; this period may be adjusted by mutual agreement between the parties to the

dispute (Guzman & Meyer, 2021). This result is a prospect of the efficient and productive

discussions within 60 days which are to prevent consultations from becoming mere procedural

formality. If the consultations do not work out within this period then the complainant has the

right of requesting the formation of panel. In turn, performing the work of the panels and issuing

their reports is characterized by strict deadlines throughout the entire period of the dispute,

including the establishment of panels, the preparation and submission of written briefs, and

appealing to panel reports and, if necessary, subsequent appellate review (Kern, 2022). These are

deadlines that are set up to offer order and structure with a view of seeing that disputes do not

prolong than when they supposed to. For example, panels are usually expected to prepare their

reports within six to nine months from the date of their formation and appeals should take not

more than sixty days starting from the time an appeal is lodged. However, these time limits have

not been free from controversy; they have been criticized especially with regards to the ever-

complicated global trade relations. Oppositions claim that the fixed time lines may not be

flexible enough to capture all that comes with it, especially for the developing nations which

often lack the resources to fast track case preparation. Additionally, the recent Appellate Body

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issue has greatly contributed to prolongation of the dispute settlement mechanism showing that it

is necessary to apply more flexibility in setting and applying such time limits while trying to

achieve the goal of expediting the dispute settlement (Pauwelyn, 2020). The crisis revealed some

key problems related to; the optimization of efficiency with the absolute consideration of basic

principles of dispute settlement and initiated the debates; on the compatibility of the volumes of

the WTO with the effective and fair decision-making.

4. Panel Proceedings: Adjudication of Trade Disputes

A. Establishment and composition of panels

The structure and formation of panels of the WTO dispute settlement system have the

responsibility of delivering fair judgments for the trade disputes. They are set on an as-needed

basis and are usually composed of three to five persons who sit in the Dispute Settlement Body

(DSB) (Busch & Pelc, 2021). This selection process seeks to employ personnel with adequate

experience in the law of international trade and policy while at the same time is independent.

Professionalism is also another factor that we notice when it comes to the panelists, because they

are endowed with the ability of tackling difficult trade affairs, and arriving at sound decisions

(Davis, par. 5). The participants in particular, the panelists, are expected to have no affiliation

with any government or organization; however, they are supposed to do that independently, and

this prevents bias throughout the entire negotiation and dispute resolution process (Grando,

2020). This independence is crucial to the credibility and hence, legitimacy of the WTO’s

Dispute Settlement Understanding. The panels’ formation is crucial as it influences the

perception concerning the acceptance of their decisions especially where it involves

superpowers, economic issues, or politically sensitive subjects (Guzman & Meyer, 2021). In

such circumstances the illusion of neutrality and professionalism is paramount for the parties to

consider the panel’s findings. However, to ensure that panelists do not have any bias that can

influence their decision, WTO has provided ways of dealing with such people. These measures

are; making provisions of disclosure requirements highly stringent and the availability of

potential conflict of interest panelist objections (Wolfe, 2021). Yet, these protective measures

leave the problem of the proper and constant choice of nonbiased and highly competent panelists

as an unsolved issue. Therefore; the efficiency of these procedures is paramount in determining

the credibility of the dispute-settlement process as well as the preservation of the WTO

members’ confidence in the WTO system. Thus, the further interest and possible changes in the

panel selection process show that the way must be constantly improved to counter these

difficulties. The WTO’s DSU requires the appointment of independent, impartial and qualified

persons to the panels: Hence, it is crucial that no panelist under review has any conflict of

interest with the case being presented or the disputing parties at hand.

B. Written submissions and oral hearings

These are written claims and oral hearings that are essential in the WTO’s panel and afford an

all- encompassing structure used in the determination of trade disagreements. This particular

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approach relies mostly on the documents that have been typed with the various lucrative

arguments, legal assertions, and substantiation which are filed by the concerned participants in

the dispute resolution process (Grando, 2020). Such documents enable the panelist to get familiar

with the matters at hand for instance; the legal foundations of the claims and defenses. Parties’

memorials are essential; because they provide a background of the facts and the law relevant to

the dispute as well as they are the only documents for panelists to review the case in detail. In

addition to written briefs, which form the main basis of the decision-makers’ analysis, oral

hearings re-organize dispute resolution by affording the various parties an opportunity to make

their case in person. In these hearings, parties can respond to the questions posed by a panel

personally, give further clarification concerning issues that have perhaps been stated obscurely or

vaguely on their written submissions, and also argue over the points that have been made by the

party on the other side(Busch & Pelc, 2021). This interactive feature of the debate is valuable;

for establishing that all pertinent points have been acknowledged and comprehended. The oral

hearings enable the panelists to interact physically and get a real feel of the strength or weakness

of the parties’ case at that point. Thus, the written and oral submission systems contribute to a

fair and open approach to dispute resolution, allowing deepening the coverage of the legal and

factual aspects of the case (Evans & Wilson, 2021). Also, during oral hearings, participants with

an interest in the particular dispute can also come to Third parties and are mostly from other

WTO members. Their input assists in placing the conflict within the context of international

relations and also enriches the panel’s comprehension of the issue’s impact in the given sphere

(Guzman & Meyer, 2021). While these are excellent qualities, efficiency and effectiveness can

be threatened by the level of compliance and the multimodal nature of the operation which may

call for significant effort. Efforts towards simplification and improvement of the capacities of the

panelists and the support staff are indispensable for the augmentation of the WTO’s dispute

settlement system.

C. Third-party participation in proceedings

It is crucial to pay a lot of attention to the independence and active involvement of the third

parties in the WTO panel’s work since they contribute to the comprehensiveness of the

dispensation of the dispute. Third parties provide observations on cases of interest in a dispute;

WTO members with interests in a case may apply to be third parties where they get an

opportunity to present their perspectives and legal arguments on issues under consideration

(Marceau, 2019). This involvement of the extra voice aids in expanding the range of views under

consideration, to aid the panel in acquiring a wider view on the systemic ramifications of the

quarrel being investigated (Grando, 2020). The approach of having members’ viewpoints in the

WTO dispute settlement system; helps in directing attention to other possible systemic

implications and precedents. The third party also plays a significant role in thereby increasing the

level of transparency and also accountability in the process of solving disputes. The third parties

though do not have procedural autonomy like the actual contracting parties; they provide the

broad interest of trade and possible issues that may affect such interest. Their arguments can give

clues about how a ruling might impact not only the parties in the case, but also the system of

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international trade (Busch & Pelc, 2021). From this broader perspective, it has the potential to

inform not only the thinking within the panel but also the decision-making whereby more WTO

members’ interests are considered (Evans & Wilson, 2021). However there are some conditions

concerning the participation of third parties that creates some problems. It is important to meet

the goals of equality and at the same time ensure that proceedings move as planned. It also

means that third party contributions shall have to be pertinent and in a measure, brief so as not to

cause undue procession of the proceeding. Oversupply of such evidence by third-party brings in

solutions sophisticated and protracted thus a negative impact on the efficiency dispute resolution.

