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Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 1
FLUCTUATING INTEREST RATES WILL CAUSE A FINANCIAL CRISIS IN
FUTURE
By [Name]
ECN 438 - International Monetary Economics
Arizona State University
Summer 2019
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 2
FLUCTUATING INTEREST RATES WILL CAUSE A FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FUTURE
Introduction
The financial crises that hit the world 10 years ago, was a big problem that the world has
never seen before. The world’s economy was facing a crisis that was triggered by quite a wide
array of issues that almost sank the world’s economy. According to various scholars, this crisis
was one of the biggest disasters since the great depression of 1929. Even though the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve applied a lot of measures to prevent it, it still occurred, an indicator that
financial crisis, even though it can be prevented, sometimes it is inevitable (Chen, et al. 2015,
p.396). Recession such as the 2008 Recession has far-reaching effects on the economy. In 2008,
it led to a number of issues such as the fall of housing prices to as low as 33% which is
considered the lowest in history even worse than during the 1929 depression (Chen, et al. 2015,
p.396). The effects of such recession can be felt for a long time because recovering from it takes
a long period. Eaton, et al. (2015, p.3402) says that two years after the recession above, the rates
of unemployment in the US was still more than 9% excluding some move the workers who
became discouraged from looking for jobs. What is worse is that various financial and economic
gurus, in recent years, have warned of impending recession in the near future. In fact, it is
predicted that the next financial crisis is only about 18 months. Given the various causes of
financial crises, what will cause the next financial crisis are the fluctuations in interest rates in
the economy in the US and other countries of the world since 2009.
Currently the system of international finance is in a period of aggravated fragility, in
which even a small change in interest rates can interact with the system’s cross border
scaffolding like a series of falling dominoes. Reinhart (2019, p.4) claims that modern financial
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 3
crises are often the result of long periods of stasis that most tend to forget, which, in fact, hide a
series of fundamental structural imbalances. This contradiction sheds light on how periods of
financial tranquility foster the same kinds of speculation that, later on, leads to that same
system’s collapse. The period since 2009 of historically low interest rates has bolstered asset
price inflation, as well as heightened corporate debt, in turn, paving the way for the next
downturn. Wolfson (2017) argues the widening gulf of financial liberalization will push the
rentier tentacles of speculation to dominate the vertices of under-marginalized credit–in other
words, to monopolize the markets of highly indebted borrowers. The enduring fragility of the
financialized regime illustrates the way in which intended growth-oriented policies can, in fact,
succeed in cultivating instability. Other scholars, to include Tooze (2018), claim that that the
arrogance of defense policymakers most during periods of recovery make them the first to ignore
or not see the unseen. That the next financial crisis is anticipated and will most likely come from
a cocktail of carelessly managed rates and abundant liquidity is a given, and rests heavily in the
observations described above. Stability, constructed from the illusion of low rates, convinces the
government to implement lax reforms and compliant investors to sleepwalk into peril. What is
perceived as a stable financial system is one that is closest to collapse, which means that
predicting regain and order in interest-rate policy may be the only way to preserve global
financial stability.
Harms also arises from the prediction of the arbitrary periods of time encompassing hike
decision expectations remaining highly uncertain, and the risk of forecast error spikes. Interest
rate forecast “forecasts” are also subject to unpredictability “unforeseen.” This risk creates the
possibility of disproportionately large financial movements resulting from minor policy changes.
“Small” policy changes made with the hopes of achieving an “intended” effect can lead to
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 4
significantly “unintended” impacts. Bloom (2014, p. 158) observes that uncertainty shocks cause
investment postponement. This also means that household spending is stifled. This is seen as
contributing to an ever-rising reduction of economic activity. What this means is that a particular
type of a crisis can connote a range of issues which arise as a result of inactivity of those steps
which are position alterations as opposed to more radical breakdowns of systems. Each and
every system has its forms of behaviors and biases which manifest physiologically as a result of
inactivity. This range of issues can easily be evaded if appropriate timely information is added to
the system. An “aider” system can assist particular systems to become easily adaptable and
dynamic to the refined functions. Uncoordinated communication from central banks has the
effect of damaging public trust, which in turn has the effect of increasing volatility. Reinhart and
Reinhart (2018, p. 87) restated the delineation of this subject, focusing on the issues of gaps in
the exposed monetary policies on the infectious effect of downturns that can be experienced
globally. The findings construct tendencies that indicate the focus of a monetary system and its
control emphasized on rate setting does not easily align with the expectations of other high
seems to rule the financial behaviors. Uncertainty prone investors should be controlled as the
trajectory of behavior of a system. In the increasing depth of complexity, these perceptions of the
economy, of crisis, or systems, have not absolutely changed or rest on a completely different set
of fundamentals. More is required in a mechanism to decode economic signals and emotions
which parallel the definition of monetary precision from the other pole level of the system.
Many negative effects have arisen from the prolonged low-interest rates, Summers (2014,
p. 28) describes this as stagnation within the economy, both within its demand and investment.
During these times, capital pursuits grow in speculative means rather than more productive and
fundamental means, resulting in growth erosion. Gilchrist et al. (2017, p. 790) have studied cases
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 5
in which inflation was low, even with the expansion of the monetary supply, suggesting that the
links in the policy transmission mechanisms are broken. This means that asset injections equate
to the appreciation of the monetary economy, which, in turn, does not impact the real economy.
According to Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2017, p. 32) there is a significant scarcity of
global safe assets in the economy which, in turn, compresses investment within higher-risk
instruments, thus increasing the financial system’s fragility. All of the previously stated factors
come together to show that the unnatural sustained non-increasing rates reproduce in an
unchecked manner concentrated asset inequality and the relative market distortion needed to
lower the asset appreciation rates. Reinhart (2019, p. 10) observes that unmatched speculation is
capital and productive investment that is bound to be unproductive to the economy. The and
unregulated economy prevents global sweating because the quarterly credit is not realigned and
thus the system is rotated within fluctuation. Therefore, low interest strategies that are reactive
are replaced with speculative strategies that are the optimal structure for stagnation.
Historical Background of Global Financial Crises
Recurrent financial crises have punctuated modern capitalism due to cycles of credit
expansion, speculative optimism, and misjudged policies. As Reinhart (2019, p. 5) points out,
most crises arise from a lack of oversight concerning financial innovation and deregulation. This
lack of oversight permits risk to accumulate invisibly across institutions, which allows crises to
persist. This historical continuity shows that crises are structural outcomes of economic systems
built on leverage and confidence, rather than anomalies. Wolfson (2017) discusses that history of
finance in the United States after the Second World War illustrated cycles of excessive
borrowing and painful deleveraging that followed. These cycles of boom and bust demonstrate
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 6
the unresolvable conflict between the liberalization of markets and the stability of the financial
system. In other words, modern economies are still bound to reproduce the same patterns of
excess, despite the claims of policymakers who argue they have learned from history’s mistakes.
Tooze (2018) contends that every crisis has a set of institutional reforms which, in time, weaken,
allowing the same forces to emerge under novel forms. History, therefore, asserts that financial
crises do not vanish but evolve, along with the instruments, technologies, and global connections
that are added, while the fundamental behavioral roots in optimism, risk-taking, and delayed
regulation remain unchanged.
The 1970s was a major paradigm shift due to the fact that global finance was becoming
more integrated due to the deregulation of capital markets and the adoption of more flexible
exchange rates. As noted by Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 85), the oil shocks of that decade
changed the pattern of global liquidity and forced central banks to deal with inflation by adopting
unprecedented strategies which central banks had never done before, raising interest rates to
unprecedented levels. This exposed vulnerability in the heavily indebted economies, giving rise
to a cascade of defaults that swept over emerging markets. Oil price instabilities, as put forth by
Baumeister and Kilian (2016, p. 144), deepened these instabilities, recessions, and the economys
responsiveness to energy-financial shocks. There was a major economic crisis in the early 80s
that was the first big tell of a systematic failure of political cooperation in global finance.
Summers (2014, p. 31), in reflecting on this later, described it as revealing a deep seated and
persistent weakness in the management of macroeconomics; the belief that a credit system in the
midst of a major restructuring is resilient is a belief reserved for the naive. Almost every episode
we discussed above teaches us that the root causes of the fragility of finance that we experience
today does not come from distinctly modern phenomena, but from a long standing legacy that
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 7
our interest rate policies are too volatile and our belief in our control over monetary policy is
overblown.
The 1990’s economy is one which Tooze has articulated in his book as the onset of
financial globalization. Capital markets were liberalized, and were thought to bring economic
development although in actuality it caused economic disease. To gain foreign direct investment,
emerging economies took on massive foreign currency-denominated debts which were harmful
as it made them vulnerable to depreciation. As Reinhart describes in his text, the Asian financial
crisis of 1997 highlighted the sudden stops phenomenon in the capital markets and serves as an
example of the dark side of capital markets. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas have observed in
2017 that during this period, the dominant global demand for safe assets, drove the so-called safe
debt instruments which were really risky, on the ponzi scheme basis, to those vulnerable
emerging debt issuers.
These multi-faceted debt crises made it clear to the world the self-reinforcing character of
financial globalization, which is the success of a nation makes it more vulnerable as well. This is
the trend which continues until this very day. The world today is more closely inter-connected,
which amplifies economic gains as well as risks, more so as localized shocks in the economy
aggravates the global credit system. The world has one lesson, which is the absence of
systemized coordination to financial openness, evokes a faux sense of security which is wiped
away once the investment sentiments are negative. This has been the order of the world.
The concerns around debt and liquidity, as well as the limits of central bank power,
reemerged with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. Wolfson (2017) emphasizes that the
entire crisis was rooted in the risk-absorbing financial engineering of intricate mortgage-backed
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 8
securities. Gilchrist et al. (2017, p. 789) illustrate a paradox in which rapid credit expansion was
accompanied by low inflation, which subsequently caused policymakers to become dangerously
complacent regarding the potential for market overheating. The imbalance between inflationary
speculation on assets and the stability of consumer prices masked the risk of rampant
speculation. Reinhart (2019, p. 9) notes that the resultant collapse had the same anatomy as older
debt crises, overleveraging, mispriced risk, and a sluggish response to policy inertia. What set
2008 apart was the velocity and breadth of its impact, which made clear how much modern
finance had outstripped the conventional regulatory framework. According to Tooze (2018), the
crisis did more than shatter the trust in self-regulating markets; it also illuminated the need for
concerted action. The historical sequence is clear: regulatory negligence combined with credit
boom leads to a systemic collapse.
The policymakers applied radical monetary easing in an attempt to stabilize the economy
after the 2008 crisis. Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 88) point out that the combination of the
ultra-low interest rates and the quantitative easing policies led to the “asset price bubbles” in real
estate and equities. Bloom (2014, p. 161) writes that during recovery periods, uncertainty
reduces the level of productive investment. Firms are reluctant to spend capital when the policies
are highly unpredictable. Summers (2014, p. 34) calls this scenario “secular stagnation,” where
the borrowing at low interest rates leads to inflation of financial assets but does not result in real
economic growth. Rationalizations of the history of the world are paradoxical. Decisions that
have been made in order to prevent a crash are the same ones that are likely to cause another
disaster. The stagnation of easy credit and the desire by policymakers not to tighten policy for
fear of a recession means that the entire economic system is vulnerable. In this regard, the post
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 9
2008 period is an example of how structural distortions can emerge from emergency policies in
an economy that is highly dependent on easy monetary policies.
Historically, the volatility of interest rates has both been a cause of, and a consequence
of, economic distress. Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuck (2014, p. S48) contend that uncertain
predictions rates generate a clouded atmosphere and cause an irrational risk-taking behavior thus,
throwing a wrench in the investment planning process. Reinhart (2019, p. 11) further explains
that during periods of recovery, erratic policy rates generate false hopes which result in over-
optimism and over-lending. A disconnect between policy rates and economic performance,
oscillates between bursts and collapses, reminiscent of centuries past, only to be moderated by
bursts of speculation. As Gilchrist et al (2017, p. 793) notes, during a crisis, a phenomenon
known as inflation shadow, poses further challenges to policy, compelling the central bank to
juggle incommensurable aims. On the balance, the evidence of the past shows that the more
interest rates are manipulated, the more pronounced the downturn becomes. Interest rate
stability, thus, demands as much institutional credibility as it does deft closure of technical
loopholes. Perceived uncertainty about the intentions of central banks only deepens the
prevailing financial rigidity and makes the distortion of self-correcting measures into policy
breakdown more likely.
