LI: explanation and critique
So as to fully grasp the ‘two level games’ position of Liberal
Intergovernmentalism it is
. This section first describes the (the first level),
then assesses the theoretical assumptions at the (the second
level) and presents an overall, streamlined, description of LI’s view of
integration in the EU. The final section discusses some of the critique levelled
at LI.
First level: domestic politics
. Specifically,
Moravcsik invokes a ‘liberal commercial’ or ‘pluralist’ approach with regards
to national policy preference formation. T
In other words, as per liberal
models of the state that see the state as
Moravcsik argues that
l. From all of these different inputs the
This ‘average’ of the policy desires
‘national policy preferences’
Domestic preferences
Second level: state to state bargaining
Moravcsik then offers a model of intergovernmental bargaining between EU
states at the international level.
.
Furthermore, Moravcsik sees states as ‘ ’
. This means that at the international level
states make decisions based on whether a settlement between EU states is in
their interests by weighting up the pros and cons of an issue. Thus, at the
‘state bargaining’ stage states are assumed to be unitary,
The final decision of bargaining between European states is decided by the
relative power of each party.
. Generally speaking,
LI argues that the less a state has to lose from walking away from the
negotiation, the more powerful its bargaining position and the more likely
will be able to achieve its overall objectives.
got info on this in one note
LI simplified
Stripped down to its most fundamental tenets, the theory of LI argues
the following.
1. European states decides on their national policy preferences by
aggregating the policy desired of the most influential sections of society.
2. Governments adopt these policies as national policy.
3. They then take these positions to interstate bargaining situations
(Council of Ministers meetings, European Council meetings etc).
4. Outcomes depend on the relative power of the states taking part and
the amount that they had to lose by not finding a solution. If one state
can walk away from the negotiation with little cost to itself, then it is in
a more powerful position that those who cannot.
Questioning Liberal Intergovernmentalism
The theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism has been very influential in the
conceptualisation of European integration and, correspondingly, has sparked
much debate. Like neo-functionalism before it, LI has been a theory that many
in the field have sought to either work with or oppose and challenge
(Rosamond, 2000, p.145). The remainder of this extract draws attention to
some of the critiques of LI.
He notes
. For (former) neo-functionalists such as Lindberg, LI does not pay
enough attention to supranational actors such as the Commission,
downplaying their role and thus not taking their importance into account
(Rosamond, 2000, p.145).
has criticised Moravcsik for focusing too much on the ‘supply
side’ of integration (i.e. the final decisions to integrate) rather than the
suggests that Moravcsik’s theory relates more to explaining integration rather
Likewise, Wincott has suggested that LI is an “approach” rather than strictly
speaking a “theory” as it does not lay out the conditions under which the
theory might be proved false (falsified) (1995, p.600). Whether you agree with
this of course depends somewhat on the definition of theory you adopt and
view on the purpose of theory (see ‘ ’ earlier in this module). Why theorise at all
Likewise, as discussed in Rosamond (2000, p.147), Smith and Ray (1993)
criticise the reduction to only two levels of analysis in LI. They argue that in
addition to the domestic level and the inter-state level, scholars of European
integration should also focus on other forums of interaction such as:
1. Regular, institutionalised EU state – EU state level (in the council of
ministers for example).
2. EU member state – non EU member state negotiations
3. Sub-national exchange between domestic levels
Criticism
This focus sees Moravcsik’s two levels as too narrow and calls for bringing
into the analysis other agents such as non-EU states and non-state actors. Such
an approach starts to match closely with the picture of multi-level governance
introduced in the previous module (Rosamond, 2000, p.147).
Many of these debates stem from a disagreement on the basic actors in the
European integration process. Moravcsik limited his focus to the actions of
states. Within his model states are the most important actors in that they
aggregate domestic preferences and then act on them at the international
level. Other scholars, however, for both academic and political reasons, do not
wish to focus solely on states. Some think that other actors such as the
Commission or the ECJ, are also (or equally as) important in the policy
making process. Furthermore, for some scholars, particularly those that
politically favour greater European integration, states are part of the problem
of European integration, rather than necessarily the drivers of it.
Further reading
Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community; A
Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach. . Vol Journal of Common Market Studies
31 (4). (pp. 473-424).
Rosamond, B. (2000). . Macmillan: Theories of European Union Integration
Basingstoke.
Wincott, D. (1995). Institutional Interaction and European Integration:
Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. Journal of
Common Market Studies. Vol 33 (4). (pp. 597-609).