All in all; it can thus be stated that the regulation of third-party participation remains to be an

important aspect; helping to improve the WTO discord resolution system. Thus, including

multiple viewpoints, the system enhances more stable and fair solutions and thus sustains the

efficiency and legitimacy of the international trade conflict resolution (Busch & Pelc, 2021).

D. Panel reports and recommendations

Panel reports and recommendations can therefore be described as the WTO’s official conclusions

of the panel proceedings they present, which present formal solutions to trade disputes that are

addressed to the organization. Such reports are written with an aim of presenting the panel and

its finding, conclusion and recommendation after careful assessment of the available evidence

and arguments that were made during the preceding (Busch & Pelc, 2021). The specific task of

the panel entails determining of consistency of the certain measures with the WTO agreements

and the general standards of international trade, which implies the thorough analysis of the legal

and factual aspects (Davis, 2018). Panel reports need to be clear and detailed so that the

concerned parties know why the panel arrived at a certain decision. This understanding is crucial

for defining the appropriate measures for adjusting national policies to the WTO requirements

(Grando, 2020). This means that the panel report once produced is forwarded to DSB for

approval or what is referred to as adoption. The report becomes definite unless there is a decision

of its rejection by members of the panel, which underlines the importance of not only a panel’s

decision about an individual case but also an example that influences the formation and

interpretation of WTO law (Guzman and Meyer, 2021). From the analysis of the same, it is clear

that panel reports have more influences than just providing a solution to cases. They participate

in the elaboration of WTO jurisprudence as a result of their involvement in the interpretation and

application of trade rules which in turn affects future cases as well as the WTO legal

architecture. However, the effectiveness of these recommendations is subject to the political will

of the parties to, at least, apply the required changes and the efficiency of the WTO enforcement

mechanism. If the parties failed to follow such recommendations, then there would be a tendency

that the credibility of the whole system would be at risk, as well as the process that pertains to

the resolution of dispute. Consequently, although panel reports are an integral part of the WTO’s

dispute settlement regime, the effectiveness of a panel report depends significantly on the

compliance by the parties to the report.

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5. Appellate Review: Ensuring Legal Accuracy and Consistency

A. Grounds for appeal and procedures

Appeal issues and the processes tied to this phase of WTO’s appellate review effectively

determine the rationale of maintaining the sound legal decisions. Panels of jurists can be

appealed by any of the parties where they are of the opinion that fundamental error was

committed by the panel in its reading and application of the WTO law (Charnovitz, 2020). It has

elaborate procedural laws and regulations that would serve to uphold the values of the appellate

practice Age, 2017 Minimum time, which is supposed to be taken to appeal, form of writing the

argument, among others are other rules that surround the appellate courts, and they are very rigid

and specific in order to assure that it would be both fair and efficient. There is no appeal on facts

but only on points of law therefore all the grounds of appeal must be of law only. This implies

that appellants can either oppose certain laws used by the panel or claim that irregularities

happened in the course of the panel hearings but cannot argue over the exact facts as reached by

the panel (Van Damme, 2018). This is done intentionally in order not to blur the findings of the

initial panel but to provide for a means of correcting blatant legal mistakes. Since the WTO has

limited the admissible basis for appeal to legal questions, the organization’s goal is to reduce

variation in the structure and performance of the dispute settlement system while also preventing

the reconsideration of facts in specific market access disputes (Busch & Pelc, 2021). Therefore,

there is a formal rigidity that is evident in the appellate review, which strengthens the rule of law

within the WTO structure. It makes sure that the appellate body concentrates on sustaining the

right implementation of legal professionalism; which gives the durability and also consistency of

the dispute settlement system. Thus, claims concerning legal accuracy rather than factual issues

are effective in maintaining stability in the legal sphere that is conducive to international trade,

enhancing the efficiency of WTO endeavors to address trade issues (Charnovitz, 2020).

However, all these rules and measures have their dampers and therefore brings us to the

challenges of appellate review process by noting the negative aspects observed in the system in

recent years that includes the Appellate Body crisis says that the system needs constant

improvement to enhance its functionality and reliability.

B. Appellate Body composition and functioning

The structure and operation of the WTO Appellate Body are necessary for the sound legal

decision-making that makes up the members’ system of dispute resolution. The Appellate Body

is composed of seven persons who hold appointment for four years with the provision for re-

appointment once (Ehlermann, 2019). Specifically; these members are chosen due to their

profound experience; in the field of international trade law and the subjects that are closely

connected with it. These persons should be distinct from any government or organization and

should not advocate for or on behalf of the government or anybody else to ensure that

controversial matters raised out of the lower courts’ determination receive an unbiased review on

appeal (Grando, 2020). The working of Appellate Body is premised on analysis of the legal

questions in appeals with the main aim of standardization in the application of WTO agreements

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across different cases (Charnovitz, 2020). Such a consistent application is or is vital in the WTO

to give members clear information about their trade obligations and also ensure that each similar

case, receives or is treated in a similar manner which enhances legal certainty and predictability

in the international trading system (Evans & Wilson, 2021). The decisions announced within the

Appellate Body; contribute to the clearer explanation and addition of exactness to the WTO law;

which results in stable and predictable legal environment for international commerce. However;

new threats have thrown into light some issues that practically affect the operations of the

Appellate Body. Prolonged and recurrent political disputes among the WTO members have made

it difficult for the organization to appoint new members hence leading to a large number of cases

with inability to resolve all of them hence the stated issue of ineffectiveness of the WTO for the

resolution of trade disputes. This crisis has hence made it clear that there is a need for change in

areas; such as these and also for the future sustainability as well as relevance of the Appellate

Body. These challenges can only be addressed by reforming the specialization so as to revive the

functionality of the Appellate Body in the WTO dispute settlement framework.

C. Scope of appellate review

The extent of appellate review within WTO dispute resolution is clearly set to ensure that

Appellate Body only deals with issues of law as a reversal of panel’s factual findings is not

allowed. It is imperative in this respect that WTO panels and the appellate body give emphasis to

legal questions to ensure consistency and legal certainty in WTO jurisprudence (Van Damme,

2018). Namely, the Appellate Body focuses on whether the panel got the WTO agreements’

interpretation and application right while not reconsidering the facts that were stipulated at the

first panel level (Ehlermann, 2019). Thanks to such limitation, the Appellate Body does not

overstep the panel’s analysis of facts and proper legal conclusions, which preserves the

discretion and non-appealable nature of factual findings made by the panel. This intentional

narrowing of the work’s focus has a number of important functions: First of all, it means that the

consideration process is rational and does not turn into prolonged debates and disputes of which

factual circumstances are relevant or not. Secondly by focusing on legal mistakes; the Appellate

Body to maintaining legal certainty and consistency on the WTO system. This is important in

offering assistance to members on their trading commitments and as a way of ensuring that there

is consistency in the evaluation of trade guidelines (Charnovit, 2020). Besides; the selectivity of

appellate review also contributes to the improvements in the stability and dependability of the

multilateral trading system. It achieves an optimal degree of formally legal regulation of relations

among individuals and legal entities due to providing for the efficient settlement of disputes and

the desire for a final authoritative decision. Such approach; helps to maintain the independence

of the actions made by the panel and also guarantees that the disagreements are solved within the

time frame; thus strengthening the predictability and the reliability of the WTO’s Dispute

Settlement System. Thus, considering its functions and positive impact on the further

development of the WTO legal system and the management of controversies of international

trade, it is possible to state that the Appellate Body is a critical component of the WTO.

