i
ASSESSING THE OPERATIONAL STRENGTHS AND STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF
CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN SOUTH SUDAN
WITHIN THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
ii
ABSTRACT
This paper determines the strengths of operation and the weaknesses of the structure of operational
mechanisms of conflict early warning and response in South Sudan as a part of the African Peace and
Security Architecture. Based on the empirical data and on the literature, the study analyzes the practice of the
functioning of these mechanisms, the degree, to which they help in forecasting and preventing the conflict and
obstacles that hamper their effectiveness. The analysis reveals that early warning systems play a significant
role in the dynamics of conflict, presenting the underlying causes of the conflict, educating timely
interventions, and coordinating interventions between the national, regional, and international actors. These
operational advantages have helped in de-escalation, better peacebuilding policies, and increased situational
awareness in the South Sudan whose conflict has been a prolonged war. The research, however, demonstrates
severe structural constraints that impede system functionality too. These are insufficient resources, weak
institutions, political interference, lack of inter-agencies cooperation, ineffective monitoring of dynamic and
changing conflict situation as well as slowness to implement the recommendations by regional bodies. These
limitations lower the ability of the mechanisms to turn early warning into early action and this increases
violence reduction and instabilities cycles. It has been determined in the paper that the best way to work
around these structural constraints is to increase resources allocation, strengthen institutional structures, better
sharing of information and increased regional collaboration to maximize early warning and response
mechanisms. Enhancing these systems is crucial to realization of sustainable peace and the promotion of
conflict prevention agenda at African Peace and Security Architecture.
iii
Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................................2
Table of Contents ...............................................................................................................................................3
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................................................7
1.0 CHAPTER ONE ............................................................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................1
1.2 Background .............................................................................................................................................1
1.3 Statement of the Problem ........................................................................................................................5
1.4 Study Objectives .....................................................................................................................................6
1.4.1 Research questions ..................................................................................................................................6
1.4.2 Objectives of the Study ...........................................................................................................................6
1.4.3 Specific Objectives ..................................................................................................................................6
1.5 Literature review .....................................................................................................................................6
1.5.1 Theoretical literature review ...................................................................................................................6
1.5.1.1 The Ripe moment theory ......................................................................................................................7
1.5.1.2 Stakeholder approach in conflict analysis (Model) ..............................................................................7
1.6 Empirical Literature Review ...................................................................................................................8
1.6.1 Factors influencing the effectiveness of early warning systems as a conflict prevention mechanism ....8
1.6.2 Efficacy of early warning systems in conflict prevention in Africa ......................................................12
1.6.4 Gaps in the Literature Review ...............................................................................................................20
1.7 Research Hypotheses .............................................................................................................................22
1.8 Justification of the study ........................................................................................................................22
1.8.1 Policy Justification ................................................................................................................................22
1.8.2 Academic Justification ..........................................................................................................................22
1.9 Theoretical framework ..........................................................................................................................23
1.10 Research Methodology ..........................................................................................................................24
1.10.1 Research Design .................................................................................................................................24
1.10.2 Target Population ...............................................................................................................................24
1.10.3 Sampling Techniques .........................................................................................................................25
Table 1.1: Target population, Sample size, and Sampling Procedure Target Sample Sample size Sampling
procedure 25
1.10.4 Data Collection Methods and Instrument of Data Collection ............................................................26
1.10.4.1 Interviews .......................................................................................................................................26
1.10.4.2 Questionnaires ................................................................................................................................28
1.10.5 Reliability and Validity of Instruments ..............................................................................................28
1.10.5.2 Validity ...........................................................................................................................................29
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1.10.6 Data analysis and Presentation ...........................................................................................................29
1.11 Chapter outline ......................................................................................................................................30
CHAPTER TWO ..............................................................................................................................................31
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AS A
CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISM IN AFRICA ..........................................................................31
2.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................31
2.2 Demographic characteristics of the respondents ...................................................................................32
2.2.1 Response rate .........................................................................................................................................32
2.2.2 Gender of the respondents .....................................................................................................................33
Figure 2.2: Gender of the Respondents Source: Field Data, 2022 ......................................................................33
2.2.3 Age of the respondents ..........................................................................................................................33
Figure 2.3: Age of the Respondents Source: Field Data, 2022 ...........................................................................34
Figure 2.4: Level of education of the Respondents Source: Field Data, 2022 ...................................................36
2.3 Early warning systems for conflict prevention in Africa ......................................................................36
2.4 Factors influencing the effectiveness of early warning systems in conflict prevention in Africa .........39
2.4.1 Timing of the early warning ..................................................................................................................39
2.4.2 Availability of resources to support early warning systems ..................................................................41
2.4.3 Availability of good institutions in place ..............................................................................................44
2.4.4 Availability of effective communication channels ................................................................................46
2.4.5 Monitoring of changing conflict dynamics ...........................................................................................48
2.5 Chapter summary and conclusion .........................................................................................................50
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF EARLY WARNING
MECHANISMS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN ................................................51
3.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................51
3.2 Predicting and Preventing Violent Conflict Occurrence .......................................................................51
3.2.1 Effective management of the electoral process .....................................................................................52
3.2.2 Development of Peaceful Governance Strategies ..................................................................................53
3.2.3 Establishment of the Community Dialogue Programs ..........................................................................54
3.3 Early warning systems enhanced adequate responses to conflict ..........................................................55
3.3.1 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), 2014 ..............................................................................56
3.3.2 The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH), 2017 .............................................................56
3.3.3 Negotiations by International Community Envoys ...............................................................................57
3.4 Early Warning led to timely Intervention of Conflict ...........................................................................59
3.5 Early warning helped address the underlying causes of conflict ...........................................................62
3.5.1 Ethno-Political Animosity .....................................................................................................................63
3.5.2 Scramble for Resources .........................................................................................................................64
3.6 Early warning led to a deeper knowledge and understanding of the conflict ........................................66
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3.6.1 Better Understanding of Conflict Root Causes .....................................................................................66
3.6.4 Civilian Perspectives on the Conflict ....................................................................................................68
3.7 Summary of the chapter findings...........................................................................................................69
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR ......................................................................................................................................71
CRITICAL BARRIERS TO OPERATIONALIZING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN SOUTH
SUDAN’S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT .....................................................................................................71
4.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................71
4.2 Lack of Resources to Support Early Warning System ..........................................................................71
4.3 Lack of Good Offices and Institutions to Support the Early Warnings System ....................................75
4.4 Poor Monitoring of the Changing Conflict Dynamics ..........................................................................78
4.5 Poor Timing of the Early Warning Systems..........................................................................................78
4.6 Failure of Regional Institutions to Respond to Conflict Early ..............................................................81
4.7 Summary of The Chapter’s Findings ....................................................................................................84
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE ........................................................................................................................................86
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................86
5.1 : Key Findings .......................................................................................................................................86
5.2 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................87
5.3 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................91
References ..........................................................................................................................................................93
APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE ..................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Dear Respondent ................................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.
PART 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
1. Please indicate your gender: .................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
2. Age: ....................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
3. What is your highest level of education: ............................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
PART II: To identify and examine the factors influencing the effectiveness of early warning systems as a
conflict prevention mechanism in Africa. .......................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Part III. To evaluate the efficacy of early warning systems in conflict prevention in South Sudan.......... Error!
Bookmark not defined.
Part IV. To assess the key challenges faced in the application of early warning systems in preventing the
conflict in South Sudan. ..................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
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List of Figures
Figure2.1- The Response Rate… .................................................................................................. 30
Figure2.2: Gender of the Respondents… ...................................................................................... 31
Figure2.3: Age of the Respondents… ........................................................................................... 32
Figure2.4:Level of education of the Respondents… ..................................................................... 33
vii
ABBREVIATIONS
ARCSS- Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan
AU- African Union
CEW- Conflict Early Warning
CEWARM- Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWARN- Conflict Early Warning and Response Network
CEWERU-Conflict early warning and response Unit
CEWS- Conflict Early Warning System(s)
COHA- Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
IFP- The initiative for peacekeeping
IGAD- Inter-governmental Authority on Development
SPLA- Sudan People‗s Liberation army
SRIC- Security Research and Information Centre
UN- United Nations
UNDP- United Nations Development Program
UNMISS- United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
1
1.0 CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Introduction
Today, early warning and response systems are at the core of newest strategies aimed at foreseeing
and handling violent conflicts. The research looks into the working systems and regulatory
limitations of such systems in the African Peace and Security Architecture, with a detailed emphasis
on their operation in South Sudan. This chapter presents the study background, the issue, the
research questions, the objectives, the literature, the hypotheses, the reasons, the theory, the method,
and the organization of the dissertation.
1.2 Background
A set of tools known as an Early Warning System (EWS) enables accurate and timely production
and dissemination of warning information, allowing for correct planning and early action to
lessen loss or damage. Early warning strategies help decision-makers understand the intricacies
and effects of violent conflict by alerting them to the potential for violent conflict's inception,
intensification, and recurrence. This technique is described in the book Conflict. Mwagiru notes
that it entails the gathering and interpretation of conflict data on a regular basis, as well as the
continuous tracking and reporting of conflict variables.1 Based upon quantitative and qualitative
analytical methodologies, early warning systems produce a systematic conflict analysis that is
meant to predict conflict and its reoccurrence. This aids in the creation of situations and reaction
alternatives for decision-makers to consider. Early warning systems are associated with
responsive tools that are meant to respond to conflict before it becomes intense.2
1 Mwagiru, M. (2010). Conflict early-warning and response mechanisms: A review of sub-regional organisations in
Africa. Africa Review, 2(2), 163-174. https://doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2010.10597297
2 Defontaine, C. (2019, February 15). Setting up early warning and response systems to prevent violent conflicts and
save lives. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/dev4peace/setting-early-warning-and-response-systems-
prevent-violent-conflicts-and-save-lives
2
Effective early warning systems have long been recognized as desirable and required
investments that, when combined with appropriate response and greater preparation, contribute
to increased stability and conflict mitigation. Early conflict warning was developed as a method
of preserving and safeguarding lives. Since its inception, the area has progressed substantially,
and early warning has become an integral part of many organizations' practice.3 According to
Wulf and Debiel, such technologies have their roots in intelligence and security surveillance
dating back to the 1950s. The development of early warning systems for natural catastrophes,
humanitarian crises, grave human rights violations, the spread of disease, and financial collapse
was the focus of the second phase. Since the 1980s, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
has tried to forecast political-humanitarian disasters. A "Humanitarian Early Warning System"
was developed as a result of numerous early warning initiatives within the UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Early
response systems were created with some success in the context of humanitarian situations, and
they are much more recent attempts to reduce the time between early warning and actions
performed.4
In Europe, the EU has taken a more active part in the movement to put early warning systems
into place for efficient conflict prevention in its region and beyond. This drive has been brought
on by developments such as in the Balkans that have suffered at the hands of conflict situations
for long periods. However, as Cameron notes, there have been difficulties along the way. He
asserts that the creation and application of early warning systems have proved challenging. He
3 OECD. (2009). Preventing violence, war and state collapse: The future of conflict early warning and
response. https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-
resilience/docs/preventing%20violence%20war%20and%20state%20collapse.pdf
4 Wulf, H., & Debiel, T. (2009, May). Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the
effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/Arf and PIF.
Crisis States Working Papers Series No.2.
3
shows how the failure of early warning systems is due to a lack of political will and coordination
with tools of formulating policy. According to Rohwerder, the community-centered early
warning and early reaction mechanisms offered by the UNDP's Peace through Development
PTD division have significantly improved the early warning and conflict prevention efforts at the
local level. He uses Indonesia as an illustration. Prospects for the effective use of preventative
measures in the area have improved with the participation of women and the local community.5
In Africa, the AU since its formation in 2002 has had an uphill task in the prevention of conflict ,
the continent has seen a persistent and protracted number of conflicts across the region resulting
from different reasons. As Odote and Nzomo note, some of the reasons behind many of Africa‘s
conflicts in recent years have included but are not limited to bad governance, inter-ethnic
clashes, boundary disputes, resource scarcity, and persistent poverty.6 The earliest depiction of a
need for conflict prevention in Africa is notably so from the Rwandan genocide in 1994 which
led to the death of many for the lack of proper prevention and response systems.7 According to
the International Peace Institute, the events in recent times in Mali and Guinea Bissau in North
Africa have shed light on the shortfalls of the AU‘s efforts in the prevention of conflict using its
present methods.8
Masila notes that although early warning systems upon their creation were facing skepticism
with many opting to separate them from prevention mechanisms, it has come to be established
that there is no way the two mechanisms can work without each other. An early warning system
5 Rohwerder, B. (2015). Conflict early warning and early response. Human Rights Documents
Online. https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_hrd-0148-2015095
6 Odote, P. O., & Nzomo, M. (2019). Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa: A
Framework. Journal of peace, education and social studies, 13, 36-61.
7 Ibid.
8 International peace institute. (2012). Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and
Response. https://www.ipinst.org/wp- content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_preventing_conflicts.pdf
4
goes beyond just assessing possible conflicts but also entails the application of the information
gathered to effectively prevent escalation and eliminate conflict emergence. He further adds in
his research that in Kenya the National Steering Committee was created in 2001 in an effort to
join the works of the government together with civil society organizations to coordinate all peace
activities in Kenya. The NSC uses tools such as social networking sites, GIS mapping, mobile
phones, and radios as technologies that are at its disposal to track relevant information.9
Julius Uma posits that South Sudan as a nation has grappled with the effects of conflicts that
have stymied development in the nation since it gains its independence a little over a decade ago.
In an effort to lessen these effects through early warning systems, the government established
and commissioned the national Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit. This division was
created especially to strengthen the government's ability to respond to potential violent conflict
risks facing the country. However, following its acceptance, violence breakouts have continued
in the nation since 2013 and have caused hardship. According to Nyadera's research,
confrontations between the Christian south and the Arab north, which mostly ignored the ethnic
tensions present among the inhabitants in the south, brought an end to the fighting in South
Sudan.10 For this reason, the youngest country in the world to attain its independence has faced
ethnic-based power struggles for the past 11 years that have continued to stall the nation.11
Herein, the role played by early warning systems comes in. though questions still remain as to
the effectiveness of their implementation.
9 Musila, G. (2013). Early warning and the role of new technologies in the prevention of violence and conflict in
Kenya. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392084
10 Nyadera, I. N. (2019). South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and
solutions. ACCORD. https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/south-sudan-conflict-from-2013-to-2018/
11 Engel, U. (2018). Early warning and conflict prevention. The Routledge Handbook of Transregional Studies, 573-
581. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429438233-71
5
1.3 Statement of the Problem
Conflict has a serious impact on human life as it leads to deaths, physical injuries, destruction of
property, loss of livelihoods, and displacements. On the African continent, civil wars are still a
big problem. Threatened by the South Sudanese civil war are not only the people of South
Sudan, but also the entire continent. A number of conflict prevention and conflict management
mechanisms have been applied in South Sudan with limited success in ending the conflict.
All conflicts have root causes since conflict arises due to irreconcilable interests. As such
conflict progresses through various stages. As a result, it is feasible to prevent conflict in its early
phases. All disputes can be avoided; however, the effectiveness of conflict prevention depends
on the methods employed and the time of their implementation. In light of this, Effective early
warning systems are essential in continuing wars like the South Sudan Conflict, which cannot be
overstated. Only when there is sufficient understanding of the when, how, and why conflict is
likely to arise can conflict be prevented effectively.
Despite the existence of a Conflict Early Warning System in the South Sudanese, conflict
continues to erupt. The ongoing fighting in South Sudan raises concerns about the early warning
system's usefulness as a tool for conflict prevention there. The South Sudanese conflict's conflict
prevention techniques have been documented in the literature; nevertheless, little is known about
the effectiveness of the country's conflict early warning system. There is a knowledge vacuum,
in particular, about the elements that have reduced the early warning system's capacity to prevent
conflict.
6
1.4 Study Objectives
1.4.1 Research questions
i. What elements affect early warning systems' ability to effectively deter conflict in
Africa?
ii. How effective are the early warning systems in South Sudan at preventing conflict?
iii. What challenges must be overcome in order to use early warning systems to halt fighting
in South Sudan?
1.4.2 Objectives of the Study
This study's primary goal is to evaluate how effectively the conflict early warning system serves
as a foundation for conflict prevention. The study's case is South Sudan.
1.4.3 Specific Objectives
i. To determine and study the factors that have an impact on how effective early warning
systems are at preventing conflict in Africa.
ii. To assess early warning systems' effectiveness in South Sudan at preventing conflict.
iii. To evaluate the main difficulties encountered when using early warning systems to stop
the conflict in South Sudan.
1.5 Literature review
An overview of pertinent research on the topic of the investigation will be provided in this part.
Reviews that are both theoretical and empirical will be covered in the review.
1.5.1 Theoretical literature review
Conflict continues to be a major issue for policymakers and academics. As such there are various
theoretical debates underpinning the subject of conflict management and prevention.
