Introduction My dissertation titled

My dissertation titled “Two Models of Consensus” explores how seemingly

unproblematic process of consensus becomes very complex and vexatious. The term

‘Two Models” represent the general sociological and anthropological distinction between

societies and communities, culture and nature, and open and closed societies that is used

to conceptually differentiate modern Western societies from non-Western traditional

communities. Consensus in a pejorative sense means agreement or compromise.

Etymologically, consensus is related to consent, which means to agree.

I was troubled by why an agreement even in simple matters remains elusive. I

realized that the entire process of consensus or agreement is informed by a fore-structure,

fore-understanding, and fore-judgment. Doctrines and dogmas are intertwined in the

process of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus. Hence, there is no plateau of

knowledge from which cultural paradigms could be theorized. What we have is a rough

terrain full of cliffs and valleys. My interest in the problem of consensus began as an

aesthetic question. Habermas claims that a genuine consensus is not possible in the

aesthetic realm because of its emphasis on subjective expressions. Only an evaluation in

the form of aesthetic criticism is possible, according to Habermas. My argument is that

since every cultural paradigm including religion, language, and science is influenced by

the social and political, aesthetics cannot be relegated to the realm of the subjective

because of its perceived absence of objectivity. Aesthetic objects are not ahistorical. It is

understandable that a consensus could be difficult to achieve in the aesthetic realm

because of individual tastes, but even normative and descriptive issues are problematic.

In order to understand the factors that support or vitiate consensual activity, I explore the

structural conditions of a process of consensus. The process of consensus has to be

normative and hermeneutical. Therefore, I surmised that consensus has to be both

diachronous and synchronous.

Consensus on any issue involves socio-political, interpersonal, and cultural

aspects. I choose to examine the process of consensus from three aspects. They are:

1) Civil society (Social conditions)

2) Interpersonal relationship within a society (I – Thou relationship)

3) Contemporary cultural paradigm (Science)

All the three afore-mentioned aspects are interconnected. In my research on the process

of consensus, I found that most social and political theorists have started from a ground

zero and then constructed a theory. In this sense, I call the theories of consensus of Rawls

or Habermas, symmetrical theories of consensus. Their theories search for conditions of

uniformity of opinions and do not deal with divergence of opinions. I decided to analyze

consensus not as a total agreement but a tentative agreement of divergent views.

Consensus is about an agreement on how to make things better. The process of consensus

involves both good and bad ramifications. In a consensual process, tactics, strategy,

honesty, threat, and conciliatory gestures are all involved. Hence, it is not only moral but

also strategic. I argue that consensus is asymmetrical. It is not only a discourse on what is

the right path but an agreement to act cooperatively in spite of disagreements. Hence, I

call consensus “co-operative action.” My conclusion is that even a definition of

consensus must be consensual and flexible. I discuss the process of cooperative action in

the fifth chapter.

In this dissertation I also compare and contrast the predominant Western models

of consensus such as Habermas’ ideal speech situation and John Rawls’ hypothesis of the

original position with the political system of the Akan society in Ghana, which

traditionally had a system of government by consensus. The Akan political system

emphasizes consensus in resolving all disputes. Habermas’ concept of an ideal speech

situation contains the following features.

1. Clarity in the structure of communication

2. Description in formal terms and show of force within the process of

understanding or from outside

3. Only the force of better argument is allowed

4. All motives except the cooperative search for the truth are to be banished.

John Rawls defines the original position as follows: “It is a state of affairs in which the

parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not conditioned by

arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces. Thus, justice as fairness is

able to use the idea of pure procedural justice from the beginning.” Since the

aforementioned approaches emphasize ideal conditions that are necessary for a process of

consensus, I call them symmetrical approaches to consensus. I have argued in the course

of my dissertation that a need for consensus in the political or social realm necessarily

indicates unrest or instability of social situations. Hence, a theory of consensus based on a

theory of ideal situations fails to recognize the dynamic nature of the dialogical process

necessary when there is strife between two social groups or paradigms. I have constructed

my arguments on the basis of five assumptions, which are as follows.

1. Consensus is asymmetrical. It has no ideal starting or culminating state.

2. Consensus is partial or limited unanimity.

3. Consensus and democracy are not concomitantly related. For example, some

African societies have a strong participatory political system, which emphasizes

consensus as the only method of resolving disputes. I have discussed the role of

consensus in the communitarian democracy of the Akan society in Ghana.

4. Consensus depends upon civil society, interpersonal relationships, and the

dominant cultural paradigm of a society.

5. Consensus is not necessarily organic to cultures or political systems. It is

deliberative and accommodates cultural differences. Hence, a consensus is

possible only as a fusion of horizons, exchange of viewpoints. Consensus is the

recognition of cultural interstices and it is a cultural middle-path.

In the first chapter titled, “Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of

Civil Society and its Problems,” I analyze the development of civil society in liberal

democracies. Civil society is characterized by freedom of association. In this chapter, I

discuss the role of individuals, social and political institutions, and modern social

imaginary discussed by Charles Taylor and how consensus evolves in civil society. What

Taylor calls direct-access society, horizontal relationships, unmediated interaction, and

secular polity are explained in sufficient detail. Taylor mentions Habermas’ idea of the

transformation of the public sphere as an important aspect of the modern social

imaginary. I discuss Habermas’ theory of communicative action, which facilitates mutual

understanding. I also analyze in detail, the development of civil society from ancient

Greek civilization to the modern period. This chapter also contains a brief description of

the Akan society and the caste system in India. I also introduce concepts of solidarity and

subsidiarity in order to explain the complementary relation between the individual and the

social. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that says, “… nothing should be

done by a larger and more complex organization which can be done as well by a smaller

and simpler organization.” The aim of the principle of subsidiarity is to encourage social

relationships and mediating institutions. I argue that democracy does not necessarily

encourage consensus while communitarianism is not necessarily authoritarian.

Kwasi Wiredu’s analysis of the Akan system of governance through a process of

consensus is a very good example of how non-Western cultures have institutionalized

cooperative concept of governance. The best example of equilibrium between solidarity

and subsidiarity is the Akan political system. Solidarity is the common identity of a

group. Subsidiarity is the mutual relationship between the individuals in a society. As a

contrast, I have also examined how social stratification has been rationalized in India as a

response to divergent social, linguistic, religious and ethnic population. Indian social

structure displays a lack of subsidiarity. Consensus becomes redundant when there is

social solidarity but not subsidiarity. But even a notion of solidarity is questionable with

respect to India.

In the second chapter titled “Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural

Identities,” I further expand on the importance of the notion of subsidiarity, I analyze two

conceptions of intersubjective relationships. One is Hans Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical

approach and the other is George Herbert Mead’s social behaviorism. The former

emphasizes the independence of the ‘other’ from the ‘I’ and the latter attempts to define

the ‘other’ in its relation to the ‘I.’ I have argued that the relationship between individuals

in a society is an important factor in political, social, and cultural debates.

competence between federal and sub-federal levels of government. The leading statement of this

principle is Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Official Journal C 340),

which states that "In areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall

take action only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently

achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed

action, be better achieved by the Community". Although the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ is not found in

the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, several commentators have been attracted to the principle

because it appears to provide a principled and rational basis for allocating jurisdiction between the

provincial and federal governments. It recognizes both the importance of provincial autonomy and

the functional superiority, in certain circumstances, of federal jurisdiction.

The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in a society is an indicator of the balance between solidarity

and subsidiarity. A climate of mutual cooperation is possible only if there is an equitable

‘I – Thou’ relationship between the members of a society. There are several underlying

factors underlying a strong ‘I – Thou’ relationship among the members of a society.

Religion, ethnicity, language, culture, and nationality could influence the ‘I – Thou’

relationship. Both Gadamer and Mead distinguish between interest based interaction and

mutual cooperative action. Gadamer characterizes communication as the fusion of

horizons, a confluence of cultural perspectives. I argue in favor of the need to treat

communicative interaction as the fusion of horizons rather than stimulus-response

activity. Consensual activity becomes more flexible if a conversation of cultural horizons

is encouraged. Gadamer’s emphasis on non-strategic communication encourages

multicultural interaction.

In the third chapter titled “Consensus in the Realm of Science,” I argue that

essential characteristic of scientific disciplines is the emphasis on the theory-laden nature

of an idea. I will supplement Peirce’s analysis of consensus in science with Stephen

Turner’s distinction between a scientific consensus and consensus among scientists.

Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science is the context of justification in

contemporary Western society. With science as the dominant cultural paradigm,

consensus is heavily influenced by scientific practices. What C.S. Peirce defines as the

experimental method or the scientific method demands a shift in paradigm since a

knowledge episode contains tenacity, authority, and a priori methods of belief. Peirce

attempts to apply the same methodology applied by the natural sciences to arrive at

epistemic consensus in scientific disciplines to the moral and social realm.

In advanced liberal democracies, the government and the people alike appeal to

scientific evidence in order to establish truth. People generally share a belief in science

and in the veracity of its method. Hence, scientific methodology has become the most

dependable tool even in non-scientific disciplines. Demonstrability of empirical evidence

and the cultivated emphasis on reciprocity and justifiability due to the proliferation of

freedom and equality has complicated the process of education and the fixation of belief.

A doctrinal approach such as the ones adopted by religion or pseudo-scientific disciplines

is inadmissible in the age of science and democracy. Vast variations in individual

standards of understanding, the tension between various dogmatic positions in the civil

society, and the progressive movement of science are always in a state of constant flux.

Hence, consensus is influenced by the dominant cultural paradigm of science.

In the fourth chapter, “Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian

Consensus,” I explain how a pragmatic and operational system of consensual governance

based on personhood and human rights was followed by the Akan society of Ghana. A

government by consent and a government by consensus were fused together by

representative and deliberative mode of governance. I argue that such a system of

governance was possible because of the communitarianism and the shared culture of the

Akan community. Ironically, Habermas’ ideal speech situation could be more plausible in

societies such as the Akans in Ghana, which are communitarian in nature. The Akan

community insists on a consensus based on a conception of common good of the

community. A decision is arrived at in the Akan council only if all concerned agree

unanimously to a course of action. Hence, the community of Akans mandates consensus.

Kwasi Wiredu’s emphasis on a non-party democracy and his views on the process of

achieving a consensus in the Akan community are also discussed.

In the fifth chapter titled “Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and ExtraCultural,”

I argue that cross-cultural interactions are hampered by a lack of agreement due to intra-

cultural and extra-cultural variations in the social, individual, and cultural realms. Hence,

only a tentative understanding of alien cultures is possible. A consensus cognizant of

differences rather than uniformity is necessary in a multi-polar and multicultural world. A

failure to recognize the asymmetrical nature of the global village would result in cultural

conflicts within and without the society. It is here that subsidiarity as the notion that

engages differences at the micro-level rather than the macro-level becomes invaluable.

There is no seamless transition between the social, the individual, and the institutional. A

consensus that emerges from cultural interstices is anti-essentialist and anti-metaphysical.

It also, in some sense, disputes the emancipatory effect of the process of deliberation

within a society. The term ‘cultural interstices’ indicates an opposition to rigid social and

conceptual categorizations. Homi Bhabha defines his philosophy of culture as a

philosophy of cultural interstices. Normal characterizations such as center – periphery,

north – south, society – community, and majority – minority relations are ineffectual as

concrete social categories. Instead of homogeneity and uniformity, a philosophy of

cultural interstices advocates an analysis of cultures in terms of their differences. A

consensus in a global and multi-cultural world is plausible only as informed by a

philosophy of cultural interstices.

A philosophy of difference is a philosophy of ever-expanding possibilities. A

concrete example of a consensual approach based on cultural interstices could be

borrowed from a completely different topic. Stephen Turner’s description of a ‘third way,’

which is the middle-path between market economy and welfare state, is a robust case of

cultural interstices. Globalization is creating problems in terms of cross-cultural

interaction in the fields of economics, science, health, political systems, religious beliefs,

and terrorism. Hence, in order to achieve consensus conjoining deontology and

consequentialism is inevitable. I suggest a concept of cooperative action that coordinates

action orientations not on the basis of rationality but on a shared conception of good.

Such a conception of a good can evolve in the process of consensus.

Ultimately, the aim of a consensus is peaceful resolution of problems. In such a

situation, a consensus need not be a rational agreement but a non-violent disagreement

that enables cessation of hostilities. More often than not, consensus is inherently

asymmetric because one side always sacrifices more than other on account of social,

economic, and political inequalities. The need for consensus indicates the existence of

disagreements because of the asymmetric nature of the lifeworld. Irrespective of whether

a consensus is sought to resolve violent or non-violent confrontations, the force of better

argument does not bring about a consensus but only the will to concede ground on the

part of interlocutors. That is the function of consensus as a cooperative action. My

conclusion is that Western cultures emphasize legal remedies of disputes and not

consensus. The Akans emphasize consensus and hence attempt to find a solution within

their community. In the caste-based Indian society, religion, morality, lifeworld, art,

culture, law, and economics were fragmented by social stratification. Contemporary

Indian society is constructing new social imaginaries by redefining the relation between

solidarity and subsidiarity in civil society. In a rapidly changing world, a cooperative

action emphasizing the redefinition of both individual and social imaginaries through a

conversation of cultures is inescapable.

Chapter 1

Historical Specificity of the Western Conception of Civil Society and its Inherent

Problems

The concept of civil society is an important part of the modern Western

sociopolitical tradition. But the idea of civil society has been transformed over the course

of history. In the modern period, the emphasis of civil society was on individual liberty in

the Lockean tradition, while in the Rousseauean tradition the emphasis was on

citizenship. A conception of civil society was antithetical to feudalism and represented

freedom of expression, free economy, and participatory democracy, to name a few. Civil

society belongs to the realm of non-governmental association of people. The history of

civil society begins with Plato and Aristotle in Greece. Later, Romans and Christian

thinkers such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Francisco Suarez emphasized different

aspects of civil society. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were the progenitors

of the contemporary notion of civil society. Alexis de Tocqueville, who traveled in

America in the nineteenth century, identified the concept of voluntary associations as the

most distinguishing aspect of the American civil society. According to Howard Wiarda,

civil society signifies civic consciousness which functions as an effective institution of

checks and balances on the government. Wiarda says, “Civil society thus meant the

possibility of participatory citizens living together in a condition of protected property

rights providing for economic prosperity and political freedom guaranteed by regular,

constitutional procedures and the rule of law.”2

In this chapter, I have analyzed the following: 1) Solidarity and subsidiarity –

defining features of a civil society; 2) Development of civil society in ancient Greece and

India; 3) Archaic and modern aspects of civil society; and 4) The impact of the modern

social imaginary. I have also given a short introduction to the Akan communitarian

democracy and the Indian caste system. I argue that civil society has ameliorated social,

religious, and political schisms in the West. But, genuine consensus is elusive in the West

on account of the emphasis on law for adjudication of disputes and the irreconcilability of

individual interests with common interests. In contrast, African communitarian traditions

emphasized the role of consensus in order to arrive at decisions in a non-adversarial

manner. I have discussed the Akan communitarian system elaborately in the fourth

chapter.

A civil society has two facets, namely, the individual and the collective. For a

society to function effectively there is a need for both arms of the society, the individual

and the collective, to have a balanced relationship. But a distinction between the

individual and the collective is not one of binary opposition to each other. Rather, a

society achieves equilibrium on account of flexible and mutually enriching nature of the

relationship between its members and the social apparatus that governs their everyday

practices. Everyday practices are encapsulated in the habits, manners, customs, religion,

and other shared practices in a society. But the most important aspect of a society is the

role of the collective in the unfettered and unencumbered development of the individual.

While the individual is not pitted in an antagonistic relationship with the social whole,

factors such as freedom, security, and opportunities for the optimal development of an all-

round personality in an individual depend upon the structure of a society to a large extent.

While equality of opportunities is dependent upon the equality of individuals as

members of a society, all ancient societies did not practice equality of social status with

guaranteed rights and autonomy. Autonomy and rights for all people are recent

developments after the advent of liberal democracy in the West. In any society, factors

such as economy, justice, social rules and regulations, standard of living, facilities such as

housing, sanitation and water, health, occupations, and creative expressions in the form of

art, sculpture, painting, and music were viewed as demonstrative of the advancement and

progress of the society under consideration.

In both ancient as well as modern societies, artistic expressions and even religion

and philosophy were considered to be the bastion of the literati and the cognoscenti. By

dispossessing the masses of their access to intellectual achievements the higher echelons

of the society could reign over the masses with untrammeled freedom. When a society is

sapped of its creative energy and aspirations, it ceases to prosper and becomes vegetative.

In most of the troubled areas in the world, the main reason for social unrest is not the lack

of existence of a civil society, but the destruction of the social structure by religious

extremism, political turmoil, ethnic violence or foreign intervention. This is demonstrable

with an analysis of the nature of violence perpetrated on the populace in developed and

developing countries. In the developed countries, the nature of violence and crimes are

more often than not individual. In a developing country, the nature of violence is mostly

of the character of group versus group, caste, religious, and ethnic. In some ways, the

notion of community or collective is stronger than the individual.

The tension between the individual (I) and the collective (Thou) is present in all

societies. In democracies, avenues for ventilating the tension between the individual and

the collective are available in the form of political and social institutions. In advanced

liberal societies, existence of a common justice system serves as an effective avenue for

ventilating the tension between the individual and the collective. In a closely-knit

community, there are institutions that adjudicate disputes. But, legal institutions in ancient

Islamic civilizations, China, or India were different from the modern day institutions in

the liberal Western countries and hence comparisons between the Western and traditional

cultures are not tenable. Even if comparisons are inevitable, thinkers such as Habermas

claim that a dialogical process of argumentation is peculiar to the Western hemisphere

because of the emphasis on rationality from the modern epoch. Habermas argues that

traditional cultures are monological and a dialogical rational argumentation is possible

only in socially rationalized Western countries. Hence, according to Habermas, a

rationally motivated consensus in a debate is possible only in the modern societies that

have democratic institutions, freedom of speech, communicative rationality, and secular

ideals. In contrast to the Habermasian position of symmetrical nature of consensus, it can

be shown how traditional cultures had a methodology of achieving consensus even in

asymmetric situations. An example of symmetrical nature of consensus is Habermas’

“ideal speech situation”. According to Habermas,4

This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based

ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus –

bringing force of the argumentative speech, in which different participants

overcome their merely subjective views and owing to the mutuality of rationally

motivated conviction, assure themselves of both unity of the objective world and

the intersubjectivity in their lifeworld.

In Ghana, the Akan society debated all decisions and arrived at a consensus not by

the force of majority but by hearing arguments from all sides. Only when all participants

were convinced of the veracity of the consensus, the debate ended. Hence, even

traditional societies had a very amicable system of conflict resolution. The aim of the

Ghanaian political system is not only a consensual decision making but also encourage

the participation of people in the deliberative process, which is the strength of the modern

day democracies. But, Ghana was forcibly turned into a Western style democracy, after its

independence from Britain, and its traditional social structure was neglected, which

resulted in a crippling economic, social, and political situation. On the other hand, the

process of consensus arrived in the Akan society is based on a strong cultural bond

existing within a group sharing a common framework of understanding.

Charles Taylor argues that the modern social imaginaries that characterize

Western democracies and the social imaginaries that characterize other cultures are

different, which brings forth the issue of cultural particulars and universals. Cornelius

Castoriadis formulated the concept of social imaginaries. According to Castoriadis, “Each

society is a construction, a constitution, a creation of a world, of its own world.” George

Elliott writes that the concept of social imaginary has a Freudian ring in Castoriadis. A

social imaginary is the world of creation effected by a subject for itself. Hence, it is

imperative to distinguish cultural universals and cultural particulars. In short, Kwasi

Wiredu emphasizes the difference between custom and morality. Customs are particular

to a culture whereas morality has universal connotations.

Solidarity and Subsidiarity – Defining Features of a Civil Society

George McLean defines two most important aspects of social interaction between the

society as a whole and its individual members. They are: solidarity and subsidiarity.

Solidarity is defined as the communication or interaction between social groupings and

communities in a society. Subsidiarity is defined as the participation of the groups and

communities in the social activities. The notion of subsidiarity is a catholic notion that

says, “… nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organization which can

be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization.” The aim of the principle of

subsidiarity is to encourage social relationships and mediating institutions. The solidarity

could be construed as a feeling of togetherness or a sense of belonging together found in a

society. Subsidiarity is the operational element that tests the solidarity of a society as it

involves the participation of the people living in that society. For example, in ancient

Indian social organization, social groupings were mobile and hence formation of

identities, namely, ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic was not static. Also, migration

in large numbers from one place to another happened when the situation became hostile

for a group of population. For a society to have a concrete framework of administration

and government, it must become sedentary and urban.

When a society settles down, efforts are made to streamline its infrastructure such

as roads, buildings, lakes, health, agriculture, education, government and trade that would

benefit the whole population. In this regard, a society is a voluntary association of its

members to improve their standard and culture of living. Even nomadic communities had

rules and regulations concerning the conduct of the group in marriages, sharing wealth,

family, occupation, social habits and other customs. For example, early Vedic

communities of India had a standardized system of procedures and rules required for a

common law. Even anterior to the Vedic Aryans, urbanization was at its zenith during the

Indus Valley civilization. Indus Valley civilization appears to have been effectively

administered.

Unlike modern social imaginaries that emphasized absolutely secularized ethics of

argumentation which itself had a very strong influence of religious tradition,

contemporary societies need a discursive framework that incorporates hermeneutical

understanding of different cultures and traditions. In Western democracies, political

relation between subsidiarity and solidarity defines the social imaginary. In most liberal

societies, subsidiarity and solidarity are interconnected. Even in traditional societies, the

city-dwellers had a better understanding of the notion of subsidiarity when compared to

their rural brethren. Problems arising out of rapid urbanization even in less populated and

abundantly rich countries such as the United States could be catastrophic to the social,

political, and economic aspects that are integral to the maintenance of social equilibrium.

As Taylor observes, in rural societies, groups coordinated their activities with each other

in the spirit of mutual cooperation while social status was not always based on mutually

equal relationships. One of the most salient features in the social imaginaries envisioned

by the modernity is the secularized transcendental principle of the equality of human

beings.

Development of Civil Society in Ancient Greece and India

The origins of civil society in the West can be traced to ancient Greek polis. Plato

envisioned a corporate system of governance that culminated in the Utopian ideal of a

Republic, in which the philosopher-king was at the helm of Athens. Plato’s pyramidal

structure of social stratification was based on a classification of physical, mental, and

spiritual capabilities of the people of Athens. The philosopher-king was the most

meritorious candidate who has been trained in several disciplines and who had outshone

all others. Such a system actively encourages social stratification in which the lower

classes such as artisans only had a theoretical chance to graduate to the next rung of the

social ladder. The chances of an artisan or a handicraftsman ascending the throne of

Athens as a philosopher-king are remote in Plato’s Republic. Thus, Plato’s Republic is

elitist. While Aristotle’s polis did not defy the prevalent social stratification in Greece, it

suggested a more ecumenical form of governance that included a broad spectrum of

population called community. Even in Aristotle’s conception of polis, women, and slaves

were not liberated. Ironically, Plato had an elaborate training regimen for women since he

envisioned a functional role for women in the society. Plato’s characterization of women

appears to be strong, independent and dynamic because their role is oriented towards the

welfare of the Republic.