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D. Adoption of Appellate Body reports

They are part of the final stages of the process of making and enforcing decisions in the WTO

disputes since they elaborate what has been ruled or recommended by the Appellate Body. This

means that once the Appellate Body has undertaken its analysis and prepared a report, this is

forwarded to what is known as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for approval (Evans &

Wilson, 2021). While panel reports when there is a negative consensus will not be adopted, An

Appellate Body report, on the other hand, is adopted automatically unless the DSB decides not to

adopt by consensus and such a situation has not been witnessed in the real world (Busch & Pelc,

2021). It is an automatic adoption mechanism that aims at; achieving the implementation of

decisions and the existence of legal security and finality to the dispute. The fact that this

adoption procedure is automatic, underlines the centrality of Appellate Body reports; in the

WTO’s dispute settlement framework. Such is the case because the system of adoption is

brought closer to being automatic, thereby reducing any possibility of delays and ensuring that

enforcement of the recommendations or findings made by the Appellate Body occurs at the

soonest possible time. This approach preserves the enforceability of the rulings of the Appellate

Body; meaning the involved parties, are legal to implement the decisions made. Thus, this

enhances the legitimacy of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism and supports the

Multilateral Trading System (Charnovitis, 2020). Such binding nature of these reports is

imperative for a proper adherence to the rule of law in international business relations as well as

because the compliance by the member states with their obligations and because the rather

predictable and systematic functioning of trade dispute mechanisms. The use of Appellate Body

reports can therefore be seen as having the central role to play in the WTO’s dispute settlement

system hence the need for its protection. This does not only uphold compliance with the rulings

but also performs the task of furnishing the last word on WTO agreements and renders an

interpretative decision in ironing out the incipience of a stable jurisprudence of international

trade law. It shows that the WTO respects fair-minded and clear lines on how to address trade

disputes to finality and helped in establishing stability in the global trading system (Grando,

2020).

6. Implementation and Compliance with WTO Rulings

A. Reasonable period for compliance

The reasonable period of time is the other component of the WTO’s system of settling the

dispute that aims at determining the time that should be afforded to the member country to alter

its policies in consideration to the decision made. In the WTO, after the adoption of a panel or

Appellate Body report, a specific period is provided to any affected party for compliance of the

measures with WTO requirements (Evans & Wilson, 2021). It is either agreed upon by the

parties in the dispute or, in case of the parties’ failure to reach a consensus themselves, adjudged

through arbitration (Montes, 2021). The main goal of a setting up a reasonable period therefore is

to ensure that the pressure for changes is balanced by the time that is required to implement

changes in the legal requirements. This move would be detrimental on the world economy and

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political lessons will be learnt as countries require some time to change their laws in compliance

with WTO decision (Busch & Pelc, 2021). The reasonable period for compliance facilitate to

achieve a less sharp angle’s economic and political shocks that might arise, due to abrupt

changes (Charnoviti, 2020). However, deciding the period of compliance could at times create

new controversies between the two parties especially in instances where there is a disagreement

on the efficiency of the offered period. This has shown the necessity of providing more specific

rules as well as efficient mechanisms for the negotiations of proper time limits for the

compliance with the decisions so that the two aspects such as the need for immediate action and

the real possibilities of the member states could be taken into consideration. The process of

setting a reasonable period for compliance thus serves a dual purpose: it entails compliance

together with WTO rulings while at the same time giving member countries the required

flexibility to alter or withdraw their policies from the WTO without causing much harm. This

balance is necessary to sustain the stability of the Global Business Environment and determine

the predictability of the international trading system that is necessary to support the proper work

of the WTO’s dispute settlement body (Evans & Wilson, 2021).

B. Surveillance of implementation by DSB

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) plays a significant role in the compliance and utilization of

WTO decisions hence, acting as a tracking authority with regards to the part of member countries

as per their obligations (Evans & Wilson, 2021). After a panel or Appellate Body report is

adopted, the DSB monitors the implementation process whereby the responding member is

expected to report to the DSB the actions taken aimed at implementing the decision taken

(Montes, 2021). It also makes the process implementable and publicly visible to notice

compliance or otherwise by the member states with WTO agreements (Busch & Pelc, 2021).

Thus, the DSB is not just a passive witness of the country’s unsustainable compliance, but it

stimulates timely and efficient compliance by means of monitoring. Thus, the DSB receives the

compliance reports that the responding member has prepared and can determine whether the

actions taken meet the defined requirements of the ruling. This oversight assists in avoiding

additional time and guarantees the measures put in place are enough to solve the disagreement

(Grando, 2020). Where requested or where compliance is suspended or considered inadequate,

the DSB is empowered to allow the complainant to request compensation or to commence trade

retaliation procedures. This mechanism enables the complainant bring issues of non-compliance

and also propels the responding member to adhere to the ruling (Davis, 2018). Compensation or

sanctions option reveals the WTO compliance mechanism in which WTO decisions can be

backed by punitive measures to ensure that they are not mere recommendations which are

usually ignored by the member states. The surveillance function of the DSB is very important in

the reformist movement of the WTO dispute settlement system. It guarantees the compliance

with the given verdicts and their implementation; which in turn, strengthens the authorities of the

given system. As mentioned earlier, through the application of legislative arrangements that

enforce and sanction the members of the WTO, the DSB is the key in determining the stability

and predictability of the trading regime for the global community (Evans & Wilson, 2021).

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C. Compensation and suspension of concessions

In case a member state has not complied with the WTO ruling in the stipulated reasonable period

of time the WTO dispute settlement system allows for remedies like compensation and other

forms of retaliation among them being suspension of concessions as stated by Montes (2021).

