Chapter I Introduction Theorizing the Political and Economic

Why are some countries developed while others are not? Are there any societies that have

mastered the winning formula for socioeconomic progress? Social scientists have pursued such

questions for decades, resulting in extensive academic literature without conclusive answers.

Noble prize-winning economist Douglas North and his co-authors took on this question. They

argued that the key to this puzzle lies in the institutional arrangements designed to control

violence in any society. Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb, and Barry R.

Weingast introduced this conceptual framework in 2007. It went through additional development

in the book Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded

Human History, published in 2009. North et al. explored this theory further in another article in

2011 and applied the framework to nine developing countries in a new book published in 2013.

Theorizing the political and economic changes that societies experienced throughout

human history is undoubtedly a formidable task. However, such systematic knowledge is critical

to better understand and improve our realities. In a world obsessed with economic growth,

creating theoretical frameworks to tackle sustainable development problems is even more

essential. The primary purpose of this thesis centers on one question: how can the conceptual

framework of violence and social order be improved to expand our understanding of

development? This thesis identifies two areas of improvement within this framework: first, by

reconceptualizing violence, and second, by integrating the extent of personalism in political

parties as critical determinants for categorizing social order. Furthermore, this thesis contends

that the state’s extensive capability to control violence and the personalized nature of political

processes can impede citizens’ freedom and rights.

In this chapter, I first introduce the research problem and objectives. The second section

explains the importance of studying this framework, and the third section outlines the thesis.

Statement of the Problem and Research Objectives

According to the conceptual framework of North et al. (2009) (hereafter NWW), politics

and economics examine development by focusing on one system only, either democracy or the

markets (110). This can be a problematic approach as various combinations of political,

economic, and socio-cultural factors impact development conditions. NWW does not fixate on

economic growth but emphasizes a state’s overall ability to control violence as the essential

precondition for development (Hesse 2015). The authors rightly recognized that there is no

foolproof process for social progress; instead, it is a constant, dynamic process of adapting to

changes. NWW provided insights into how societies adapt to these changes with the support of

organizational and institutional structures. NWW is a bold attempt since it examines the

evolution of development in recorded human history. However, any extensive conceptual work is

bound to have some deficiencies. NWW framework distinguishes countries based on how

successfully they foster competition, limit violence, and allow citizens access to political and

economic organizations. Based on these conditions, they categorize countries as open access and

limited access societies.

According to this theory, open access societies are better suited to ensure these conditions

than limited access societies. A myriad of formal and informal organizations and institutions help

open access societies to better control violence and adapt to external shocks, which is why they

advance politically and economically. However, since the authors first introduced this concept,

the political and economic dynamics of the world have undergone significant changes. The 2008

financial crisis, the emergence of China as a superpower, the expansion of personalism within

political parties, the rise of populist leaders, and the Covid-19 pandemic are a few of the many

events which have altered global politics and economies since this concept first appeared in

2007.

This thesis aims to refine and enhance the NWW framework in the renewed global

context. Specifically, this thesis seeks to develop a more nuanced understanding of violence and

its expression through personalist politics in societies. Studying this framework can provide

insights into how social institutions and power structures perpetuate violence, allowing us to

work towards creating more just and equitable societies.

Why Study the Conceptual Framework on Violence and Social Order?

The conceptual framework of violence and social order is an established and widely

recognized theory in academic literature. Its emphasis on the role of institutions in societies

positions it as a critical concept in social science, particularly in New Institutional Economics

(NIE). The academic reputation of North, Wallis, and Weingast certainly enhances the

framework’s significance in NIE literature. However, it is essential to clarify the importance of

studying this topic to emphasize the relevance of this thesis. Therefore, this section will outline

the rationale behind exploring the conceptual framework of violence and social order,

highlighting two significant points.

Influence of New Institutional Economics (NIE) on Global Developmental Agenda

The influence of New Institutional Economics (NIE) on the global policy-setting agenda

has been paramount. It underscores the importance of social, legal, and political institutions in

economic growth and development. NIE is highly intradisciplinary and has influenced many

development policy discussions, prompted numerous academic publications, and even gathered

four Nobel Prizes in economics (Legiedź 2020; Menyashev et al. 2011; Ménard and Shirley

2014; Schneider and Nega 2016). Supplanting the neo-liberal Washington consensus, the NIE

concepts of good governance, the rule of law, and the primacy of institutions have taken

precedence in the policy prescriptions of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and

other international development organizations (Tamanaha 2015; Burki and Perry 1998; Dutraive

2009).

NIE-inspired institutional reform conditions have become an integral part of the policy

prescriptions of international financial organizations and aid agencies. One World Bank report

noted that since 2011 “1 in every 2 World Bank projects included a thematic focus on

institutional reform,” and they appeared “in more than $50 billion worth of World Bank

sponsored projects between 2006 and 2011” (Bridges and Woolcock 2017, 4). Nevertheless,

despite the billions of dollars spent on this cause, institutional reform for good governance in

developing countries remains elusive because patron-client relationships and corruption embed

themselves in the politics of developing countries (Uberti 2016). The organizational nature of

political parties can indicate the extent of patron-client relationships in society. For example, a

personalist political party can be based on patronage and clientelism (Ansell and Fish 1999).

Therefore, international development and aid organizations should consider the level of

personalism in political parties of aid recipient countries for efficient execution of institutional

reforms.

Economic growth and development are not isolated phenomena but are strongly

connected with culture, history, law, religion, military, and politics. NIE highlights the dynamism

and interconnectedness between political and economic processes in society (Furubotn and

Richter 2005; Tamanaha 2015) and, therefore, is perhaps better suited to explain economic

development. Designed by Douglas North, the founding father of NIE, and his coauthors, the

NWW framework advances the core NIE concepts like the importance of organizations and

institutions, beliefs, and property rights in relation to violence. It also marks a breakaway from

North’s previous recommendations on institutional reform for developing countries emulating the

Western liberal political and economic model (Gray 2015, 71). NWW acknowledged that

institutional reform prescriptions might not produce the same developmental results for different

countries.

That is why NWW recommended evaluating the unique socioeconomic power dynamics

underlying the institutional arrangement of society and economic development. The

understanding of institutional arrangement is incomplete without incorporating power and power

relations (Manioudis and Meramveliotakis 2021). Besides, the extractive and inclusive nature of

political and economic institutions can significantly impact the development trajectory of a state

(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Moreover, the NWW framework helps to explore what

configuration of these political and economic institutions can trigger (in)stability in any country

(Ademmer, Langbein, and Borzel 2020, 205).

Similar to the NIE core concepts, the NWW framework has also influenced global

development policy dialogues. For example, the framework for increasing institutional resilience

and violence mitigation in the 2011 World Development Report was inspired by the NWW

framework (World Bank 2011; Gray 2015). The implications of the NWW conceptual framework

in NIE literature and global development policy discussion are profound. Therefore, a refinement

of the NWW framework is essential due to the overwhelming influence of NIE in international

development discourse.

The Development Conundrum: Stability and Growth Versus Limited Freedom

The importance of stability for economic development is undeniable. The question is,

however, to what extent should individual freedom be given up to maintain stability in the

country? While the NWW theory offers a broader understanding of development, it can also be

misused. For example, the authors noted that “peace depends on the balance of interests created

by the rent-creation process” (NWW 2009, 20). Such arguments could be misappropriated to

support corruption as long as economic growth prevails. States can also exploit NWW’s

emphasis on maintaining stability as a requirement for development. Additionally, the

implication that economic openness and high institutional capacity (administrative and legal) is a

precondition for political openness is problematic, which Snyder (2010) aptly summarized as

below:

“This is both good and bad news for efficient authoritarian regimes on the Chinese

model. On the one hand, it implies that the outside world should tolerate China’s orderly

elite consensus as a step toward maturing its natural state and preparing the doorstep

conditions for a transition to an open-access system. On the other hand, it implies that

economic growth will be unsustainable unless the Chinese elites agree sooner or later to

step across that threshold” (288-89).

China has consistently defended its governance model, but recently it has taken a firmer position

by officially conceptualizing its governance as a “democracy that works” (The State Council

Information Office of the People’s Republic of China 2021). Unsurprisingly, this model

emphasizes peace, stability, continued growth, and consolidated state power.

While the Western liberal democratic model is not flawless, the Chinese model is also

deeply problematic as it entrusts absolute power to the state. The developmental journeys of

Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea also show that economic development can happen in an

illiberal political context. These success stories have strengthened new developmentalism,

especially in emerging economies, which endorse the primacy of the state for rapid

industrialization and economic redistribution (Trubek et al. 2013; Döring, Santos, and Pocher

2017; Warburton 2018; Chatterjee 2022). Developmental states lie between liberal states and

statism, which characterizes a combination of capitalist political and economic organizations to

drive economic growth (Bresser-Pereira 2019). This dynamic of political and economic

organizations complementing each other with the sole objective of economic growth is similar to

the NWW idea of double balance, where political and economic organizations mutually support

each other to ensure stability. The statism in new developmentalism resembles the NWW

rationale for the state’s violence control capability. With increasing Chinese influence, this

approach can trigger an ideological reorientation of the global political-economic order.

Therefore, the original NWW framework should consider the implications of circumstances

where political and economic openness is not concurrent.

Except for a few cases, most modern states have a monopoly over violence, often at the

expense of individual freedom and liberty. The stateness indicator in Bertelsmann Stiftung’s

Transformation Index (BTI) shows that most countries have high internal cohesion and state

control over violence. Besides, the emergence of digital technology has changed how violence is

organized and carried out. For example, social media can incite violent acts and damage public

assets. As a result, the state’s violence control capabilities require a broader understanding today.

Digital repression in the name of limiting violence has become pervasive across the globe. Fear

culture and self-censorship in the virtual world are forms of psychological violence that restrict

individual liberty. This thesis is significant in this context as it critically explores the

development conundrum with a comprehensive understanding of violence and freedom in a

contemporary digital society.

In summary, the fundamental significance of this research work lies in its potential to

improve critical theoretical work in NIE literature and global development policy discourse.

Thesis Outline

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the context of the

research. The second chapter describes the major points from the original NWW framework and

reviews relevant literature. The third chapter discusses the theoretical framework for this thesis

by describing relevant terms and concepts, followed by a chapter on the research methodology.

This chapter explains the logic of adopting the case-study method to fulfill the research objective

of refining NWW theory and operationalizing relevant concepts. It also describes the contextual

considerations for selecting China as a case. The fifth chapter applies the refined

conceptualization of violence and personalist political parties in the case of China. Lastly, chapter

six summarizes the major findings of the thesis in a critical reflection on personalist politics and

violence in the digital era that ties together the discussion of the previous chapters.

CHAPTER II: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDER

The principal objective of this thesis is to critically examine the NWW framework,

identify its weaknesses, and create an improved understanding of the NWW framework. As such,

this chapter first focuses on introducing NWW and clarifying relevant terminologies in the

original framework. Next, it provides a literature review and identifies the contribution of this

thesis to the existing literature. This study contributes to the NWW literature by incorporating an

extensive understanding of violence and personalism in political parties.

Introducing the NWW Framework

NWW framework explores the complex interrelationship between the role of institutions

in limiting violence and promoting political and economic developments of societies. This

conceptual framework includes violence, organizations, institutions, and beliefs (North et al.

2009, 2). NWW defined social order as a mechanism of structuring institutions and organizations

in society. These organizations shape social interactions, norms, and behaviors and eventually

limit violence within society. The authors identified three types of social orders in human history.

The first one, the foraging order, has the characteristics of hunter-gatherer societies and preceded

the other two social orders.

Limited access order (LAO) or natural state is human history’s most enduring social

order. Throughout past centuries, empires, kingdoms, and states have maintained LAO societies,

while open access order (OAO) emerged in a few societies in the 19th century. Afghanistan, the

Philippines, Bangladesh, China, and India are a few examples of countries with LAO. OAO

examples include the USA, Japan, Canada, and other countries. According to North et al. (2009),

only “25 countries and 15 percent of the world’s population live in open access societies today;

the other 175 countries and 85 percent live in natural states” (p. xii). The underlying motivations

of LAO societies throughout history were to manipulate “the economy to produce rent, motivate

stability and reduce violence” (North et al. 2012, 6).

In LAOs, access to organizations is restricted, and personal connections are critical in

securing positions in the rent-seeking coalition. Power in LAOs is distributed based on social

identities and hierarchies. On the other hand, OAOs support access to organizations and political

and economic competition, which are facilitated by impersonal norms and institutional

regulations. In this framework, the “state is an organization of organizations” (North et al. 2009,

31). However, OAOs typically have a higher number of civilian organizations than LAOs. The

authors also point out that institutions and organizations exist in both limited and open access

societies but can deliver different outcomes. For example, the institution of election produces

different results in LAO and OAO countries (North et al. 2009, 15). In OAO countries, elections

can ensure accountability and representative democracy, whereas, in LAO countries, incumbents

can use it as a tool to strengthen power and legitimacy.

These two types of social orders also contrast in how they regulate violence. Both

societies have dominant coalitions comprising political, economic, religious, and military elites.

In LAOs, elites have greater access to resources, property rights, and organizations. Violence can

reduce the rent generated through these opportunities. The threats of rent reduction prompt them

to cooperate and limit violence. Consequently, they form the ruling coalition by establishing

control over state institutions, rent-generating resources, and rent distribution. Enhanced elite

cooperation helps increase rent, which is later distributed among individuals based on personal

ties, and thus a mutually benefiting patron-client network is established. Out of the dynamic of

elite cooperation emerges a double balance, which North et al. (2009) defined as “a

correspondence between the distribution and organization of violence potential and political

power on the one hand, and the distribution and organization of economic power on the other

hand” (20). The double balance provides stability, but it is not always permanent.

In LAOs, for example, elites can always resort to violence if the rent distribution is

unequal. As such, LAOs are always vulnerable to instability and violence due to the

noninstitutionalized nature of the elite agreement. Again, LAOs can also vary in their abilities to

support organizations outside the state and control violence. North et al. (2011) provided a

spectrum of limited access order societies, shown in Table 01. Firstly, in a fragile LAO, the

violence capacity lies among different groups outside the state. In a basic LAO, either

authoritarian or competitive clientelist, violence capacity is largely controlled by the state. This

type of country also heavily controls political and economic opportunities.

Table 01: LAO and OAO Spectrum (North et al. 2011)

Type (Examples)

Economic

Organizations (EOs)

Political

Organizations (POs)

Violence Capacity

(VC)

Fragile LAO

(Afghanistan, DR

Congo, Haiti,

Mozambique 1980s

EOs and POs are not clearly distinguishable,

except perhaps for multi-national firms

present in fragile LAOs.

All organizations

have VC. Civilian and

military are not

clearly distinguished.

Basic LAO—

Authoritarian (USSR,

Korea with military

government, Mexico

1940s-80s)

All major EOs—

public or “private”—

are linked with the

central state; some

are also with

multinationals

Most POs are

controlled by the

state, e.g., a one-party

state or dictatorship.

Opposition parties are

under threat.

Most VC

organizations are part

of the state, yet some

may compete with or

threaten the civilian

state.

Basic LAO—

Competitive

Clientelist

(Philippines,

Bangladesh, and

Zambia, since the

early 1990s

Some private firms,

some multi-nationals.

Political connections

are needed for major

economic success.

Competing POs, but

effective power is

dependent on central

permission.

Most VC

organizations are part

of the state, yet some

may compete with or

threaten the civilian

state.

Table 01 Continues

Table 01 Continued

Mature LAO

(Mexico since the

1990s, Chile since

1990, India, China)

Many private firms

and multinationals.

Political connections

are needed for major

economic success in

the face of informal

mechanisms of limits.

Multiple POs, but

effective power is

dependent on central

permission. The

democratic process, if

present, cannot

challenge major

economic powers.

