Chapter 1 Background and Problem Statement Introduction

Regime breakdowns are pivotal moments in political history, shaping the course of

nations. These critical junctures often dictate the subsequent trajectory of a country,

serving as catalysts for transformative change or tumultuous upheaval. For

instance, the 21-year military regime in Brazil ended in 1985 via a series of

widespread protests and mass mobilizations. Motivated by the goal to withdraw the

military from domestic politics, the Brazilian uprisings centered around the demand

to transition to civilian rule (Power, 2016). As a result, Figueiredo’s military regime

broke down with elections taking place in 1985, and the newly-elected and

inaugurated democratic government started restoring free elections and civil

liberties (Hochstetler, 2006).

In contrast, the breakdown of Mubarak’s 30-year military regime in Egypt

exemplifies a different facet of regime breakdown. Although the 2011 protests in

Tahrir Square ultimately resulted in the incumbent ejection of Mubarak and paved

the way for procedurally free and fair elections, the military and the Egyptian

Supreme Court of the Armed Forces used them to create an exclusivist political

arena, marginalize political voices and further shatter any democratization attempts

(Stacher, 2020). Upon Morsi’s democratic election in 2012, he took an aggressive

turn as he edged towards authoritarianism by retiring military officers and issuing

unchecked decrees, sparking widespread demonstrations (Adigbuo,

2013). Shortly after, in 2013, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi orchestrated a violent

military coup, ousting Morsi and inaugurating an enduring autocratic era

characterized by aggressive state violence, the suppression of opposition groups,

and shattered attempts at democratization (Stacher, 2020). The subsequent 2013

military coup d’etat ultimately led to the emergence of a new military regime, one

that is far more authoritarian and repressive than Mubarak’s 30-year-long rule over

Egypt (Stacher, 2020).

While these cases are not exhaustive, they stand as compelling examples illustrating

the diverse trajectories that regime breakdown and post-breakdown spheres can

take, from non-violent and stable transformations to violent and unstable ruptures.

The briefly outlined cases furthermore raise a fundamental question central to our

current understanding of regime breakdown processes: Although it is frequently

asserted that the prior regime type has a varying effect on the regime breakdown

outcomes when the established order is contested (Geddes, 1999), how can we

account for the disparity observed between two countries with identical prior

regime types that lead to distinct post-breakdown results? For instance, one military

regime transitions to democracy through a regime breakdown enabled by a popular

uprising. Conversely, the other military regime becomes a more entrenched

authoritarian setting via a military coup d’état. The intricate dynamics within these

cases serve as a springboard for understanding the broader puzzle centered around

deciphering the varied dynamics surrounding political violence

across different modes of regime breakdown.

As such, this thesis analyzes the relationship between the different modes of regime

breakdown and the extent to which they impact state violence by the incoming

regime after the breakdown. Specifically, it addresses two overarching questions

central to our understanding of this relationship:

(1) What is the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on short-term state

violence instigated by the incoming regime?

(2) What is the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on long-term state

violence instigated by the incoming regime?

The theoretical framework presented in this thesis is underpinned by the following

conceptualizations of regime breakdown and state violence: regime breakdown is

understood as the first of three phases of regime change, namely, the deconstruction

and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime. As for state violence, it is

conceptualized as the use of physical violence by state actors to inflict harm on non-

state actors. Theoretically, this thesis examines the multifaceted mechanisms

through which military coups create a political environment conducive for the

incoming regime to catalyze and exacerbate state violence. From the abrupt

overthrow of the existing regime and the fast consolidation of power and repression

tactics used by the incoming military regime to achieve the militarization of

institutional and governance structures, this thesis dissects different factors through

which military coups engender violence committed by the incoming regime.

Similarly, this thesis examines the mechanisms linking popular uprising with post-

breakdown state violence. It underscores how the participatory nature of popular

uprisings influences legitimacy, governance structures, economic development, and

the level of international support – thereby linking how these factors help mitigate

the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime after the breakdown.

As such, the hypotheses are formulated as follows:

H1: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate

violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

H2: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate

violence in the long term than a regime that emerges after a popular uprising.

To test the outlined hypotheses quantitatively, this thesis undergoes an empirical

analysis with cross-sectional data spanning from 1900 until 2013 to examine the

different modes of regime breakdown and their correlation to the level and duration

of state violence. It does so by analyzing the levels of state violence by the incoming

regime one year after each breakdown, five years, and ten years after. As such, the

primary objective is as follows: By analyzing different modes of regime

breakdown, this research aims to improve our understanding of how state violence

by the incoming regime persists and varies in the post-breakdown sphere. The

regression models found that military coups are more likely to be associated with

higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after

regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. These findings underscore the

importance of considering the mode of regime breakdown when discussing post-

breakdown state violence and the implications for state-society relations.

Furthermore, this analysis underscores the evolving nature of state violence

dynamics. While the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence by

the incoming regime is significant until five years following a regime breakdown,

the impact diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant at the ten-year cut-off

point after a regime breakdown enabled by a military coup or popular uprising.

To contextualize the quantitative analysis, this thesis also illustrates the sequence

of events surrounding the 2011 popular uprising and the consequential 2013

military coup in Egypt. Specifically, a process-tracing analysis is conducted, which

aims to delve deep into the implications of state violence when two successive

regime breakdowns occur within temporal proximity. In doing so, this thesis

examines the extent to which state violence was instigated by the Supreme Council

of Armed Forces and the Morsi regime after the 2011 uprising. It contrasts it with

the level of violence instigated by El-Sisi’s regime in post-coup Egypt – and the

duration thereof. The sequence of events in the Egyptian context shows how the

military regime, which emerged against the backdrop of a popular uprising, was

initially successful in leveraging the symbolism of the revolution to gain legitimacy

and present narratives of stability, security, and economic promises. However, after

securing the public’s mandate to instigate violence initially against the Muslim

Brotherhood and shortly after against any source of dissent, the popular support that

once bolstered the El-Sisi regime has since been supplanted by widespread popular

discontent in light of the ongoing cycle of unprecedented violence and repression.

In consideration of the above, the contribution of this thesis to existing scholarship

is twofold. While regime breakdowns have gained significant scholarly attention in

the past decades (Levitsky & Way, 2013; Goldring & Greitens, 2020; Clarke, 2017),

it is often treated as a single concept and traditionally perceived in the transitology

literature as the first phase in regime change, one that is followed by democratic

transition and democratic consolidation (Gill & Gill, 2000; Frantz & Kendall-

Taylor, 2017; Haggard & Kaufman, 2016). Only a few studies have examined how

different factors in the post-breakdown sphere can vary depending on the mode of

breakdown (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). As such, this paper's first contribution

lies in its focus on the mode of regime breakdown and its implications for the level

and duration of state violence instigated by the incoming regime in the post-

breakdown political sphere. This thesis transcends existing theories that

predominantly focus on assessing and explaining the levels of political violence in

the post-breakdown sphere based on the prior regime type pre-breakdown. Instead,

this study endeavors to shift its lens toward examining the modus operandi of the

regime breakdown itself, seeking to present an alternative explanation for the

varying levels of state violence after the breakdown. Second, in addition to

augmenting the understanding of state violence through the different intensity

levels, this thesis aims to broaden the scope of the analysis by examining the

temporal dimension of state violence. By analyzing the duration of state violence

by the incoming regime, this thesis provides a more comprehensive narrative that

captures the evolution of state violence over time in post-breakdown scenarios. It

unveils the interplay between different modes of breakdown and the duration of

state violence in the aftermath of the breakdown. Overall, this thesis provides a

holistic perspective on the complexities inherent in the post-breakdown sphere by

analyzing whether the mode of regime breakdown affects the level and duration of

state violence.

This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 constitutes a comprehensive literature

review examining existing arguments on political violence and regime breakdown.

It elucidates the intricacies of political violence by addressing its different

conceptualizations, typologies, and determinants. Similarly, it delves deep into the

processes of regime breakdown by discussing scholarly discourse surrounding the

different modes of breakdown, authoritarian durability, and the variables that can

influence regime trajectories. Subsequently, Chapter 3 builds upon the literature by

developing a theoretical model that hypothesizes on the mechanisms through which

military coups and popular uprisings influence the level and duration of state

violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following a breakdown. This analysis

presents this study’s formulated hypotheses, which shed light on the multifaceted

mechanisms through which military coups create a conducive political environment

for the incoming regime to catalyze and exacerbate state violence. In contrast,

popular uprisings create a climate that helps mitigate the likelihood of state violence

by the incoming regime after the breakdown. To test the hypotheses, Chapter 4

presents a set of regression models that find that military coups are more likely to

be associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime than

popular uprisings. As such, Chapter 5 contextualizes the quantitative results by

illustrating the events of the 2011 popular uprising and the 2013 military coup in

Egypt through a process-tracing analysis. Lastly, Chapter 6 offers concluding

remarks.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter constitutes a comprehensive literature review examining existing

arguments on political violence and regime breakdown. It aims to dissect the

different dimensions and factors underpinning the occurrence of both phenomena.

The first part elucidates the intricacies of political violence, whereas the second part

delves deeper into regime breakdown.

The first part is titled “Part I: Understanding Political Violence.” This part embarks

on a journey to understand the multifaceted nature of political violence. The chapter

begins by exploring the concept of violence itself. It presents different scholarly

perspectives, ranging from the classic delineation of legitimate rule to

contemporary definitions addressing the different violations considered violent,

such as the restriction of physical freedom and mental integrity. After laying the

groundwork, the challenges of defining and conceptualizing the term political

violence are presented. The sections navigate through different historical

precedents and theoretical frameworks to understand the inherent, symbiotic

connection between politics and violence. Moving forward, the typology of

political violence is discussed by presenting comprehensive classifications

proposed by different scholars to gain insights into the varied dimensions of

political violence, its dynamic nature, and complex interactions. To conclude the

first section, the intricate web of factors that shape the emergence of political

violence is explored. Specifically, the different determinants of political violence,

with a specific focus on structural, cultural, and individual factors, are examined.

Transitioning to the second part of this chapter, “Part II: Understanding Regime

Breakdown”, the focus of the literature review is shifted toward the process of

regime breakdown and its aftermath. To conceptualize this phenomenon, the

sections below delve deep into the scholarly discourse surrounding authoritarian

regimes, democratization processes, and authoritarian durability. Through the

exploration of regime breakdown in the context of regime change at large, this

chapter discusses different questions about when it leads to regime change and

when it does not. Continuing this exploration, the different determinants of

breakdowns are discussed by probing into both domestic and international factors

that influence regime trajectories. In this context, factors like economic crises,

political mobilization, and international pressure are dissected as myriad forces

shaping the fate of authoritarian regimes. Building upon this foundation, different

modes of breakdown are discussed, ranging from the classical categorizations of

military coups, popular uprisings, loss in war, and so on, but also delving deep into

the dynamics of pacted transitions. Lastly, the emergence of political violence in

the post-breakdown sphere is discussed.

While Part I and Part II of this chapter discuss the ongoing scholarly debates

revolving around the definitions of regime breakdown and political violence, the

sections clearly highlight how both phenomena are conceptualized and defined in

this paper. For the definition of political violence, this research has chosen to

conceptualize political violence in its most narrow definition, namely as “the use

of physical force to inflict injury or cause damage to a person or property”

(Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817) by state or non-state actors for political reasons.