These are meant to encouraged compliance and some of the effect of non-compliance regarding

the economy. Compensation is one of the most common remedies that are usually arrived at

through bargaining between the warring factions. It is usually presented in the context of trade

advantages or compromises as a short-term settlement between the non-compliant member and

the complainant (Busch & Pelc, 2021). Remedy seeks to offset the prejudicial impacts that the

complainant has to endure during the time that the member is in the process of adapting its laws

to WTO decisions. This measure is usually adopted to uphold diplomatic relations and as a

interim measure docket in the absence of a more prolonged course of action. If there is no

agreement on compensation or the complaint is dissatisfied with the terms that have been

offered, they may petition the DSB to request permission to withdraw concessions or other

obligations owed to the errant member (Evits & Wilsln, 2021). Another of these actions ensures

that retaliation measures are placed and the complainant may be able to place trade sanctions or

withdraw some concession previously provided to the non-complying member. These forms of

suspension affect the trade privileges and the liberalized market that the integrating member

gains in the process of integration, thus have enormous ‘enforcement power’. These remedies

thus bear certain characteristics; yet their efficiency depends on some factors. This means that

the influence which the complainant has on the economic aspect of a certain issue affects the

severity of the consequences of the suspension of concessions to the maximum. The above

economic cost is also higher in the event that the complainant is a trade partner of large scale and

high market power (Grando, 2020). On the other hand, in circumstances where the injured party

is an insignificant buyer or there is no clear dominance of the complainant’s business over its

counterpart, the results of these measures may vary (Davis, 2018). Therefore, it can be noted that

compensation and suspension of concessions have always been feasible in the WTO dispute

settlement, being simultaneously more of an enforcement measure and, at the same time,

containing certain controversies.

D. Compliance proceedings and implementation disputes

Amicable enforcement processes are an essential feature of the WTO dispute settlement

mechanism; responsible for prompting member states to implement the adopted decisions.

According to Evans and Wilson (2021), when there is a dispute concerning a member’s failure to

provide evidence of compliance concerning a ruling, the complainant can launch what is referred

to as compliance proceedings; this leads to the creation of a compliance panel. Next, compliance

proceedings originate from the complainant’s request for a formation of a compliance panel to

determine whether the measures taken by the respondent complies with the WTO ruling. The

purpose of the compliance panel is to assess how the respondent has addressed the matters on

outbreak apps to judge if it addresses all the problems that were raised under the first dispute

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resolution. This includes the assessment of the specific shift implemented by the member to its

trade policies, regulation, or practice in order to meet new WTO ruling (Busch & Pelc, 2021). If

complainant is still unsatisfied with the result given by the panel or if there are further questions

regarding the compliance measures and infraction then findings of the compliance panel can be

appealed to the Appellate Body (Montes, 2021). The function of the Appellate Body is strictly

juridical: it examines legal matters; so that the compliance panel’s work is based on WTO

agreements and legal norms. It is a useful second check, which helps to ensure that compliance

decisions are correct and are being applied properly (Charnovitz, 2020). The compliance

proceedings mechanism is important; since it helps preserve the WTO Dispute Settlement

System. This helps to ensure that they are not just on paper but they are also complied with in

practice and any non-compliance is directly pointed to the member states (Davis, 2018). Thus, by

serving as a structured way of addressing disputes concerning compliance, such proceedings

assist in the enforcement of the rule of law within the WTO and building confidence among

WTO members in the given system for the settlement of disputes. In conclusion; since

compliance proceedings involves enforcement of the WTO decisions this is hence a critical area

of the WTO’s work in enhancing the implementation of the WTO decisions; thus supporting

WTO’s role in managing and also directing the international trade related disputes.

7. Special Provisions for Developing Countries

A. Extended timeframes and technical assistance

Developing countries’ WTO-specific measures are intended to overcome the constraints that

such countries have to surmount, in order to be an effective part of the WS/DS process. These

provisions are mainly the longer periods and the technical specialists, which are essential to

assist the developing countries with challenges of the WTO disputes (Keck & Low, 2021).

Longer time horizons are one agreement component that takes into consideration financial

limitations and bureaucratic difficulties in the developing world. These rather long periods of

time were needed by these nations for the preparation of their cases, collecting the required

evidence as well as developing their legal strategies necessary due to the often limited legal and

financial capacities of the states concerned (Busch and Pelc, 2021). Thus, this extension assists

in placing the developing nation on equal footing where they acquire an opportunity to engage in

the process of the dispute settlement without compromising their capacity (Miyagawa, 2019).

Financial support is another major type of assistance offered by WTO Secretariat and various

other bodies; technical assistance is also important support form of assistance. This support

encompasses; capacity building initiatives such as; training, seminars and the provision of legal

services relevant to the enhancement of legal and institutional frameworks in developing

Australia’s developing partners. Technical assistance; improves these countries’ palliative

influence and enables them to function effectively in WTO rules and dispute settlement in terms

of legal and also procedural requirements. This is particularly important for; enhancing the

capacity of the developing nations to not only engage in the WTO’s DSM but also gain from it.

These special provisions are designed towards the broad intention of making WTO’s dispute

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settlement mechanism equally available to all member states irrespective of the developed or

developing world status. While offering more time and assistance, WTO aims at decreasing

prejudice and striving for fairness for creating favorable conditions for solving the issues related

to trade (Evans & Wilson, 2021). In the end, these solutions are envisaged to enhance the

efficiency of the dispute-settlement system and to maintain the relevant principle of the relations

between the trading partners.

B. Legal aid and capacity building

Legal assistance and capacity enhancement remains core to increasing the capacity of developing

nations in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (Keck & Low, 2021). All these are aimed at

facilitating the regard to the difference that exists between the developed and the developing

countries in terms of the resources and manpower. Among those is the Advisory Centre on WTO

Law (ACWL) that offers legal services including consultancy and legal representation to the

developing and LDCs at subsidized rates (Miyagawa, 2019). The support of the ACWL is very

essential to these countries in the sense that, due to the technical nature of WTO litigation, with

issues having to do with interpretation of legal texts, presentation of cases before the panels and

the Appellate Body, among others, requires technical assistance. Other services are capacity-

building programs; which together with legal aid provide organizational and individual learning

for sustainable legal development. Such programs are commonly supported by developed

countries and international organizations and provide training to government representatives,

lawyers, and other interested parties in the field of trade law and dispute settlement (Busch &

Pelc, 2021, p. 20). Information acquisition is also characterized by training, where subjects are

introduced to the WTO framework, basic knowledge of trade under the WTO and state-of-the-art

approaches to dispute resolution and containing trade disputes, thus preparing the participants for

successful engagement in WTO. Such changes are helpful in WTO to fashion a fair environment

within the framework of WTO. It focuses on the capacity building of the developing nation or

country so that it can fully participate in the Dispute Settlement Process Legal aid is meant for

developing nations, and most of its efforts try to make specific nation proficient so they can

compete equally with other nations (Grando, 2020). This inclusiveness eliminates any

discrimination of WTO members while accessing the dispute resolution mechanism; thus,

increasing the fairness of WTO’s mechanisms, according to Evans and Wilson (2021). In

addition the WTO through these initiatives enhances the developed country’s intellectual

property protection rights while at the same time additionally enhancing the dispute settlement

mechanisms as it empowers the developing nations. When all members particularly both the

developed and the developing countries can enjoy their respective membership in the system, the

WTO harnesses the power of credible means for the appropriate implementation of equitable

economic trade liberalization; and the management of trade disputes in accordance with the fair

shots of the entire trading world.