The state controls

almost all VC.

OAO

(Western Europe,

USA, Canada, Japan,

S. Korea)

Most are private.

Non-discriminatory

rules exist for citizens

to start an EO and get

state legal support.

Non-discriminatory

entry rules exist for

any citizens to start or

join a PO.

No non-state

organizations have

VC.

Next, in the mature LAO, the state has almost complete control of violence, but ties to the

ruling coalition are still critical in gaining access to political and economic organizations. Unlike

fragile and basic LAOs, a mature LAO has more enduring organizations and allows free entry to

these organizations. Another necessary logic of LAO is that this type of social order is not static,

and countries can progress or regress within the spectrum in the face of internal and external

shocks. The NWW framework also identifies a few conditions that enable LAOs to transition to

OAO.

These conditions are labeled as the doorstep conditions: the rule of law, long-established

organizations, including state and various public and private organizations, and civil-political

control over the military. These three conditions are mutually reinforcing and materialize out of

an elite agreement that impersonal rules and intra-elite competition will better serve the interests

of the ruling coalition. According to North et al. (2012), open access is institutionalized through

substantial political, legal, and economic changes at the tipping point of transition. Consequently,

mature LAOs cross the threshold and transition to OAO societies.

In OAOs, the state monopolizes authority over violence, and security organizations such

as the military and police remain under civilian control. Organizations outside the state check the

state’s illegitimate use of violence, and economic actors prevent the political system from

controlling economic competition. The political system’s ability to use violence is also

constrained by the different political actors competing for state power. These additional

constraints to reduce violence are embedded within institutions and organizations. As such,

nonviolent political and economic competition is possible in OAO countries.

NWW also argued that the logic of OAO accommodates principles of ‘creative

destruction’ and equality by allowing everyone accesses to organizations based on impersonal

norms and rules. OAOs can sustain non-violent competition due to the prevalence of such

impersonal norms as opposed to LAOs, and thus experience greater stability that supports

economic development. Both societies generate rent, but OAOs are less likely to manipulate

rent-generating resources. To summarize, OAOs can reduce violence and promote competition

because economic, political, and social actors can act freely to protect their interests and

constrain each other when necessary.

Literature Review

Many researchers have used NWW to study the development journeys of different

countries, and Table 02 summarizes a list of such academic works. A few of these studies also

identified circumstances where the development course of some countries differed from NWW

conditions. For example, Reckendrees (2015) demonstrated that the political organizations, the

majority electorate, or the dominant coalition might paradoxically choose to limit access.

Economic organizations might not counteract maintaining political openness as long as economic

openness is not affected. Again, Kuditchar (2019) and Grimmer-Solem (2015) demonstrated the

dynamics of open economic access and limited political access with cases of South Korea,

Imperial Germany, and Meiji-era Japan. These critiques are particularly relevant considering the

development success of countries like China, Singapore, and Vietnam, where economic and

political competition is not mutually reinforcing. This framework has also been applied to

investigate development problems, such as corruption, by international development

organizations like the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

(MungiuPippidi et al. 2011)

Most of these works are qualitative, given the difficulties in developing a viable empirical

model with large-N cross-country analysis to test NWW theory (Kapstein 2014). But empirical

operationalization of NWW core concepts like violence is essential to use this framework in

applied research (Stefanic 2011).

Table 02: Application of NWW Framework in Academic Literature

Case/Country

Author(s) and Year

United States, France, and Britain

North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009)

Tunisia

Wegner, Heinrich-Mechergui and Mechergui

(2013)

Bangladesh

Khan (2013)

Maharashtra and West Bengal of India

Roy (2013)

Iran and Turkey

Esfahani and Gürakar (2014)

Dominican Republic and Haiti

Frankema and Masé (2014)

Germany

Modern

Hesse (2015)

Interwar Period

Reckendrees (2015)

Imperial Period

Grimmer-Solem (2015)

South Korea

Mo and Weingast (2013), You (2013),

Kuditchar (2019)

Pakistan

Rehman (2015)

Table 02 Continues

Table 02 Continued

North Korea

Weston (2016)

Northern and Southern Italy

Di Martino, Felice, and Vasta (2017)

Russia

Kluge (2017), Flikke (2021)

Taiwan

Legiedź (2018)

Bangladesh and India

Sarker and Khalid (2018)

Ghana

Kuditchar (2019)

Hybrid Regimes

Ademmer, Langbein, and Borzel (2020)

Mozambique

Mairoce, Silberberger and Zweynert (2021)

Carolingian empire

Young (2021)

Although North et al. (2009) claimed NWW as a fundamentally new approach in social

science analysis, critics have argued that it embodies classic liberal ideals and rational choice

bias (Bates 2010; Gray 2015; Hickey 2013). Again, NWW primarily conceptualizes violence as

organized violence that encompasses threats and acts of physical violence (North et al. 2009, 14).

When the consequence of violence is instability in society, it indicates the destructive nature of

violent activities. However, the conceptual parameter of violence, conflict, and security has

expanded beyond physical attacks in the age of technology (Brantly 2017; Egloff and Shires

2021; Van Puyvelde and Brantly 2019). In this context, states are equally vigilant about digital

and cyber security in addition to controlling traditional violence capacities.

Violence is a multidimensional phenomenon. Violence and attacks using digital tools can

cause instability within a country, and at the same time, the state can also use technology as a

tool of repression (Gohdes 2020; Gunitsky 2015; Sullivan and Davenport 2018). Digital

repression in the name of limiting violence has become widespread worldwide. Fear culture and

self-censorship in the virtual world are forms of psychological and cultural violence that restrict

individual liberty. In emphasizing the importance of the state’s capacity to control violence for

stability and economic development, its ability to perpetrate structural violence has been ignored.

States and political parties can exert direct and institutional violence (Riaz 2019). There is a lack

of scholarly work focused on reconceptualizing the concept of violence under this framework.

Therefore, NWW theory can be improved by expanding the discussion of violence.

Besides, the concept of development in recent decades has expanded beyond economic

growth. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) does not entirely reflect how economic development

benefits people. As such, academics and practitioners of development studies increasingly

emphasize the importance of expanding people’s capabilities and overall well-being as

development outcomes. In this context, Sen’s concept of development focused on expanding the

freedom and capabilities of individuals is notable. His idea of development is expansive.

According to Sen (1999), development should increase opportunities for individuals to

pursue a life of their choice. He considers political freedom and civil liberties, such as freedom of

speech, press, and association, paramount to enhancing economic development. He has also

argued against the ‘Lee Thesis’ — named after the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan

Yew — which maintains that restricting political and civil rights can help promote economic

development (Sen, 1999:15). Similar to NWW, Sen's development theory also essentially

embodies Western values of freedom, capitalism, and market economy. Nonetheless, his theory

has inspired transformation in development discourse and has been instrumental in designing

UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI). From this comprehensive view, development

outcomes should enhance individual well-being. In a similar vein, personal wellbeing should also

go beyond the absence of physical violence. Relating economic development to restraining

organized violence and threats of physical violence prevents a comprehensive conceptualization

of development.

While OAO societies may be better equipped to handle external shocks due to their

formal and informal organizations, LAOs have also shown comparable capabilities, as

demonstrated by China’s response to the 2008 financial crisis (Hartzell 2010). Again, the

suggestion that OAOs prioritize inclusion, equality, and impersonality is debatable. Income

inequality has risen, and social mobility has declined in OECD countries despite institutional

stability (OECD 2021). This suggests that discrimination still exists within OAOs. Moreover,

OAOs may not always represent citizens’ interests, as pluralist politics can be biased toward

certain groups (Bates 2010). The lack of effective policies addressing inequality implies a lack of

elite commitment to prioritize impersonal rules, blurring the line between OAOs and LAOs. In

this context, the NWW theory can benefit from analyzing the patterns of impersonality within the

political settlement and elite agreement underpinning the social order.

Political parties are critical organizations in any society. Academic research shows that

the strength of political parties is related to long-term development (Bizzarro et al. 2018). NWW

also identified political parties as important social organizations; however, their discussion of

political parties was underdeveloped. Bates (2010) also pointed out the failure of NWW to

examine political parties as a long-lasting organization of societies (755). In their subsequent

work, North et al. (2013) emphasized the tendency of personal ties in political organizations and

the ruling coalition of the lower-spectrum LAOs. However, the implications of the personalistic

nature of political parties did not advance further. Political parties are vital agents that shape the

political settlement of society, which in turn impacts stability. Similar to NIE literature, the

NWW framework emphasizes the importance of political institutions in economic development.

However, NIE discussions on political institutions primarily center on the electoral system (Cox

2008), government types (Carey 2008), and legislative processes (McCubbins 2005). Therefore,

both the NIE literature and the NWW framework can benefit significantly from a comprehensive

discussion of political parties, considering their relevance in economic development.

Like limited access order, personalist leadership is perhaps history’s most enduring

leadership type. From Aristotle and Machiavelli to Laswell (1930) and Weber (1947), scholars

have explored personalism in political leadership. Emperors, kings, and presidents have

repeatedly attempted to establish absolute loyalty from the elites and masses. Although

personalism in politics is not new, it has not been studied extensively in NIE literature.

Personalistic political parties, or non-partisan parties (Ignazi 1996), do not emerge from the

traditional elite consensus in society, have a weak organizational structure, rely on a clientelist

network, and function as a vehicle for the personal aspirations of the leader (Gunther and

Diamond 2003). The level of personalism can be a helpful indicator of understanding the

institutional strength of a political organization. Academic research has shown that personalism is

low in highly institutionalized political parties (Mény 1990; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005;

Kostadinova and Levitt 2014).

Moreover, in contrast to the NWW assumption, greater economic competition has not

supported political competition or the institutionalization of impersonal rules in political parties

worldwide. Rather, personalism is increasing in democracies and authoritarian countries

(Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2017). Hungary, Poland, China, Bangladesh, Russia, and

Turkey are contemporary examples of increasing personalistic politics. The governance style of

former President Donald Trump also indicates threats of personalism in U.S. politics (Frantz et

al. 2021). Furthermore, hegemonic political parties in Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros 2013), personalistic

political parties in the Philippines (Montinola 2013), and Pakistan (Rehman 2015) show that such

political organizations can perpetuate LAO conditions by avoiding political accountability.

The rise of personalism in political parties can further intensify LAO conditions, as it

features a fragmented elite coalition, less horizontal accountability, and a weaker rule of law

(Rhodes-Purdy and Madrid 2020). The increasing personalization of political parties threatens to

undermine the rule of law, traditional elite coalitions, and political accountability. Put differently,

personalism in political parties can cause the OAO to regress and prevent the LAO from

progressing. In this context, studying personalization in political parties can help to better

understand the political settlement that underpins OAO and LAO societies.

In summary, the literature review demonstrates that many academic studies have applied

the NWW framework to analyze the development and related socio-economic phenomena.

However, there is a lack of scholarly works that critically examine the fundamental elements and

characteristics of the NWW social order at length. Thus, this research contributes to the existing

NWW-related literature by providing a more comprehensive conceptualization of violence.

Besides, the discussion about the role of institutions in driving economic growth is central to

both NIE and developmental state literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010; Haggard 2003;

Bresser-Pereira 2019). The literature review and the introduction of this thesis highlight the

dangers of overly emphasizing institutions and resulting in growth-centric developmental state

arguments. An increased level of personalization in political organizations can only exacerbate

this problem. This thesis also finds an opportunity to contribute to the NIE literature by

extending the discussion on political organization with a specific focus on the personalization

within a political party. By identifying and addressing a gap in the NIE literature, this thesis

offers novel insights and potential avenues for future research. In short, this thesis delves deeper

into the complex relationship of violence, personalist politics, and development narrative in

contemporary societies. By doing so, it explores a complex relationship between violence

perpetration by personalistic politics under the disguise of development narratives.

CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to introduce and implement various concepts relevant to the proposed

research agenda. The original NWW framework views violence as organized violence and

recognizes that states’ dominance over violence capacity organizations is conducive to long-term

stability and development. The NWW concept of organized violence entails threats and actions

of violence by groups. Again, NWW did not offer a substantial discussion on political parties,

despite acknowledging their importance as an institution in society. This chapter first focuses on

a comprehensive conceptualization of violence that sheds light on its more complex nature and

manifestation in the contemporary world. Next, it discusses personalist patterns in political

parties, which have been increasing in both democratic and non-democratic countries.

Conceptualizing Violence: Minimalist and Comprehensive Approach

Violence is an inescapable phenomenon in human history. From Heraclitus, Plato, and

Aristotle to Hobbes, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, and Arendt in the modern ages, philosophers

and scholars have critically studied violence from different vantage points (Mider 2013;

Malešević 2010; Bufacchi 2005). Conceptualizing violence is challenging, as it has many

variations, qualities, and consequences (Heitmeyer and Hagan 2003, 3). Different branches of

science have studied violence, and as such, its definition can depend on disciplinarian traditions

and paradigms (Van der Dennen, 1980). When discussing violence, scholars consider “what type

of the use of force, by whom and against whom or what” and how violence manifests itself

(Mider 2013, 703).

A Minimalist Conception of Violence (MCV) emphasizes the use of forces that causes

injury or suffering (Bufacchi 2007; Grundy and Weinstein 1974; Coady 1986). Such discussions

on violence also consider using force based on legal and legitimate authority (Hartogs and Artzt

1970; Macfarlane 1974; Taylor 1991; Sederberg 1994). Mider (2013) argued that emphasis on

the legality and legitimacy of violence is a restrictive approach to the definition of violence

because it considers the legitimate use of violence as a necessity to prevent disorder in society

(Grundy and Weinstein 1974).

The definition of violence in the NWW framework focuses on organized violence that

contains threats and actions of violence by groups (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 14). The

authors also emphasized the state’s ability to prevent the illegitimate use of violence to maintain

stability. In their work, the state’s consolidated or dispersed control over the legitimate use of

violence distinguishes OAO from LAO. As such, the NWW conceptualization of violence is also

a form of political violence as it entails threats or actions of violence by groups and the state’s

ability to bring these groups under control (Weiss, Newman, and Abraham 2010, 11-12). While

there can be various types of political violence, the NWW concept of violence is concerned with

a type of political violence where non-state groups are the principal actors. However, the state

can be an actor of violence when it engages with violence against citizens. For example,

institutional violence is a type of political violence, which is more directly associated with the

state (Riaz 2019, 21). In this type of violence, state or social institutions are used to perpetrate

violence. This dimension of state’s role in violence is not addressed in the NWW framework.

The NWW conceptualization of a state’s capacity to control violence differs from the

Weberian approach in theorizing the state. According to the Weberian assumption, the state is a

single coercive organization. In contrast, NWW understands the state as an organization of

organizations where the state has consolidated control over violence capacity. There is an

incentive structure with interlocking political, economic, and social organizations that work to

discourage group violence. However, central to both definitions is the state’s consolidated control

over the capacity of violence. State’s consolidated control over violence is critical, especially

when non-state actors threaten the stability and security within the country by enacting violent

activities. However, states can also be an actor of violence by engaging in violence against the

citizens (Riaz 2019, 17). Therefore, NWW’s concept of violence is essentially a restrictive or

minimalist approach emphasizing organized violence and the state’s consolidated power over

violence capacity. In contrast, a broader definition of violence prioritizes the scope of violation of

an individual’s physical or mental integrity over the legal basis of the perpetrator’s or victim’s

identity (Mider 2013).

The Comprehensive Conception of Violence (CCV) goes beyond physical injuries and

incorporates the violence’s psychological, structural, and cultural dimensions (Bufacchi 2005;

Audi 1971; Gatlung 1969, 1990). This expansive definition considers violence as a violation,

which means infringing, encroaching, and interfering with rights or norms (Bufacchi 2005).

