Creating a Continental Army
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
According to Washington's aide Alexander Hamilton, the military strategy the General
would pursue throughout the Revolutionary War was as follows: "our hopes are not placed in
any particular city, or spot of ground, but in preserving a good army . . . to take advantage of
favorable opportunities, and waste and defeat the enemy by piecemeal."
In order to "preserve a good army," one had to be created in the first place. It was a long
and difficult road from the Continental Congress's edict designating the militia around Boston as
a Continental Army and creating such an army in fact. Although many colonials had had some
military experience in the French and Indian War, most had served in militia units, a far cry from
service in a regular European-style army. The latter, Washington believed, was what the
Continental Army needed to become if the colonies were to stand up to the British army.
As Washington put the matter shortly after he arrived in Boston to take command of the
army: "The course of human affairs forbids an expectation that troops formed under such
circumstances [militia] should at once possess the order, regularity, and discipline of veterans."
Washington rather optimistically added, "Whatever deficiencies there may be, will, I doubt not,
soon be made up by the activity and zeal of the officers, and the docility and obedience of the
men. These qualities, united with their native bravery and spirit, will afford a happy presage of
success. . . ." How this opinion would soon change!
When Washington assumed his duties in Boston, he saw no end to problems. "The abuses
[problems] in this army, I fear, are considerable, and the new modelling of it [reorganization], in
the face of an enemy, from whom we every hour expect an attack, is exceedingly difficult and
dangerous." Although often dismayed by his charge, Washington set out to create an army that
could stand up in the field to the best army in the world at that time. The documents included
here will give you a sense of some of the problems and issues. These and other problems
continued to plague Washington and his army throughout the conflict. Over time, Washington
would come to believe that only the creation of a permanent standing army could save the
revolution.
Revolutionary War: Northern Front, 1775-1777
In the first eighteen months of armed conflict with the British (the conflict would not
become a "war for independence" until July 4, 1776), Washington had begun to create an army
and forced the British army in Boston to evacuate that city in March 1776. The major question
after their evacuation was what they would do next. Washington was almost certain that the
British would attack New York, since that position was of critical importance for their operations
both North and South. Besides, that is what he would have done had he been in Sir William
Howe's shoes.
Even though his premonition eventually proved true, British intentions did not become
clear until their fleet descended upon New York in August 1776. For a variety of reasons,
Washington and his generals made a number of mistakes during the engagements in the New
York area. These mistakes and Britain's far superior naval power led to decided British victories
on Long Island and on Manhattan. Had the British commanders been a bit more aggressive, their
naval power might have put the Continental Army at great risk of total defeat.
After Washington was driven from Manhattan, his army fought Howe's forces to a
standstill at White Plains. Even so, the British were now in control of New York City. Again, the
question became, what would the British do next? Washington thought the logical next step for
them to do was to move on Philadelphia, so he moved most of his army south into New Jersey.
Indeed, British forces under General Charles Lord Cornwallis chased and harrassed the
Continentals all the way through New Jersey. When Washington's army reached Trenton Falls,
their fortunes seemed at low ebb. Surprisingly, at that point Howe ordered his army into winter
quarters rather than attacking the Americans. Seizing the opportunity Howe presented him,
Washington counterattacked at Trenton in late December 1776 and then at Princeton in early
1777.
What Washington had done in nine days was truly staggering. Just when many Americans
thought all was lost, Washington had produced two major victories over one of the world's most
powerful armies. Trenton and Princeton tended to put to rest the second-guessing about
Washington's leadership, a belief that had grown as the Continental Army suffered defeats in
New York and then retreated through New Jersey. These victories had also been watched closely
by many European leaders; they now came to view Washington as an adroit and able
commander.
On the other hand, the British were not impressed with Washington's accomplishments.
All in all, Lord North thought 1776 had been a very good year for the British. They had retained
Canada and captured New York City, their losses of soldiers had not been great, and nearly
40,000 loyalists had received pardons from Howe. British leaders would also have been
heartened had they fully known what Washington knew about the chronic problems experienced
by the Continental Army. Washington was continually concerned with problems of the militia,
recruits, and deserters and he constantly reminded Congress of the need for a standing
professional army and a better system of supply.