Subsequently, state violence is understood as the use of physical violence by state

actors to inflict harm on non-state actors. As for regime breakdown, this thesis

perceives regime breakdown as the first of three phases of regime change; namely,

the deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime.

In essence, this chapter serves as a foundational exploration of political violence

and regime breakdown, laying the ground for the subsequent analysis in the

subsequent chapters. By synthesizing different scholarly perspectives, this chapter

aims to conceptualize the phenomena discussed in this thesis and unravel the

associated factors.

Part I: Understanding Political Violence

1. Definition of Violence

Before discussing the literature on political violence, it is essential to take a step

back and delve deep into the intricate dynamics of the term “violence.” This is a

springboard for understanding the interplay of violence in politics.

The most narrow understanding of violence is deeply rooted within the Weberian

sociological school of thought and what Weber himself referred to as legitime

Herrschaft – legitimate rule (Weber, 1921). The concept of the legitimate rule

implies compliance with laws, but more broadly, the authorization to act. As such,

understanding violence from the legitimate rule perspective imposes a clear

distinction between the authorized and legitimate use of violence by state actors

and the illegitimate use by non-state actors. In building up on Weber’s distinction,

scholars have typically referred to the former as force and the latter as violence

(Parsons, 1964; Coser, 1967).

A broader understanding of violence in more recent literature frames violence as

the use of physical force, regardless of which actors are performing it and the kind

of substantiation that is provided (Van der Dennen, 2005). The conflicts that could

potentially arise within the legitimation of violence by non-state actors were

thoroughly given thought to by international organizations such as the United

Nations in the 1970s. This consideration came in light

of non-state actors resorting to violence to justify their attempts at

national liberation during anti-colonial struggles or to threaten authoritarian

regimes (Taylor, 1991). Under this conceptualization, violence is perceived as an

invasion of personal inviolability no matter who resorted to its use and who was

victimized by it. In other words, the former distinction between force and violence

is blurred — violence is primarily perceived as the restriction of physical freedom

by any entity. (Grundy & Weinstein, 1974).

A more expansive understanding of violence encompasses not only the restriction

of physical freedom and integrity but also the violation of an individual’s or a group

of people’s mental integrity (Taylor, 1991). Consequently, the term violence

encompasses not only physical attacks but also discrimination and defamation. It

also constitutes any acts that threaten the autonomy of a person and extend to

different forms of emotional or mental abuse and the determination of destructive

harm (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001; Mazurkiewicz, 2006). It is noteworthy that

some scholars have contested this definition of violence by arguing that both

defamation and discrimination cannot be placed under the same category as

physical violence (Grundy and Weinstein, 1974).

In the broadest definition of violence, it is understood as the restriction that is

imposed on an individual. It is perceived as any form of violation, such as the

violation of fundamental rights, individual rights, or community rights (Grundy and

Weinstein, 1974). At large, individuals are entitled to two fundamental rights: the

right to their bodies and the right to autonomy (freedom). If one of these rights is

violated, this school of thought asserts that it is perceived as violence (Garver,

1974). Under this definition, the concept commonly known as “structural violence”

was first conceptualized by Galtung (1969). Structural violence results from

inequalities stemming from economic, political, and social structures and

institutions, which can result in inequalities in different social subsystems, such as

education opportunities and military and legal structures. This type of violence is

invisible within social structures and can create both political oppression and

economic exploitation. However, structural violence can result in the suffering and

death of the individuals suffering from it, and it also can lead to direct violence

from the oppressed towards the oppressors (Winter & Leighton, 2003).

However, Thomas (2001) argues that broad definitions of violence, including

structural violence, are not useful in the study of international relations. While the

relationship between structural injustice and violence is important, scholars should

not label all structural injustice as violent. Instead, the author argues the narrow

understanding of direct violence as “the use of physical force to to inflict injury or

cause damage to a person or property” is more useful (Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817).

2. Definition of Political Violence

Political violence is a type of violence and can be manifested and examined from

the perspective of the different understandings of violence illustrated above. In

general, it is difficult to define the relationship between violence and politics due

to its cognitive and multifaceted nature (Taylor, 1991). Wright Mills’ (1956) famous

quote, “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence,”

and Weber’s (1921) belief that the lack of violence in political life can only be

explained by the indifference of individuals and their insensitivity to socio-political

problems are both a springboard for the standard argument in the literature; namely

that politics and violence cannot be separated from each other.

Other scholars also argue for the connection between violence and politics. Arendt

(1963) argued that violence in politics dates back to medieval and postmedieval

schools of political thought, during which legitimate rebellion against an existing

authority and resistance was used as a tool to instill pressure on the authority. In her

renowned essay “On Violence”, Arendt (1970) also emphasizes the permanent

nature of the violence in politics and asserts that the connection of violence in

politics is interconnected in a way that conspicuously manifests power – although

violence and power can be perceived as the opposite sides of the spectrum, both

can be used for politics.

Furthermore, in attempts to conceptualize what political violence is, scholars have

found themselves in conflict with each other on the definition of “political” in the

term “political violence”. This stems from the fact that there is a certain flexibility

in defining the concept of politics, which ultimately results from different

experiences and historical traditions (Ryszka, 1990). Politics can be exceptionally

subjectively defined and categorized, and the question of the limit of politics even

goes back to the limits of an individual’s political sensitivity (Dybel and Wróbel,

2008). A narrow and broad definition of politics is available in the stream of

literature on political science as a discipline at large (Bodio, 2003). A narrow

definition is restricted to the consensual definition of politics and tightly limits the

understanding of political actions to what can be considered legitimate. It

emphasizes the importance of consultation and cooperation. For instance, Deutsch

(1966) defines politics as the coordination by individuals to arrive at the goals of

society. Another definition encompasses concepts such as stability, coordination,

contribution, and integration to the social structure, which is built upon the common

values shared by members of society (Dahrendorf, 1975).

However, these narrow definitions of politics do not take into consideration

different phenomena like war, civil war, and coups within a political framework.

Not only do they not take into consideration instances characterized by high

intensity of violence, but they also do not take into account other instances with

violence levels, such as the use of physical force against individuals or the violation

of fundamental rights of individuals. As such, the definitions of political violence

encompass the broad definition of politics (Mider, 2014). The broad definitions of

politics leave excellent room for subjectivity in their interpretation; it can

encompass the procedures of elections or the outbreak of a revolution or a civil war

(Mider, 2014). For example, Rapoport (1960) defines politics as a gradable concept,

which can either be practiced as a form of debate to convince the enemy of a game

with cooperation and rivalry as its rules or a fight to destroy the political opponent.

Against this backdrop, scholars have proposed different theories to define the

actions that are considered political violence. First, Lupsha and Mackinnon (1973)

examine this from three perspectives. The first perspective entails all activities

related to politics from the opinion of the target against which these actions were

taken. This includes attacks on state institutions and government representatives.

Their second perspective categorizes acts of political violence based on the events

and the initiator consciousness that led to an act of violence. For example, it would

be considered an act of political violence if it resulted from a political decision

being introduced or implemented. Lastly, the third perspective takes into account

violent actions that have been taken by groups that have specific political goals,

such as political parties and movements. In this perspective, acts of violence are

perceived as intentional or semi-intentional actions that include force, lead to

psychological or mental harm to other individuals and groups, and were undertaken

with the ultimate goal of influencing a political process.

On the other hand, other scholars have put forward more broad definitions that

conceptualize political violence as collective action involving high intensity

physical force intended to damage an enemy or achieve political goals. This

broadness is rooted in the classical social science definition of violence, namely

widely perceived as the behavior “designed to inflict physical injury on people or

damage to property” (Graham & Gurr, 1969: XVII) and “any observable interaction

in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite

of resistance” (Tilly, 1978; 176). When specifically looking at oppositional or non-

state political violence, it has also been perceived as a series of collective acts used

within a political community to attack and oppose the regime in power (Gurr, 1973).

As the academic debate on the definition and conceptualization of both violence

and political violence dates back to the timeframe of 1960s-1980s, many modern

scholars have followed this line of thought and characterized political violence as

the use of force, coercion, or means of intimidation by individuals, groups or states

to achieve their political objectives or maintain power (Hoffman, 2006). They also

add that the term can encompass and take different forms of violence, including but

not limited to armed conflicts, terrorism, political assassinations, riots, and state

repression (Collier et al., 2002). Additionally, Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2017)

stress that political violence comprises diverse elements such as repertoire,

targeting, frequency, and technique. However, Della Porta (2002) has criticized the

stretching potential of the term as it has resulted in difficulties in operationalizing

as it is highly subjective to interpret and closely related to subjective historical

experiences. The operationalization and empirical assessment can become

controversial or even problematic for three reasons: (A) it is essential to understand

that a degree of physical force may be included in collective actions that cannot be

perceived or considered violent per se; (B) all collective action, violent or non-

violent, typically has the goal to damage an opponent or an adversary and lastly,

that cannot be considered legitimate political action, it remains challenging to

measure legitimacy empirically (Mider, 2014).

While all authors cited above make a great case in justifying their definitions of

political violence, this research has chosen to define and conceptualize political

violence in its most narrow definition. Therefore, political violence is understood

“the use of physical force to inflict injury or cause damage to a person or property”

(Thomas, 2011; pg. 1817) by state or non-state actors for political reasons. As such,

moving forward in following sections of this thesis, when state violence is

discussed, it is defined as the use of physical violence by state actors to inflict harm

on non-state actors.

3. Typology of Political Violence

Political violence can take many forms and involves different collection actions

such as property destruction, rioting, clashes between ethnic or political factions,

confrontations with law enforcement, targeted physical assaults, indiscriminate

bombings, the armed takeover of locations or individuals, robberies, and instances

of hijacking (Kalyvas, 2019). Given the broadness of this phenomenon, several

authors have created criteria to reduce the complexity of political violence and

increase its traceability. First, Della Porta (2002, pg. 7) suggested the following:

“I suggested the following dimensions as most relevant for a

typology: (1) the intensity of violence (low-level violence, usually not

enacted against people, versus high-level violence, including political

assassinations) and (2) the organizational form of violence (open

versus underground). On the basis of these two variables, I formulated

a fourfold typology including the following: (1) unspecialized violence

– low-level, less-organized violence; (2) semi-military violence –

violence that is also low-level but is more organized; (3) autonomous

violence – violence used by loosely organized groups that emphasize a

“spontaneous” recourse to high-level violence; and (4) clandestine

violence – the extreme violence of groups that organize underground

for the explicit purpose of engaging in the most radical forms of

collective action”

Another classification was put forward by Kalyvas (2019), who classified different

types of political violence based on two different dimensions: (A) the perpetrator

— being either a state or non-state actor, and (B) the target — being either a state

or non-state actor. Based upon these criteria, he classifies different existing

categories and typologies of political violence in the literature.

Interstate war is classified by Kalyvas (2019) as a violent activity perpetuated by a

state against another state. Previously not paid attention to in the literature beyond

legal theories regarding the laws of war, violence had been overlooked by other

topics and perceived as a natural consequence of interstate war (Gat, 2008).