Garver (1973) theorized that an individual possesses two inalienable rights: rights to the body

and rights to autonomy. This expansive view of violence can be difficult to comprehend due to its

complex nature. However, it is relevant considering the importance of individual freedom and the

right to dignity in modern societies. For example, contemporary Western societies censure

actions that cause mental and psychological harm to individuals (such as hate speech), and their

political practices and legislation also reflect these disapprovals (Mider 2013). Abusive and

humiliating words can affect psychological well-being. So, any activities that undermine

individual dignity and freedom could be considered violent if we believe violence is a violation

(Degenaar 1980).

Again, the CCV also encompasses the concept of structural and cultural violence.

Norwegian scholar Johan Galtung developed these concepts in 1969 and 1990, respectively. In

contrast to organized violence, structural and cultural violence is systemic and not readily

discernible. These two concepts are pertinent as this thesis aims to refine the NWW framework

with a more nuanced understanding of violence in the contemporary context.

Structural violence stems from systemic barriers that obstruct people from accessing

political and economic resources. Such barriers can impede individuals from fulfilling

fundamental rights and achieving societal equality. In addition, structural violence can cause

direct violence by deepening discrimination (Winter and Leighton 2001). In situations

concerning structural violence, institutions and social structures also compel people to follow

specific patterns (Mider 2013, 705). Structural violence is a type of political violence as it

engages institutions to perpetrate violence (Riaz 2019, 21). An example of structural violence is

limited access to economic opportunities for all citizens. One of the distinguishing features of

LAO and OAO in NWW is the ability of people to form and participate in political and economic

organizations. Therefore, the NWW framework should consider the concept of structural

violence as it can improve the analysis of the ability to access political and economic resources in

LAO and OAO.

Galtung’s (1990) concept of cultural violence represents actions normalizing physical and

structural violence. In other words, cultural violence legitimizes, justifies, or standardizes various

acts of direct and structural violence (Mider 2013). There are multiple ways in which cultural

violence can legitimize and normalize behaviors, norms, and values. For example, symbolic

violence, introduced by Bourdieu (2002), is a form of oppressive domination by a group over

another group in society (Mamzer 2012). This type of violence includes actions to force specific

universal standards by one group over everyone. Bourdieu (2002) identified different

mechanisms (e.g., social categorization, language) and institutions (e.g., educational, and legal)

focused on propagating values and legitimizing the existing order in society. Symbolic violence

involves an inconspicuous, even informal, or casual, mode of domination, which often operates

in everyday politics of life (Topper 2001). For example, disseminating derogatory words

targeting any gender, racial or ethnic group to normalize or rationalize their subjugation is a form

of symbolic violence. Such type of violence is deeply entrenched in society through a network of

institutions. Nevertheless, it remains unacknowledged by many influential theories of institutions

(Topper 2001). Again, ideological violence is also very closely related to cultural violence.

Ideological violence, a type of political violence, is when a group uses violence to promote a

particular social and political agenda (Riaz 2019, 21). For example, if a political party uses

violence to disseminate and establish its political agenda in society then it can be considered

ideological or cultural violence.

Another significant type of violence in modern times is iconic violence, a concept by the

Polish author Agnieszka Ogonowska (2004). Iconic violence is a process of intentional

construction of audio-visual texts targeted to influence consumers. In the era of digital media and

the internet, this concept holds great significance. Iconic violence is not simply a manipulation of

opinion. It is a process where the consumer is a passive recipient of specially designed products

with specific values and meanings (Mider 2013). Dominant groups can use such mechanisms to

propagate norms and legitimize a favorable social order. This process also signifies how an

institution, such as the media, can become an instrument of social control (Ogonowska 2004). It

is extremely difficult to capture the psychological impact of iconic violence on people. However,

such an implicit and imperceptible form of control is relevant now, considering the extent of

online and media surveillance by the state and the use of the internet to propagate specific

propaganda.

Figure 1 Conceptualization of Violence: Minimalist and Comprehensive Definition

Manifestation of Violence: Oppressive and Repressive Forms

One primary focus of the political violence literature is violence committed by the state.

Violence by the state can manifest itself either in an oppressive or repressive form (Beger and

Hill 2019). Different types of direct and physical violence, such as torture, cruel punishments,

disappearances, executions, and imprisonment, are examples of oppressive violence by the state

(Haschke 2017). Some scholars also identify state violence unrelated to political motives as

oppressive violence (Bissell et al., 1978). However, most studies on political violence in the past

few decades have principally focused on the repressive nature of state violence. deMeritt (2016)

defined repression as a form of coercion. States can use force to prevent violence and

Minimalist

Conception of

Violence (MCV)

Direct/ Physical Violen

(

Legalist Definition)

Comprehensive

Conception of

Violence (CCV)

Pscyhological Violen

Structural Violence

Cultural Violence

Symbolic Violence

Iconic Violence

simultaneously apply force to suppress opposition. Repressive state violence targets political

opposition and aims to discourage or deter organized political resistance (Beger and Hill 2019;

Bissell et al., 1978; Davenport 2007a; Stohl and Lopez 1984). The state’s overt use of force can be

categorized as high-intensity repression instead of more subtle threats of force, which is lowintensity

repression (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright 2020).

In Weberian definition, the state has the legitimate authority to exert coercion. According

to NWW, in OAO, the state has consolidated power over all organizations with coercive power,

and legitimate violence capacity organizations are also under civilian control. In other words,

capacities of repression are integral parts of the state and government. The military, police,

militia, and other security forces under government control are the usual repressive agents of the

state. However, the NWW framework implies that in LAO, organizations or groups outside the

state’s power can possess repressive capacities.

States can employ repressive violence preemptively to dissuade opposition and dissenting

voices. As such, ensuring the state’s capacity to prevent violence is essential to maintain the

country’s stability. However, in this process, if a state’s cohesive power becomes a tool of

violence, it can cause violence in various forms, as discussed under the CCV definition. The

state’s violence-mitigating capacities must not transform into acts of violations that infringe on

citizens’ rights and individual freedom. Therefore, the NWW framework must carefully weigh

the blurred lines between the state’s role as a violence mitigator and perpetrator behind the

rationale of maintaining domestic stability.

Apart from threats of direct violence, states or governments can apply various

mechanisms of cultural, symbolic, and iconic violence as a form of repression. Media monitoring

and internet activity surveillance are examples of such repression. Using digital tools to carry out

repression is digital repression. Internet, social media, artificial intelligence technology, and

online versions of conventional media outlets are a few examples of digital tools. In addition,

governments, particularly in non-democratic countries, are developing preemptive repressive

strategies that reflect the mechanisms of symbolic and iconic violence, such as using social

media to disseminate government propaganda.

In fact, digital repression has become the latest tool of repression in authoritarian states

(Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright 2020). As digital technology evolves, the scope and nature

of such repression are also changing. While digital repression is low-intensity repression, it can

also lead to high-intensity repression. For example, the government’s social media monitoring

and internet data tracking can lead to the arrests of political opponents. The scope of digital

repression demonstrates that the application of state violence does not need to be direct or

physical.

Even though digital tools have joined with the conventional repressive agents of the state,

it is also critical for states to establish control over digital spaces. Digital media can cause

instability and violence. The expansion of cyber-attacks by international actors indicates the

potency of digital tools in creating chaos (Brantly 2017). Moreover, misinformation and

disinformation can generate confusion and violent turmoil in society. For instance, social media

can instigate violence against individuals or groups. In addition, various kinds of hate speech in

digital media can undermine individual dignity and freedom. Therefore, it is also crucial that

states maintain sufficient control over digital spaces to prevent violence and instability. The

NWW framework, thus, should consider the possibilities of digital technology to create

instability in society.

North and his colleagues (2009) discussed how new production technologies transformed

human societies ten thousand years ago and created violence mitigation incentives (51-54). Since

the invention of fire, the wheel, the steam engine, and the computer, the expansion of the internet

and sophisticated digital technology are the latest and perhaps the most consequential form of

technology impacting modern human societies. Therefore, discussing how the manifestation and

mitigation of violence can occur in the digital era under the NWW framework is only pertinent.

Figure 2 Manifestation of State Violence in Oppressive and Repressive (high/low) Mechanisms

Political Parties in Social Order

NWW chronicled the evolution of political parties in the US, Britain, and France. In this

framework, the authors highlighted how Western societies have grappled with a problem for two

millennia: “how to constraint a ruler who is above the law?” ( North et al. 2009, 248). Political

parties evolved in this gradual process of systemically restraining the ruler/sovereign and

minimizing threats of violence from elite factions. The institutional arrangements of competitive

political parties impact society’s long-term stability by forming elite agreements. North et al.

(2009) accurately observed that fear of factions and intra-elite conflicts are common in both LAO

and OAO societies and political parties. If the fear of factions and threats of violence in society

contributed to the evolution of political parties, what system manages the fear of factions in a

State Violence

Oppresive

(

such as torture, killing,

disappearance etc.)

Repressive

High intensity

(

such as arrests

)

Low intensity

(

such as survellience,

monitoring)

political party? Personalization in a political party can help limit internal factions within the

party. Greater power and autonomy of leaders can be useful in streamlining the party’s policy

decisions and implementation. However, a high level of personalization can also create

challenges for political parties by undermining intraparty competition as well as the

organizational nature of the party.

Since the condition of impersonality is a critical determinant in the organizational

structure or institutional arrangement of the NWW concept, it is important to develop a

substantial discussion on personalist political parties. Put differently, the discussion on

personalist political parties is relevant because the lack of impersonality in political organizations

undermines the central NWW condition of impersonality in perpetually lived organizations in the

OAO. Establishing the rule of law is one of the primary characteristics distinguishing an OAO

from an LAO. However, personalization in politics also replaces the rule of law with the rule of

man (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 65), contradicting the critical NWW conditions for OAO. In this

context, a discussion on personalism and personalization of political parties is relevant for an

improved understanding of NWW.

Personalism, personalization, and personalist political party

In the history of modern nation-states, political parties have been at the center of political

development, making them one of the most consequential institutions in any society. Political

parties are durable organizations comprising a group of citizens with similar ideals, interests, or

principles (Morese 1896). A high degree of institutionalization and organization is required in a

political party to disseminate its ideologies, mobilize citizens, and secure power. The internal

organizational strength of political parties can also impact development in the long term

(Bizzarro et al. 2018, 276). Academic research on political parties has a long pedigree, focusing

on questions of formal structure, leadership and membership in parties, candidate selection, party

regulation, and financing (Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen 2021; Husted, Moufahim, and

Fredriksson 2021). Research also exists on the increasing authority and influence of political

leaders (Passarelli 2015; Poguntke and Webb 2005) and trends of leader-centric political

activities (McAllister 2007, 2015; Cross and Blais 2012; Zittel 2015; Prusysers and Cross 2016;

Marino, Diodati, and Verzichelli 2022), which comprises the broader phenomenon of

personalization of politics (Cross, Katz, and Pruysers 2018).

From kingdoms and empires to modern nation-states, personalism has always been

present in politics to a varied degree. It is true that, in many aspects, “the personalization of

politics is as old and ubiquitous as politics itself” (Holtz-Bacha, Langer, and Merkel 2014). In the

first few decades of the twenty-first century, personalism has become one of the most prominent

political trends (Rahat and Kening 2018, 263). Personalism in politics can be defined as

individual political actors’ high visibility, importance, and prominence (Cross, Katz, and Pruysers

2018, 3).

While personalism is a phenomenon, personalization is a process. The personalization of

politics is a multidimensional concept (Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Karvonen 2010; Balmas et al.

2014; Rahat and Kening 2018; Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen 2021). This thesis identifies

personalization as a process in which the prominence of an individual actor expands over time

while the primacy of the party declines in the political process (Rahat and Sheafer 2007, 65;

Karoven 2010, 4). Therefore, a political party turns more personalist when the authority and

control of one single political leader supplant other senior party elites (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor,

and Li 2022, 920-21). In other words, when a political party undergoes the personalization

process, it can be called a personalist political party.

Personalism, personalization, and personalist political parties are three distinct terms and

concepts. In general, personalism is a situation, while personalization is a gradual process, and

when they manifest visibly within a political organization, it can be labeled a personalist political

party. However, they essentially indicate one phenomenon where an individual political actor is

more influential than other party elites, party members, and even the party institution itself.

Therefore, in this thesis, these terms are used interchangeably to discuss political parties under

NWW.

Two prominent characteristics of personalist political parties are the presence of a

dominant leader and weaker organizational and institutional structures (Kostadinova and Levitt

2014; Kefford and McDonnel 2018). Dominant leadership implies the extensive authority of the

leader over the party’s mission, decision-making, and management process, which is also

considered legitimate by party elites and rank-and-file party members. Again, the leader-centric

approach in personalist political parties undermines the deliberative decision-making process and

the values of intra-party democracy (Ignazi 2020). As such, personalist parties often lack rules of

operation and have an underdeveloped organizational structure.

Personalization in political parties can occur in three ways: institutional, behavioral, and

media (Rahat and Sheafer 2007). These three types of personalization can take two directions:

centralized and decentralized. According to Balmas et al. (2014), centralized personalization

refers to power flow from the party or cabinet to an individual political actor. In decentralized

personalization, power disperses among the political elites within a party. These two routes of

personalization can happen concurrently or separately. Wauters et al. (2018) studied these two

routes in the case of Belgium and found that centralized personalization is rising while

decentralized personalization is decreasing.

Institutional personalization involves adopting rules, mechanisms, and institutions

prioritizing individual politicians instead of party groups. Centralized institutional

personalization expands the personal authority of a leader (e.g., President, Prime Minister, or top

leader) within the party institution. However, with decentralized institutional personalization, the

personal influence of individuals increases within an institution (e.g., cabinet or party), and

electoral performance centers on individual reputation (Balmas et al. 2014, 38-9). Behavioral

personalization highlights the actions of voters and politicians. This indicates voters’ tendencies

to emphasize individual leaders over parties and politicians’ tendencies to focus on personalities

and campaigns over party commitments. In other words, it implies a decline in partisan activity

and increased individualized political activities.

Figure 3 Mechanisms of Personalization in Politics, Adapted from Rahat, and Sheafer (2007)

Media personalization refers to the centrality and higher focus on the individual leader in

news coverage compared to the parties, organizations, and institutions. It can be further

categorized into unpaid and paid media subtypes. Many scholars have identified the growth of

Personalization in

Politics

Institutional

Behavioral

Personalization in the

behavior of

politicians

Personalization in the

behavior of the public

Media

Personalization in the

paid media

Personalization in

the unpaid media

media, such as newspapers and television, as a significant reason for the personalization of

politics in general (Ian 2007; Holtz-Bacha, Langer, and Merkel 2014). In addition, new

technologies have compelled political parties to reassess party management and engagement

strategies (Iganzi 2017), leading to organizational restructuring to adapt to a digital society.

In centralized unpaid media personalization, the highest political leader (party head,

president, or prime minister) receives maximum media coverage. Again, electoral campaigns

become more leader-centric instead of the party with centralized paid media personalization. In

contrast, with decentralized paid and unpaid personalization, the importance of individual

reputation continues to outperform the party. However, candidates and leaders other than the

party leaders also receive media coverage. Even though there is no hierarchy among these three

types of personalization, media personalization has the potential to significantly influence the

other two processes by engaging and shaping public opinion.

These three elements of personalization, institutional, behavioral, and media, together

highlight a trend towards the political leader and candidate-focused politics instead of the party,

which can impact the organizational nature of the political party (Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen

2021). In other words, personalization in political parties can weaken a political party’s

organizational or institutional nature. Highly personalized politics can also subvert the

competitive party system (Rahat and Kenig 2018, 262). Personalization is particularly

consequential in a democratic political system (Pedersen and Rahat 2021). The potential

implications of personalization on political parties have already captured scholarly interest,

resulting in extensive academic literature on this topic.