Plato claims that men are physically stronger than women. Romantic relationship

between men and women is discouraged in Plato’s Republic. Even procreation is for the

purpose of strengthening the Republic. The relationship between men and women is

devoid of traditional male-domination because even conjugal relationship is for a higher

cause. Hence, women have more equitable status under the auspices of the Republic. But

a philosopher-king could rarely be a woman because Plato did not consider men and

women equal in terms of natural abilities thereby adhering to the social hierarchy. While

Plato’s Republic is designed to eliminate factors that contribute to disorder in the state by

a system of governance that respects knowledge, Aristotle’s politics is regulated by the

ethics of the polis. A polis is administered as per the wishes of its citizens. Aristotle did

not consider women and slaves part of the citizenry. But the role of an individual citizen

is very clearly delineated by Aristotle in his ethics. According to Aristotle, positive

qualities such as responsibility, friendship, non-acquisitiveness and duty if nurtured in its

citizens would strengthen the polis. A strong and cordial intersubjective relationship

amongst the citizens of a polis cements its stability. But, it is very clear that the welfare of

the citizens is always subservient to the stability of the polis. Thus, eudaimonia, as the

concept of good life, is always in the context of the polis towards which its citizens have

a duty.

While the city-states of Greece were strong cultural entities, India was the land of

immigrants. Pastoral and agrarian cultures were in constant tension, which necessitated

continuous redefinition of cultural identities. After the demise of the Indus Valley culture,

the Aryans who were pastoral inhabited the Indian subcontinent. Re-urbanization of

Northwestern India was at its pinnacle after the period of the Upanishads. Urbanization is

the result of the development of subsidiarity, the spirit of participation of the members of

a society. A city administration requires the participation of its people in an orderly

fashion in its political and development. There was a paradigm shift in the social

organization of the post-Upanishadic India, which was already beginning to move away

from a society of hunter-gatherers and pastoralists towards a full-fledged agrarian

population. After several stages of social development, urbanization was achieved.

While ideas of individual enterprise, moral values, a good life, a happy family,

work ethic, and religious activities were all part of the Indian social fabric, the role of the

collective was dominant and the individual had freedom within limits as prescribed by the

collective. Indian society was stratified into four classes from the time of the Rig Veda.

The famous Puruasukta (the hymn to the Purua) clearly delineates the class distinctions

that existed during the Vedic times. Social distinctions were common to almost all

contemporary ancient civilizations such as the Egyptian civilization and Mesopotamian

civilization. In the Western hemisphere, the Greeks and the Romans also had social

stratification in the form of class structure. But the factor that distinguishes other

civilizations from the Indian civilization is the entrance of the caste system into the class

structure. With the advent of the caste system, the application of concepts such as

solidarity and subsidiarity assumes an entirely different connotation. In India, solidarity

and subsidiarity were based on the imperceptible law of karma, which explains social

status on the basis of past deeds. A concrete social imaginary is a more recent

phenomenon in India. Religion had a minimal bonding effect while the caste-system

effectively divided the Indian society into windowless pockets of social space.

While society can be theoretically mapped as a whole and its parts, in practice, a

society cannot exist as a collective without its parts, the individual members or vice versa.

The subtle distinction between the society as a whole and its members lies in the

perspective of the members as individuals and their function as a part of the collective.

When a society fails to produce conditions conducive to a good life, then such a society

will witness dissensions and schism between its individual members and the collective

community that oversees the everyday functions of the society. When mutual cooperation

between members of the society and the general social order breaks down, the society is

thrown into turmoil. The absence of a cultural social imaginary in the form of a

nationstate, religion, language, or culture in India and the daunting task of governing a

diverse culture resulted in the hypostatization of cultural differences.

In India, in order to preserve the social order, solidarity was emphasized to the

detriment of subsidiarity. Even though novel attempts, as those found in The Bhagawad

Gita, to instill a sense of purpose and belonging to those who were disempowered in the

form of non-attached action (niśkāma karma), order (dharma), action (karma), devotion

(bhakti) and knowledge (jñāna) were philosophically appealing, these concepts could not

be put into practice due to asymmetric social relationships. Even religions such as

Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, and Islam tried in their own ways to redress caste

stratification in India. But, all Indian religions could only suggest a spiritual escape to the

social problems. The Gita proposed an indirect way of reconciling social stratification

and individual freedom by the concept of non-attached action that could lead any person

belonging to any caste to achieve liberation.

In almost all societies that were either contemporaneous or anterior to the Greek

society, social stratification was based on perceived natural qualities. African societies did

not practice social stratification. Plato stipulates four virtues required of the citizens of the

republic. They are: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The afore-

mentioned qualities are imperative for being the citizens of a successful state. Plato also

describes three qualities that In India, social stratification was justified on the basis of

gun as (qualities). Three qualities equivalent to appetite, courage (spirit) and reason

(wisdom), respectively, tamas, rajas, and sattva combine in different ratios to constitute

the human species. Interestingly, the concept of gun as, which sought to adduce natural

justification for the class distinctions in India, was developed over a course of several

centuries. From a classless society, gradually the Indian society was divided into four

classes, namely, the brahman (priest), kshatriya (warrior), vaisya (business), and śudra

(labor). From a society of hunter-gatherers and clans, the institution of kingship evolved

with increasing urbanization. Weber’s account of cities as centers of political

administration could be applied to the development of the cities in the Indian context as

well. The development of a class-system aided administration and the specialization of

occupations led to the institutionalization of kingship. Thus, from a diffuse and

consensual decision-making social structure in the form of clans, Indian civil society

came under the control of kingship and its supporting institutions.

Simultaneously, a hitherto non-class society also began to stratify itself on the

basis of endogamous and exogamous rules of kinship, social status based on vocation,

access to religious rituals, and political clout. But in the context of India, what Socrates

euphemistically called a noble lie, the gun as or qualities, was ennobled in the scriptures

and became rigidified. The gun as became constitutive in determining behavioral and

hereditary qualities of the individuals but only in the context of a society classified on the

basis of vocational status. Because of relentless migrations and intra-social stratification,

class distinctions were gradually replaced by more minute caste distinctions. The caste

distinctions were based on birth and hence any chance of upward mobility in the social

hierarchy was impossible. Interestingly, religious ideologues realized the problems

inherent in reconciling the concepts of svadharma (individual duty), kuladharma (family

duty) on the one hand, and apadharma (duty under extraordinary circumstances)

sādhāran dharma (everyday duty).

The tension between the individual and the social duty is one of the main aspects

discussed in The Bhagawad Gīta. The term dharma contains the social aspect, which is

in turn linked to the cosmic order (rta). Thus, the concept of dharma is akin to a

conception of duty of the citizens of a polis. According to the concept of dharma,

individual duty is always attuned to family and social obligations. Interestingly, in a

class-based society, different modes of dharma were based on various occupations

whereas in the caste-based society one’s birth determines one’s individual, family, and

social dharma. The ineluctable causal relationship divined by the votaries of the caste

system absolutely arrested upward mobility in the caste hierarchy by connecting birth,

social status, and past deeds. It was only by fulfilling duties pertaining to one’s caste that

a person could graduate to the next caste in the hierarchy which could ensure rebirth in

higher classes for attaining liberation from the birth-death cycle.

One could argue that while the higher classes were living and enjoying the

present, the lower classes were wallowing in the fruits of their past while yearning for a

better future all the while ruing the present. Throughout human history the higher classes

have subjugated the lower classes by denying and depriving their hope for a better future.

Very seldom has there been an uprising in the history of mankind that has been unaided

by disgruntled elite classes even in revolutions inspired by popular movements. As

Charles Taylor observes, people seem to be paralyzed with fear without a leader.

One of the reasons why the Indian society did not witness revolutions in the scale

of the French or the American Revolution is the lack of one identifiable singular cultural

objective and mind-boggling diversity of cultures. The political, economic, and religious

power in the Indian society was distributed among the three forward classes, namely, the

priestly, warrior and mercantile classes. Apart from the fourth class, the śudras, there was

a fifth class (panchama) or pariah (drummer). Furthermore, because of the in-

group/outgroup, ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural differences, the interstices of the

society were filled with intra-caste distinctions. No attempts were made to unify the

society based on a common goal. Instead, individual, family, and social goals were

meshed with the caste and class obligations, which prevented any mobilization of the

masses. Even the elites who authored the codes of conduct, interpreted scriptures, and

taught statecraft to the rulers could only provide the masses with a vague and abstract

concept of liberation (moksha) that is actually expressed vividly by the Buddhist

conception of nirvāa, which is the total destruction of the birth and death cycle.

In the absence of a unitary social imaginary, Indian society was not able to either

produce huge empires such as the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East or the Greek, the

Roman, the British or the French Empires in the West. The same reason could be

attributed to the lack of concerted and unified effort to fight the British when they ruled

India for almost two hundred years. The vertically stratified Indian civil society helped

the British unseat the top layer of the society and conquer India without much bloodshed.

The lower classes, which were alienated from the higher classes, did not feel any

structural difference in political governance or moral compunction when power changed

hands from the Indian kings to the British Viceroys because the social structure was left

unmolested. In somewhat similar manner, present day democracies fail to inspire the

populace even during elections unless some revolutionary events such as war,

assassination, terrorism or economic depression happen.

In the Indian society, myriad distinctions among the castes made it difficult for the

people to fight for their rights as well as social change. The rumblings due to discontent

were usually passed on to the vertical and horizontal social structures that are

immediately above or below one’s caste. For example, a group of people belonging to a

lower caste if they feel disempowered and disgruntled usually fights with the immediate

sub-caste above or below themselves. Ironically, each caste has its own chosen nemesis

and seldom do members of different castes join together in a clash between two castes.

The Modern Aspects of Civil Society

The concept of civil society is considered to be one of the finest achievements of Western

social and political theory in terms of social organization. Civil society is considered to be

the consummation of a politics of discussion that empowers democratic system of

governance. The history of civil society has traversed a long and torturous path

culminating in advanced liberal democracy in which the State and the society are

separated. The Western conception of civil society is situated on certain cultural,

religious, economic, and political contexts. Civil society has acquired the connotation of a

religious dogma as the panacea for all the ills of the world. Principles such as democracy,

freedom, rights, law, and free market are considered to be irrevocable for a harmonious

existence. Civil society, which is a cardinal feature of democracy, emphasizes freedom

from authoritarian institutions such as religion.

One of the cornerstones of religious dogmatism was the community of believers

and the Enlightenment attacked the very conception of a religious community by

encouraging individuation. Civil society is ineluctably intertwined with democracy and

market economy in which freedoms of action, speech and expression are guaranteed.

While democracy facilitates individual freedom and social cooperation, civil society is

the non-political manifestation of democracy. But, many vexatious issues such as

religious tensions, ethnic strife, abject poverty, majority-minority differences and ethical

questions that characterize the public sphere are not considered to be a part of the

political-legal spectrum, by thinkers such as John Rawls.

John Rawls' in his “Justice as Fairness – Political not Metaphysical” defines issues

such as justice, equality, and liberty as conceptions that could be approached

procedurally. But Rawls expressly affirms that his notion of justice as fairness must be

considered only in the context of liberal democracy. This salient claim of Rawls has been

neglected by most advocates of civil society who have treated the conditions required for

a liberal democratic society as the end-result of a democracy. Democracy requires stable

economy, representative government, peaceful society, and a justice system that

adjudicates disputes. Scholars such as Rawls and Habermas have attempted to rationalize

democracy by adducing ideal conditions such as the original position and a veil of

ignorance in the case of Rawls and ideal speech situation in the case of Habermas. In

many ways, social and political theories of Habermas and Rawls are democratizations of

the Kantian categorical imperative. The categorical imperative has two aspects. The first

aspect emphasizes the duty of a moral agent to act not out of self-interest but common

interest. In many ways, it is a restatement of the Golden Rule, which exhorts people to act

towards others in a way they themselves would like others to act towards them. The

second aspect of Kant’s categorical imperative emphasizes the autonomy and human

value of individuals. Kant asserts that every human being must be treated as an end and

not as a means. In a democracy, the Kantian concept of duty has to be rational,

redeemable, justifiable, and discursive. The Kantian conception of categorical imperative

facilitates a conception of procedural democracy. But a procedural democracy could be

deliberative. The categorical imperative is the summum bonum of practical reason, for

Kant.

When questions are raised about the justification of the categorical imperative,

questions of happiness and good life arise. But, for Kant, categorical imperative is far

removed from the expectations of happiness. The categorical imperative is universal and

hence beyond the confines of individual happiness. Only a rational and moral person can

act according to the principles of Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant’s moral philosophy

has tremendously influenced the modern social imaginary.

Civil society and democracy are procedural categories that cannot be uprooted

from their contexts and transported to other cultures. All cultures have the potential to

cultivate democracy but the fertile conditions have to emanate organically in order to

sustain it. Even if governments in countries such as the United States and Britain sow the

seeds of democracy accompanied by a civil society in an attempt to rationalize

nondemocratic regimes all over the world, the connection between democracy, freedom,

prosperity, and justice cannot be replicated without a precipitous process of forcible

democratization of the lifeworld of those cultures. Hegel's brilliant expression “the owl of

way that we treat Humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in

itself. Johnson, Robert, "Kant's Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring

2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/kantmoral/>.

Minerva flies at the dusk” explains the progression of reason towards the Absolute Idea

and the process of sublation. The problem facing Western cultures is that of simulating

the flight of the Owl of Minerva on those cultures in which the dusk has not been reached

yet or long forgotten.

Habermas’ Communicative Reason and its Problems

Habermas' emphasis on communicative reason necessarily assumes linguistic and

communicative competencies on the part of the interlocutors who debate in a

speakerhearer situation. For Habermas, social rationalization cannot be reduced to

purposiveinstrumental activity. Hence, communicative reason presides over a normatively

regulated discourse, which invokes the illocutionary force of an argument in an

atmosphere of free and un-coerced interaction. This is in essence the ideal speech

situation. The underlying assumptions of a theory of communicative action suggest a

specialized discourse that, even though conducted in an everyday language, is not

accessible to common people. Moreover, by overzealously guarding communicative

discourse against all forms of defects, Habermas limits its scope. Habermas considers the

open society (modern Western rational society) as dialogical in nature and the closed

(archaic societies) as monological. Habermas argues that an archaic understanding of the

lifeworld was seamless and undifferentiated while the modern understanding is objective

and critical. In Heidegger's terminology, a distantiation between the subject and the

environment is not found in the archaic understanding.

Robin Horton argues that archaic or traditional societies do not have a distinction

similar to the public – private sphere distinction, between a person, a group, and an

environment. Horton calls a lack of critical-rational framework as the absence of

innertheoretic critique. According to Habermas, archaic societies do not possess

criticalrational understanding. But the modern worldview is constructed upon critical

rational distinction and universalizing validity claims which are in turn discursively

justifiable. While Habermasian communicative theoretic bolsters the Enlightenment

rationality it humanizes the purposive-rational component by positing a communicative

rationality. The emancipatory intent that Habermas assumes is, however, as irrational as

the archaic understanding that he examines. A deliberative democracy is an abstraction

from the existing democratic societies. Democracy did not evolve out of a disinterested

search for a true form of government. Hobbes emphasizes the presence of self-interest in

the formation of a state and Locke's political philosophy emphasizes the value of

individual rights and property. Furthermore, Locke even justifies the exploitation of

foreign lands if they lay unutilized. Thus, the emancipatory intent envisioned by

Habermas does not stand scrutiny in a democracy.

Ancient Greek society with its polis had a conception of a utopia or eudaimonia

but such a conception is not possible in a liberal democracy. Democracy is a result of

social rationalization, not in terms of emancipation, but economic and political freedom.

Economic and political freedom for the individuals is antithetical to a conception of

emancipation akin to religious concepts of liberation. There is no salvation but only

progress and betterment. Habermasian attempts at social rationalization leads us to some

unpalatable conclusions. Habermas' process of argumentation is applicable only in a

highly specialized discursive environment and his communicative discourse is symmetric.

But Habermas does not adequately address issues pertaining to an asymmetric discourse

in which participants belong to all sections of the society.

The process of disengagement with other cultures because of the difference in the

conceptual apparatus has real life consequences. The most catastrophic examples in

recent history are the World Trade Center and Pentagon terror acts and the Iraq War. The

failure to understand, hermeneutically, cultural conflicts and their potential social and

political manifestations have resulted in the clash of cultures. Ironically, Western societies

are considered to be civilized and non-Western world less socially rationalized. Such a

conclusion is inescapable not only because of the historicity of understanding but also

due to an attitude of possessive individualism cultivated in advanced capitalistic

societies.34 By making the enemy the other or vice versa, once again the West is mired in

the religious binary-oppositional framework of good and evil.

For a good life, which Habermas aims to facilitate in his Communication and

Evolution of Society (1979), linguistic and communicative competencies serve only at

the level of meta-theoretical and meta-practical discourse. Communicative action is

required to formalize and universalize opinions. But, an interpretation of social, political,

and scientific discourse does not stop at the level of communicatively competent actors

but filters down to actors at different levels of linguistic and communicative

competencies. Hence, there is a need for addressing social and political issues at different

levels simultaneously. A communicative action, at once, needs to appeal to actors with

strategic (oriented to success), norm-forming, and dramaturgical (expressive) intentions.

In this sense, I argue that there is a need for a broader conception of social action than

communicative action that coordinates strategic, norm-forming, and dramaturgical

actions. Hence, I would call such an action, a co-operative action. A co-operative action

does not aim at outright conversion of viewpoints but accommodation, rational

persuasion, and non-violent problem solving.

Charles Taylor’s analysis of the modern social imaginaries of the Western

hemisphere deals with societies that have less religious strife and less rigid social

stratification than countries such as India or Nigeria which are culturally diverse. Taylor

also forewarns that any attempt to replicate the Western experience in a non-organic

manner elsewhere could produce catastrophic results. While Taylor accepts the existence

of several social imaginaries even within the Western hemisphere, differences between

them could be termed as variations in cultural particulars rather than universals.

Impact of the Modern Social Imaginary

There is a need for de-centered understanding of civil society in terms of procedures that

supply the contours of what Taylor calls modern social imaginaries. Modern social

imaginaries are those imagined structures of social beliefs that determine the social

practices particular to a society. The concept of social imaginaries is also reflexive in the

sense that people belonging to a particular social grouping understand themselves and

their goals from what they perceive as their social milieu. People belonging to a cultural

and social milieu have an idea what their society stands for. It is this centered

understanding of one's position in a society, what is valued in the society and what the

society stands for, which determines the civil society. Contemporary Western discourse

on civil society seems to conveniently neglect the ontological remnants that underlie an

ontic understanding in the emphasis on human rights, individual liberties, and equality.

Liberal democracy that facilitated the emergence of free market and individual

freedom is hailed as the panacea for all ills of the world. Due to the dissociation of the

individual and the society, in the modern social imaginary the state became more

responsive to individual interests. This is a reversal of the traditional Platonic and

Aristotelian conception of the individual as the citizen of the polis. Plato and Aristotle

emphasize the unity of the polis as most important function of justice. The social

imaginary of that particular epoch is fractured along the lines of social classes. In

contemporary liberal democracy, the social imaginary has less solidarity and more

subsidiarity. The social imaginary also varies according to the contexts and hence it is not

stagnant. In a discourse, the social imaginaries of interlocutors are constantly shifting.

Another important aspect of the liberal democratic discourse is regarding the question

whether it only applies to the population belonging to the society with which the

government has a compact or are the rules applicable to the interaction between the

countries with different forms of governments. Taylor’s notion of a ‘social imaginary’ is

contextual and limited to a society or a lifeworld to which one belongs. The choice of the

term ‘imaginary’ underscores the point that it is the perception of the people of a society

about the objectives and practices of their own society. The social imaginary of a society

is a mosaic of perceptions. The social imaginary has several parts but reconciled in a

whole. The social imaginary also affects the ‘I – Thou’ relationships, mutual respect and

equality that Charles Taylor mentions as the main aspect of the modern Western social

imaginary.

Charles Taylor identifies economy, public sphere, and democracy as the three most

distinguishing features of modernity that govern the self-understanding of the people. The

pre-modern conception of politics contains a strong religious dimension imbedded in the

perception of the world as totally ordered by a God who was a benevolent supernal

artisan, micro-managing the events happening in the world. The institution of monarchy

was a replication of such a God controlled the conception of nature, which is an ancient

idea. But in modernity, the upward despondent gaze towards the whims of a celestial

being was abandoned and terrestrial prospects were eagerly explored.

In an interesting transformation, what Weber characterized as the ethics of the

puritans, encouraged people to toil and succeed in this world rather than worrying about

what was in store for them in the nether world. Such an insouciant attitude towards the

designs of God was largely due to the development of science. The laws of nature that

governed the world prompted people to doubt the unseen cause. Adam Smith recognized

such a need when he claimed that economic prosperity was indispensable and social order

would be better served if they were causally related to observable phenomena rather than

intangible qualities such as virtues and wisdom. Another important attitudinal change

palpable in modernity is the recognition of mutual cooperation. Kant’s categorical

imperative identifies the inescapability of the need for mutual cooperation among human

beings. But most of the political thinkers of the eighteenth and subsequent centuries have

been content with the prudential imperative of Kant.

Weber’s and Tönnies’ diagnosis of the inexorable triumph of purposive rationality

also anticipates mutual cooperation based on mutual benefit. Weber attributes the

development of political associations and cities in Western Europe in the Middle Ages to

the realization of the potential of mutual cooperation to economics. Economics and

politics are inextricably related. Taylor argues that in modernity, political institutions

adapted to the changing scenario of crumbling social hierarchy and growing democracy

by facilitating mutual cooperation. Interestingly, the reflexivity of the civil society in

Europe and America was not reflected in their economic and political exchanges with the

third world countries. The third world countries were not deemed sufficiently civilized to

warrant an attitude of mutual cooperation.

A sense of solidarity, which ensures the social imaginary of any social

organization, and subsidiarity, which indicates mutual cooperation, cannot be dissociated

from each other. Thus, the subsidiarity of a society is in a hermeneutic relation with the

solidarity of its constituents. Such solidarity could be organic or politically forged as

witnessed in the development of democracy in the United States. There are two

possibilities if the equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity is disturbed. They are:

1) the notion of subsidiarity would become predominant in a society with excessive

emphasis of individual rights and property. As a result, economics becomes increasingly

a citadel of powerful corporate interests. Hence, intervention of government through law

enforcement to curb malpractices and other predatory market tendencies increases. This is

an extreme result of Locke’s social contract. Neither Hobbes nor Locke envisaged such a

scenario. 2) If a tendency to emphasize solidarity predominates, then nationalistic fervor,

secessionism, religious fanaticism, and ethnic cleansing are distinctly possible results. It

is my intention to explore a middle path between the afore-mentioned options.

Consensus makes such a middle path possible.

The notion of equality that spawned the concept of mutual cooperation is the

cornerstone of a discourse aimed at achieving consensus in the Western societies. In the

Akan society in Ghana, personhood and human rights are intuitively recognized. In status

societies such as India, solidarity needs to be redefined in terms of contemporary social

imaginary. Subsidiarity needs to be oriented with respect to newfound solidarity and

social imaginary as a nation. Hitherto, subsidiarity was based on a code of conduct in a

caste system, religion, language and ethnicity.

There are structural differences in an asymmetric lifeworld that preclude any

rationally motivated agreement. A theory of civil society must create conducive environs

of intersubjective interaction among the members of a society. The power structure and

relations between various strata of a civil society defines its strength as a society. If a civil

society is robust, then the rights of individuals in a society are guaranteed and vice versa.