However, recent theories developed on civilian victimization during the interstate

war have shifted scholarly attention to the correlation between regime type and

civilian victimization (Downes, 2004). The most renowned theory in IR studies

remains the democratic peace theory, positing that democracies are less likely to

engage in wars against each other (Russett et al., 1993). However, other theories

have challenged the premise of the democratic peace theory by arguing that

democracies also resort to violence to maintain their existence against any

threatening violent movements; such violence can escape democratic control and

the democratic state’s foundational rights (Schwarzmantel, 2009).

Under the category of state-perpetuated violent activities against non-state actors,

Kalyvas (2019) identifies state repression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. State

repression is characterized by the use of violence by states against their opposition

within the country. It is typically deployed by autocratic regimes with different

intensities – varying from limited coercion to extensive mass violence (Davenport,

2007). The academic consensus on state repression is that non-violent opposition

dissent provokes state repression more than violent dissent, the effects of repression

in the longer run heavily rely on the state’s capacity and its relationship with the

security apparatus, and lastly, the effectiveness of state repression is decreased

when it is targeted against organized non-violent opposition in comparison to other

forms of opposition (Chenoweth et al., 2017). Genocide is a state-led activity

motivated by the intent to completely exterminate a particular group of people

based on characteristics determined by birth as perceived by the state (Straus,

2015). Likewise, ethnic cleansing is a subcategory under genocide that also aims at

the extermination of a particular group, specifically targeting the creation of a state

characterized by ethnic homogeneity (Liebermann, 2006; Bulutgil, 2016).

As for politically violent activities perpetuated by non-state actors and targeting

state actors, the following types are classified: organized crime, mass protest,

military coup, political assassination, civil war, and terrorism (Kalyvas, 2019).

Organized crime, produced by organized criminal motivations such as cartels and

motivated by illicit profit maximization, typically aims at exercising indirect

influence on state actors to ensure that their business can be conducted in a country.

The violence that is associated with organized crime can create militarized violence

against the state and its civilians (Schedler, 2013), lead to full-fledged wars

(Lessing, 2017), recruit local civilians and provide them with arms (Kalyvas, 2015),

and lastly increase political contention and rebellion (Hobsbawm, 1971). While

mass protests can be a peaceful activity to express claims in democratic settings,

this might not be the scenario if they erupted in authoritarian settings (Kalyvas,

2019). Authoritarian states are likely to either react with the use of violence and

cause civilian casualties or resort to repressing the mass protest violently (Pierskalla

2010). In a few cases, protests can escalate into a mass uprising or even a social

revolution. If the authoritarian fails to repress, it could lead to regime breakdown

(Beissinger, 2002).

On the other hand, military coups constitute a coordination game from the military’s

side and a form of rebellion against the state (Luttwak, 2016). They tend to occur

overnight and produce low levels of violence, but they could also lead to intense

fighting between the military and the state or transform into civil wars (Singh,

2014). Political assassinations target high-profile figures for political reasons and

can have significant effects on democratic prospects (Iqbal & Zorn, 2008). Weak

and repressive authoritarian leaders face the highest risks for assassination, but the

successful assassination of authoritarian leaders typically leads to sustained efforts

toward democratization after the attack (Jones and Olken, 2009). Civil wars have

been closely associated with high levels of violence due to their transgressive nature

of extreme civilian victimization (Kalyvas, 2006). It is frequently argued that low

income countries and weak states are more prone to the onset of civil war (Fearon

& Laitin, 2003). In the same context, countries that are neither clearly democratic

nor autocratic and are situated in times of political change are more likely to be at

risk of civil war (Hegre, 2001). Lastly, terrorism is used as a means of violence to

intimidate a large group of people beyond the immediate victims of the terrorist

group. It is typically operated not only on domestic land but also internationally in

foreign states (Enders and Sandler, 2012).

Finally, intercommunal violence is considered among politically violent activities

perpetrated by non-state actors but also targeting non-state actors. It describes the

setting whereby there is intense and lethal conflict between civilians from one

ethnic group and civilians from another ethnicity (Horowitz, 2000). It also includes

rebel groups killing opposition party supporters and members (Sundberg et al.,

2012).

A seminal insight emerging from the scholarship on political violence underscores

a close relationship between armed conflict and violence against unarmed civilians,

notably visible in autocracies such as genocide, mass killings, and ethnic cleansing

(Valentino, 2000; Straus, 2006; Downes, 2017). In the past decade, scholars have

increasingly acknowledged that large-scale violence against civilians in interstate

and civil wars is not random, unintended, and peripheral to the essence of warfare

(Valentino, 2014). In this regard, Valentino (2000, p.47) has modified Clausewitz’s

famous “war as politics by other means” to “sometimes mass killing is simply war

by other means”. This perspective shows that civilians are not bystanders to armed

conflict but often unwitting participants who serve as essential providers of a war’s

material, financial, or human resources (Valentino, 2014).

4. Determinants of Political Violence

In understanding the complex phenomenon of political violence, it is pivotal to

explore the multitude of factors that contribute to its occurrence. A plethora of

scholars have argued that acts of political violence have emerged out of reality with

a system of defective socio-political structures. As such, three different approaches

have been taken to explain the determinants of political violence, namely structural,

cultural, and individual approaches. The sections shed light on these different

theories.

(A) Structural Determinants of Political Violence

Scholars have argued that the structural sources of political violence stem from the

social and political systems, specifically the inequalities between the different

social classes, the economic system, and the prevailing political hierarchy

(Burgoon, 2006). Likewise, the role attributed to how the states’ institutions and

structures function concerning generating political violence or suppressing attempts

at political violence is also frequently discussed. In this context, specific arguments

are made about different governance systems. It is argued that the different

structures and systems in democratic states are designed to prevent actions of

political violence through a multitude of layers, for instance, by holding periodic

free and fair elections and undergoing both police procedures and court proceedings

(Keane, 2004). When violence is manifested in democracies, it is usually a

testimony to significant defects in a country’s democratic structures.

High governmental legitimacy is typically associated with low levels of violence

(Hughes, 2004).

Another structural source of political violence is theorized to be an excessive

distance between the state and its citizens. This distance is likely to create a social

clash between different ethics and mutual blocking (Mider, 2014). Overwhelming

institutionalization and bureaucratization of a state not only exacerbate the distance

between the state and its citizens but can also be perceived as a form of violence

from the state against its citizens and can retaliate the use of force and violence by

its citizens as a reaction (Peyrefitte, 1982). In his essay, Mider (2014, pg. 180)

summarizes the widely identified structural determinants of political violence as

follows: “violation of the democratic process (violation of human rights, violation

of legal norms by the state, corruption), political instability (sudden changes in

governance), the ethnic composition of the ruling group differing significantly from

the rest of society (political and economic power distributed according to an ethnic,

religious or social key), the deterioration of public services (a significant decline in

the range and effectiveness of public social security allowing for the provision of a

universal minimum standard of

services).”

(B) Cultural Determinants of Political Violence

Another stream of literature has found an alternative perspective to explain the

emergence of political violence. Namely, scholars argue that the sources of violence

need to be considered from a cultural perspective by paying attention to the patterns

of behavior and actions within a social community resulting from sanctioned values

and beliefs passed down through the natural course of socialization (Mider, 2014).

More specifically, violence emerges when it is culturally widely held that violence

is an effective method to achieve

socio-political goals and objectives in a society (Gurr, 1970).

To furthermore understand how these cultural beliefs normalize the use of violence

as an effective tool for political goals, scholars have shifted their focus on (A)

micro-social factors, such as the socialization processes that normalize the use of

violence, (B) macro-social factors, such as the historical experiences and

consequent beliefs and (C) factors that emerge from contact between different

cultures, such as cultural shocks and clash of civilizations (Mider, 2014). From the

micro-social perspective, the emergence of violence can be perceived as a result of

defective socialization processes within the family, e.g., broken families,

emotionally distant families, exposure to domestic violence and domestic sexual

abuse, or extreme religious and cultural beliefs at home that embed specific cultural

norms, values, and rules. This remains a significant cause of violence as such an

environment normalizes different subcultures of violence, for instance, by having a

relationship with the perpetrators, building loyalty within gangster groups,

recurring hospitalization as a result of violence, normalization of violence from the

media and lack of condemnation for violence at large (Guerra & Huesmann 2004;

Hartogs, 1970). Some scholars have even built upon these micro-social factors to

explain the basis of an authoritarian personality, highlighting that cultural factors

such as conservative methods of upbringing, lack of emotional support, and severe

punishments fuel displaced aggression (Sanford et al., 2010).

From the macro-social perspective, authors pay attention to the dominant cultures

that can generate the willingness of individuals to partake in violent actions. More

specifically, in the attempt to explain the different cultural approaches to violence,

scholars pay attention to the differences between the different scopes, frequencies,

and intensities of violence in different societies (Gurr, 1970). In this context, the

historical context of every culture is deemed of significant importance. For

example, the frontier theory and the role of firearms in the creation of the US state

(the gun theory) are theorized to have contributed to the normalization of the

Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms (Nieburg, 1963). Any approach or

historical event that normalizes the use of violence evolves over time into the

emergence of a dominant culture that accepts violence (Mider, 2014). However,

other scholars contributed to this debate by arguing that the cultural determinants

of violence cannot be dated back to one historical event but rather to the

characteristics of the entire cultural system. Precisely, the societies that still have

agrarian, pre-modernist characteristics create a recipe for war. In contrast, societies

that have fully emerged in social control development are less likely to be violent

(Durkheim, 1992).

The third approach to explaining the determinants of political violence involves the

examination of personality-based characteristics. It mainly focuses on subjective

perspectives – such as different emotional factors, personal motives, and

experiences – that could lead to some individuals condoning and actively

participating in acts of violence, whereas others do not (Barken & Snowden, 2001;

Mider, 2014). At large, one overarching argument stemming from psychoanalytic

studies views the concept of violence as devoid of social sense, pathological, and

symptomatic of an individual's insanity (Apter, 1997). The perception of violence

as a phenomenon that lacks social sense can anchored in three different

understandings: violence can be caused by random or unintentional factors, it can

signify behaviors of individuals exhibiting irrationality due to factors such as

mental illness, substance influence, and extreme stress or lastly, violence can be

performed without moral and ethical contemplation and devoid of consideration for

possible consequences (Ball-Rokeach, 1973). Additional arguments have been set

forward on the correlation between the use of violence and severe childhood or

sexual traumatic experiences (Grimshaw, 2017).

While on the one hand, Barkan and Snowden (2001) posit that a rational

explanation of collective violence does not exist, other scholars embrace the

rational choice theory and argue that the use of violence is a rational choice taken

by an individual after calculating the advantages and disadvantages (Apter, 1997).

When analyzing both the advantages and disadvantages of violence, the contention

arises that the use of violence comes at a prohibitive cost and can only rationally be

taken if the potential advantages outweigh the potential punishment or loss that

comes with it (Mider, 2014). Therefore, it is assumed that the decision to undertake

such an action is thoroughly thought through and typically

significantly serves any interest (Malešević, 2010).