7
1.5.1.1 The Ripe moment theory
The theory of the Ripe moment, which was first proposed by William I. Zartman and endorsed
by others like Richard Hass and Steve Steadman, states that successful conflict resolution is
contingent on taking action at the proper time. The idea focuses on the parties' contextual
circumstances that make a situation appropriate for intervention. This is because timing is
important for the intervention of any conflict management strategy. The theory is intuitive, and
many practitioners agree with it. The only issue is that, despite being intuitively clear, this
moment might be challenging to recognize in the heat of battle. In hindsight, the theory does a
better job of explaining why mediation worked than it does of predicting when the moment
would actually happen. The results are in line with the idea that, where necessary, a conflict early
warning system should be put in place.
1.5.1.2 Stakeholder approach in conflict analysis (Model)
Conflict analysis using the Stakeholder method is advocated by Jonathan Goodhand. Identifying
the primary parties or stakeholders in the conflict and determining how each one affects the
system as a whole is the process of doing a stakeholder analysis. A thorough analysis of the
political economy of conflict provides a comprehensive understanding of how conflict functions
and may result in more precisely focused conflict prevention and resolution activities.12
Every conflict has a unique history, dynamics, and parties involved. The issue of stakeholders
must be addressed by those involved in conflict management. Conflict managers must pose
important questions to themselves in order to avoid conflict from recurring: Who makes up the
war economy's primary players? What drives them to participate in the war economies? What
12 Goodhand, J. 2004. Afghanistan, in: Pugh, M. and N. Cooper, with J. Goodhand 2004. War Economies in a
Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers
8
drives their efforts to find peace? Who is in charge of the military equipment? This is crucial for
accurately assessing the many functions of war economies.
1.6 Empirical Literature Review
In accordance with the specific goals of the investigation, this section evaluates the empirical
literature on a subject level.
1.6.1 Factors influencing the effectiveness of early warning systems as a conflict prevention
mechanism
According to Odote, conflict prevention necessitates the detection of both systemic and proximal
contributing factors, as well as attempts to prohibit causes from escalating before violence breaks
out. The promotion of conflict resolution does not suggest that conflict is a bad thing. It merely
means that attempting to mediate a problem after it has occurred complicates and costs money.
There are three phases of conflict prevention: structural or long-term, early warning and
assessment, and practical. Preventive action is more practical (though more challenging) in a
post-conflict setting, and that the lessons learnt from post-conflict prevention efforts must
educate and inspire pre-conflict deterrence, are the two main concepts of conflict prevention.13
Since the end of the Cold War and the independence declarations of various nations throughout
the world, there have been a number of ongoing hostilities. These wars have a variety of causes
and can be interethnic, religious, intrastate, or even interstate in nature.
However, despite the emergence of new ways to abate further escalation of conflicts both in
Africa and around the world, we are still witnessing continued occurrences of conflicts and
violence that are setting back economies and communities from experiencing development.
13 Odote, P. O. (2019). Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict Prevention in Africa: A Framework. Journal of
Peace Education and Social Studies, 13, 36-61.
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10
According to Lewis and Shinoda, corruption, ethnicity, nepotism, sociopolitical prejudice, and
economic inequities resulting from the unequal distribution of public funds served as the
foundations for tyranny and repression, which eventually contribute to upheavals, tribal warfare,
and protracted armed conflicts in various communities.14
Herein the reprieve provided by preventative approaches to conflict resolution comes in.
According to writers of studies on peace building, the Rwandan genocide was one of the most
well-known wars in Africa that caught the attention of the international community. The death
toll from the genocide stimulated the development of innovative techniques to identify conflict
through preventative measures even before conflict starts. According to Odote, it was in this
setting that the concept of early warning first appeared, implying that it was meant to be a way to
stop open confrontation from escalating to intolerable proportions. The nature of warfare
changed when the cold war ended in the early 1990s, with intrastate conflicts taking precedence
over interstate conflicts. The nature of wars altered after the Cold War, forcing stakeholders to
consider new approaches. This circumstance sparked support for conflict early warning as a
means of averting protracted conflicts.15
Jonathan Whittall defines early warning as "approaches centered on comprehensive information
gathering, evaluation, and/or development of guidelines, encompassing risk evaluation and
exchange of information." The goal is to generate or draw early responses during the latent
phases of an anticipated violent conflict in order to prevent, decrease, resolve, or modify
situations that might enhance the risk that a violent conflict will break out. acquiring, evaluating,
14 Lewis, R., & Shinoda, H. (2012). Operationalizing Early Warning for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in
West Africa: A Case Study of ECOWAS Early Warning System. Hiroshima Peace Science, 34, 1-32.
15 Odote, P. O. (2016). Role of early warning systems in conflict prevention in Africa: Case study of the Ilemi
10
authenticating intelligence assessment and monitoring, risk calculation, educating, lobbying,
surveilling, and evaluations are some of the most key functions in early warning.16
According to Ackerman, a slightly more conceptual and empirical study-directed approach has
made it possible to use quantification methods widely to enhance data-based forecasting
analytics for identifying the risks of complicated humanitarian emergencies, political unrest and
poor governance, intrastate and ethno political disputes, genocide and politicization, and other
serious violations of human rights. In the first, structural markers are used, in the second,
sequential models, and in the third, inductive methods. These are three different risk assessment
types. The issues of ―lost opportunities‖ to prevent as well as the warning-response shortfall
represent problems with early warning and preventive diplomacy.17
To be effective, early warning and response systems must be more proactive than merely data
gatherers and risk assessors, and this depends in part on their capacity to be more proactive.
Therefore, an important factor that comes into play is that of stakeholders in making sense of
information gathered to predict conflict from small occurrences of disputes and unrest. Odote
confirms this by stating that early warning, on the other perspective, has a dual purpose: to
prevent conflicts and to influence deterrence. However, it stands to reason that in order to receive
a prompt answer, the proper documentation and information must be given to the appropriate
party at the appropriate time. Conflict anticipation requires both expertise and enough local
credibility for the intervening entity to be trusted with the authority to intervene.18
16 Rosenberg, S. P., Galis, T., & Zucker, A. (2016). Reconstructing Atrocity Prevention. Cambridge University
Press.
17 Ackermann, A. (2020). Early warning and conflict prevention responsibilities of the international community.
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.527
18 Ibid. P. 107.
11
Types of conflict are different depending on the region and the people involved. Therefore, no
one conflict situation can be the same. Thus, early warning and response measures have to be
conflict specific to be effective. Odote and Nzomo opine that on the one end, knowledge of the
nature of a dispute is critical, while on the other, intelligence about the scenario is at risk.
Disseminating information is also considered as part of early warning, highlighting the amount
of data gathered. An early warning system is incomplete without a frequently updated database
of countries at danger of conflict, where information has been exchanged among relevant parties.
An effective dispute intervention can control conflict in its early stages. As a result, academics
advocate for a definition of early warning that includes specific sorts of violence instead of large-
scale fighting, which often occurs later in a conflict.19
The existence of effective and accountable humanitarian, security, and political institutions
working together to solve the conflict and dispute problem before it even arises is another aspect
that impacts the efficacy of early warning and reaction. According to Paul, In Africa, approaches
have included bolstering the continent's conflict resolution organizations. They are predicated on
the premise that maintaining peace necessitates long-term organizations rather than ad hoc
actions. Establishing agendas, assigning resources both in form of human and financial, and
developing both bureaucratic procedures and methods, as well as an ability to create and share
information were all components of the process of establishing such an organizational
architecture throughout the continent (and hopefully act upon it). One of the major issues in the
early 1990s was that Africa's regional organizations were ill-equipped to deal with armed
19 Ibid. P. 39.
12
conflicts; they were understaffed, lacking in funds, and most had been founded to stimulate
economic development and sub-regional cooperation.20
Agbunde and Olorunyomi posit that to successfully implement conflict prevention and early
warning there is a need for improvements in other areas of governance including; the sincerity of
democratic government, respect for human rights, awareness of the media's role, encouragement
of economic development, and higher educational standards and processes.21 They also add that
in identifying conflict indicators for early warning, what may be a conflict indicator according to
one analyst may not be so for another. therefore, a streamlined and systematic approach to early
warning is needed. They propose that following the three steps of information gathering, analysis
and response is the best way to do so. The ability of an early warning system to appropriately
identify a potential conflict situation is therefore a key component of its success. This is by
identifying whether it is rooted in political issues, demographic or societal issues, or economic
issues.22
1.6.2 Efficacy of early warning systems in conflict prevention in Africa
Early warning systems, in Nyheim's opinion, are essential for preventing conflict from starting in
the first place. Predicting conflict patterns, warning communities about potential dangers,
supporting in decision-making, providing advice on how to design response tactics, and initiating
responses to violent conflict are some of its objectives. However, given the dynamic character of
war, the emergence of fresh security issues, and the underfunded global defense and stability
construction, it is important to take into account whether current early warning systems are still
20 Paul, W. (2013). War and Conflict in Africa. John Wiley & Sons.
21 Agbunde, G., & Olorunyomi, B. R. (2013). Conflict: Preventive Mechanism and Early Warning. P. 215.
22 Ibid. p. 223-224.
13
pertinent. If they are relevant then establish whether they are prepared to handle such a changed
security context.23
According to Nhema et al., a key element of a successful early warning system is establishing the
dependability of an information source for the system. One characteristic of early warning is the
use of enormous amounts of data and information gathered over extended periods of time.
Such information is then evaluated to ensure its relevance and accuracy. However, despite being
bombarded by a lot of information, the key to efficacy is centered upon the reliability of this
information in the prediction of conflict situations. In addition, the involvement of a wide range
of participants who are knowledgeable in the issues in the context of conflicts enables the
systems of early warning to become more effective in their implementation over time.24 This
way they benefit from both information availability and knowledgeable actors.
The African Union (AU) has long dominated discussions in Africa about the need for early
warning systems to address crises that are erupting throughout the continent. In order to respond
swiftly and effectively to both ongoing and impending conflicts and crises throughout Africa,
the Peace and Security Council was founded in 2002. This council was established to serve as a
system for group defense and early warning. In 2006, a Continental Early Warning System
(CEWS) was established to function as an examination and surveillance center or Situation
Room where data on possible conflicts and dangers to peace and stability in Africa was collected
23 Nyheim, D. (2015). Early warning and response to violent conflict. Time for a rethink. Safeworld.
24 Nhema, A. G., Zeleza, P. T., Zeleza, T., & Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern
Africa. (2008). The roots of African conflicts: The causes & costs. Ohio University Press.
14
and then sent to the Peace and Security Council as suggestions, including recommendations on
the best way to proceed.25
Regional and sub-regional organizations, according to Amao et al., have a part to play in this
circumstance. As they are obliged to give the political and socioeconomic aid necessary for their
practical execution, regional organizations have taken on the task of ensuring the effectiveness of
these violence prevention measures. The regional organizations ECOWAS and IGAD, which
have taken the initiative to build and implement conflict early warning and response mechanisms
in their respective regions, stand out for carrying out this job in Africa.26 Therefore, part of the
efficacy of existing early warning systems is hinged upon collaboration and coordination of
activities between regional organizations and civil society organizations across the continent.
Literature on the country underplays the role of civil society organizations as a component of the
early warning system. They collaborate with regional organizations to put the community-level
mechanisms into action. Eze and Frimpong contend that civil society organizations (CSOs) are
recognized as key stakeholders in strengthening the effective implementation of continental early
warning systems at the sub-regional and multilateral echelons by providing early-warning
assessments and disseminating information that is pertinent to reducing the impact of potential
threats to peace and stability.27 Therefore, in ensuring successful and effective early warning
systems in the prevention of conflict, the coordination and collaboration efforts between civil
society organizations and the already-existing regional bodies on the continent need to be
25 African Union. (2010). Moving Africa forward-The African Peace and Security Architecture, Assessment Study.
Security Council Report. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/RO%20African%20Peace%20and%20Security%20Architecture.pdf
26 Amao, B. O., Ettang, D., Okeke-Uzodike, U., & Tugizamana, C. (2014). Revisiting the Utility of the Early
Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: Any Role for Civil Society. Peace and Conflict Review, 8(1),
78.
27 Eze, C. B., & Frimpong, O. B. (2020). Contributions of early warning to the African peace and security
architecture: The experience of the West Africa network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). The State of Peacebuilding in
Africa, 182. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46636-7_11
15
improved. An additional crucial element of conflict prevention and mitigation through early
warning systems is preventive diplomacy. The AU and RECs have used preventive diplomacy to
intervene in conflicts, such as those sparked by election-related unrest in Zimbabwe and Kenya
in 2008. Despite the challenges associated with its early response to specific crisis situations,
preventive diplomacy has been successful in resolving conflicts.28 Additionally, strong levels of
collaboration and goodwill among state leaders are necessary for early warning systems to
function effectively. According to Ettang, doing so will necessitate placing national security and
peace above of political considerations. Technology improvements are also a major factor in how
successful early warning systems are. Studies reveal the potential for even the most fundamental
technological developments, like cell phones, to enhance early warning systems in the future.
Today, in nations like Uganda, the transmission of timely and trustworthy data has been made
possible in large part by CEWARN's ICT for peace programmes. However, difficulties persist.29
According to Ikhalid, the Horn of Africa is marked by protracted conflicts that have wreaked
havoc on the area. At any given period, each nation in the region has experienced its own unique
brand of conflict, which has led to instability and impacted other facets of national development.
This documented history of the area is also true of South Sudan. Since its inception, the role of
CEWARN in IGAD's established early warning and response in the region has made concerted
efforts to realign the data collection and activities taken to avert conflicts in the region.30 Its
efficacy has been centered on an open information center.
CEWARN is tasked with working
28 Ibid. p. 186.
29 Ettang, D. (2015). Early Warning and Early Response in Africa. Gaps and Prospects. Consultancy Africa
Intelligence.
30 Ikhalid, H. (2017). The effectiveness of conflict early warning and response mechanisms in Africa: A comparative
study of IGAD and ECOWAS (2005-2015) [Master's thesis]. The University of Nairobi.
16
with established and successful early warning systems to prevent the emergence of violent
conflicts, particularly cross-border pastoral conflicts.31
Mbugua opines that South Sudan, like most of its neighbors, has had a conflict atmosphere
crippled by numerous developments in the dynamics of politics and ethnic-related disputes.
Literature on the country shows that the conflicts have been directly or indirectly related to
armed resources that continue to be redistributed across the nation. For CEWARN to be effective
in the nation, there is a need for a realigning of the existing legal protocols under the IGAD
docket to incorporate the negotiating parties in the process of peacebuilding. In addition, there is
a need to change from the initial focus, which was pastoral conflicts, to an effective and
enhanced approach to early warning systems in the country.32
1.6.3 Challenges faced in the application of early warning systems in preventing conflict
Whitehall notes that since interference in another country is predicated on individual self-
interests and sovereign limits, early warning as an area of science and technology has often
faltered. The authorities appear unconcerned aside from these issues. The majority of the
literature we've researched focuses on the technological solutions needed to get around the well-
known problems with early warning since this reality is ignored. As a result, early warning
systems for humanitarian emergencies are frequently ineffective at best and have even been used
by governments to justify intervention in other nations in the name of their own self-interest,
which is becoming more closely linked to national security in the context of the so-called "war
against terror."33
31 Ibid.
32 Mbugua, J. (2014). Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa. International Peace and
Secuirty Training Center.
33 Whittall, J. (2010). Humanitarian early warning systems: Myth and reality. Third World Quarterly, 31(8), 1237 -
1250. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2010.542967
17
The OECD cites that despite the various advances in the sector of security studies and early
warning systems, there are challenges that continue to affect the sector. These issues are centered
upon coordination and cooperation between the different organizations and the leaders of states.
Another area of concern is seen as that of effective interpretation or understanding of
information. Clear warning signs continue to be overlooked and misinterpreted in the age of
information access.34 Accordingly, given the results of this study, any early warning and
response mechanism's performance will depend on how well crucial information is disseminated
in a timely manner and how well the necessary solutions are developed for the given situation.
Acknowledging that no two disputes are same and that each has prevailing dynamics that are
regionally unique.
One of the challenges in developing and coordinating early warning systems is the absence of
political will among the leaders and politicians in positions of authority in a country. According
to Maru, decision-makers are unwilling to acknowledge early warnings from powerful African
nations, hesitate to prioritize continental wellbeing over national security interests, and lack the
power to apply judgments on member countries, according to an evaluation of political will. The
AU‘s conflict early warning system‘s organizational structure contains elements that provide for
early decision making, however, it also faces elements that inhibit successful decision-making
processes. Significant obstacles include the typical lack of or restricted communication between
early warning experts and decision-making processes, the poor information flow, the lack of a
clear framework, and the top-down hierarchical organizational structure.35
34 OECD. (2009). Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The future of conflict early warning and response.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.