For corporate civil societies that exist in countries like Japan and some South East Asian

countries, individual rights are subservient to the welfare of the society. In such a

situation, a notion of order is paramount and the individual rights are less important in

comparison to the common welfare.

In countries such as India, which have had a cultural continuum of over five

thousand years and a rigidly stratified society, structural transformation of a communal

society into a democracy, that respects individual rights, has not been without difficulties.

Especially, reciprocal relationships and mutual cooperation have had different

connotations because of the unequal caste-class relationships. Reciprocity and mutuality

were always considered in the background of individual duties within the ambit of caste

duties. Hence, before the terms reciprocity and mutuality are considered within the

framework of equality of social status, there is a need for votaries of democracy and

liberalism to evaluate the social conditions of those countries that are forced to become

democratic. The question that arises here is: Does democracy restore equality of social

status? Or is equality of social status a must for democracy? In a culturally diverse

democracy, it is imperative that the political discourse is not reduced to majority-minority

framework. The cultural interstices or the intermediary viewpoints, which straddle the

center-periphery, majority-minority, and first world-third world, and social-communal

categorizations, would go a long way in initiating a process of rapprochement. I will

discuss the philosophy of cultural interstices in the fifth chapter.

Chap 2

Intersubjectivity and the Problem of Cultural Identities

In this chapter, I will be arguing in support of a reflexive approach to intersubjective

communication in a consensual activity. Intersubjective communication creates optimal

conditions for achieving consensus while debating controversial issues. Institutional

safeguards such as strictures against any form of verbal or physical coercion or stifling

discussion that guarantee formal conditions of a debate only prevent abuse of the

individual rights of the participants. Formal conditions of consensus such as ideal speech

situation or the original position ensure that a debate is democratic. But the will to create

a moral bond between interlocutors demands much more than the formal conditions of a

discourse. In order to achieve a consensus or a tentative agreement, the interlocutors

ought to engage each other at an inter-personal level. A relaxed and cordial atmosphere is

more conducive for a discussion of difficult issues. Absence of personal rapport or the

presence of mutual distrust more often than not derails negotiations. Hence, civility is one

of the basic requirements of a discourse. Civility also encourages an ethic of mutual

recognition.

In this chapter, I have discussed two approaches to intersubjective interaction

aimed at achieving consensus. One approach is that of Hans Georg Gadamer who

advocates hermeneutical understanding of intersubjective communication. The other

approach is that of George Herbert Mead, who is a proponent of social behaviorism.

Mead emphasizes mutual adjustment of behavior as the basic condition of a successful

communicative activity. I will illustrate how Gadamer’s hermeneutical approach is more

accommodative of differences. An asymmetrical concept of consensus necessarily

requires recognition of differences in the conceptual and cultural understanding of those

individuals who are participating in a consensual activity. Gadamer’s idea of

communication is a fusion of horizons of autonomous human beings. Communication is a

participatory activity for Gadamer. Hence, the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ have an equal,

reciprocal, and independent relationship.

Gadamer and Mead approached the concept of intersubjectivity as a process of

dynamic inter-relation between human beings. Hence, their theories of intersubjectivity

are essentially theories of understanding the ‘other.’ I characterize the ‘other’ as the

‘Thou.’ It is necessary to have an understanding of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship for an

asymmetric idea of consensus in contrast to Habermas’ idea of consensus as a rationally

motivated agreement. A dynamic notion of ‘I – Thou’ relationship prevents

hypostatization of human interaction. Mead and Gadamer emphasize intersubjective

interaction that unveils problems associated with a teleological approach to human

relationship.

George Herbert Mead and Hans Georg Gadamer considered the problem of

intersubjectivity to be pivotal in explaining concepts such as language, culture, history,

science, and religion. George Herbert Mead’s method is avowedly scientific because it

germinated from the methodology of science espoused by celebrated pragmatists such as

William James and John Dewey. Mead wanted to understand the nature of human

interaction and thereby control the factors that hamper the establishment of a smooth

process of communication. Mead’s method is teleological because it is tailored to achieve

success in communicative activity. [For example, if there is a vexatious economic issue,

internalizing the perspectives of one side by the other will foster a better understanding of

the problem.]

Mead, as a social behaviorist, believed in connection between impulse, stimulus,

and response in any communicative activity. Therefore, if a general schema of how

individuals react in a particular situation could be framed then Mead felt that mapping

human behavior and achieving success in communication and avoiding conflicts would

become easier. Mead’s analysis of a successful communicative activity emphasizes direct

and free interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ or between various interlocutors

participating in a debate or a dialogue. But the ‘I – Thou’ relationship involves

internalization of various roles performed by the social actors in various roles of ‘I’ and

the ‘Thou.’ As a behaviorist, Mead analyzed the behavior of social actors by observing

and mapping their interactions among themselves. Mead writes as follows: 2

Social psychology has, as a rule, dealt with various phases of social experience

from the psychological standpoint of individual experience. The point of approach

which I wish to suggest is that of dealing with experience from the standpoint of

society, at least from the standpoint of communication as essential to the social

order. Social psychology, on this view, presupposes an approach to experience

from the standpoint of the individual, but undertakes to determine in particular

that which belongs to this experience because the individual himself belongs to a

social structure, a social order.

In contrast to Mead, Gadamer treats the ‘other’ as irreducible to the ‘I’ or vice

versa. Gadamer’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is in terms of a hermeneutical

understanding emphasizes the inexhaustible or unique nature of the ‘other.’ Gadamer

conceptualizes the ‘I – Thou’ relationship as unproblematic within the framework of

historical consciousness and as a fusion of horizons as the paradigm of hermeneutical

consciousness. In this chapter, I will explain the structural difficulties associated with

Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship. Gadamer’s analysis addresses problems

that arise out of a behavioral approach by a contextual interpretation of all intersubjective

activities. For Gadamer, the ‘I’ cannot transcend its own conditionedness and know the

‘other’ in its entirety. Any attempt at reducing the ‘I’ to the ‘other’ or the vice versa

violates the moral bonding that exists between the individuals whose relationship is based

on mutual respect and recognition of freedom. In this sense any observation and response

to the ‘other’ is only an interpretation of the gestures, actions and communicative activity

of the ‘other.’ Hence, an objective spectator of Aristotle is non-existent for Gadamer

because any understanding of the ‘other’ as an interpretive activity is laden with

assumptions or prejudices (vorurteil).

2 George Herbert Mead, Mind Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist, Ed. Charles W.

Mead’s Social Behaviorism

Mead’s behavioral method is based on an observation of human behavior in different

situations, gestures, and roles. In order to come up with a schema that denominates

common factors shared by people, Mead formulated concepts such as ‘significant

gestures,’ ‘generalized other,’ and role formation, which is the ambit within which

understanding of the ‘other’ could be grounded.3 The ‘significant gestures’ are normally

verbal gestures that elicit responses because of their deliberate nature and directedness.4

Mead emphasized the fact that only if the proponent of an idea assumed responsibility for

his/her verbal proposition, communicative activity would move forward. With the help of

‘significant gestures,’ Mead sought to thematize the concept of role-formation. According

to Mead, one’s knowledge of other human beings is possible only by understanding

others through the roles assumed by oneself. For example, one’s idea of a teacher is

plausible only by an introjection of the role of a teacher. Furthermore, one assumes the

role of a teacher while internalizing ideas about teaching. Only in this way, could

knowledge of other human beings be possible, that is, as teachers, doctors, engineers,

singers, and dancers. This is what Mead means by role-formation.

The logical corollary of role-formation, in Mead, is the ‘generalized other.’ Mead

defines the ‘generalized other’ as “taking the attitude of others toward himself and of his

Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. pp. 1 - 8.

3 I have used the ‘other’ to indicate the independently existing human beings without being

subordinated to the ‘I.’ In the case of Gadamer, I have used the ‘other’ more frequently

because Gadamer does not collapse the ‘other’ into the ‘I.’ While explaining Mead, I have

used ‘others’ more frequently in the common sense of the term which indicates that which is

not ‘I.’

finally crystallizing all these particular attitudes into a single attitude of standpoint.”5

Mead avers that in order to understand the attitude of others toward oneself, one must

understand the attitude of oneself towards others. Only if a person takes the attitude of

others towards oneself, would he/she be in a position to see a problem from different

angles. Once the conceptual horizon of a person is widened, then conflicts could be easily

resolved because of better communication and shared understanding. In furthering

knowledge and scientific understanding by observation and control of social behavior of

human beings lies the teleology of Mead’s social behaviorism. Mead believed that a lack

of proper understanding of the behavior of other social actors complicated

communication. In Mead’s social behaviorism, human interaction consists of three

factors:

1) The views of the individual about oneself

2) The views of the individual about others (role-taking), and

3) The views of the individual about the views of others about the individual (the

generalized other)

Relationship between two individuals is always hyphenated with the ‘I,’ for Mead.

Hence, the ‘other’ or for that matter the ‘I’ is never separated from one another. Thus, the

‘Thou’ exists only as how the ‘I’ views the ‘other,’ which is in turn dependent on how the

‘I’ views itself as viewed by others. The above-mentioned thesis of human interaction of

Mead reduces the ‘other’ ultimately to the views of the ‘I.’ Thus the ‘Thou’ never exists

4 J.L. Austin’s illocutionary speech acts would serve as good examples of significant gestures.

on its own. Mead also assumed that through concepts of role-taking, significant gestures

and generalized other, the ‘Thou’ could be understood and human interactions controlled.

Mead staunchly believed that an individual could objectify oneself and take the attitude

of the society towards oneself, which would educate the individual to effectively remove

irritants in the process of resolving conflicts.

Mead believed that the future could be determined by the present from the lessons

learnt from the past. Social progress, for Mead, is possible by tailoring one’s actions in

response to the interests of others. In order to gain knowledge about people, Mead wanted

to observe and gather knowledge of the social actions of people. Once knowledge about

social acts and social actors is categorized then the facilitation of a cooperative approach

to solve problems would be simpler, according to Mead. Concepts of mind,

consciousness, language, meaning, and self are possible only as social acts. Thus, social

action is imperative to any individual activity. Since all individuals are also social actors

it becomes easier to observe and categorize social behavior. For Mead, science of “social

psychology” is “the study of the experience and behavior of the individual organism or

self in its dependence upon the social group.”6 The individual has the power to change the

future of the society, according to Mead. Mead’s social behaviorism is situated on his

firm belief in the theory of evolution, the principle of continuity, and human

development.

5 Paul P.Fuetze, The Social Self, New York: Bookman Publishers, 1954. p. 76. 6 Pfuetze, p.

36.

As an advocate of evolutionary biology, Mead assumes that human beings are at

the zenith of evolutionary cycle, which is typified by the capacity to communicate with

each other and share information. Language is the defining feature of the human beings.

Language is the tool of socialization and socialization is a behavior peculiar to human

beings. Language consists of gestures and symbols. Gestures are the bedrocks of the

‘IThou’ relationship. By analyzing the linguistic behavior of human beings, Mead also

adduces reasons for the religious, social, political and economic behavior of human

beings in his theory of understanding.

Mead views the formation of mind and self as products of social activity. Both

mind and self arise out of social activity. Mind is natural while the social activity of the

mind gives rise to the self. Mind is a biological form and when mind assumes a social

attitude it becomes a self. The formation of a social attitude includes linguistic

communication, role-taking, and mutual adjustment. For Mead, mind is the capacity to

interact verbally, through gestures and symbols. Communicative activity between

individuals is deliberate and intended to evoke a response. Thus, a self is a socialized

mind. The need for a social mind arises out of the need to communicate with others.

Communication is possible only through gestures. Mead distinguishes between ‘ordinary

gestures’ and ‘significant gestures.’ Ordinary gestures are those gestures that do not bind

the individual to own responsibility for his/her gestures. Mead gives an example of the

gestures of children. In the case of significant gestures, they are deliberate and aimed at

eliciting responses from the hearer. Business activity is a good example of significant

gestures.

Significant Gestures

Society comes into existence only when individuals share a common perspective,

according to Mead. A common perspective consists of not only the perspectives of

individuals but also the perspectives of members as a group. A common perspective

objectifies social goals; it also helps in creating a social organization. Social organization

is possible only if social actors take the attitude of others or only if they are able to

internalize the viewpoints of other members of the social group.

Mead introduces the notion of comprehensibility, which is pivotal to his

conception of communication and common perspective. Mead’s emphasis is on the

relation between individual perspective and common perspective. Mead’s theory of

interpersonal relationships is based on two assumptions:

1) Interest based interaction

2) Cooperative interaction

In the first category, Mead analyzes the common environment of ants and bees. The

dwelling place of ants is the anthill while bees live in hives. Mead argues that there is no

communication among the ants or bees. In communication, deliberate intent to discuss an

issue is displayed by both the speaker as well as the hearer. Under the second category,

the speaker or the gesturer commits himself or herself to sincerely involve the hearer in a

discourse. Thus, cooperative activity is facilitated by the ‘significant gestures’ in the form

of communication. Mead gives an interesting definition for the concept of ‘significant

gestures.’ ‘Significant gestures’ are defined in terms of communication. Mead writes as

follows:

It does not become communication in the full sense, i.e., the stimulus does not

become a significant symbol, until the gesture tends to arouse the same response

in the individual who makes it that it arouses in the others. The history of the

growth of language shows that in its earlier stages the vocal gesture addressed to

another awakens in the individual who makes the gesture not simply the tendency

to the response which it calls forth in the other, such as the seizing of a weapon or

the avoiding of a danger, but primarily the social role which the other plays in the

cooperative act. This is indicated in the early play period in the development of

the child, and in the richness in social implication of language structures in the

speech of primitive peoples.

Mead avers that an individual becomes socialized only when he or she assumes the

attitude of the others towards himself or herself, respectively, whereby the individual

assumes an objectifying attitude towards one’s own actions. This attitude of others

towards oneself is known as the ‘generalized other.’ Mead also claims that only if the

mind is able to take the role of the ‘generalized other’ that a self is formed. There are two

factors that make the role-taking attitude possible in the individual. One is

comprehensibility and second is intelligibility. The aforementioned factors are

responsible for the two most important developments that made possible the sociality of

human beings.

1) In the early stages of communication, human beings assume the attitude of others

and thus become an object to themselves, becoming a self in the process. The

same attitude also constitutes the other too.

2) The next stage is that of the generalized other in which the individual is known by

the roles played in the society. The individual is always known only as a

‘generalized other.’

Mead explains the concept of the “generalized other”, with an example based on

property holding. Mead points out that unlike squirrels, which store the nuts gathered

from the ground, property is not only acquired but also protected and maintained. In

buying a property, an impulse is transformed into a stimulus-response framework. The

impulse present in a person to buy a property elicits an expected response from the seller.

“An offer is what it is because the presentation is a stimulus to give. One cannot

exchange otherwise than by putting one’s self in the attitude of the other party to the

bargain.” The core concepts of Mead’s social behaviorism can be explained with the help

of the example cited above. They are as follows:

1. The conversion of a mind into a self happens as a result of the buyer assuming the

attitude of the seller and vice versa because of the participation of the buyer and the

seller in the social act of property exchange. Only when the subjective mind assumes

the objective attitude about itself does a mind become a self.

2. By assuming the role of a buyer, the seller puts himself \ herself in the shoes of the

other. The buyer also assumes the role of a seller while bargaining for a property.

3. The role-taking attitude is possible only as a generalized other. Human beings know

others only in the variegated roles played by people in the social setting. In order to

understand the roles played by others, it is imperative to know the roles assumed by

the individual in the social setting. If the self is objectified and its roles analyzed, then

the roles played by others are understood better. The different roles played by the

individuals as teachers, doctors, mothers, fathers, engineers, etc., are first known in

terms of one’s own actions and then generalized into a framework about the other.

This is the concept of the ‘generalized other.”

4. Before proceeding to the concept of the “generalized other” one needs to stimulate a

response in the people who are part of a social act. This is possible only in terms of a

shared linguistic understanding. Such a linguistic understanding is a part of the social

act.

In the four aforementioned steps, I have traced the development of a self in the

descending order. The emergence of a self from the mind is preceded by the notion of the

‘generalized other,’ which is preceded by the concept of role-formation. The

roleformation is possible only when the complex linguistic communication comes into

play.

A meaningful linguistic interaction is known as ‘significant gestures.’ A social act,

which is a part of the social organization, is not possible without any of the

abovementioned four steps.

Social Act and Social Organization

Social act is possible only if the individual introjects social roles. Introjections of the

roles of others into one’s own understanding is a process of becoming a self, that is, an

individual organizes his\her response with respect to the tendencies of the others to

respond to his\her act. A social act is possible only if the individual and the common traits

move into each other, in a manner akin to the “fusion of horizons” of Gadamer. When an

individual takes the attitude of others, that individual becomes the object of study for

oneself. Mead takes great care to emphasize the ineluctable relationship between the parts

and the whole, the individual and the social. The individual becomes an individual only

in lieu of the social. The social is the common reservoir of all individual tendencies. Thus

the self-consciousness or the ‘I’ consciousness is never divorced from the other

consciousness or the ‘Thou’ consciousness. Construction of a self is a dynamic process

that is made possible by language, which operates as the bridge for communication.

According to Mead, language is the social stimulus that makes possible the same

response in the hearer that a speaker would expect of herself for the same stimulus.

Mead elucidates the beginning of the ‘I – Thou’ consciousness in terms of an

example of a play and a game. Interestingly, Mead and Gadamer have similar views about

the analogy of a play and a game. Given below is Mead’s analysis of a play and a game.

In a child’s play, the child takes the attitude of different social actors, viz., teachers,

mother, father, sister, brother, friends, etc. The child acts all these attitudes towards itself

while at the same time internalizing the actions of himself/herself towards others. The ‘I –

Thou’ attitude in a play arises simultaneously and does not really involve social actors in

a real life situation. Hence, a child’s play remains as a prototype for social roles played by

the individuals.

In a game, there are rules and regulations to be followed meticulously. An

individual has to match wits with social actors. Only if there are commonly agreeable

ideas, can the individual communicate successfully with other actors. In a game, reactions

to the stimulus are more organized and hence the advent of the ‘generalized other.’ Every

action takes into account the social reaction. Thus, the individual has an overarching idea

of the ‘generalized other.’ Concepts such as rights, law, religion, education, culture, and

other institutions take into account the concept of the ‘generalized other.’ Mead even goes

to the extent of saying that a breakdown in the schema of ‘generalized other’ leads to war.

According to Mead, if only people would put themselves into other’s shoes, conflicts

could be reduced significantly. Mead cites the examples of the League of Nations, the

International Court and other kindred organizations that try to settle disputes as the result

of the notion of the ‘generalized other.’ Thus, Mead sees the application of the concepts

such as ‘generalized other,’ significant gestures [language], and role-taking in augmenting

social controls that serve the society better in managing conflicts.

For Mead, communication and interaction are tools for social control. Social

actions of human beings are reflected in the social behavior of the individuals. Thus,

Mead applies his conceptions about the ‘I - Thou’ relationship to control the social

behavior of human beings. On the other hand, Gadamer accords more freedom to the

‘other’ and holds that objectification of the ‘other’ leads to problems of power and ethical

dilemma about the treatment of the ‘other’ as a tool to achieve a goal. The lack of

contextual situatedness in the analysis of Mead becomes a major impediment in analyzing

cultures and processes about which we do not have prior experience. Hence, Gadamer

suggests a more encompassing and empathetic hermeneutical consciousness that treats

the ‘other’ as a free entity without being reduced to a ‘me’ which is the ‘objectified self’

for Mead. The ‘objectified self’ is the social self that is known in its various roles as the

‘generalized other.’

Gadamer - The Nature of Intersubjective Experience In contrast to

social behaviorism of Mead, which lays emphasis on observation and control of social

behavior of human beings, Gadamer’s approach is humanistic. An understanding of social

phenomena is a part of the human experience, for Gadamer. According to Gadamer, the ‘I

– Thou’ relationship is a hermeneutical relationship and not a historical relationship. In

the hermeneutical view of the world, the ‘other’ is not reducible to the ‘I’. While

advocating hermeneutical understanding, Gadamer follows the Kantian principle of not

treating others as means to an end. Thus by stipulating the inviolability of the freedom of

the ‘other’ Gadamer also delineates the guidelines for an ethics that recognizes the value

of the ‘otherness.’

According to Gadamer, understanding encompasses both what is agreeable to us

and what is contrary to our beliefs. Gadamer thus recognizes the sovereignty of the

‘other.’ Since Gadamer does not believe in absolute truths, the views of the ‘other’ stand

on its own strength instead of gaining its validity in the altar of an absolute truth. Thus

understanding, for Gadamer, is not a power over the ‘other’ gained through the

knowledge of the ‘other.’ The ‘other,’ thus, cannot be understood in its entirety. Thus, the

experiencing of the ‘Thou’ is a moral experience whereby the ‘other’ is not objectified. In

understanding a person, what must be kept in mind is that the person, with whom we are

interacting, ‘is in relationship with us.’11 Gadamer is very particular about respecting the

subjectivity of the person whom we seek to understand. Gadamer delineates three forms

of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. They are as follows:

1. The ‘other’ is experienced by the observation of his or her behavior.

2. The ‘other’ is assimilated by the ‘I’ reflectively and co-opted and preempted.

The ‘other’ is understood in terms of one’s own behavior.

3. The ‘other’ is given a voice. The ‘other’ is experienced as an independent

individual ‘Thou.’

The first two ways of understanding are based on what Gadamer calls the historical

consciousness. In a historical consciousness, the ‘I’ purveys the ‘other’ as if the ‘other’ is

historically objectified. The historical situatedness of both the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ is

neglected in the first two ways of understanding the ‘other.’ Only in the third form of

understanding the ‘other’ is the historical situatedness of the ‘I’ is also taken into account

so as to consider the views of the ‘other.’ Only as an equal interlocutor does the ‘Thou’

stand a chance of being represented as it is. Mead’s analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship

falls under the second category of ‘I-Thou’ relationship.

Gadamer distinguishes between theories of experience that are based on scientific

methodology and those that are historico-critical in nature. Scientific theories of

experience neglect the inner-historicity of individual experience and objectify experience.

In this sense, the scientific method is a-historical. The historico-critical method takes into

consideration the historicity of experience and interprets experience critically and

contextually. But the historico-critical method also objectifies experience. Gadamer

criticizes both scientific and historico-critical methods for their unswerving emphasis on

repeatability.12

According to Gadamer, the verificationism inherent in the scientific method is not

applicable to the lifeworld. Repeatability is concomitant with verification and

11 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall, New York:

Continuum Publishers, 2000. p. 358.

objectification of experience. Gadamer cites Francis Bacon as the ideologue non-pareil

of the method of science. Bacon went as far to suggest that language muddles thinking by

distracting the mind to pour over empty conventional forms. Gadamer criticizes the

unidimensional and unidirectional experience advocated by science. He also defends

language through which we experience the world. Even though Gadamer concedes that

problems exist in language due to conventions and other systematic distortions, he

reiterates that the lifeworld is governed by linguistic behavior.

Gadamer expresses his reservations about the application of the methodology of

natural sciences in human sciences. The specific goal-oriented activity of science

straitjackets human experience. Scientific experience does not encompass the whole

gamut of experience and it is situated on everyday experience. For science, only the

positive experience, which successfully fulfils the objective of a scientific method, is

acceptable. For human sciences, all kinds of experiences are acceptable. Experiencing is

itself a learning activity, for Gadamer. Hence, the characterization of an experience as

positive or negative is constrictive. For the natural sciences, any theory is valid only as

long as it continues to remain unfalsified. [Gadamer indicates the similarity to Karl

Popper’s theory of falsification in this context.]