Part II: Understanding Regime Breakdown

1. Conceptualizing Regime Breakdown and Authoritarian Durability

The study of the third wave of democratization has commonly perceived the process

of regime change as three phases: regime breakdown, democratic transition, and

democratic consolidation. While regime breakdown typically refers to the

deconstruction and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime, a democratic

transition is defined as the change and shift in the structure and process. Lastly,

democratic consolidation is when these new structures and processes have

stabilized in a country and have been embedded across its institutions and citizens,

gaining normative authority. Remarkably, these three phases are only sometimes

temporally separate from each other and can simultaneously overlap. Nonetheless,

a regime breakdown does not necessarily lead to establishing a democratic system

(Gill, 2000). In line with this categorization, this paper defines and refers to regime

breakdown as the first of three phases of regime change; namely, the deconstruction

and potential disintegration of the incumbent regime.

Evidence from the third wave of democratization indicates a rise in the frequency

of regime breakdowns followed by democratic transitions and consolidation,

alongside a simultaneous increase in rates of democratic backsliding (Lührmann &

Lindberg, 2019). This phenomenon has prompted many scholars to ask

themselves different questions about authoritarian durability and many underlying

factors that answer the following questions: First, why do some regimes break down

while others do not? Second, why do some breakdowns lead to democratic

consolidation, whereas others do not?

In this context, different theories and explanations have been put forward. A notable

argument by Brownlee (2007) posits that there are institutional differences between

unstable authoritarian regimes and durable dictatorships. He argues that whereas

authoritarian regimes tend to hold elections to receive clear indicators for political

competition, elections can either serve as catalysts to promote democratization

opportunities or ensure durable authoritarianism. Instead, the main factor

preventing regime breakdown and enhancing regime durability is the interaction of

elites within the ruling party. If the ruling party takes on the function of sustaining

the coalition of elites, contributes to the resolution of elite conflicts during the

period of regime formation, and enables a structure that allows room for its

members’ influence on agenda-setting and individual ambitions, the likelihood of

elite defection to the opposition can be minimized and regime breakdown will be

less likely to occur. A different perspective proposed by Gerschweski (2015) puts

three pillars at the forefront of the stability of autocratic regimes: legitimation,

repression, and cooptation. Specifically, the author contends that these three pillars

gain their stabilization effect by three different processes that happen within the

individual pillars and between the pillars: 1) the exogenous self-reinforcement

process within the pillars is driven by the need for an external drive to navigate the

process, such as power and material resources, 2) the endogenous self-enforcing

institutionalization process within the pillars when they are enforced by high-fixed

and set-up costs, coordination efforts and network effects and start exhibiting

increasing returns and lastly 3) the reciprocal reinforcement and complementarity

within the pillars.

Beyond the arguments that discuss regime breakdowns in authoritarian regimes at

large, other arguments have been put forward in this regard on specific types of

authoritarian regimes. For example, Lachapelle et al. (2020) argue that autocracies

that emerge from social revolutions – commonly referred to as revolutionary

regimes – are more likely to be durable and, therefore, less likely to break down

than non-revolutionary regimes. When revolutionaries take over power in a

collapsed state, radical policies are typically implemented to transform the state.

These are typically catalysts for violent conflict initiated by counter-revolutionary

and military threats. Revolutionary regimes that survived these conflicts built a

cohesive ruling elite, a loyal military, a powerful coercive apparatus, and a

decentralized source of power due to the existential threat faced during their state-

building process. These legacies strengthen authoritarian durability and protect the

regime against elite defection, military coups, and mass protests. On a similar

wavelength, Levitsky and Way (2012) address the durability of party-based

authoritarian regimes and argue that the distribution of patronage among elites in

ruling parties enhances regime durability during peaceful times but ultimately does

not prevent elite defection and regime durability during violent conflict.

Specifically, they argue that “ruling parties will be most cohesive where they have

gained power due to a sustained, violent, and ideationally driven struggle”

(Levitsky and Way, 2012, pg. 871). Violent conflict fosters partisan identities,

strengthens partisan boundaries, necessitates the establishment of militarized

structures within the military and the security apparatus, and enhances the regime’s

capacity to repress altogether while cultivating leaders with elevated levels of

domestic legitimacy and authority. These non-material resources, when combined

with material sources such as the distribution of patronage, enhance the regime's

durability against threats, which could have led to the possibility of regime

breakdown.

2. Elements of Regime Breakdown

Different elements have been paid attention to in the literature concerning their

effect on regime breakdown. In the study of political economy, economic crises

have been frequently linked to regime breakdown. For example, previous research

on South America has demonstrated that zero non-democratic regimes survived

three consecutive years of negative economic growth between 1945 and 1988.

Furthermore, economic crises have been suggested to play a key role in enabling

democratic transition in the post-breakdown sphere, but not necessarily sufficient

alone to induce democratic consolidation (Gill, 2000). Geddes, Wright and Frantz

(2018) argue that party-led regimes with extensive patron–client networks can help

the elites navigate the economic crisis by distributing to the citizens necessary for

the regime’s survival and shifting the economic burden to other weaker segments

of the population. However, regimes that do not have wide party networks among

different party leaders, local political leaders, and other leaders nationwide will not

be able to co-opt citizens in the same manner and, therefore, are prone to breakdown

if the regime does not respond effectively.

Another element that could stimulate regime breakdown is the degree of political

mobilization of the opposition. Whether repressed or co-opted, potential opposition

leaders still exist in regimes and were often at some point closely tied with the

incumbent leader. The available resources and wide networks that the leader’s allies

enjoy are often valuable resources employed to challenge the regime (Svolik,

2012). The potential opposition leader decides if and how they challenge the regime

based on a cost-benefit calculation, including the extent of resources available, the

degree of support by citizens, the risk of the challenge, and the probability of the

win (Geddes et al., 2018). The strategic choice on how to challenge the current

regime, if successful, is what is referred to as a “mode of breakdown,” unfolding in

the patterns that are either coups, uprisings,

assassinations, etc.

Beyond domestic explanations, other authors have focused on the international

factors that could lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian regime. The intensity

of the international factors leading to breakdown could vary from highly intense

factors, such as a defeat in war, to less intense factors, like international sanctions

coupled with other domestic factors (Gill, 2017). In the literature, two different

types of international pressure have been identified: international pressure aimed at

a regime breakdown via direct foreign policies or international political economy

structures (Gill, 2000). Beyond this distinction, other theories have been put forth

on the effect of the international environment on regime breakdown and regime

change. In the vanguard of these arguments, Levitsky and Way (2006) argue that

the international environment has two different dimensions to influence regime

change: western linkage (the socio-political and economic ties) and leverage (the

vulnerability of governments towards international democratizing pressure).

Because the primary source for linkage is geographical proximity, it enhances the

effectiveness of leverage by strengthening international prominence of regime

abuse, enhancing the likelihood of the West to shift the country’s domestic actors

pre-democratically and influencing the reorganization of domestic powers within

authoritarian regimes. High leverage and linkage lead to regime change via

international democratization pressure regardless of unsupportive domestic actors.

High linkage and low leverage lead to indirect but substantial means of international

pressure toward regime change. Low linkage and high leverage lead to partial

effectiveness of international democratization pressure.

Another domestic feature of regime breakdown is international splits within the

regime’s ruling structure. These splits can contribute significantly to the weakening

of a regime by reducing its support base and creating a state of dysfunction within

the regime itself; if regime leaders are internally in conflict with each other and

have failed to resolve that internal conflict, the opposition or military force can

seize the opportunity to overthrow them. Institutional differences can often be a

source of internal split within regimes, whether the regime is ruled by collective

leadership or one single prominent finger. If an authoritarian regime does not have

adequate institutional procedures to resolve these disputes, the threat of regime

survival is heightened. Furthermore, disunity within the regime also poses symbolic

challenges due to the frequent authoritarian rhetoric emphasis on unity. As a result,

these internal divisions can threaten the regime’s legitimacy, capacity for effective

governance, and ideological framework and ultimately pave the way for regime

breakdown (Gill, 2017; Gill, 2000).

3. Modes of Regime Breakdown

Regime breakdowns can be manifested in various ways, representing a unique

confluence of circumstances and dynamics. The spectrum of potential modes of

breakdown is vast and multifaceted. It can take many forms, such as a military coup,

autogolpe, assassination, or the natural death of the incumbent leader, defeat in civil

or inter-state wars, gradual policy shifts under the same leader, popular uprisings,

foreign intervention, or the failure of the political elite to retain control.

These different processes through which regimes break down are commonly called

“modes of breakdown”.

Amongst different modes of breakdown, this thesis looks explicitly at two different

modes, namely military coups and popular uprisings. Military coups denote the

removal of the incumbent regime by the orchestration of military leaders who defect

from their support of the regime. Coups necessitate the voluntary cooperation of a

few senior officers, leveraging the obedience of lower-ranking personnel to execute

their plans. Regime breakdowns via military coups typically unfold over a brief

period and hinge on the element of surprise. It often does not take more than a

couple of days for the military officers to consolidate their power (De Bruin, 2019).

On the other hand, popular uprisings are grassroots movements of dissent against

the incumbent regime, which are fueled by widespread dissatisfaction among the

citizens. These uprisings often emerge as a response to perceived injustices,

inequalities, and abuses of power. They rely on collective civilian action and take

to the streets to voice their opposition. Compared to military coups, popular

uprisings can be protracted processes, lasting for days, weeks, or even months as

protestors demand systematic change (Geddes et al., 2018). The proposed theory of

this thesis, as outlined in Chapter 3, delves deeper into the intricacies of both modes

of breakdowns and presents the challenges faced in coups and uprisings during the

process of the breakdown and the post-breakdown sphere.

Beyond the precise categorization of different modes of breakdown, other scholars

have focused their attention on the prominence of pacted transitions in authoritarian

regimes that lead to democratization. This stream of literature is based on the

typology presented by O’Donnell et al. (1986) that builds on the existing modes of

breakdown and adds that there are two scales to a regime change and

democratization process, namely the drivers of regime change (elites or opposition

leaders) and the degree of cooperation between elites and opposition leaders. This

has led transitology scholars to suggest different modes of regime change. For

instance, Schmitter (2015) posits that there are four different modes of regime

change: regime change through policy reform, regime change through a revolution

demanding liberalization, pacted transitions between regime leaders and the

opposition, or imposed transitions undertaken by the government alone. Pacted

transitions, characterized by negotiations between ruling elites and the opposition,

are advocated as the most successful path to democracy (O’Donnell et al., 1986;

Huntington, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Stradiotto and Guo, 2014). These

transitions are more likely to result in democratic outcomes than other regime

breakdown modes (Stradiotto and Guo, 2014; Geddes et al., 2018). Early scholars

in the transitology literature argued that the democratization success of pacted

transitions is due to the success of the negotiations creating a path dependency by

excluding radicals and preventing violence (O’Donnell et al., 1986; Huntington,

1993). Modern scholars predict the success of regime change and the transition into

democracy based on the prior regime type in the authoritarian setting pre-regime

breakdown, not based on whether the regime change happened through a pacted

transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes et al., 2018). In Chapter 3 below, this

thesis will delve into these modern arguments regarding the connection between

the prior type of the authoritarian type and the processes of regime breakdown and

regime change, particularly emphasizing the different contemporary scholarly

perspectives.