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C. Special considerations in dispute proceedings

The system of SDT measures within the WTO framework can be defined as the provisions that

recognize the difficulties faced by developing countries and show them preferential treatment in

world trade (Keck & Low, 2021). All of these provisions must be understood as recognition of

the fact that relatively less developed countries have problems different from those of the

developed countries. In this regard, SDT provisions afford some degree of freedom in fulfilling

obligations, prolong duration periods for compliance, and consist of some safeguard mechanisms

aimed at enhancing the trade interests of developing countries in trade and/or dispute resolution

agreements (Miyagawa, 2019). Situations in which some SDT provisions contain advantages in a

number of procedural aspects can be experiences in the sphere of dispute solving. For instance,

long periods of appeals and time extension on compliance and submissions help the developing

nations to address and implement WTO decisions (Busch & Pelc, 2021). Also, it appears that

SDT provisions can involve reference to the development-related considerations in panel and

Appellate Body decisions, thereby guaranteeing that the specificities of exposure to the

developing countries’ economy and society become appreciated in the course of the issue’s

resolution (Grando, 2020). These measures are intended to improve; the existing system of

regulating the settlements of the dispute and to take into account the existing possibilities of the

developing countries. In this regard, SDT provisions are aimed at strengthening such countries’

capacity to navigate the WTO framework and optimize the utilization of the global trade regime.

However, these protective measures have to be supported by proper implementation of SDT

provisions and further engagement of developed countries in financing these activities (Evans &

Wilson, 2021). It is crucial to evaluate the implementation of SDT provisions; regarding their

aims, in order to achieve the intended objectives. This is has to do with determining if the

measures are effectively responding to the interest of developing nations and if the provisions are

being fulfilled as planned. As a result, it is critical for programs that monitor SDT measures to

continue to review and adapt them because SDT measures’ usage continues to evolve as well,

with the key agenda being to assist developmental countries within the WTO framework.

D. Challenges faced by developing nations

Trade litigation faces challenges and opportunities for the developing countries in the WTO

dispute settlement system affecting their ability to engage in and benefit from the system (Keck

& Low, 2021). Another is a lack of financial and legal capabilities, as the mentioned countries

belong to the least developed ones. At this point, this constraint may limit their capacity to

participate in expensive and comprehensive dispute processes, shaping the overall case filing,

sufficient protection of interests, and the enforcement of decisions (Busch & Pelc, 2021).

Moreover, both substantive area of international trade law and procedural characteristics of

Dispute Settlement of WTO might be too complex to be easily comprehensible for developing

countries which might not afford domestic expertise and experience. However, there are still

opportunities for developing countries to engage in the WTO dispute settlement scheme as will

be explained later. Successfully applying the system, these countries can safeguard their trade

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interests, obtain better terms of market entry, and enhance their positions within the framework

of the world trade (Grando, 2020). The process of settling the dispute; can also be used as a

weapon in dealing with trade compliances and enforcing WTO rules as well as fair trade

practices. In the same way, efficiency in the working of the system also contributes positively to

the legitimacy of developing countries in the rule based trading systems thereby increasing their

commitment in the multilateral trade system (Evans & Wilson, 2021). It is necessary to

intensively concentrate, which is the meaning of the aimed efforts necessary to fully utilize these

opportunities while comprehending the essential challenges. In supporting developing states;

capacity-building endeavors, technical cooperation and law-related services are essential. Some

of these practices involve training, funding, and legal aid, which assist in the development of

skill, the main requisite of participation in dispute resolution (Charnovitz, 2020). When these

challenges are tackled through follow up support systems, developing countries’ chances to

participate in WTO dispute settlement system increases, they contribute to the realization of fair

trading environment, and the world gains a better trade system.

8. Criticisms and Reform Proposals

A. Length of dispute resolution process

The WTO Dispute Settlement System has faced many criticisms on its efficiency, transparency

and fairness which show areas, which can be improved upon for reformation (Keck & Low,

2021). There is a general concern that the processes of dispute resolution may take a long time.

Mavroidis (2020) believes that one of the drawbacks of many-year periods for appeals is that

they slow down the effectiveness and implementation of some trade rules, as well as create

uncertainty for oriented businesses. This delay therefore frustrates early resolution of trade

disputes and can hence prove disadvantageous to the stability as well as certainty of the Global

trading environment. The next major concern can be pinpointed to the question of the efficiency

of the dispute settlement system and the general notion was made that developed countries

dominate this sphere and that developing nations’ voice is not heard enough. Due to its intricate

and highly consumptive structure, it allocates higher burdens to developing nations which,

furthermore, suffer from a lack of financial and legal capital (Miyagawa, 2019). It is worrying to

observe such imbalance since it may lead to injustices and exclusions especially in the A2

countries, which may not be in a position to fully engage in the strategy and benefit from the

dispute system effectively. The fate of the Appellate Body has also become a problem, some

opponents believe that, through judicial proven theories, it has sought to extend the WTO

agreements and create new conditions for members (Van Damme, 2018). This was deemed as

abuse of functions that has seen the Appellate Body accused of going rogue with the WTO

agreements likely to be unbalanced with the rights and obligations as initially intended by the

parties to the agreement. These criticisms have thus led people to demand changes, which will

thereby increase the effectiveness of this system and also its perceived equity as well as

righteousness. Some of the recommendations for change include reforms on the nature of

systems to reduce the amount of time taken in the settlement of contractual disputes,

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representation and diversity concerns, and definition of the Appellate Body mandate and the

court’s boundaries (Evans & Wilson, 2021). Solving these concerns is vital to obtaining the ideal

resolution to the WTO dispute settlement system, and therefore to the satisfaction, at least to the

same extent, of all WTO member states.

B. Enforcement challenges and compliance issues

In light of efficiency concerns regarding the WTO dispute settlement system, efforts have been

made with regard to initiating the following reforms with a view to minimizing procedures and

delays (Mavroidis, 2020). One such recommendation is the need to set more rigid time frames

for each phase of the dispute resolution plan. To avoid delays of the process, the WTO actually

has working fixed deadlines that cover consultations, panel proceedings, and appellate reviews.