Language, for Gadamer, illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of experience.

Experience is not reducible to those that conform to our expectations alone. There are

new experiences, always. In a manner akin to Mead, Gadamer writes:

In his Phenomenology of Mind he (Hegel) shows how the consciousness that

would be certain of itself has new experiences. For consciousness its object is the

in-itself, but what is in-itself can be known only as it presents itself to the

experiencing consciousness. Thus the experiencing consciousness has precisely

this experience: that the in-itselfness of the object is in-itself “for us.”

Gadamer takes a very catholic view of experience by designating openness to variegated

forms of experience as the primary condition of gaining knowledge. The validation of

experience must not be biased and dogmatic. Experience must always welcome new

insights. Gadamer writes: “The dialectic experience has its proper fulfillment not in

definitive knowledge but in openness to experience that is made possible by the

experience itself.”17

One of the most important aspects of lifeworld experience is the role of tradition.

Tradition is the treasure-trove of experience. Tradition makes experience possible as the

continuum of events. Tradition adduces meanings to identities, cultures, and languages.

The lifeworld is inextricably entwined with tradition. Tradition is the landscape in which

hermeneutical consciousness, which is not only historical but also open and undogmatic,

validates its experience. There is an unceasing fusion of horizons between tradition and

hermeneutical consciousness through language. Tradition is a ‘Thou’ that always forms

the backdrop of a dialogue, interaction, andcommunication. But traditionary meaning has

an existence of its own. Tradition is not reducible to the opinion of others or opinions

about others. Gadamer thus criticizes those approaches that objectify social roles. In such

approaches, tradition is seen as an aggregate of individual opinions. This critique of

Gadamer applies to Mead’s role-taking attitude. Gadamer avers that tradition becomes

universal because it is always a partner in all activities and it is accessible to all in

different ways. Tradition is not a person and hence personal relationship is not

emphasized. In ‘I-Thou’ relationship the ‘Thou’ is always a person and hence moral

questions arise when interacting with others.

Experiencing the ‘I-Thou’ relationship

Gadamer distinguishes three types of ‘I-Thou’ relationships. In the first type, a person

tries to categorize the behavior of his/her fellow beings. The behavior of other people is

then categorized in several ways. These categories are used to predict any future

behavior. Gadamer writes: “We call this a knowledge of human nature. We understand the

other person in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our

experiential field – i.e., he is predictable.”18 Gadamer disavows such an analysis on the

basis of the Kantian categorical imperative, which forbids any one from treating fellow

human beings as means to an end. When a person is treated as an object of knowledge,

the humanity of that person is not acknowledged. Thus, the other, ‘Thou,’ is used as a

means to gain knowledge, which is the end.

17 Gadamer, p. 355.

According to Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness, the relationship between

the individual and the other (I – Thou) must not be subordinated to each other. The

problems in such approaches, as we see in Mead, could be traced to the dogmatic

emphasis on the method and the objectivity of knowledge. Because of the emphasis on

the method, the historicity of the experience in question is not acknowledged by the

scientific and the historico-critical methods. It is impossible for a person to experience

tradition in a detached manner shearing himself \ herself from the tradition which is the

underlying framework. Gadamer attributes this method of isolation of facts to the

methodology of social sciences borrowed from the eighteenth century scientific methods,

whose progenitor was Hume. The scientific method only accepts as knowledge what is

‘typical and regular in behavior.’ Gadamer criticizes this method as a-historical because it

purely depends on induction; from a known behavioral analysis accruing from

observation of human behavior, the future actions of human beings are predicted.

In the second type of ‘I-Thou’ relationship, the ‘Thou’ is recognized as a person.

But the ‘Thou’ is always understood in terms of the ‘I’. The dialectical relation between

the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is deduced from the way the ‘Thou’ is understood through the ‘I’.

Under this process of understanding, the proponent of an idea is countered by another

idea, emanating from the opponent, and this is the way all forms of communication are

carried out. The dialectical relation is only reflective and hence this opens up the

floodgates for the understanding of the ‘other’ through one’s own categories. Mead’s

concepts such as role formation and ‘generalized other’ fall under this category. Mead

assumes without any compunction the uniformity of mental structures. As a result, Mead

concentrates on explaining the knowledge of self with the help of the knowledge others.

The mind gathers information about the behavior of others by assuming various roles

donned by others. The self is formed when these experiences about the behavior of others

are introjected. Mead does not have any qualms about coopting and preempting any

reflection on the part of the other. Mead uncritically assumes that the ‘I’ can know about

the other without any questions being raised about the mediacy or immediacy of such

knowledge.

Gadamer traces the dialectical analysis of the ‘I-Thou’ relationship to the struggle

for mutual recognition that characterizes human interaction. Gadamer cites the example

of a Master-Slave relationship that Hegel uses so effectively to illustrate the dialectical

relationship between the ‘I’ and the ‘Thou.’ But, the dialectical relationship between the

‘I’ and the ‘Thou’ is very complex and multi-dimensional. The dialectical relationship is

not just a calculated evaluation of human behavior but a commensurate reaction, which

also has what Gadamer refers to as the ‘negative element.’

Gadamer avers, “The experience of the ‘Thou’ attained here is more adequate than

what we have called the knowledge of human nature, which merely seeks to calculate

how the other person will behave.”22 Mead’s analysis of the ‘I – Thou’ relationship is

more concerned with the knowledge of human nature and only less remotely with the

dialectical mode of interpersonal interaction. Gadamer’s critique of the dialectical model

of ‘I-Thou’ relationship is that reciprocity that governs the relationship is not always

apparent to the interlocutors. Individuals are not self-conscious in the dialectical model.

Gadamer gives the example of a servant who tyrannizes the master by serving him as a

slave. The servant does not know that he is tyrannizing the master by his unswerving

allegiance. In another interesting example, Gadamer also maintains that welfare and

charity work strip away the individuality of the person to whom they are directed.

The dialectical model of reciprocal relationship is the bulwark of historical

consciousness. The otherness of the ‘other,’ the past, and the understanding the ‘other’ as

a person is assumed to be unproblematic for the historical consciousness. The historical

consciousness aspires to transcend its own conditionedness in search of certainty in

knowledge. Gadamer addresses the above-mentioned lacunae in the historical

consciousness in his concept of hermeneutical consciousness.

The Hermeneutical Consciousness

Gadamer emphasizes the role of hermeneutical consciousness in understanding third form

of ‘I – Thou’ relationship. In the hermeneutical consciousness, incompleteness of the

knowledge of human nature and the dialectical mode of understanding human

relationships are recognized. The prejudices (Vorurteil) in viewpoints are inescapable

22 Ibid. p. 359.

according to Gadamer and hence neutral knowledge free of all prejudices is impossible.

This makes the hermeneutical consciousness historical too. The mutuality of the ‘I –

Thou’ relationship is emphasized in the hermeneutical consciousness. The hermeneutical

consciousness is the consciousness of the presence of tradition as the refractory crucible

in which all interactions are validated or invalidated. By accepting the commitment to

treat each other mutually, the moral bond is cemented. Gadamer says, “A person who

reflects himself out of a living relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning of this

tradition in exactly the same way … To be situated within a tradition does not limit the

freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.” The most important of the hermeneutical

experience is its emphasis on a reflective relation to tradition. In this context, Gadamer

argues that the ‘Thou’ has to be seen as a partner and it must be allowed to voice its

opinion without being constrained by the ‘I.’ Gadamer explains openness to tradition as

follows: “Openness to the other, then, involves recognizing that I myself must accept

some things that are against me, even though no one else forces me to do so.”24 As

against historical consciousness, which is not critical of the historicity of the knowledge

of historian, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness recognizes its historicity, its

prejudices, need for openness and the empowerment of the ‘Thou.’

Mead and Gadamer : Behavioral Versus Hermeneutical Perspective

Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness enshrines the role of tradition, intersubjectivity,

historicity, openness to opinions of others, fallibility of knowledge, power of the

negative, and the entitlement of the ‘Thou.’ Gadamer lays emphasis on the irreducibility

of the ‘Thou’ to the ‘I.’ The ‘I – Thou’ relationship in Mead is restricted to what Gadamer

calls the first two levels of his categorization of ‘I-Thou’ relationship. Gadamer subsumes

all types of ‘I – Thou’ relationship examined by Mead and goes a step further by a

critique of historical consciousness. Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness advocates

the treatment of the other in its own immediacy without reducing the ‘other’ to the ‘our.’

In Mead, self-consciousness is possible only through the consciousness of the

‘other.’ But the ‘other’ is accessible to the ‘I’ without any problems of mediacy or

immediacy, for Mead. If the social roles of others are internalized, then the understanding

of the ‘other’ is possible in Mead’s social behaviorism. Activities involving

intersubjective enterprises like language, society, tradition, economics, and religion are all

reducible to stimulus-response framework in Mead. Even though Mead himself criticized

the scientific method for being mechanical in its application without any window for

interpretation, he is entrapped within the scientific method. Mead introduces the future-

oriented approach to his method of observation of human behavior but the scientific

method is causal in character and hence not open to negative results. Only a successful

response is gratifying to a stimulus. Hence the historicity and the multifaceted nature of

knowledge are neglected.

24 Ibid. p. 361.

Mead introduced concepts such as novelty and cooperation in the ‘I – Thou’

relationship. But there is an uncritical assumption inherent in Mead’s schema that the ‘I’

and the ‘Thou’ are equally empowered in terms of status (mental, social, political and

economic). Since Mead fails to show how the ‘Thou’ could be understood immediately,

problems persist in the individual – social relationship. Furthermore, Mead also readily

assumes that any knowledge-driven activity is good and the society is willing to

participate in communicative activity to solve problems. The aforementioned assumptions

are only ideals whereas Mead installs them as the pillars of his theory of sociality. Mead,

though he concedes that experience has to be historical in taking into consideration the

past, the present and the future, does not successfully explain how a universal framework

is possible for the interpretation of the social and the individual. The only interaction

possible is through the ‘generalized other.’ Mead, perhaps, assumes that ‘generalized

other’ is a universal concept. But the ‘generalized other’ is a signification and not a

symbol as Mead claims because communication is not perfect.

Gadamer argues that there are no custodians of knowledge in hermeneutics.

Knowledge is an event, which is never complete. Only universality is the hermeneutical

situatedness. Tradition is the only horizon into which all other horizons merge. All

knowledge arises only inside tradition. Historicity is an integral part of the tradition.

Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness opens new vistas in ethics, law, philosophy, and

art. By empowering the ‘other’, Gadamer gives a voice to the unheard. The empowerment

of the ‘other’ dismantles the structures of domination. Gadamer’s emphasis on the

openness to the ‘Thou’ has enormous significance for cross-cultural interaction, religious

tolerance diverse interpretations of history, political dialogue and economic liberty.

Gadamer’s non-teleological approach unfetters him from any transcendental goals. But,

even for Gadamer, resolution of conflicts while accommodating divergence in viewpoints

is a problem because a disourse has to end in a consensus.

A consensus necessarily means that one opinion is considered superior to another

and hence more correct. Gadamer’s and Mead’s conception of the “I – Thou” relationship

has great significance in multicultural dialogue with respect to liberal democracies. But

liberal democracies have a strong economic focus, which emphasizes competition in the

promotion of individual interests. A majority promotes social interest only as an

aggregate of individual interests in the form of legitimation.

Dialogue and Cultural Tradition

Dialogue is a pivotal part of interpretation. Interpretation is possible only in the context of

language. Unlike Habermas, who initiates a shift in paradigm from ‘consciousness’ to

‘language,’ Gadamer does not accord foundational authority to language. While Gadamer

entirely agrees with Heidegger that language is the dwelling place of being, language is a

product of tradition. Every epoch is defined by a cultural paradigm and vice versa, which

is representative of dominant ideas informing that epoch. A cultural paradigm of a period

is its social imaginary. Social institutions of an epoch embody its cultural paradigm. By

stipulating a cultural paradigm, other important aspects of a culture are marginalized.

Based on the determination of a paradigm of a culture, cross-cultural comparisons are

performed. In order to illustrate the democratic character of a dialogue, Habermas

differentiates the monological character of traditional communities and the dialogical

character of the Western societies on the basis of social rationalization. The underlying

assumption in Habermas’ comparison is that social conditions influence the dialogical

framework. While linguistic development is also a part of the process of social

transformation, it does not entirely exhaust the cultural paradigm. Habermas assumes that

Western civil society has been transformed structurally and hence un-coerced dialogue is

indeed possible. A direct-access society, which according to Taylor the liberal democracy

is, seems to indicate a social transformation that has given rise to a civil society, which is

capable of making better social choices. According to Max Weber, such a civil society is

the resultant of social rationalization.

Max Weber has described the path of the social, political, and cultural

transformation of the public sphere in Western Europe in his mammoth Economy and

Society. Max Weber’s analysis of the quantum leaps achieved by the Western society

during a particular epoch also delves upon various social, political, religious and cultural

aspects. Science and technology have been a part of the market and hence have a rhythm

of their own in development and consumption. But democracy, as anticipated by Lyotard,

has been outflanked by globalization. Hence, there is a need for more openness to other

traditions. Democracy as a tradition needs to be hermeneutically questioned. The

question that needs to be answered is whether democracy has become hypostatized. As

the individual-social relationship is being constantly redefined, Gadamer’s broader

perspective with emphasis on conversation and dialogue rather than a political system

that is based on majoritarian rule facilitates consensus in a democracy. Gadamer’s

emphasis on a convergence of horizons accommodates cultural particulars and universals.

In this respect, Mead’s strict scientific methodology excludes the issue of cultural

particulars, differences in human capabilities, emotional persuasion, rhetoric and strategic

action. The assumption that after the Enlightenment, some how, people have been

transformed into rational beings intent on achieving a consensus was pervasive. But in

other disciplines such as science, technology, politics, and business that encounter ethical

issues only in terms of social responsibility conducive to a successful enterprise, reason

never assumes an emancipatory function. Hence, in those disciplines consensus is

contractual agreement.

Gadamer indicates that the nature of scientific methodology and scientific enquiry

does not successfully explain the realm of the social sciences and art. Imbedded in

Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition is the relation of the self (I) to the notion of the ‘Thou,’

which is possible only as a part of the culture (Bildung). Gadamer says, “What remains

important is the concept that a self can be formed without breaking with or repudiating

one’s past and that this formation cannot be achieved by any merely technical or

methodical means.”28 Interestingly, Gadamer discusses two kinds of experience, one is

Erlebnis and the other is Erfahrung. With respect to the Erlebnis, Gadamer speaks of

aesthetic experience or experience of works of art. Erlebnis has a subjective tinge. With

reference to the Erfahrung, Gadamer discusses experience that pertains to the lifeworld

and perspectival horizon. It is within this experience that the ‘I – Thou’ relationship needs

to be situated. According to Gadamer, Erfahrung is a constant fusion of horizons,

integrating new experiences.

In Habermas’ search for a postnational constellation there is an urgency towards

universalization of horizons, which does not allow a role for subjectivity. Gadamer warns

against such a hasty generalization in which the individual moments are tyrannized in

search of the universal. By defining experience as shades of Erlebnis and Erfahrung,

Gadamer addresses the issues of being and becoming respectively. The ‘I – Thou’

relationship in Gadamer is one of creative interrelation. Such a dynamic interrelation

between two interacting subjects could be understood from Gadamer’s views on

communication. Communication is akin to excavation of historical sites. In a

communication, the subject matter (Sache) becomes mutually accessible.29

Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of arguments in a normative

regulated action has the telos of uncoerced consensus. But in spite of universal

pragmatics, which emphasizes communication aimed at mutual understanding, discourse

is not mutually accessible to the participants with strategic and dramaturgical motives.

While a self-imposed code of conduct emphasizes coherence of intentions and declaration

of intentions, which is epitomized by the illocutionary speech acts of Austin,

28 Ibid. p. xii.

normatively regulated discourse has an expressly practical telos. Truthfulness, truth, and

rightness are associated with validity claims that are contested in a discourse. But

truthfulness or sincerity is not the defining feature of a normative discourse. Truthfulness

or sincerity, which is the hallmark of a concept of authenticity, cannot be institutionalized

except in a religious discourse because of its subjective nature.

Everyday discourse is authentic in its sphere and there cannot be a generalized

account of authenticity, which is epoch defying.30 In Habermas’ normatively regulated

action, only filtering cultural differences in an “ideal speech situation” ensure personal

autonomy, which is incumbent on the rationality of human beings. Mead explains the

social situatedness of communication. He says,

The social environment is endowed with meanings in terms of the process of

social activity; it is an organization of objective relations which arises in relation

to a group of organisms engaged in such activity, in processes of social experience

and behavior. Certain characters of the external world are possessed by it only

with reference to or in relation to an interacting social group of individual

organisms; just as other characters of it are possessed by it only with reference to

or in relation to individual organisms themselves. The relation of the social

process of behavior -- or the relation of the social organism-to the social

environment is analogous to the relation of the processes of individual biological

activity-or the relation of the individual organism-to the physical-biological

environment.”31

Accessibility of language camouflages inequalities and differences that a culture

injects into the language. Here, Gadamer’s critique of Habermas’ emphasis on rationally

motivated consensus is especially valid. According to Gadamer, language conceals more

29 Gadamer, Truth andMethod, p. xvii.

than what it reveals. Habermas’ emphasis on the illocutionary force of an argument is

based on the concept of authenticity belonging to the Enlightenment epoch. But in a

decentered world of understanding, any attempt at universalization is paradoxical. On the

one hand, universalization is possible on the basis of objective and empirical

observations. On the other hand, universalization is anti-thetical to a decentered

understanding. In Lyotard’s parlance, there are only petty narratives and not grand

narratives. Habermas seeks to conjoin petty narratives and grand narratives in a

decentered lifeworld. In this sense, Habermas’ has effected a change in the paradigm

from ‘consciousness’ to ‘language.’

Mead clearly distinguishes an ideal discourse from a socially situated discourse.

He also mentions that a social discourse is influenced by economic, religious, and

political factors. Mead says,

Universal discourse is the formal ideal of communication. If communication can

be carried through and made perfect, then there exists the kind of democracy to

which we have referred, in which each individual would carry just the response in

himself that he knows he calls out in the community. That is what makes

communication in the significant sense the organizing process in the community.

It is not simply a process of transferring abstract symbols; it is always a gesture in

a social act which calls out in the individual himself the tendency to the same act

that is called out in others.

What we call the ideal of a human society is approached in some sense by the

economic society on the one side and by the universal religions on the other side,

but it is not by any means fully realized.32

30 Charles Guignon, On Being Authentic, London: Routledge, 2004.

31 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, p. 130.

32 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 327-328.

Both Mead and Habermas envision a state of perfection even though philosophically they

realize the vacuousness of such an idea whether it is a perfect democracy for Mead or

“ideal speech situation” for Habermas. Thus, a theory of consensus constructed upon a

theory of perfection in an atmosphere of imperfection is bound to be exclusionary.

Gadamer refuses to acknowledge such a state of perfection even though language as a

paradigm is not inimical to a hermeneutical understanding of the tradition.

Consensus must necessarily take into account individual interests and values.

Mutual cooperation must not neglect individual aspirations. In this chapter, I have

discussed two approaches to interpersonal communication. One is an interest-based

interaction and the other is mutual cooperation. Mead’s theory of social behavior is based

on the success of internalization of the perspectives of other actors. Hence, it restricts the

scope of the otherness. Gadamer’s approach recognizes the autonomy of the other and

requires the interaction of the ‘I’ and the ‘other’ as independent but culturally informed

actors who cannot be reduced to each other. I favor Gadamer’s treatment of en-worlded

subjects who as historically situated and hermeneutically conscious agents have to come

together and discuss mutually important issues. An asymmetrical process of consensus

does not stipulate rationality or an ideal social choice. Preferences become values or vice

versa in the course of a consensual activity. Values and preferences evolve only in the

process of consensus. Thus, cultural particulars are dialogically contested.

Chapter 3

Consensus in the Realm of Science

Science – Cultural Paradigm of Democracy

In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the triangular relation between science,

culture, and liberal democracy. The dominant cultural paradigm in the Western

hemisphere, which is science, informs the background understanding and shared

lifeworld in social, political, and cultural spheres of interaction. Consensus in the Western

hemisphere is to be understood within the framework of the dominant cultural paradigm.

Charles Sanders Peirce emphasized the importance of science for the betterment of

society. Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on community of observers and unlimited

community indicate his interest in the social relevance of scientific method. Peirce argued

that an experimental method devised along the principles of science would facilitate

convergence of beliefs. Peirce applies an experimental method, which is similar to Karl

Popper’s theory of falsification in order to verify the logical certainty of beliefs.

Kwame Anthony Appiah asserts that science as a paradigm questions existing social and

cultural beliefs, while stipulating what is and what ought to be believed. Synchronous

questions such as what is scientific and unscientific, justification of scientific hypothesis,

and diachronous questions such as the historical development of the discipline of science

inform the discourse about society, politics, education, and economy in the Western

hemisphere.

In advanced liberal democracies, science is the context of justification for

important issues. Our attempt to achieve a consensus is dependent upon science, which is

the context of justification. I will also examine Rawls’ theory of justice, which applies the

method of hypothesis but without the supporting premises. Rawls neglects the impact of

science on the lifeworld. I will show how Peirce and Popper accepted the historicity of

science while Rawls begins with the ahistorical conception of politics in his theory of

“Original position.” Rawls is thus guilty of theorizing for an entirely different lifeworld.

His theory of justice is theory laden but suffers from the lacuna of positing an ahistorical,

stationary, and isolated social thought experiment. In order to explain the effect of Peirce

and Rawls’s theories on liberal democracy, I will utilize Stephen Turner’s writings on

liberal democracy. I will show how the method of hypothesis is conducive to achieve

consensus in scientific and social spheres.

Karl Popper claims that disciplines such as psychology and history are afflicted by

demarcation problems. Disciplines such as psychology and Marxism were considered to

be scientifically justifiable in the early twentieth century. Popper argues that scientific

predictions are not possible in the afore-mentioned instances and only a negative

utilitarian (reducing the misery instead of increasing the happiness) thesis is possible.

Popper’s social and political thought is characterized by his theory of falsification, which

will be discussed more elaborately in the course of this chapter. Popper believed that in

order to test the validity of scientific theories, they must be subjected to the attempt of

falsification. Unlike the post-Enlightenment optimism of an emancipated society, Popper

has a very moderate projection of social advancement, which he calls “piecemeal

engineering.” Popper attributes historicism and holism to the natural yearning of human

beings to control their lives with the knowledge of future events. Popper argues that

society is not static, isolated, and recurrent like the solar system.4 Hence, according to

Popper, future-oriented social programs are not scientifically justifiable. But Popper

concedes that scientific advancement impacts education and hence social and political

changes have occurred. Popper, himself, was a staunch advocate of liberal democracy.

Lakatos and Putnam criticized Popper’s theory of falsification for simplifying the

process of critical evaluation of a scientific hypothesis. Lakatos argued that Popper’s

disjunction of falsification/corroboration does not encapsulate how major theories in

science are corroborated. Only repeated experimental failures could undermine the

scientific validity of major theories of science. Unless a theory fails to satisfy both simple

and complex experimental applications consistently, only the auxillary hypothesis to the

established theory is altered.