In this context, the party institutionalization concept presented by Bizzarro, Hicken, and

Self (2020) is applicable. Personalization can affect a party’s institutional and organizational

structure by increasing a political leader’s influence. This framework helps conceptualize a more

nuanced understanding of personalism in political parties across regime types. They defined

party institutionalization as

the extent to which parties build stable organizations (routinization), party followers

develop lasting connections with the parties, and come to prioritize party interests in

addition to their individual short-term interests (value infusion) (3).

This definition helps examine the level of institutionalization in a political party in both

democratic and non-democratic regimes. In both types of regimes, political parties can

institutionalize similarly by routinizing activities and value infusion. Their conceptual framework

is also the basis of VDem’s Party Institutionalization Index, which this thesis utilizes to analyze

personalism in political parties.

Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Li (2022) also developed a framework to measure

personalism in the ruling political party. They conceptualized personalist political parties by

measuring “the extent to which parties are vehicles to advance leaders’ personal political careers

such that the leader has more control” (920-21). Using eight qualitative categories (available in

Table A in the Appendix), they developed a dataset to empirically measure personalism in the

ruling political party of democratic countries. These indicators help examine the gradual

expansion of a leader’s influence by tracing past experiences at different party levels. The

following chapter explains how the party institutionalization index and the qualitative indicators

from Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Li (2022) are utilized in this thesis.

Summarizing the Theoretical Framework

In summary, this chapter provides an overview of the theoretical concepts of

comprehensive violence and personalist political parties, essential to refining the NWW

framework. The conceptualization of violence in the NWW framework is a one-dimensional

approach that only accounts for destructive impacts on society. State and non-state actors’

capacity to exert violence has grown due to technological advancement. For example, non-state

actors can use digital tools to create social, political, and economic instabilities. Thus, states

require non-traditional violence-prevention capabilities. States can also utilize digital technology

to exert various forms of implicit yet more targeted violence on their citizens. As such, a

comprehensive and multidimensional conceptualization of violence is essential to maintain the

relevance of the NWW framework in present times.

Personalization in political parties is fundamentally incompatible with the norms of

impersonality, which are central to open access order societies. In addition, it can weaken the

institutional strength of political organizations, affect the rule of law, and increase threats and

actions of violence. In countries with a high degree of centralization of executive power, the

personalization of political parties can blur the lines between state and party. The systemic

dismantling of check and balance mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the political

executive is known as executive aggrandizement (Khaitan 2018). This phenomenon is prevalent

in both democracies and non-democracies. Weak institutionalization is connected to

personalization of politics and executive aggrandizement (Ufen 2022). Putin in Russia, Orbán in

Hungary, Erdogan in Turkey, and Xi in China are a few notable examples where individual

leaders have increased their influence, assumed control over collective leadership structures, and

undermined mechanisms of executive accountability. Elements of this dual phenomenon can also

be also found in democratic countries, particularly in presidential systems, like the USA,

Philippines, and Indonesia (Froomkin and Shapiro 2021; Bünte and Thompson 2023).

Personalization in politics undermines society’s progress and takes it back to the original

problem of limiting the personal power of an all-powerful leader with institutional checks and

balances.

In the original NWW framework, a political party was defined as a part of a complex

institutional arrangement that limits societal violence. However, when the comprehensive

concept of violence and personalist political parties is considered, we find a more intricate

relationship between these two elements. Even though political parties are supposed to limit

threats of violence in society, this institution can ironically perpetuate violence through

personalist political activities. The centralized institutional personalization and centralized paid

and unpaid media personalization in politics reinforce a mechanism of psychological and cultural

(symbolic and iconic) violence, accentuating individual political leaders’ ideologies and

philosophies.

By promoting a personality-centric political culture, centralized institutional and media

personalization can create an environment where cultural violence is normalized and justified in

pursuing political goals. The growth of digital media has heightened the risk of such violence.

This danger is present in both democratic and autocratic countries. However, in non-democratic

regimes, the personalization of political parties can have particularly damaging consequences,

further exacerbating the manifestation of violence in oppressive and repressive forms. As a result,

these personalization processes in non-democratic countries can reinforce the coercive nature of

the state and lead to increased violence and repression that undermines rights and freedom.

Figure 04 demonstrates this complex relationship between the personalization of political parties

and the manifestation of violence.

Figure 4 Conceptual Map: Relationship Between Personalization of Political Party and

Manifestation of Violence

CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To operationalize the concepts from the theoretical framework, this chapter explains the

research methods and case selection process for this thesis.

Research Methods

North and his coauthors adopted a qualitative approach with a historical narrative analysis

to construct the original conceptual framework on social order. The authors used case study

methodology in their subsequent book, In the Shadow of Violence, to validate and expand their

Personalization of Political Party

Centralized P

ersonalization

(

)

and Unpaid Media

Institutional, Paid

Psychological, Structural, and

Cultural Violence

Self-censorship for fears of

direct/physical/oppressive

violence

Limited access to political

organization

Symbolic

Iconic

Oppressive Violence

(

)

Arrests, Diseappereances etc.

Repressive Violence

(Surveillance, Censorship by

state etc.)

original argument and offer an understanding of various development problems. Moreover,

qualitative methods are also employed in most of the existing literature applying the NWW

framework to study the developmental process of different countries. Therefore, consistent with

the existing scholarly works, this thesis also uses a qualitative design and employs a case study

approach to refine the premises of the original framework. The case study method for small N

analysis has gained popularity and credibility (Collier 1993) and is considered an established

research method in political science. It is particularly useful when a researcher has limited time

and resources (Lijphart 1971). Limited time is a key constraint of this thesis; therefore, the case

study approach is the most suitable methodology.

One of the significant strengths of the case study approach is the capacity to treat cases

holistically by incorporating the contextual complexity of causal relationships (Ragin 1994;

Bennet 2004). It is relevant when the research question requires an in-depth discussion of a

contemporary phenomenon involving contextual conditions (Yin 2009, 18). This approach allows

individual analysis and facilitates a systematic and focused comparison of cases. In LAO and

OAO analysis, NWW especially emphasized that societies change constantly and cautioned

about the risks of ignoring the underlying logic of the social order in development policies.

The proposed refinements to NWW theory also integrate the philosophy that societies are

not static and that social change is a multidimensional process. As such, the subsequent analysis

requires a methodology that permits a more focused, systematic, and contextual analysis.

Besides, understanding violence and personalist political parties in the contemporary

development context is an intricate process. For example, why and how some countries adopt

specific violence control measures can depend on the socio-economic or cultural context. Again,

personalism in politics is not new; it can exist in both democratic and non-democratic countries.

However, the emergence and institutionalization of personalism in political parties can vary from

country to country and thus requires a context-specific understanding.

From the economic development viewpoint, the transition from a basic to a mature LAO

or an OAO indicates the process of becoming a more open country. The key expected outcome of

this developmental journey is achieving increased income and better health of citizens, the rule of

law, durable organizations, more equality, and greater political participation (North et al. 2013,

329). However, the circumstances and conditions for achieving these outcomes vary significantly

in different countries. Therefore, understanding developmental outcomes in LAO or OAO needs

a contextual discussion. For these reasons, a case study approach fulfills the research objectives

of this study by exploring different contextual conditions of violence and political developments.

Furthermore, the insights generated in this process can be employed to explain the role of

violence and personalist political parties in other countries.

The scope of hypothesis testing is comparatively limited in the case study approach but

can contribute to theory-building. In his seminal article, Lijphart (1971) discussed how different

case study methods contribute to theory-building. For example, theory-infirming cases can

highlight the weaknesses of a theory, whereas deviant cases can refine and improve a theory by

proposing modifications. Put differently; the case study method can enhance a theory by

accentuating the inconsistencies within the concept. Case studies can “examine the internal

workings of a theory in a case or cases, both to test the theory and to develop it further” (Shively

2006, 346). Thus, this approach contributes to the theory continuum by contradicting and

reconstructing existing conceptual frameworks (Ridder 2017).

As indicated, this thesis aims to refine the NWW theoretical framework with an

exploratory analysis. Studying a few cases can illuminate the contradictions and possible scope

of refinement in the NWW theory. As such, this thesis’s case study approach also conforms to the

characteristics of Lijphart’s (1971) theory-infirming and deviant case study categories. However,

in this approach, researchers often face a tradeoff between selecting a small number of cases for

detailed discussion and many cases for inferring broader generalizations (Bennett 2004, 44). This

study is aware of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of exploring a small number of

cases. To fulfill the research objective of improving the NWW theory, this study focuses on the

illustrative case of China.

The illustrative case study is “an intermediary step between hypothesis generation and

hypothesis testing” that illuminates a broader theory (Levy 2008, 3). This study is not concerned

with structuring a new theoretical framework but contributes to theory-building by identifying

gaps in the existing NWW framework and recommending potential adjustments. As such, one

illustrative case is selected to substantiate the arguments for proposed adjustments and generate

insights that can be employed in future research.

However, this study also faces challenges typical of case-study research methods. The

case-study approach is often criticized for selection bias (Achen and Snidal 1989; Bennett 2004;

Geddes 1990). Case selection based on the dependent variable is also generally discouraged

(Shively 2017, 101-16; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). In case study methods, purposeful

sampling that fit the hypothesis and random case selection can generate serious bias (Levy 2008,

8). But in the case study approach, intentional case selection can be comparatively more

appropriate than random sampling as it enables a researcher to choose the most relevant cases

(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295-96; Collier and Mahoney 1996, 89).

Therefore, a careful and theory-guided case selection process is required in a small

Nstudy (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 124–128; Collier et al. 2004; Gerring 2007, 87–88).

The limitations of the case study method can be addressed by adopting a transparent process.

Crowe et al. (2011) recommended discussing in detail the various steps of case selection, data

collection, and interpretation to increase the transparency and trustworthiness of the research.

Considering these points, this study applies a purposeful case sampling based on statistical

indicators to ensure a transparent case selection process.

Case Selection

NWW avoided statistically analyzing their theory because there are no straightforward

measures for the concepts of their framework (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 263). For

example, the measurement of the rule of law, one of the critical features of the NWW framework,

can vary depending on the data source. Freedom House measures the rule of law based on four

factors, whereas World Justice Program measures it based on eight factors. Similarly, measuring

violence and access to political and economic institutions can also be complex. To study hybrid

regime stability in LAOs, Ademmer, Langbein, and Borzel (2019) measured political access with

elections, civil liberties, corruption, and horizontal accountability of state institutions. They

assessed economic access based on market-enhancing institutions, capital, privatization, interest

groups, and trade liberalization. While these measurement indicators were useful in

operationalizing variables and look at their effects on hybrid regime stability in LAOs, this is not

an exhaustive list for measuring political and economic access. As such, it is incredibly

challenging to design an all-inclusive list of indicators that measure the concepts of NWW.

Considering these challenges and data availability, this thesis utilizes data from the

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank (WB), Varieties of Democracy

(VDem), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), and Digital Society Project (DSP) to collect

statistical information for the purpose of case selection. Data were collected from 2010 to 2019.

As explained in the research objectives, this thesis aims to reassess the NWW theory since it was

introduced in 2009, considering the changes in the world in the last decade. Again, the COVID19

pandemic caused significant economic changes, the full extent of which is yet to be determined.

As such, the period for data collection started in 2010 and ended in 2019. Besides, longitudinal

data also helps provide a more coherent understanding of the changes in the indicators. This

thesis considers the following measurement indicators for case selection: Human Development

Index (HDI), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (current USD), stateness, the potential of

violence using digital tools, and transformation of democracy, economy, and governance status.

The first step of the case selection process involved identifying countries with high

developmental outcomes. Originally, NWW used GDP per capita to demonstrate economic

development in OAOs. GDP per capita is a widely accepted measure of economic development.

However, the one-dimensional focus on economic output fails to capture the improvement of

people’s lives. Individual well-being does not only depend on income. In an open, free society,

the institutions should systematically maintain and promote freedom of choice. An absence of

restrictions to access different political and economic resources is inadequate to assess

OAO/LAO typology. Equality and equity of opportunities for people to pursue their individual

choices could lead to different outcomes in real life. Equity of freedom and opportunities enable

the capabilities of people from the periphery and empower them by strengthening their human

agency. Therefore, this thesis prioritizes HDI as an alternative indicator to assess economic and

social development. HDI is a composite index that measures the quality of life from 0 to 1.

Countries scoring closer to 1 indicate a high standard of living. This study first selects countries

that scored above 0.7, indicating high living standards. The objective of this thesis is to refine the

NWW framework, whose premise explores the context of why some countries develop while

others do not. For this reason, this thesis first utilizes the development indicators for the case

selection process.

Again, the BTI database was used as it offers a wide-ranging indicator to measure

changes in democracy, economy, and governance. A detailed list of BTI indicators, including the

sub-categories, is provided in the Appendix (Table A). BTI scoring scale ranges from 0 to 10,

where 0 indicates the lowest and 10 shows the highest value. The BTI indicator on democracy

transformation includes the rule of law, political and social integration, stateness, and political

participation. These factors provide a more comprehensive idea of a country’s political openness

and access to political resources. The stateness indicator from BTI’s democracy index is also

considered separately for this study. BTI defines stateness as the extent of a state’s legitimacy

and internal cohesion in terms of state identity, monopoly over the use of force, and basic

administration. This definition aptly represents the central NWW premise about the state’s

capability to control violence and the Weberian definition of the state.

According to BTI, in countries with scores 6 to 8, the state’s monopoly over violence

exists on principle with some group challenges. In countries with scores of 9 to 10, the state has

complete control over violence within the territory. During case selection, the threshold value for

stateness was at least 6, as scores below that indicate more dispersed control of the state over the

violence capacity organizations.

Again, the NWW framework focuses on organized violence and control of the state over

violent capacity organizations. But digital tools can also incite violence and disability in a

country. Therefore, modern states also require control over such non-traditional medium of

violence to ensure societal stability. In this context, for the purpose of case selection, this thesis

examined the use of social media to organize offline violence using the DSP dataset. It

categorizes incidents of offline violence with nominal values 0, 1, and 2, which respectively refer

to frequently, sometimes, and no occurrence of offline violence using social media.

Again, BTI’s economy transformation index is helpful as it considers private property

rights, market and competition, and monetary and fiscal stability. Consideration of property

rights and market economy competition is central to the economic access feature of the NWW

framework. This index also includes factors like environmental and educational sustainability

and levels of social development. The levels of social development indicate if the economic

development outcomes create freedom of choice for citizens.

Furthermore, the governance transformation index measures civil society participation

within the country, state efficiency of different policy formulation and implementations,

administrative structural constraints, and level of international cooperation. This is important as it

reflects the capability of the state to drive political and economic governance. It indicates the

political actors’ ability to undertake effective development policies and conduct a marketoriented

economy. The governance transformation index can help LAOs to transition to OAO or OAOs to

maintain the open access order features.

Based on these considerations, this thesis selects China as an illustrative case. Table 03

indicates the average HDI and GDP per capita from 2010 to 2019. The HDI scores indicate that

China maintained a high standard of living for a decade. The GDP per capita was included to

demonstrate the country’s development status using a traditional economic growth indicator.

Based on the World Bank categorization, China is an upper-middle-income country. As such, in

theory, China exhibits the characteristics of development, in both traditional and expansive terms,

and high living standards.