4. Political Violence In the Post-Breakdown Regime Consolidation

While “Part I: Understanding Political Violence” revisits different theories on the

levels of violence expected during regime breakdown, the subsections delve deeper

into the intricacies of political violence in the post-breakdown sphere.

The issue of violence following regime breakdown is discussed concerning state-

building and regime-building. As Fukuyama (2004) defined, state-building

involves "creating new government institutions and strengthening existing ones."

Brahimi (2007) expands on this idea by emphasizing elements such as 'constitution-

making,' 'electoral processes,' 'reintegration and national reconciliation,' and

establishing the 'rule of law.’ Many scholars have presented evidence that state-

building processes after regime breakdown often coincide with political violence

and instability (Newman, 2013). Throughout history, state-building has frequently

involved coercion and violence. It typically entails imposing a centralized state

while subjugating regions to consolidate national political projects. Scholars like

Tilly (1991) and Skocpol (1976) emphasize the importance and centrality of

conflict in state-building, whether driven by domestic reform agendas, ideological

conflicts, or external pressures. Although recent scholarly consensus suggests a

decrease in both the scale and number of conflicts, Goodwin (2001) and Pinker

(2011) have shown that there is still an association between state-building efforts,

revolutionary change, and armed

conflicts.

In recent decades, efforts in international peacebuilding within post-conflict and

conflict-prone societies have shifted towards state-building engagement. The

primary goal is to prevent the recurrence or escalation of violence and establish

lasting peace. (Fukayama, 2015). Scholars argue that activities related to

peacekeeping and state-building have become interconnected and mutually

dependent (Brahimi, 2007; Suhrke et al., 2002; Rubin, 2005). Similarly, Billerbeck

and Tansey (2019) suggest that international peace-building missions can influence

regime-building in post-conflict countries, potentially enabling authoritarianism by

strengthening the capabilities of existing authoritarian leaders and creating a

conducive environment for them.

Furthermore, Tansey (2009) suggests that international authorities and

peacebuilders have gone beyond their primary focus on promoting development

during regime change. They have also taken on the responsibility of establishing a

system in the host country through their actions and interactions with local actors.

As a result, the nature of their intervention directly impacts how the transition

unfolds after a regime breaks down.

Lastly, several theories have been proposed regarding the long-term effects of

violence regardless of how the regime broke down. These theories argue that

political violence can lead to socio-economic consequences, such as decreased trust

in state institutions, reduced investment, and slower economic growth (Blattman &

Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Additionally, over time, political violence

can undermine the rule of law and perpetuate cycles of

retaliation that can persist for generations. It can also exacerbate existing divisions

and make it more challenging to build an inclusive society (Weinstein, 2006; Roht

Arriaza et al., 2006).

Conclusion

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the literature on political

violence and regime breakdown, laying the groundwork for a deeper understanding

of both phenomena. By examining political violence and regime breakdown

separately and in conjunction, the insights gained in this chapter are essential for

the foundation of this thesis.

Moving forward, the next chapter, which encompasses the theory and

hypotheses-building sections, expands the discussion introduced in this chapter.

Specifically, Chapter 3 first expands on the existing literature on two modes of

breakdown, namely military coups and popular uprisings, which have been

introduced in this chapter. It intensely looks at the different theoretical arguments

presented on both modes of breakdown. Second, it builds upon the above

foundation by including further literature on the connection between political

violence and regime breakdown. It elaborates more extensively on theories briefly

presented above and challenges the connection between the prior type of the

authoritarian type and the levels of political violence after regime breakdown. In

doing so, the groundwork laid above is essential for exploring the connection

between the mode of breakdown and political violence.

Chapter 3: Theory: Expectations and Hypotheses

Introduction

This chapter embarks on a comprehensive journey to understand the intricate

dynamics between different modes of breakdowns and political violence.

Specifically, it aims to delve deep into the mechanisms through which military

coups and popular uprisings influence the level and duration of state violence

perpetrated by the incoming regime following a breakdown. In doing so, this

chapter synthesizes existing literature and develops a framework to illustrate how

the mode through which the regime breaks down creates a political environment

that influences the level and duration of state violence perpetrated by the incoming

regime.

As such, this chapter explains two mechanisms connecting military coups and

popular uprisings with the violence perpetrated by the incoming regime post-

breakdown—or lack thereof. After laying out the mechanisms, this chapter

concludes with formulating the hypotheses for empirical testing in the following

chapters.

This chapter's first section examines the mechanisms linking military coups with

post-breakdown state violence, focusing on how different factors at play, which are

associated with the events of the military coup, impact state violence. It analyzes

factors ranging from the consolidation of power, repression tactics, institutional

erosion, political polarization, and the international response to unravel the

pathways through which military coups catalyze and exacerbate state violence, both

in the immediate aftermath of a regime breakdown and over a prolonged period.

Following the first section, this chapter examines the mechanisms linking popular

uprisings with post-breakdown state violence perpetrated by the incoming regime.

It investigates how the participatory nature of popular uprisings mitigates the

likelihood of state violence from the incoming regime following a breakdown.

Specifically, it explores different variables, including but not limited to the role of

legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity, economic development,

and international support.

Drawing on these analyses, the chapter concludes by presenting the hypothesis that

will be tested empirically in the subsequent chapters. The formulated hypotheses

offer comparative insights into the impact of military coups and popular uprisings

on the level and duration of state violence in the short and long term.

1. Relevant Theories

Several theories have been proposed regarding the long-term effects of violence in

general. These theories argue that political violence can lead to socio-economic

consequences, such as decreased trust in state institutions, reduced investment, and

slower economic growth (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Additionally, over time, political violence can undermine the rule of law and

perpetuate cycles of retaliation that can persist for generations. It can also

exacerbate existing divisions and make it more challenging to build an inclusive

society (Weinstein, 2006).

Beyond the examination of political violence as the independent variable in the

sections above, an ongoing academic debate exists surrounding the extent to which

the mode of regime breakdown impacts the perpetuation of violence during regime

breakdown. The cornerstone of the debate is best articulated by Geddes (1999). In

the words of Stradiotto and Guo (2010, pg. 26):

“Geddes (1999) argues different types of authoritarian governments

have varying effects on the incentives facing regime supporters

when the status quo is challenged and classifies

authoritarian regimes into three primary categories: military, single

party and personalistic. According to Geddes, "...military regimes

tend to split when challenged, personalist regimes... circle the

wagons, and single-party regimes co-opt their challengers." Geddes'

argument suggests that military regimes are more likely to negotiate

a withdrawal and democratize. Personalist regimes rarely leave

office voluntarily; as a result, these transitions are violent such as

revolution or intervention. Single-party regimes tend to survive the

longest, even under severe economic crises, but when they do end,

it is through negotiation.”

Building on this, Balcells (2015) contributes to the discourse with a more recent

study, asserting that economic conditions before regime breakdown shape the

potential for a violent process. Cheeseman and Klaas (2018) also follow in Geddes’

(1999) footsteps by suggesting that the prior regime type and the political elite's

response can synergistically influence the extent of violence during the breakdown.

Additionally, Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) posit that the prominence of political

polarization and the prevalence of armed groups also play a crucial role in

determining the likelihood of violence. Scholars like Gates (2002) and Sisk (2009)

argue that the extent to which institutions provide a framework for conflict

resolution and promote political stability can significantly impact the course of

violence. Crucially, political elites wield substantial influence, as their decisions

play a pivotal role in determining the nature and scale of political violence. This

point is illustrated by the choice made by political elites either to pursue their goals

through force or to seek a peaceful compromise (Kalyvas, 2006; Weinstein, 2006).

Adding context to Geddes's (1999) argument, other scholars briefly discuss how

different modes of regime breakdown can potentially lead to varying levels of

violence. Tilly (1979) argues that popular uprisings are associated with high levels

of political violence. According to him, such uprisings often entail extensive

mobilization of citizens, rendering the political landscape more challenging for the

government to manage and creating opportunities for violent reactions. In contrast,

Brancati (2009) takes a divergent stance, asserting that military coups significantly

contribute to creating a political environment that are conducive to high levels of

violence. This perspective is grounded in the idea that military coups typically

involve force and breaking down state institutions.

While the arguments presented above, specifically by Tilly (1979) and Brancati

(2009), touch upon the relationship between the mode of breakdown and political

violence, they do not encompass an overarching theoretical framework that

explains whether the mode of breakdown can explain the levels and duration of

violence. As such, this thesis seeks to explore this argument in greater depth.

2. Rationale of the Theory

As illustrated above, the existing theories that predict the level of violence

experienced following a regime breakdown encompass different explanations;

some scholars argue that the regime type prior to the breakdown affects the level of

violence post-breakdown, others seek to explain the level of violence in the

aftermath of regime breakdowns by examining different structural factors, such as

economic conditions before the breakdown, the level of political polarization

during the breakdown, the role of the political elite and the extent to which conflict

resolution efforts have been exerted.

While recognizing the viability of these arguments, this research presents an

alternative approach to studying political violence in the wake of regime

breakdown. At the heart of this chapter’s analysis lies a fundamental question: How

do different modes of breakdown influence the level of duration of state violence

by the incoming regime after the breakdown? Whereas the different modes of

breakdown are widely discussed in the literature, as presented in Chapter 2, the

critical role they play in shaping the dynamics of the political arena after

breakdowns is frequently overlooked. This omission in the study of

democratization points to a gap in the connection between two different streams in

the literature; on one side of the argument, the elements leading to a mode of

breakdown and the difference between the modes are discussed, whereas on the

other the implications of each mode on the subsequent political system are

discussed.

While Geddes's (1999) notable efforts contributed to a breakthrough argument on

how military, single-party, and personalistic regimes transition differently post-

regime breakdown, no scholarly efforts have been made to argue for a connection

between the mode of breakdown and specific factors in the post-breakdown

sphere—or the lack thereof. The absence of work on this topic is surprising,

especially considering how frequently modes of breakdown are discussed. This

omission is even more surprising given the scholarly consensus on the importance

of the mode through which the regime broke down.

Given that the breadth of this gap in the scholarly literature is so extensive, this

thesis has chosen to focus on a specific subset of this under-researched topic. While

synthesizing the existing scholarly work, the argument that will be examined and

developed in the following chapters focuses on the gap in understanding around

how the nature of (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings create a political

environment that impacts the level and duration of state violence after regime

breakdown.

In addition to synthesizing the literature on political violence after regime

breakdown, this thesis delves into a crucial aspect often overlooked in existing

studies. While prevailing arguments typically focus on the violence that unfolds in

the different stages associated with the regime-building process following a

breakdown, this thesis takes a different approach in this context. Rather than

examining the violence perpetrated by the incumbent regime in response to military

coups or popular uprisings, the arguments presented below focus on the levels and

durations of violence perpetrated by the regime, which assumes power after a

breakdown. The deliberate choice to specifically examine the violence by the post-

breakdown incoming regime and not the incumbent one serves an essential purpose;

it allows for an in-depth analysis of how the mode of breakdown shapes the post-

breakdown sphere beyond the immediate response of the incumbent regime and

how the mechanism through which power transitioned leaves an effect on the newly

formed regime.