Succeeding financial crises exhibit changes in the underlying structure of power in the
global economy. Tooze (2018) believes the collapse in 2008 accelerated the ceding of financial
supremacy in the West, leading to frameworks of greater pluralism, with emerging economies
taking on pivotal roles. Reinhart (2019, p. 12) highlights the fact that crises have almost always
led to changes in the structure of economic power, with the recovery phases benefitting those
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 10
able to implement changes on the fly. China and the Eurozone's responses are emblematic of this
tendency: China’s rapid growth was the result of the aggressive stimulus put in place, while
Europe stagnated because of austerity. Bloom (2014, p. 160) claims that uncertainty is sliced
differently in the context of the institutional matrix and is therefore more pronounced in systems
with high degrees of governance fragility. Such structural resilience fragility aids in showing that
financial crises are more than just economic catastrophes, and serve as profound, political, tests
of’ resilience. Looking closely at the issue, one sees that the countries which stand to gain the
most are the ones which embed systems for institutional learning from crises, rather than only
reacting. This determines that the geography of financial power is ever-shifting, as the
frameworks and the systems that countries construct in order to understand and incorporate the
lessons from collapse prove enduring.
The investigation of evidence has also showcased the impact of confidence as a factor of
crisis impact. Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 86) propose the notion of a sentiment-
fundamentals gap, where the soft landing of an economy occurs as market perception worsens
quicker than the economy itself. Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2017, p. 34) relate this to the
safe asset shortage phenomenon, where investors, in times of panic, buy into a small pool of safe
assets, creating turbulence in the assets of higher risk. In times of panic, investors buy into a
small pool of safe assets, creating turbulence in assets of lower risk. Bloom (2014, p. 162)
furthers this by explaining that shifts in sentiment freeze the credit market by creating negative
silence on both the supply and demand sides. These insights show that financial crises are as
much psychological as they are structural. Stepping into the past, confidence has always been
easier to destroy than to restore, which is why recoveries are slower than collapses. The lesson is
that financial stability is the complimented reflex of belief in institutional competence and
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 11
openness. That belief is lost, and well-shaped approaches become impotent, converting
temporary shocks into long lasting slumps.
The impact of oil price volatility has historically influenced inflation rates, consumption,
investments, and economic instability during a given period. Monetary policies become tighter
during oil price surges, and recessive periods become even deeper. Baumeister and Kilian (2016,
p. 146). Commodity price shocks and banking instability in energy importing countries are noted
by Reinhart (2019, p. 7). Summers (2014, p. 35) attributes these shifts to excessive vulnerability
to internal factors, coupled with a lack of strategic policy guidelines, to the actions of external
forces. What is also clear is the impact of macroeconomic policies is also constrained by the
inability of the monetary economy to insulate the financial economy from resource instability.
Shocks in the energy market change expectations, change capital flows, and distort the ability to
maintain equilibrium in debt, thereby connecting disparate economies in intricate cycles of risk.
Financial history in the modern world is deeply entangled into the world’s economic energy
resource policies. This in turn, shifts the murky parameters of understanding and analyzing
advanced crises on the world economy, whereby, in addition to other factors, the ability to
absorb and manage real shocks becomes crucial.
Another recurring alaethos in financial history is the cyclical forgetfulness that appears
after a recovery. Wolfson (2017) has observed that, in every generation, crisis risk is always
underestimated and renewal of old vulnerabilities is attributed to some regulatory advances.
Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 89) call it “this time is different syndrome” and explain the
phenomenon of thinking that changes in the structure render us immune to the lessons of the
past. Tooze (2018) argues that the complacency of the mid 2000s was equally optimistic as the
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1920s, both fanned by the spirit of technological change and the absence of a regulatory embrace
over finance. The repetition of such stories indicates that ignorance alone does not bring about
crises, rationalizing the risk of calamitous events is equally a human failing. Much of the
systemic stability depends on institutional amnesia, Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2017, p.
35) claim, mechanisms that temper optimistic risk-taking in good times. In the past, economies
like that which institutionalized structural amnesia and prudent features such as conservative
lending or counter cyclical reserve bordering on bucking economic orthodoxies, escaped crises
and suffered only milder ones., However, the enduring amnesia is the single greatest and most
rational explanation for collapse.
The interconnectedness of the recent crises exemplifies the constricted outcomes of
national policy responses within an integrated financial system. Reinhart (2019, p. 13) claims
that unlike in the past, domestic stability now relies on external policy decisions due to cross-
border linkages. In his analysis, Tooze (2018) explains the prolonged stagnation that followed
the 2008 recession as a result of European and American monetary discoordination. The lack of
globally safe assets, as pointed out by Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2017, p. 31), worsened
contagion because it drove investors to focus their portfolios on a small number of large
economies. The condition is this: the understanding of crises has to evolve past national
boundaries, they are failures of global governance. Bloom (2014, p 165) states that the ability to
anticipate and contain a crisis is now a matter of international collaboration that integrates
national interest with systemic risk. In the past, financial recovery relied on action from multiple
countries, and never a single nation, from Bretton Woods to the G20. Without global
coordination, the repetition of historical cycles on a larger scale will ensue due to interest rates
that are unsteady and cross border trade that is unregulated.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 13
The examination of history surrounding global financial crises has shown an evolution in
processes as opposed to an evolution in outcomes. Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 84) highlight
that every crisis seems to be distinct on the surface, but the underlying mechanics do not change:
too much of leverage, unfounded optimism, and procrastination of decisions. Wolfson (2017)
calls the of interrelation between innovation and innovation and speculation the ever-lasting
source of instability. Summers (2014, p. 36) through his extensive research asserts that the
financial system of capitalism will always be prone to crises, and that will be the outcome unless
structural change is made in the order in which savings, investment and productivity are placed.
The proof amassed over decades shows that the management of interest rates, while necessary,
will not, in isolation, guarantee stability. The proof amassed over decades shows that the
management of interest rates, while necessary, will not, in isolation, guarantee stability. History
shows that to avert crises, crises and adaptation of monetary policy, structural change,
transnational cooperation and psychological honesty about the market’s self-destructing
configuration is compulsory. The recurring history surrounding financial crises is not a
coincidence, but rather a manifestation of an economy which has been forgetful in learning its
lessons. Appreciating gaps in record time is the first of many steps to constructing such
institutions which will be able to obliterate such records.
Interest Rate Fluctuations and Economic Stability
Despite the impressive records of increased economic growth in the past years after the
2007-2008 recessions due to the increased interest rates after the recession, a new trend is
becoming evident from the past four years. After the recession, the only way that was available
to correct the effects of the financial crisis was to ensure that interest rates increased to increase
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 14
economic growth. Eaton, et al. (2015, p.3403) states that this was a response to the signature of
the disproportionately rapid interest rates that lead to a rapid decrease in economic growth.
However, Juselius, et al. (2016, p.24) asserts that the Federal Reserve adopted a new measure
since 2015 that included cutting the interest rates. This happened even in other countries across
the world that were affected by this financial crisis and not only the United States. As a result,
the investment in the residential properties has experienced a contraction in each of the quarters
in 2018 and this has happened for a very fast time since the 2009 occurrence. In the last quarter
of 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, Juselius, et al. (2016, p.24) found out that the deficits in
trade expanded, hence weighing on the US and the world’s growth, with the American imports
and export, competing the producers domestically as the increasing value of the US dollar
hampered them because it caused an increase inflows from other parts of the world. Therefore,
these two aspects which are increasing trade deficits and the contracting residential investments
are two root causes of the previous financial crises that caused the previous crises and which are
predicted to trigger the next one.
There has always been a withdrawal between the historical relationship of interest rate
adjustments and financial stability. According to Badarau and Popescu (2015, pp. 363) interest
rates simultaneously perform the dual role of a corrective and a destabilising force, depending on
the time and the form the monetary channel takes. Their analysis indicates that after an economic
recovery, narrowing the tap too soon can choke the recovery’s liquidity, while too much restraint
too late can overheat the economy and set inflation off. The contradiction of both these positions
indicates the questionable effectiveness of employing rates to attain stability. According to
Ajello et al (2016, pp. 8) optimal policy is one which seeks to simultaneously achieve output and
financial stability. This is an ever more difficult task because of the mobility of capital across
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 15
borders. Such a balance is seldom if ever attained, since policy makers tend to focus on short
term concerns rather than on systemic weaknesses. This suggests that the rate of inflation is
impaired when the rate of economic growth and the rate of change in economic policy is set to an
intended response. It is set much lower because of the overly simplistic character of the policy
devised by policy makers. It is a little too late when the global capital economy has already
begun to react to the centre. Minsky (2015) has long warned that stability breeds instability of a
different form by encouraging the use of leverage in periods of low interest rates. The search for
equilibrium, therefore, leads to the creation of a disequilibrium which is the very equilibrium
interest rate policy attempts to avoid.
The growing interconnectedness of economies means that the consequences of national
interest rates policies are virulent. In the case of advanced economies, Chipeta and Mc Camel
(2018, p. 71) rate shifts and advanced economies reside shocks through trade, exchange rates and
capital flows in emerging markets. The spillover effect demonstrates the loss of monetary
autonomy in a self-reliant world. Guarata and Pagliacci (2017, p. 8) on the other hand,
emphasize the increased synchronization of financial cycles across borders, and which tend to
aggravate the volatility of financial systems in the periods of contraction. The reduction of rates
by central banks in the system is likely to force other central banks to reduce their rates to avoid
unbalanced currency conditions. Smets (2018) emphasizes that this synchronization also limits
the ability of domestic policymakers to respond effectively to external shocks. These factors
demonstrate that cross-border finance is organized in a decentralized manner that remains
uncoordinated. The conclusion reached is that domestic rate policies are bound to fail in the face
of external systemic risks. The unregulated cross-border finance will continue to cross Instability
through interest rate shifts.
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Volatility of interest rates has a significant impact on many asset markets which includes
real estate. Kuttner and Shim 2016, page 34, point out how low policy rates can lead to
speculative investments on real estate and lead to asset markets bubbles that cause financial
system instability whenever these rates increase later on. Such behavior was seen before the
2008 crisis and continues to reappear even today in plenty of the countries in the world.
According to Agur and Demertzis 2019, page 70, the impact of these regulations, however, can
only be minimized to a certain degree in the absence of proactive monetary policy. This
determines that the two forms of stablility, that being price and financial, are dependent on each
other. If a central bank focuses on one, they risk losing the other. Minsky 2015, suggests how
asset markets come to expect, “the easy credit dominator” and as a result, we see the creation of
fragile balance sheets. This reinforces the argument that behavior feedback mechanisms, rather
than solely inflation levels, should guide interest rate setting policies. Interest rate policies that
do not account for the speculative psychology in the equity and housing markets are more likely
to cause a complete economic collapse rather than economic growth.
The suspicion with which orthodox credit policy frameworks regard behavioral credit
response tends to conflict with empirical data. As Ajello et al. (2016, p. 14) elucidate, credit
booms which result from a drop in the benchmark rate, tend to increase banks’ liquidity risk
exposure. The longer the period before bank assets mature, the more this exposure increases. If,
at some point, there is an unexpected spike in interest rates, a liquidity barrier is likely to
develop. The barrier, coupled with the mismatches, exacerbates financial stress. In an empirical
study, Badarau and Popescu (2015, p. 367) have previously established that, in economies that
are highly leveraged, the responsiveness to changes in interest rates tends to decline more
rapidly, with the situation exacerbated by debt overhangs. In less econometric terms, Agur and
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 17
Demertzis (2019, p. 73) point out that there are some macro-prudential buffers such as interest
rate control that can alleviate this problem, but it is policy correlated with buffers that misses the
point. The above cited works tell us that frameworks in contemporary monetary policy tend to
overlook credit cycles’ policy instrument interactions, and the question begs what that means
analytically. The logic in such a thought goes that stabilization policy based purely on interest
rates assumes an economic response so dramatically simplistic and correlated that it borders a
dysfunctional pseudo-rationality. The opponent stands the theory of reflexive social systems,
which posits that no social action escapes interdependent feedback. In the field of monetary
theory, it is all too easy to forget that policies are a response to the voters of a country. De la
Dehesa (2011) is most likely to point out that, borrowers, investors, and lenders all react to
interest rate changes asymmetrically. The cycle to which these subjects belong is not distant
from the amplification of instability, which politically is self-cancelling.