35 Maru, M. (2016). Conflict Early Warning and the Response Nexus: The Case of the African Union-Continental
Early Warning System [Doctoral dissertation]. https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/incmdoc_etd/3/
18
Lewis and Shinoda opine that inside the functional, legal, and organizational structure, the Early
Warning System lacks a formal linking structure that boosts or supports early response
mechanisms in response to early warning signals or analyses provided by partners. This hinders
preventive and transformational mobilization because it lacks collaborative cooperation with
important stakeholders in establishing effective and collaborative reaction approaches and
network mechanisms to handle potential early warning situations.36 In addition to this, they add
that a major challenge faced in early warning systems is the lack of gender consideration.
Gender-sensitive topics should be included in the early warning data collecting and assessment
process since it makes current methods more complete and provides for early warnings by
predicting macro-level problems by micro-level happenings. In the comprehensive evaluation of
the processes, when it comes to information gathering, the creation and evaluation of markers,
and the evaluation and monitoring of special indigenous conditions, the ECOWAS method falls
short of an acceptable system for fostering early warning.37
How early it is appropriate to respond to conflict concerns is another area that challenges
warning systems implementation. Twagirayezu‘s study reveals that in any case, early hybrid
response systems are very suitable. The research study discovered that before a conflict breaks,
people from the local community are aware of it, and conflict signs are anticipated in the area.
Frequent attacks and the spreading of hateful speech and weaponry inside neighborhoods are the
most visible manifestations of open warfare. When it comes to determining the optimal moment
for preventative intervention, there is no simple or prescribed solution. For all parties concerned,
determining "how early is early" remains a challenge. Another constraint is the timeframe in
which you give a warning. Converting early warning into an efficient early reaction is the key
36 Ibid. p. 10.
37 Ibid. p. 11.
19
challenge for AU conflict early warning systems on the continental environment. The inability to
quickly mobilize resources in advance of violent disputes slows early action.38
Tanui asserts that aside from the absence of political will to put early warning systems into place,
there are other issues to be concerned about. In addition to this, other issues related to political
will also come into play and exacerbate the issue. One of these is the incorporation of security
sector reform. This is because security sector reform is also determined by good governance
structures and ultimately a lack of coordination between both challenging early warning
systems.39 Tanui further adds that the occurrences of conflicts are revealed in signs and signals
that early warning systems are meant to identify. Therefore, she notes that in the case of IGAD
and in particular for nations such as South Sudan which have been in conflict for the last decade,
the issue of undetected signals is a major challenge to early warning and prevention mechanisms.
The gaps in the identification of conflict signals beforehand through engaging with community
members and leaders are a major hurdle in the effectiveness of early warning systems.40
Like many other challenges that face various sectors in the African landscape, the lack of funds,
resources, and capability is a prevailing issue even in security and peacebuilding initiatives. As
Matveeva posits, any interventionist organization with a responsibility to act must have both the
capability and the local confidence to prevent. The advantages of civil society-based early
warning are significant; yet, it is critical to be pragmatic about civil society's mandate, as its
capabilities for action are sometimes overestimated and vary widely from place to region.
Recognizing the need to strengthen civil society organizations' response abilities is already a leap
38 Twagirayezu, A. (2021). Understanding the African union conflict prevention mechanisms constraints:―the case
of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo‖ [Doctoral dissertation]. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1468
39 Tanui, C. C. (2020). Challenges and prospects of prevention and management of conflict in Africa: The role of
IGAD early warning mechanism [Master's thesis]. The University of Nairobi.
40 Ibid.
20
forward.41 This illustrates that when there is insufficient funding and capacity to handle threats or
dangers of conflict erupting in a place, the value of conflict early warning systems is
fundamentally degraded.
1.6.4 Gaps in the Literature Review
There are academic gaps notwithstanding the literature review's relevance. In spite of the fact
that an early warning system is there and crucial to the research, the literature is unable to
explain why conflict in South Sudan continues to occur. The report, in particular, falls short of
clearly articulating the reasons behind the ineffectiveness of South Sudan's early warning system.
This study will attempt to address these questions and aid in the creation of better policy
solutions. It is clear that South Sudan lacks a comprehensive knowledge of how the early
warning system should operate. Little has been done to improve South Sudan's early warning
system and make it useful for ending the protracted conflict.
21
41 Matveeva, A. (2006). Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas. Global
Partnership for Prevention of Armed Conflict.
22
1.7 Research Hypotheses
H1: The complexity of a conflict has a significant impact on how well early warning systems
function as a conflict prevention strategy in Africa.
H0: Early warning systems have been ineffective in conflict prevention in South Sudan.
H1: Inadequate institutional and resource support is one of the main obstacles to using early
warning systems to stop the conflict in South Sudan.
1.8 Justification of the study
The findings of this investigation are important to many parties.
1.8.1 Policy Justification
The study is useful to South Sudan‘s government and other regional actors in developing
sustainable peace frameworks and pre-conflict intervention strategies. The study will be helpful
to the South Sudanese administration, which is dealing with ongoing violence that has had a
number of detrimental effects on the nation's development and system of government. The study
gives policy recommendations aimed at preventing and controlling conflict in South Sudan
through an effective early warning system.
1.8.2 Academic Justification
This study is helpful to other academics who are researching the same subject and serves as a
resource for upcoming scholars on unrelated but relevant themes. The study will also reveal
other crucial connections that need additional research, such as the ideal time to put in place a
conflict early warning system.
23
1.9 Theoretical framework
The Conflict Transformation Theory was used in this investigation. Examining a number of
previous definitions brings up the uniqueness of conflict transformation. The major theoretical
contributions of Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach are highlighted in particular. Lederach's
study is especially valuable in understanding why it is so difficult to maintain peace over time
and finally alter conflict situations. He contends that many critical deficiencies are to blame for
the incapacity to develop and sustain peace projects, the most essential of which are
interconnectedness, fairness, and process structures. Conflict transformation is defined by
Galtung as the perception as well as a reaction towards the movements and flux of social unrest
as chances for developing positive initiatives that minimize aggression, promote justice, and
address real-life difficulties in human interactions.42
As a result, conflict transformation theory contends that modern confrontations necessitate more
than simply rethinking perspectives and identifying win-win resolutions. A trend of contentious
interactions might well be ingrained in the underlying principle of entities and interactions.
According to the conflict transformation school, conflicts are constantly in flux, in a state of
perpetual change, and the goal is to turn them into something socially helpful and non-
destructive. As a result, conflict is a fluid and variable approach, as well as the method that
strives to transform conflict, should be similarly agile and adaptable. Conflict transformation
further contends how certain conflicts are best transformed rather than resolved.
Conflict transformation theory fits the study well in that the aim of conflict resolution strategies
is to transform a conflicting society to a peaceful one. The aim of a conflict early warning system
42 Galtung, Johan. 1967, Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking. Oslo:International Peace
Research Institute
24
is to prevent or avert conflict before it escalates into a full-fledged war. Since South Sudan needs
a conflict early warning system, the ideas of conflict transformation theory fit in well with this.
South Sudan must be transformed from a country of conflict to one of peace and prosperity
because of its vast resources. This is only possible, though, if conflict early warning systems are
reliable enough to prevent future conflicts.
1.10 Research Methodology
An overview of the research methods applied in this study is provided in this section. This
includes the following: the goal of the study, the intended audience, the sample size and strategy,
the data collection techniques, validity and reliability, and the method of data analysis.
1.10.1 Research Design
In order to conduct the inquiry, a hybrid methodology that included qualitative and quantitative
techniques was adopted. Using a descriptive research methodology, the conflict early warning
system's usefulness as a framework for conflict avoidance was evaluated. It uses South Sudan as
a case study.43
1.10.2 Target Population
The people who made up the target demographic for this study were South Sudanese government
representatives, AU and IGAD representatives in South Sudan, local residents, workers for peace
organizations, South Sudanese security personnel, and combatants or former combatants.
43 Kumar, Ranjit. Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners. (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers,
2011) p. 94.
25
1.10.3 Sampling Techniques
For this study, individuals were chosen by basic random sample methods and purposeful
sampling methods. A total of 400 people, including members of the South Sudanese government,
African Union and IGAD officials stationed there, locals, workers for peace organizations, South
Sudanese security officers, and combatants or former combatants, participated in the survey.
n=number of samples Using the (Yamane,
1967) formula n=N/1+NE²
N= Target Population
E=Margin of Error (0.05)2
n=11, 200,000/1+11,200,000×0.0025
n=11,200,000/1+28,000
n=11,200,000/28,001
n= 399.98
n=400
Table 1.1: Target population, Sample size, and Sampling Procedure
Target Sample Sample size Sampling procedure
South Sudan government
officials
50 Purposive
Officials of the African 50 Purposive
26
Union and IGAD in South
Sudan
Peace NGOs in South Sudan 50 Purposive
The citizens of South Sudan 50 Purposive
Academicians 100 Simple random
The security agencies in
South Sudan
50 Purposive
The combats or Former
Combatants
50 Purposive
Total 400
Source: researcher 2022
1.10.4 Data Collection Methods and Instrument of Data Collection
In this study, secondary and primary data were combined with data from primary and secondary
sources using a mixed methodology. To obtain firsthand information from relevant respondents,
key informant interviews were employed (Regional peace organizations, Policymakers, officials
from relevant Government Ministries, and security departments). Books, journal articles, reliable
reports, and other hard and soft library resources found in national, institutional, and
organizational libraries were used to gather secondary data.
1.10.4.1 Interviews
27
In Kumar's opinion, interviewing techniques are somehow superior than other research
approaches. This is due to the fact that after rapport has been built and confidence established,
28
specific sensitive information that would have eluded the researcher will readily show itself. It
further assisted the researcher to make follow-ups where necessary and assist the researcher
gauge and authenticicate the answers.44
1.10.4.2 Questionnaires
The study used both open-ended questionnaires, see appendix 1. The open-ended questions gave
an in-depth insight into the respondents' views and opinions. According to Frankfort-Nachmias,
the respondents have time to consult and respond if possible.45
1.10.5 Reliability and Validity of Instruments
1.10.5.1 Reliability
Reliability is defined by Mugenda & Mugenda as the accuracy or precision of the measurement
equipment, which aids the researcher in looking for errors in the various instruments and relies
on the guidance of experts to make the necessary corrections or modifications with regard to the
study. It is also the extent to which the results are seen to be consistent over a period of time. It
also ensures the same method is used and gets the same results. On the other end, problems with
reliability are overcome when there is a high degree of accuracy and consistency. Respondents
from the research's target demographics can be used as the small random sample in pre-testing to
gauge the validity and reliability of the instrument. When the same respondents are given the
instruments at several times and the results are the same, the instruments can be regarded as
dependable. Coefficient analysis was used in this particular investigation. Additionally, the
44Kumar, Ranjit. Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners. (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 2011)
p. 94
45 Frankfort-Nachmias, C. and Nachmias, D. (1996), Research Methods in the Social Sciences (5th edn) New York:
St. Martin‘s Press. pp.14-36
29
computable replies to the research items on the pilot study instruments, particularly the
questionnaires and interview guide, were used to conduct the reliability test.46
1.10.5.2 Validity
On the other hand, validity is the set of indicators that are derived to gauge the concept measures.
The validity of the research instrument should be determined by experts in order to ensure that
the procedures are followed systematically as per the study objectives.
Last but not least, the researcher has a responsibility to train the research assistant before
beginning the work, including topics such the study's goals, significance, techniques of data
collecting, and steps to become familiar with the research area.
1.10.6 Data analysis and Presentation
The goal and function of data analysis is for the researcher to draw conclusions and inferences
from the data that was gathered in order to determine the outcomes. Therefore, for the researcher
to come up with the findings, entails editing, classification, and also tabulation of the raw data.
The exploratory/ descriptive data obtained from interviews was analyzed by a narrative report
using the thematic technique. In order to enable descriptive analysis when necessary, the data
obtained from surveys were examined using a computer spreadsheet in a standard format.
Through the use of frequencies and percentages, the researcher presented the data in a
descriptive format. The study's findings will be presented as pie charts and bar graphs.
Contrarily, data from documents and interviews will also be topically reviewed, transcribed, and
then organized as required. This will aid the researcher's assessment, determination, and
46 Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches. (Acts Press:
Nairobi, 2003). pg. 95
30
interpretation of the study's goals and research questions. As a result, the findings will be able to
enhance the results of the questionnaires.47
1.11 Chapter outline
The study's background, the problem statement, the research objectives, a review of the
literature, the motivation for the investigation, the research hypothesis, the theoretical
framework, and ultimately the research methods are all included in the introduction chapter of
the study.
The elements affecting early warning systems' efficiency as a tool for preventing conflicts in
Africa are covered in Chapter 2.
The effectiveness of early warning systems in South Sudan for preventing conflict is examined in
Chapter 3.
The main difficulties encountered while using early warning systems to prevent conflict in South
Sudan are evaluated in Chapter 4.
The investigation is concluded in Chapter 5 with a summary of the results, conclusions, and
suggestions.
47 Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. Research methods: Quantitative and qualitative approaches. (Acts Press:
Nairobi, 2003). pg. 95
31
CHAPTER TWO
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS
AS A CONFLICT PREVENTION MECHANISM IN AFRICA
2.1 Introduction
Conflicts have been an issue that has become more of a normal occurrence for many nations in
the world. The search for peace and security, consequently, continues to be a central focus for
many leaders across the world. As a result, early warning systems for disputes have gained
popularity throughout time as a tool to anticipate and prevent disagreements from growing out of
control. Systems for early warning and preventing conflicts must be connected because they are
crucial components of the process. As a result, the discipline that studies early warning systems
and conflict prevention techniques continuously comes up with fresh, original ideas for how to
stop the trend of conflicts.
A major area of concern for many countries has been the availability of various early warning
systems and institutions. However, the main problem for many countries, including South Sudan,
has been the absence of strong supporting elements for the structures put in place to deal with the
various impending crises. The successful prevention of conflicts using early warning systems
requires certain factors that ensure that these mechanisms hold up in the long term. The goal of
this chapter is to clarify the elements that affect early warning systems' efficacy. An efficient
early warning system must have all of these components operating at once. The timeliness,
resource availability, institutions in existence, efficient communication channels, and conflict
dynamics monitoring structures were among the issues that came into emphasis.
32
2.2 Demographic characteristics of the respondents
The respondents' demographic information is provided in this section.
2.2.1 Response rate
A 64% response rate was achieved to the 85 surveys that were distributed, with 55 questionnaires
fully completed and returned to the researcher.
For data analysis, a response rate of 50% is regarded as normal, one of 60% as respectable, and
one of more than 70% as extraordinary. This study's questionnaire had a 64% response rate. The
study was successful in obtaining responses from all of the target samples; therefore the response
rate was favorable for data analysis.
Figure 2.1- The Response Rate
Source: Field Data, 2022
33
2.2.2 Gender of the respondents
Men made up the bulk of the respondents since the study examined the efficiency of the conflict
early warning system as a framework for conflict prevention in Africa. 56% of people were male
and 44% were female. Despite this, men still made up the slight majority since they continue to
govern the security and military industries Gender must be considered in the study in order to
comprehend how respondents felt and evaluated the conflict early warning system as a
framework for conflict prevention in Africa.
Figure 2.2: Gender of the Respondents
Source: Field Data, 2022
2.2.3 Age of the respondents
The survey aimed to determine the respondents' ages, and it found that 47% of them were
between the ages of 19 and 30. Then, 33% of respondents aged 41 to 70, and 20% of respondents
aged 19 to 30 were next in line. The age element was important to the study since it provided
insight into how different age groups felt about the research issues. Numerous respondents from
a range of age groups shared their opinions and experience on the study's topic. The age factors
are important in a study in that a lot of useful information will be gained from the various age
34
brackets of the people who took part in the survey. This will show whether there is a significant
relationship between age and later attitudes and behavioral characteristics.48
Figure 2.3: Age of the Respondents
Source: Field Data, 2022
2.2.4 Level of education
To ascertain whether or not the respondents understood the research study, it was crucial to
determine their degree of education. The majority of respondents (41% of the total) had post-
graduate degrees, followed by degrees (23% of the total), and college (21% of the total). This
proved the correspondents' understanding of the research study's topic.