Importantly, this thesis does not aim to explore how incumbent regimes respond to

violence during military coups and popular uprisings. Instead, the primary focus

lies in illustrating how modes of breakdown, namely military coups and popular

uprisings, create different conditions in the post-breakdown context that impact the

level and duration of state violence. Going forward with this examination and

directing attention to the violence perpetrated by the incoming regime, this thesis

seeks to uncover the consequences and impacts of both modes of breakdown, which

are argued to shift the evolving landscape of state violence in the aftermath of

regime breakdowns.

Lastly, it is crucial to highlight that this thesis is interested in the institutional legacy

of violence that emerges after military coups or popular uprisings. As such, this

thesis does not aim to contribute to the question of democratization post-regime

breakdown. While high or low levels of state violence are indicative of the presence

of democratic values or the lack thereof, this analysis will be conducted

independently of the regime type that emerges after regime breakdown.

Fully acknowledging that the legacy of violence is

intertwined with democratization processes, the quantitative analysis conducted

in Chapter 4 will control for the effect of the democracy level. However, in the

theory discussed below, the main focus remains fixated on the effect of the mode

of breakdown on the institutional legacy of violence in the post-breakdown sphere.

3. Understanding Military Coups

The threat of violence is reinforced in military coups in comparison to other modes

of regime breakdown, e.g., voluntary resignation and peaceful transfers of power

(Luttwak, 1979; De Bruin, 2019). Nevertheless, the extent of violence in coups

varies in different cases. In some cases, the military takes over the power without

bloodshed (e.g., in Nigeria in 1993, Fiji in 2006, and 1992 in Peru) (De Bruin,

2019), other cases demonstrate that coup plotters resort to violence and result in

mass killings (e.g., Dominican Republic 1965 and Guinea Bissau in 1998) (Bosch,

2007; Dixon & Sarkees, 2015).

In an attempt to explain why some coups are violent, and others are not, scholars

have focused their attention on the dynamics of coup attempts in hopes of

explaining the variation in the level of violence during coups. In this context, two

overarching schools of thought have emerged in the literature, explaining why we

can predict coup plotters to either use violence or deliberately avoid it.

Regime breakdowns occurring via military coups are typically characterized by a

group of military officers' sudden, violent takeover of power. However, before the

takeover, coup plotters plan and coordinate their attack by recruiting potential

supporters in the state apparatus. The coordination and consultation are usually

close in time of the coup to ultimately maintain secrecy before their attack (Stepan,

2015; Nordlinger, 1977). The number of coup conspirators is usually very low to

avoid the danger of the regime finding out about their planes, leaving the majority

of military officers not committed to their side (De Bruin, 2019). During the first

hours of the coup, the conspirators and plotters aim to capture centers that

symbolize the takeover of power (e.g., parliament, presidential palace) and mass

media stations to livestream their attack (Geddes, 1999; De Bruin, 2019; Singh,

2014).

The literature broadly agrees that the level of violence associated with a coup

depends on two factors: (A) how the incumbent regime responds and (B) how the

military and security forces respond. Beyond this agreement, the literature proposes

different, often contradictory, arguments. On the one hand, some studies assert that

coup plotters are incentivized to avoid intra-military violence and, when able,

consult with as many officers as possible in advance to have their coup successful

without visible force or resistance from the military (De Bruin, 2019; Geddes, 1999;

Lutwak, 2016). Likewise, it is argued by Geddes (1999) that the worst outcome for

a military coup is the scenario in which civil war breaks out between the different

armed forces within the military fighting each other. Similarly, coup plotters also

avoid violence to maintain support for the coup and ensure unity and cohesion

within the military (Needler, 1975).

On the other hand, other studies assert that coup plotters use violence to suppress

opposition and maintain power when the military coup succeeds and successfully

forms a new military regime. More specifically, it is argued that the level of

violence is likely to remain high in the immediate aftermath of the takeover because

coups are likely to increase state repression, even when they target repressive

autocrats (Lachapelle, 2020). Increased violence and repression can be explained

by the fact that military leaders typically reduce executive constraints in the post-

coup sphere, are unable to deliver economic benefits in the short term, and may be

faced with strong popular support from the ousted regime (Thyne & Powell, 2016).

Recognizing that the literature only entails different arguments on whether military

coups are violent without generating statistical predictions on when coup violence

can occur, De Bruin (2019) develops a theoretical model that considers the

likelihood of success, cost of defeat, and cost of violence. The result suggests that

when the incumbent regimes and military officers can estimate the likelihood of the

coup succeeding, the outcome of the coup is likely to be coordinated without

violence. When the post-coup outcome appears dire, the cost of defeat is higher

than the cost of violence. In this scenario, the incumbent regime will likely use

violence to combat the coup. In contrast, when the regime perceives a reasonable

prospect of peaceful retirement, they are likely to relinquish their power without

violent fighting. Lastly, if all actors perceive the cost of violence to be high, they

are likely incentivized to avoid the use of it.

4. Mechanisms of Military Coups and Post-Breakdown State Violence

Understanding the mechanisms that connect military coups with post-regime

breakdown state violence is paramount to synthesizing the existing literature on

political violence after regime breakdown. While recognizing that the literature in

the section above covers the different dynamics of a presidential overthrow

perpetrated by military officers, this section builds on the insights gained from the

existing arguments. It mainly aims to construct a coherent framework that

elucidates the pathways through which the nature of military coups creates a

political environment in the post-breakdown context that influences the level and

duration of state violence. It does so by focusing on the actions of the incoming

regime rather than the incumbent one and examining different factors that influence

the outbreak of state violence.

By elucidating the mechanism through which military coups and post-breakdown

state violence are intricately interconnected, this section delves deep into different

variables that influence patterns of violence. As such, these variables are analyzed:

power consolidation and repression, institutional erosion, political polarization and

social fragmentation, international response, economic stability and domestic

resource allocation, and lastly, transitional justice processes. By exploring these

factors, this section presents a comprehensive mechanism of how military coups

catalyze, perpetuate, and exacerbate state violence in the immediate aftermath of

regime breakdown and in the long run.

Following a successful military coup, heightened uncertainty and instability are

often prevalent (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021), providing fertile ground for increased

state violence. The incoming military regime typically embarks on a path to

consolidate its power, legitimize its authority, and establish its control over the state

apparatus. This consolidation process involves many forms of violence – against

public dissent, opposition forces, or incumbent leaders' resistance – and simply any

perceived threats to the new military regime’s stability (Slovik, 2015). The new

incoming military regime commits significant human rights violations (Lachapelle,

2020), including but not limited to the repression of political opponents, activists,

and any perceived sympathizers of the ousted regime who often face arbitrary

arrest, extrajudicial killings, or systematic oppression. The objectives of this type

of state-led repression are twofold. On one hand, the consolidation of power is the

immediate, short-term objective. On the other hand, instilling fear in the long run

is vital to ensure the sustained dominance of the incoming regime. It is worth noting

that how military coups are orchestrated inherently disrupts the existing

institutional continuity by creating a power vacuum that the incoming regime aims

to fill rapidly. In the context of power consolidation, the use of violence by the

incoming regime becomes a fundamental means of asserting dominance and

dismantling potential threats to its rule.

In the period of power consolidation, the incoming military regime works to

dismantle the existing institutions – whether previously democratic or authoritarian.

The erosion of civilian control over institutional structures undermines the

principles of constitutionalism and the rule of law and enables the regime to impose

authoritarian institutional structures (Beliakova, 2021). Hence, when there are no

institutional checks and balances to hold the incoming military regime accountable

in a fair manner (Bennett et al., 2019), the regime creates conducive conditions for

the proliferation of violence and the use of coercion to maintain its grip on authority

in the long run. Even the new institutions established by the incoming regime in the

post-coup political landscape can be expected to prioritize the interests of the

military over the civilian interests. This can pave the way for militarizing

institutions, state apparatuses, the economy, and the overall entrenchment of

military influence in different governance structures. This militarization

exacerbates the inclination for state violence even further, as any threat to the

stability of these governance structures is directly a threat to the interest of the

military, which can lead to the prioritization of regime stability and security over

respect for civil liberties.

The militarization of the institutional structures following a military coup can have

profound implications for transitional justice, which directly influences the patterns

of state violence and domestic conflict resolution. The transitional justice processes

are manifested in prosecutions, truth commissions, and institutional reforms. These

manifestations are crucial in addressing human rights abuses, promoting

accountability, and achieving reconciliation. However, it is noteworthy to

understand that transitional justice can only be successful when coupled with the

political will of the perpetrators to acknowledge their past mistakes. In the context

where the perpetrators of violence remain unpunished, the existing grievances and

the continuity of the cycles of violence persist. However, the militarization of

transitional justice processes and, in turn, their ineffectiveness paves the way for

the incoming regime to maintain the use of violence to repress any perceived threats

without being held accountable judicially for its acts of violence and injustices. As

a result, the militarization of the transitional justice processes increases the

likelihood of state violence in the short and long term in the post-coup political

landscape.

Whereas military coups aimed at orchestrating a rapid and swift transfer of power

via the coup, they can give rise to resistance and insurgency from the different

segments of the society opposing the incoming regime (Cynkin, 1982). Although,

as discussed above, the incoming regime is likely to respond with violence and

force to suppress dissent and consolidate its power, insurgent movements and

armed resistance can still emerge. These movements, fueled by grievances about

the coup, can challenge the regime’s stability. As such, the incoming regime’s

response in this context can further exacerbate the likelihood of state violence, as

the regime can go to extreme extents to impose its rule and maintain its control

amid insurgency movements. Counterinsurgency operations, characterized by a

cycle of indiscriminate violence and human rights abuses, are also enabled by the

militarization of institutional governance, which encourages the incoming regime

to amplify its use of violence and force as a primary means to address political

threats and challenges. This also affects the likelihood of state violence in the long

run.

Likewise, the post-coup political landscape can also exacerbate existing political

polarization and social fragmentations between different segments of society

(Aydin-Düzgit & Balta, 2017), which can lead to intense tensions and conflicts

manifesting different types of violence. The other ethnic, religious, or ideological

cleavages within the society can be defined as a result of the various perceptions of

the coup based on the different affiliations and interests. As a result, the incoming

regime, which seeks the consolidation and legitimacy of power, can exploit these

divisions by co-opting specific segments and mobilizing their support while

marginalizing others. In doing so, the incoming regime can perpetuate intergroup

rivalries and violence as a means of suppressing the opposition. This can breed

resistance from the opposition and fuel cycles of violence and counter-violence.

Beyond domestic factors, the consolidation of power by the incoming regime can

attract international attention. The different international responses to coups are

shaped by several factors, including but not limited to geopolitical interests,

material interests, and normative commitments to human rights (Shannon et al.,

2015). Foreign interventions brought about by diplomatic pressure or instigated by

economic sanctions or military intervention can influence the level of violence in

the post-coup landscape. While international condemnation of the coup and

economic isolation can constrain the ability of the incoming regime to resort to

violence, international support or indifference can encourage the regime to resort

to excessive violence against its perceived threats. Another viable scenario in which

international actors involve themselves in the post-coup sphere is when they

provide the opposition support or encourage the incoming regime to restore

domestic order. This form of intervention can aggravate existing tensions and thus

contribute to the perpetuation of state violence.