Risk associated with the changing climate adds another layer to the interest rate policy
and stability discussion. Dafermos et al (2018, p. 223) suggest that financial risk profiles will
change due to environmental shocks and the efforts at decarbonization requiring responsive
monetary policy. Carney (2015:221) termed this “the tragedy of the horizon,” where rate targets
for the short-term deny the reality of the climate threats for the long-term. These observations do
not simply reiterate the “decoupling” of environmental policy from financial policy. As Minsky
(2015) would have put it, this sort of neglect is another brand of systemic myopia, where
emerging fragilities are overlooked in the name of stability. To this end, climate change imposes
additional rigidities to the interest rate policy of central banks. Such policy will be aimed at the
avoidance of climate-related instability. As deteriorating environmental conditions influence the
value of various assets, it will be increasingly difficult to establish financial equilibrium in the
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 18
presence of such instabilities, unless proactive measures are taken to address these changes. The
absence of such measures will, in effect, embed environmental shocks in the future scenarios of
credit crunches, which is the growing financial vulnerability that inaction on climate change
gives rise to.
Monetary policy interacts with inequality in ways that may affect macroeconomic
resilience through distributional outcomes on consumption. The persistent low rates in South
Africa discriminate in favour of the owners of the assets and, thus, exacerbate wealth inequality
(Meyer, Chipeta, and Mc Camel 2018, p. 74). The inequality here reduces consumption and
lowers the rate of inclusive economic growth. According to the Smets (2018) article, more
inequality translates to greater fragility of the financial system, especially when the rate of
interest rises, and the system is dominated by debt. Inequality in the world, greater than the
country, puts a limit on the effectiveness of monetary policy for the social stability of the country
(Badarau and Popescu 2015, p. 370). The argument here is that control of interest rates cannot be
apolitical. No matter the intention, social and economic burdens of inequality will be transferred
to some parts of society. The Elusive Linked Fate of Monetary Economic and Inequality in
Maintaining Control of Order suggests that to maintain society against the disruptive
consequences of economic resilience, equity needs to be included in macroeconomic policy.
Otherwise, deliberate efforts to stabilise the price level in a country may have the opposite effect
on the livelihoods of the citizens, and undermine what lies at the bottom of economic resilience.
The unpredictability of changes to interest rate responses to shocks demonstrates
economic modeling limitations. Guarata and Pagliacci (2017, p. 9) point out that traditional
models consider instable relationships between the rates and output even when there are frequent
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 19
empirical link breakages. Ajello et al. (2016, p. 17) remark that when the system undergoes
stress, the forwards lose credibility, and the rate change signaling effect is attenuated. As
Badarau and Popescu (2015, p. 372) further claim, the set of effects from which the monetary
policy derives institutions, and the policy effects, makes calibration of the instruments of policy
uncertain. These examples reveal the illusion of the exactitude in the control of money. It
appears that central banks are in need of adaptive learning, policies that are informed by new
information in place of mitigation of framed options which leads to policy drift. Encompassing
the idea that uncertainty is not a break from the monetary system, but its very defining feature,
would allow for more flexible accommodation to unpredictable future system disruptions.
Fiscal capital market integration has also accentuated the division between financial and
monetary policy. Open capital accounts transmit rate differentials, influencing investments
across borders (Smets, 2018). In these scenarios, rates policy must be supplemented with macro
prudential measures, otherwise, unrestrained cross-border credit flows will occur (Agur and
Demertzis, 2019, p. 76). Developing economies incur a unique set of policy dilemmas where
increasing rates in a bid to protect the currency can also diminish economic growth, and reducing
the rates may lead to capital outflows (Meyer, Chipeta, and Mc Camel, 2018, p. 76). These
instances highlight the policy trilemma, which consists of integration, autonomy, and stability.
Global interconnectedness suggests the necessity of hybrid frameworks, which combine
domestic discretion with cross-border collaboration. In the absence of such coordination, even if
domestic rate policies are well-calibrated, they will lead to global dis-balances, resulting in the
continuance of economic cycles of boom and bust.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 20
The development and operationalization of any policies regarding changes in protected
capital of a bank and setting the base of the positive interest rate Peg rate and the maximum
negative interest rate to banks which will at central banks give the policy in the real economy
and in financial transactions at the intertwining level, the effects also in banking flows of money
and the interbank bond and realize the efficiency of any company. It has reached a target will
establish a system which in the real economy will absorb the flows of protected capital in real
spheres at a relatively lower. The implementation of any changes the central banking system,
which rationally, give me positive and negative rate policy, will in a real economy and Interbank
bonds and a range of other financial transactions that will move the protected capital. The bank’s
capital of the system in which central banking flows act, adjust and the policy at each level in the
Interbank and the bond. And then will give reach cycle based and the real protected flow capital
to various spheres in real, the system and core mechanism which achieved flow capital which
block the positive base rate bank where and low bonds of that capital.
The integration of technological and structural changes in the frameworks for setting
interest rates is what will determine the future of monetary policy. As Smets (2018) observes, the
digitalization of the economy facilitates capital mobility and changes the channels through which
interest rates influence investment. According to Dafermos, Nikolaidi and Galanis (2018, p.
226), new green technologies will fundamentally change the credit demand and the underlying
risk of assets. Carney (2015, p. 229) emphasizes that monetary institutions will lose relevance in
tackling new systemic risks if they do not adopt proactive strategies. From the perspective of
analytical reflection, the evolution of financial stability demands dynamic frameworks which are
able to integrate divergence, the behavioral climate transition, and complexity. It follows that
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 21
interest rate policy must evolve from a passive to a proactive policy instrument, shaping, instead
of just reacting to, the changes that will define global stability.
The Post-2008 Recovery and Monetary Policies
The increase and decrease in interest rates has negative effects on the world’s economy
because it plunges the economy into recessions. On September 18, 2019, the US Federal Reserve
decided to cut the benchmark interest rates by as high as 0.25% which is the second time since
the 2008 recession (Borio & Gambacorta, 2017, p.218). The reason why this was done was to
ensure that amid the many signs of a slowdown, the government is trying to ensure that the
economy of the country expands. According to Borio and Gambacorta (2017, p.219), this
measure was taken to ensure that the costs of borrowing become low which acts as a catalyst for
businesses and individuals to take out loans which will lead to production expansions as well as
the creation of more employment opportunities. However, it is important to be remembered that
this was one of the causes of the recessions that took place in 2008. It is likely to cause the next
financial crisis because when the interest6 rates becomes lower, the bond markets are impacted
because the yields on almost everything from the United States will become Treasuries to other
economic aspects such as corporate bonds will eventually become unattractive to the investors
because they will tend to fall (Claessens, Coleman & Donnelly, 2018, p.2). The result of this is
that it creates what is called the stock market rallies since the investors will be prompted to pull
their money out of the bonds and invest in stocks. This is likely to trigger a financial crisis
because the impatient investors will sell off their stock which will affect them when the crisis
ends because they will buy at higher prices.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 22
The limits of conventional monetary policy tools in maintaining sustainable long-term
stability were illustrated by the recovery after the 2008 financial crisis. Minsky (2015, p. 67)
claimed that long episodes of low interest rates offer incentives for the creation of speculative
financing (i.e. speculative borrowing) that undermines the discipline of the markets. This insight
explains the phenomenon in the liquidity trap and explains the post-crisis liquidity injections that
caused inflation in financial markets rather than inflation in the real economy. Chodorow-Reich
(2014, p. 6) notes that the unconventional monetary policy of quantitative easing does ease bank
credit in the short term, but that it compresses bank profit margins in such a way that banks will
refrain from lending. This is economically explained by the fact that profit-maximizing banks
will create credit only to the extent it is economically viable and profitable to do. This profit
paradox is closely related to the explanation of Green and Lavery (2018, p. 83) who points out
the “monetary indiscipline” of overreliance of the government on the central bank. This leads to
the conclusion that the recovery from a financial crisis that relies only on monetary liquidity
instead of real structural reform is a postponed recovery.
The construction of post-crisis policy frameworks is also a question of uneven
interpretations of stability. Beck, Colciago, and Pfajfar (2014, p. 3) explain how financial
intermediaries unevenly transmit rate changes, which exacerbates sectoral imbalances. When
central banks provided the economy with a larger volume of reserves, banks shifted their funding
towards a higher proportion of risky assets and higher yielding assets in their portfolios. For
Minsky (2015, p. 72) this is indicative of a shift from “hedge” to “speculative” finance, in which
solvency is reliant upon the continuous refinancing of debt. Sumner (2017, p. 94) notes that the
paralysis of the “psychological” scars of the crisis on borrowers was an important consideration
in the estimation of the responsiveness of low rates to investment. The asymmetry of monetary
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 23
stimulus was the result of plentiful credit and subdued demand. This suggests that the restoration
of credit supply will not succeed if the appetite for risk is also absent. This will explain the
failure of monetary levers to replace the social and institutional trust that is critical for a lasting
recovery. The final post-crisis policy stability is a product of sentiment, not of explicit technical
policy design. Rebuilding trust in the economy is critical to any transformative effect of
monetary policy innovations; any failure in this regard will render such innovations mere
symbols.
The post-2008 period has shed light on the tension between autonomous states and their
interdependent systems, especially with respect to the global response to the financial crisis.
Mohan and Kapur (2014, p. 5) state that the lack of cross-border coordination with respect to
policy frameworks resulted significant domestic stimulus inefficiencies due to increased
exchange rate fluctuations. Yamashita (2015, p. 205) states that Japan’s stagnation during the
1990s and Europe’s stagnation post-2008 shows how asynchronous monetary policy responses
led to the perpetuation of deflation in the region. According to Green and Lavery (2018, p. 88),
global policy frameworks based on neoliberalism and price stability formulated in the domestic
economy overlooked the global liquidity management issues. This repetition indicates the lack of
equilibrium due to the currency and capital flow policies of the country in recovery. To avoid the
beggar-thy-neighbour policy issues, there should be coordinated rate and fiscal policies. The
period after 2008 shows that the competitive devaluations and uncoordinated policies of the
major central banks have resulted in temporary recoveries without the expansion of sustainable
demand. There should be no doubt that the uncoordinated monetary policies of a central bank
can postpone the inevitable.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 24
Persisting unconventional monetary policies has altered the incentives for financial
institutions. Chodorow-Reich (2014, p. 10) explains how the reduction of yields due to
prolonged asset purchases led to the compression of net interest margins to the extent that banks
were pressured to pursue profits in more perilous markets. Beck, Colciago and Pfajfar (2014, p.
8) argue that the expansion of intermediary balance sheets operating under these incentives leads
to the intensification of leverage cycles and the further erosion of stability. As noted by Sumner
(2017, p. 96), the “search for yield” phenomenon further undermines monetary control by
diverting balances of potentially uncontrolled monetary instruments into speculative activities. It
seems recalcitrant distortion policies have rendered recovery efforts ineffective. In bearing
confidence of the banking system, the expansion of quantitative easing measures also transferred
systemic risks posed by banks to the less regulated shadow financial markets. Future policy
efforts hinge on analytical constructs that keep monetary policy support from becoming a
destabilizing influence. The gap left from uncovered risk appears from the broader question of
moral hazard that prolonged accommodation poses. Unquestioned permanent intervention,
assumed to be prolonged, will serve to rationalize the abandonment of the fragile measures of
risk control that financial agents have posed.
Over the past decade, forward guidance has been one of the dominant means of
expectation management in the post-crisis world. Sumner (2017, p. 98) argues that while this
form of communication contributed to the stabilization of short-term forecasts, it may have
fostered complacency in the market by providing certainty of prolonged accommodation. Minsky
(2015, p. 74) would argue that speculative behavior, especially overly driven leveraged Minsky
cycles, would arise from the prediction of policy moves that remove spontaneous market risks.
Duarte (2019, p. 586) argues for the adoption of alternative monetary goals such as nominal
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 25
income or financial-stability benchmarks to achieve a better mix between growth and prudence.
The balance of the evidence suggests that the credibility of guidance is contingent as well as
transparent: they must believe that policy will change/react if conditions demand it. The post-
2008 guidance practice is often criticized for being excessively rigid, encasing central banks in a
policy path that placed the primacy of rational investor calm over rational excusability. The
stabilization of the economy revealed the limits of such rigid guidance, especially in the form of
a market crash, because the predictability of the guidance required to stabilize the economy also
closed off rational flexible excusability. Communication is required to rationally incomplete and
flexible and not predictable or absolute.