Popper’s philosophy of science has direct influence on his social and political

thought. According to Popper, applying the method of natural sciences in social sciences

would encourage totalitarianism. Popper admits that science is the major social paradigm.

By denying science of the task of predicting historical development, Popper seeks to

preempt social engineering. Popper emphasized the importance of creativity and heuristic

motivation in scientific research. Similarly, Charles Sanders Peirce also emphasized the

methodology of science in understanding the phenomenon of the world. In order to

cultivate the habit of scientific thinking, Peirce envisaged a community of observers. For

Peirce, scientific research was a social activity and hence a need for consensus among the

scientists was necessary for the development of critical inquiry.

There is a stark difference between the consensual activity of a group of scientists

working on a specific scientific problem and a group of scientists who are working on a

problem that involves multi-lateral levels of understanding. An example of the former

would be nuclear scientists and the latter environmental scientists. Another example is

that of a group of medical scientists discussing an epidemic. In the field of science, there

is a contrast between the cognitive understanding of the expert and the audience. For a

specialized group of professionals, linguistic and communicative competencies about

their field are immediate. For the group of experts who observe the process and

development of a theory, product, or policy, results are explainable in terms of structural

factors within their discipline. But, the non-experts resort to a belief in the authority of

the experts, which is tenaciously clung on to by them. The cognitive understanding of the

expert is identified by her proximity to the process of structural changes within a

particular paradigm where as in the case of non-expert it is defined in terms of an ardent

adherence to the principles laid down by the experts.

The clash of paradigms within a culture is due to the conflict between the

expertise and non-expertise aspects of theorization of knowledge within a scientific

discipline. Instead of characterizing the debate between science and other disciplines as

theory – practice problem, it is imperative to recognize the chasm between the status of

experts and the audience. Russ Hanson argues that all observations are theory-laden.

Hence, Hanson refutes the existence of a theory-practice problem. The cognitive authority

of scientists emanates from their expertise. Since there is no real plausibility of direct

access to the citadels of scientific knowledge for the non-experts, only avenues of fixing

beliefs are that of authority, tenacity, and a priori forms. The non-expert audience

understands science, as an alien paradigm, in terms of other accessible paradigms. In

several ways, the process of understanding science by non-scientific audience stunningly

resembles Plato’s “allegory of the cave” and the Indian parable of “five blind men and an

elephant.”

Expert Versus Audience

The expert or the non-expert tag is dynamic and interchangeable when paradigms change.

Depending upon the esteem need of the society, expertise is valued. A doctor is a non-

expert when she learns music or dance from an artist and vice versa. But there is a tacit

understanding of the hierarchy on the social scale. For all the popularity and fame, in the

corridors of power, scientific, economic, and legal experts have more political clout than

artists. There was an epoch when art was considered divine. During that epoch, even

management was considered to be an art. Martial art is a classic example. Now, martial

art is called martial science. What was considered to be a divine individual talent is now

harvested scientifically. Social rationalization has transformed many an art into a science.

John Dewey’s writings on aesthetics bespeak of the importance of education and training

in art, sport, law, psychology, and science. This could be attributed to the disenchantment

of the lifeworld due to a change in paradigm to science and the democratization of the

public sphere. Religious bewitchment of the intellect has given way to the scientific

mastery of the environment. Science is about universals and hence cultural particulars

have played a limited role. Or science can also be explained as essentially a bourgeoisie

steering mechanism from the viewpoint of the left. Science has been an effective

justificatory context for the communists and the capitalists alike. My objective in

emphasizing the scientific method and science as a cultural paradigm is to explain that

symmetrical conception of consensus in based on an idea of rational citizen who is

heuristically motivated to know the reality. Democracy and science have transformed the

process of achieving consensus.

In the Middleages, as long as science did not challenge the existing paradigm,

which was religion, there was an uneasy peace between them. In some sense, the

paradigm conflict between science and religion was also a clash between religious and

scientific bourgeoisie, in which the proletariat were the infantrymen. As Turner points

out, the masses are ensnared by the sentiment of self-denial and whichever paradigm

portrays itself as the epitome of self-denial that paradigm would be respected. In a liberal

democracy, there are institutions and processes to legitimate paradigms and the most

important avenue for legitimating is by discussion. To some extent, knowledge

associations, boundary organizations, and commissions bridge the distance between the

experts and the audience. But the question that is upper-most in our midst is whether

consensus achieved via knowledge associations is a surrogate-consensus?

Expertise – Transformation of the Cultural Paradigm

Kwasi Wiredu emphasizes the need to recognize the objective of a dialogue that seeks to

achieve consensus. According to Wiredu, questions about cultural particulars in religion,

ideology, and ideals can be intractable. The objective of a consensual activity is to arrive

at an agreement on ‘what needs to be done.’ A debate about ‘what ought to be done’

would never end. The everlasting struggle between the proponents of various ‘ought’

positions is based on dogmas and hence positions that are at variance cannot be

reconciled without a complete transformation of the belief systems of the participants in a

dialogue. Hence, Wiredu insists on the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ issues in the

epistemological realm from social and political issues while attempting to reach a

consensus. The testability of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ positions is logical in the realm of

epistemology and more specifically science. In social and political realm, what Peirce

calls the methods of fixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and the a priori operate

along with the experimental method. In the social realm, logic is a heuristic tool.

Wiredu’s position is very similar to Rawlsian theory of avoidance and his separation of

political idea of justice as fairness, on the one hand, and metaphysical, religious, moral,

and subjective conceptions of justice, on the other. But Wiredu does not advocate an ideal

situation in which social and historical conditions must be suspended in a political

discourse.

Pragmatic Consensus

Charles Sanders Peirce’s writings on fixing beliefs, clear ideas, and necessity elucidate

the need to have guiding principles or provisional hypothesis, not only in science but also

in everyday transactions, rather than absolutely indubitable principles as the starting

point. Science is a discipline that emphasizes common skills, training, and common

discourse.12 Turner points out the monopolistic nature of scientific expertise and its

inalienable connection with politics. The general tenor of Turner’s argument that

scientific expertise is political could be extended to other forms of expertise such as

religious, economic, literary, artistic, and therapeutic. Expertise in its nature is

monopolistic. As Turner points out, what Ulrich Beck terms as demonopolization is never

plausible in any form of expertise. A political consensus on subjective, emotive, and

vexatious issues is even more intractable. Hence, what Turner calls self-denial is

indispensable for achieving a political consensus on issues pertaining to individual

interest such as income tax, distribution of resources, agricultural subsidies, affirmative

action, and healthcare. Consensus becomes even more difficult when the paradigm is as

asymmetric as social justice, ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, and terrorism. Let us

discuss the prospects of applying scientific models in social communication.

Most of the early pragmatists such as Peirce, James, and Dewey believed that a

functional model of science could effectively solve the problems of authority, dogmatism,

and a priori modes of ascertaining beliefs. Peirce suggested an interesting idea of what

could be termed as working hypothesis, which resembles the theory of falsification

suggested by Karl Popper. According to Popper,

The result of tests is the selection of hypotheses which have stood up to tests, or

the elimination of those hypotheses which have not stood up to them, and which

are therefore rejected. It is important to realize the consequences of this view.

They are these: all tests can be interpreted as attempts to weed out false theories -

to find the weak points of a theory in order to reject it if it is falsified by the test.

This view is sometimes considered paradoxical; our aim, it is said, it to establish

theories, not to eliminate false ones. But just because it is our aim to establish

theories as well as we can, we must test them as severely as we can; that is, we

must try to find fault with them, we must try to falsify them. Only if we cannot

falsify them in spite of our best efforts can we say that they have stood up to

severe tests. This is the reason why the discovery of instances which confirm a

theory mean very little if we have not tried, and failed, to discover refutations. For

if we are uncritical we shall always find what we want: we shall look for, and

find, confirmations, and we shall look away from, and not see, whatever might be

dangerous to our pet theories. In this way it is only too easy to obtain what

appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached

critically, would have been refuted. In order to make the method of selection by

elimination work, and to ensure that only the fittest theories survive, their struggle

for life must be made severe by them.

According to Peirce, both deductive and inductive inferences do not need absolute

certainty. As MacIntyre describes in After Virtue, problems concerning generalization of

predictions in social sciences could be traced to their tendency to model their methods on

the basis of the mathematical models of natural sciences. In the natural sciences, there is

an ‘Original position,’ which is, according to Peirce, provisional and hypothetical.

Peirce’s aim was to discover a method of forging an agreement in the realm of

community and not just individuals. The most important tenets of Peirce’s pragmatism are

as follows:

1. Beliefs are identical if and only if they give rise to the same habit of action.

2. Beliefs give rise to the same habit of action if and only if they appease the

same doubt by producing the same rule of action.

The underlying assumption in Peirce’s pragmatic definition of belief as a habit is the

emphasis on the motivation for action. Only that which motivates a person to act is a

belief. By tracing the pattern of beliefs, one can also anticipate the path of action. The

scientific methodology imbedded in this approach appears to be hampered by

stereotyping action-habit-belief patterns. But as John Murphy points out, there can be

different beliefs, which produce same actions. This is the iconic method of signification

of Peirce. The meaning of an action is dependent upon the result it produces. According

to Peirce, “ … we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of

every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtle it may be; and there is no

distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in

practice.” An allied aspect of Peirce’s pragmatism is his experimentalism. Peirce wanted

to cultivate a habit of thinking as a question of experimentation as it is thought in the

laboratories. In his “The Fixation of Belief” he delineates four methods of fixing beliefs.

They are as follows:19

1. Method of tenacity

2. Method of authority

3. A priori method

4. Experimental method.

A true belief, for Peirce, is the one, which elicits general agreement. Peirce’s experimental

method emphasizes a concomitant relation between habit, action, true belief and

consequences. Peirce’s experimentalism is incumbent on scientific realism. While the

experimental method poses several important questions about religion, culture, customs,

and manners, it is not directly applicable to issues that have a long and torturous history.

Scientific consensus that was sought by Peirce is easier to achieve in a laboratory

setting in which heuristic motivation is an important factor. But in politics, the emphasis

is not on knowledge but power. For politics, science is an instrument of power, which has

replaced religion. A scientific consensus, which is a broad consensus about a scientific

finding, is different from a consensus among scientists. The former is an informed

judgment, which is more debatable. Stephen Turner gives the example of global warming.

There is a broad consensus among scientists about global warming while on the other

hand there are wide variances in conclusions drawn in different studies on global

warming. A good example of consensus among scientists would be a group of medical

professionals who discuss the most effective treatment to epidemics and arrive at a

consensus.

Peirce, while trying to clear the cobwebs of metaphysical muddles, suggests the

application of the model of consensus among scientists to non-scientific realms. The

community of observers who are more scientific in their approach would have to contend

with conflict of interests in social, political and economic spheres. While an emphasis on

functionality could redress metaphysical muddles, which paralyze society, especially in

the religious realm, into inactivity, it could also create new modes of reality that is

scientifically constructed.

In the laboratory, scientific procedures that are adopted need an objectivating

attitude. It is impossible to adopt such an objectivating attitude to social and political

issues because people have different beliefs on which they are prepared to act. (It is to be

noted here that Peirce was an anti-foundationalist and believed that knowledge was

historical.) Habits of action have become ingrained in people’s minds. In the public

sphere, there is no ground zero (theoretically) in contrast to what a scientist has in the

laboratory, especially with respect to vexatious religious, social, economic, and political

issues. However, for the purpose of consensual activity, the tenor of Peirce’s experimental

method could be utilized. The concept of non-teleological activity with emphasis on

procedures rather than final ends could be a viable alternative. In the postmodern epoch,

is it possible to have a purposive activity as practiced in Aristotelian polis? It appears

impossible to have a concrete purposive goal for a society or a community without

subordinating the individual goals to the common goal. In a liberal democracy, the

assumption of inviolable individual liberty is both a boon and a bane. For the protection

of individual rights and facilitating individual cultural development, an emphasis on

individual rights is inevitable. But, how are the social goals to be reconciled with the

individual goals? There is an inherent contradiction in liberal democracy. By emphasizing

absolute inviolability of individual rights, a position of compromise is preempted.

Ian Hacking argues that there are problems related to the scientization of moral or

ethical issues. Hacking explains how the concept of child cruelty was medicalized into

the phenomenon of child abuse. In the 1960s, a group of physicians in Colorado decided

to define child cruelty in medical terms. Thus, the scientization of child cruelty began

deliberately in an effort to take it away from the realm of ordinary discourse to the realm

of scientific discourse. In course of time, most of the developed Western countries

promulgated laws and elaborate procedures to address the issue of child abuse. Hospitals

and law enforcement agencies were inundated with reports of child abuse. Since, the

occurrence of child abuse is not akin to traditional criminal activities, the help of the society

was enlisted to inform the police and child-care agencies about plausible cases of child

abuse. While the process of determining whether a child has been abused was scientifically

analyzed, the process of affixing the blame was carried out in a haphazard manner. Thus,

scientific method does not ensure fairness.

One of the problems that Peirce did not envisage with the scientific method was

the evolution of technology as the business engine of science. As long as science

remained as the pursuit of knowledge, the fruits of its endeavors trickle down to the

public sphere only as a movement from above. On the other hand, with the inextricable

matrimony of science and technology, science has also lost its perceived emancipatory

telos that it gained during the Enlightenment epoch. The aim of reason to emancipate the

humankind from the throes of despair into which it was thrown by religion was frittered

away once again with the intervention of politics. Religion, as long as it did not attempt to

legislate what reality was, had an important role in constituting a goal for human life. But

with the ascent of reason, it gradually abdicated its authority to science. Science, as long

as it was concerned with the discovery of the wonders of nature, had an emancipatory

telos. But, once science started constituting reality by mastering nature and altering the

balance of nature, it became a dominating force. Science has effectively replaced religion

as the new religion.

As monarchy, oligarchy, timocracy, and tyranny were the political expressions of

a religious-communitarian society, democracy is the expression of a scientific society.

Democracy and science, together, constructed the world of freedom and suffrage. As

religious institutions of the West fervently proselytized in foreign lands and on many an

occasion engaged in forcible conversions, which were justified in terms of superior

knowledge and culture, the present day democracies of the West justify the

proselytization of democratic practices based on a scientific methodology. But Peirce’s

experimental method is not aimed at the construction of an infallible foundational

ideology. But still it suffers from a failure to recognize the infelicities and abuses that

would have ensued from a total emphasis on experimental methodology. Peirce explains

that synonymous sentences could be used to explain different beliefs and antonymous

sentences could be used to express similar beliefs. Ultimately, the behavior determines

the efficacy of the belief. Peirce seems to anticipate perlocutionary speech acts of

Austin.25 While Peirce’s theory explains the problem of beliefs in a refreshingly explicit

manner, the variance between beliefs could cause gargantuan problems. The society is, at

once, dogmatic, authoritarian, and speculative. The experimental method assumes a

community of observers who share the same goals and aspirations. Peirce’s provisional

hypothesis is applicable to a situation in which interlocutors share values. But in a civil

society, consensus is difficult to achieve because interlocutors are culturally diverse. One

can only find adherence to laws of the society, which are guaranteed to elicit penal

actions from law enforcement. Laws are the religious rituals of liberal democracy.

Peirce’s Community of Observers

Charles Sanders Peirce viewed the experimental model of science as the pragmatic

technique for clarifying the meaning of ideas. Peirce was opposed to metaphysical system

building and hence questioned whether determinism should be the postulate of science

rather than indeterminacy. In his philosophy of evolutionary categories, Peirce

emphasizes the role of tychism (chance), synechism (continuity), and agapism

(evolutionary love). In several ways, Peirce’s philosophy has phenomenological leanings.

Peirce likens people who are unsettled by doubting a concept of truth in science or

religion to Ostriches that bury their heads in the sand. Doubt is identified with weakness

and truth with certitude. For Peirce, ultimately, the problem of doubt pertains to the

community and not restricted to the individual alone. So, Peirce identifies method of

tenacity with individual belief. The second method of fixing beliefs is that of authority.

Peirce says that the method of authority is the chosen method of upholding theological

and political doctrines. In a manner similar to the tirade of Socrates against Athenian

citizens, Peirce derisively remarks:

Let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions made into

the manner of thinking of suspected persons, and when they are found guilty of

forbidden beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal punishment. When complete

agreement could not otherwise be reached, a general massacre of all who have not

thought in a certain way has proved a very effective means of settling opinion in a

country. If the power to do this be wanting, let a list of opinions be drawn up, to

which no man of the least independence of thought can assent, and let the faithful

be required to accept all these propositions, in order to segregate them as radically

as possible from the rest of the world.

Peirce claims that the method of authority thrives on religious and political power. The

individual right is always subordinated to the community need. A feeling of sympathy

and fellowship creates a very strong bonding which creates an intoxicating social feeling,

which demands absolute servitude. Such servitude as demanded by institutions such as

religion, guild, and aristocracy spawns an emphasis on authority. Peirce tellingly points

out the scheme of intellectual slavery initiated by organized faiths. Peirce’s examples are

also multi-cultural. The monumental stone structures erected in the name of religion in

Siam and Egypt illustrates the power of the social feeling of fellowship that characterizes

religious fervor. Peirce cites the institution of priesthood in religions as the best example

of authority. The method of authority is challenged by cross-cultural interaction, which

poses questions about the superiority of the belief perpetrated by the religious or political

authorities. A reflection on the veracity of knowledge-claims of religious or political

institutions also causes authority as a method of fixing beliefs to flounder.

A more complex method replaces the method of authority and it is called the a

priori method. The emphasis on the agreeableness to reason is the basis of the a priori

method. A description of the a priori method resembles that of the search for an essence

during romanticism. The uncanniness inherent in human beings would naturally decide

what is reasonable in “harmony with natural causes.” Peirce refers to Plato’s reasoning

that “the distances of the celestial spheres from one another should be proportional to the

different length of the strings which produce harmonious chords.” The afore-mentioned

relation appears reasonable but it is not factual. Another universalization that Peirce

indicates is “the doctrine that man only acts selfishly-that is, from the consideration that

acting in one way will afford him more pleasure that acting in another.” The latter

observation could be construed as an attack on utilitarian emphasis on pleasure. Peirce is

skeptical about the a priori method because it depends on social sentiments, accidents,

and instinct. Only distantly, the a priori method is connected to observation and

verification of facts. Inductive generalizations are rampant in the a priori method.

Methods of fixing belief such as tenacity, authority, and a priori are capricious and

unsystematic. Demonstrating external certainty is not possible in the afore-mentioned

methods of fixing beliefs. Science obeys laws that are not individual but common to all.

The modes of reasoning in science are not inspirational but factual. Hence, Peirce claims

that the method of science is the only valid form of inquiry. According to Peirce, science

resolves the problem of doubt by illustrating practically and objectively the cause of such

a doubt. On the other hand, Peirce also pointed out that isolated experimentation would

not contribute to the corpus of scientific knowledge and hence science needs a

community of observers. Interestingly, Peirce also encouraged the process of formulation

of scientific hypothesis that would be a precursor to actual experimentation. In this

context, he called the process of trial and error method of formulating successful

hypothesis abduction. For Peirce, beliefs were not infallible but probable or provisional.

What Peirce called “critical common sensism” is a perfect example of conjoinment of

teleological and deontological understanding of the process of science. The term

“common sensism” in terms of reflecting the “sense of the commons” is not critical. But,

“common sensism” as recognition of the commonly understood but in the backdrop of a

critical method, which is the scientific method, defines pragmatism as a philosophy, for

Peirce. The process of consensus among the community of observers operating upon a

provisional hypothesis enables the confluence of reason and experience. Reason allows

experience to manifest itself, which results in the phenomenology of the given. Thus, in

Peirce’s scientific method, procedures, application of procedures and consistent

readjustment of hypothesis have great importance. Peirce’s emphasis is on the inferential

relation between the premise and the conclusion of a scientific hypothesis. Peirce

contends towards the end of “How To Make Our Ideas Clear” that even though there are

variations in the results in the experimental method as more perfection is achieved, the

results will tend to converge rather than diverge.

Peirce’s method of logical inquiry could be applied to the process of achieving

political consensus. Peirce rejects the need for ultimate foundations in fixing beliefs and

clarifying doubts. Even though Rawls insists on the need for tolerance of variegated

beliefs and a phenomenological suspension of judgment in the form of ‘veil of ignorance”

unlike Peirce’s theory of inquiry, Rawlsian theory of justice is handicapped by an ascetic

approach which does not engage but withdraws from the world. In some ways, Rawlsian

approach mirrors that of Romanticism that searches for a deeper self or true meaning by

valorizing one perspective of a theory of justice. On the other hand, the scientific

objectivating attitude necessary for social rationalization makes Rawlsian theory of

justice very much a product of the Enlightenment thinking. Rawls utilizes economics and

sociology to explain inequalities in the distribution of goods. In this context, Ronald

Dworkin contests Rawls argument that the original position would lead to equality of

resources. Dworkin argues that only equality of resources would lead to the original

position.

In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Habermas discusses the

development of moral consciousness in relation to the process of learning and behavior.

Habermas analyzes moral rationalization on the basis of developmental psychology of

Piaget, Selman, and Kohlberg. The first stage of moral development is based on the

success or failure of an action and hence at the physical realm. In the second stage, the

paradigm is “Do unto others that you want to be done to you,” the Golden Rule. Not

surprisingly, the Golden Rule has been applied in all cultures and religions. Habermas

criticizes Mead for not going beyond the second stage, even though Mead proposes

mutual cooperation. The third stage is the Kantian categorical imperative “Never use

others as means to an end.” The last mentioned is the deontological perspective in which

success or failure of desires becomes immaterial. Only the means of an action becomes

paramount. The rectitude of the means, especially in the sense of Kantian duty, attains

foremost importance. In Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches to issues such as justice,

the deontological perspective predominates. The other two realms as discussed above, is

not accorded as much importance as the categorical imperative of treating everyone as

ends and not means. Concepts such as “ideal speech situation” or “overlapping

consensus” or “reflective equilibrium” target the realms of esteem needs and not the

preliminary levels of moral development explained by Kohlberg and Sellman.

For the purpose of achieving a consensus, is it possible to ground the process on

the supposition of highest moral development? Applying Peirce’s thesis of provisionality

of hypothesis, a strong emphasis on an emancipatory or altruistic course of moral

development appears illogical. But, Peirce believes very strongly that chance plays an

important role even in science. The physical world, which is governed by laws, according

to Peirce, also changes. In Peirce’s logic and scientific method, probability occupies a

special place. The Hegelian identification of the manifestation of reason in the state and

the Marxian subversion of the state as the repository of false consciousness seems to lurk

beneath the surface of most liberal theories. It is in this sense that Peirces’ provisional

hypothesis about fixation of beliefs is necessary. But, Peirce vehemently argues for

unconditional love, self-sacrifice, and unlimited community in his ethics. There is a

strong sense of asymmetric and communal relationship. Even while discussing the

problem of evil, Peirce advocates unadulterated love.

Peirce’s ethics has a strong deontological component. In an almost Kantian tenor,

Peirce says, “The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim.” In another context

while pursuing his idea of ‘unlimited community,’ Peirce says,

…the very first command that is laid upon you, your quite highest business and

duty, becomes, as everybody knows, to recognize a higher business than your

business, not merely an avocation after the daily task of your vocation is

performed, but a generalized conception of duty which completes your

personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos.