35
48 Sandberg. F, How age affects survey interaction – the case of Intelligence studies, (Halmstad University, 2016)
36
Figure 2.4: Level of education of the Respondents
Source: Field Data, 2022
2.3 Early warning systems for conflict prevention in Africa
According to the vast majority of respondents, conflict early warning strives to pinpoint and
launch initiatives to minimize the origins, breadth, depth, and repercussions of various forms of
political violence. Despite the fact that governments' commitment to comprehensive conflict
prevention was not uniform across Africa, more than 60% of respondents stated that conflict
prevention - and, as a result, conflict early warning - had gained relevance in international
relations during the past three decades. The respondents further noted that greater investment in
better early warning systems with incredibly advanced temporal and spatial components has
resulted from this growing engagement, combined with developments in computation. However,
37
for a multitude of reasons, the practical implementation of conflict prevention and early warning
falls behind its theoretical growth.49
This is further supported by Schmeidl & Piza-Lopez who notes that the culmination of the Cold
War generated various changes to the international order, including increased prominence of
early warning systems. The resolution of prior stalemate scenarios between East and West -
illustrated best in the United Nations Security Council - made serious measures for early warning
conceivable. Nevertheless, the transition from international to mostly internal conflicts made
conflict prevention initiatives including military intervention problematic, as they posed a threat
to state sovereignty. The increased visibility of long-running domestic conflicts, along with
increased media and non-governmental attention, has pushed the horrors of war considerably
closer to home.50
As noted by Masila, the conception of early warning systems was met with much skepticism
from various people and organizations. However, in recent years, it has gained popularity as a
method for spotting potential conflict situations and taking action to prevent their escalation. An
early warning system must have a conflict prevention component in order to be effective. Masila
asserts that because the two concepts work together to foresee and settle any potential conflicts,
it is impossible to tell them apart.51
Policymakers, international organizations, and other stakeholders have become more aware that
early intervention could have prevented or at least mitigated tragedies like those in Rwanda,
Somalia and humanitarian organizations to improve their ability to detect the onset of a violent
49 Muggah, R., & Whitlock, M. (2022). Reflections on the Evolution of Conflict Early Warning. International
Journal of Security and Development, 10(1).
50 Schmeidl, S., & Piza-Lopez, E. (2002). Gender and conflict early warning: A framework for action. London:
International Alert.
51 Ibid.
38
conflict with its accompanying needs for humanitarian aid. The authorities in charge of providing
humanitarian relief are hoping that the early warning will allow them to schedule food and other
supply deliveries to people who have been affected by the violence more successfully. Other
groups that focus on diplomatic or military operations desire to use early warning to prevent an
escalation of violence or its reappearance after a conflict in order to give themselves more time
to implement conflict prevention measures, such as preventive diplomacy or preventative
peacekeeping.52
According to Wulf and Debiel, early warning and conflict prevention systems can be divided
into two groups. Both qualitative and quantitative models may be used. The most detailed early
warning response system exists in at the UN level and is mainly catered to humanitarian crises
and not specifically to conflicts.53 Only in the last two decades have these responses established
in humanitarian organizations begun to be applied beyond merely natural disasters and economic
crises and evolved to other areas such as conflict and wars. Wulf and Debiel add that the under-
explored areas remain as to who is to be warned, at what time, and what actions are to be taken
to prevent the escalation into conflicts.54
Questions remain as to why despite the presence of established conflict prevention and early
warning systems especially in war-prone nations, there is still a prevalence of violence and war
in these areas. Reasons, why these systems are not working to prevent, de-escalate and control
the spread of war to other regions, remain largely under-explored. Organizations that have taken
upon themselves the role of peace-keeping and humanitarian aid in such situations are lacking in
their conflict prevention and early warning approaches.
52 Brecke, P. (2000). Risk assessment models and early warning systems. WZB Discussion Paper.
53 Ibid. p 1.
54 Ibid. p 3.
39
Therefore, the absence of a workable preventive response is the basic issue with early warning
systems and conflict prevention in Africa. According to the Ripe moment theory, it is
challenging to make precise predictions, but it is even more challenging to convince important
figures and the general public to heed warnings. It is difficult to reach out to communities that
might be able to use the knowledge gathered to respond to the threat of violence.55 Haider adds
to this by stating that civil society organizations frequently find themselves in the position of
both warning and response, despite their inability to adequately record and respond. The system
is less effective as a result of the redundant practices used by numerous groups involved in early
warning and conflict prevention.56
2.4 Factors influencing the effectiveness of early warning systems in conflict prevention in
Africa
The elements that affect successful early warning and early reaction in Africa were asked about
by the respondents. In a more coordinated and team-oriented approach that offers better
prospects for successful conflict prevention, the respondents provided a variety of variables. The
factors that have been identified in this section are the main areas that have come up as crucial to
the effective running of conflict early warning systems at all levels of governance.
2.4.1 Timing of the early warning
The majority of respondents, representing more than 90% of the sample, believe timing is an
essential element of the early warning system. Everything that determines whether or not a
possible conflict situation will be prevented or escalated is dependent on the timing of any
response to a crucial circumstance. The issue here is when the right time to respond is. Basically,
55 Arnado, M. A. (2012). Opinion – Women‘s involvement in conflict early warning systems: Moving from rhetoric
to reality in Mindanao. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.
56 Haider, H. (2014). Conflict: Topic Guide. Revised edition with B. Rohwerder. Birmingham: GSDRC, University
of Birmingham. p 50.
40
how early is good enough to do something about the existing tensions and emergent situations?
The reality is there is a need for the existing structures to be implemented effectively without
exacerbating the situation to its tipping point.
Nevertheless, because of a paucity of fine-grained and encompassing indicators of geopolitical
tensions, efforts to predict hostilities have so far failed miserably. Chadefaux posits that one of
the most persistent challenges in predicting conflicts has been the absence of measures that
are comprehensive in their assessments of tensions. Furthermore, these measures are frequently
inconsistent among countries, and their assessment (for example, military spending) may be
influenced by the government's benevolence or strategic objectives. Ultimately, they are unable
to accurately assess the perceived actuality and importance of timing. Contemporaries could
have been unaware of real risk factors or, on the other hand, could have invented them when
none existed.57
There are three stages in every conflict situation: the pre-conflict stage, the conflict stage, and the
conflict stage after the conflict. Specific circumstances in each of these phases could either end
the disagreement or make it worse. Early warning systems are based on the premise that they can
only be applied to stop or minimize conflict after it has already started. However, this is not the
case when a trustworthy early warning and response system is to be deployed. According to
Tiruneh, an early warning can happen at any point in the conflict management, escalation, or
prevention process. It's a system that detects nascent, potential, or current conflict at an early
stage. As a result, thinking about early warning as an essential feature of three phases: pre-
conflict, in-conflict, and post-conflict is somewhat more applicable and realistic.58 With this in
57 Ibid.
58 Tiruneh, B. T. (2010). Establishing an Early Warning System in the African Peace and Security Architecture:
Challenges and Prospects. KAIPTC Occasional Paper No. 29.
41
mind, it is crucial to keep in mind that an efficient early warning and reaction system's timing is
crucial to the conflict management process. Without proper timing then the escalation into
violent conflict is prone to be faster and much harder to manage as relates to the notions
presented by Ripe moment theorists.
Early response systems, in Stine's opinion, are preventive measures that are put into place in a
timely and appropriate manner, typically during the latent phases of a potential violent conflict.
Short-term conflict responses are more reactive since key stakeholders use speedy gathering and
transmission of information concerning violent occurrences to prevent the violence from
escalating. Longer-term preemptive approaches are more proactive, analyzing data accumulated
over time to address conflict sources.59
According to the discussion in this paper, the implementation and timing of responses affect how
well an early warning system performs. The process of early warning is said to be greatly
influenced by the interval between the gathering of information and the response. The
information gathered analyzed and verified must reach the persons and communities involved in
time for it to make a difference in turning the tide in a potential conflict situation.60 Therefore,
accurate timely, and consistent information is an essential component in an effective conflict
early warning system.
2.4.2 Availability of resources to support early warning systems
Most respondents also noted that early warning and response systems‘ effectiveness is hinged
upon the reliable collection and analysis of data from various sources over time. The process of
59 Stine, K. (2013). Internal evaluation: Participatory early warning for more effective response to religious conflict
in Plateau State, Nigeria – A pilot project funded by USIP. Search for Common
Ground. https://www.sfcg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/NGR_EV_Nov13_ParticipatoryEarly-Warning-for-
More-Effective-Response-to-Religious-Conflict-in-Plateau-State.pdf
60 Ibid. p. 2
42
data collection on potential conflict indicators entails the application of various resources that are
pertinent to the accuracy and reliability of this data. This is the most important stage in any early
warning system. It entails the application of various technologies that are required for data
collection. Pham and Vinck note that access to these technologies proves hard for many nations
creating deeper disparities and inequalities in data collection.61
A smart strategy to guarantee the accuracy of data collection and analysis is to focus early
warning systems on the acquisition of new technologies. However, these resources times prove
to be quite expensive. This means that leaders prioritize other aspects of conflict management
that are not as expensive in an attempt to optimize their available resource use. One of the ways
that have come up in the recent past is the integration of existing technologies with new
technologies instead of reinventing the whole system every time.
According to Wulf and Debiel, taking that into consideration, early warning and response
research funds should prioritize the integration of current models and discoveries, with a focus
on openness, accessibility, and connectedness to local and regional early warning and response
systems. At the same time, development assistance to multilateral organizations should refrain
from funding the building of entirely new systems and instead encourage its crisis-affected
partners to benefit from current informational resources, connectedness, and cooperative
learning. In order to develop realistic and workable response plans, it may be essential to track
and evaluate local events, as well as to create policy-oriented scenarios and regional early
warning and response techniques.62
61 Pham, P. N., & Vinck, P. (2012). Technology, conflict early warning systems, public health, and human
rights. Health and Human Rights Journal, 14(2), 106-117.
62 Ibid. p 30.
43
An early warning system must rely on data analysis to pinpoint the precise regional and local
causes that could motivate individuals or organizations to conduct violence. Everyone involved
in an early warning process should be able to agree on the events or developments that are most
likely to raise tensions in this situation as a result of this. Such a scenario relies solely on
information and its quality. The process of information gathering and analysis of data relies on
resources that if made available ensure that the process of early warning is implemented timely
and effectively as the potential for conflict increases.
Palli notes that although the information is becoming more widely available, quantity does not
always guarantee quality. Quantitative and qualitative data collection methodologies
employed in the early warning are still improving, and conflict databases have considerable
discrepancies in terms of coverage, definitions of what constitutes conflict/violent occurrence,
and other factors, which might compromise the accuracy and validity of findings. Methods to
encourage more innovation in this field through investments of resources could produce better
results.63
Despite the proven advantages of resource investment in the area of data collection and early
warning response mechanisms, there remain many hindrances. Among them is the lack of
political will. Early warning techniques' limited ability to trigger intervention is well understood,
and policymakers are eager to use early warning products that decrease risk in complex decision-
making operations.64 However, despite these structural limitations, significant resources have
63 Palli, S. (2017, May). Early Warning Systems as a Conflict Prevention Tool: Recommendations for the Arab
Region. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).
64 Power, S. (2013). A Problem from Hell: America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books.
44
been invested in developing increasingly sophisticated systems that combine high-resolution
surveillance, communication, and responsiveness in response to the early warning system.65
2.4.3 Availability of good institutions in place
The majority of respondents also agreed that the early warning system mechanism's efficacy was
largely dependent on the presence of reliable institutions. According to the respondents,
governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations increasingly have
early warning systems. They perform a number of tasks, including as issuing alerts, quickening
response times, enhancing the quality of the data used to make choices, and acting as full-fledged
response mechanisms. There is consensus on what constitutes a "good" early warning system,
and numerous initiatives have put this best practice into practice. Political decision-making
bodies are ideally suited to help early warning systems.66
Although structural indications fall into fairly simple models, the progression of a heated
situation into conflict is the product of the interplay among various phenomena in a complicated
network of interrelated levels of organizations, not the straightforward summation of a cleanly
defined set of causes.67 Complexity research suggests that in order for organizations to adapt to
the structures of their surroundings, they must put in place feedback systems and decision-
making frameworks that are more flexible in order to strengthen organizational resilience and
legitimize the learning process. It follows that the institutions in question must be able to learn
from their past mistakes and adapt to the changes that materialize during the early warning and
reaction phase.
65 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2009). Global assessment report on disaster risk
reduction. https://www.undrr.org/publication/global-assessment-report-disaster-risk-reduction-2009
66 Ibid. p 15.
67 Meier, P. (2007). New Strategies for Early Response: Insights from Complexity Science. http://www.conflict-
reduction.org/meier/Early%20Response.pdf
45
Meier suggests that by constructing hybrid hierarchies and networked governance systems, the
"warning-response gap" could be closed through early warning and response mechanisms.
Certain situations may prompt the formation of ad hoc task groups, which serve as consultation
tools to guarantee that information and potential judgments do not get drowned in predetermined
decision-making routes.68 The competence of the institutions and offices charged with this
responsibility, according to Wulf and Debiel, restricts the efficacy of the current conflict early
warning systems.
Debasing measures must be utilized in a variety of areas where cognitive biases exist in these
companies in order to assure the success of the early warning and reaction process.69
Muggah and Whitlock assert that the bulk of conventional early warning systems in use today
involve investigation, notification, and intervention through necessary institutions that is
tactically, strategically, and operationally pertinent. There is a divide between study, warning,
and action for some organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe, which includes conflict resolution and settlement (OSCE). Others have more flexible
and integrated roles, such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) (ECOWAS). The core tenet of many of these early warning systems
is that decision-makers may effectively record, investigate, disseminate, and consolidate
information about the fundamental risks associated with crises and conflicts, which can then be
utilized to generate suggestions for action.70
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. p 26.
70 Willmont, H. (2017). Improving U.N. Situational Awareness: Enhancing the U.N.‘s ability to prevent and respond
to mass human suffering and to ensure the safety and security of its personnel. New York: Stimson Center.
46
It is therefore fair to say that international institutions, bi-lateral institutions, research centers,
and non-governmental groups have all a role to play in early warning and reaction systems. Civil
society organizations frequently find themselves in the position of both warning and response,
despite their inability to adequately record and respond. When several early warning and early
response organizations carry out the same duties, the system is less effective. According to a
recent study on regional organizations, the primary threat to early warning systems rather than a
lack of trustworthy data—comes from organizational issues and internal political disputes.71
2.4.4 Availability of effective communication channels
The majority of respondents also agreed that gathering knowledge and useful data is important
for informing the conflict intervention process and is related to early warning and response. As
was already said, the collecting and analysis of data is made much faster and more trustworthy
by the use of technologies like machine learning. But this is just one step in the procedure. Once
information is gathered, there is a need for this information to be communicated through the right
channels of the organizations involved to ensure a timely response at the ripe and opportune time
for it to be effective as advanced by the ripe moment theory.
According to Palli, the flow of information goes through different levels and is prone to issues of
information bias and distortion along the way. The amount of information that is being
communicated at any given time is another important aspect to note. This indicates that a variety
of information is received, and for the decision-making process to be effective, it must be
carefully filtered and categorized. In this view, the efficiency of communication channels is a
crucial component of early warning and response for community-level conflict prevention.
71 Ibid. p 50.
47
Many facets of operations in hostile and post-conflict environments depend on communication.
It has long been recognized that the traditional or mainstream media—radio, television, and print
journalism—is an important medium for communicating ideas and messages with the potential to
influence public opinion. These venues for communication have been used to spread messages
that support peace and reconciliation and help prevent violent conflict, as well as to incite
violence. New communication channels and opportunities have been made possible by
technological breakthroughs. Additionally, communication has been boosted, information is
conveyed quickly, and new places for individuals and organizations to participate in the various
stages have been established thanks to mobile phones, crowdsourcing technology, and social
networks.72
Meyer et al. developed a persuasive intrastate conflict warning model that highlighted the
filtering of information as part of the communication channel that this information on potential
conflicts goes through before it reaches the response stage. This flow of information is rooted in
the organizational culture that is already established in the institutions in question. Essentially,
organizational culture affects the way information flows and how it is filtered.73 Dev notes that
the inclusiveness of an organization, its consistency, flexibility, and mission are all four aspects
of the organizational culture of any institution involved in early warning.74
In keeping with the idea, a functional communication channel is thus a crucial component of the
early warning system. Only if the intended recipient can receive the information on time is an
early warning system effective. The age of information and communication technology is
72 Coyle, D., & Meier, P. (2009). New Technologies in Emergencies and Conflicts: The Role of Information and
Social Networks. Washington D.C. and London U.K.: UN Foundation and Vodofone Partnership.
73 Meyer, C. O., Otto, F., & De Franco, C. (2010). Recasting the warning-response problem: Persuasion and
preventive diplomacy. International Studies Review, 556-578.
74 Dev, S. (2013). Assessing and understanding organizational culture: Variouse views and theories. Indian Streams
Research Journal, 1-11.
48
currently in effect. Utilizing social media and mobile technology as a whole is a part of early
warning and reaction. Utilization of these technologies at the local level makes access to
information easier for those who are capable of taking action to prevent the escalation of
violence. ICT-supported programs, on the other hand, must begin with a reliable understanding
of local geopolitical tension to be successful. Peacebuilders must also be conscious that these
instruments can be used to organize violence, and they must be prepared for this.75
2.4.5 Monitoring of changing conflict dynamics
Monitoring, according to the OECD, is "a continuous process that includes collection and
analysis of information on specified indicators to give management and relevant parties with
indications of the level of performance and progress of objectives, as well as effectiveness in the
use of allotted money."76 The process of gathering data is ongoing, and the information is
utilized to inform programming decisions that will improve timely planning and implementation
in addition to serving as a source of transparency. The ability of programs to adapt and respond
to changing circumstances, which is critical in complex and dynamic conflict and violent
situations in
particular, must
be monitored
effectively.77
As a result,
monitoring program
implementation performance in conflict contexts entails more than just reporting.