The intricacies of energy market behavior did little to simplify recovery dynamics.
Uncertainty in economic policies is likely behind the increased long-term correlation between oil
prices and stock indices, and the increase in the stock market decoupling of the rest of the
economy (Fang et al., 2018, p. 59). For Minsky (2015, p. 81) this decoupling is indicative of a
financing of the cycle commodities and of the economy, linking the real and financial cycles to a
greater degree. Yamashita (2016, p. 212) remarks that, because of recovering economic fragility
in Japan and the EU, energy price and market volatility conditions constrained the normalization
of monetary policies. This implies that the non-financial component of economic shocks during
the post-crisis period ultimately defined the consolidation of monetary policies post crisis. The
central banks shifted their focus to new cross-market dependencies that had emerged outside the
traditional realm of bank credit and inflation. This suggests that the limited focus of monetary
policy on credit may need to expand to include fiscal, environmental, and sectoral plans to
include non-financial interdisciplinary strategies. The non-financial component of the economic
shocks in the post-crisis period indicates that economic resilience is interdisciplinary in nature.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 26
The risk of cross-sectoral dynamics repeating crises is very real, and it is likely to take new and
unexpected forms.
The impact of central bank unconventional policy initiatives on central bank roles is still
widely debated. Mohan and Kapur (2014, p. 26) contend that central banks’ quasi-fiscal
activities from which central banks “doubled” democratic and market oversight led to
accountability blurring and eroded institutional credibility. Green and Lavery (2018, p. 90)
describes this as “re-statization” of finance, in which the government dominates monetary
control to hierarchically manage systemic risk. According to Duarte (2019, p. 590), redefining
monetary control centers on balancing independence vs. legitimacy. Ex-post analysis of the 2008
crisis revealed that institutional “adaptation” and not merely technical “circuit” closure,
determines policy success. There is a significant credibility expectation on central banks when
they become market makers of last resort during a crisis, as they must provide transparency and a
clear strategy of exiting the “emergency” measures. Otherwise, the public will assume monetary
control is permanently interventionist, and will lose faith in the central bank’s monetary
neutrality. The more complex and globalized finance becomes, the more a central bank’s
governance must evolve to incorporate these features, and the more centralized control a
governor must assume.
Restoration activities provided insight concerning the relationship between monetary
innovation and inequality. Beck, Colciago, and Pfajfar (2014, p. 10) point out that the
undervalued credit supplied to financial intermediaries disproportionally improved asset
valuations and benefited upper-income households. Green and Lavery (2018, p. 86) connect the
subtle shift to the rise of populist politics that questioned the legitimacy of central banks. Minsky
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 27
(2015, p. 78) described inequality as an uneconomical and destabilizing imbalance because the
disproportionate distribution of wealth and property concentrated financial risk within
economically speculative and destabilizing speculative peripheral systems. Other Analytical
insights suggest that monetary policies aimed at stimulating aggregate demand may, at least in
part, tend to widen the distributional gap within society along the dimensions of structural
imbalance and inequality. The imbalance provides the financial system the incentives to reach
out to the economically impoverished. Hence, in order to achieve the primary economic
objective of stabilization, the system must be supported by appropriate fiscal and regulatory
policies. These insights bring a moral dimension to the distributional focus of monetary policy. It
emphasizes that the ill consequences of politically destabilizing economic and social recovery
must be prioritized to ensure politically and socially stabilizing economic policies.
Throughout the 2010s, much discourse was framed by the tension between normalization
and accommodation. Preemptively increasing interest rates in the U.S. may have been offsetting
some of the fragile economic gains, but more chronically unresponsive rates may have
contributed to the growth of unsustainable financial bubbles (Sumner, 2017, p. 101). Duarte
(2019, p. 594) suggests hybrid models of secondary frameworks with discretionary flexibility
may overcome some of the risk of capture by opposing (and therefore, paralyzing) actions.
Japan’s experience robustly supports the reform-as-reward theory (Yamashita, 2016, p. 217).
Such lessons have important implications for the framing of recovery strategies. The policy
direction may be much less important than the credibility of the intended normalization path.
Analytical reflections indicate the primary factors driving policy success are communication and
coordination between institutions. Expectations of stability will be dynamic and adaptive with
flexibility, rather than static expectations. With this, the reframing of monetary policy suggests
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 28
the need for institutions to be responsive to pressures for growth. Enduring economic growth is
achieved with agility, not the rigid frameworks of economic dogma.
During the decade after 2008, the geopolitical aspect of monetary policy became even
more apparent. Mohan and Kapur (2014, p. 9) state that the policy of the largest central banks
affects capital flows that determine the growth opportunities of emerging market economies.
Fang et al. (2018, p. 62) show that the uncertainty of US policy was a potential cause of the
increased volatility of global commodity and equity markets. According to Green and Lavery
(2018, p. 92), monetary policy and monetary policy decisions become acts of geopolitical power,
shifting financial stress and determining global financial hierarchies. This leads to the conclusion
that recovery policy is also a matter of international relations. If interest rate changes in one
country are followed by destabilizing consequences in the countries that surround it, then that
country’s monetary sovereignty is a challenged source of power. Future policy frameworks will
need to incorporate the geopolitical aspects of monetary policy to ensure that one region’s
stability will not lead to the monetary weakening of another region. The geopolitical implications
of monetary policy are to be expected. central banks and their policies in the first place to
determine the economic sovereignty of the state.
The aftermath of 2008's unique monetary policy continues to have an impact on
discussions concerning the trajectories of capitalism. Every crisis compels the financial system to
reconstruct the new guardrails (Minsky 2015, 83). Future structures will also encompass new
broader horizons of goals like financial durability and inclusive growth (Duarte 2019, 598). With
regards to the transformative criteria, Green and Lavery (2018, 94) suggest that we have to deal
with the ideological remnants of neoliberalism that puts “market order” above other “social”
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 29
factors. An important conclusion on the need for monetary reform after a crisis must be more
than the transcendence of a technocratic exercise. It must also address the aspirations of justice,
equity, and the durability of the social order. The lesson of the monetary recovery of 2008 is that
policy must do more than the primary function of cyclic monetary control. It should also
“shrugged” off old parameters of “control” and redefine monetary policy to the “well-being” of
the economy. The most important issue of monetary governance is the conjunction of innovation
with moral imagination.
The Federal Reserve’s Role in Interest Rate Adjustments
The effect that comes with low-interest rates is that when the Federal Reserve reduces the
interest rates and senses a financial crisis, it takes measures such as increasing these rates too fast
causing more problems in the markets. Bean, at al. (2015, p.17), for instance, states that when the
Federal Reserve the growth in the aggregated demands poses a threat by running ahead of the
growth in the productive capacity of the economy and triggers inflation at accelerated paces, it
takes measures such as raising interest rates as a way of containing the likelihood of a financial
crisis. As a result, Bean, at al. (2015, p.17) confirms that the hikes in interest rates causes “slow
debt-financed spending” that often includes factors such as increased home purchases, increase
investment by businesses and moreover, increase in purchase of goods that are deemed more
durable such as automobiles. When this happens too fast, the end result is always a recession. A
good example is the cause of the recession that took place in 1970, 1980 and 1990s (Bean, at al.
2015, p.17). During these recessions, were triggered by the same effects brought by reducing the
interest rates to very low levels and then increasing it too fast when finical crises becomes
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 30
eminent. This is likely to happen in the future given that the Federal Reserve cutting these rates
and the only way to curb inflation will be doing the vice versa by increasing it.
The Federal Reserve is no longer just a national regulator, but also an architect of
international economic order. Its focus on domestic monetary policy has shifted to the global
monetary system. Bernanke (2017, p. 4) mentions that, “beyond the usual scope of price
stabilization, the Fed also took on the balance of payments for the world.” This shows the extent
to which central banking has to consider policy interdependence. Carpenter, Demiralp, and Kiley
(2018, p. 7) assert that the Fed's balance sheet expansion, via quantitative easing, applied
“sustained downward pressure” on long-term yields. This, in turn, induced a significant increase
in cross-border borrowing. This means that direct liquidity provision has replaced implicit rate
cuts. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p. 320) state that, “in a world of pervasive low rates, the main
policy targets of the central bank have become communication and, to a lesser degree,
credibility.” This shows that strategic communication is a policy tool. The Fed today rules by
action and narrative, exercising control of the finance system using a range of technocratic and
rhetorical means to foster confidence.
Expansions of reserve balances during unconventional monetary policy periods have
caused fundamental changes to the functioning of U.S. monetary policy. Such changes represent
a structural revision in the manner in which interest rate signals permeate the economy. As noted
by Smith (2019, p. 10) the buildup of excess reserves during the period of quantitative easing
unsustained the passage of the reserve hierarchy. Such evidence shows the extent to which the
abundance of liquidity triggered operational innovations at the Fed. According to Carpenter et al.
(2018, p. 11), innovations like the imposition of interest on excess reserves (IOER) sought to
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 31
regain control of monetary policy amid excess liquidity conditions. Such innovations reflect the
Fed's aptitude in crafting policy tools that adapt to changing market conditions while maintaining
the discipline of the market. "This established a corridor system that permits control over the
cash's overnight rate and allows free control over the balance sheet, predicts Bernanke (2017, p.
15). Such a system improves predictability and control on the Fed's part. The flexibility and
control these tools offered the Fed are more predictable than the system, suggesting the shift in
the Fed's approach from rigid quantity targeting to more sophisticated and market-driven forms
of regulation.
The management of expectations has come to characterize the monetary policy of the
Federal Reserve in the 21st century as part of the transforming relationship between the Federal
Reserve and the world’s markets. Shaping expectations has, to some extent, become as important
as adjusting liquidity. As Bauer and Rudebusch (2018, p. 3) put it, the announcement of bond
purchases has the potential to change investor confidence and bond yields more so than the
purchases themselves. This shows that, in many instances, central banking has to deal as much
with perceptions as with economics. Engen, Laubach and Reifschneider (2015, p. 9) argue that
clear signaling leads to the compression of the term premium and the synchronization of
expectations around a given policy, which points to the phenomenon of credibility acting as a
surrogate for policy action. Kuttner (2018, p. 128) notes that coherent and constan t policy
discourse lowers volatility and enhances confidence in the markets. This shows that discourse
has come to rival interest rates in determining market behavior. In a sense, these findings suggest
that the monetary authority’s leadership rests on the management of market narratives. This
illustrates that the Fed’s power lies not only in its economic instruments but also in its ability to
engender a belief in economic stability.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 32
Interest rate policy has a strong effect on productivity and innovation, as well as the
composition and structure of economic activities. While controlling inflation in the short term is
crucial, the policy's long-term impact on development is even more important. Fernald (2014, p
6.) showed how moderate rate normalization reallocates some capital to more productive uses
and improves total factor productivity. This means innovation is encouraged, rather than
suffocated, by moderate tightening. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p 335) emphasize the risk of early
tightening, when the policy will restrict credit and stop the economy from growing. This suggests
that central banks are not only expected to provide “stability” and stop growth from boiling over
but also provide the stability necessary to promote the economy’s growth. Engen, Laubach and
Reifschneider (2015, p 12) also emphasize that the output gain from accommodative policies will
not be forever and will need to be recalibrated to stop the diminishing returns. This explains the
need to focus on the schedule of fundamental shifts. It is innovative and productivity rate shifts
that should be the focus of interest rate policy to ensure that economic stability is achieved
alongside necessary structural change to provide strong and inclusive economic growth.
The implications of Federal Reserve policy underscore its effective reality as a pillar of
the international financial system. In a globalized economy, even minor adjustments in U.S.
policy trigger responses in international capital markets. Aizenman, Binici and Hutchison (2014,
p. 2) claim that capital outflows from emerging markets in response to the 2013 tapering
announcements demonstrated the liquidity effects of the Federal Reserve. Bernanke (2017, p. 20)
notes that such external movements also return to the domestic economy and affect the
implementation of policy in the U.S., which illustrates the feedback loops involved. This
feedback loop illustrates the global repercussions of domestic policy. Kuttner (2018, p. 130)
points out that the Fed’s rate moves and expectations provide effective benchmarks for policy
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 33
and provide a framework for global lending, investment, and currency arrangements. This
highlights the Fed’s dual role as a domestic financial authority and an international monetary
authority. From an analytical perspective, such interconnectedness calls for enhanced multilateral
collaboration to address the more comprehensive systemic risks that can emerge from the
unilateral actions of central banks, which signals a new paradigm in collaborative monetary
policy.