Table 03 Case Selection Indicators for China (Average

from 2010-19)

Category

Value/Score

HDI

0.7279

GDP per capita (current USD)

7609.883735

Stateness

8.8

Use of social media to organize offline violence

Democracy Transformation Status

3.308

Economy Transformation Status

6.652

Governance Transformation Status

5.038

The stateness indicator shows that the Chinese state has high control over violence. It also

indicates relatively stronger administrative and bureaucratic cohesion in China, which also means

the country has successfully maintained stability within this period. However, the DSP indicator

shows that, from 2010 to 2019, there were few cases in which social media was used to organize

offline violence. Thus, the Chinese state might not have absolute control over nontraditional

violence media. Again, the economic and governance transformation index scores indicate that

China still needs to improve economic outcomes for its citizens and administer development

policies. It also shows that regardless of continued stability and higher control over violence,

China is yet to perform strongly in economic and governance indicators. Therefore, the empirical

indicators provide a mixed picture of China from the NWW perspective. In other words, the case

of China illustrates that understanding stability, violence control, and development using the

NWW framework can be complex in practice.

The Curious Case of China: Contextual Rationale for Case Selection

Statistical indicators played a major role in choosing the illustrative case for this thesis.

Countries were listed and filtered based on empirical information that corresponds to the NWW

framework’s social order characteristics. However, it is necessary to clarify further the contextual

reasons for selecting China as an illustrative case.

Firstly, the statistical indicators discussed in the last section clearly demonstrate that the

application of NWW social order characteristics is complicated in the case of China. Therefore, it

is challenging to categorize China as an LAO or OAO. Considering how NWW conceptualized

the condition of double balance in the framework further complicate the case of China. North et

al. (2009) argued that “open access in either economics or politics can be sustained only by the

double balance of open access in both systems, and open access requires that a large share of

individuals be able to form organizations at will” (231). China is a one-party state, meaning a

group of citizens cannot form a political organization at will, directly contradicting the NWW

assumption. However, despite the limited political access, we see from the empirical indicators

that the country has high stability and control over violence.

Moreover, the meteoric economic development of China is recognized in academic works

and public discourse. The economic and development indictors show China’s continued growth

despite lacking open access in the area of politics. , Therefore, the dynamics of open economic

access and limited political access in China contradict the NWW assumption of double balance,

making it an interesting case to study. Besides, there has been much scholarly research to

understand the developmental miracle of China, but there has been no substantial academic work

studying China from the NWW perspective.

Studying China is also relevant considering its increasing prominence in the international

arena and its evolving political landscape, identifiable by a combination of authoritarianism and

economic growth. In particular, the personalization of politics in China under the Communist

Party of China (CCP) has been a crucial feature of this political landscape, with significant

implications for the country’s social, political, and economic stability. However, most works on

the personalization of politics have primarily focused on democratic countries. While some

academic research acknowledges the similarities of personalization processes in democratic and

autocratic regimes, there is an opportunity to expand the discussion on this topic by focusing on

personalization in the CCP.

Besides, China’s increasing global influence means it can export its governance and

political model to other countries. China has touted its idea of ‘democracy’ (State Council of

China 2021), ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or ‘Asian capitalism’ (Osokina et al.

2020), whichever they perceived fitting to distinguish an ideological uniqueness in the face of a

West-inclined liberal democratic hegemony. The Chinese concept of social order prioritizes

social harmony and stability. However, social stability and economic growth must not supersede

individual freedom and liberty, either in the physical or digital sphere. Therefore, by examining

how the personalization process in the CCP has led to violence (e.g., structural, cultural, and

iconic), it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the political landscape of one of the

world’s most influential nations and simultaneously improve the core concepts of NWW

framework. The next section of this chapter explains how the concepts discussed in the previous

chapter are operationalized to analyze China’s illustrative case.

Comprehensive Conception of Violence (CCV) for a Revised NWW Framework

A revised NWW framework needs to reconceptualize violence by incorporating the

comprehensive definition of violence in the context of emerging digital technologies. States can

mitigate violence with digital tools and simultaneously execute violence with the same tools. In

other words, a state can both be a mitigator and a perpetrator of violence. As such, it is dangerous

to emphasize the digital violence prevention capabilities of the state without considering the

impacts of digital repression. Repressive manifestation of state violence with digital tools can

involve various forms of violations discussed under the CCV definition. The expansion of digital

media increases the scope of cultural violence (symbolic and iconic) by disseminating

propaganda, direct violence with acts or threats of arrest and other forms of intimidation, and

psychological violence by instilling self-censorship practices with fear and intimidation of

surveillance.

The literature on the state’s digital repression capabilities is also developing as digital

technology evolves. Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, Wright (2020), and Feldstein (2021) used data from

the Digital Society Project (DSP) to construct the Digital Repression Index for their studies.

Following examples from their models and using DSP data, this study critically examines the

violence capacity of the state using digital tools by constructing a set of indicators.

Firstly, DSP data helps assess the state’s capacity to prevent violence using digital tools

indicators on cyber security and the government’s ability to shut, filter, and regulate the internet.

In extreme circumstances, the government might need to shut down the internet to limit the

spread of violence. Secondly, the digital violence capability of the state can be examined from

both the repression and CCV perspective. The digital repression of the state can be measured

through a government’s censorship, monitoring, and filtering of social media in practice. Third,

the government’s ability to perpetrate direct, symbolic, and iconic violence can be assessed with

arrests for political content and dissemination of false information by the party or government.

Table 04 summarizes the various measurement indicators employed in this study to

operationalize the CCV definition within the NWW framework.

Table 04: Digital Capacity and Digital Violence Indicators

Digital Capacity

Digital Violence

Repressive Violence

Other Types of Violence

(Direct, Iconic and Symbolic)

Government cyber security

capacity

Government social media

censorship in practice

Government dissemination of

false information on domestic

Government Internet shut

down capacity

Government social media

monitoring

Party dissemination of false

information on domestic

Government Internet

filtering capacity

Government social media

shut down in practice

Online media perspectives

Government capacity to

regulate online content

Government Internet

shutdown in practice

Online media fractionalization

Government Internet filtering

in practice

Arrests for political content

Government social media

alternatives

Personalist Political Party for a Revised NWW Framework

A second area in which this thesis aims to improve the NWW theory is by situating

personalist political parties within the social order. The comparative party literature is extensive,

and it has four major subfields: party leadership selection, candidate nomination, party

membership, and party regulation (Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen 2021, 29). Personalization in

politics is an intricate concept to measure. Considering the extent of the topic and associated

measurement challenges, this thesis identified VDem’s Party Institutionalization Index as the

most suitable framework for operationalizing the concept of a personalist political party.

VDem’s index has two dimensions that measure the degree of routinization in a party and

the extent to which voters and party elites value the party and its program (Bizzaro, Hicken, and

Self 2020, 2). VDem’s index has several categories of indicators, but this thesis only uses the

party personalization and candidate selection indicators due to the limited scope of the research.

The data for these two indicators have been collected from VDem’s dataset. VDem defines

personalization as the degree to which a party becomes a vehicle for one individual’s personal

will and priorities (Lindberg et al. 2022, 35). As such, this indicator is a straightforward

measurement of personalization in a political party, making it a helpful indicator to achieve the

objectives of this research. VDem scores range from 0 to 4. A score of 4 indicates that the party

focuses entirely on the personal will of one individual leader, and a score of 0 means that the

party is not focused on the leader’s personal priorities and will.

On the other hand, VDem defines candidate selection as the party’s process of deciding

on candidates for the national legislative elections (Lindberg et al. 2022, 34-5). The rules in a

political party for candidate selection reflect the organizational culture of the party (Gauja and

Kosiara-Pedersen 2021, 31). VDem scores for candidate nominations range from 0 to 4. In this

case, 0 means that the party leader unilaterally decides the candidate selection, and a score of 4

shows that registered voters decide the candidates. This index is helpful because its

conceptualization of party personalization is largely consistent with the existing literature.

For example, candidate selection and party leadership are two major indicators of

intraparty democracy (Cross and Katz, 2013; Bolin et al., 2017; Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen

2021). Candidate selection is one of the principal functions of a political party through which the

party endorses official election candidates. The candidate selection process reflects the party’s

organizational culture and allows the rank-and-file members to exercise influence in the party

(Cross 2008, 598). As a result, this process reflects intraparty politics and the personalization

level in a political party (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Marino, Diodati, and Verzichelli 2022).

Again, much comparative research on this topic has examined the organizational context

and reform initiatives of party leadership selection. Personalization of politics is one of the

central factors in reforming the party leadership selection process (Gauja and Kosiara-Pedersen

2021). As such, there appears to be a connection between the personalization of politics and

recent changes in the party leadership selection process in CCP. This thesis relies on the

qualitative indicators developed by Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Li (2022) to assess the

personalization of politics in party leadership. They used ten categories of questions in

empirically evaluating the ruling personalist political party. These questions (available in Table B

in the Appendix) illustrate the expansion of the influence of a political leader in the party by

tracing their gradual progression in party politics. Therefore, this indicator set is useful for

assessing the impact of personalization in party leadership. These indicators’ qualitative and

descriptive information has been collected from various secondary sources, such as newspaper

articles and scholarly papers.

CHAPTER V: CASE STUDY OF CHINA

This chapter explores the comprehensive concepts of violence and the personalization of

political parties within China. The first section of the chapter discusses the various mechanisms

of comprehensive violence and their manifestations. The second section explores the increasing

personalization trend within the Communist Party of China (CCP). The third section provides an

overview of how these two concepts interact with one another within the context of the NWW

framework.

China: A Brief Context of the Case

China is one of the world’s largest and most populous countries with a complex political,

economic, and cultural landscape. The country has a rich history and culture spanning over

several millennia. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949.

Constitutionally China is a socialist state under the leadership of the CCP. Its unique blend of

communist politics and capitalist economics has resulted in a remarkable transformation in recent

decades, propelling it to become one of the world’s largest economies and global powerhouses.

From 2010 to 2019, China’s average GDP per capita was $7609.88, and its HDI scored 0.7279,

indicating high economic growth in both traditional and expansive economic measurement

frameworks.

During the same period, the average BTI score on Stateness was 8.8, which suggests

strong internal cohesion within the country regarding state identity, monopoly of the use of force,

and basic administration. Additionally, at the same time-frame, China spent an average of 1.72%

of its GDP after military expenditures, which means the state spends substantial resources for

maintaining control over violence capacity (SIPRI). According to the Lowy Institute’s Asia

Power Index (2019), China ranks third globally in terms of resilience which evaluates the

capacity to deter real or potential threats to state stability. The principal military force of China,

the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), is a military wing of the CCP. This status of the PLA under

CCP signifies that the military is under civilian control. As such, China exhibits some OAO

characteristics regarding the state’s robust control over violence capacity, and civilian control

over the military.

However, China simultaneously demonstrates LAO characteristics. According to World

Justice Project (WJP), from 2015 to 2019, China’s average rule of law score was 0.4875. A WJP

score closer to 0 indicates a weaker rule of law in China. The extent of access to political and

economic organizations also had some limitations. As a one-party state, the freedom to establish

new political organizations is limited in China. The membership of the Chinese Communist Party

is also very selective, which is discussed in more detail in section 5.3.1, indicating limited access

to participate in political organizations.

Compared to other developed economies, the contemporary Chinese economy features a

strong regulatory presence of the state, accompanied by the invisible hand of the CCP. The

market is expected to serve the overarching goals of party and state, resulting in a form of

partystate capitalism (Pearson, Rithmire, and Tsai 2023). In 2019, according to the World Bank’s

Ease of Doing Business index, China ranked 32nd. This suggests that the country’s laws,

regulations, and institutional arrangements are not conducive to starting a business. Despite the

challenges, China has sustained economic growth, prompting Bai, Hsieh, and Song (2014) to

label the institutional arrangement as Crony Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics because

entrepreneurs must cultivate special relationships with political leaders to succeed with their

business ventures.

CCP leaders who can boost local economic growth are rewarded with promotion, which

motivates them to support entrepreneurial activities. However, this approach also results in

uneven distribution of public resources, resulting in pervasive corruption and increased scope for

patron-client relationships among business owners and political leaders. From 2010 to 2019,

China consistently performed poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception

Index (CPI). In 2018, President Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign. However, many

experts argue that this campaign targeted entrepreneurs perceived to have accumulated too much

wealth or influence independent of the party (Feng 2021).

Figure 5 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranking of China

Therefore, despite the continuous high economic growth, China exhibits a mixed picture

from the viewpoint of NWW social order characteristics. It satisfies a few LAO and OAO

conditions, situating it as a mature LAO in the NWW social order spectrum.

State of Violence in China

China has one of the most advanced militaries in the world. According to the Lowy

Institute’s Asia Power Index (2019), China ranked second globally in military capability. It

signifies the country’s conventional military strength, such as the size of military and

paramilitary forces, military expenses, possession of sophisticated weaponry, and asymmetric

tactical and strategic instruments like offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. Together these

military strengths are critical for a modern nation-state to maintain internal stability and prevent

external attacks. However, the scope of violence has increased with the expansion of digital

platforms and tools. State and non-state actors can utilize these tools to act violently. In this

context, the Chinese state has invested in expanding its capacity to prevent violence with digital

100

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX (CPI) RANKING OF CHINA

technology. Figure 06 indicates the digital capacity of the government in China, where a score of

0 indicates a lack of government capacity. In contrast, a score of 4 indicates maximum capacity

in the digital sphere. The Chinese government possesses a remarkably high capacity to combat

sophisticated cyber-attacks and, if necessary, shut down all forms of domestic internet access.

Since the 1990s, China has gradually expanded its cyber capabilities to confront domestic or

external conflicts.

Figure 6 Digital Capacity Assessment of China Based on DSP Data

One of the principal objectives of China’s most recent military strategy is improving the

state’s control over cyber infrastructure to maintain national security and social stability (Lyu

2019). China also aims to enhance military capabilities by incorporating sophisticated digital

technology like Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Kania 2019). In fact, AI-integration in China has

gone beyond military capabilities, so much so that it is often called the “surveillance state” that

systematically collects citizens’ information. This ongoing mass surveillance effort continues the

CCP’s “mass defense, mass rule” policy, combining surveillance by formal security apparatus

with informal public participation for societal stability and security (Atha et al. 2020). Integrating

powerful surveillance technologies to maintain stability and security directly manifests President

Xi Jinping’s national security ideas (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022). Since assuming power, Xi

has overseen a gradual centralization of control over digital spaces. In this process, Central

Cyberspace Affairs Commission (CCAC) was established in 2018 to streamline overall internet

monitoring activities. CCAC, chaired by Xi, was established, which supervises cyberspace

security, internet content management, and news reporting and approves online content-related

businesses (Horsely 2022).

The continued investments in developing cyberinfrastructure have made China one of the

cyber superpowers globally. According to the National Cyber Power Index (NCPI), in 2022,

China ranked second in overall digital capabilities. DSP data in Figure 05 shows that, from 2010

to 2019, China scored 4 in cyber security and internet shutdown capacity, which means the

government has adequate resources to counter sophisticated cyber-attacks. It can shut down

almost all kinds of domestic internet access. A score of 3 in internet filtering capacity means the

government can block any sites. However, while the government has a very high internet filtering

capacity, the fourth indicator in Figure 05 shows that the government has inadequate staff and

resources to regulate online content. A score of 1 indicates the government has limited resources

to regulate. So, China is more adept in preemptive monitoring and surveillance in digital spaces.

Therefore, China can still develop monitoring capacities of digital spaces to prevent violence and

ensure stability.

On the other hand, Figure 07 demonstrates the digital repression capabilities of the

Chinese government using DSP data. China has one of the world’s most sophisticated internet

censorship infrastructures, which is more commonly known as the Great Firewall. Although

China’s internet and digital media were always under strict government control, it has increased

significantly in the past decade (Economy 2018). Figure 07 shows that, from 2010 to 2019,

China scored 2 in social media censorship in practice indicator, meaning the government

successfully censors a significant portion of political content on social media platforms. During

the same period, it scored 0 in social media monitoring, which indicates that the government

virtually surveils all social media content. A score of 2 in social media shut down in practice

means that the Chinese government sometimes shuts down social media during this period.