Furthermore, military coups also have significant implications for economic

stability and resource allocation within the regime (Blum & Gründler, 2020), which

also affect the likelihood of state violence in the post-coup timeframe and in the

long run. The economic disruption following a coup, political uncertainty,

international investing confidence, and capital flight can create economic

grievances and exacerbate social inequalities. These grievances and inequalities

fuel public dissent and opposition resistance to the incoming regime. In response to

these threats, the incoming regime can prioritize resource allocation towards

security and defense sectors to hold onto its power and suppress perceived threats.

This prioritization can divert the resource allocation away from social welfare and

development sectors. The militarization of the state perpetuates cycles of state

violence, deepens economic grievances and socio-economic inequalities, and,

lastly, strengthens the civilian resentment against the military regime.

In summary, military coups serve as catalysts for the perpetuation of state violence.

The different processes investigated above – including the erosion of the previous

institutions, the militarization of the political sphere and the economy, and the

state’s response to opposition – elucidate how the incoming regime creates

conducive conditions for the perpetuation of violence immediately after they

overthrow the incumbent regime and assume control over the state, but also on the

longer run after they have consolidated their power.

5. Understanding Popular Uprisings

Not all regime breakdowns facilitated by popular uprisings are alike. While some

uprisings are primarily characterized by violence, with armed opposition

challenging the existing regime, others unfold through nonviolent means (Schock,

2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In the timeframe between 1950 and 2013, it is

estimated that mass killings occurred in approximately 43% of all popular uprisings

challenging the existing regimes (Chenoweth & Perkoski, 2018).

Existing literature addressing the extent of political violence during regime

breakdowns via popular uprisings commonly focuses on structural factors to

explain the use of violence from both state and non-state actors. Two widely held

explanations to explain mass killings during uprisings are capacity and threat (Hill

& Jones, 2014). When a popular uprising breaks out, the existing regime is more

likely to resort to physical violence if the military has the strategic logistic

capability and financial capacity to coordinate and go through with mass killings.

If such capacity exists within the military, non-state actors and key opposition

figures in the popular uprising will likely find this intimidating. Existing literature

asserts that the existing regime is likely to resort to violence and mass killing if the

uprising poses an existential threat to its survival and its rule (Hill & Jones, 2014).

Therefore, mass violence from state actors typically occurs during popular

uprisings to maintain the status quo if their military is sufficiently capable and if

the uprising is perceived as a threat (Valentino, 2003). Structural theorists also take

into account regime type, power concentration, GDP per capita, level of democracy,

power concentration, ethnic fractionalization, population number, and recent

history of coup attempts (in the country or neighboring countries) when theorizing

on the level of state violence in specific instances of popular uprisings (Chenoweth

& Perkoski, 2018).

Recent theories on political violence during regime breakdowns have emerged via

popular uprisings extending beyond structural theories. Chenoweth and Perkoski

(2018) build on the theories outlined above and argue that the characteristics of an

uprising and the strategic interaction between the opposition and the regime can

explain the likelihood of subsequent state-based violence. Specifically, they argue

that the primary mode of contention of the uprising (violent versus nonviolent), the

behavior of the military during the uprising, the degree of foreign support to the

uprising, and the opposition's goal shape the government's response. The study

finds that nonviolent resistance and uprisings are less threatening to the regime and

decrease the likelihood of a violent reaction. Contrarily, violent uprisings increase

the threat of the regime’s rule over power and the personal safety of its leaders.

Therefore, the existing regimes will go to any lengths to maintain their power, with

mass violence being positioned as a last resort for them. Regime leaders who order

the military to attack unarmed civilians, specifically in nonviolent uprisings, risk

the defection of the military and insubordination. For this reason, leaders are less

likely to suggest launching mass violence and atrocities in non-violent uprisings

and resistance. Lastly, when foreign states provide material aid to the dissidents

within the uprising, the likelihood of mass violence increases from violent

insurgencies that are against the regime – overall increasing the possibility of

violence as a response from the existing regime.

6. Mechanisms of Popular Uprisings and Post-Breakdown State Violence

Understanding the mechanisms connecting popular uprisings with post-regime

breakdown state violence is further paramount to synthesizing the existing literature

on political violence after regime breakdown. Whereas the literature in the section

above covers the different elements related to a regime breakdown by a popular

uprising, this section builds upon these arguments to construct a framework

elucidating how the nature of a popular uprising creates a political environment that

can affect the level of violence perpetrated by the incoming regime following a

successful post-uprising breakdown.

By illustrating the mechanism through which popular uprisings and

post-breakdown state violence are intricately interconnected, this section delves

deep into different variables that influence patterns of violence. As such, these

variables are analyzed: legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity,

democratic transition, economic development, and international support. By

exploring these factors, this section presents a comprehensive mechanism of how

the participatory nature of popular uprisings ipso facto decreases the likelihood of

state violence by the incoming regime.

First, it is essential to highlight that popular uprisings are likely to gain domestic

and international legitimacy from broad public support and a perceived alignment

within the society on popular grievances against the incumbent regime. Unlike the

events associated with military coups, which may lack legitimacy and face

resistance from both domestic and international actors, uprisings often enjoy

legitimacy if the participants are diversely representative of different demographics,

the events are rooted in a grassroots nature, and the demands align with the

principles of democracy (Bartkowski, 2016). As a result of the legitimacy of the

events of the uprising, the incoming regime following the breakdown is presented

with a crucial opportunity to establish its authority through peaceful and inclusive

means. By capitalizing on the democratic spirit of the uprising, the incoming regime

can consolidate and maintain its power without resorting to violence as a means –

it can instead do so by engaging in dialogue with the opposition and instituting

reforms that are responsive to popular demands.

Furthermore, the legitimacy garnered from popular uprisings leaves a sense of

national unity and collective identity, which promotes social cohesion and

transcends existing socio-economic and ideological divisions (Adler, 2012).

Suppose the incoming regime capitalizes on this opportunity by emphasizing

common values. In that case, it can consolidate its power by providing the public

with a sense of shared responsibility that comes with its support for the regime. The

collective sense of shared responsibility in the immediate aftermath of the uprising

can be translated into inclusive governance structures that promote citizen

participation. If the incoming regime harnesses the participatory approach post-

uprising, it can enhance its legitimacy and simultaneously decrease the likelihood

of resorting to violence to suppress dissent and opposition.

When an incoming regime assumes power after a popular uprising, a significant

challenge for its leaders is restoring public trust in the governance and institutional

structures (Ishiyama & Pechenina, 2016). Therefore, in the short term, at least, the

incoming regime needs to provide a foundation for institutional continuity, show a

willingness to foster a democratic transition, and uphold the rule of law. The

participatory nature of popular uprisings fosters a culture of civic engagement and

political activism, often followed by citizens' demand for a strengthened social

contract between the incoming regime and its citizens. This social contract includes

an open dialogue through which citizens can hold their leaders accountable and

expect transparency. As such, the incoming regime is left with no choice but to

uphold democratic norms and employ a participatory governance approach to

consolidate its power in the short term. The civilian expectations for its incoming

regime immediately post-regime breakdown ipso facto create a political

environment in which there is no room for the incoming regime to consolidate its

power by violent means and repression. Contrarily, the incoming regime can only

gain domestic legitimacy if inclusivity, transparency, and representation are

promoted in the political process immediately after it assumes power.

On an economic note, while popular uprisings may have a short-term negative

economic impact by disrupting economic activities and undermining investor

confidence, they do not carry the risk of prolonged economic instability and

uncertainty as military coups. On the contrary, popular uprisings present the

incoming regime with economic development opportunities (Sadiki, 2000).

Implementing inclusive economic policies and addressing underlying socio-

economic grievances will help the incoming regime overcome the threats related to

potential social unrest and violent conflict. Support and assistance from the

international community in reconstructing the economy following the collapse of

the previous regime will also reduce the likelihood of employing violent means to

restore economic justice. While popular uprisings do not guarantee immediate

economic prosperity and stability, the opportunity for civil society actors and

grassroots organizations to assert more influence promotes greater economic

resilience and innovation in the long term.

Finally, another element that could explain the state violence patterns post-uprising

is international support (Stewart et al., 2016). Popular uprisings often attract

significant international attention. Therefore, the incoming regime may draw

support from foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and

international institutions. Unlike military coups, which may be diplomatically

isolated and faced with economic sanctions, the international solidarity of popular

uprisings can help the incoming regime consolidate and maintain its power without

resorting to violence. The link between international support for the incoming

regime can operate via two different channels: First, the various forms of

international support, e.g., diplomatic pressure, economic aid, and humanitarian

assistance, can be of significant importance for the incoming regime and thus, the

regime will not risk losing this support at the risk of international condemnation

resulting from state violence. Second, international solidarity also significantly

increases the legitimacy of the incoming regime, decreasing the extent to which

opposition groups will be perceived as a threat to its survival – therefore reducing

the likelihood of the state resorting to violence to suppress these groups.

In conclusion, the nature of popular uprisings can transform the post-breakdown

political landscape and shape the trajectories of the incoming regime’s use of

violence. By fostering legitimacy, principles of good governance, social cohesion,

democratic transition, and economic development while simultaneously leveraging

international support, the incoming regime is left with little room to resort to state

violence as a means to consolidate and maintain its power. Instead, citizens'

demands of political change, accountability, and transparency lay the groundwork

and create an opportunity for the incoming regime to either (A) consolidate its

power by responding to civilian demands or (B) consolidate its power based on the

momentum of the international support without necessarily responding to these

demands. However, whichever option the regime chooses, the likelihood of using

violence to consolidate and maintain power is decreased – because, in both

scenarios, the threat posed by the opposition is not likely to be perceived as a

challenge to the regime’s stability.

7. Hypothesis Building

The discussion of the mechanisms linking military coups and popular uprisings with

the level of violence perpetrated by the incoming regime after a regime breakdown

has been instrumental in analyzing how the different elements associated with both

coups and uprisings can create different post-breakdown political environments that

impact the extent to which states resort to violence. As such, this section presents

the hypotheses that have been derived from the theoretical framework above on the

level and duration of state violence, both in the immediate aftermath and over

prolonged periods. The following hypotheses encapsulate the expected arguments

from the preceding sections and will be tested quantitatively in the next chapter of

this thesis. They are formulated as follows;

H1: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate

violence in the short term than a regime that emerges after a popular

uprising.

Hypothesis 1 postulates that military coups' abrupt and coercive nature predisposes

the incoming regime to instigate state violence immediately after the regime breaks

down to consolidate its power. The intense suppression of opposition forces often

accompanies the swift assumption of power by military officers and, therefore, is

expected to result in a surge in state violence in the short term. Different elements,

including but not limited to the challenges of consolidating power, resistance from

the ousted regime and opposition groups, and the need to establish authority

abruptly increase the likelihood of the use of violence by the incoming regime.

H2: A regime that emerges after a military coup is more likely to instigate

violence in the long term than a regime that emerges after a popular

uprising.