There has been expanded criticism of the independence of the Federal Reserve as its
boundaries and functions continue to expand. Among the institution's most notable challenges
has been the balance between autonomy and accountability. Conti-Brown (2017, p. 9) claims that
the post-crisis interventions executed by the Federal Reserve blurred the lines between monetary
and fiscal authority. This blurring creates risks that may undermine credibility. Kiley and
Roberts (2017, p. 325) state that the best way to defend expanding authority and functions is to
deal with trade-offs as openly as possible. This trade-off will demonstrate that the institution's
openness is a cornerstone for the institution's integrity. Carpenter et al. (2018, p. 15) showed that
even in the face of criticism, the publication of detailed documents and minutes of meetings
enhanced public confidence. This implies that autonomy is strengthened by, and not undermined,
by transparency. Independence in the current era is not derived from isolation but the trust that
has been earned. Openness has now become one of the credibility tools of the Fed that
demonstrates that accountability and good governance are principles that must coexist.
Analyzing how the market responds to the Federal Reserve’s communication strategies
emphasizes the psychological aspect of monetary policy. With the rapid flow of information,
expectations may determine outcomes even more than actions. Bauer and Rudebusch (2018, p. 6)
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 34
explain how ambiguous or overly anticipatory policy communications may lead to market
corrections even when no real changes transpire. This illustrates how sensitive financial
outcomes can be to the perceptions of market participants. Investors, as Bernanke (2017, p. 27)
describes, respond to both the information content and the phrasing of communications,
emphasizing the need for careful precision. Kuttner (2018, p. 133) shows that the stabilization of
investor behaviors is the result of predictable and constant communications, which the Fed
appreciates as the primary instrument of policy. The Fed’s analytical problem lies in striking the
right imbalance of clarity and flexibility in guidance to shape expectations while retaining the
ability to respond to changes in conditions.
The relationship between monetary and fiscal authorities is crucial in ensuring recovery is
effective and sustainable. When the two spheres collaborate, the results of their policies are
consistent and sturdy. Engen, Laubach & Reifschneider (2015, p. 18) argue that the absence of
fiscal stimulus makes monetary expansion unsustainable, highlighting the limitations of "stand
alone" policy tools. Political barriers have historically limited the joint monetary and fiscal
strategy that most member states of the G20 implement, which Bernanke (2017, p. 25) claims
would have expedited recovery from the global financial crisis. This illustrates the relevance of
the Institutional Framework. Conti-Brown (2017, p. 11) paradoxically states that "over-
coordination" and lack of policies aimed at fiscal stimulus and monetary expansion to control the
rate of interest undermines both the independence of the Central Bank and the credibility of its
policies. There is considerable tension between interdependence and independence. From the
standpoint of policy coherence, "growth" can only be the objective when both monetary
authorities and fiscal policymakers actively target the same growth rate.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 35
The rapid advancements in technology and financial services are changing how central
banks do their work. There are new aspects of the digital economy which complicate the
calibration and the transmission of central banks policies. As Fernald (2014, p. 9) points out,
digital technology increases the productivity cycles and therefore weakens the link between the
interest rate and real output. It emphasizes the restructuring of the economy concerning the
responsiveness of the monetary system. As Kiley and Roberts (2017, p. 340) state, the traditional
mechanisms of transmission are modified by digital finance as well as non-bank credit providers.
This calls for new and, perhaps, more complex policy frameworks and the dynamism of real-
time policy frameworks. Carpenter et al. (2018, p. 18) argue that forecasting techniques would be
more effective and relevant for policy making if predictive models included technology
indicators. It shows the need to keep in pace with the economic innovations. In terms of
analytical constructs, the 21st century monetary policy will require the Fed to implement
anticipatory financial technology and intelligent monitoring of the Fed’s monetary policy to
ensure that the monetary policy frameworks are relevant to the economy.
Global Monetary Policy Trends
In recent years, global monetary policy has been structured around long-term changes
rather than changes on a global cyclical basis. Financial crises have forced central banks to take a
new view on liquidity and reserves over the last century, and each crisis has taught institutions
valuable lessons on policy design (Reinhart, 2019, p. 4). Learning and adapting over each crisis
can be viewed as institutional learning. The addition of risk-adjusted forecasting methods aims at
predicting and controlling the uncertainty of the rate (Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuck, 2014, p.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 36
S48). This means predictive control has shifted to real-time toward more risk-averse policy
making. Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 84) argue that the period after 2008 has been
characterized by more risk-averse caution in the normalization of monetary policy, where the
gradual tightening of policy affects liquidity more slowly than in previous decades. The
analytical view of these changes suggests that risk-averse, global monetary authorities and
systemic stability are entwined. The global patterns that are visible around the world shifts
toward risk-averse policy tightening show the implicit recognition that systemic risk can build
more rapidly than it can be dealt with when monetary policy is extreme.
The intricacies surrounding capital flows have brought added currency to
interdependence with respect to monetary policy. Uncertainty shocks, which Bloom (2014, p.
156) argues increases volatility, unevenly affects the cross-border flow of capital and, thus,
policy announcements. Controlling uncertainty has now become as pivotal as controlling
liquidity. Inflation dynamics have also become uncoupled from the monetary base, as evidenced
by Gilchrist et al. (2017, p. 789), which contributes to further weaken predictability of policy
responses. Fragmentation and globalization of the transmission mechanism adds to the
complexity of the policy response. With the increase of capital mobility, the policy spillover of
monetary and fiscal policy interdependence as described by Reinhart (2019, p. 6) is blurring the
lines of domestic and external frameworks. Therefore, these structures suggest the necessity of
global monetary coordination. Shared communication and the willingness to centralize predict as
contingency frameworks, regardless of the geopolitical environment, will enable central banks to
sustain intertemporal and cross sectional stability.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 37
Ultra-low interest rates in advanced economies have become a piece of monetary policy
in the period following the global crisis. Summers (2014, p. 28) reasons this as part of the
phenomenon of “secular stagnation,” in which a market experiences chronic disinflation due to a
mismatch (deficit) of investment demand as compared to supply within the structure of the
economy. This imbalance in the structure of the economy is indicative of chronic conditions
which transcend the conventional business cycle. Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 85) have
pointed out the reasons for the expansionary stance of “finish” monetary policy due to the weak
momentum in the private sector. Monetarily, the system has moved into a state of stagnation,
where the temporary (default) monetary policy has shifted to a permanent position of monetary
“ease.” Kunze, Kramer, and Rudschuck (2014, p. S50) have also pointed out how “finish” rates
weakened market expectations. This has led to a situation where the signals of monetary policy
tightening are perceived as a bluff. It illustrates the paradox where the mechanisms of stability
breed fragility. From an analytical perspective, the global economy resembles a precarious
equilibrium, held together by liquidity and shrouded in confidence, that, when lost, could lead to
a catastrophic collapse.
Demographic and technological changes are also shifting global monetary dynamics.
Summers (2014, p. 32) argues that in developed economies, the increase in the proportion of
older people in the population reduces potential investments and lowers equilibrium interest
rates. This demographic perspective treats stagnation in monetary policy as the result of
structural changes rather than policy. According to Gilchrist et al. (2017, p. 791), technological
advancements have slowed wage growth, which in turn reduces the pressures of traditional
inflation. This suggests that low productivity growth may now occur alongside high price
stability. Furthermore, Bloom (2014, p. 160) points out that uncertainty caused by high volatility
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 38
of technological advances makes it more difficult for central banks to predict the demand cycle
and thereby respond to it. Collectively, these observations suggest that monetary policy is likely
to focus on stagnating secular forces as opposed to fluctuating volatility in the short term. The
global monetary system is likely to focus on integrated, interdisciplinary constructs that bring
together the disparate fields of economics, population studies and technology to explain changes
in the new forms of value creation.
The intensification of cross-border financial contagion has necessitated increased
collaboration amongst the global monetary authorities. Inter-regional financial crises transmit
with “virtual” instantaneity via the bonds and currencies markets due to the impetuses of
interconnected and integrated cross-border capital systems. This indicates that the dissipation of
global liquidity renders the adoption of isolationist monetary policy frameworks a theoretical and
practical impossibility. Shocks of economic uncertainty that originate from large economies
proliferate instantaneously through electronic financial markets, thus amplifying the speed of
contagion to policymakers and compressing the time available for the policymakers to respond.
The Reinharts, thus, argue that the acceleration of financial contagion crises from one system to
another necessitates pre-emptive frameworks in central bank relative to the inter- and intra-
central bank collaborative adoption of information frameworks. Overall, the global financial
system functions as one large adaptive system with interdependent stability. The currencies of
Co-ordination, transparency, and synchronized execution of policy frameworks are the new
currencies of Resilience in the New World.
The erosion of autonomy over monetary policy is one of the biggest issues facing central
banks of sovereign nations. As Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuck (2014, 47) point out, on the one
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 39
hand, the interconnectedness of financial systems makes it impossible for policymakers to
independently choose their interest rates without invoking the volatility of exchange rates. On the
other hand, the impacts of globalization on the efficacy of domestic policy tools undermines
autonomy. Reinhart (2019, 12) describes this situation as one where interdependent monetary
systems force smaller countries to 'shadow' the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank.
The evidence suggests that policy power, or monetary policy influence, has a stratified or
'pecking order' structure within the international system. As Bloom (2014, 158) describes it, the
need for safe instruments and the 'risk-off' environment surrounding capital flight to reserve
currencies reinforces dependence on monetary policy of the central banks. Structurally, this is a
significant gap in global governance where the financial conditions of the majority of the world
are set by a handful of 'monetary' countries.
The duration of unconventional monetary policymaking has sufficiently reframed
expectations about inflation and growth, which has been and continues to be unique. Post crisis
inflation remained subdued even with the large expansion of liquidity, which has been seen as
challenging and decoupling the presumed positive relationship between the money supply and
inflation, as noted by Gilchrist et al. (2017, p. 793). This has led to the assumption that advanced
economies are experiencing weakened monetary transmission. Weaker monetary transmission
leads Summers (2014, p. 35) to characterize the remaining capital stagnation as deep structural
stagnation on the order of inefficiency. Liquid capital stagnation described by inefficiency poses
no threat to inflation. As noted by Reinhart (2019, p. 13), these inefficiencies pose the threat of
creating “silent bubbles” on the “unobservable” side of the asset markets. Thus, the focus of such
analyses suggests that the incredible liquidity and capital stagnation are the result of a shifting
economic paradigm characterized by psychological and structural impediments.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 40
The philosophy of global monetary governance has been influenced by the history of
crises. According to Reinhart and Reinhart (2018, p. 87), the overlapping of crises cycles
occurring within shorter time frames has made it necessary for policy makers to become
proactive. This reflects a new approach predicated on continuous monitoring, as opposed to
simply episodic intervention. Kunze, Kramer and Rudschuck (2014, p. S52) note that the
predictive policy documents which were designed to forecast potential crises have tended to
provide greater focus on uncertainty factors. The focus on predictive policy-making to ensure
crises avoidance marks a shift to a proactive approach to stability. Bloom (2014, p. 163) points
out that the management of uncertainty has become central to the avoidance of a self-fulfilling
spiral of decline. The globally integrated monetary policy signifies the emergence of new risk
and the management of the psychology of that risk. The modern central banker must now act as
an economist, as well as a strategist, to ensure confidence and financial order.
Global Interdependence and Policy Synchronization
The fluctuations in interest rates are a tool that the Central Banks across the world uses in
control the economy of their respective countries. In doing this, it also controls the world’s
economy because each country’s central bank ensures that changes in interest rates are in
accordance with the international set standards that could help in avoiding changes that can harm
the global economy. According to Claessens, Coleman, and Donnelly, (2018, p.2) setting these
rates, normally ensure that they are held at low levels in the bid to cause a boom in the economy
after financial crises. However, Gourinchas and Rey (2016, p.34) posits that such changes bring
about interferences into the organic functioning of the financial markets as well as the economy,
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 41
something that brings about innumerable serious consequences that include imbalances and
distortions.