The majority of respondents also mentioned that a vital component of the early warning system
is altering conflict dynamics. Therefore, it's crucial to continuously monitor how conflict
dynamics are changing. Data and information serve as the foundation for an effective monitoring
strategy. However, data gathering and monitoring might occasionally be misunderstood. At both
75 Shields, C. M. (2014). ICTs in conflict early warning - possibilities and challenges. Peace
Insight. https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/articles/icts-conflict-early-warning-possibilities-
challenges/?location=kenya&theme=culture-media-advocacy
76 OECD-DAC. (2010). Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management. Paris: OECD, 27-28.
77 OECD-DAC. (2012). Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility – Improving
learning for results. Paris: OECD, 30.
49
the action and result stages, program managers must have the discipline to consistently gather,
assess, and reflect on data about their programs. To put it in another way, a monitoring strategy
must have aspects that allow information to be absorbed and used.78 Both donors and
implementation organizations must put in place analytical, organizational, and procedural aspects
to have a comprehensive and appropriate monitoring strategy that influences flexible and fast
decision-making on programs in crisis settings.
Conflict situations are dynamic processes that do not just prop up out of the blue. They are
situations that develop and evolve resulting from existing or new tensions between communities
as advanced by the conflict transformation theory. They are propelled by various factors such as
incitement by politicians and leaders, prevailing challenges such as resource scarcity, and many
more issues. A functional early warning and response strategy requires the ongoing monitoring
of these elements. The sharing of this data, which is gathered in advance of conflict, enables
prompt conflict resolution. Therefore, keeping track of conflict dynamics as they develop offers
a crucial chance for early warning systems to operate effectively in conflict prevention.
As a result, it is accurate to argue that early warning systems need to adopt a proactive mindset.79
In post-conflict situations, the potential for future escalation into conflict is still a threat that
requires to be addressed. Therefore, monitoring conflict situations even after they have been
resolved presents a chance for future prevention of new conflicts from emerging. Early warning
systems as noted have a role to place in all stages of a conflict. Therefore, changing dynamics
should be constantly monitored even after a solution is reached.
78 Church, C., & Rogers, M. M. (2006). Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict-
Transformation Programs. Washington: Search for Common Ground, 83.
79 Ibid. p 49.
50
2.5 Chapter summary and conclusion
Early warning and response systems provide the opportunity for effective conflict resolution
methods to be applied at various stages of a disagreement. The process relies on information
gathering and dissemination. However, there are various challenges encountered in this process.
The factors that are essential to an effective early warning system must exist together in a
synchronized and harmonious system to be functional. These factors as identified in this chapter
are the timing of the responses, resources required for response, effective communication
channels, presence of appropriate institutions, and monitoring of conflict dynamics.
51
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF EARLY WARNING
MECHANISMS TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN
3.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the effectiveness of South Sudan's conflict early warning systems. It
assesses the efficiency of conflict early warning systems and their impact on the direction of the
national conflict. Despite failing to entirely stop civil wars in South Sudan, conflict early
warning systems have influenced developments toward peace and alleviated conflict in the
country to some level. Today, as opposed to full-fledged wars in the early years of South Sudan‘s
independence, early warning systems have helped reduce the conflicts to endemic low-tone
clashes, giving the country some level of stability.
3.2 Predicting and Preventing Violent Conflict Occurrence
The vast majority of respondents to the study noted that South Sudan's early warning systems for
violent conflict had been extremely effective in foreseeing and preventing bloodshed. In addition
to regional and international early warning systems run by the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the country's
Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU) routinely evaluates and forecasts the
conflict situation. Based on the review, the agencies collaborate with the government to create
strategies for reducing violent conflict and advancing national stability. The developments below
highlight the role of early warning systems in predicting and preventing violent conflict in South
Sudan.
52
The remarks make it very evident that the early warning system was essential for anticipating
and ending the fighting in South Sudan. The early warning system's mechanism, which was put
in place to prevent conflict from reoccurring in the country, bears some responsibility for the
relative peace that has been achieved in South Sudan.
3.2.1 Effective management of the electoral process
The majority of respondents claimed that an early warning system had been used to control the
voting process and avert unrest over elections. Brosché & Höglund elaborate that following its
independence from the larger Sudan in 2011, South Sudan was scheduled to have its first general
elections in July 2015. IGAD and the country‘s early warning system however reported the
possibility of a coup d'état in light of the continuing conflict in the country. IGAD reported that
there remained heightened divisions in the military – a situation they warned would have been
made more volatile if the country was to hold its first elections as scheduled80. With attempted
evidence of violence in African countries that went to elections with divides in their armed
forces like Chad, Mali, and Guinea, it is fair to conclude that the systems successfully predicted
violent conflict and helped prevent it.
“I believe that the postponement of the country’s general elections was a smart move in conflict
prevention. It prevented the worst from happening and is a tool in the conflict early warning
mechanisms for the country to employ even in future instances.”81
80 Brosché, J., & Höglund, K. (2016). Crisis of governance in South Sudan: electoral politics and violence in the
world's newest nation. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1), 67-90.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X15000828
81 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
53
3.2.2 Development of Peaceful Governance Strategies
The respondents observed that Early warning systems in South Sudan have also shielded the
country from full-blown conflict by helping the government come up with leadership strategies
that contain the situation and steer the country towards peace. The country's parliament amended
the transitional constitution of 2011 in 2015 to lengthen the presidential and legislative terms to
two and four years, respectively. International peace groups, particularly IGAD and the United
Nations through UNMISS, were instrumental in this process. 201882. With elections postponed,
these organizations through their conflict early warning systems provided recommendations that
influenced the decision of the parliament and ensured continuity in an otherwise uncertain period
that would have easily ended in violent conflict. Again in 2018, the country‘s rival pacts
influenced by concerns over the feasibility of a violent power transition signed a peace
agreement that invoked a three-year transitional period to be followed by general elections next
year (2023)83. By influencing the postponement of the general elections, conflict early warning
systems have given the country a sense of stability and continuity essentially transforming the
conflict situation as advanced by the conflict transformation theory. Thus, making even rival
political leaders appreciate the value of peace and sustainable development over an unguided
scramble for power.
“As a young nation, South Sudan finds itself in the early stages of learning to build up its
leadership and governance. Despite being rocked with ethnopolitical conflicts, the early warning
systems present are strategic tools in formulating a new governance structure that works.”84
82 Agwanda, Billy, and Uğur Yasin Asal. "State fragility and post-conflict state-building: An analysis of South
Sudan Conflict (2013-2019)." Güvenlik Bilimleri Dergisi 9, no. 1 (2020): 125-146.
https://doi.org/10.28956/gbd.736103
83 Liaga, Emmaculate Asige. "South Sudan's transitional government Realities, challenges and opportunities." ISS
East Africa Report 2021, no. 41 (2021): 1-28. https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/ejc-isear-v2021-n41-a1
84 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
54
It is evident from the observations that South Sudan's early warning system has aided in the
creation of peaceful governance initiatives. The early warning system has helped avert and
prevent election-tied conflict and fight for power by predicting and opting for power-sharing to
help strengthen governance and prevent election violence.
3.2.3 Establishment of the Community Dialogue Programs
Most respondents expressed their opinion that South Sudan‘s conflict early warning led to the
establishment of community dialogue programs to mitigate hostility among civilians and sustain
peace after the 2014 ceasefire85. Due to this, the Action for Conflict Resolution (ACR) was
created
and
registered
in
2015
with
the
goal
of
preventing
disputes
by
fostering
more
collaboration between the Dinka and Nuer groups. ACR works to prevent violent conflict by
reducing extremism among civilians who support one side over another in conflicts because of
their racial or ethnic affiliation. One of the key advantages of early warning systems, according
to Souare, is their capacity to pinpoint and address the underlying causes of conflict before
violence breaks out. ACR reaches out to the civilian population, raising awareness of the
devastating effects of armed conflict, the necessity of peaceful coexistence with neighbors, and
the appropriate channels for resolving disagreements rather than resorting to violent conflict,
along with other community dialogue programs influenced by reports and recommendations by
South Sudan's CEWERU86. In a country where civilization has not sufficiently taken root,
community dialogue helps reduce the extremism and alignment to ethnic rivalries thus mitigating
conflict. Conflict early warning systems in Sudan have therefore played a critical role in
preaching peaceful coexistence, helping the country avoid all-out community wars.
85 Oral interview ,…
86 Ibid.
55
.
“The citizens of South Sudan must be included in the process of conflict prevention if the process
is to work. This is because they are the first affected and stand to lose the most from a protracted
conflict situation.”87
From the discussion, it is evident the critical role conflict early warning systems have played in
preventing violent conflict in South Sudan, especially on the subject of power transition.
Elections are the main cause of conflicts in African countries – a fact that the conflict early
warning systems in South Sudan were clearly weary of. Thus, the systems have constantly urged
the country to pursue stability before attempting to alter its leadership through a general election,
and they have influenced peaceful governance tactics in this way. So far, South Sudan's deadly
conflict has been predicted and mostly avoided thanks to conflict early warning systems.
3.3 Early warning systems enhanced adequate responses to conflict
The significant majority of responders stated that the early warning systems had enhanced the
reaction to the violence in South Sudan. The South Sudanese conflict has recently been waning
in terms of both intensity and frequency. This is primarily the fault of the early warning systems
that have increased mediation in South Sudan.
Conflict early warning systems, in particular the Conflict Early Warning and Response
Mechanism (CEWARN) of IGAD and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
(CEWERU) of the country, have been crucial to the creation of successful responses to major
conflicts in the country since South Sudan's independence. While sporadic civil wars remain
87 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
56
prevalent in the country, major wars have over the years been successfully contained by the
efforts of early warning systems and associated organizations.88
3.3.1 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), 2014
Following the IGAD involvement, the first significant confrontation (2013) between President
Salva Kiir Mayardit and the allied forces of his adversary Riek Machar was successfully
contained. In 2014, the group used information from its conflict early warning system to
negotiate the COHA (Cession of Hostilities Agreement), which put an end to hostilities and
allowed for further negotiations. After that, negotiations to determine and resolve issues of the
warring pacts were promised by the August 2015 Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in
South Sudan (ARCSS). This is the first evidence of conflict transformation by early warning
systems in South Sudan89. As outlined in the conflict transformation theory, one strategy to
subdue violence is to diffuse hostility by encouraging objectivity in conflict90. Conflict early
warning systems in South Sudan have been able to manage major conflicts by proposing
objective approaches to grievances and non-violent approaches for advancing the interests of
parties in a war.
3.3.2 The Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities (ACoH), 2017
Following the breakdown of the initial peace agreement by Salvar Kiir and Machar's forces
through the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in 2017, IGAD again brokered a second
ceasefire through its early warning system (CEWARN), with the assistance of the United
Nations UNMISS and the African Union (ACoH)91.
The agreement went on to influence the
88 Nyadera, Israel Nyaburi. "South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and
solutions." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 18, no. 2 (2018): 59-86. https://doi.org/10520/EJC-14066df969
89 Kasaija. "IGAD‘s mediation‖
90 Jeong, Ho Won. "Conflict transformation." In Routledge companion to peace and conflict studies, pp. 25-34.
Routledge, 2019.
91 Nyadera, "South Sudan conflict‖
57
signature of the September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in
South Sudan, the second peace accord (RARCSS). The conflict between the opposing political
factions was successfully put under control, and as negotiations continued for the following three
years, the two leaders were urged to order the withdrawal of their armies and entreat their
constituents to remain in place so that talks could take place.92. Conflict early warning systems
were crucial in keeping these two significant episodes of intense conflict under control and in
laying the groundwork for an objective discussion of the conflict between President Salva Kiir
and his rival, Riek Machar, the two supreme leaders.93
“ The tensions between supporters of rival leaders Salva Kiir and Riek Machar have been an
issue since the nation gained its independence. The hope for conflict resolution through an early
warning mechanism has been aided by their acceptance to reach peaceful agreements. These
agreements maintain a sense of peace because the two leaders a seen to be in collaboration and
consensus with each other which translates to the citizens.”94
It is therefore evident that early warning systems have been relied upon to prevent conflict in
South Sudan. This has led to the singing of various cessation of hostility meant to prevent the
outbreak of war. The early warning system has enabled relevant institution like IGAD and Africa
Union to broker peace at the early stages of a conflict.
3.3.3 Negotiations by International Community Envoys
Majority of the study‘s respondents stated that early warning systems have also influenced the
intervention of the international community towards peace in South Sudan. Wepundi reports that
since the country‘s independence, international agencies have been substantially involved in
negotiations to resolve power struggles in the country and establish policies for the peaceful and
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Oral interview June 1515,
58
sustainable utilization of the country‘s capital resources95. South Sudan‘s capital resources
including oil and pastoral land are a serious bond of contention and one of the factors behind the
endless civil wars. The UN, AU, IGAD, and other international bodies have all sent envoys to
South Sudan over the years to help the country‘s leadership establish better governance
structures and better strategies for the exploitation of capital resources. As elaborated by
Stamnes, the involvement of international agencies is largely influenced by the desire to uphold
human rights and to avoid spillover effects of war such as refugee situations in neighboring
countries96. International agencies are therefore keen on findings and reports by conflict early
warning systems and are always on high alert to move in and intervene appropriately. Early
warning systems have therefore been highly critical to drawing the attention of international
organizations leading to effective interventions on conflicts in South Sudan.
“The international community has been active in supporting South Sudan and its people since
attaining independence. This support from international institutions through aid, finance, and
military support has been strategic in improving the prospects for a peaceful nation.”97
Early crisis detection technologies have made it possible for UNMISS to provide assistance to
civilians during hostilities until the situation has been stabilized and everyone has been turned
over to government custody. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) works with
the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to strengthen peace and security and foster sustainable
development in South Sudan. The agency was established as a preventative measure leading
ahead to South Sudan's independence in order to emphasize the significance of conflict early
warning systems. Early warning systems influence precautionary measures that enable better and
95 Wepundi, Manasseh, and Roba D. Sharamo. "The state of peace and security in East Africa." Institute for Security
Studies Monographs 2021, no. 205 (2021): 1-68. https://journals.co.za/doi/10.10520/ejc-ismono-v2021-n205-a1
96 Stamnes, Eli. "The United Nations mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS): Protecting civilians in a
volatile environment." Policy Brief 24 (2015). https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/193787/NUPI-Policy-Brief-24-15-
Stamnes-3.pdf
97 Oral interview June 1616,
59
adequate conflict management whenever violence ultimately ensues. UNMIS established bases
for civilian protection during war, Protection of Civilians Camps (POCs) manned by the UN
peacekeeping forces. These camps whose establishment was informed by conflict early warning
systems by the UN, are safe havens for civilians in times of conflict and help diffuse wars by
safeguarding targeted communities from their adversaries98. The POCs are a further example of
how conflict early warning systems have influenced adequate response to war since South
Sudan‘s independence.
“Civilians suffer the most when conflicts break out in South Sudan. The death toll, injuries, loss
of land and property, and many more areas of normal life suffer. The humanitarian aid that is
made available through already established early warning systems ensures that assistance to
those affected is available.”99
It is therefore correct to say that the early warning system has enabled the involvement of as
many mediators as possible in the South Sudan conflict to prevent the outbreak of war. By
intercepting conflict at its early stages and incorporating both international communities and
regional actors, conflict in South Sudan has been addressed and peace agreements signed to
strengthen the peace processes.
3.4 Early Warning led to timely Intervention of Conflict
A bigger percentage of the respondents were of the opinion that conflict early warning systems
have facilitated timely interventions to conflicts in South Sudan by influencing decisions to
restore peace before conflicts intensify, or prompting preventive action before major conflicts
can break out100. As explained in the Ripe moment theory, successful conflict resolution is
98 Sugawara, "Effectiveness of Early‖
99 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
100 Ibid.
60
contingent on taking action at the proper time101. Decisions such as the procrastination of
elections on two occasions for the sake of peace are examples of timely interventions that the
country was able to arrive at due to the influence of early warning systems. Through an
assessment of precedents in newly liberated nations, the early warning systems in South Sudan
were able to accurately appraise the volatile nature of general elections in such a country and
have continued to push it forward as the country waits for the ripe moment. The decisions on
elections were made well in advance before the country got into an electoral mood further
ensuring that violence does not erupt as a result of the postponements102. Early warning systems
have therefore been able to successfully mitigate electoral chaos in South Sudan by ensuring that
the decision to postpone polls is made well in advance before the country is polarized politically
and peace prioritized over the interest of the country‘s rival leaders
Also, the systems in South Sudan recognized the limits to which certain strategies for preventing
war lasted. First, the agencies recognized the dangers of continuing to postpone elections.