However, a score of 4 in internet shut down in practice means government rarely prohibits

domestic access to the internet.

DIGITAL REPRESSION

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Government social media censorship in practiceGovernment social media monitoring

Government social media shut down in practiceGovernment Internet shut down in

practice

Government Internet filtering in practiceGovernment social media alternatives

Figure 7 Evaluating Digital Repression in China Based on DSP Data

Even though the government does not shut down domestic internet, it can shut down

websites and other digital access platforms at any time. In the first three weeks of 2019, the

Chinese government shutdown 700 websites and 900 mobile apps (Polyakova and Meserole

2019, 3). Figure 07 shows that China scored 0 in the fifth indicator on the government’s internet

filtering in practice. It means it is a regular practice for the government to remove online political

content, except for pro-government content. Therefore, the Chinese government evidently

surveils nearly all content on social media and executes a wide range of censorship to control

political content in social media and online platforms. Figure 07 also shows that from 2010 to

2019, China scored 0 in the government social media alternative indicator, meaning that

essentially all social media uses took place under state-controlled platforms. In China, there is no

alternative social media platform outside state control. For example, foreign social media

platforms like Facebook and Twitter are not allowed in China.

China cultivated the home-grown digital infrastructure and industry systemically,

enabling the government’s unparallel digital monitoring and censorship capacity (Tufekci 2017,

238). Again, the fourth indicator shows that although the Chinese government does not typically

interfere with domestic access, it almost always removes political content, except for

progovernment sites. The government is particularly concerned about censoring social media

content that can prompt collective action. An analysis of social media posts during the Hong

Kong movement found that while social media posts criticizing the party or government were

allowed, any posts with the potential to organize collective action were quickly removed (Tufekci

2017, 235). Such actions show how the government limits dissent and considers it a threat to

stability. Altogether, they indicate the highly repressive nature of digital platforms, which allows

virtually no freedom for citizens to voice their dissatisfactions or disagreements with the

government.

Figure 08 below portrays the capabilities of the Chinese government to perpetrate

violence by disseminating party or state-approved ideas and information. According to DSP data,

in Figure 08, China scored 1 in the first two indicators for disseminating of false information by

government and party. A score of 1 means that the government and party often spread incorrect

information among the domestic population. Therefore, the government, party (CCP), and their

agents regularly use social media to disseminate false information on critical political issues to

influence public opinion. A 2016 study from Harvard University reported that the Chinese

government posts and fabricates about 448 million comments annually on social media

(Economy 2018). The government recruits paid online commentators, known as “Fifty Cent

Party,” as they receive fifty cents of RMB (renminbi) for each post, to steer online conversations

in government-approved directions (Hsing 2014, 132).

Figure 8 State’s Ability to Perpetrate Violence in China (Comprehensive Definition of Violence)

Based on DSP Data

The government also engages employees to post targeted content or posts to distract

public attention from critical issues on social media platforms (Tufekci 2017, 238). The third and

fourth indicators show that while major online media allows different perspectives, they present

mainly the same narrative on political issues, which are consistent with the dominant ideology of

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Year

State’s Ability to Perpetrate Violence in China (Comprehensive

Definition of Violence)

Government dissemination of false information domestic

Party dissemination of false information domestic

Online media perspectives

Online media fractionalization

Arrests for political content

the state. These activities represent ideological, cultural, symbolic, and iconic violence,

propagating particular norms and behavioral patterns that strengthen the existing social order.

Cyber power and state security in China have an ideological dimension that attaches great

importance to mobilizing public support for the party’s agenda.

In fact, China has a long history of imposing censorship to safeguard the CCP’s

ideological hegemony, such as literary and self-censorship (Link 2000). Hladíková (2021) argued

that such censorship targeted promoting CCP’s meta-discourse of ‘social harmony’ and ‘stability’

and was characterized by persistent psychological pressure and self-censorship. Such censorship

and promoting CCP-approved values have continued to the present day. The state has actively

promoted a discourse where patriotic citizens refrain from criticizing the Chinese Communist

Party’s agenda and top leadership (Gregory 2018). From 2012 to 2014, China introduced a

centralized institutional framework to restructure Internet governance and digital

communications (Creemers 2017).

In 2013, the government introduced “Seven Baselines” to constrain the nature of online

content, which led to the deletion of social media accounts that did not conform to the rules

(Economy 2018). The continued control over content and promotion of specific behavioral

patterns have noticeably shaped the behaviors of Chinese citizens. For example, Chinese author

Fang Fang faced heavy criticism from fellow citizens for publishing a book internationally

during the COVID-19 outbreak (Wang 2020). Interestingly, Fang did not oppose the government

or party, but many citizens commenting on social media found her work tarnishing the national

image. Such reactions indicate the outcomes of decades-long promotion and normalization of

specific behavioral norms in digital media by the state. Lastly, the fifth indicator, presented in

Figure 07, demonstrates that citizens will likely to be arrested if they post political content that

opposes the government and its policies. It shows that digital repression strategies can cause

other forms of direct violence against citizens. Amnesty International (2022) documented stories

of several human rights activists facing torture and unfair trials, who were arrested, had unfair

trials, and were tortured for “subverting state power” when they only critiqued President Xi or

government policies over corruption and sexual harassment. This shows the dangers of

expressing opinions against the state and leaders. Such threats of direct violence propagates a

culture of fear that can lead to increased self-censorship.

In summary, the Chinese state has a high capacity to control digital media to prevent

violence in the country. China has one of the largest militaries in the world. Apart from

traditional military strength and cohesive state organization, it has an edge in digital security. As

such, China demonstrates strong capabilities even with a refined conceptualization of violence

that includes the state’s ability to prevent violence through digital media. However, under the

refined NWW theory, we also see the threats of the state’s substantial control over the digital

platform. China has a powerful capacity to perpetrate repression and violence on its citizens. The

government’s activities can undermine the dignity and freedom of individuals. The state actively

propagates CCP-approved ideologies and penalizes any dissent. From the minimalist

conceptualization of violence, such penalties indicate the state’s ability to perpetrate direct and

physical violence.

The state promotes acceptable behavioral norms in digital platforms that favor the

government and CCP under the façade of social harmony, security concerns, and nationalist

interests. The powerful surveillance culture also instills self-censorship practices. From a

comprehensive perspective of violence, this indicates the state’s capacity to commit

psychological violence and other forms of symbolic and iconic violence. These types of violent

acts through digital tools can also result in structural violence. As such, a comprehensive

understanding of violence provides a more nuanced understanding of stability and economic

development. Such an understanding also helps identify the contradictions within the social order

concept in the NWW by highlighting how the state can use the tools to mitigate violence to

violate citizens’ rights, freedom, and exercise various types of direct, psychological, and cultural

violence.

Personalism in Political Party in China

Introduction to the Chinese Communist Party

The Communist Party of China (CPC), also known as the Chinese Communist Party of

China (CCP), dominates the political landscape of modern-day China. Inspired by Marxist-

Leninist ideas, CCP was founded in 1921. CCP has led China since the People’s Republic of

China was established in 1949 (Xinhua 2021). Most scholarly research on political parties

theorizes it from the Western experience and fails to explain political parties like CCP (Zheng

2009, 8). CCP differs in many ways from Western political parties. For example, it does not focus

on mobilizing political and electoral competition, the party is indistinguishable from the state

(Thornton 2021), and the party membership process is highly selective and exclusive (Li 2022).

Regardless, CCP has transformed into one of the largest political parties in the world. In

the face of various social and economic changes, CCP has undergone radical and gradual reforms

in the past one hundred years. Different generations of political elites of the CCP have strived to

craft the party’s role concerning the state and government to maintain its legitimacy and

ideological supremacy as the premier organization of the country (Brown 2012). CCP’s emphasis

on upholding Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the

Scientific Outlook on Development, Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese

Characteristics, and other ideologies reflect various reforms and changes within the party

organization (Xinhua 2021).

CCP has developed a strict membership recruitment process to maintain the party’s power

grip. CCP membership is a multi-year-long process. Political engagement with CCP can start at

an early age for young children, receiving exposure to CCP’s ideologies in primary school.

Students with good grades and behaviors can join Young Pioneers, who take leadership roles and

wear red neckerchiefs that set themselves apart from other students (Yew 2021). In a similar

path, good students at the high school level can join Youth League. The application stage to join

CCP can take two to three years, which involves a five-stage screening process. Participation in

youth leagues is often a steppingstone for CCP membership (Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001, 813).

Membership also requires renouncing religion and adopting secular atheism (Yew 2021).

Despite the restrictive procedure, CCP has 96 million members, which comprises 6.9% of

China’s population (Grünberg 2022). Membership recruitment has become more stringent under

the leadership of Xi Jinping (Thornton 2021). CCP was initially founded as a party for workers

and farmers. However, since 2009, CCP has become more elitist, with more members with

college degrees and decreasing number of workers, farmers, and other blue-collar members,

which comprise around 30% of the party in 2021 (Grünberg 2022). Figure 09 shows that in 2009

39.7% of CCP members came from workers and farmers groups, which decreased to 34.8% in

2019. In 2021, more than half of CCP members consisted of individuals with academic degrees.

Besides, CCP affiliation is considered prestigious, and membership helps advance careers in

government and public sector jobs (Yew 2021).

Figure 9 Share of Different Professional Groups Among CCP Members

(Source: Grünberg 2022)

CCP has a complex leadership structure with “interlocking Party and state hierarchies that

extend from the national level down as far as the village” (Lawrence 2021, 2). The party’s

leadership is chosen through a complex system of elections and appointments designed to ensure

that only those loyal to its leadership and its ideology can rise to positions of power (Gore 2016).

CCP holds National Party Congress every five years, during which delegates select Central

Committee members. The Central Committee formally elects the 25-member Politburo, which

selects the Politburo Standing Committee. Presently, the Politburo Standing Committee has seven

members and is considered the most influential section of the party that determines party

policies. Figure 9 depicts the CCP leadership hierarchy in descending order based on power in

2022. The General Secretary must be a member of this committee (CFR 2022). The Politburo

and Politburo Standing Committee elections are non-competitive, whereas the election of the

Central Committee is comparatively more competitive (Lawrence 2021, 9).

Figure 10 CCP Leadership Structure in 2022 (Collected from Council on Foreign

Relations (CFR))

CCP’s Central Committee also has a complex bureaucratic system comprising five

functional departments and seven high-level commissions (Lawrence 2021, 18-20). Table 05

summarizes a list of these offices and commissions. One of the major organs of the Central

Committee is the Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees China’s military forces.

The primary objective of CMC is to protect CCP’s authority and interests (Maizland and Albert

2022). Since 1989, CMC has been headed by the CCP General Secretary (Lawrence 2021, 16).

The Central Committee also oversees the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI),

which ensures member compliance with party rules and regulations.

Table 05: CCP Central Committee Bureaucracy

Departments

Commissions

General Secretary

Politburo Standing

Committee (7

Members)

Politburo (25

Members)

Central Committee

(

~370 Members

)

Central Military Commission

Oversees armed forces, such as

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

and People’s Armed Police

National Party

Congress

(

~3000 members

)

The Organization Department

Office of the Commission for Integrated

Military and Civilian Development

The Publicity Department

Office of the National Security Commission

The Commission for Political and Legal

Affairs

Office of the Financial and Economic Affairs

Commission

The United Front Work Department (UFWD)

Office of the Commission for Foreign Affairs

The International Department

Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs

Commission

Office of the Central Commission for

Deepening Overall Reform

Office of the Central Institutional

Organization Commission

In summary, based on its leadership, organizational structure, and membership

recruitment process CCP is unique from most political parties. It also has a military wing that

oversees the armed and security forces, effectively keeping them under political control. Since its

establishment, it has undergone many gradual, but significant changes. Despite controversial

party mechanisms and state-party relationships, the extent of the CCP’s influence and power

remains unparallel in the history of political organizations.

Personalization in CCP

Personalization of politics has remained a prominent feature of Communist Party politics

since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. From Mao Zedong to Xi

Jinping, there have been examples of leaders consolidating power and ideological messaging

centered on the highest-ranking political figure. VDem’s party personalization index helps

empirically outline trends of personalization in politics. There is inadequate data about CCP’s

personalization. However, even limited data, shown in Table 06, provide a quick look at the level

of personalization, particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Table 06: China (Personalization of Political Party)

Party

Year

Party Personalization

Candidate Nomination

Chinese

Communist Party

China (CCP)

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

VDem score for candidate nominations ranged from 0 to 4. In this case, a score of 0

implies that the party leader unilaterally decides the candidate selection, and a score of 4 means

that registered voters decide. Table 06 indicates the available information from the VDem

database for these two categories in China. For party personalization, a score of 0 indicates that

the party is not focused on one individual leader’s personal will and priorities, and a score of 4

means that the party is entirely focused on the leader’s goals and vision. In 2013, China scored 2

in this category, which suggests that the CCP is somewhat focused on one leader’s priorities and

personal will. Although not included in this table, VDem’s data from 2008 showed that China

scored 1 in this category. As such, there has been an increase in personalization from 2008 to

2013, which coincides with Xi’s rise to CCP leadership.

For the candidate nomination category, a score of 0 means that the party leader

unilaterally decides the national election candidates. On the other hand, a score of 4 indicates that

registered voters decide which candidates will participate in national legislative elections. In

2013, China considered 1 in the candidate selection category, which suggests that a group of

senior leadership or executive committee collectively selects candidates. CCP is known for

maintaining patron-client relationships and nominating candidates for party membership.

Empirical studies show that connection to top leaders is a significant factor in obtaining party

membership (Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012; Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim 2015). It is important to

understand the patronage connections of CCP membership as members later play a role in

selecting other higher committees within the party. In China, local-level elections are somewhat

competitive as they can have multiple candidates. However, the local-level elections act as an

instrument to strengthen CCP ideology, leadership, and governing abilities (Tsai and Kao 2012).

People can directly vote for members of legislative bodies, known as deputies, at town, district,

and county levels. These deputies later elect members for municipal, provincial, and national

level legislative bodies. However, given the illiberal environment of the country, elections are not

competitive, and CCP-endorsed candidates enjoy more advantages than any other candidates.

Therefore, as a one-party state, in China, party member selection and nomination of candidates

for legislative bodies are closely interdependent with a strong influence of political patronage

that ultimately functions to ensure the CCP’s political legitimacy.

Since there is insufficient empirical information from VDem’s index from 2010 to 2019,

this thesis also utilizes qualitative indicators from Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Li (2022) to

describe the personalization process within CCP. They used these indicators to collect empirical

data on personalist ruling parties in democratic countries only. However, these indicators help

develop a qualitative discussion on the personalization process of CCP. The scope of this thesis is

confined to the period between 2010 and 2019, which is concurrent with Xi Jinping’s ascension

as the top leader of China. As such, the discussion on personalization will outline his rise to

leadership and gradual consolidation of power using the eight qualitative indicators from the

theoretical framework.

The first indicator considers if the leader created the political party, which helped them

elect the chief executive. This indicator does not apply to CCP under Xi Jinping because CCP

was founded in 1921. Xi, however, hails from a political family. His father was a first-generation

CCP leader and a former vice-premier of China. The case of China is different from many other

authoritarian countries as it continues to be a single-party state for more than seven decades. CCP

has been the only ruling party since the establishment of modern China. The constitutional

mechanisms and the lack of political competition ensures that only CCP political elites can

assume the state’s executive positions, such as President and Prime Minister. The following five

indicators evaluate whether the chief executive has previously occupied an appointed or elected

position, national or local, and a party position (such as treasurer or party leader) within the

political party.