Hiring additional staff for the WTO Secretariat is another reform suggested for implementation

by the WTO’s members- Shock 4. If it had more resources in terms of money and personnel, the

Secretariat could effectively contribute to the sustenance of the administration of the dispute

settlement system and handle the cases efficiently, and provide necessary support to panels and

the Appellate Body (Busch & Pelc, 2021). This support could also encompass; the enhancement

of the physical capabilities of the centers and their preparations for increased caseload. There is

also the suggestion of the use of digital tools for the management of cases and communication

purposes as well. Advanced technology can enhance the accomplishment of the objectives below

par since it can help in the quicker processing of the documents besides facilitating

communication and improving the case management systems (Grando, 2020). Introduction of

digital technology also work to increase case information accessibility where all the stakeholders

get to receive and be informed at all times. Also, the proposal for the implementation of more

speedy procedures for cases that are not so complicated is also supported. It would also enable

the WTO to clear these cases faster thus had the potential to handle the continuously rising

backlog of the cases (Encyclopedia of Political Economy, 2021). Such an approach would mean

that the system directs its resources on the many complicated cases while at the same time

handling many simple disputes in a proper manner. In summary; all these reformation efforts

thus bring about a positive change; by seeking to make the WTO dispute settlement system more

efficient. Through eliminating the delays in the application of trade rules as well as augmenting

the administrative support, all WTO members will be benefited and at the same time the

credibility of the DRSM will be maintained.

C. Enhancing transparency and inclusivity

Improving Objectivity and Participatory process is one core area that has been receiving reform

agendas’ within the WTO context relative to Dispute Settlement System (Keck & Low, 2021). It

is also necessary; to expand the access to the materials of dispute settlement and related materials

to the public. There might be increased openness to the way in which judgments are arrived at,

thereby enhancing the possibility of better appraisal by the public particularly of the factors that

informed their implementation (Miyagawa, 2019). This increased openness could consist in

disseminating more elaborate case files, panel reports and procedural documents thus increasing

P a g e | 23

accountability. The second important reform proposal is to enhance activity with civil human

organizations and other interested parties. To include these organizations the WTO can allow

them to file amicus briefs and participate in consultancy to ensure that their viewpoints are

included into the process of resolution of disputes (Van Damme, 2018). It is important to add

that such an approach; diversifies the decision making not only quantitatively, but also

qualitatively, thus increasing the legitimacy of the decisions made. Concerning this, measures are

being discussed for the improvement of the situation for the developing countries as a response

to ensure the inclusiveness of the policy. Such steps are funding for legal aid and capacity

enhancement programs without which these countries cannot effectively engage in the dispute

settlement system (Busch & Pelc, 2021). Depending on its commitments, the WTO can facilitate

financing and technical assistance so that the development countries will not be limited by their

capacities when pursuing a resolution to the conflict. These reforms’ main purpose is to increase

a fair and better balance between WTO membership and the rights attached to it (Evans &

Wilson, 2021). Hence, the WTO stands a better chance of enforcing its DSS by dealing with the

issues of access and representation, thereby improving the DSS system for the needs of a cross-

section of its stakeholders.

D. Appellate Body appointment crisis

A key subject of WTO’s Dispute Settlement System, involving the appellate body directly,

pertains to reforming the Appellate Body: This stems from questions and doubts concerning its

position and efficiency within the system (Mavroidis, 2020). Here is one noticeable proposal:

The delivery of the organization’s mandate to the Appellate Body should be made clearer in a

bid to demarcate the Body’s authority. This means that it should limit its function to providing

answers to legal questions regarding WTO’s agreements and avoiding policy choices and legal

interpretation beyond the black letter of the agreements (Van Damme, 2018). Said clarification is

intended to restore the, albeit disparate, initial equality of arms in the context of the dispute

settlement system and to prevent the desired and much-discussed judicial activism of the

Appellate Body from shaking its authority. Another reform proposal is regarding the

appointment of the Appellate Body members where it is suggested that the appointment process

should be enhanced. To further support this, Keck and Low (2021) affirmed that balancing the

sources of legal diversity can improve the body’s general neutrality and efficiency as well. Thus,

it will make the Appellate Body more diverse, and hence, its decisions will encompass all

aspects of interest to global trade. Besides, some scholars consider that it is crucial to set more

definite or specific procedures of the Appellate Body operation and increase the responsibility of

the Appellate Body members as the measures that would help to consolidate the trust an

efficiency of this essential supplement to the WTO dispute settlement system (Busch & Pelc,

2021). That is why the possible reforms that can be introduced could stipulate the measures as to

fix the detailed policy on the decision-making procedures and specify the ways of decision-

making related to the possible conflicts of interest or bias among the members of the council.

Increased measures of accountability would help in preventing the Appellate Body from being

opaque and in maintaining high ethical standards thus considering its validity. In general, the

P a g e | 24

outlined reforms are required to enhance the Appellate Body as an institution that ensures the

cohesion of WTO legal system (Evans & Wilson, 2021). When dealing with these important

problems, the reforms aim at bringing people’s trust back to the Appellate Body and guarantee

that the latter will be capable of providing fair and equitable results in acts of trade disputes.

9. Landmark Cases Shaping WTO Jurisprudence

A. United States – Shrimp-Turtle Case

Among the early WTO panel instances, the well-known United States – Shrimp-Turtle case from

1998 contributed a lot to the formation of the subsequent understanding of trade and

environmental protection within the WTO (Grando, 2020). The case concerned the Americans’

import ban of shrimp produced by countries not using turtle-excluder devices that help avoid

entrapment of sea turtles, a threatened species (Keck & Low, 2021). India, Malaysia, Pakistan

and Thailand opposed the ban stating that it was in violation of the GATT since it placed

unjustifiable barriers to trade. The decision of the Appellate Body in this case is somewhat

revolutionary. To that, WTO agreed that members possess the right to shield the environment;

however, this right has to meet certain requirements to qualify as Shore Excuse under trade rules.

Namely, the Appellate Body underlined that environmental measures cannot be regarded as

measure involving arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries in which like

conditions exist, or a disguised restriction on international trade (Van Damme, 2018). Regarding

its assessment, the Appellate Body looked at the Article XX of the GATT, which provides for

the exceptions to the trade rules relating to the living organisms, animals and plant life and health

and for the conservation of the natural resources which are exhaustible. This was to confirm on

one hand that environmental protection is a lawful objective but all those measures applied in its

protection have to respect the GATT norms on non-discrimination and fairness. The Appellate

Body ruled that the U.S measure was applied unreasonably because it could not incorporate

sufficient account of various conditions in the exporting countries concerning the degree of

flexibility. The United States – Shrimp Turtle case was quite an important ruling before the

WTO for both the principle of trade and environment. It affirmed that whereas environmental

measures are lawful, they should only be constructed and applied in such a manner that doesn’t

provide public notice of intent to violate the rights of other WTO member nations. This has

impacted the subsequent cases that relate to similar problems and defines how the environmental

concerns are instituted in the trading system (Busch & Pelc, 2021).

B. Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft

One of the most important WTO disputes which discussed subsidies and their relation to the

fairness of the competition is the Brazil – Export Financing Program for Aircraft case of 1999.