The international linkages in current monetary policies has changed the way countries
view their sovereignty and their newly acquired economic territory. Globalization, in particular,
Lane (2017, p. 12) argues, has created an intricate network of economic interdependencies a
stream of interconnected national economies that function as a networked whole. This network
system highlights the increasing difficulty of independent policy implementation. Over the last
20 years, Ductor and Leiva-Leon (2016, p. 113) claim that the synchronization of business cycles
among the world’s major economies has worsened brought about by trade and cross-border
investments. They point out that increasing interdependence could lead to greater collective risks
although mutual benefits are then easier to achieve. Chatterjee (2016, p. 185) for instance,
reiterates that “regionete le monetary-policy comovement” is the outcome of central banking
practices convergence structural aligned since 2008. This outcome is an outcome of institutional
isomorphism, as mimicry of systemically important central banking countries now provides the
most global monetary policy stability. From an analytical point of view, it is, as these studies
tend to show, that area economic policies ever more depend on cross-border policies too. More
than ever, the ability to bounce back economically is the outcome of a collective understanding
of mutual risks that a decline in one area is bound to bring about similar outcome on the rest.
The interconnectedness of global finance systems has increased the speed and scope of
policy transmission. Growing empirical evidence showcases the effects of market heightening
integration on the diffusion of shocks. Matesanz and Ortega (2014, p. 1838) show that during
financial crises, the exchange data of different countries exhibits powerful contagion where
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 42
shocks in one currency market spread to other currency markets in record speed. Their work
illustrates that in the case of real-time interconnectedness, the system creates and conditionally
enhances volatility. Bergholt and Sveen (2014, p. 4) underscore that inter-sectoral linkages in
small open economies drive domestic cycles in tandem with the global business cycle. This
finding demonstrates that such open systems serve to amplify the global instability. Lane (2017,
p. 25) maintains that integration of interdependence with cooperation comes foremost in the
context of its global governance. His position demonstrates the primacy of institutional
architecture in balance maintenance. From an analytical standpoint, global markets no longer
function as isolated systems. It is the integration that provides the capacity for independent
response that creates the challenge for policymakers in controlling integration.
The development of synchronized policy behavior relates to both economic necessity and
common institutional culture. Growing scholarly consensus recognizes that synchronization has
both cultural and financial aspects. Alasuutari (2015, p. 44) states that policymakers of the world
increasingly become a “tribe of moderns.” This characterizes the cultural aspect of economic
governance. Oatley (2019, p. 961) argues that interdependence has made the world’s national
policy decision bounds untangled, as global standards limit national independence. His argument
sheds light on the elusive political compromises that lie within economic cooperation. Leiva-
Leon (2017, p. 518) remarks that even in the United States, due to synchronized external factors,
regional business cycles now orbit in unison, following the global pattern. This confirms the
prevailing assumption that globalization reaches even the large, diversified economies. From an
analytical perspective, these patterns illustrate that interdependence creates cultural and
institutional convergence in the exercise of power in an interdependent context. Therefore, policy
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 43
synchronization is a sociopolitical and technical fact, an equilibrium territory sustained by
common perception and also economic perception.
The growing interconnectedness of global economies has increased the importance of
understanding predictive horizons across nations. Some authors argue that coordination is
formed in anticipation of the actual policies. Ductor and Leiva-Leon (2016, p. 117) show that, in
the realm of finance, market players increasingly expect central banks to respond in unison as
opposed to acting in isolation, and their anticipation stabilizes market sentiment. Matesanz and
Ortega (2014, p. 1842) show that the contagion of crises is, to some extent, a function of the
density of the global exchange network, arguing that a higher level of market integration
accelerates the transmission of policy effects. This shows that integration enhances both the
positive and negative aspects. From a different angle, Chatterjee (2016, p. 189) remarks that the
most intense monetary comovement is among nations that are economically and institutionally
proximate, which suggests that the level of synchronization is driven by unifying elements of
transparency and credibility. This points out the importance of trust in international relations. By
now, analytically, the global coordination operates by anticipation in parallel ways, markets
predict coordinated action, which in turn pressures decision makers to actualize that scenario.
This circular interaction restructures monetary governance as a sovereign collective practice of
managing anticipation.
Polices and market responses have always had a temporal gap but the interval has now
been greatly reduced due to the advancement of technology. Digital internetworking has made
real time cooperation both possible and obligatory. Digital integration to the capital market
instant payments and other digital services which has reasoned an increased speed of monetary
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 44
information circulation and hence the easier and urgent coordination of which Oatley brings up
in Oatley (2019, p. 968). It is pertinent to note that his argument also identifies technology as a
both limiting and enabling factor. In another case, evidence presented by Bergholt and Sveen
(2014, p. 6) demonstrates that even small economies that embrace open technology experience
an increased in the synchronization of production and investment because of the digital
opportunity they are exposed to. Further, Lane (2017, p. 34) asserts that real time
synchronization of policies is increasingly reliant on the openness of central banks to share
institutional information and other data. This underscores the importance of information in the
current digital era. The interrogation of technology and global interdependence has given birth to
a new form of digital policy making which is instant policy coordination that address the gap
filed in value information in order to stabilize the system.
Even with its potential for system stabilization, policy synchronization can paradoxically
increase systemic risk if applied incorrectly. Many researchers have warned about the potential
resiliency risk that can materialize from duplicated responses. Matesanz and Ortega (2014, p.
1847) show that excessive policy interdependence results in homogeneous reactions and greater
chances of simultaneous economic downturns. Their results show that variety in tactics shrink
possibility of rigid responses. Leiva-Leon (2017, p. 521) states that synchronized responses can
overshoot recovery and mask subdivisions of regional weakness in aggregate regional balance.
This finding suggests that overzealous optimism can underline fundamental flaws. Oatley (2019,
p. 970) believes that the politics of multiclass complex interdependence system almost always
prefers integration over differentiation. His assertion suggests the unintentional desire for
synchronization. From an analytical global point of view, global stability should be achieved
through complementarity, not uniformity. Differentiated overlaying synchrony should define
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 45
global policy revisions. The ability to integrate contextual synchrony with unified interdependent
action will define the next generation of global policy frameworks.
The integration of monetary cooperation on a global scale continues to change the
distribution of power within the international financial system. More and more scholars
recognize that cooperation has become a persistent, enduring characteristic of the system. As
noted by Alasuutari (2015, p. 49), the IMF, the BIS, and the G20, along with other transnational
policy networks, now engage in formal policy synchronization that is legitimized by shared
norms. This exemplifies the notion that global governance has evolved more sophisticated than
merely informal consultations. As Lane (2017, p. 39) notes, such systems provide venues for
ongoing communications, thus diminishing the asymmetries of information that drive crises.
This analysis illustrates the contradictions of resilience and transparency. As Ductor and Leiva-
Leon (2016, p. 120) argue, policy synchronization within these networks improves systemic
stability by aligning anticipations and lessening uncertainty. This evidence illustrates the
reinforcing nature of trust. From a historical perspective, these shifts represent a move away
from informal, ad hoc collaboration to more structural forms of interdependence. The global
monetary system is progressing toward a system of governance that is quasifederal in nature,
operationally decentralized but normatively and instrumentally unified within a common
purpose.
Monetary policy has evolved due to moral changes and developmental obligations that
comes with global interdependence and increased coordination. There is an increasing body of
research that ties coordination to distributive outcomes. Oatley (2019, p. 974) notes
interdependence forces domestic policymakers to consider global equity ramifications of
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 46
domestic rate changes. In this regard, he shifts the framework of the economics to ethical
dimension. The work of Bergholt and Sveen (2014, p. 9) shows that business cycle
synchronization propagates inequality across borders to the detriment of the sized and poorer
economies that are structurally weaker. This, in turn, shifts the focus to the ill effects of
cohesion. Emerging policy dialogue institutions, Alasuutari (2015 p. 52) argues, are increasingly
grappling with the idea that fairness and inclusion are integral to structural stability. This, in turn,
secures the ethical and the normative proposals. Collectively, these findings argue that global
coordination will, in the future, need to embrace ethical and moral concerns in the economic
framework. The interdependence of coordination will be sustainable, in the future, not in the
operational excellence alone, but in territory of justice balance as interdependence fosters
common wealth, not systemic inequality.
Effects of Rapid Interest Rate Changes
One of the effects of interest rates fluctuation, for instance, is that when the Federal
Reserve or the Central Banks in various parts of the world, hike it, it brings about “false signals”
which encourages the undertaking of business as well as other endeavors that are not viable or
profitable in a market or economic environment where interest rates are normal. Gourinchas and
Rey (2016, p.34) adds that such hikes lead to creation of businesses or investments known as
“mal-investments” that will typically fail when the interest rates come back to normal. Some of
the companies that faced such effects include the dot-com firms of the tech bubble of the late
1990s, the failed developments in housing that took place in the middle of 2000s during the US
housing bubble and others around the world such as the incomplete skyscrapers in Dubai among
many post-global financial crisis markets (Eaton, et al. 2016, p.3417-18). Therefore, it is evident
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 47
that when in the nearest future, the possibility of increasing interest rates in the US and the global
market, given the current lowest rates, will lead to the recurrence of the mass failures of the
“malinvestments” that occurred in the past decades are likely to occur in the future as interest
rates increase resulting in banking/financial crises or recession. There are various other examples
that illustrate how a hike in interest rates led to recessions. In the 1980s, a recession occurred for
a period of six months and it was concentrated in manufacturing, housing and the automobile
industry (Eaton, et al. 2016, p.3417-18). From 1981 to 1982, there was another recession that led
to the loss of over 2.9 million jobs. Therefore, the likelihood of another financial crisis occurring
is high because of the current fluctuations.
Interest rates have the potential to impact several other variables simultaneously, and
tightening them too quickly may have irreversible impacts on credit markets. Guarata and
Pagliacci note that unforeseen monetary tightening has a strong tendency to induce a shortage of
liquidity and a contraction in the supply of credit, particularly in high-leverage economies. Their
research demonstrates the instability of the highly leveraged short-term borrowing system.
According to Smets (2018, p. 6), the relationship between monetary policy and monetary
instability is non-linear; moderate increases may strengthen the balance sheet, but aggressive
increases increase systemic stress. This highlights the need for central banks to exercise a fine
balance between controlling inflation and safeguarding the stability of the financial system.
Kuttner and Shim (2016, p. 33), for example, illustrate the impact that rapid policy shifts may
have, predicting that the consequence os such shifts would be the simultaneous destabilization of
the housing market and the rest of the economy in a systemic manner. This evidence is
descriptive of the erosion of household wealth resulting from rate shocks. From a policy analysis
perspective, rapid increases in interest rates may be more damaging than beneficial; these hikes
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 48
may relieve the economy from the stress of over-heating, but are more likely to induce severe
structural changes that increase future systemic risk.
These changing interest rates also reveal gaps in the distribution of capital around the
world. The countries with bottom tier institutions suffer the most in these scenarios. Capital
flight and currency depreciation in emerging markets still emerging from the destabilizing
financial systems of their economies is a result of sudden policy reversals in advanced economies
which Agur and Demertzis (2019, p. 69) assert. This is a demonstration of how the rest of the
world suffers from the realignment of global monetary policy. Dafermos, Nikolaidi, and Galanis
(2018, p. 221) argue that investment in the more sustainable projects is a divestment rage in the
recent hot climate change and monetary instability because the vulnerable interest rate shifts can
change the whole investment prism. This study is a demonstration of how reining financial
instability chokes off green finance. According to Yamashita (2016, p. 206) the stagnation of the
1990s Japan and the post 2008 recovery of the EU is a good lesson to learn from, and points out
that interest rate changes, when poorly sequenced, prolong the stagnation instead of restoring
growth. All the above mentioned points makes it clear that the effects of rate volatility are more
than just cyclic; there are also structural elements too. Managing the changes in rates is a global
issue needing coordination and other policy targets to be intertwined such as developmental and
environmental stability.
The housing sector is arguably one of the most striking examples of how sudden changes
of rate can disrupt the balance of an economy Its the case when interest rates go up sharply and
speculative investments simply vanish. Kuttner and Shim (2016, p. 38) show that sudden shifts
in monetary policy contraction tend to disproportionally decrease demand in housing markets
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 49
with high leverage, and bring about price crashes in unison with defaults. Their work brings to
light the delicate relationship of asset bubbles with rate cycles. Minsky (2015, p. 41) has
captured the essence of the phenomenon by arguing that such corrections signal the transition
from the state of euphoria to panic in the financial system, where the investors reprice the risk in
more shackled conditions. He argues that such cycles can be avoided, or at least, the negative
consequences mitigated, by the combination of macro-prudential regulation with gradual
adjustments to rate policy. These strategies, Minsky argues, should be implemented in a
coordinated fashion to achieve desired stability. In a way, the housing market serves as a
composite measure of interest rate manipulation: the more abrupt the changes, the
disproportionate the contraction that spills over to construction, banking, and consumer spend,
all of which ultimately constrict economic growth.