Vhumbunu explains that with the opposition growing agitated about the further derailment of its
plans to ascend to power, IGAD in collaboration with other regional and international agencies
saw the need for a revised accommodative arrangement that would see a transitional government
put up for 3 years, awaiting elections in 2021103. The Revitalized Transitional Government of
National Unity in February 2020 brought the conflict to a formal end and continues to buy the
country time as it awaits its first general elections in 2023104. Conflict early warning systems
have therefore ensured timely management of the South Sudan situation and the strategies by the
101 Keethaponcalan, S. I. "Resolving Third World Conflicts Ripe Moment to Intervene and The Peaceable Change."
(2021): 32-51. https://indianjournals.com/ijor.aspx?target=ijor:wa&volume=25&issue=1&article=003
102 Ibid.
103Vhumbunu, Clayton Hazvinei. "Reviving peace in South Sudan through the revitalised peace agreement:
understanding the enablers and possible obstacles." Conflict Trends 2018, no. 4 (2018): 3-11.
https://doi.org/10.10520/EJC-14c04c94cd
104 Vhumbunu, "The formation of the revitalized‖
61
organizations associated with them keep on changing with the evolving nature of the country‘s
animosity landscape. The systems continuously develop early responses during the latent phases
of a forecasted violent conflict, effectively arresting situations that may enhance the probability
of violent conflict erupting.
Second, the conflict early warning systems in South Sudan realized the diminishing impact of the
country‘s supreme leaders, Sava Kiir and Riek Machar, and influenced community dialogue
strategies as a means of reaching the people as their allegiance to the two leaders‘ fade. Krause
notes that as opposed to the early years of South Sudan‘s independence and Riek Machar‘s
dismissal as vice president when the country‘s citizens pledged strong allegiance to either of the
two leaders, years of negotiations between the two parties have seen their influence on the
ground fade significantly105. In fact, Krause reports that most of the sporadic ethnic wars
witnessed regularly in various parts of the country today are no longer nationalistic and are rather
ignited by local struggles for capital resources such as pastoral land, water sources, land, and
local control106. The early warning systems recognized these developments and embarked on
strategies to encourage communities to peacefully coexist. The agreement on cessation of
hostilities (ACoH) previously discussed is an example of efforts by early warning systems to
promote peace among the locals without having to go through their leaders. This and many other
community empowerment initiatives influenced by early warning systems are timely
interventions that have helped de-escalate conflict in South Sudan.
From the discussion, it is worth mentioning that conflict early warning systems in South Sudan
have moved the country closer to stability every year by igniting negotiations whenever the
conflict situation is about to get out of control. It can be argued that the country has moved closer
105 Krause, Jana. "Stabilization and local conflicts: communal and civil war in South Sudan." Ethnopolitics 18, no. 5
(2019): 478-493. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1640505
106 Krause, "Stabilization and local conflicts‖.
62
to stability every year since 2013 except for the significant setback in 2017. Liaga explains that
conflict early warning systems have been the force behind the revision of peace agreements
ultimately leading to the end of the political clashes when the revitalized transition government
was established107.
The early warning system, therefore, has consistently alerted key stakeholders in South Sudan,
particularly IGAD and international agencies on developments in the country‘s conflict situation
allowing continuous negotiations and deliberations that have seen the country unite under one
government and a formal end to the political war. While the systems can be criticized for failing
to completely ensure peace, an analysis of the developments in the war lay bare the possibility
that the situation would have been much worse over the years if not for the interventions
influenced by these systems. It is on this basis that the interventions are considered to have been
timely and the systems are accredited with leading effective timely strategies to improve the
situation.
3.5 Early warning helped address the underlying causes of conflict
According to the vast majority of responders, the early warning system has made it simpler to
deal with the underlying reasons of conflict. Conflict early warning systems helped South Sudan
deal with some of the conflict's core causes. This is consistent with the ideas of conflict
transformation theory, which hold that understanding the traits and underlying causes of conflict
is necessary in order to try to overcome it. These included ethno political animosity, scramble for
capital resources, divisions in the country‘s army, and economic devastation and oil production.
107 Ibid.
63
3.5.1 Ethno-Political Animosity
According to the responders, the early warning system has been crucial in tackling the major
sources of conflict in South Sudan, such as the intense political tension that sparked a civil war
there. The main cause of conflict in South Sudan when the country effectively seceded from the
original Sudan was political competition between Dinka leader Salva Kiir and Nuer-backed Riek
Machar108. The marriage between the two rival ethnic groups in pursuit of independence was
bound to break given the deep history of animosity between them. The conflict between these
communities was predicted by early warning systems, which influenced the establishment of
several peace initiatives in South Sudan, including the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.
“Ethnic-related politics has been the bane of South Sudan’s sovereign progress as a nation.
Each of the two conflicting ethnic groups believes in their right to leadership and this causes
conflict.”109
Divisions in the country‘s army were the other underlying cause of conflict identified by early
warning systems and were of the stand-out agendas of the revitalized transitional government. In
the new government, the army was to incorporate soldiers from Riek Machar‘s break-away
troops, and strategies were outlined to ensure unity in the army as well as precautionary
measures against possible future divisions. Vhumbunu presents that while the country‘s president
did not welcome the idea of incorporating Machar‘s soldiers into the army to which he is
commander in chief, Kiir succumbed to international pressure and agreed to the reunification of
the country‘s forces under one transitional government110. Conflict early warning systems
underscored the role of the country‘s divided army in propagating conflict and effectively pushed
for reforms to address it.
108 Johnson, Douglas H. "Briefing: the crisis in South Sudan." African Affairs 113, no. 451 (2014): 300-309.
https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu020
109 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
110 Ibid.
64
“The military of South Sudan much like its citizens is divided between the two rival leaders. This
created increased tensions in the country and exacerbated the conflict situation further. Early
warning systems have enabled the nation to recognize this underlying cause and address it
through the reunification of the military arm.”111
It is therefore true to say that through the early warning system, political tension is South Sudan
has been de-escalated. The early warning system has allowed the political players main President
Salva Kiir and Riek Machar to share government and avoid political violence. In cases where
violence was likely, through an early warning system it was made possible for the election to be
postponed to a time when tension has de-escalated.
3.5.2 Scramble for Resources
According to most respondents interviewed by the study, conflict early warning systems also
identified the scramble for capital resources as a significant driver of the conflict and influenced
programs aimed at facilitating equitable and sustainable utilization of capital resources. The local
government, regional agencies, and the international community have since embarked on
projects to empower communities economically and promote peace in South Sudan through
sustainable development112.
For instance,
South
Sudan
is
recognized
as
one
of
the
key partners
in
the
2063
Africa
development blueprint, which aims to promote inclusive and sustainable socio-economic
development over a 50-year period, as part of the African Union's economic development
program.113 The program recognizes that capital resource issues in South Sudan must be resolved
to enable the country to thrive both socially and economically. The union has outlined several
111 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
112 Radon, Jenik, and Sarah Logan. "South Sudan: Governance arrangements, war, and peace." Journal of
International Affairs (2014): 149-167. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24461710
113 Gowreesunkar, Vanessa. "African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 and tourism development in Africa: contribution,
contradiction and implications." International Journal of Tourism Cities (2019). https://doi.org/10.1108/IJTC-02-
2019-0029
65
economic empowerment initiatives including mega To address the nation's capital resource
problems and reduce friction amongst communities, irrigation projects and other types of
infrastructure development are needed.114. The identified sources of conflicts that early warning
systems have identified and are currently a priority in the nation's peace efforts are capital
resources like arable and pastoral land, water bodies, and transportation infrastructure.
“Early warning systems in the country have enabled recognition of the economic factors that
spark conflicts. These factors once identified can therefore be dealt with beforehand and during
a conflict to prevent its escalation.”115
According to the respondents' responses, the conflict early warning and response unit
(CEWERU) of South Sudan recognized the nation's oil resources as a key factor in the conflict.
In collaboration with other peace agencies, CEWERU pushed for the formation of the Nile
Petroleum Corporation (Nilepet) to represent the interests of the country‘s citizens in the
exploitation of oil resources in a way that benefits the people and promotes national peace116.
The conflict early warning system explained that one of the causes of the intense struggle for
power is the country's oil wealth, observing that rival factions avidly view oil income as a
potential prize for holding central power and control of the purse. Onditi et al. explain that this
has fueled political ambitions and is behind the zero-sum thinking in negotiations where parties
with the upper hand want total control over oil resources117. The ability of the current
administration to fund ongoing military and security operations while also preserving the
patronage networks , in a more immediate sense, largely dependends on the price of oil. As a
114 Gowreesunkar, "African Union (AU) Agenda 2063‖
115 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
116 Onditi et al., "Power-sharing consociationalism in resolving South Sudan‘s ethnopolitical conflict in the post-
Comprehensive Peace Agreement era." African Journal on Conflict Resolution 18, no. 1 (2018): 37-64.
https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/175828
117 Onditi, et al."Power-sharing consociationalism‖
66
result of South Sudan's conflict early warning systems, Nile Petroleum Corporation was created.
It is a shareholder in all oil processing firms there and is primarily responsible for guaranteeing
the equitable distribution of oil earnings and advancing the interests of the populace.118. Early
warning systems in South Sudan acknowledged the importance of the nation's oil resources in
influencing conflicts and encouraged measures for their equitable and sustainable management to
reduce conflicts brought on by the battle for power and control of the nation's primary source of
income.
“The presence of oil deposits in South Sudan is a major economic boost for the nation. However,
it also represents a potential for conflict emergence and escalation if it is not dealt with. Early
warning systems come into play in this sense through identification and de-escalation of
potential conflict caused by disputes over oil deposits.”119
Notably from the discussion, the early warning system has been key in addressing the main issue
of resource conflict in South Sudan. It is worth mentioning that resource conflict remains a
challenge for the country. However, through the conflict early warning system in South Sudan, it
has been made possible to address the issue of sharing resources like oil. The early warning
system has made it easy to predict the likelihood of violence erupting hence allowing the
relevant institution to act promptly.
3.6 Early warning led to a deeper knowledge and understanding of the conflict
The success of any conflict resolution mechanism relies on how well the conflict is understood.
3.6.1 Better Understanding of Conflict Root Causes
By understanding the underlying causes and some of the driving forces behind the ethno political
antagonism between the Dinka and Nuer, early warning systems, according to the majority of
those surveyed, helped them better understand the conflict. Through continuous assessment and
118 Ibid.
119 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
67
early warning systems, root cause analyses of the war situation identified several factors that
contributed to the conflict in South Sudan, including the historical rivalry between the Dinka and
the Nuer, the competition for capital resources, the fight for control of oil resources, and the
politically motivated divisions in the army that were covered in the previous section. As Mamiya
et al. report, the first step toward managing conflict understands the root cause of the problem120.
Early warning systems for conflicts helped to comprehend what was happening by identifying
the root reasons of the conflict.
Conflict early warning systems, according to 73% of survey respondents, also helped people
better comprehend how the battle was progressing. Systematic data gathering and analysis on
disputes served as the foundation for the systems. In so doing, a better understanding of variables
in the war was established and used in the formulation of responses or providing
recommendations to the appropriate organizations to act on the intel. Larrauri explains that
conflict early warning and response programs systematically monitor and report conflict
indicators based on quantitative and qualitative analytical methods121.
Additionally, early warning systems influenced players to divulge more about their grievances
and reasons for getting involved in the conflict. Interventions proposed by the systems involved
bringing the warring parties together in negotiations where both were encouraged to air their
grievances and why they felt violent conflict was the only way out. In the negotiation processes,
the leaders opened up on issues influencing the war increasing peace organizations‘
understanding of the war and building knowledge on how best the conflict can be managed.122
120 Mamiya, Ralph, and Haidi Willmot. "Early warning, the protection of civilians and United Nations peacekeeping
operations." African Security Review 22, no. 2 (2013): 68-77. https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2013.792549
121 Larrauri, Helena Puig. "New technologies and conflict prevention in Sudan and South Sudan." New Technology
and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict (2013): 71-86. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep09625.9.pdf
122 Zambakari et al.,"The role of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) in protecting civilians." In The
Challenge of Governance in South Sudan, pp. 95-130. Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315158464-5
68
Therefore early warning system has provided the information used in hypothesizing possible war
scenarios and brainstorming response options for mitigating conflict. Early warning systems in
South Sudan provided invaluable insight into the war from continuous data collection and
analysis and active monitoring allowing the institutions in place to act on time and prevent
violence or civil war.
3.6.4 Civilian Perspectives on the Conflict
A bigger percentage of the respondents 65% also pointed to the fact that the early warning
system has also helped rope in civilians and citizens in peacebuilding in South Sudan. The
interventions influenced by early warning systems such as community empowerment programs
and campaigns for peaceful coexistence revealed the civilian perspectives on the war. In many
conflict situations, the focus is always on the leaders, and sometimes critical follower
perspectives are missed. Dorff explains that to effectively manage conflict, followers‘
perspectives should be taken into account to build an understanding of whether the citizens are
merely participating in wars because of their leaders or whether they share in their leaders‘ views
and objectives for the war123. Interventions founded on insights from the early warning systems
connected with the civilians hence better knowledge and understanding of the war.
“The presence of an early warning system in the nation has enabled the leadership in South
Sudan to understand the conflict situation in its essence. The causes, character, and drivers of
conflict once identified facilitate better leadership and decision-making in the nation.”124
123 Dorff, Cassy. "Violent and nonviolent resistance in contexts of prolonged crisis: the civilian perspective." Journal
of Global Security Studies 4, no. 2 (2019): 286-291. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogz007
124 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
69
Early warning systems in South Sudan were successful and contributed to the official end of the
civil war in that nation in 2020. Even though the country still witnesses sporadic ethnic clashes,
there is far much less violence today and the country is geared towards stability under the
revitalized transitional government. While the several years of unrest may make it seem that
peace strategies were effective, evidence demonstrates that the situation would have been much
worse were it not for conflict early warning systems by the local government, regional entities
(particularly IGAD), and the international community – most notably the UN. Early warning
systems predicted violent conflict scenarios and influenced preventive measures to contain
situations before they could erupt. The country's general elections were postponed for the sake of
peace and ultimate readiness before power shifts could even be considered, which is an excellent
example of peace preservation actions adopted as a result of warnings from these systems.
There as per the discussions it is true to conclude that early warning systems have enhanced
timely and adequate responses to conflict. The systems enabled prompt and efficient
interventions, such as ceasefire agreements and peace treaties, to ensure that the conflict did not
explode through meticulous analysis of conflict trends. The root causes of the conflict were also
addressed with the aid of early warning systems. The conflict's underlying causes were examined
by the systems, and they developed resolution plans. These included community empowerment
and cohesion programs, proposals for better management of the country‘s capital resources,
unification of the army, and better management of oil resources.
3.7 Summary of the chapter findings
In conclusion, early warning systems in South Sudan promoted knowledge and a better
understanding of the war. It laid bare the causes of the conflict and risk factors for its escalation,
the leader‘s grievances, the civilian perspectives, and how the conflict could be resolved. Early
70
warning systems therefore played a significant role in South Sudan's seven-year path to the end
of the civil war. The mechanisms contributed to the conflict's effective and gradual containment
until its resolution in 2020.Conflict early warning systems are effective in predicting and
managing violence but are constrained by systematic challenges. Implementing conflict early
warning systems can help South Sudan and indeed all African countries become stable and
develop sustainably because of peace.
.
71
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR
CRITICAL BARRIERS TO OPERATIONALIZING EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS
IN SOUTH SUDAN’S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
4.1 Introduction
Significant obstacles must be overcome in order to employ early warning systems to halt the
conflict in South Sudan, and these obstacles are discussed in this chapter. The efficiency of early
warning systems in preventing confrontations was assessed in the chapter before. Due to a
number of institutional limitations, using conflict early warning systems to manage the civil war
in South Sudan was difficult.
Even though the systems significantly helped steer the country to the formal end of the conflict,
several factors challenged their implementation with the war consuming an estimated four
hundred thousand lives. If there hadn't been so many barriers, the early warning and reaction
systems may have been more successful and peace might have been achieved much sooner. This
chapter discusses the key difficulties South Sudan's early warning and response systems ran into
when seeking to prevent conflict. African conflict early warning systems face a number of
challenges, which lowers their effectiveness and fuels growing criticism of their role in
preserving peace and preventing violent clashes between governments.
4.2 Lack of Resources to Support Early Warning System
From the responses sampled, most of the respondents argued that early warning systems in South
Sudan failed to achieve maximum because of resource constraints. South Sudan's early warning
systems were limited by the absence of the majority of these resources. For instance, Nganje
explains that one of the biggest challenges faced by South Sudan‘s conflict early warning and the
CEWERU response unit has outdated technology. Nganje goes on to say that the agency's low
72
effectiveness in foreseeing developments that would endanger the nation's peace is due to the
agency's slow adoption of the majority of the most recent intelligence analytical technologies.125
Ohazuruike goes on to explain that the UNMISS, the UN Mission in South Sudan, is currently
forced to hire workers from neighbouring nations like Kenya and Ethiopia due to a dearth of
competent manpower. Due to resource constraints, South Sudan's conflict early warning systems
are no longer as effective at fulfilling their duty to avert violent conflict.126
“Part of an effective early warning system is its ability to have all the required resources needed
to avert conflict situations and deal with them if they do occur. South Sudan is fairly young in its
independent status, as such, it is yet to obtain and take advantage of key resources relevant to
conflict prevention and economic development. This has been a major constraint for the conflict
early warning mechanisms in the country.”127
Success stories of early conflict warning systems in other parts of Africa imply that the
effectiveness of these systems is determined by resource availability. For instance, the success of
west Africa's early warning Network (WARN) in preserving peace in West Africa is largely
attributed to the availability of both human and capital resources to support the operation of the
system.128 Formed by the West African Preventive Peacebuilding Program coordinated by
(WANEP) and supported by civil societies across the member states, WARN has been successful
in preventing violent conflicts in nations such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D‘Ivoire, and
125
Nganje,
―Local
Peace
Committees‖.