Peirce’s passionately claims that one’s duty is to expand the ethical horizons to

embrace the whole world. Ethics, for Peirce, is a science of ideals. As a habit, ethical

action is desirable and logical. Since conduct is a rational action that aims at the ideal

good of the society, even self-sacrifice must not limit its horizons. In this sense, Peirce

advocates universal love. He calls evil a limited and imperfect stage of love. In that sense,

Peirce also separates science and ethics. A question of justice for Peirce, thus, would be

asymmetrical. Peirce’s conception of an “unlimited community” stems from the finitude

of human beings and the illogicality of hatred and destruction. Hence, Peirce’s

deontology is based on the purposelessness of fighting over issues that are ephemeral.

Peirce’s realism is evident when he emphasizes unconditional love for all. One can sense

almost Buddhistic non-attachment to the triviality of individual desires vis-à-vis common

good. Peirce strongly argues that the welfare of the community defines individual goals.

The Original position – Precondition of an Overlapping Consensus Rawls’

theory of justice emphasizes the liberal notion of the inviolability of individual rights. In

the same breadth, Rawls also propounds a proviso, which ensures equal distribution of

opportunities and resources in a manner advantageous to the underprivileged groups in a

society. The original position, according to Rawls, is the initial situation. Rawls says,

“These principles are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests

would accept in this position of equality to settle the basic terms of their association.”

Later, Rawls claims, “The original position is defined in such a way that it is a status quo

in which the parties are equally represented as moral persons and the outcome is not

conditioned by arbitrary contingencies or the relative balance of social forces.” In the

following quotation, Rawls refutes the utilitarian theory of the greatest good of greatest

numbers. According to Rawls,

Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of

a society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of

justice for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not

allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of

advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the rights secured by

justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.

Rawls’ afore-mentioned emphasis on deontology is aimed at preempting purposive

rationalization, that is, a theory of justice as a confluence of individual interests. An

emphasis on purposive-teleological rationality encourages individual pursuit of

happiness. Rawls, by emphasizing the deontological aspects of theory of justice, ensures

an overlapping consensus based on shared consent, mutual respect, reciprocity, fairness in

terms of equality and opportunity and other primary goods. But Rawls’ ‘difference

principle’ is akin to the Lockean proviso that characterizes his theory of property. Rawls

acknowledges the existence of inherent inequalities in a society. But by propounding the

condition of ‘Original position’ which when characterized by a ‘veil of ignorance’ leads

to the two principles of justice, Rawls ignores the historicity of the social understanding

of democracy.

A Lockean program for the colonization of the American continent was based on

the justification of acquiring landed property on the basis of labor.43 Equality and human

rights were not universal ideals during Locke’s era. But it is quite clear that for Hobbes,

Locke and Rousseau, slavery was not as unproblematic as it was for other philosophers

and thinkers of their era. There is definitely a paradigm shift from ‘what ought to be’ to

‘what is to be done,’ especially, in Hobbes and Locke. A strong emphasis on individual

rights and property was a great leap in political philosophy for the reason that a less

comprehensive doctrine of social and political conceptualization was being introduced in

the West. The British society, during the period of Hobbes and Locke, was governed by

strict religious dictates that spawned the entire spectrum of life. Hence, horizontal

sociopolitical associations and voluntary associations were available only to the upper

classes. But with a common law ensuring the safety and security of the individuals

without reference to the class or creed of the people brought about a great revolution in

Britain.

By ordaining the state with the responsibility of guaranteeing safety and security

of the individuals, social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke engineered a formula that

benefited both the state and the citizens. Hitherto, the state was corporate and hence

encumbered by lugubrious inefficiency on account of its monumental administrative

tasks. Since, religion, education, sports, arts, economy, and foreign policy were all

concentrated in the hands of the state the task of administration became cumbersome and

unwieldy. With the diminution of religious and social tasks, which were to be followed by

the liberalization of trade, the state became more efficient in delegating authority whereby

ensuring responsibility. Thus, social contract and later democracy rescued the suffering

state. With social responsibility vested in the individuals, social values underwent a

tremendous change. Institutions that were more democratic and reciprocal such as

constitution, parliament, congress, courts, and elections gradually replaced the elite

political systems that installed institutions and established values.

One can deduce the unmistakable imprint of the Enlightenment reason, which had

quashed the divine rights theory or even a theory of privilege masquerading as a theory of

natural selection. In many ways, Socratic polis is a paradox and reveals the maladies of a

comprehensive and centralized state. Socrates also assumes an original position in the

form of selection and training regimen for the auxillaries. The laborers and

handicraftsmen are naturally bereft of qualities that are to be found in the guardians and

auxillaries. The Socratic Republic indicates the failure of a totally deontological system

and the need for teleological action. A Republic exists as a just state, which is

purposive. In order to maintain the sanctity of the Republic, those factors that do not

assist in the betterment of the Republic have to be weeded out.

For Rawls, the original position entails the foundation of an equitable system of

social equality and freedom. Rawls assumes those conditions as a given in a liberal

democracy what Hobbes and Locke envisioned as proposed guarantees. In Rawls’ theory

of justice, the goods that were so important for Hobbes and Locke are already enshrined

in a constitutional democracy and hence the ascent to the next stage is that of justice for

all. Hobbes and Locke enunciated a social contract theory, which also assumed certain

shared qualities of human beings. Both Hobbes and Locke were influenced by Newtonian

mechanics, particularly, and science, in general. Hence, the concept of ‘becoming’

assumed more importance to that of ‘being.’

Rawls does not accord importance to the process of expertization of the liberal

public sphere. But Rawls did not apply the methodology of science because of an

inversion in the conception of politics. Aristotle’s good life in a polis is not the basis of

Rawlsian minimal conception of the role of politics. Instead of integrating the horizontal

(an emphasis on addressing those issues that affect the society in the present) and vertical

concepts of development (future-oriented objectives), Rawls precludes politics from

social reality by performing an epoche on everything except what could be simplified as

food, clothing, and shelter. Thus, politics, which is hailed as the mother of all sciences by

Aristotle, has been reduced to a discipline that can arbitrate issues, which do not brook

emotional or ideological responses. Thus, in Peircean parlance, Rawls’ theory of justice

only aspires to be an a priori theory of fixing beliefs in the political arena.

Rawls’ theory of justice operates on the concept of arriving at a consensus, which

faintly resembles Peirce’s experimental method of inquiry. The foundational principle of

Rawls’ theory of justice is the ‘Original position.’ The ‘Original position’ is a situation in

which individual interests are kept in abeyance and only a rational approach to common

interest is suggested. Among a community of believers in the rectitude of reason, the two

principles of justice, namely, the principle of equal opportunity and the difference

principle will be the final rational evolutes. Rawls believes that there would be consensus

in the process of distribution of resources because of the absence of individual interests. A

veil of ignorance is the self-imposed restriction on rationalization on the basis of

individual interests and goods. According to Rawls, in the Original position none will be

advantaged or disadvantaged by social or natural contingencies. While Rawls’ approach is

less comprehensive, the procedural approach itself is a long-term approach. A procedural

approach to the concept of social justice demands a very strong commitment to the

process, which is not debatable. While Rawls does not define a hierarchy of ends, rational

interlocutors would decide for themselves whether the principles chosen to represent the

process of realizing justice is fair to all. Rawls tries to conjoin rational foundations and

pragmatic functionalism.

The theory of justice is comprehensive because it follows a causal argument

ensuing from the concept of impartiality of reason and scientific objectivity. Rawls’

theory of justice is comprehensive in terms of cultural universals and not in terms of

cultural particulars. Rawls’ thought experiment is thoroughly an Enlightenment ideal

recast in the mold of twentieth century liberal democracy. A concept of Aristotelian

eudaimonia with the social conditions of a Greek polis is more comprehensive while

Rawlsian approach is less comprehensive because of the triumph of individual rights and

right to property in a democracy. The foundational principles of Rawls’ theory of justice,

principle of equal opportunity and the difference principle are constant. Only a process of

institutionalization of justice in the form of laws, institutions, and government policies

could usher in social change. Reflective equilibrium, the state of theory merging with the

practice, which is asymptotic to the say, the least, maintains an emphasis on the principles

of justice.

Rawlsian theory of justice needs both empirical and theoretical justification as

indicated by Dworkin. By neglecting theoretical justification of a theory of justice, Rawls

does not accord importance to the critical evaluation of empirical justification. A theory

of justice encounters great difficulties when faced with ethical dilemma, scientific issues,

and political decision-making. While Rawls might eschew a comprehensive theory of

justice in order to avoid controversial and vexatious claims that are ideological in nature,

a compartmentalized view of human lifeworld into public and private spheres

has never been able to withstand the onslaught of media, government, religion, and

technology. Unless Rawls proves the absolute separation of physical and mental qualities

of human beings, the attitude of avoidance amounts to an act of ascetic withdrawal from

the hostile world. As enworlded subjects, human beings do not have the luxury of

withdrawing from the world.

Most of the theories on justice are hampered by either an entirely comprehensive

or minimalistic approach. In order to have an effective theory of social justice, there is a

need for not only normatively regulated approach but also a theory of justice that speaks

to people both at the individual and social realms. That is a theory of justice or good have

to be of interest to the society as well as the individual. There have been several attempts

from Plato to Rawls to situate a theory of justice as a communal virtue or as an individual

motivational principle. In all these approaches, there is a tacit assumption that people

want to live in a certain way. Interestingly, Chanakya and Machiavelli also arrived at the

conclusion that people yearn to live peacefully with their families and aspire for wealth.

There is a tendency not to consider human life as a mixture of both good and bad. Liberal

democracy is an approach, which harnesses the good and discourages the bad with

respect to individual rights. Any absolute frame of reference for good and bad is not

amenable to addressing problems addressing social justice at different levels, as the

paradigm of religion proved. Religious faith sought eternity in an ephemeral world.

Hence, Rawls constructs his theory of justice on a soft consensus that ignores social

situations.

Problems in Peircean and Rawlsian Models of Consensus

I will first discuss the problems associated with Peirce’s experimental method and then

Rawls’ procedural method. In Peirce’s method, the appearance-reality problematic of

Plato remains alive. While science is not a vain search for Utopia, for Peirce, it is

inherently better than other methods of affixing beliefs such as tenacity, authority, and the

a priori method because of its provisional foundations and critical methodology. But on

the other hand, science is also a social construct and it battles other disciplines for being

the tool of social change. What Peirce also considers the convergence of logical thinking

and scientific knowledge necessarily requires the eclipse of methods of tenacity,

authority, and a priori. I emphasize that even scientific method contains appeals to

tenacity, authority, and a priori justification since science is institutionalized. This was the

reason why Karl Popper recommended falsification as the method of ascertaining the

validity of scientific theories.

In the course of time, science also spawned institutions akin to religious institutions.

Religious institutions had the priestly class, the oligarchic patrons, powerful rulers, and

loyal followers. Science has effectively replaced religion with its own hierarchy with the

experts on top of the hierarchy. As Lyotard predicted, governments and experts have a

mutually enriching relationship as long as the relationship is cooperative to the agenda of

the government. But with great technological advancements, governments need

technocrats and not just bureaucratic administrators. Such a class requirement only serves

to cement the hegemony of the educated elites, which is meritocracy, admixed with

aristocracy. Such an arrangement led Plato to anoint Philosopher-King as the ideal

concoction of reason and spirit. In a society composed of “noble lies,” such a concoction of

qualities (Gold, Silver, Iron or Bronze) is plausible.

The dilemma of convincing the people about the imperative need to change a system

of governance underscores two possibilities. On the one hand, it takes a long time for a

system of governance to change procedurally. On the other, democracy, which is a

“government by discussion”, is problematic because of the universalistic ideals that

characterize a conception of democratic polity in general. One of the prime examples

given by Turner in Liberal Democracy 3.0 is that of Rawls’ theory of justice.

Rawlsian theory of justice takes into consideration a sample of people who are

already democratic and hence already into the scheme of social rationalization particular

to liberal democracy. Furthermore, the sample of people chosen also has an ideal though

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minimal in the Rawlsian sense. Thus, whether one person or a group of persons

imagining oneself in the situation of the original position would come up only with the

two Rawlsian principles of justice. Rawls tacitly applies the experimental method of

Peirce and introduces an Aristotelian intent. Hence, Rawls wants to conjure a science of

morality. It is a vividly Aristotelian project sans social stratification. Even though Turner

criticizes Rawls for not taking into account the impact of science in determining the

character of liberal democracy, following the tradition of pragmatism, Rawls and other

political theorists have imbibed the scientific method adopted by both Peirce and Dewey.

The ‘guiding principle’ and ‘provisional hypothesis’ of Peirce find an echo in Rawls as

original position and a veil of ignorance respectively. While Peirce is optimistic about his

experimental method and the application of the consensus among scientists to the realm

of everyday discourse, Rawls banishes science from the political realm. It is ironical that

Rawls says that the science follows a different methodology that cannot be discussed in

the political realm. But Rawls’ notion of a healthy liberal democracy assumes the

following about a good society.

1. No sexual discrimination

2. No racial discrimination

3. No religious discrimination

4. No social discrimination

The afore-mentioned injunctions require laws supported by scientific procedures from

fields such as economics, statistics, biology, and physics, to name a few. Laws necessary

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entail enforcement of penalties in case of infringement. Science disproves bogus theories

about evolution of human beings, sexual differences, and rational capacity.

Rawls assumes a pervasive sense of a humaneness as the foundation of a

democratic community as a given. In Rawls’monumental work on justice, one can find a

divergence of good and justice. This divergence also impacts Rawls conception of natural

duties and institutional obligations. Rawls himself discusses how his theory of justice

takes an Archimedean standpoint because of its emphasis on long-term wellness of the

society. Rawls also emphasizes how individual desires that conflict with the principles of

justice are to be discouraged. But contrary to Rawls’ claim that justice supersedes good,

justice is also a good. Perhaps, as Socrates claims in the Republic, justice is the highest

good. As Joseph Raz, William Galston and Alasdair MacIntyre emphasize relentlessly, at

least a minimal perfectionism is necessary. In his chapter on “Justice in Political

Economy,” Rawls speaks of “embedding ideals in our working principles” which

encapsulates the necessary connection between short-term and long-term goals. But what

Rawls maintains as the independence of the theory of justice from the existing wants and

needs is not possible by a less comprehensive theory of fairness. I strongly argue that the

process of establishing a just society is a positive conception, which requires a

metamorphosis of the existing social conditions that ferment injustices in the society.

An ideal thought-experiment while functioning as a driving force needs an

overlapping consensus with the progressive elements of the various arms of the society

such as science, religion, law, and education. While disciplines such as economics, law,

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and science have changed the conception of social reality, an emphasis on a political and

non-comprehensive theory of justice is based on a conception of a static self. Charles

Guignon describes the drastic transformation of even the conception of a social self from

the pre-modern to post-modern epoch. Globalization has mandated the need for a

comprehensive re-evaluation of the concept of justice. Both Rawls and Peirce emphasize

deontology. But Rawls espouses a policy of avoidance while Peirce advocates active

engagement. Rawls posits an ideal beginning, which would lead to an ideal outcome.

Peirce’s scientific method is “a search for the laws demanded by the facts and inclusive of

them.”

Feibleman claims that Peirce learnt from Kant’s observation that self-love propel

people to act. The logical connection begins with the individual and ends ultimately with

the universe. According to Peirce, human beings are driven towards the possession of

ecumenical things. But, paradoxically, everything in this world is ephemeral and the

community of such things, he calls an ‘unlimited community.’

I conclude from the afore-mentioned argument of Peirce that a consensus in a

multiculturally diverse society must logically begin with the analysis of the metaphysics

of relations between conflicting practices and extend it to the ‘unlimited community.’

This is the ideal. But Peirce also claims that consensus could be elusive due to

interpersonal and social factors. This is the reality. Peirce’s paradox presages Kenneth

Arrow’s impossibility theorem, which states that individual interests and social choices

are logically divergent. I have tried to argue in the course of the chapter that individual

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and social components are integral to any social, political, or scientific enterprise. A

consensus in the political arena necessarily needs a provisional hypothesis that engages

on the one hand, beliefs that emanate from tenacity, authority, and a priori reasoning, and

on the other, illustrates and justifies the superiority of the scientific method. Democracy is

entwined with the concept of provisional hypothesis because even ideal original positions

are subject to a provisional consensus. Based on the provisionality and justificatory

nature of the method of hypothesis when applied to a social and political system,

preparatory conditions of a partial or limited consensus are established. This is the

strength of any participatory democracy, whether it is communitarian or liberal.

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Chapter 4

Kwasi Wiredu – The Akan Conception of Communitarian Consensus

In the first chapter, I applied Charles Taylor’s framework of modern social imaginaries to

analyze the character of civil societies. Society, morality, and polity derive their

legitimacy from the social imaginary of a culture. In the context of the United States, the

bitter antagonism between the Democratic and the Republican parties reminds one of the

Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles with one stomach and fighting over food. Partisan

politics in democratic societies emphasizes political success and not consensus. Because

of antagonistic relationship between different political parties intent on furthering the

interests of their supporters, social imaginary is fractured. Such a fractured social

imaginary leads to a thoroughly confused civil society. The Democratic and the

Republican absorption with each other, prevents a more ecumenical understanding of the

world. Consensual politics, which is considered to be one of the defining features of

advanced democracies, is rare in the United States or any multi-party democratic politics.

In this chapter, I advance the thesis that plausibility of consensus is more in traditional

African communitarian societies than in multi-party democracies. I also explain the

equilibrium between solidarity and subsidiarity that exists in the Akan political system.

Solidarity is the unified social imaginary, which is broadly shared in a culture. The Akan

have a strong cultural identity. Subsidiarity is the element that cements mutual social

relationships between individuals. It is a necessary condition for social cooperation, in

other words consensus.

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The absurdity that prevents consensus in our lifeworld is epitomized by the

Ghanaian imagery of two crocodiles having the same stomach but fighting over food. The

Akan community in Ghana followed a system of consensual decision-making process,

traditionally. But the emphasis on consensus has suffered due to the shift in the social

imaginary of Ghana from traditional Akan community to colonial Ghana and then to post-

colonial Ghana. The sense of solidarity and subsidiarity that is organically fostered in a

communitarian society is entangled in the quagmire of competitive and avaricious

individualism that is alien to the Ghanaian social imaginary due to colonization. Thus,

African thinkers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, and Kwame Anthony Appiah

emphasize the need for cultural decolonization of African thought.

Kwasi Wiredu especially emphasizes a system of consensual democracy with no

parties.1 Wiredu argues that traditional Ghanaian decision-making was non-majoritarian.

Wiredu further goes on to say that in parliamentary or other forms of majoritarian

democracy, only the winning political grouping has greater power on decision-making.

Wiredu says, “It is, then, from a consensus-oriented standpoint, a system that is

frequently deleterious of genuine representation, that is, representation beyond

parliamentary window-dressing.”

1 Kwasi Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996. pp.

143-144. Hence forth abbreviated as CUP.

The Need for Conceptual Decolonization of African philosophy

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The conceptual colonization of African tradition has debilitated the conceptual schema of

African thought process. While manifestation of external influence is cause enough for

concern, dearth of scholars trained in traditional African thought in modern Ghana is far

more appalling. The superimposition of an alien thought-schema on traditional African

culture, language, religion, and political institutions has created conceptual complications

for African philosophers in distinguishing what is traditional African thought. An

impartial and critical analysis of the conceptual schema of native African thought requires

decolonization of modern African thought.

While educated Africans were twice removed from their own culture due to

colonization, scholars from erstwhile colonial powers have written extensively about the

African culture. The already de-Africanized post-colonial Africans have recourse mainly

to those texts written by non-Africans scholars about Africa. Some writings that were

inaccurate created artificial philosophical, linguistic, and religious muddles. Kwasi

Wiredu lists several concepts such as God, Reality, Being, Existence, Belief, Knowledge,

Faith, World, and Universe prevalent in African cultures, which have been distorted due

to conceptual inaccuracies in their rendition into Western languages. Kwame Gyekye

cites the works of Horton, which characterize entire African thought as collective, rigidly

monolithic, lacking inter-theoretic competition and alternative possibilities. Wiredu

delineates three factors that cause conceptual colonization the most. They are as follows:

1. Language

2. Religion

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3. Politics

Wiredu cites the example of Cartesian skepticism, which is explicated by the famous

method of doubt. The Cartesian claim for explaining certainty is Cogito ergo sum [I

think, therefore I am]. Wiredu explains the complex process involved in unraveling the

philosophical import of the Cartesian doubt in Akan. Descartes’ attempt to illustrate

infallible certainty would be very difficult to formulate in Akan for the simple reason that

in the Akan conceptual schema, there is no place for infallible proposition. The Akan

discourse assumes that knowledge is possible without being infallible and at the same

time recognizing that certainty is not possible at all times. Hence, “I think, therefore I

am,” translates into a variety of expressions such as:

1. I know very clearly or I know very clearly therefore I am there. [Minim pefee or

Minim koronyee enti mewoho ]

2. I very much know. [Minim papaapa]

The level of conceptual colonization is evident from responses from John Mbiti who

argues that the Cartesian dictum ‘I’ must be replaced with ‘We.’ Leopold Senghor averred

that traditional Africans had a participatory view of knowledge and hence would rather

say, “I feel, I dance the Other; I am.” Alexis Kagame points out the absurdity of ‘I am’ in

Bantu since it always has to be followed by an attribute or an adjunct of a place.

Mind, in Akan, is conceived as an ability to think and does not the status of an entity.

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Wiredu indicates the conceptual incongruity between traditional conception of the

universe as the place in which human beings exist and divining a mythology about the

creation of universe along the lines of Christianity which requires the postulation of a

creator God. While a religious affiliation or conversion to the religion introduced by the

colonizers does not indicate an abdication to colonial mentality, a steadfast refusal to

evaluate critically the beliefs of one’s religion does smack of irrationality. Wiredu argues

that an uncritical mixture of indigenous and foreign religions have led to severe

distortions in the African conceptual schema.

The third avenue, which has been completely distorted by colonial domination, is

the political system of Africa. All African countries had their own system of governance.

Governing bodies were of two kinds; centralized and decentralized. In both forms of

governance, political representation of various groups was accorded importance. Wiredu

and Gyekye, specifically mention the political system of the Akans in Ghana that arrived

at decisions through consensus. The Akan system of decision-making emphasizes a

political rule by consent through consensus, which is more rigorous than any modern

system of democracy.

Western democracies, especially, the Anglo-American system of democracy, are

attuned more towards transaction of daily business. The decision-making has to be short

and swift so that time is not lost in haranguing over disputes. Time is translatable into

money in Western democracies that are maintained by advanced liberal economies.

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Hence, the market considerations are more important than humanistic considerations.

But, in Akan, for example, the political process could not avoid consensus. The

empowerment of each person as an indispensable part of a community supersedes any

other consideration. Since each person is considered invaluable as a member of the

community, considerations ranging from individual human rights, personhood, and

ethical obligations are imbedded in the process of consensual mediation.

In Akan, the person and the community are intertwined. Hence, there are no

separate armies; no bureaucrats; and no landowners. Land is jointly owned by the lineage.

Each person as a part of the community performs all the aforementioned functions.

Western democracies adhere to a majoritarian decision-making process. This alienates a

huge chunk of people who do not form a part of the winning majority. In Africa, the

traditional African form of government by consensus was not encouraged during the

colonial rule. The British government insisted on a multi-party democracy with elections

as a precondition for independence. Most of the African countries accepted the system of

multi-party democracy foisted on them only to get independence from ruling foreign

powers. Once independence was attained, the elected rulers became dictatorial and

dissolved all opposition parties. One-party system was introduced in most

African states.