Businesses require long-term planning and investment horizons to strategically deploy
capital, and shifting rates and rates changes do not encourage capital investment in guaranteed
returns, as lack of capital can stifle growth. Pagliacci and Guarata (2017, p. 6) discuss how
volatility in interest rates can lead to productive investment aversion, as uncertainties about
financing and demand conditions become pronounced. Clearly, stasis itself becomes a resource.
As Sumner (2017, p. 95) contends, the rules of monetary control predicted tend to supply more
confidence to the long-term horizons of the economy than hands-on changes, even in recessions.
This is compatible with the body of evidence that suggests lack of policy guidance can lead to
panic type adjustments. Agur and Demertzis (2019, p. 72) argue that while macro-prudential
buffers can mitigate certain volatility effects, these buffers need to be sustained in a coordinated
manner across all financial institutions. This speaks to the need for systemic stability. When
treated discretely, rapid, erratic and volatile behavior associated with changes in the rate of
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 50
interest, leads to a severe erosion of trust, which is the foundation of all financial systems.
Predictability in policy, then, is not a purely technical requirement, rather, it serves to highlight
the major determinants of sustained investment growth and confidence.
The pondering implications of fluctuations in interest rates now also include interest rate
instability and its ecological consequences. As Dafermos, Nikolaidi and Galanis (2018, p. 223)
put it, unstable monetary conditions increase environmental risks, because they inhibit longer-
term financing for green infrastructure and climate adaptation. The authors demonstrate how
monetary uncertainty translates into ecological vulnerability. The longer-term consequences of
climate change have been termed the tragedy of the horizon by Carney (2015, p 220), since it
does not allow constructive investment in changeable transitions. This lack of changeable
investment is the reason for stunted policies in the long run. He then restyles the lack of
monetary stability to an environmental issue. As climate change and monetary policies grow
intertwined, the failure to address monetary policies beyond the bounds of inflation targets
further aggravates the issue. As Smets (2018, p 15) explains that the integration of climate
change resilience into the central framework of central banking requires the alignment of rate
policy to sustainable indicators rather than purely inflation indicators. Shifting the focus of
monetary policy to the longer-term structural elements of the economy is the next step. The
increasing overlap of financial and ecological stability has yielded the understanding that the
governance defects concerning the stability of interest rates, and the subsequent need for control
of growth and spending, is the governance of finance, growth, and planetary boundaries.
History has shown that sharp changes in interest rates tend to go through cycles of
excessive overreactions followed by corrections. Policymakers tend to go back and forth
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 51
between extremes which damages both credibility and long-term stability. Minsky (2015, p. 58)
reminds us that the financial system is, by its very nature, unstable and prone to crises which
arise out of the very mechanisms which are intended to prevent them. Minsky’s insight draws
attention to the paradox adjacent to the overwhelming system of which there is regulation.
Yamashita (2016, p. 211) shows that tightening too early after a certain period of recovery has
been, and in Japan’s “lost decade,” one of the most pronounced examples of post-war stagnation,
one of the most devastating examples of reserve gain erosion. This example is a warning against
policymaking that is overly knee-jerk in nature. Sumner (2017, p. 98) argues that the structural
rules of which are drawn in advance that are followed are more effective than measured changes
of policy in lessening such cyclical mistakes. His claim only serves to reemphasize the more
surpassing continuity of less creative reasoning. Looking at it from the analytic perspective, the
pattern illustrates that the interest rate policy is not a matter merely of setting the interest rates at
the right level, but having the self-control not to deploy erratic measures. Therefore, the stability
of global finance rests equally on the 'technical' and the 'institutional' in terms, respectively, of
policy design and discipline.
Fiscal Policy and Debt Levels
Heavy spending combined with high levels of government debt makes managing that
debt vital, as pointed out by Bernanke (2017, p. 12), who states that while spending to stimulate
demand is important, managing that debt “can undercut" a country’s credibility on a global scale.
Mohan and Kapur (2014, p. 7) point out that spanning the policy gap “above the zero lower
bound on interest rates” is highly restrictive “contradictory policy” that could lead to instability
in credit systems, and they argue that joint action by fiscal policy and central banks diminishes
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 52
the credit market contradictions. These works point to the interaction of fiscal policy and central
banking. It is the additional condition of global interdependence that also calls for collaborative
management as fiscal policy is no longer regarded a “domestic policy” but a “policeman” with
boundless implications to control the international market.
The debt accumulation and fiscal expansion phenomena captures the paradox of progress
and exposure amid the speculative nature of recovery in the economy sustains the borrowing.
However, fiscal capacity becomes constricted. According to Sumner (2017, p. 95), the structured
rule of policy strategy improves fiscal predictability, which reduces the likelihood of excessive
fiscal deficits and private investment. This empirical observation captures the way in which
institutional margins stabilize defaults. Beck, Colciago and Pfajfar (2014 p. 5) assert that the
ilog-fold inter relation of fiscal deficits and monetary transmission is indeed through the ailing or
robust condition of the institutions of finance. This demonstrates how the conditions of
government debt can structure the tangential ease of banks to the policy switch. The austerity of
Green and Lavery (2018 p. 83) argues that government policies and the associated neoliberal
fiscal doctrine that has dominated the last three decades do not only restrain public expenditure,
but also public investment which in turn diminishes the capacity that the government can use to
mitigate crises. This analysis captures the strategic political economy of public investment vis-a-
vis the paradox of austerity. In the analysis of the political economy of impact investment fiscal
tether and investment anchor, policy emphasis has to rest on the shifting inter-sequences of
confidence and counter-cyclicality.
Global economic disruptions are particularly difficult to undertake, thus growing within
them unique policies adapted to the specific conditions of the crisis, usually on the government
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 53
side, the spending policies of the government, often deficit financed, that mitigate contractions of
aggregate demand. Bernanke (2017, p. 19) posits that, in the integrated world economy, the
fiscal expansion aids the liquidity flows that underpin the solvent equilibrium of the domestic
economy and the international economy. His argument shows the international fiscal spillover
effects. Duarte (2019, p. 590) suggests that the structural disaggregation of fiscal stimuli, like the
issuance of infrastructure bonds and selective fiscal transfers, augments the efficacy of
disbursement stimuli without excessive debt burden. This is the reflection of the rational
argument of risk exposure. Mohan and Kapur (2014, p. 11) point out that coordination of
policies among the advanced economies is designed to avert any competitive distortions in
financing of debt and the value of currency. Their argument brings out the fiscal policy
collaboration aspect. Collectively, these studies imply fiscal governance over the world is
increasingly considered to be a public good that needs transparent, co-ordinated, innovative
policies to decide on the governance of borrowing to build resilience and stave down future
tendencies of instability.
When exploring the intersection between fiscal policy and private investment, we find the
paradox of debt that expands faster than productivity: the negative correlation between the two
phenomena. Government borrowing heavily and paying for the interest that comes with it can
drive up interest rates, thus restricting the availability of cheap money. Beck, Colciago and
Pfajfar (2014, pp. 9) highlight the fact that private lending channels can get suppressed by fiscal
expansions that dominate the liquidity of the financial system. This is a good suggestion of how
a debt-financed stimulus can curtail entrepreneurship. A counter example is where Sumner
(2017, pp. 99) states that erratic borrowing demoralizes investors, yet predictable fiscal paths
boost private sector anticipation. This helps Sumner’s case. It again accentuates that
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 54
macroeconomic management is unimaginably complex, with many psychological factors at play.
Weak fiscal management can modify the psychology of certain market segments in detrimental
ways, and debt uncertainty is a perfect case in point, as it is associated with more uncertainty
(volatility) of certain assets such as those commodities (like crude oil) whose prices are heavily
influenced by the market debt perceptions (Fang, Chen, Yu and Xiong 2018, pp. 59). There
exists a connection between fiscal balance and private sector dynamism that can demonstrate
analytically the effectiveness of a debt policy that builds trust. This must ensure the state
borrowing’s productive investment, more than competitive interest, must take center stage.
Accumulating debt has geopolitical and intergenerational consequences which still need
to be explored. The shift in influence and the allocation of resources in the future as a result of
ongoing fiscal deficits is advanced by almost every nation in the world. Lavery and Green (2018,
p. 87) say that the indiscriminate spending of a state and fiscal unbalance for free does shift the
state’s equity balance on the borrowing’s future taxpayers, which leads to the erosion becoming
a specimen of debt policy, the cover, that has, policy. Growth goals and intergenerational equity
Ms. Duarte (2019, p. 596) balances. Growth is attained by shifting toward “sustainability-
adjusted debt”, a shift to long term accountability. When it comes to long term planning,
Bernanke (2017, p. 25) states fiscal management of a major economy is misconstrued in a
manner that confidence shocks from the economy gets triggered and the entire fiscal systems
gets agitated. There, the systemic fragility of focus is exposed. This serves as a reminder that
credit that is transparent is lacking, to say the least, in cross borders in Finance. The legality of
public debt is doctrine. The obligations of the state that is considered the trustee, public debt
comes without fiscal account. The balance of governance is trust, unaccounted for, the decisions
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 55
of the past and the obligations of tomorrow are in bondage. Detaching economic rationale is
diffused, the answer’s governance is amply endowed with none the less reason.
The rise of unconventional monetary environments has deepened the complexity of
monetary policy. The persistence of low interest rates has changed some of the dynamics
associated with debt sustainability. Chodorow-Reich (2014, p. 8) illustrates how unconventional
monetary easing temporally lowers the costs of debt servicing, but may distort the fiscal
apparatus’ incentives towards excessive borrowing. This illustrates the moral hazard
consequences of an accommodative policy. Duarte (2019, p. 600) argues that the adoption of
fiscal structures resilient to low-rate environments helps avoid reliance on temporary monetary
bottoming. He highlights the urgency and the case for policy expansion. Beck, Colciago and
Pfajfar (2014, p. 12) argue that effective financial intermediation enhances the ability of fiscal
policy to direct investment towards the real economy rather than speculative “finance” activities.
They draw a line from debt management to real economy performance. From a policy
perspective, the ability to manage the economy in a low interest rate environment requires fiscal
discipline and guided borrowing, towards long-term productivity enhancing investment, rather
than short-term consumption and political costs.
The combination of public finance strategies and globalization business uncertainties is
one of the fundamentals of the economy today. The political and market disturbances perennially
challenge the sustainability of debt frameworks. Fang, Chen, Yu and Xiong (2018, p. 63)
illustrate that oil and stock market policy uncertainty diverges on long run correlation and hence
there is higher dislocation of assets, and greater correlation breakdown, in stressed fiscal
conditions. Their work illustrates the way in which markets are pulled together by the
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 56
expectations of fiscal policy. Green and Lavery (2018, p. 89) point out that in denial of growth
the neoliberal fiscal response to the last crisis has imposed considerable constraints on the
transformative potential of recovery. This position, of avoiding growth, is the conventional bias
of the neo-moderate fiscal policy. For example, Sumner (2017, p. 102) in clear terms states that
policy credibility in the current economic environment suffers from the exclusion of fiscal rules
and cooperative monetary policy and the policy rigidity is a result of absence of combination of
the two. Policy resilience, in his view, is defined by structural adaptability and the management
policy boundaries of in the 21st century, financing should be economic holistic the spending
while restraint. In fiscal policy, there has to be balance of innovative flexibility to deal with
predicaments of expectation in the global economy.
Impact on Banking Institutions and Profitability
Banks are important institutions in an economy and no country can survive without
banks, which are important economic institutions that regulate the economy. Changes in interest
rates affect banks as well. It is because when the Central Banks change interest rates, banks,
despite their concerns have to adopt such measures. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p.318) states that
in 2012, for instance, the Federal Reserve reduced its deposit facility rate, which are the interest
rates that all the banks get when they receive when they deposit their money with the central
bank. As a result, Kiley and Roberts (2017, p.318), report that during this period the interest rate
was at 0% and other series of cuts followed leading to as low as -0.4% by 2016. These cuts were
intended to give monetary accommodations during the low inflation period as well as during
periods when economic growth was weak. Even though low-interest rates have the ability to
boost the economic growth, it has raised concerns due to the fact that it could lead to a reduction
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 57
of income from the assets that bear interest. It also leads to financial crises because it affects
banks as it reduces their ability to make healthy profits. This is likely to be the biggest financial
crisis in the next few years if interest rates continue to reduce.