The case was sparked when Canada complained that Brazil was extending export financing to its

airplane industry since these constituted prohibited export subsidies under the WTO regulations

(Evans & Wilson, 2021). When it comes to Brazil, the financing program that was developed

specifically to help a domestic aircraft manufacturer called Embraer to compete with foreign

P a g e | 25

rivals, including a Canadian one, Bombardier, is called the Proex program. The program that was

extended to the purchasers of the Brazilian aircraft was the interest rate equalization payments

for the Brazilian exporters (Miyagawa, 2019). Canada argued that this sort of financial aid placed

Embraer in a competitive advantage within the international market, hence, breached the SCM

Agreement. The WTO panel, and later the Appellate Body agreed with Canada’s arguments.

APP’s analysis of the proex program indicated; that it was an export subsidy because it was

contingent with export performance and consisted of fiscal incentives that skewed trading

patterns. This ruling also reiterated the disciplines on subsidies that were provided under the

SCM Agreement; thus noting that members are barred from offering subsidies for exporting

goods or that are Railroad, contingent on exports. The case of Brazil – Export Financing

Program for Aircraft clearly pointed out that WTO plays pivotal part in controlling subsidies so

that members cannot provide unfair competition in the international market. By standing for the

rules against the prohibited export subsidies in general; the WTO proved its desire and attempts

to maintain the fair trade in the world. This case showed that it is important for countries to play

by the rules agreed internationally and to announce measures that will create distortions on trade

(Grando, 2020). Moreover; the case had general coverage to the globe aerospace business and

other firms that strongly rely on the government support. It informed the WTO members that

they need to devise their subsidization arrangements in a way that will not violate the trade

regulation norms over the SCM Agreement. The decision also helped; to pay more attention and

also reestablish discipline in the provision of subsidies; thus, facilitated the more sound and fair

relations in trade.

C. European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and

Distribution of Bananas

The main features of the European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale, and

Distribution of Bananas case (1997) are that it is a WTO dispute that greatly affected

jurisprudence on market access and preferential trade agreements. The case emerged when some

Latin American countries and the United States sued the European Union in an attempt to

complain on the EU’s biased import policy on bananas from the ACP countries (Busch & Pelc,

2021). The EU also had preferential import policies for bananas; the Lome Convention for ACP

intended to support former colonies by gaining certain privileges in European market. However,

this regime was considered by the Latin American countries as discriminative mainly because it

violated GATT and other WTO principles, particularly the non- discrimination and market

access principles. In the end the WTO panel and Appellate Body sided with the complainants

and determined that EU regime for banana importation was in violation of WTO agreements. In

more detail, the Appellate Body stated that such treatment violated the most favored nation

(MFN) provision enshrined under Article I of the GATT and other relevant provisions. This

principle holds WTO members to be impartial in their treatment of all the parties and maintains

that one cannot be treated differently from another in as much as the products being dealt with

are similar ones produced in different states (Keck & Low, 2021). Basic to the ruling; it

P a g e | 26

highlighted the requirement that; the measures adopted for trade policies should not contradict

the rules governing multilateral trade, even if the trade policies taken are contained in the

regional or preferential trade policies. Thus; the case highlighted issues of the WTO and the

Lomé Convention policies thereby providing a balance between regional organization and world

trade policies and rules. It also discussed the centrality of the non-discrimination principle; in

ensuring each WTO member equal opportunities, within a fair market competition environment.

However; the selected case also established some rules concerning the interpretation of non-

discrimination principles in WTO law. Consequently, it explained that regional trade agreements

are not prohibited, but any measures that are contained in these agreements cannot derogate from

the principles of the WTO. This case also illustrated a part played by the WTO in monitoring the

formulation of preferential trade deals so that they do not provide unfair protectionism or

distortions in trade.

D. China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services

for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products

The Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and

Audiovisual Entertainment Products (SCS/China, 2009) is another important WTO dispute that

focused on China’s measures of restricting import and distribution of foreign publications and

audiovisual entertainment products. The United States incurred the dispute since it deemed these

restrictions’ inapposite to China’s obligations to the WTO and the latter’s WTO membership

agreement to liberalize market access to foreign products and services (Evans & Wilson, 2021).

The main issue of conflict was the Chinese regulation which placed severe limitations on the

trading rights and distribution services for Books, Newspaper, Journals, DVDs and other Audio

Visual products. These measures entailed directives that direct state-owned enterprises to deal

with imports as well as restrictions of the freedom of foreign participants to circulate such

merchandise in China. The United States claimed these restrictions constitute discrimination and

violation of China’s WTO obligations most importantly the rules on market access and non-

discrimination (Miyagawa, 2019). The WTO panel and Appellate Body made the decision in

favor of the United States resulting from the conclusion that China’s measures were unlawful in

the sense that they violated its trade obligations. For example, it pointed that according to the

WTO Accession Package of China, China had undertaken to bring trading rights and distribution

services in line with the requirement of WTO. Hence, the panel concluded that Chinese restraints

on accesses to foreign magazines and TV/broadcasting programs and movies posed an unequal

trade barrier that infringed on the GATS and PRC Protocol (Keck & Low, 2021). This case

clearly brought to light that M.A among the trading partners is a vital ingredient; in the modern

free trade environment and also asserted the WTO’s function as the watchdog to the trading

nations; on their obligations to honor liberalization agreements. This is how through the

discussed case the WTO proved it was willing to counteract China’s unfair restrictions in

international business and defend the principles of free trade even against the powerful country.

It also had implications for the development of WTO jurisprudence regarding services and

P a g e | 27

intellectual property as the panel’s decision shed light on the correct implementation of WTO

rules regarding these areas (Busch & Pelc, 2021). In addition; it had systemic implications for

other WTO members; thus expressing that the Members must stick to the commitments, in terms

of market access and that the WTO dispute settlement can address violation effectively.

10. WTO's Impact on Global Trade Relations

A. Reduction of trade barriers

Some of the WTO success has been realized through directing the reduction of barriers to trade

and thus helping in increasing the liberalization of trade internationally (Mavroidis, 2020). Over

the rounds of negotiation, WTO members have committed themselves to reduce tariffs, reducing

the quotas, and reducing NTBs for improving the access to markets for goods and services

(Miyagawa 2019). All these combined efforts, have seen the world trade grow, countries’

economies becoming more intertwined, and internationalization of production processes

deepening hence enhance internationalization of the global economy (Busch & Pelc, 2021).