Even though Africa boasted of leaders such as Leopold Senghor, Kwame

Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere who were highly educated freedom

fighters, all of them banned other political parties and garnered power. The lack of critical

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counsel and accountability, which was the defining feature of traditional African political

systems, severely damaged the cultural, social, economic, and political fabric of nascent

post-colonial African states. The quagmire created by despotic leaders of the newly

independent African states created incalculable amount of suffering.

Liberal Democracies and Adversarial Politics

Colonial powers such as Britain and France forcibly introduced majoritarian democracy

as a pre-condition for the independence of their colonies. Questions could be raised about

the rationale for laying down the precondition of democratization of traditional societies

that had a communitarian form of government. The political, geographical, and cultural

landscapes of the colonized countries have been ravaged beyond redemption. Hence, by

installing a system of democracy with which people did not identify what were the

chances of such a country surviving as a unified political entity? Democracy and colonial

rule being oxymoronic, what was the rationale behind the insistence of the colonial

powers on a democratic form of government as the precondition for freedom? Only the

educated elite of the colonized countries had exposure to the process of that foreign style

of democracy while the vast multitude was never educated in that system of democracy.

In countries such as India, during the colonial rule, monarchy was operative and

the governance was based on village, town, and city administrations that still followed the

native system of governance. The British had taken over the top administration and the

Viceregal powers regulated the already existing forms of governance. The kings, petty

kings, and other regional rulers were made subservient to the British crown. The British,

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who left religious, cultural and ethnic demography of India mostly unmolested, undertook

very limited structural transformation of the social sphere. Only for strategic reasons, did

the British encourage the Hindu-Muslim divide and later sow the seeds of dissension

between the Hindus, the Sikhs, and the Muslims. After decades of struggle, the British

granted Indians limited political participation at the state level while the final decision-

making authority was with the British. The British had also trained Indians in the

democratic system of governance and hence a transition to democracy was less

problematic compared to several other newly independent colonies.

But, in Africa as well as in Asia, what caused gargantuan miseries to the

population was the arbitrary division or formation of nation-states based on religion,

tribal affiliation and ethnicity. In some cases such as Nigeria, arbitrary grouping of tribes

into one nation has led to calamitous consequences. While colonial powers attempted to

religiously homogenize the colonies with the objective of civilizing the barbarous native

population in many countries, as the religious climate changed in the mother country

giving way to democratic forms of political legitimation, those new ideas were introduced

into the colonies without any time for gradual assimilation or organic development. Thus,

within a space of a few decades, the conceptual schema of the colonized countries

underwent frequent changes, which totally unsettled the social and political systems that

evolved organically. Colonialism was also a cultural invasion. In that sense, both good

and bad aspects of the colonizing cultures intermingled with the native culture of the

colonies. After independence from the colonial powers, those cultures that could not

disentangle the complex web of inter-cultural miasma hurtle down the path of self-

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destruction. The process of cultural de-colonization involves both learning and unlearning

that requires cultural self-reflection.

After democracy became the ruling form of government in all colonizing

countries, the logical corollary was to introduce the same system of governance in the

colonies. The colonies were devastated in the spheres of economy, politics, religion and

education after being ruled by foreign powers for several decades. Christianity was used

to “civilize” the native population of the colonies; democracy was also introduced as a

system of governance not with any consideration to the social and political framework of

the colonized countries but because it was the only system of political legitimation known

to the colonizing powers. The process of aggressive democratization undertaken by

Britain and the United States in the twenty first century also has a dogmatic element but

in a manner much different from the French and the British as colonizers.

When Britain withdrew from India, Iraq, Pakistan, Ghana and other countries after

ending its colonial rule, all those countries were required to design a democratic

constitution. But, in the present climate, constitutional democracy has assumed the

proportions of a religious dogma. With the separation of the Church and the State, the

only good-in-itself whose specter lurks even beyond cultural, religious, and geographical

identities is democracy, the religion. Democracy has assumed a transcendental identity

and, in a manner reminiscent of all religious ideologies, shuns immanent critique.

Democracy is the state religion of the twenty-first century.

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Wiredu rejects both multi-party democracy and one-party rule for Africa. While

the multi-party democracy is majoritarian and power-oriented, the one-party rule is more

despotic. Hence, Wiredu advocates a system of non-party democracy devised along the

lines of traditional African systems. Such a non-party system of democracy could be a

very important structural adjustment in diverse civil societies such as those found in

India, Nigeria and even the United States which is increasingly becoming a home to

multi-lingual and multi-ethnic population with more concrete-identities. Wiredu’s

analysis indicates the flaws in a bi-partisan political system found in countries such as the

United States.

In a two-party system, diverse interests are broadly classified and identified with

either of the parties contesting statewide and nationwide elections. Only those interests

that have powerful financial and political support achieve their ends whereas the voices of

people who belong to the downtrodden sections of the society are seldom heard. While

the separation of the Church, the state, and the market has benefited the people in general,

the strong nexus between the market and the state prejudices the political authority. Even

civil society which in democracies plays a very pivotal role in galvanizing public opinion

on issues of common welfare does not have as much access to the corridors of political

power as the multi-national corporations. In most cases, issues such as health-care,

education, security, and social justice are debated endlessly and totally politicized in a

partisan manner. Proceduralism, unwittingly, contributes to the dilatory tactics of partisan

interests.

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Procedurally, in a democratically elected body such as the United States Senate or

Congress, the Republican and the Democratic parties have to pass laws by a majority

vote. In an atmosphere vitiated by diametrically opposite interests, both parties wrangle

over the items that need to be added or deleted for a bill to pass in the Senate or the

Congress. Finally, when a compromise is reached, a skeletal law that is a pale

resemblance of the original draft of the law is passed. More often than not, the most

powerful interests would have influenced the outcome of the law or bill and the interests

of the common people would have been neglected.

The supporters of a competitive and adversarial politics of the democratic system

found in the United States would indicate the efficacy of the decision-making powers of

the Senate and the Congress. The deliberative politics in the United States is unequivocal

in ensuring legal safeguards, which guarantee the individual rights of the people. But,

even in the court of law, the legal process benefits those with access to good lawyers,

financial support, media exposure, and the willingness to tenaciously pursue a lawsuit.

Even law is politicized in the United States because people elect judges, district attorneys,

and sheriffs according to their party affiliation. Thus, ultimately, procedures that have

been agreed to by the Democrats and the Republicans determine what is true or false and

good or bad.

The domination of corporate interests and emphasis on majority decision-making

is justified by an appeal to possessive individualism and ethical egoism, which culminates

in the reluctance to coordinate social actions on the basis of common welfare interests.

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By encouraging ethical egoism, the welfare of less privileged population is neglected.

Such an emphasis on individual self-interest that evolves into selfishness could be traced

to the total inviolability of individual rights and property as instituted by

Locke. Hobbes and Locke also influenced Jefferson and Madison who encouraged

science, public schools, economic independence of individuals and a separation of

religion and state. Benjamin Franklin was a proponent of Republican ideals and

represented the mercantile interests of America quite admirably.

While Protestant religious ideals were a binding factor, economic interests

predominantly influenced American society because of an emphasis on property and

individual rights as envisaged by Locke. Even today, welfare measures of the government

of the United States always face opposition from the Libertarians because distribution of

property under any guise is an attempt to distribute property. Even the changing face of

the United States which has increasingly integrated people from scores of nations into its

society and the need for investments in social security, education, science and technology,

and infrastructural development has little impact on the Libertarians and the Republicans

who zealously protect their inviolable right to property. Thus, American civil society is

riven by a conflict between the republican and the liberal ideologies. Both ideologies

have allied with interest groups for support. In spite of the United States having

drastically transformed into a multi-cultural society, both conservative and liberal

ideologies do not encourage a system of coalition government democracy with more

representation from under-represented ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups.

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Effects of Cultural Colonization of Africa

Wiredu’s non-party democracy could theoretically redress the problems of

nonrepresentation or under-representation of several cultural, ethnic and racial groups

that feel disenfranchised due to a lack of recognition of their problems. Gyekye and

Wiredu concur on the conceptual reconstruction required to rediscover the cultural past of

Africa and chart a path to the future, through a turbulent present. Africa of the future

needs address issues that arise from colonization in the linguistic, cultural, and political

spheres. In this context, Gyekye analyzes problems inherent to the traditional African

corpus of knowledge. Some problems discussed by Gyekye are technological skill,

scientific knowledge, rights of the spouses in the event of death of the other, one-lineage

rule, and women’s rights. Wiredu also mentions the disadvantages of a commentarial

tradition vis-à-vis written or scriptural traditions of philosophy found in the West and the

East.

Gyekye evaluates both positive and negative aspects of post-colonial African culture.

Wiredu and Gyekye also recognize the need to challenge distortions of African

philosophical thought caused by the discoloration of African culture, language, and

religion during colonial rule. Okot p’Bitek lambasts Western studies of African religious

texts for their ulterior motives. Okot p’Bitek cites several instances in which incorrect

assumptions have completely distorted the meaning of religious beliefs.

Wiredu’s example of the Akan concept of “Anyamesom” will elucidate the lack of

linguistic clarity in English accounts of the Akan practices. The root of “Anyamesom” is

“Onyame.” Roughly translated “Anyamesom” means “service of God.” The word

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“Onyame” translates into Akan “supreme being.” Christian scholars have translated Akan

religion as “Abosomsom.” “Som” means “service” and “Obo” means “stone.” Akan

religion is then translated as “the service of the stone service.” The Akans do believe that

some spirits reside in stones and natural objects. But they do not have any service for the

stones. They do not even worship Onyame, their supreme being. Hence, the

JudeoChristian belief system has been unreflectively transposed on the Akan belief

system. P’Bitek attributes the flippant translations to the motive of defending colonialism

and demeaning African religions. As Wiredu believes, de-Christianization of African

religions is a very important step in disentangling the thread of colonization of African

culture. Religion and culture cannot be de-colonized without recourse to linguistic

devices. Hence, it is necessary for the Africans to philosophize epistemic and

metaphysical concepts in their own language.

Destructive Power of Colonial Myths

In the political arena, the most cataclysmic effect was brought about in Rwanda and

Burundi. The gradual injection of the Hamitic hypothesis into the psyche of both Hutus

and Tutsis was responsible for the eruption of genocidal violence.14 Mahmood

Mamdani’s work on the factors that contributed to the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda and

Burundi traces it to the strong belief in the Hamitic hypothesis of both Hutus and Tutsis.

The Tutsis were considered to be different from the Hutus on account of the former being

Hamitic. The Christian fables have a story about the curse of Noah who was the father of

Ham. Noah cursed Ham for showing disrespect to him. Thus, Ham’s son Cannon

purportedly was the progenitor of a clan of black people. The descendants of such a race

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were the Tutsis according to the colonial masters. While the Tutsis were Africans, the

colonizers painted them as the descendants of Ham arguing that the curse made them

black. Since the Tutsis were the ruling clan in Rwanda, the Tutsis were hailed as Hamites

who were considered to be more of European stock than the native Hutus. All the while

Helen Buss Mitchell, Ed., Roots of World Wisdom, Canada: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999. pp.

106-111. Also refer to Kwasi Wiredu’s “The Moral Foundations of an African Culture” for Akan ethics

which places great emphasis on the interconnectedness of sociality and morality. pp. 331-341. 14

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002.

the Hutus were being ruled by the Tutsis who themselves started believing in the Hamitic

hypothesis.

For the colonial masters, the Hamitic hypothesis gave ample ammunition to

support the Tutsis who were ruling the Hutus. After the independence of Rwanda, the

Hutus who outnumbered the Tutsis in Rwanda captured power and also the jobs. The

Tutsis who were sulking under the Hutu regime repeatedly attacked Rwanda in the name

of Rwandan Patriotic Front from the neighboring Uganda. This resulted in brutal reprisals

from the Hutus. To exacerbate the situation, just before the genocide, the Tutsi army

assassinated the Hutu President of Burundi. What followed were several raids of the RPF

into Rwanda. The Hutus started retaliating by killing several thousand Tutsis in Rwanda.

After repeated provocations by the proponents of the Hutu power, several hundreds of

thousands of Tutsis were killed in a clinical fashion. Thus, the genocide began and with

the assassination of both the President and the Prime Minister of Rwanda, there was no

one to stop the genocide in which the army, hospitals, colleges, schools and Churches

participated as a community ritual. Such a situation arose as a result of colonization and

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the resultant distortion of history that poisoned the relationship between the Hutus and the

Tutsis.

Intersubjectivity in Akan Philosophy

The eyepiece of African culture has been the colonial past, thus far, and hence an entirely

different discourse is needed to balance the colonial past and the post-colonial future. It is

not entirely possible to revisit the ancient African culture because of the irreversible

changes that have taken root in the African society such as Western education,

Christianity, urbanization and political system of multi-party democracy. But there are

ways of incorporating traditional African procedures that would foster a consensual mode

of arriving at political decisions. The traditional Akan emphasis on consensus has

underlying strong moral and communitarian assumptions. Morality in Akan is not

individual but communitarian and hence always has a strong “I-Thou’ (intersubjective)

connotation. Intersubjective relationship also ensures reciprocity that is a defining feature

of the Akan conception of personhood.

A process of introjection of social roles is natural to the Akan conception of

personhood, which is connected with being a responsible member of the Akan

community. Proverbs such as the following emphasize the reflexive nature of Akan

interpersonal relationships, morality and polity. They are:

1. If you do not allow your neighbor to reach nine you will never reach ten.

2. Somebody’s troubles have arrived; those of another are on the way.

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3. It is a fool that says, “My neighbor is the butt of attack not me.”

4. The stick that was used to beat Takyi is the same that will be used to beat

Nyankomago.

5. One person’s path will intersect with another’s before too long.

6. Do not do unto others what you would not that they unto you.

Wiredu argues that the golden rule of doing unto others what one wants to be done to

oneself is enshrined in Akan injunctions against selfishness and egoism. Deontic theories

of ethics of which Rawls was one of the most recent proponents do not address issues of

social inequality effectively and consequentialist-utilitarian ethics of happiness neglects

the need for a social structure and the ineffable nature of happiness. Akan communitarian

ethics allocates roles for a conception of duty as well as happiness within the confines of

Akan community.

Wiredu calls the Akan ethics humanistic because of its emphasis on the

importance of coordination and cooperation within a community without reference to a

God or other supernatural foundations of ethics. In the Akan community, the notion of

personhood required procreation as a necessary qualification. The youngsters were

expected to reverential obey the elders. The strong communal identity itself depends on

traditional agrarian rural culture. In liberal capitalism, civil society replaces traditional

communitarianism.

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Consensus and the Political Structure of the Akan Community The

Akan notion of consensus is communitarian in nature. Akan notion of community

stems from concepts such as mogya (blood principle), onipa (person), and okra (life

principle.) The okra is also the divine element that is present in all human beings

according to the Akans. According to the Akans, human beings are naturally endowed

with the qualities of equality and dignity. The Akan society is matrilineal. Members of

the Akan lineage are found far and wide in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. The Akans

believe that human beings are interdependent. From childhood till death, people need

help from others and hence the individual is always beholden to the society. Some

Akan sayings to this effect are as follows:

a) A human being is not a palm tree so as to be sufficient unto himself.

b) A human being needs help.

c) It is because of the need to have someone blow out the speck of dust in one’s eye that

antelopes go in twos.

There are several adages in Akan that emphasize the need for mutual cooperation,

interdependence, reciprocity, and equality of status of human beings. Akans also

repeatedly indicate equality of human beings in their religious outlook. God bestowed

responsibility on the Akans as masters of their own destiny and at the same time also

vested the individuals with the duty of social responsibility. Akan communitarianism also

stems from a dependency on land. Since agriculture was the main occupation land was

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not owned by individuals but by the community. Even the Akan lineage chiefs did not

have the right to sell off land.

The Akan political system was essentially composed of a council of lineages. The

council chiefs were the most experienced and respected village elders representing

various villages. While most of these positions were hereditary, they were subject to the

will of the people. Some positions such as the ‘leader of the young men’ went to the most

eligible young man of the village who represented the village in the council of chiefs. He

had the right to speak fearlessly about the issues such as those relating to the

nonperformance of chiefs. The Akan community strongly enforced the rule that the chiefs

were selected according to the will of the people. The Akan towns had a council of

village heads with the Chief of the town accorded the role of the chairman. The office of

the chief was both hereditary and elective. Out of the group of eligible leaders from a

lineage, the Queen Mother selected a candidate based on factors such as experience,

reputation, military prowess and integrity from a pool of candidates. But finally the

decision to appoint a chief was in the hands of the council and popular consent.

Deserving candidates from other branches of royal lineages were also given an

opportunity to participate in the political process.

The title of the ‘chief of the young men’ (Nkwankwaahene) was given to a person

who did not belong to the ruling lineage but who had the support of the population of the

village in general. Such a person was authorized to raise objections and convey the

misgivings of the people about a candidate for the title of the chief of the council and on

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any other issue. The Akan political system had confederacies at both state and national

level and the paramount chiefs serving at the level of a group of states were in charge of

the administration of the whole nation.

The Akans recognized the need for an administrative head of the state while at the

same time instituting a system of checks and balances that mirrors the attempts of modern

day democracies. By making the office of the chief accountable to the council of elders and

also popular consent, tyranny was preempted. The decision-making in the council of village

elders achieves its fruition only when a consensus was reached. Such a consensus became

the view of the chief and not vice versa. Since great efforts were made to hear all views

without dismissing or marginalizing any strand of opinion, the final decision was totally

binding on all members of the council. Public criticism of consensus achieved by the council

members was viewed with reprobation. Only the popular representative who did not belong

to the council of elders could question the decision of the council even after a decision was

reached.

In the event of a chief failing to adhere to the rules of political governance, he

faced the prospect of being ‘destooled.’ The Akan equivalent of a throne is the stool. The

office of the chief had sanctity. But the chief was considered to be a spiritually endowed

person only as long he followed the rules of the political governance. Thus, one can

discern an apparently seamless relation between village, town, state and national

governance. Because of a strong local organization and a federal structure at the central

level that emphasized participatory decision-making at all levels, the Akan system of

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governance ensured that local issues were resolved at the local level. Instead of

proceduralizing issues and taking them to a separate judicial authority, issues were

resolved within the community with the aim of establishing peace rather than demanding

retribution. Another important individual right enshrined in the Akan community is the

right to trial. No punishment is meted out without a trial. Wiredu mentions an instance in

which even the dead-body of a person who committed suicide and suspected of some

wrongdoing was tried posthumously.

The Akan concept of right to land is not based on individual ownership but

lineage ownership. The land belonged to the lineages and not to the individuals. No land

could be sold or bartered away. Only the chief has the right to reallocation of possession

in times of distress for a lineage while other lineages have more than what they require.

But the right to the redistribution of the land also requires the cognizance of the lineages

concerned and cannot be done arbitrarily by the chief. In spite of Akan practices such as

right to trial accorded to everyone, community land ownership, non-discrimination,

religious freedom and political consensus, there were social practices which appear

anachronistic such as ritual killing of people to accompany the dead chiefs and the total

supplication demanded of the non-adults as they were not considered mature enough to

voice their opinions. Some of the positive traits of the Akan culture have been ravaged by

colonization, modernization and greed of the chiefs. Wiredu laments the lack of moral

rectitude that has led to the cultural and political chaos in Ghana in particular and Africa

in general due to the collapse of traditional communitarianism.

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Some of the modern African leaders such as Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah, and

Kaunda took advantage of the traditional emphasis on non-party democracy to install

themselves as unquestioned leaders and established one-party rule. By obfuscating the

distinction between a non-party democracy and one-party rule, despotic African leaders

justified their rule on the basis of traditional communitarian political system of Africa. As

Wiredu points out, one of the most cherished rights of the African culture, the right to

representation in political decision-making, has been denied by despotic regimes in

outright defiance of the UN Human Rights declaration. But more recently, because of the

tremendous pressure exercised by the UN and other member countries on military

dictators and other tyrannical rulers, Africa has multi-party democracy in several

countries. Wiredu argues that even though a multi-party democracy is better than tyranny;

it only breeds adversarial attitude and not consensual decision-making because of the

emphasis on majority vote. While the ethno-centric approach of the colonizers to

political, social, economic and religious affairs of Africa has contributed to a large extent

in the ensuing political instability of those African states that gained independence in the

second half of the twentieth-century, a dearth of African leaders with a vision for better

Africa and also the collapse of traditional political institutions and the post-colonial pangs

of anxiety have contributed to the desuetude.

Difference between the Akan and the Western notion of Consensus

The notion of consensus has different connotations in the Western and African contexts.

In the Western conception of a notion of consensus idealized by Habermas, which is

designed on the Enlightenment idea of reason, people debate an issue aiming to arrive at

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an understanding with the only deciding factor being the force of arguments (rationally

motivated agreement). Every person will be allowed to speak without being coerced. The

process of argumentation and discourse will require people to be linguistically competent,

rational, and democratic. All these prerequisites demand Western education, linguistic

skills, and a particular type of rationality. Such a notion of consensus in which the best

argument wins the day does not take into account variations in linguistic competence,

social practices, political system, education, and cultural traditions. Moreover, by

stipulating the necessity of a winning argument, the other parties feel excluded and

unrepresented. Thus, by reducing the rationality to the outcome of an argumentation

process, the resultant agreement does not qualify as a consensual agreement.

The Western notion of consensus is arriving at an agreement without recourse to

extra-verbal remonstrations. Disagreements are to be resolved within the framework of a

discourse and the discursive framework has been agreed upon before the commencement

of the debate. Hence, only those arguments that stand out as rational will be acceptable to

the people who are chosen as interlocutors based on their communicative competence.

Thus, a concept of consensus in Western democracies, according to Habermas, is only

aimed at arriving at a mutual understanding among free and equal individuals. The

Western concept of consensus depends upon the conception of individuals as capable

actors who can engage in rational argumentation. But a consensus among variegated

ethnic, linguistic, racial and religious groups requires genuine compromise and

understanding. The asymmetrical nature of multicultural dialogue would be best served

by adopting a path of consensus similar to the Akan notion of consensus.

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Thinkers such as Wiredu and Gyekye refer to an entirely different conception of

consensus in their writings. The African notion of consensus that Kaunda, Nyerere,

Wiredu and Gyekye talk about is related more to a compromise that is achieved as a result

of detailed consultation on thorny issues in which people from all sections are represented

by delegations at various levels of the government. Among Western countries, the United

States of America practices a form of democracy in which two big parties (the Republican

and the Democratic Parties) contest elections and the power changes hands between them.

While legal and constitutional safeguards are in place, all sections of people are not

represented, especially minorities, handicapped, and women. The decision-making power

rests with the party that has more members in the Congress or the Senate. Every political

decision boils down to a power game between the

Democrats and the Republicans. Finally, in order to transact business in the House or the

Senate, there is a need for compromise, which is more often than not based on

expediency. The acrimony and antagonism that is created between the two political

parties is matched only by the apathy shown by the suffrage due to the cynicism arising

out of the irremediability of the situation.