Xi Jinping started his political career in Youth League, obtained a CCP membership in

1974, and went on to hold different party and administrative positions at village, county, and

provincial levels before rising to the national level politburo committee and eventually election

as the President of China in 2013 (Osnos 2015). Another indicator examines if the chief

executive has participated in elections before as an independent candidate, which is not

applicable given the unique state-party relationship in China. The last indicator inquires about the

leader’s experience in a party before assuming office. Xi had a decades-long career at various

party and state administration levels before he was elected the state’s chief executive. As such,

these indicators demonstrate a steady career and rise of Xi Jinping in Chinese politics.

The personalization of politics within the CCP under Xi is also evident in the institutional

and media personalization mechanisms. These processes were described in Chapter 04, showing

how personalization manifests in politics differently. In the case of the CCP, in the aftermath of

Mao’s rule, China adopted a “collective Presidency” system to dilute the individual leader’s overt

importance (Osnos 2015). This system allowed greater power of other political elites, for

example, politburo members, in the overall party policymaking and management process. Mao

had nearly unquestioned power and authority. However, the subsequent CCP leaders learned

from the devasting outcomes of such power and adopted a system that distributes power among

several political elites. This collective leadership model has helped maintain a balance of power

among key leaders and factions within the CCP in the post-Mao era by negotiating leadership

appointments and selections (Dickson 2021, 48).

However, Xi’s dominant role currently undermines the collective leadership principle and

reduces the influence of politburo members (Lawrence 2021, 11). Xi’s gradual expansion of

power sidelined other influential political elites like Li Keqiang, whose Premiership position has

recently been filled by Li Qian, a close Xi ally (Yu 2023). He has also replaced members of other

factions of important party and state positions with loyalists (Brady 2016; Li 2022). Xi has also

dismantled the promotion process within CCP, which is increasingly dependent on closed-door

negotiations, paving the way for a more clientelist arrangement within the party and state (Doyon

2018).

From 1989 to 2007, the turnover of power and elite succession within the CCP followed a

smooth pattern (Shambaugh 2008, 164-5). For example, Xi’s two immediate predecessors - Jiang

Zemin (in office from 1989-2002) and Hu Jintao (in office from 2002-2012), served two terms

and retired even though CCP’s constitution does not include a term limitation for the General

Secretary. However, Xi has ushered in systemic changes in the CCP’s constitution that

consolidate his authority over the party and enlarge his image using government and media tools.

For example, in 2017, Xi’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era

was officially added to the party charter, which solidified his identity as the most powerful leader

since Mao (Phillips 2017; Economy 2018). In 2018, the Chinese legislature introduced

constitutional amendments scrapping the Presidential term limits (AP 2018). In continuation of

these institutional changes, CCP passed a “historical resolution” in 2021 that further solidified

Xi’s political authority within the party (Ni 2021). In 2023, the CCP-controlled legislature

endorsed Xi for an unprecedented third Presidential term (Buckley and Bradsher 2023).

To consolidate power, Xi assumed leadership of various commissions and groups. Apart

from being the General Secretary of the CCP and President of China, Xi is also the Chairman of

the Central Military Commission that oversees China’s armed forces. In addition, Xi also chairs

six of the seven high-level commissions of the CCP Central Committee along with the State

Central Military Commission (Lawrence 2021). The leadership of multiple high-level groups has

earned him the name “Chairman of Everything” (Aoyama 2023, 2). In this process, Xi has

established himself at the core of the CCP.

Under Xi’s leadership, CCP has focused on expanding its influence in various sectors of

society, including business and economic organizations, either by introducing new institutional

regulations or enforcing existing ones. For instance, the revival of the 1993 PRC Company Law

gradually extended the requirement for implementing the legal status of party organization within

companies (Livingston 2021). This initiative at first targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs)

exclusively. In 2016, Xi emphasized the distinctive characteristic of Chinese SOEs, integrating

party leadership and organization into corporate governance (Livingston 2021, 4). Subsequently,

the 100 largest SOEs amended their charters by 2017 to incorporate the party's role in corporate

governance. Over time, this campaign extended to private economic organizations as well. By

2018, 73.1 percent of private companies had established a party organization, a significant

increase from 58.4 percent in 2013. Under Xi’s leadership, “CCP has extended its authority and

reach – organizationally, financially, and politically – into China’s domestic and foreign

economic relations” (Pearson, Rithmire, and Tsai 2023, 22). Thus, the party’s policy aspirations

are increasingly dominated by Xi’s vision of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which has

penetrated political, economic, and social life.

The media coverage has changed since Xi assumed power. Historically, central news

media in China have covered CCP-sponsored propaganda. CCP has an entire office dedicated to

propaganda dissemination under the Publicity Department. Xi has used the media to carefully

cultivate an image of a visionary statesman, a family man, and a down-to-earth person (Kuhn

2018). During the early days of his presidency, he carefully promoted the image of a humble

leader in the media, earning him nicknames like “Xi Dad” or “Uncle Xi” from Chinese people.

For example, he was photographed waiting in line and paying for lunch (Yuan 2022). This

indicates a concerted personalization process by focusing media attention on leaders’ leadership

and personal qualities, personal lives, and other human dimensions (Langer 2007). A 2017 study

showed that Xi has consistently received greater media coverage than his predecessor Hu Jintao,

confirming the claims of personalization of power under his leadership (Jaros and Pan 2017).

Again, the presence of Li Keqiang, China’s former Premier and the second-most

influential leader in the CCP, has diminished simultaneously. Since 2013, media control has also

increased in China, implementing Xi’s directions on circulating positive messages surrounding

harmony and stability in Chinese media (Brady 2016, 136). Xi has used ‘positive energy’ on

multiple occasions, and since then, it has entered CCP’s official lexicon and discourse at the

highest level (Yang and Tang 2018, 2). In 2019, All-China Journalist Association updated the

code of ethics for journalists that directs following guidance from Xi’s ideologies (Wescott

2019). Journalists are required to study and prove proficiencies in Xi Jinping Thoughts on

Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (Hamilton and Ohlberg 2020, 166). The

Chinese government also has increased its global media footprint to expand its influence

(Freedom House 2022). In addition, China has been employing various digital media, e.g.,

YouTube and social media, to propagate new narratives on China beyond its border (Kuteleva

2023). These efforts indicate the government’s and party’s efforts to coordinate propaganda

dissemination, at home and abroad, that aligns with Xi’s vision.

Overall, Xi has established a cult of personality that strengthens his political grip over the

party and state. Using the need for social stability as a reason, Xi has justified the gradual

concentration of power (Li 2022). Moreover, through institutional and media personalization in

CCP, the primacy of one leader, Xi Jinping, has been established at the party’s expense.

A Nexus of Personalist Political Party and Manifestation of Violence

The previous two sections of this chapter discussed the state of violence and the

personalization of politics in China from 2010 to 2019. This discussion first shows that the

Chinese state has a high level of control over violence capacity across traditional and

nontraditional platforms, which enables stability within the country. Second, the level of

personalization increased during Xi Jinping’s leadership. When the comprehensive conception of

violence and personalization of politics in China is viewed from the perspective of the NWW

framework, it provides an opportunity to develop a nuanced understanding of this influential

theory by highlighting the inconsistencies of its framework. The economic performance of

China, in terms of both traditional and expansive ideas of development, demonstrates OAO

characteristics. However, the personalization of politics in China indicates that the country is an

LAO despite its stability, monopoly over violence capacity, and impressive developmental

performance. From the NWW social order spectrum viewpoint, China is a mature LAO.

However, this categorization does not fully capture the impact of personalization in politics on

weakening impersonal institutional mechanisms in society and strengthening the state’s capacity

to perpetrate violence. However, this categorization can help expand the conceptual

understanding of different types of social order.

According to NWW (2009), most LAOs limit electoral competition, prevent citizens from

organizing, and restrict press freedom. They also prevent parties from becoming perpetually lived

organizations (267). As a single-party state, political competition has been absent in China.

Again, perpetually lived organizations are institutions that sustain their existence for an extended

period by relying on impersonal rules, norms, and regulations. Scholars have identified weak

organizational or institutional structures as prominent features of personalist political parties

(Kefford and McDonnel 2018). As such, a political party can become a ‘perpetually lived

organization’ when the level of personalization is low. However, the discussion on CCP shows

deviations from these conditions. As a political party, the CCP has existed for around one

hundred years. It has a complex bureaucratic structure that runs party activities and manages

millions of party members. The organizational structure seems to be functioning despite ongoing

personalization in the CCP.

Again, the norm of impersonality is a critical component of the NWW framework.

According to the authors, one of the fundamental features of OAO is the “prevalence of

impersonal relationships that sustain beliefs in freedom and equality” (262). In an OAO, these

impersonal relationships exist in public and private spheres and political and economic domains.

When a society transitions from LAO to OAO, citizens obtain greater opportunities for forming

impersonation relations and face fewer restrictions. However, the personalization of the CCP

indicates that the norm of impersonality is shrinking in the political process, which also affects

other aspects of society.

The CCP has long relied on personalization in China to consolidate power and maintain

social stability. However, this personalization process has various negative consequences,

including eroding impersonal norms and perpetuating cultural and iconic violence. For example,

the discussion in the previous section highlighted how Xi gradually solidified his sole leadership

in the political party, military, and state by changing its constitution and implementing new rules.

He also ensured that his allies held important party and state positions to advance his agenda. Xi

has also expanded his influence on private entrepreneurs and businesspeople so that their

economic activities serve the party’s goals (Buckley and Bradsher 2023). In addition, CCP

membership can help advance an individual’s career in the state and public sectors. It indicates

that personal loyalty and connections are critical for essential leadership appointments at the state

or party level. As such, the typical OAO feature of impersonality is absent in CCP.

Again, the personalization process significantly impacts how violence is constructed and

perpetuated in China. One of the most significant ways the personalization process in the CCP

has led to cultural, symbolic, and iconic violence is by constructing a cult of personality around

the party’s leader Xi Jinping. Cultural, symbolic, and iconic violence refers to a form of violence

that operates more inconspicuously through social and political mechanisms, influencing

people’s beliefs and values and shaping their understanding of the world. Cultural violence is

embedded in the symbols and structures of society and perpetuates inequality and discrimination.

On the other hand, iconic violence involves using images and representations to justify and

normalize violence in pursuing political goals.

The personalization of political leaders in China has been a central aspect of Communist

Party politics since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. This process has involved the

creation of personality cults around specific leaders, as well as the promotion of a more general

cult of personality around the party itself. Media and other forms of propaganda have been

crucial in this process, as the party has sought to control the narrative around its leaders and

shape public opinion. It has also used media to disseminate certain values such as loyalty,

discipline, and the subordination of individual interests to the collective good. Such values have

been used to justify various repressive measures, including the suppression of dissent,

persecution of religious and ethnic minorities, and restriction of civil liberties.

Personalization in Chinese politics intensified under Xi’s leadership and transformed the

state’s role as a perpetrator of cultural, symbolic, and iconic violence. The characterization of Xi

as a humble and kind leader aimed to create a more relatable image for the public. The elevation

of Xi Jinping’s status to that of a ‘core leader’ and the inclusion of his political ideology, Xi

Jinping Thought, into the CCP’s constitution has cemented his status as a dominant figure in

Chinese politics. This process has been facilitated by the use of state media and propaganda,

which has constructed an image in which Xi Jinping’s leadership position has become

synonymous with China’s ascension as a global superpower.

By emphasizing the importance of Xi Jinping’s leadership in constructing a stable and

prosperous China, the CCP has created a climate in which dissent and opposition to the party’s

leadership are viewed as a threat to China’s national identity and stability. This has led to the

marginalization and repression of groups and individuals who do not conform to the party’s

vision of Chinese identity and the justification of violence against these groups in the pursuit of

national unity. The persecution of Muslims in Uyghur directly indicates how Xi has established

absolute control over China’s institutional and ideological mechanisms (Tobin 2022). Reports of

forced labor, invasive hi-tech surveillance, sexual violence, and detentions in camps of Muslim

minority groups in Uyghur for cultural assimilation indicate threats of direct and physical

violence and cultural violence (BBC 2021). The police crackdown on Hong Kong’s protesters

and arrests of activists further highlights the dangers of direct and physical violence under the

excuse of maintaining national unity (Human Rights Watch 2022). In other words, the

personalization process in the CCP has also led to the normalization of violence (direct, cultural,

and iconic) as a tool of political control.

Moreover, the role of cultural and iconic violence in the CCP personalization process is

not limited to domestic areas only. China’s increasing international influence has also been

accompanied by a projection of its cultural identity and values abroad. This has led to the use of

cultural and iconic violence as a tool of political control in other countries, particularly those in

which China seeks to expand its influence. China’s extensive political and economic leverage

sometimes compels Western media outlets to acquiesce and censor negative publicity. For

example, Chinese state officials canceled Bloomberg terminals, a significant source of income

for Bloomberg L.P., and blocked the Bloomberg news server after it published news on the

wealth of Xi’s family in June 2012. In another event in 2013, Bloomberg suspended investigative

journalist Michael Forsythe for an article on a Chinese tycoon and his ties with the CCP (Wong

and Haughney 2013). Beijing also punishes foreign journalists by restricting visas (Hamilton and

Ohlberg 2020, 182-3).

CCP also aims to amplify its discursive power through technology to influence global

norms and values (Shi-Kupfer and Ohlberg 2019). For example, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is

the focal point of Xi’s foreign policy. BRI is the most remarkable initiative to reorganize the

post-World War II international order, aiming to create a Sinocentric world, by forging economic,

business, media, cultural, and diplomatic ties (Hamilton and Ohlberg 2020).The Digital Silk

Road strategy, a component of BRI, seeks to expand the Chinese home-grown internet software

and infrastructure market in foreign countries. It also aims to reshape the international order that

resembles China’s state-led capitalist economy and an illiberal political architecture (Cheney

2019).

In summary, this chapter describes the various forms of comprehensive violence and

personalization of the only political party in China. The discussion establishes an intricate and

complex interrelationship between the personalization of politics and the comprehensive concept

of violence and sheds light on a few inconsistencies within the NWW framework. Strictly from

the NWW point of view, China is a mature LAO. However, the case study highlights that

distinguishing characteristics of different social orders might not be consistent. For example, in

terms of the first feature of a basic or mature LAO, as shown in Table 7, China exhibits more

characteristics of basic LAO.

Table 7: LAO and OAO Spectrum (Abridged Version)

Type

(Examples)

Economic Organizations

(EOs)

Political Organizations

(POs)

Violence Capacity

(VC)

Basic LAO—

Authoritarian

All major EOs—public or

“private”—are linked with

the central state; some are

also with multinationals

Most POs are

controlled by the state,

e.g., a one-party state

or dictatorship.

Opposition parties are

under threat.

Most VC

organizations are

part of the state, yet

some may compete

with or threaten the

civilian state.

Table 7 Continues

Table 7 Continued

Mature LAO

Many private firms and

multinationals. Political

connections are needed for

major economic success in

the face of informal

mechanisms of limits.

Multiple POs, but

effective power is

dependent on central

permission. The

democratic process, if

present, cannot

challenge major

economic powers.

The state controls

almost all VC.

OAO

Most are private.

Nondiscriminatory rules

exist for citizens to start an

EO and get state legal

support.

Non-discriminatory

entry rules exist for

any citizens to start or

join a PO.

No non-state

organizations have

VC.

At the beginning of this chapter, indicators from the Ease of Business Doing Index and

examples of crony capitalism in China indicate an environment where political connections help

successful business ventures. This suggests limited access and the weak presence of impersonal

rules in establishing economic organizations. Besides, the all-powerful nature of the Chinese

party-state means that it infiltrates every part of society, including economic or business

organizations. China generally accommodates a competitive market economy and does not

exercise explicit control over economic organizations. However, policies for integrating party

organizations in SOEs and private enterprises indicate attempts to influence corporate

governance and exercise implicit control over most economic organizations. As such, most

economic organizations in China are linked to the state, directly and indirectly.