Globalization that has been characterized by the decrease in the barriers to trade has led to

increased competition, developments, and effectiveness in the delivery of goods and services. In

a bid for firms to compete in the new open market, they are compelled to seek for ways of

improving on the undertaking or coming up with better service and products. It exposes the firms

to competition which in turn leads to lower prices for the consumers, assorted products, and

improved standard of living (Evans & Wilson, 2021). In this context, the enlarged offer of

differentiated products and services originating from various global markets enhances the

consumers’ choices and is sound for welfare. In addition, it can be pointed out that global value

chains have become a focus of WTO members due to the liberalization of trade. Business

organizations can now obtain inputs and close by components or productions parts from several

efficient manufacturers around the globe, cutting costs on production. For this reason; there is

interdependency between nations, and resource distribution is now more effective; which has

increased both productivity and economic growth. In a similar tone, integrating into GVCs has

especially proved beneficial for the developing countries in a way that helped them become

active players in the international economy improving the outlook for their development (Busch

& Pelc, 2021). It has also led to the developments of closer economic relations; among the

nations, a fact that has seen most countries dismantle most of their trade barriers. The nature of

decision making concerning the relations between countries has an economically interdependent

nature and as such, conflicts are less probable while cooperation is more likely. Finally; it deems

the WTO’s involvement crucial in this economic integration; to ensure steady relations building

an effective international society. However, there are still some weaknesses especially

concerning the way the fare of liberalization of the trading system can be shared. These elements

require continuous addressing, for example through offering finance to the developing states and

adhering to the correct principles of commerce to keep the optimistic aftermaths of liberalization

of commerce reachable.

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B. Promotion of Rule-Based Trade

The WTO has particularly helped in raising the standards for rule-based trade by increasing the

stability and predictability of the trade relations among countries (Evans & Wilson, 2021). The

WTO has provided, and improved through the years, the basic legal structure that engulfs all

relations on the acquisition of traded goods and services and has reduced the chance of

contentious and arbitrary trade wars by adaptive Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This rule-based

system has helped the global markets to operate effectively and promoters invest thus enhancing

economic growth (Grando, 2020). Due to the WTO’s stability and forward planning, it has been

most helpful for the small and developing economies, which require predictable trading

environment in which they can engage in the international economy (Keck & Low, 2021). These

WTO rules assist these economies; in constraining unjust shifts in trade policies and offer them

an independent legal mechanism, for solving the conflicts. This stability is important in foreign

investment; this is because investors are willing to bring their capital to a market with well-

understood and consistently enforced regulation. Furthermore, the WTO different rules under the

rule-based system and the dispute settlement mechanism’s institutional nature. At least it

presents a procedure for the settlement of commercial differences which may be instrumental in

preventing conflicts from degenerating into trade wars. Since the WTO acts as a place where

countries can sort out their issues by using legal norms, it decreases the chances of

countermeasures that might destabilize the international markets (Busch & Pelc, 2021). Through

signing of these agreements it makes sure that the member countries fulfill their obligations and

gives mechanism where a country can seek redress for injustice in the entire multilateral trading

environment. The rule-based system also enhances the Integration of the global economy;

through the implication of the trade rules with equal consequences in all members’ countries.

First of all, this uniformity is especially useful for the businesses that have to act on the foreign

markets as they do not have to waste time and money on learning and following the laws of

different countries. It helps to increase the predictability of business operations because the rules

and the mechanisms of trade transactions are clear and unchanging (Everson & Wilson, 2021).

Also, the WTO has directed that member-countries have to make their trade laws public and

inform the WTO whenever they are changed.

C. Facilitation of Trade Negotiations

The WTO has most actually been instrumental in the process of trade negotiations whereby; it

has offered the necessary common multilateral forum whereby members of the WTO could

negotiate trade policy and the resolution of trade disputes (Grando, 2020). The social regulation

makes sure that all the members in the organization have their say on how trade policies are

made, whereby there is unanimity (Keck & Low, 2021). This is a democratic operations style

that is core to WTO because majority of the members feel a sense of ownership, and hence

would follow set rules and regulation that is set. Through WTO’s aid in the coordination of trade

negotiations, liberalization trade agreements, that of intellectual property, services and

agricultural subsidies among others have been greatly advanced (Miyagawa, 2019). These

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agreements have paved way to the creation of a liberalized trading environment on the global

market (Busch & Pelc, 2021). For example, the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights

(TRIPS) regime contains detailed measures for the protection and enforcement of intellectual

property rights which has played a critical role in encouraging innovation particularly in the

global south (Mavroidis, 2020). Likewise, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)

provided the architecture of the liberalization of services trade that boosted service industries’

performance everywhere (Grando, 2020). In agriculture, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)

signified an effort to lower the trade-distorting subsidies as well as providing equal competition

opportunity for agriculture’s market (Keck & Low, 2021). It has been useful especially to the

developing nations because many of which are put at a disadvantage in agricultural trade because

of the subsidies given by developed nations to their farmers (Miyagawa, 2019). Thus, these

disparities have been corrected by the WTO, thereby giving traders around the world a fair

chance in doing business internationally. Another organization important in regulating and

evaluating the trade policies is through the WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM)

(Busch & Pelc, 2021). This mechanism offers an opportunity in which member states scrutinize

and assess the other’s trade policies and policies enhancing transparency and accountability

(Evers & Wilson, 2021). As a result of the reviews and discussions from the peers, the TPRM

allows the member states to discover areas that need improvements and to promote member

states to use proper standards in policy on trade formulation and management (Grando, 2020).

D. Challenges in adapting to new trade issues

The WTO has grown its work and role to encompass many dimensions of trade beyond the trade

restrictions that have historically been at the center of the organization’s mission (Evans &

Wilson, 2021). This expansion then perfectly demonstrates the flexibility and the responsiveness

of the organization to the changes and increase in the dynamics and the nature of the

international business environment. A good example of trade agreements is the Trade-Related

Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) that provides coherent standards on the rights

and enforcement of IPRs, globally (Grando, 2020). From the broad context of trade-related

aspects of intellectual property rights, the primary objectives of TRIPS include the integration of

the member states’ intellectual property laws, the enhancement of innovation and creativity, and

the protection of the consumers as well as producers. In this aspect, TRIPS works to guarantee

the minimum standard levels for patent protection, copyright, and trademarks for any country to

be a member of the WTO in order to promote respect to intellectual property in different part of

the world; hence making it more predictable and secure for creators and investors to protect their

work and investments (Keck & Low, 2021). Another major understanding is the Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement, which deals with the standards for food safety,

animals as well as plants (Miyagawa, 2019). The SPS Agreement permits members of the WTO

to apply measures to safeguard human, animal and plant life from risks resulting from food and

animal and plant pathogens and pests with an equal and proper regard to the requirements of the

principle of non-interference with free trade. First, it allows countries to sustain their health and

safety regulation from the scientific basis and ensures that measures are transparent during their

P a g e | 30

application. It is essential because it aims at incorporating health/ environmental effects to the

trade policies that do not distort the market access. Furthermore, although the WTO has become

involved with environmental and labor standards in the move to free trade, it has attempted to do

so in a positive manner and towards the overall goal that the WTO is striving for which is

sustainable development. The organization’s endeavors in these categories to ensure that trade

polices reflect other general global objectives like conservation of the environment and improved

working standards (Grando, 2020). These commitments apply to the WTO’s roles in these

domains; as recognition of the relationship between; trade and other facets of global concern.

Therefore, it is evidenced through the intellectual property rights, environmental conservation,

the welfare of employees’ rights; the WTO remains relevant today and is progressing to meet the

new world’s economy.

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