A large portion of American voters believes that the Republican and the

Democratic parties are only after power and not common good. Since there are no

alternatives because of the domination of two major political parties in the United States,

the Democratic and the Republican parties, it is not possible for small political parties

such as the Green Party or the Libertarian Party to advertise their message adequately to

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the general public. Bipartisan consensus is more akin to the concept of interest-based

democracy and not the Habermasian ideal of deliberative democracy. Even fundamental

issues such as education and health-care are contentious because of the procedural

incompatibility between the liberal and the conservative strands of American political

system. Max Weber’s characterization of the Western bureaucracy as driven by

purposive-rationalization has been consummated in the American political system.

Reductionistic analysis in terms of good-evil, friend-enemy, and rationalirrational

categories have gained such a stranglehold on the American populace that a third option

is never considered a viability. More often than not, Habermas’s ideal consensus operates

even rarely in the rarefied atmosphere of the board meetings of multinational companies.

On the contrary, paradoxically, Habermasian consensus unlike in the highly rationalized

societies is possible only in communities such as Akans in

Ghana. The underlying assumptions in Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” based on the

categorical imperative of Kant have become supererogatory in the post-modern scenario.

Hence, consensus along the lines of Habermas’ theory of communicative action is ironically

out of place in advanced liberal societies such as the United States. Unlike interest-based

democracy, Africans especially in Ghana practiced a form of delegacy, a form of consensual

communitarianism that was non-party.

The consensual form of governance that was prevalent in African groups such as

the Akan, the Zulu and the Swazi have a long history of successful resolution of conflicts.

According to Wiredu, a need for consensus indicates conflict and a successful consensus

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is in the resolution of the conflicts taking into account the views of all concerned. Unlike

the Western notion of consensus that has been constructed around the Hobbesian social

contract that is negative in connotation, the African notion is positive. In the Western

notion of consensus, the innate assumption is the vacuousness of involving all sections of

the populace in the consensual decision-making process. Another negative assumption

that characterizes Western debates is a sense of disbelief in the ability of people to come

together to resolve conflicts, which could be due to the failure of the Enlightenment ideal

that reason would free the world of all its ills. The classic example of such a mutual

distrust is the doctrine of mutual destruction practiced by the erstwhile Soviet Union and

the United States of America. Perversely, the tenuous peace that lasted for more than

thirty years between the Soviet Union and the United States validates both Hobbes and

structural transformation is indisputable but Habermasian postnational constellation has been theorized only

from the viewpoint of advanced liberal countries and a global economy. The prospects of the twentyfirst

century appear to be more daunting and more catastrophical and with the absence of a doctrine of mutual

deterrence, however sinister it then appeared, the world looks even more dangerous and selfdestructive.

Thus, Habermas’ oxymoronic ideal espouses a universal communitarianism, which is antithetical to liberal

individualism, which would require a Sisyphean sadomasochistic self-denial on the part of the entire

population of the world.

Socrates. The fear of awesome retribution acted as a deterrent for both the USSR and the

US while extraordinary amount of restraint and back channel diplomacy also bespeaks of

some last vestige of goodness that prevented the respective governments from taking

extreme measures. While any direct strike on the US or the USSR was deterred, it did not

preclude both the US and the USSR from waging proxy wars in different parts of the

globe. The cost of those proxy wars has been colossal for both the USSR and the US.

Especially, in the case of the US, it culminated in the events of September 11th 2001.

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A doctrine of mutual deterrence, strict surveillance of people, an adversarial

political process, and a society that encourages competition than cooperation is not the

best setting for consensual interaction. While the African consensual process presumes an

intention on the part of the interlocutors to arrive at a consensus irrespective of their

positions, the Western notion of consensus has too many mandatory requirements to even

qualify to be a part of the consensual process, which stipulates necessary cultural

prerequisites.

The imagery that characterizes the Akan rationale for a consensus is that of a

crocodile with two heads and one stomach fighting over the food. The colourful imagery

portrays the paradox of the people belonging to a same group with same interests fighting

over matters that could have been resolved amicably if only they had understood that the

final destination or the ultimate objective is best achieved by working together.

The crocodile imagery scoffs at the stupidity of human beings caused by selfish motives.

Another striking example of the Akan openness is the statement “even a fool is entitled to

be heard.” Any consideration of social status, intelligence quotient, or any other

discriminatory factors have been dismissed by the edict that everyone needs to be heard.

While the preparatory process of an Akan consensus is laudable for its emphasis

on equality, the procedural part of a consensual process is even more rigorous. Any

vexatious issue would have to be discussed at various levels such as villages, towns, cities

and finally amongst the king and the advisory council. Instead of a process that imposes

the will of a numerical majority on everyone else, the Akan process of consensus

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necessarily involves the participation of the people at every level. But, does the Akan

process of consensus lead to unanimity? While K.A. Busia nostalgically remarks about

the emphasis on unanimity among the interlocutors, Wiredu argues that the condition of

unanimity is meant to be only an ideal objective of a consensual process. Unanimity is the

avowed goal but not if it is forced. A consensus is achieved through compromise between

clashing viewpoints on social issues. Epistemic and ethical issues have underlying

assumptions about truth and value respectively. These are assumptions that are shared by

all cultures. Hence, they are known as cultural universals. An example of a cultural

universal concept is human rights. Epistemic or ethical issues need to be justified

critically and rationally. But on social issues, compromise leads to consensus. A general

broad-based consensus presages unanimity while the particulars and the specifics are

open for further discussion. “Unanimity is the perfection of consensus. But consensus

does not call for unanimity.” Wiredu clarifies that while unanimity of opinions will solve

all conflicts, it is next to impossible to arrive at unanimous decisions while tackling

thorny issues. Hence, consensus is a peaceful reconciliation of differences by taking into

account various ideas voiced by the affected people. Even if the process takes more time,

the objective of a consensus will have to be pursued to its logical end. A consensual

decision-making process, in the African context, is very close to a decision-making

process by consent.

Democracy - A Government by Consent

In a democracy, individual opinions are supposed to be valued. But, in Anglo-American

forms of democracy, the majority group enjoys total political power. Democracy is

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identified more with the possession of decision-making power than a form of governance

that takes into consideration the common good. Since winning elections is the only form

of power, the whole process is categorized by competition, jealousy, and rivalry. The

winner take all policy is not representative of all sections of people and this leads to

alienation amongst people who are not part of the winning party. Wiredu also points out

the lack of representation from various sections of the electorate in spite of various

committees, commissions, and other constitutional safeguards guaranteeing a voice for

the minorities. The minority has Hobbesian privileges of rights to self-preservation and

Lockean rights of property while the majority has the power to enforce their social and

economic policies on the minority.

In the case of African traditional societies such as the Akan, the Zulu and the

Swazi, the aim of a consensual process of decision-making is not triumph or defeat but

amicable settlement of problems. The majority opinion does have its significance but the

minority needs to be heard and its concerns noted. If the minority is convinced by the

sincerity of majority opinion then there is no objection to implement the majority

decision. But the majority opinion cannot be imposed as a decision on minority based on

the numerical strength of the majority. The main objective of democracy is to protect

individual freedom from the tyranny of the majority. Wiredu constantly reminds us of the

perils of a contentious and adversarial form of democracy encouraged in Britain and the

United States. But democracies in the United States and Great Britain, while situated on

the ideal of common good for all, are influenced by public opinion or vested interests. In

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a rights based democracy, any infringement of individual rights would have to be fought

procedurally.

The Weberian analysis that the movement for democracy has been influenced

heavily by monetary and mercantile considerations can be applied to the interest-based

forms of democracy practiced in the United States. It has been widely recognized that

economic interests determine the political clout in especially countries such as the United

States. If an individual has wealth, then he/she has access to power and vice versa. The

macro-economic trickle-down theory is the predominant economic principle that is aided

by a strong procedural streak embedded in the United States political system. A partisan

war is fought on several fronts in the United States political system such as immigrant

rights, welfare, health insurance, education, social security, foreign policy and trade.

While the conservative right and the liberal left both recognize individual liberty,

their interpretations of the concept of liberty are different. While the liberals emphasize

negative liberty with non-interference from the government, the conservatives emphasize

positive liberty with non-domination as the guarantee of the individual rights. Thus,

economic liberty is paramount for the conservatives while the liberals value individual

rights in terms of sexual orientation, body, and religious beliefs. While the libertarians

avowedly oppose any intervention in both economic and individual rights, the

Republicans support the trickle down economy of neo-classical capitalism while the

liberals want social security, unions, education and health-care all affordable to ordinary

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citizens. There is a subtle class conflict but more complex than those found in the mines

of England in the mid-nineteenth century.

The salutary effect of proceduralism, even while producing alienation and

individuation, is that it protects the social fabric of capitalistic economies, by creating a

complex web of bureaucracy, entertainment, courts and elections, from descending into

the Hobbesian state of nature. The governments in such democracies have to perform a

balancing act between various interest groups and hence are necessarily majoritarian in

policy implementation. Such governments do not have a holistic view of common good.

As Wiredu rightly points out, the basic premise of such democracies is based on the

assumption that there are not many possibilities for arriving at a consensus in order to

solve problems. In order to expedite the decision-making process, the majority opinion

necessarily overrides minority sensibilities. Even though, in some sense, most

democracies are interest-based democracies, majority opinion has greater procedural

force in the United States. Hence, there is minimal scope for a government by consent or

consensus in adversarial democracy practiced in the United States.

Democracy – A Government by Consensus

Traditional African societies such as the Akan, the Zulu, the Swazi, the Banyankole, the

Tallensi and several others have had either centralized or non-centralized forms of

governance. Wiredu analyses the system of political governance in the Ashanti group of

Ghana to illustrate how consensus is achieved. The Ashantis, who are a subgroup of

Akan, are matrilineal. Every Akan town or village is composed of several clans. A lineage

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from one of these clans constitutes the royal lineage and the people of the town or village

accept the royalty of the lineage. From this lineage, the chief is elected. A lineage

comprises of individuals who are linked by kinship relationship. Every town or village

constitutes a political unit and together the villages and towns for a paramountcy, a state

(oman), namely, the Asante state or Akim Abuakwa state headed by a paramount chief,

the omanhene. While selecting the chief of a state, the council comprising of village

chiefs and the ‘commoners’ Asafo company have to authorize the selection out of a pool

of worthy men. Thus, a chief cannot be imposed upon the Akan community. The chief

does not have an agenda apart from the one given by the people. The chief publicly takes

an oath assuring the people that he would implement and adhere to what has been

ordained by the people of Akan. Some of the demands imposed by the people on the chief

are as follows:

We do not wish that he should curse us.

We do not wish that he should be greedy.

We do not wish that he should be disobedient [or, refuse to take advice].

We do not wish that he should treat us unfairly.

We do not wish that he should act on his own initiative.

We do not wish that it should ever be that he should say to us, “I have no time,” “I have

no time.”

The above-mentioned dictates of the people illustrate what is meant by the concept of

‘democracy by consent.’ While the people have invested political authority in the chief,

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he/she cannot act unilaterally without consulting the people at every level of the Akan

political organization, be it the village or the state. The council of elders, who are

themselves chiefs or lineage heads of the villages or the towns, will have to consult their

constituents before taking the matter to higher levels. The chief will then act on the

advice of the council of elders. Thus, the chief does not exist apart from the people and

the people demand a part in the decision-making process. Any violation on the part of the

chief invokes the punishment of de-stooling.

While the rule by the consent of all is a sublime ideal, the question is how to

translate consent into practice. Or in other ways, how does the consent of people manifest

into political action? The answer is through consensus. While the consent of the people is

sought at every stage of decision-making, divergent views are processed at the crucible of

consensus. Consensus brings about a compromise between various options. The Akan

system of governance fervently believes in collective thinking. Adages such as “One head

does not go into council,” and “Wisdom is not in the head of one person,” betray a strong

sense of participatory decision-making that is supposed to be the hallmark of modern

democracies. Since the people of the Ashanti community did not feel themselves

alienated from the political process, a separate system of checks and balances was not

needed.

In the final analysis, African ethnic groups such as the Akan, Zulu, Tallensi, and

Swazi fostered a system of governance that could be viewed as democratic, broadly.

Some of them had centralized governance, for example, Akan, and some did not such as

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Logoli and Tallensi. But, the emphasis on consensus is found in many groups such as the

Akans. For Akans, consensus is the only way to resolve conflicts and no other way is

better. Consensus is the only avenue for cementing the consent of the people.

Majoritarian democracies of the Anglo-American model do not rule by the consent of the

people by any stretch of imagination. Consensus in such democracies operates at the level

of deal making or compromise on what is acceptable to both parties in conflict. A change

of cultural paradigm is not possible from such positional negotiation process. Two sides

involved in a debate dogmatically hold on to their foundational ideologies and hence a

solution outside the existing paradigmatic framework fails to emerge.

Wiredu captures the essence of the sense of deprivement and alienation that

permeates the being of the vanquished political party and its supporters. Wiredu also

suggests that the democratic models of governance found in Switzerland and Belgium are

better models than those found in the United States and Britain for the simple reason that

the government includes people belonging to political parties representing different

sections of the people. The inability of the Anglo-American models to include diverse

interests and the stranglehold of the business interests on the government has resulted in

adversarial politics and the neglect of the process of rapprochement between eternally

feuding political parties. While the system of traditional governance in Africa,

theoretically, took into consideration the will and the welfare of the people, modern

democracies attach more importance to the system of administration. While individual

liberties and rights are enshrined in the UN Human Rights Charter and in the constitution

of various countries, translating rights into practice is seldom smooth. In traditional

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African societies, protection of individual rights was coeval with governance and hence

there was little need for a separate charter of human rights.

African Communitarianism and Post-Colonial Political Ideology

Post-colonial Africa produced several leaders such as Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor,

Kenneth Kaunda, and Kwame Nkrumah, who utilized their Western education to suit the

African context. All the afore-mentioned leaders were trained in Western cultural

environment and also received advanced Western educational training. Julius Nyerere

espoused an indigenous approach to social organization and economic development similar

to traditional African form of communitarianism, which he called Ujaama socialism. As the

President of Tanzania, Nyerere pursued an agro-based economy and encouraged

cooperatives that would be supported by communitarian African society. Leopold Senghor,

who ruled Senegal as its President for more than two decades, advocated a strong blend of

native African culture of Senegal and the acquired knowledge in science and technology

from Europe. Senghor also accommodated religion in his philosophy. Senghor was a

Christian leader in a predominantly Muslim country.

In his writings, Senghor was refreshingly candid about the foibles of African

culture and the benefits of European scientific development and the need to strike a right

balance between European education and African culture. Senghor’s European education

influenced his political ideas. Senghor’s words encapsulated his thoughts about the

concept of a nation: “What makes the Nation, is a common will for a life in common.”

Senghor’s approach took a critical view of European capitalism as well as

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Soviet-style socialism. Senghor’s avowed idea was to integrate the contributions of

European socialism with African traditional values.

Julius Nyerere, who was the first President of Tanzania, endorsed

communitarianism and opposed capitalism. Nyerere felt that only a shared enterprise

characteristic of African communitarianism would be suitable for Tanzania. Hence,

Nyerere was more interested in state participation in the distribution and sharing of

wealth than in state ownership of the means for the creation of wealth. “The Arusha

Declaration” clearly outlines Nyerere’s emphasis on rural development and cooperatives.

He disavowed the economic theories of both Adam Smith and Marx. While Adam Smith

is considered to be the high priest of capitalism, Marx’s theory of class conflict between

the proletariat and the bourgeoisie created a crevasse between various sections of the

society. Nyerere and Senghor, both contest the relevance of the proletariat-bourgeoisie

dichotomy in the African context.

Kwame Nkrumah, who was the first President of Ghana, was a sworn Marxist but

tailored his ideology to the Ghanaian topology. Since Nkrumah did not have to contend

with the Marxian binary opposition between the bourgeoisie and the exploited proletariat

in Ghana, Nkrumah went on a reckless spree of mechanization in Ghana that brought

disastrous consequences. Nkrumah did not find any contradiction between religion and

Marxism. For Nkrumah, the Marxist revolution was only contingent upon the situation.

During the Ghanaian freedom struggle, Nkrumah charted a course of non-violent protests

and strikes rather than espousing armed revolution. It is ironical that Nkrumah advocated

revolutionary socialism while in exile after he was deposed in a coup in 1966. It was

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convenient for Nkrumah to talk about armed revolt since he was deprived of political

power and wanted to recapture power. Nkrumah exhorted his compatriots to rise in revolt

against the people who deposed him. Hence, the Marxian element of inner-contradiction

in capitalism and also the tension between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are not a

part of the political ideology of Nkrumah, in a true sense.

All the afore-mentioned leaders were culpable of identifying communitarianism in

non-partisan traditional African societies with one-party system of democracy, in which

alternative processes of electing leaders were scuttled. A despotic leader forcibly imposed

the one-party system on the populace in order to perpetrate a system of governance

without a choice for alternatives. While Nkrumah was unscrupulous in changing

strategies to consolidate his political power, Nyerere truly believed in the efficacy of

African communitarianism and systematically implemented measures to encourage

people to get involved in rural reconstruction. Senghor understood the lacunae in Western

socialism and capitalism and hence advocated self-reliance, cultural rejuvenation and

pooling of resources. Senghor’s Mali Federation was an idea in promoting federalism

amongst Sudan, Senegal, Upper Volta and Dahomey. Upper Volta and Dahomey did not

join the federation as the referendum failed to muster support and later they joined Niger

and Ivory Coast in the Counseil de l’Entente. Senghor also tried to initiate a federation of

twelve West African states with the exception of Madagascar.

Senghor’s integration of West African states is based on the concept of negritude.

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The concept of negritude defines Senghor’s communitarianism as African collectivity.

Nkrumah contributed little or nothing to strengthen the notion of African

communitarianism in Ghana. Nkrumah dreamed of a federation of African countries. But,

Nkrumah’s drastic measures to indiscriminately industrialize Ghana in a short span of time

and revitalize the economy by huge imports proved to be a disaster in the long run.

Nkrumah, who was a despotic ruler, neglected Ghana’s traditional system of governance,

which symbolized communitarianism.

Nyerere is the best example of an African leader who designed his whole political

enterprise on the concept of communitarianism. But Nyerere also ruled Tanzania with an

iron hand under a one-party system. The Akan concept of communitarianism, which

encompasses personhood, human rights and consensual political decision-making,

distinguishes communitarianism from individualism. The Western notion of

communitarianism is rights-based and treats community as an aggregate of individuals.

Gyekye rejects any such description of African communitarianism and also asserts the

proviso of individual value imbedded in the collective decision-making process of

communitarian African groups such as Akans. Gyekye refers to Senghor’s moderate

stance on African communitarianism and his simultaneous emphasis on the importance of

the role of individuals in a community. Hence, African communitarianism is not inimical

to individual development.

Chapter 5

Political Consensus – Intra-cultural and Extra-cultural

In the postmodern epoch, the originary or foundational categories have been replaced by

the interstitial spaces of the binary oppositional categories such as subject-object,

blackwhite, colonizers-colonized, and capitalist-communist discourse. While

globalization has created a common market, post-colonial and post-modern frameworks

have created a sense of the present in terms of subjective-identities. The post-colonial and

minority groups have started experiencing the presence while advanced liberal

democracies are oriented towards the future. Hence, there is a phase-difference in the

conceptualization of concepts such as democracy, religion, economy, justice, and

education and what they signify for the developed and developing countries. The tyranny

of the universal, which was total in the pre-modern and modern cultures, had

camouflaged the interstices, which epitomize difference and instead constructed a canopy

of illusion of universality. In this chapter, I have argued that a process of consensus

cannot avoid cultural differences, conflict of identities, systematic distortions, and a clash

of social and individual imaginaries. Conflict between cultural universals and particulars

afflict both intra-cultural and extra-cultural discourse. In intra-cultural discourse, a debate

on cultural

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universals and particulars depends on a shared social imaginary within a culture. In an

extra-cultural discourse, there is a clash of social imaginaries of different cultures. In the

former there is confusion about what constitutes cultural particulars and universals. In the

latter, there is a need for conceptual clarification of social imaginaries. In order to

facilitate consensus, I propose cooperative action, which aims at partial or limited

unanimity, a joint venture in pursuit of agreement, recognition of cultural differences,

mutual adjustment of viewpoints, and a flexibility in initial and final conceptual

positions.

While there is always the danger of panoply of individual identities dissolving

into egoism, at the individual level, and ethnic conflict, at the social level, celebration of

individual identities have immensely contributed to the colorfulness of world in terms of

variegated cultures, languages, customs, and religions. It must be noted that as Cornel

West and Bell Hooks averred, historical descriptions of pre-modern, modern and

postmodern epochs have differing significance depending upon social contexts. The

aforementioned contextual framework is emphasized by Amartya Sen as evaluator-

relative ethical framework. Homi Bhabha argues that there is a cultural consciousness of

the interstitial and that of the presence that characterizes the postmodern firmament.

Bhabha writes as follows:

It is in the emergence of the interstices – the overlap and displacement of domains

of difference – that the intersubjective and collective experiences of nationness,

community interest, or cultural values are negotiated. How are subjects formed

‘in-between’, or in excess of, the sum of ‘parts’ of difference (usually intoned as

race/class/gender, etc.)? How do strategies of representation or empowerment

come to be formulated in the competing claims communities where, despite

shared histories of deprivation and discrimination, the exchange of values,

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meanings and priorities may not always be collaborative and dialogical, but may

be profoundly antagonistic, conflictual and even incommensurable?

While Bhabha’s description would encapsulate the Indian post-independence cultural

experience to a nicety, it is also true of most advanced countries that are addressing the

issue of multiculturalism. Michael Dummett’s writings on the plight of economic

refugees in European and North American countries have revealed glaring deficiencies in

addressing the issues of economic and political asylums. Bhabha refers to an underlying

process of cultural hybridization that has cultural difference at the center. Cultural

differences are recognized and respectfully engaged. According to Bhabha, “The

borderline engagements of cultural difference may often be consensual as well as

conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; realign the

customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge

normative expectations of development and progress.”6

Bhabha reiterates constantly that internationalism must be a ‘middle passage’ that

does not totalize individual experience. A lack of recognition of cultural hybridity and the

presence of the interstices have had incalculably damaging consequences as witnessed in

Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, Rwanda-Burundi, and Palestine, to name a few. Totalization of

particular cultural experiences lead to exclusionary lifeworlds. Bhabha argues that the

postcolonial epoch is a celebration of cultural hybridity and interstitial spaces. The

concept of fusion of horizons brilliantly explicated by Gadamer has a hoary history. Kant,

Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Levinas, Benjamin, Adorno, and Heidegger have been the

torchbearers of the ethics of mutual recognition. Of all the above-mentioned pantheon of

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philosophers, Gadamer and Levinas have given the most positive and constructive

reconciliation of the theoria and praxis of the ethics of mutual recognition.

Intersubjectivity and Cultural Hybridization

The approach that characterizes Gadamer’s and Levinas’ theories of alterity is the warmth

and comfort exuded vis-à-vis the ‘other.’ Heidegger grounded the Dasein as the dynamic

being-in-the-world that straddles the ontic and the ontological level. The ontological level

is not an abstraction from the ontic level. But Gadamer and Levinas take the concept of

intersubjective relationship to a new level by creating the optimal non-instrumental

conditions for a mutual interaction between the ‘I’ and the ‘other.’ While Gadamer’s

philosophical hermeneutics desists from a categorical incarceration of the ‘other,’ Levinas

makes the ‘I’ completely subservient to the ‘other.’

I would characterize Levinas’ inversion of the Enlightenment prejudice towards

the ‘I’ as the tyranny of the slave. This would probably engender a dread that Sartre

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