Regarding the second characteristic of basic or mature LAO, China aligns with the basic

LAO category more than the mature one. The absolute dominance of one party over state power

and the absence of political competition are evident in China. The absolute power of the

partystate allows it to challenge economic forces, if necessary. For example, Jack Ma, one of the

wealthiest Chinese entrepreneurs, faced severe backlash from the government when he criticized

the country’s financial regulatory policies in 2020. Under government pressure, he remained

primarily out of the public eye for years while his company faced regulatory investigations

(Baker and Biron 2023). Therefore, political organizations have significantly more power in

China than economic organizations.

However, regarding the third characteristic of violence capacity, China exhibits more

similarities with an OAO than a mature LAO. It is also unique compared to other OAOs like the

USA, Japan, or South Korea. In these countries, armed forces are controlled by the state, led by

democratically elected governments. However, in China, the military and security forces of

China are under the control of the CCP, which is a political party. Put differently, the military is

under civilian control in China, like OAOs. This raises a question about how to define civilian

control, especially in one-party states. These inconsistencies within the NWW characteristics of

social order demonstrate the importance of taking a more comprehensive approach to this

framework.

NWW can address these contradictions by incorporating the conditions of comprehensive

violence and personalist political parties. Emphasis on state’s control over violence capacity is

not a conclusive feature of the social order because modern states are more focused on

strengthening such control, often at the expense of freedom and civil liberties. Therefore, the

conceptualization of violence in NWW requires a comprehensive approach, as discussed at the

beginning of this chapter.

In addition, the prevalence of impersonal norms in critical organizations like political

parties should also be given more priority in distinguishing social orders. The discussion on the

personalization of the CCP provides a sophisticated understanding of social order within the

NWW framework. The personalization of the CCP indicates how this process directly

undermines critical features of the norms of impersonality in institutions. This also suggests that

the personalization of political parties, especially in a single-party country, enhances the

structures of domination and repression. It can strengthen the state’s capabilities to perpetrate

direct, cultural, and iconic violence toward its citizens and use them as a tool for political control.

Under the current NWW framework, the social order categories only consider steady economic

growth, the government’s capability to control violence, maintain stability, and perform

administrative functions, the rule of law, and the presence of widespread impersonal social

relationships. However, this discussion shows that NWW social order characteristics can benefit

by incorporating a new condition — a level of personalization in political parties — as it directly

influences norms of impersonality and the manifestation of violence in society.

In conclusion, the NWW conceptual framework can be improved by integrating the

concept of comprehensive violence and personalization of political organization as distinguishing

features of social order. The NWW examines the conditions under which countries experience

different development trajectories. However, development is not only continued economic

growth. Development also means freedom from hunger and poverty as well as the freedom to

achieve self-realization (Sen 1999). It also means the right to pursue a life of dignity in a society

that embodies equality, justice, and sustainability (Himanen 2014). Such development is only

possible in a society without all kinds of violence, from physical and psychological to structural

and cultural. A political process that focuses on the vision and goal of one supreme leader is one

of the most significant obstacles in achieving such a society. Therefore, the NWW theory should

focus on these critical dimensions of modern societies. The case study on China also

demonstrates that categorizing it as a mature LAO is problematic when it clearly undermines the

institutions are playing a different role instead of fulfilling the NWW social order characteristics.

Therefore, this framework should also consider additional characteristics, such as personalization

of critical institutions like political parties, to distinguish among different types of social order.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

This thesis concerns the research question of how the conceptual framework on social

order and violence can be improved. To answer the research question, this thesis provides a

nuanced analysis of the relationship between violence and personalization in the political process

within the NWW conceptual framework by generating insights into how political institutions and

personalized power structures perpetuate violence in the contemporary world. This thesis begins

with the goal of improving the NWW conceptual framework. It identifies two specific areas of

improvement in the NWW framework: the reconceptualization of violence and the inclusion of

personalism in political parties as an essential feature in social order categorization. This thesis

contends that, while the state’s ability to control violence is essential for the social order, it can

also have negative implications for citizens’ rights and freedom. It also argues that increasing

personalization of political processes, particularly in non-democratic countries, can restrict

citizens’ freedom and liberties. Thus, by addressing these gaps in the framework, this thesis

provides a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between violence, personalization of

politics, and development.

The NWW conceptual framework is certainly important even though it does not introduce

fundamentally unique concepts. Nevertheless, it deserves credit for integrating salient concepts

such as violence and development under one umbrella. This encourages a comprehensive

approach to explaining development. The academic eminence of North, Wallis, and Weingast

undoubtedly reinforces the recognition and significance of this framework. This is an influential

theoretical work in the NIE literature. NIE has had a profound influence on global development

policies. NIE emphasizes the interconnectedness and dynamism of society, recognizing that

economic growth and development are shaped by a range of factors, such as culture, history, law,

religion, and politics, making it a more comprehensive approach to understanding economic

development. Similarly, NWW conceptual framework underscores the crucial role organizations

and institutions play and the impact of complex economic and political factors on growth and

development.

The NWW argument is simultaneously straightforward and multi-layered. This theory

argues that societies that successfully solved the violence problem have progressed politically

and economically. The key to limiting violence and maintaining stability lies in society’s

impersonal rule-based institutional and organizational network. One of the distinguishing

features of these social categories in NWW is the extent of non-discriminative access to political

and economic organizations and activities. Unlike LAOs, access to political and economic

organizations is universal in OAO societies, implying more freedom, liberty, and rights.

However, North et al. (2009) recognized the limitations of social order categories in explaining

how organizations function in society. They noted, “the categories of mature, basic, and fragile

turn out to be useful as heuristics, but real societies are much more complicated than any simple

categorization” (XIV). Access to organizations in the same society can be simultaneously open

and limited. Emphasis on stability and violence mitigation for social order can also be

problematic. Besides, the suggestion that economic and political openness sustain each other is

debatable. The economic success of countries such as China contradicts this claim and shows that

economic openness does not always complement political openness.

If we accept the NWW emphasis on the dynamism of society, it is only appropriate to

critically re-examine the conceptual framework in the present moment and identify some areas

for improvement. The conception of violence and how organizations like political parties

function have changed substantially in recent times. Technological innovations have impacted the

social fabric throughout history, changing how we pursue political, economic, and civic

activities. The expansion of the internet and sophisticated digital technology is one of the most

consequential events in human history. This has fundamentally transformed the way societies

function. In the twenty-first century, war, bloodshed, and threats of direct physical harm have

decreased compared to most of human history. As such, the conception of violence is not limited

to organized violence with destructive consequences only. On the other hand, in the current

global political climate, the personalization of politics is a common phenomenon that threatens

the organizational structure of political parties. As a vehicle for fulfilling one individual leader’s

goals, the personalization of political parties also has other negative implications for society, as it

can undermine the rule of law, weaken elite coalitions and horizontal accountability within the

party, and transform political parties, and even governance institutions.

In this context, this thesis addresses the research question using an illustrative case study

of China. Using several types of empirical information, a qualitative analysis of China’s case

generates evidence about the research objectives. First, this thesis identifies the conceptualization

of violence in the NWW framework as restrictive or minimalist because of the focus on

organized violence only. Emphasis on organized violence, with destructive implications, makes

this concept one-dimensional. The case study of China shows the inadequacy of adopting a

restrictive approach to understanding violence. From a minimalist point of view, the Chinese

state demonstrates a robust capacity to mitigate violence on both traditional and non-traditional

platforms. However, China’s case reflects the manifestation of comprehensive violence in

society.

A comprehensive concept of violence incorporates its psychological, structural, and

cultural dimensions. Structural violence obstructs non-discriminative access to political and

economic opportunities. Various forms of ideological and cultural violence normalize and

legitimize physical and psychological violence, such as arrests, detentions, and censorship. The

case of China shows that the threat of comprehensive violence has increased through digital

repression mechanisms. These types of violence manifest by utilizing state and non-state

institutions, such as legal, bureaucratic, educational, or media institutions, to disseminate specific

ideologies, icons, and messages to create a conformist society.

The high likelihood of arrests for political content indicates threats of direct and physical

violence, whereas a high level of digital surveillance and censorship suggests a high level of

repressive violence in China. Additionally, the strict content moderation in digital media that

conforms to the state and CCP ideology features mechanisms of cultural violence in Chinese

society. Digital content monitoring in China also indicates how a state can preemptively employ

repressive violence to reduce the chances of destructive violence and instability in society. The

illustrative case study of China highlights how the institutions of the state responsible for

preventing destructive violence can also be perpetrators of violence. Thus, it is imperative to

reconceptualize one of the principal determinants of NWW, violence, to maintain the

framework’s relevance in the contemporary world.

The second and last point identified by the illustrative case study of China is how the

personalization of political parties invalidates the core NWW value of impersonal relationships

in the institutional mechanisms of society. In LAO societies, personal relationships play a

significant role in determining rights, privileges, and benefits. In contrast, an OAO society

functions with impersonal rules, and everyone has the right and opportunity to compete in both

politics and the market economy. Instead of personalized networks, impersonalized institutional

mechanisms systemize the economic and political activities in the OAO. The personalization of

the political process can reinforce LAO conditions by weakening the rule of law, political

accountability, and elite coalitions about power sharing in society.

The existence of the CCP as a political organization for around a century indicates its

status as a ‘perpetually lived organization’ that can adapt to external shocks and societal changes.

The wide bureaucratic and administrative networks of the CCP underscore the party’s

organizational strength. However, the discussion on the CCP also highlighted how the CCP has

always relied on personalistic political leadership, which has intensified under Xi Jinping. This

reflects an interesting combination of the institutionalization of party organization and

personalization practices. Centralized institutional and media personalization has increased

considerably since Xi assumed leadership. He leads multiple important departments and

institutions, most notably the state, party, and military. State media also actively disseminates

propaganda that closely aligns with Xi’s ideologies and philosophies about national unity and

social harmony. Moreover, the appointment of Xi’s favored candidates in state and party

leadership positions demonstrates the presence of political patronage. The stringent selection

process for party membership and preference for party members in public-sector appointments

also highlights the limited access to political organizations and the selective distribution of

political and economic privileges.

The findings of this thesis highlight that the personalization of the political process and

the manifestation of various types of violence are closely related to each other. Political parties

are merely one type of organization in the sprawling institutional web of society. However, they

are at the center of political and economic development in any country, making them more

important than other types of organizations in society. Moreover, as a significant part of the

institutional arrangement of society, political parties are supposed to play a critical role in

mitigating violence by managing elite agreements. However, this thesis points out that political

parties can become agents of violence, especially with the high personalization of political

parties, and the risks of psychological, cultural, and repressive violence toward citizens can

increase.

These threats are even higher for non-democratic countries, where there is a lack of

political access and a limited presence of civil society organizations. In particular, the scope of

centralized personalization in the political process and the exertion of targeted violence in

nondemocratic countries has increased substantially with the expansion of digital media and

online surveillance capabilities of the government. China’s case demonstrates that the

prominence of a powerful patron or leader in politics has far-reaching consequences. The

patron’s ideologies, visions, and goals are transmitted via media and gradually reinforced through

institutional changes. The combination of constant repetition of messages and institutional

reforms can instill those values and visions in the public psyche to the point that it can become an

acceptable ideology. In the case of a globally powerful country like China, the personalization of

politics does not only impact domestic policies but also foreign policies. The digital strategies of

China, such as the Digital Silk Road, show how powerful countries can attempt to export norms

and values to foreign countries.

While this thesis has several limitations regarding the lack of data availability and

empirical analysis, it highlights the importance of critically examining influential development

theories, especially from well-renowned and established scholars. When policymakers of leading

international development organizations adopt such theories in policy planning and

implementation, they tend to have a snowball effect among regional and local level policymaking

processes. For example, when international organizations like the United Nations adopt policies

like Sustainable Development Goals, other international or local-level development organizations

worldwide, including various government departments and agencies, integrate the objectives and

themes of such policies in their own organizational policies or action plans. This thesis does not

negate the central argument of the NWW conceptual framework but contends that the lack of

nuances in the NWW hypothesis can have serious implications on development discourse. It is

imperative to accommodate the nuanced understanding of violence and threats of personalization

of political parties to avoid misusing the logic of this framework in legitimizing problematic

development models like China, which combines liberal economy and illiberal politics. The

status of China as a global superpower is indisputable at this point, which increases its capability

to, directly and indirectly, export norms and values to other countries. Chinese leaders and

policymakers also are tenacious in legitimizing their policies and strategies with every available

tool. Therefore, an influential conceptual framework like NWW should carefully design its core

arguments to avoid exploitation.

Overall, this study contributes to the NIE literature by examining the relationship between

violence and the personalization of political parties. While this research only concerns the

comprehensive conceptualization of violence and personalization of politics, there is scope for

further research to investigate other NWW core components. For example, NWW discussed the

consequences of the separation of state and religious institutions in the evolution of

impersonalized rule-based society. Future research can expand the discussion on the role of belief

and religious institutions in political and economic development under the NWW conceptual

framework. There is also scope for empirically testing the core determinates of this framework.

Additionally, the complex relationship between violence and the personalization of politics raises

the possibility of whether a political party can become an agent of violence.

Ideally, political parties represent citizens in a functional democracy, but can they become an

instrument of violence in non-democratic regimes?

The key takeaway of this study is that we should be aware of the multidimensional aspect

of violence that leaves both physical and psychological marks, especially about the implicit yet

targeted violence that curbs rights and freedom and enslaves our thought processes. This thesis

also underscores the importance of recognizing the threats of personalization in political parties,

particularly in powerful countries. This finding has implications for both citizens of home and

other countries. Given the considerable influence that superpowers wield in global politics and

the economy through bilateral and multilateral relationships, the personalization of political

parties can pose serious threats to the entire international community. The personalization of

politics in countries like China and the United States should be equally worrisome even though

they represent diametrically opposite political systems. Therefore, it is crucial to be aware of the

far-reaching consequences of the personalization of politics and ensure that political parties

prioritize institutional accountability and transparency above everything.

APPENDIX

Table A: BTI Index Indicators List

Political Transformation

Economic Transformation

Governance Transformation

Stateness:

• Monopoly on the use of

force

• State identity

• No interference of

religious dogmas

• Basic administration

Level of socio-economic

development:

• Socio-economic

barriers

Level of Difficulty:

• Structural constraints

• Civil society traditions

• Conflict intensity

• GNI p.c. PPP rescaled.

• UN Education Index rescaled.

• Average of BTI Stateness &

the Rule of Law criteria scores

Political Participation:

• Free and fair elections

• Effective power to

govern.

• Association/assembly

rights

• Freedom of expression

Organization of Free

Market and Competition:

• Market organization

• Competition policy

• Liberalization of

foreign trade

• Banking system

Steering Capability:

• Prioritization

• Implementation

• Policy learning

Rule of Law:

• Separation of powers

• Independent judiciary

• Prosecution of office

abuse

• Civil rights

Monetary and Fiscal

Stability

• Monetary stability

• Fiscal stability

Resource Efficiency:

• Efficient use of assets

• Policy coordination

• Anti-corruption policy

Stability of democratic

institutions:

• Performance of

democratic institutions

• Commitment to

democratic institutions

Private Property:

• Property rights

• Private enterprise

Consensus-building:

• Consensus on goals

• Anti-democratic actors

• Cleavage/conflict

management

• Civil society participation

• Reconciliation

Political and Social

Integration:

• Party system

• Interest groups

• Approval of democracy

• Social capital

Welfare Regime:

• Social safety nets

• Equal opportunity

International Cooperation:

• Effective use of support

• Credibility

• Regional cooperation

Economic Performance:

• Output strength

Sustainability:

• Environmental policy

• Education/R&D Policy

Table B: Qualitative Data Categories to Measure Personalism in the Ruling Political Party

(Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Li 2022)

Chapter I Introduction Theorizing the Political and Economic

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