126 Kennedy Ohazuruike, "The United Nations and Challenges of Civilian Protection in South Sudan Crisis, 2013-
2018," Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 3, no. 15 (2019), https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-
detail?id=785783.
127 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
128 Peter Arthur, "Promoting Security in Africa through Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African
Union‘s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)," Insight on Africa 9, no. 1 (2017),
doi:10.1177/0975087816674577.
73
Cameroon among many others.129 Perhaps if the conflict early warning systems in South Sudan
including the country‘s own CEWERU, IGAD‘s CEWARN, and the United Nation‘s Mission in
South Sudan received the same infrastructural and human capital support as WARN, more
incidences of violent conflict would have been prevented, more lives preserved, and an end to
the war achieved much earlier.
The poor state of transport and communication infrastructure in South Sudan further impeded the
work of conflict early warning systems. Newly independent, war-torn, and underdeveloped,
South Sudan lacked critical transport and communication infrastructure such as roads and
network coverage in most parts of the country. This limited the movement and communication of
members of the peacekeeping organizations, preventing them from gathering comprehensive
intel on conflict developments in some parts of the country and coordinating with teams scattered
in different locations.130 The lack of sufficient infrastructural resources therefore significantly
compromised the operations of conflict early warning systems, limiting conflict research to the
accessible regions and resulting in findings that do not sufficiently represent the war situation
throughout the country.
“Conflict situations take away significant resource bases required by the nation and divert them
to providing humanitarian aid to the affected citizens. These diverted resources would otherwise
be used in ensuring that an effective early warning system is established and functions
adequately.”131
Additionally, the peacekeeping organizations‘ early warning agendas were constrained by the
opportunity cost of advancing humanitarian aid at the expense of investing heavily in early
129 Arthur, "Promoting Security‖.
130 Racheal Watera, "Assessment of challenges to inter-governmental authority on development peace mediation in
South Sudan: A case of South Sudan conflict (2011-2016)," (PhD diss., Nkumba University, 2018).
131 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
74
warning systems. Juggling between advancing humanitarian aid and funding early warning
systems, the international peacekeeping organizations often found themselves sacrificing
resources
to
help
civilians
while
their
warning
systems
remained
underfunded
and
less
effective.132 UNMISS for instance prioritized the provision of humanitarian aid to the civilians
affected by war as this was a more pressing and immediate concern. The considerable need for
humanitarian aid made any other aspects of the war seem less urgent hence little investment in
them.133 In the competition for the limited resources by the peacekeeping agencies, humanitarian
aid won at the expense of conflict early warning systems. The systems operated on tight budgets
with limited human and capital resources hence reduced efficiency and ultimately, reduced
effectiveness.
From the explanation above, it is clear that the early warning system's resource issues have
prevented it from being totally successful. To be effective, early warning systems need a
tremendous amount of human and financial resources. The systems' foundation is the gathering
and examination of intelligence data. They can be likened to national investigative agencies in
that they gather and assess information from the highest commanders of warring parties to the
citizens at the grassroots. Highly qualified personnel, resources for networking and connecting
with communities at different levels, security apparatus, and logistics for coordination of
activities are examples of the resources an effective early warning system would require in a
country as vast as Sudan.
132 Adam Day et al., "Assessing the Effectiveness of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS),"
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, last modified 2019, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:7595/EPON-
UNMISS-Report-LOWRES.pdf.
133 Day et al., "Assessing the Effectiveness‖.
75
4.3 Lack of Good Offices and Institutions to Support the Early Warnings System
The majority of respondents also expressed their belief that the early warning system in South
Sudan is severely hindered by the absence of supporting good offices. The absence of reliable
and committed institutions to assist conflict early warning systems in South Sudan was a
problem. Critical national agencies in South Sudan such as the military and the police were
divided based on the political affiliation of officials, making it difficult for the early warning
systems to have any meaningful engagements. Furthermore, according to Watera, national
organizations in the country operated under President Kiir's direction frequently impeded the
work of foreign groups there to further the Dinka agenda for political power in South Sudan.
South Sudanese agencies were not receptive to the early warning systems by international
agencies since the country‘s government was deep into the conflict.134
Conflict early warning systems by international organizations which included IGAD‘S
CEWARN, the Africa Union, UNMISS, European External Action Service, and the initiative for
peacekeeping (IFP) also lacked support from the local security agencies. The native government
had to provide security support for the early warning system in order for it to function in a
country that had a history of civil unrest.135 No such support was forthcoming, and members of
these systems could not effectively execute their tasks which fundamentally involved tactical
collection of intel due to security concerns.136 Officials enrolled in these systems operated in
fear, having to watch their backs and unable to penetrate deep into the villages to
comprehensively assess the war situation. The lack of local security support significantly
compromised the conflict early warning system by international organizations.
134 Watera, "Assessment of challenges‖.
135 Stella N. Mukhono, "State Building and Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of South Sudan 2015-
2019," (PhD diss., United States International University-Africa, 2020).
136 Mukhono, "State Building‖.
76
“A major challenge to the effectiveness of conflict early warning systems in South Sudan was the
lack of coordination between the different stakeholders involved. The lack of cohesion between
the military, civil society, international organizations, and the private sector was a constraining
factor. For the early warning systems in South Sudan to work in the future, collaboration is
necessary.”137
The early warning systems in South Sudan also lacked conducive offices to pitch base. In the
war-torn country (South Sudan), early warning systems lacked permanent offices to pitch base
and coordinate operations. Watera notes that most of the peace organizations in the country
operated albeit nomadically, moving from one base to another and having to live in container
houses and offices.138 Ohazuruike observes that up to today, most of the UNMISS members still
operate from container houses and offices. This resulted in poor planning of operations, poor
coordination of members, and a lack of consistency and synergy in reports due to limited
engagement by teams that made up the systems. An early warning system requires adequate
planning and coordination between members. The usefulness and efficiency of conflict early
warning systems were severely hampered by the lack of sufficient offices and operation bases in
South Sudan.139
“Support from international organizations and regional bodies that have a presence in South
Sudan is critical to the efficacy of the early warning systems in the nation. However, the wars
that have broken out in the nation have revealed that international support and intervention have
been lacking to some extent. This lack of supportive engagement from international and regional
137 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
138 Ibid.
139 Ohazuruike, "The United Nations‖.
77
bodies has slowed the process of conflict early warning and rendered these mechanisms
ineffective in the long-term.”140
Another institutional hurdle that South Sudan's conflict early warning systems had to overcome
was the African Union's failure there. Mlambo and Dlamini argue that the AU, the principal
organization in charge of safeguarding peace and sustainable development throughout Africa,
made essentially no contribution to the South Sudan conflict early warning system.141 The union
was anticipated to be at the forefront of supporting peace organizations and early warning
systems through tactics like resource mobilization and international organizations' condemnation
of government sabotage of conflict early warning systems. The union was the main institution in
charge of maintaining peace in Africa. In times of extreme crisis, the union would only
sometimes send mediation envoys to speak with leaders.142 Researchers found that, in
comparison to the AU, IGAD was far more instrumental in bringing about the formal conclusion
of the war. Early warning systems for conflicts were thus severely hampered by a lack of African
Union assistance. Had the AU supported the early warning systems and put pressure on the
government to cease undermining them, much more would have been accomplished.
“South Sudan has been in a state of stalled development in terms of its governance and
democracy. This is an essential element if the nation is to formulate an early warning system that
works for the future. This will begin by freely and fairly electing a new government and
prioritizing the need for conflict early warning mechanisms in the country.”143
140 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
141 Victor H. Mlambo and Mpume Dlamini, "Conflict and violence in Africa in the 21st century: Where is the
African Union? A case of Libya, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Central African
Republic," Journal of Public Affairs 19, no. 4 (2019), doi:10.1002/pa.1939.
142 Mlambo and Dlamini, "Conflict and violence‖.
143 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
78
The position of this study, therefore, is that early warning systems require the support of a
functioning and well-integrated governance structure that has the support of its different arms to
function. For the better part of the last decade of its independence, South Sudan lacked a
functional government that can concentrate on early warning as a central priority to avert future
conflict. As such, the nation has gone through phases of conflict and phases of peace that have
lasted for a very short period. The presence of a functional government structure that responds
well to the indicators of conflict and stems them before they occur is essential to a functioning
and effective early warning mechanism. In addition, the country has failed to concentrate on
establishing functional and unique early warning systems that are custom to its specific
challenges, hence, the adoption of early warning system systems may not always work for it.
4.4 Poor Monitoring of the Changing Conflict Dynamics
Most of the respondents also noted that the inability to Monitor the Changing Conflict
Dynamics posed a big challenge to the early warnings system in South Sudan. The war in South
Sudan was highly intermittent and unpredictable even for the systems set up to monitor and
predict. The triggers of the conflict were largely a secret of the two leaders and without much
access to either president Salva Kiir - who cuts out as a highly secretive man and keeps a well-
knit inner circle, and his rival Riek Machar – who is equally combative,144 early warning systems
found themselves on the back rows in their attempts to keep up with key developments in the
war. Largely made up of non-locals who could not effectively blend in to collect inside
information on war planning and developments in the local communities, early warning systems
were significantly disadvantaged hence their inability to develop timely predictions and
144 Theresa D. Nyombe, "African Sub-Regional Organizations in Conflict Resolution: Analyzing the Contribution of
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) In the South Sudan Conflict Resolution 2013-2018," (PhD
diss., United States International University-Africa, 2019), http://erepo.usiu.ac.ke/11732/5359
79
sufficient recommendations on how to stop the conflict.145 Rapidly changing dynamics of the
war therefore considerably undermined the ability of conflict early warning systems to fulfill
their mandate.
As previously mentioned, resources were limited hence the systems only focused on aspects of
the war that were considered critical. This explains why the early warning systems were largely
able to predict and influence the prevention of serious violent conflict while sporadic local
clashes remained highly prevalent. The nature of the war significantly challenged conflict early
warning systems in South Sudan in accordance with the conflict transformation theory. While
critics may take this as a point to prove that early warning systems are ineffective, the
presentation suggests that maybe the early warning systems in South Sudan would have been
much more effective if the war was triggered by fewer factors.
“The effectiveness of a conflict early warning mechanism is reliant on its ability to monitor and
predict the future of a certain situation. The conflict in South Sudan was triggered by many
different factors that contributed to its escalation and severe consequences. The early warning
systems in the nation were active in predicting some of these factors however, failed in picking
up on others. Its inability to track and monitor all these factors has been a restricting factor and
should be improved for the future.”146
Limited interagency cooperation also led to the poor monitoring of the changing conflict
dynamics. In analyzing the South Sudan conflict from 2013 to its formal end in 2018, Tanui
notes that the lack of cooperation between key international bodies such as the IGAD, AU,
145 Israel N. Nyadera, "South Sudan conflict from 2013 to 2018: Rethinking the causes, situation and
solutions," African Journal on Conflict Resolution 18, no. 2 (2018),
https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ajcr/article/view/182087.
146 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
150 Oral interview June 16, 2022.
77
UNMISS, and the EU influenced the long route to the revitalized transition government.147 Liaga
notes that it is only when the agencies started coordinating in 2018 that significant progress in
peace and power-sharing negotiations were made.148 Conflict early warning systems were
undermined by the same factor; each agency‘s system mostly worked independently.149 With
each system facing its challenges, none of the programs were able to adequately keep pace with
developments in the field. Lack of cooperation, collaboration, and synergy between the conflict
early warning systems from different agencies in South Sudan, therefore, impeded their efficacy
for predicting and preventing conflict a great deal. From the highlighted literature evidence,
more cooperation and synergy between the systems would have achieved better outcomes.
“At the onset of conflict in South Sudan, there were several international and regional bodies
that provided support and assistance in the conflict period. Each of them possessed their
methodology and way of dealing with the whole conflict situation, however, their collaboration
was lacking. This lack of cooperation challenged the conflict early warning monitoring and
prediction process ultimately slowing the road to peace.”150
According to Verjee, the monitoring is based on the premise that truthful reporting of ceasefire
violations will discourage subsequent violations. It's unclear whether this theory holds water in
South Sudan. The parties' lack of commitment to their responsibilities and an impartial
monitoring process, their limited recognition of the monitoring results, and the absence of
147 Carolyne C. Tanui, "Challenges and Prospects of Prevention and Management of Conflicts in Africa: The Role of
IGAD Early Warning Mechanism," (PhD diss., University of Nairobi, 2020),
http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/153688.
148 Emmaculate A. Liaga, "South Sudan's transitional government Realities, challenges and opportunities," ISS East
Africa Report, no. 41 (2021), https://hdl.handle.net/10520/ejc-isear-v2021-n41-a1.
149
Watera,
―Assessment
of
challenges‖.
78
substantial repercussions for violations all undermine the value of monitoring.151 Operational,
organizational, and technical shortcomings, such as ineffective leadership, unskilled monitors,
and a lack of internal security, have plagued the nation's monitoring operations. Additionally,
efforts to engage with South Sudanese civilians and publicly disclose monitors' findings have
been patchy. A nationwide, consistent public education campaign would raise the standard of the
monitoring procedure.152
“The challenge of local leaders’ non-adherence to the monitoring and evaluation processes in
the early warning mechanisms is slowing down the process of conflict prevention. For a future
with no conflict, these leaders must follow the agreements made and face repercussions when
they do not.”153
In line with the above findings, without proper monitoring of changing conflict dynamics, there
are several risk factors that have made it an uphill task for the early warning systems to
effectively monitor the war situation. The war was influenced by several factors, from national
and local politics, scramble for capital resources (grazing land and water), historical ethnic
rivalries, oil mining conflicts, and other facilitators. The conflict early warning system was
unable to keep up with these factors which have sometimes made it difficult to correctly predict
the exact cause of conflict.
4.5 Poor Timing of the Early Warning Systems
Poor timing, according to a sizable proportion of respondents, is a significant obstacle for South
Sudan's conflict early warning systems. How successful early warning systems are will depend
on when and how they are used to respond appropriately when necessary. This mostly
determines when an early warning will be given and how the issue will be addressed. The rising
151 Aly Verjee, Ceasefire Monitoring in South Sudan2014–2019: "A Very Ugly Mission", (United States Institute of
Peace, 2019).
152 Verjee, Ceasefire Monitoring.
153 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
79
goal and the actual results of conflict early warning systems, however, clearly differ from one
another. Hegre et al. note that rarely are concurrent political desires and practical action
accompanied by increasing investment in analysis tools and supercharged approaches to foresee
the threats of organized political violence.154 However, the bulk of outbreaks of mass violence
have been more difficult to foresee and address than anticipated. The causes of this are often the
shortcomings of early warning assessments, the restricted availability, dependability, and
verification of real-time data, and last but not least, the modelling difficulties posed by the
endogeneity found in complex conflict processes. The timing of the warnings was another
important factor that significantly reduced the effectiveness of South Sudan's conflict early
warning systems. The inadequacy of the early warning systems to determine the best moment to
propose cures was the reason for the low efficacy of the efforts advanced based on their
recommendations. For instance, the first ceasefire agreement (2014) was signed at the peak of
the conflict following president Kiir‘s fallout with his vice, Riek Machar.155 The Ripe moment
theory stipulates that the opportune moment to resolve a conflict is during a stalemate, thus this
would not be the ideal moment to advance negotiations between warring parties.
Explaining the Ripe moment theory of conflict resolution, according to Mac Ginty, parties
should only settle a dispute when they are prepared to do so. Keethaponcalan, who asserts that
during conflicts, objectivity is lost and the participants feel as though they are in an
uncomfortable and expensive predicament, supports this view. As a result, the sides fail to make
compromises for fear that it would jeopardize their position going forward.156 At that ripe
moment, parties seek or are amenable to proposals that offer a way out and it is at this moment
154 Håvard Hegre et al., "Introduction: Forecasting in peace research," Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 2 (2017),
doi:10.1177/0022343317691330.
155 Tanui, "Challenges and Prospects‖.
156 S. I. Keethaponcalan, "Resolving Third World Conflicts Ripe Moment to Intervene and The Peaceable Change,"
25, no. 1 (2021), https://indianjournals.com/ijor.aspxtarget=ijor:wa&volume=25&issue=1&article=003.
80
that peacekeeping agencies should take the swoop. Conflict early warning systems' poor timing
of warning and recommendations significantly challenged their effectiveness in South Sudan.