Interest rates have and still impact the profitability models of the banking sector for many
countries. Continued drops in the monetary policy rates can “squeeze” the banks’ net interest
margins and thus forces bank to rethink their models and strategy. The ability of banks to set the
price of credit and the interest rate depends on the resources that the Federal Reserve has and the
directional policy. The weakening ability of the Federal Reserve to control the reserve balances
has the ability to “dull” the mechanisms of monetary policy. This even further complicates the
picture for the banks. Kiley and Roberts (p. 322) found that banks with balances approaching
zero may still take on risky investments. Low policy rate shifts the behavior of banks from them
trying to preserve their safe potential, to them moving towards riskier investments. This however
comes with a deep challenge of moral behavior and the formed accommodation. After the 2008
financial crisis, Fed expanded its balance sheet and shifted its revenue streams. Carpenter et al.
(p. 9) emphasize that banks with eyesight on non-interest income like service fees and gains from
trading have the ability to adjust profit levels faster. The accommodation policy has led banks to
steer way from capital controls and have transitions to models of bold profit. This brings in the
highest level of exposure to recessions. The global financial crisis and the Federal Reserve
response shifted the banking model for the United States from stable interest earning to service
charge hitting income variability.
The compression of profitability as interest rates fall, has led to financial innovations with
sometimes destructive effects. Banks tend to diversify and engage in speculative lending or fee-
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 58
based products. Bauer and Rudebusch (2018, p. 18) advance the argument that the Federal
Reserve's acquisitions of bonds imply the direction of future rates, which leads to banks
changing their portfolio investments in the direction of duration and capital gains sensitive
assets. Such activities exacerbate volatility in asset prices when the policy changes from
restrictive to loose. Engen, Laubach and Reifschneider (2015, p. 11) assert that the
unconventional monetary policy's purchase of assets led to changes in the yield curve which
changes the bank's expectations on profitability with regard to maturity transformation. Their
works imply that central bank policy, in such cases, has the unintended consequence of
influencing the financial structure of the private sector. In the case of Smith (2019, p. 17), the
argument is that the response of banks to decreasing profit margins results in the positive
feedback of increasing systemic connections due to greater securitization and trading of
derivatives. Innovation in response to competitive pressure is exhibiting resilience, but is also
increasing fragility, as profit accumulation seeks and finds avenues in systemic risk exposure.
Since the global financial crisis, the changes in central bank balance sheets have altered
the manner in which banks operate with reserves and allocate capital. When central banks own
massive amounts of assets, there are changes to the banks' liquidity. Carpenter et al. (2018, p. 12)
point out the shift in the lending market, as the Fed's asset purchasing accumulated excess
reserves and interbank lending activity was squeezed, thus suppressing the standard liquidity
flow. Their findings suggest that the expansion of the balance sheet has less direct impacts on
financial intermediation. Aizenman, Binici and Hutchison (2014, p. 5) proved that capital
outflows from emerging markets were triggered by the Fed's tapering announcements,
illustrating with a case how the reverberations of balance sheet actions by the US have global
impacts. This is a case in point that demonstrates the influence of U.S. monetary operations.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 59
Kiley and Roberts (2017, p. 327) contend that concentration of assets in government securities,
which is typical of a low-rate environment, constrains the expansion of private credit. The
balance of central bank reserves and commercial bank actions, in this case, demonstrates how
stability oriented policy measures can reshape behavior in the marketplace, as well as liquidity
flow in the global banking system.
Profitability and institutional adaptability are two economic factors that quite differ from
and impact one another within the banking industry. In the period of time that the interest rates
were prolonged and set at a lower tier, the internal and adjusted productivity within financial
systems hindered productivity because productivity premiums shifted away from the gains of
regulatory control and more into the hands of regulatory compliance, which included
inefficiency increments. In the center of stagnation and stagnation, Fernald elucidates the
relevance of lacking competitiveness of the sectors that are mid to lower tier to the purpose of
discrimination pricing. The Federal Board, as noted in footnote 1, exercising indirect control
over the decisions of commercial banking, through the autonomy endowed constitutionally,
defines precise pores within which the constructive disintegration of banking policy adjustment
and private economics is to be understood. While regulatory construction and operational
activities are in standstill, Engen and Laubach and Reifschneider capture the banking sector in
the mid of social protection, which in return, is the reason. In a more concise posting, their
conclusions make a point that in order to maintain the financial profits, legislation, which is
contextualized in the purpose of prolonged interest compliance banking becomes a steady
principle, compliant with the principles of fully sovereign and relevant policy construction.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 60
Like the previous era, rising interest rates after long periods of accommodation create
equally deadly challenges to banking stability. As rates rise, the costs of funding climbs much
quicker than the yields on the assets, resulting in tighter margins. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p.
331) caution that rapid normalization can bring to the surface duration mismatches on banks’
balance sheets, resulting in valuation losses on bank-held fixed income securities. These losses,
though indirect, illustrate the hidden costs of tightening the policy. Carpenter (2018, p. 15) and
his colleagues demonstrate that certain banks, which hold a significant proportion of long-term
securities, are exposed to pronounced volatility in their earnings due to sudden spikes in interest
rates. This information reveals a need for deeply conservative strategies of counteracting interest
rates. Bauer and Rudebusch (2018, p. 21) surmise that the signaling effects of policy tightening
can, and often do, destabilize contingency market expectations, giving rise to unconventionally
sudden changes in the allocation of capital. The rate normalization, in a sense, is a stress test on
the banking systems of the post crisis era. These systems must balance the rekindling of profit
and the risk of a new cycle of turbulence.
The shifting nature of monetary policy has now become a most critical risk factor for the
profitability of banks. Finacial institutions always have a hard time forecasting funding and
investments when communication from central banks is poor. As Aizenman, Binici and
Hutchison (2014, p. 9) argue, unpredicted policy announcements from the Federal Reserve’s
shift changes has kept most of the globe upwards, thus during such times, banks are most
uncertain about the policy direction and become more apprehensive about volatility. Their work
illustrates the value of forward guidance, proactive communication. Clear and translucent
guidance decreases unsettled the markets and clear Engen, Laubach and Reifschneider (2015, p.
18), communication and even more so the lack of it, is a clear predictor of central monetary
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 61
policy action. This assertion also illustrates the transparency assertion to aid in the mitigation of
operational risk. The case made by Conti-Brown (2017, p. 32) that the policy signaled by the Fed
is the veil or the exterior of many layers of policy communications that needs to be in harmony.
This grants incredibility to the independence of the Fed. Indirectly, communication has become
one of the more crucial elements of monetary control, akin to the interest rate itself, to manage
the varying nature of the conditions and the expectations of the institutions profitability.
Due to the intertwined nature of international banking, any changes to interest rates in the
United States have much more severe consequences. Aizenman, Binici and Hutchison (2014, p.
12) observe that in emerging markets, banks lose capital and the national currency depreciates
during US interest rate hikes, which significantly impairs their lending ability. This illustrates the
asymmetric consequences of global monetary changes. Bauer and Rudebusch (2018, p. 25) assert
that within smaller economies, the policies of the Federal Reserve influence foreign bond yields
more than domestic bond rates. This suggests how the US dominates the global market.
Carpenter et al. (2018, p. 18) state that normalization of the balance sheet induces financial
tightening on a global scale due to cross-border holdings and in a network of cross-border
lending flotations. In simple terms, globalizations have made the Federal Reserve a global
central bank of sorts, and their policies for setting rates determine the profitability and risk of
national banks around the world.
The use of technology in banking these days has changed how institutions react to rate
changes. Increased digitization spurs dependence on third party services. Fernald (2014, p. 6)
states that, technology related productivity, reduction in profit in low-rate scenarios, along with
improved cost efficiencies, confirms the stabilizing (or cost) changing effect of innovation. Kiley
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 62
and Roberts 2017, p 335 argue profitability is maintained with low margin lending, and profits
are obtained, due to the change in credit assessment systems. This, according to the authors,
passive banking behavior underscores the systems adaptability. This phenomenon has been
observed due to by the phenomenon in systems and micro economies having digital investments.
digital systems. Smith 2019, p 29 argues, along with other transformational changes, digital
changes increases systemic risks by synchronized algorithms where all systems react the same to
a major market change. From an analytical vantage point, change in technology, in order to cover
the market, a level of vulnerability is born due to lower diversification, human intervention is
needed for the desired level of stability.
The ability of banks to remain profitable in changing monetary circumstances hinges on
strategic diversification and regulatory anticipation. According to Engen, Laubach, and
Reifschneider (2015, p. 22) adaptive policy design–combining both conventional and
unconventional policy instruments, enhances the ability of banks to deal with volatility. This
stance focuses on the need for policy adaptability. Conti-Brown (2017, p. 38) argues that the
stable institutional arrangement of central bank independence fosters financial innovation by
avoiding politically motivated capture. This looks at the relationship between the quality of
governance and remain resilient. According to Carpenter et al (2018, p. 20) greater confidence
and moderation of profit uncertainty comes from higher transparency in the projected balance
sheet and financial statements. This shows the emphasis on the information aspect of stability.
From an analytical point of view, the profitably of banks in the future hinges to interdependent
collaboration: central banks and private banks have to work together to construct permissive
frameworks for innovation, risk and profitability control in changing monetary systems.
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 63
Recommendations
Amidst the looming occurrence of an economic crisis, there is a need to take measures
that will help in curbing the likelihood of such occurrence. There are various ways in which low-
interest rates could be controlled to avoid affecting banks which are important players in
transmitting monetary policy and other crucial monetary issues. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p.387)
suggests that one of these ways is by monitoring the effects that such changes on interest-rate
policies produce on the banks’ behavior. When this is done, it ensures that banks are able to
maintain a reasonable and useful net worth. Therefore, such a measure could reduce the
possibility of experiencing financial problems in the economy through the banks.
The other recommendation that could help in avoiding a financial crisis is ensuring that
the current low-interest rates remain steady. Kiley and Roberts (2017, p.390) states that the
Federal Reserve or the Central Bank should ensure that the current interest rates are not hiked too
fast due to the fear of a financial crisis because it will still trigger another financial crisis. It is
logical to keep the current interest rates because it not only encourages investors, but it also
stimulates the economy. However, it should not stay low for too long to avoid the economy
plunging into stagnation. Therefore, increase interest rates at relatively lower percentages and
speed, will ensure a financial crisis does not occur and it also stimulates economic growth as
investors will not have fears of engaging in business endeavors.
Conclusion
The staggering interconnectedness of the global financial system makes financial stability
a complex issue that takes more than just the adaptive actions of an individual nation on fiscal
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 64
and interest-rate policies, responsible banking actions, and self-sustained global coordination to
fiscal discipline. More than politics and economics, banking discipline governance that
synchronizes global banking with sustainable fiscal needs to accompany monetary regulator
provided all governance borders are crossed. Avoiding the risk of policy loops that can sparked a
new global economic catastrophe also warns that profits during aggressive interest phases have
to be balanced with rate of pay that defends the principles of soft funds. Inedited shocks to the
economy when rate of pay increases drastically, just as the interest rate environment falls on the
other end of the spectrum, reaches the soft band where the money is not disallowed, connect with
more silence during syncopated exposure of monetary governance. Finally, not all region
intentions are self-sufficient and all excess governance borders crossed are temporary soft phases
that only the controller of the Nation can with President's or the other type of his funds identify
as global payment deficits also feuds level. The analysis concludes, however, along the
innovation borders of the loops southern you set out the common turn region, blocked circuits,
reserve funds and counter systems have to run out of soft funding as credits that can be shielded
are more.
The financial crisis of 2007-2008, was one of the biggest disasters not only to the United
States but also to other countries across the world. For the various research findings contained in
this paper, it was clear that fluctuations in interest rates are a major cause of a future financial
crisis. It is because the past financial crises were caused by low or high-interest rates, which with
the current low-interest rates, causes concern on the likelihood of the occurrence of another
financial crisis. Financial crises affect households, investors, the government and even financial
institutions. Therefore, the best thing to do is to ensure that fluctuations in interest rates are
steady to avoid triggering a crisis. Finally, by monitoring the effects that changes on the interest-
Fluctuating Interest Rates Will Cause a Financial Crisis in Future 65
rate policies produce on the banks’ behavior, ensures that banks are able to maintain a reasonable
and useful net worth.
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