“When it comes to conflict situations, timing is everything. It determines the precise moment to
apply responses, in what places, and in what methods to elicit the required outcomes. The South
Sudan conflict early warning mechanisms have failed in this sector due to delays in evaluation,
monitoring, and responses. Ultimately this is why the conflicts in the last decade have had such
adverse outcomes."157
Conflict early warning systems in South Sudan were also poorly timed. Except for UNMISS
conflict monitoring systems were set up in the build-up to the country‘s independence, the other
early warning systems such as IGAD‘s CEWARN in South Sudan were established with the war
well on its course. They were introduced when the conflict was already boiling and lacked an
adequate background assessment of the situation before embarking on sounding alarms and
offering intervention recommendations for preserving peace in the country. Lutz elaborates that
conflict early warning systems are a necessity, and should not only be introduced in cases of
ongoing/prolonged conflicts. Early set up of the systems would have enabled them to have the
proper background of the war leading to better understanding which translates to better
prediction of the conflict situation, and superior response proposals.158
Part of early warning is also realizing how to convey the information and who to convey it to.
This is part of effective timing and response. Where the information is collected in good time but
conveyed to the wrong persons or through the wrong channels then the communication fails.
Wulf and Debiel note that in a mechanism of multi-level leadership where the directly impacted
communities are situated in local contexts and deserve to be more than "objects" of preventative
157 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
158 Luca M. Lutz, "African Early Warning Systems: Challenges and Prospects for African Security Integration,"
(master's thesis, Charles University, 2021).
81
measures, but instead "collaborators" and "subjects,". It is important to emphasize that early
warning systems must describe explicitly who they should be going to forewarn, premised on
which presumptions they anticipate effective early response to be undertaken, and whom they are
attempting to address.159
“ Early warning in South Sudan will forever remain flawed if the governance structures and the
leaders present are divided. Their lack of collaboration and cooperation means that early
warning data collection, communication, and responses are disconnected. Which makes such
mechanisms ineffective.”160
With this in mind, therefore, the major challenge to effective early warning in South Sudan has
been the communication channels and response mechanisms present to aid in the conflict early
warning systems present. Tanui contends that as evidenced in the national leadership structure
which is divided between two opposing leaders, the communication of structures in such an
administration remains fragmented and divided. The lack of trust and accountability in the
communication of early warning data to the relevant parties and their subsequent swift response
has rendered the early warning systems largely ineffective in some areas. In the future, the
government needs to recognize the importance of communication and timely response for early
warning to work effectively.
4.6 Failure of Regional Institutions to Respond to Conflict Early
The majority of the respondents also argued that regional institutions like IGAD and AU have
failed to promptly respond to the early warning system. Regional organizations play a critical
role in the response to a conflict situation. They provide support, resources, and aid to the nation
159 Wulf and Debiel, ―Conflict early warning‖.
160 Oral interview June 1515,
82
affected. South Sudan has not been left behind in the response of regional institutions to the
conflicts it has encountered since it attained independence. Among the most active organizations
has been IGAD providing an early warning mechanism that has aided South Sudan to divert
from a conflict state to peace agreements. However, the roles that IGAD has undertaken in its
early warning mechanisms for South Sudan have faced numerous challenges in swiftly
responding to the conflict.
According to Alunga, IGAD has largely been constrained in its responses to conflict in South
Sudan due to member states' reluctance to act as well as their commitments to other regional
organizations.161 These factors have limited the actions that IGAD has taken due to some
member states being unable or reluctant to act citing that it goes against their commitments to
other regional institutions. In addition, the fact that IGAD largely relies on the supply of funding
from international organizations such as the UN, limits it in terms of financial resources to
respond timely. Alunga recommends that regional organizations such as IGAD need to establish
strategies to ensure they are independent and self-supporting to ensure long-term success in early
warning.162
“While IGAD has been a major contributor to the early warning system working in South Sudan
to date, it faces many constraints that have limited its response to conflict. These internal
organizational challenges have affected and continue to affect the effectiveness of the early
warning mechanisms in South Sudan”163
The African Union specifically let down the South Sudanese people and downplayed the efforts
of conflict early warning systems by refusing to impose harsh sanctions against the South
161 David D. Alunga, "Sub-regional Organizations on Conflict Management: A case of IGAD in South Sudan,"
(master's thesis, University of Nairobi, 2014).
162 Alunga, "Sub-regional Organizations‖.
163 Oral interview June 1616,
83
Sudanese government, which played a crucial role in the conflict. The AU is tasked with
maintaining a focus on managing conflicts and violence's external manifestations rather than
dealing with their true root causes, which include the politics of war, continuous human rights
abuses, and never-ending cycles of impunity. This is true despite its desire and need to create
organizations and mechanisms like the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Continental
Early Warning Systems (CEWS). In the absence of significant action from the continent's top
peace agency, millions of civilians in South Sudan continued to be slain, forced to flee their
homes, and subjected to sexual abuse. Conflict early warning system efforts and suggestions
were ineffective because no one carried out the desired steps to halt the war. Therefore, the
effectiveness of conflict early warning systems in South Sudan was constrained by the AU's
unwillingness to take immediate action to execute conflict prevention and resolution efforts.
Other regional and international institutions compromised the effectiveness of South Sudan's
conflict early warning systems by doing nothing. The Northern region, ECOWAS, and the East
African Community are examples of war-affected communities that have not taken action, which
has hampered the adoption of the early warning systems' recommendations for conflict
resolution. South Sudan, however, was a serious issue that received much attention. With the
exception of IGAD and UNMISS, many regional and international organizations just condemned
the war.164
“Delayed action by the international community when the war broke out and gross human rights
violations took place was a major challenge in the timely application of conflict early
warning mechanisms. Recognition of a problem without acting on it inevitably causes
164 Mashilo S. Mokgola, "The role of external actors in resolving the 2013 political crisis in the newly independent
state of South Sudan: From 2013 to 2015," (master's thesis, University of Venda, 2019),
http://hdl.handle.net/11602/1504.
84
more harm than good. An early warning goes hand in hand with an early response of
both regional and international organizations together.”165
In line with this, it should be noted that preaching peace is not enough. Regional organizations
are expected to take bold action to address egregious crimes against humanity and crimes
perpetrated during times of armed conflict. The organizations should have been more proactive
in fighting for justice and peace for the people of South Sudan. Talking about peace without
taking necessary steps towards ensuring it – in this case implementing recommendations for
conflict resolution by early warning systems, is mere advocacy of capitulation. Calls for the end
of conflict must be accompanied by appropriate action to resolve them as advanced by the
conflict transformation theory. Conflict early warning systems in South Sudan were let down by
regional bodies that failed to take decisive action and implement proposed recommendations.
4.7 Summary of The Chapter’s Findings
Conclusively, conflict early warning systems in South Sudan were challenged by both internal
organizational factors and external constraints. Internally, the effectiveness of the agencies was
impeded by a lack of adequate human and capital resources, poor timing, poor monitoring of the
evolving developments in the war, and a lack of good offices to coordinate activities. Poor inter-
agency collaboration between the early warning systems also adversely affected their ability to
adequately keep up with developments in the war and come up with accurate/sufficient
recommendations. Externally, the warning systems in South Sudan were constrained by a lack of
sabotage by the South Sudanese government agencies, a lack of support from regional
organizations and their failure to take action, the sophisticated nature of the conflict, and poor
transport
and
communication
infrastructure
in
South
Sudan.
These
factors
affected
the
coordination of agency activities and
the implementation of system
recommendations for
165 Oral interview June 15, 2022.
85
preserving peace and resolving the conflict. Despite the difficulties, early warning systems were
crucial in helping South Sudan achieve the end of its civil war in 2020 and the creation of a more
effective transitional government. Early warning systems can achieve more if the challenges
constraining them are addressed.
86
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 : Key Findings
The study found that early warning and response systems give the chance for effective conflict
resolution methods to be applied at different phases of a disagreement. This is based on the
study's initial goal, which was to identify and analyze the elements impacting early warning
systems' efficiency as a tool for preventing conflicts in Africa. Information gathering and
dissemination are essential to the process. However, this method is fraught with a number of
difficulties. The factors that are essential to an effective early warning system must exist together
in a synchronized and harmonious system to be functional. These factors as identified in this
chapter are the timing of the responses, resources required for response, effective communication
channels, presence of appropriate institutions, and monitoring of conflict dynamics.
According to this study, South Sudan's early warning systems improved information and a better
grasp of the situation. Based on the study's second goal, which was to assess how well early
warning systems performed in South Sudan's conflict prevention, this result was drawn. It laid
bare the causes of the conflict and risk factors for its escalation, the leader‘s grievances, the
civilian perspectives, and how the conflict could be resolved. Therefore, early warning systems
made a significant contribution to South Sudan's seven-year process of ending the civil war. The
mechanisms contributed to the conflict's effective and gradual containment until its resolution in
2020. Conflict early warning systems are effective in predicting and managing violence but are
constrained by systematic challenges. Implementing conflict early warning systems can help
87
South Sudan and indeed all African countries become stable and develop sustainably because of
peace.
The study concludes that South Sudan's early warning systems for conflict were hindered by
both internal organizational issues and external constraints, which is in line with the third
objective of this research, which was to evaluate the major difficulties encountered in the
application of early warning systems in preventing conflict. Internally, the effectiveness of the
agencies was impeded by a lack of adequate human and capital resources, poor timing, poor
monitoring of the evolving developments in the war, and a lack of good offices to coordinate
activities. Poor inter-agency collaboration between the early warning systems also adversely
affected their ability to adequately keep up with developments in the war and come up with
accurate/sufficient recommendations. Externally, South Sudan's warning systems were limited
by the complex nature of the conflict, South Sudan's poor transportation and communication
infrastructure, a lack of sabotage by South Sudanese government agencies, a lack of support
from regional organizations and their failure to act, and these factors. These elements had an
impact on how agencies coordinated their efforts and how system suggestions for maintaining
peace and ending the conflict were put into practice. Despite the difficulties, early warning
systems were crucial in helping South Sudan achieve the end of its civil war in 2020 and the
creation of a more effective transitional government. If the obstacles limiting early warning
systems are overcome, they will be able to accomplish more.
5.2 Conclusion
The study's conclusions show that a lot of factors influence how effectively early warning
systems work in any conflict in the African context. The study demonstrates how these factors
work together to ensure that a country's early warning systems work to prevent the onset or
escalation of conflict situations. It has been demonstrated that an early warning system's success
heavily depends on how quickly a response is given. This is because the timing of the use of an
early warning system determines its ability to produce the intended results in a potential conflict
situation. One important aspect of the early warning process is the interval between information
gathering and action. For the information to make a difference in shifting the balance in a
possible conflict situation, it must get to the people and communities concerned quickly after it
88
has been gathered, processed, and validated.
The resources that can back up and support an early warning system's efficient operation
determine its dependability. In the various stages of a conflict, early warning requires vast
amounts of information and intelligence gathering, analysis, and conclusion before any response
is made. Such processes require vast resources that at times governments are not willing to offer.
The study finds that despite the proven advantages of resource investment in the area of data
collection and early warning response mechanisms, there remain many hindrances.
The study concludes that good institutions are needed for an effective early warning system to
exist. These institutions all serve their unique purpose in the grand scheme of things and where
one falls short then this could make or break the early warning system. Despite this, businesses
may still encounter problems even when they are operating at their peak efficiency. The system
is rendered less effective by the duplication of efforts by the several groups involved in early
warning and early response. The study comes to the conclusion that a good early warning system
and good communication go hand in hand. Information must be relayed to the appropriate
authorities promptly after being obtained through the channels of available resources in order for
it to be used to prevent or defuse conflict situations. If an early warning system is to be effective,
the communication channels must be followed with regard to the volume of information, the
channels through which it is transmitted, the individuals through whom it passes, and the crucial
filters it is placed through.
According to the study's other findings, conflict situations are characterized by dynamic forces
that constantly shift how things play out. Therefore, the monitoring of these changing conflict
dynamics is critical to the process of early warning. A reliable monitoring approach is founded
based on data and information collected but must not be confused with to be the same thing.
Monitoring and data collecting work together to guarantee that an early warning system is
operating at its highest level of effectiveness. The study refutes the first hypothesis, according to
which the complexity of a conflict situation has a significant role in the efficacy of an early
warning system.
The study comes to the conclusion that a number of factors have affected how effective early
warning systems have been at stopping the conflict in South Sudan. By effectively managing
electoral procedures, nonviolent government tactics, and community engagement initiatives, the
89
nation's conflict early warning systems are effective in foreseeing and averting violent conflict
and its escalation. These avenues enabled the government to ensure that conflicts are predicted,
managed, and handled to prevent their escalation into violence and war.
The study concludes that the early warning systems in South Sudan have enhanced the adequate
responses of both the governments and the international community to conflict situations in the
country. The study concludes that the presence of agreements of cessation of hostilities both in
2014 and 2017, coupled with negotiations with the international community envoys and support
provided to citizens by organizations such as the UN have all been avenues that have shown
response provided through early warning systems.
The study also concludes that conflict early warning systems have facilitated timely interventions
to conflicts in South Sudan by influencing decisions to restore peace before conflicts intensify, or
prompting preventive action before major conflicts can break out. These timely responses have
been made through the early decision-making and taking of action in situations such as the
elections postponement, community dialogue, negotiations, and peace agreements. Despite the
fact that the country has yet to achieve sustainable peace, early warning systems' quick
intervention has allowed conflict situations to be managed.
Early warning technologies have made it possible to identify the root of the conflict in South
Sudan. According to the study's findings, the root causes of the conflict have been ethnic politics,
competition for few resources, conflicts within the armed forces, and the fight for control of oil
revenues. Early warning also allowed for a better grasp of the South Sudanese conflict situation.
This basically means that the existence of an early warning system in the nation allowed
stakeholders to comprehend the fundamental reasons for complaints, the key players involved,
the viewpoints of the residents, and the overall course of the dispute. The analysis refutes the
second assumption, according to which South Sudan's early warning system has not been
successful.
The study concludes that the early warning systems in South Sudan have faced key challenges
that have hindered their effectiveness in the long run since the nation gained its independence.
There were both internal and external hindrances that challenged the early warning system in the
country. Resource constraints were a major internal hindrance to the South Sudan conflict early
90
warning systems such as poor technologies, labor shortages, and other relevant mechanisms. One
important factor that affects the efficacy of conflict early warning has been recognized as the
availability of both human and financial resources.
The study comes to the conclusion that South Sudan's conflict early warning systems were
hindered by a lack of internal support from powerful and committed institutions. Critical national
agencies in South Sudan such as the military and the police were divided based on the political
affiliation of officials, making it difficult for the early warning systems to have any meaningful
engagements.
Another significant problem that restricted the organizations engaged in early warning in the
nation was the widespread absence of physical locations to set up base and carry out early
warning and response activities. These coupled with the lack of functioning government arms
rendered the conflict early warning system institutionally challenged.
The study conclusively shows that internally, the poor monitoring of changing conflict dynamics
was a major hindrance because the two leaders in disagreement were the only ones who truly
knew why they were at loggerheads. The early warning data collection was done by non-locals
who could not be able to blend in to collect inside information on war planning and
developments in the local communities. Due to improper communication and lack of
responsibility throughout the entire process, early warning and response were timed poorly,
which had an impact on this as well. These issues internally made the early warning system
function poorly.
The study concludes that externally, the conflict early warning system in South Sudan faced
hindrances in terms of sabotage by the South Sudanese government, a lack of support from
regional organizations and their failure to take action, the sophisticated nature of the conflict, and
poor transport and communication infrastructure in South Sudan. These factors affected the
coordination of agency activities and the implementation of system recommendations for
preserving peace and resolving the conflict. In conclusion, the study proves the third hypothesis
as true that institutional and resource inadequacies were key internal challenges that hindered the
effectiveness of conflict early warning in South Sudan.
91
5.3 Recommendations
The research suggests the following significant points in light of its findings, which were guided
by the three particular study objectives:
1. The study makes the suggestion that at the policy-making level of governance in South
Sudan, there is a need to identify variables that affect the likelihood of conflict occurring
there and designate these as areas of concentration for the nation's early warning system.
Such a strategy will ensure that the early warning systems are put to use even in times of
peace to monitor the situation keenly by looking at areas of vulnerability.
2. The study recommends more resource allocation to the early warning systems in South
Sudan. In South Sudan, it is necessary to acknowledge the significance of conflict early
warning systems. For the early warning systems to function well, they will require the
provision of material, financial, and human resources by the governing bodies. This will
also involve the proper directing of foreign aid and assistance given specifically to early
warning systems in the country.
3. Finally, the study recommends the need for stakeholder cooperation and collaboration in
the early warning systems. An early warning system that recognizes the value of
collaboration, cooperation, and communication is essential for the realization of long-
92
lasting peace in South Sudan. This will ensure that data and information gathered by the
system are relayed to the relevant institutions in time and they can collaborate and
coordinate their activities in response to conflict. Thus, the system will function
effectively.
93
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