Building upon the promise of the first hypothesis, Hypothesis 2 suggests that the

resonance of military coups is likely to extend beyond the immediate aftermath and

its repercussions, as the incoming regime can perpetuate state violence over an

extended timeframe to hold its grip on power. Factors such as the erosion of

previous institutions, the militarization of governance structures, and the

suppression of democratic norms are all characteristics that have emerged from the

nature of military coups and contribute to a greater likelihood of state violence in

the long term.1

As mentioned above, the hypotheses present a set of core concepts to explore

empirically in the following chapters. They are intended to provide a framework

1In other words, the hypotheses can also be formulated as following:

H1: A regime that emerges after a popular uprising is less likely to instigate violence in the

short term than a regime that emerges after a military coup.

In contrast to military coups, the nature of popular uprisings, which are characterized by grassroots

mobilization and collective action, impact the incoming regime’s use of violence. The broad

legitimacy and participatory nature of uprisings create an immediate political environment for the

incoming regime that mitigates the use of violent measures in the short term. Instead, it fosters a

conducive environment for democratic transition and governance, reducing the likelihood of

immediate state violence in the short term following a breakdown.

H2: A regime that emerges after a popular uprising is less likely to instigate violence in the

long term han a regime that emerges after a military coup.

Extending on the rationale of the third hypothesis, Hypothesis 4 suggests that the conditions created

by popular uprisings leave a long-lasting effect on the incoming regime’s use of violence. The

demands for political change during the uprisings often result in accountability in governance

structures and socio-economic reform. This contributes to the facilitation of political stability and

democratic resilience in the long-term post-breakdown context and decreases the likelihood of state

violence.

for a comprehensive insight into the multidimensional relationship between state

violence perpetrated by incoming regimes and different modes of regime

breakdown. As the complexity of the immediate and cumulative consequences of

military coups and popular uprisings is examined from various perspectives, such

endeavors will contribute to the existing scholarly knowledge and offer a basis for

future scholarship to examine the post-breakdown context from a different lens.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has shed light on the multifaceted mechanisms through

which military coups can catalyze and exacerbate state violence. From the abrupt

overthrow of the existing regime and the fast consolidation of power and repression

tactics used by the incoming military regime to the militarization of institutional

and governance structures, this chapter has dissected different factors through

which military coups engender violence committed by the incoming regime.

Similarly, this chapter has examined the mechanisms linking popular uprising with

post-breakdown state violence. It has underscored how the participatory nature of

popular uprisings influences legitimacy, governance structures, economic

development, and the level of international support – thereby linking how these

factors help mitigate the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime after

the breakdown.

At the heart of this chapter’s analysis lies a fundamental question: How do different

modes of breakdown influence the level and duration of state violence by the

incoming regime? The hypotheses presented herein offer insights to answer this

question for two modes of breakdown, namely military coups and popular

uprisings. The following chapters build upon the mechanism developed in this

chapter and the hypotheses presented herein with an empirical analysis.

Chapter 4: Operationalization, Data, and Findings

Introduction

This chapter undertakes a quantitative analysis to explore the relationship between

the mode of breakdown and the subsequent level of state violence perpetrated by

the incoming regime following the breakdown. It aims to test the hypotheses

outlined in the preceding chapter and draw robust conclusions regarding the effect

of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence by the incoming regime.

Without further ado, Part I of this chapter sets the stage by creating the scaffolding

of the analysis. It introduces the Varieties of Democracy Index and elucidates the

different variables employed to measure the independent, dependent, and control

variables. Moreover, it provides a detailed analysis of the selected timeframe from

the analysis, spanning from 1900 until 2013, and delineates the specific cut-off

points utilized to measure state violence by the incoming regime one year, five

years, and ten years following each observation of a military coup or popular

uprising within the selected timeframe.

Part II delves into the heart of the analysis and unveils the findings after employing

Ordinary Least Squares beta regression models to estimate the effect of military

coups and popular uprisings on the level and duration of state violence across the

selected timeframe and cut-off points. Through a systematic

examination of the different coefficients, standard errors, and significance levels,

this chapter aims to answer the following question: How does the mode of

breakdown affect state violence by the incoming regime?

The analysis explored below shows that military coups are more likely to be

associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five

years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. Moreover, the

findings illustrate that the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence

by the incoming regime diminishes ten years after the breakdown. After elucidating

and discussing the empirical patterns detected in the different regression models,

this chapter concludes by discussing the potential limitations that can arise from the

analysis, thereby providing a comprehensive understanding of the scope and

implications of the findings.

Part I: Operationalization

1. Timeframe

This paper’s research question will be analyzed quantitatively using OLS beta

regression models. The three models will measure the extent of political violence

during (1) one year after the breakdown, (2) five years after the breakdown, and

(3) ten years after the breakdown. By doing so, this research will measure levels of

state violence by the incoming regime associated with each mode of regime

breakdown for ten years following the original incident of each breakdown. As a

result, interpretations of the data will examine the short- and long-term variations

in the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime associated with

each mode of breakdown.

The selection of the cut-off points in this analysis (one, five, and ten years) is driven

by a dual consideration of both short- and long-term effects following a regime

breakdown. A one-year post-regime breakdown examination allows immediate

analysis of the post-breakdown scenario, capturing the incoming regime’s initial

reactions and repercussions immediately after its leaders assume power. In other

words, this short-term perspective is essential for understanding the immediate

impact different modes of breakdown have on the first orders of business of the

incoming regime. The choice of a five-year timeframe enables the analysis of

medium-term effects. It facilitates a nuanced analysis of how the dynamics of state

violence evolve over a more extended period of time while still considering the

distinctive features of each mode. Lastly, choosing a ten-year timeframe provides

an understanding of the long-term repercussions. It simultaneously acknowledges

that the impact of the mode of regime breakdown on the level and duration of state

violence by the incoming regime can extend far beyond the immediate assumption

of power and allows for an analysis of the sustained impact of each breakdown on

the evolution of violence over time. This approach to timeframes, coupled with a

specific focus on the mode of breakdown, enables a thorough analysis of the

temporal dimensions of state violence by the incoming regime in the post-

breakdown sphere.

While the choice of the timeframe may prompt reasonable questions about the

choice of the specific cut-off points, it is essential to acknowledge that these

intervals are both arbitrary and logically selected. This analysis establishes a

foundation for exploring temporal dimensions of state violence by the incoming

regime following regime breakdowns. Therefore, starting with these particular

timeframes stems from the need for a practical and manageable analysis.

Recognizing that the manifestations and dynamics of state violence are complex

and multifaceted, the chosen timeframes provide an initial framework to delve into

this complexity. Viewing these cutoff years as a starting point is essential, and fully

acknowledging that future research can build upon and extend these temporal

boundaries. The goal of this research is to lay the groundwork for a nuanced

understanding of the effect of the mode of regime breakdown on state violence by

the incoming regime. It comes with the flexibility to refine and expand the temporal

dimensions in future studies.

The quantitative analysis in this study covers the period from 1900 to 2013. This

timeframe was selected to ensure sufficient data availability while accommodating

the measurement of the lagged effects of state violence up to ten years following an

observation of a regime breakdown. As such, the inclusion of data from 1900

onwards enables the analysis of a significant number of observations, whereas

stopping at 2013 serves as a meaningful endpoint to examine the long-term effects

of the mode of breakdown on state violence.

2. Independent and Dependent Variables

The measurements of the independent and dependent variables are all derived from

the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset (2024) for ease of data collection and

vary over the timeframe of 1900-2013. The V-Dem Dataset offers extensive

political, social, and economic indications, providing a multidimensional

perspective of democratic processes and governance worldwide. By leveraging

access to more than 350 indicators and observations that date back to the French

Revolution, my analysis enjoys a robust foundation of

operationalizing the variables with measurements that provide insights into the

complexities and nuances of regime breakdown and state violence.

The selection of the V-Dem Index (2024) as the sole source for independent,

dependent, and control variables in this research is driven by practical

considerations to enhance the efficiency and efficacy of data collection within the

specified timeframe. Opting for one overarching database offering data for the

different variables used in this analysis offers a solution for coding consistency.

Likewise, it is also considered a pragmatic approach to the overall research proposal

as it minimizes potential discrepancies that could arise from integrating data from

different sources and ensuring a more streamlined analysis.

As the consolidation of data from different sources and databases is a practice done

in many papers, the decision to rely solely on V-dem (2024) is rooted in the

necessity for a manageable analysis within the given timeframe for the thesis. While

acknowledging that the V-Dem (2024) Index, like any dataset, has received both

acclaim and criticism, the research seeks to strike a balance between practicality

and awareness of the potential limitations of relying on a single database. It

recognizes that this choice involves a trade-off but is essential for the feasibility of

this research.

For the independent variable, the mode of regime breakdown measurement will be

operationalized with the “Regime End Type” variable from the V-Dem Index

(2024). The selection of this variable to operationalize the mode of regime

breakdown is deliberate and aligns seamlessly with the objectives of this research.

The variable, developed by Djuve, Knutsen, and Wig (2020), offers a classification

of the modes through which each observation of regime breakdown occurred in the

specified timeframe of 1900-2013. This research will extract data from this

variable, coded as a dummy variable, to indicate the mode through which a regime

breakdown occurred and how the preceding regime ended. This binary nature

facilitates precise quantification and categorization to distinguish between each

mode of breakdown. The decision to code this variable a binary allows for

straightforward identification of (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings. As

such, modes of breakdown that occurred via military coups are coded as 0, and

modes of breakdown that occurred via popular uprisings are coded as 1. This

variable's inherent strength lies in its ability to provide detailed and specific

observations for each instance of regime breakdown. Therefore, it clarifies the

mode of breakdown that led to the assumption of power by the incoming regime in

the post-breakdown sphere. Moreover, through this dummy variable, this analysis

is able to control for the effect of the different categories (military coups vs. popular

uprisings) within the data and isolate the impact of other continuous variables or

modes of breakdown. By extracting data to indicate each observation of a regime

breakdown via military coup or popular uprising, the quantitative analysis of this

paper will be able to statistically explore the variations in levels and durations of

state violence by the incoming regimes that emerged after either mode of

breakdown within the specified timeframe of

1900-2013, thereby contributing to test the different hypotheses laid out in Chapter

2 on the impact of military coups and popular uprisings on the use of violence by

the incoming regime. In the specified timeframe, the dependent variable includes

2,493 observations for regime breakdown via military coup and

351 observations for popular uprisings.

For the dependent variables, typically, the quantification of political violence

encompasses the following categorization: physical vs. non-physical violence and

state vs- non-state actors' use of violence. As this study primarily focuses on state

violence by the incoming regime, the analysis below narrows this down to focus on

the physical violence by state actors to ensure a concentrated analysis. In this

context, this study has prioritized the measurement of violence from state actors in

the analysis. This choice provides a more focused approach to exploring political

violence exercised by state actors while maintaining flexibility for potential future

analyses. As such, first, the state violence variable will be run from data by the

Physical Violence Index, which defines the absence of violence as the “freedom

from political killings and torture by the government” (Skaaning in V-dem

Codebook, 2024). The dependent variable is coded as an interval variable with a

scale of 0-1, 0 representing low physical violence and 1 representing high physical

violence. It is important to note that the dependent variable is coded three times as

it will be run in three different models to capture the level of violence one, five, and

ten years after the breakdown. As such, the first model that tests the effect of the

modes of breakdown on state violence one year after the breakdown will include a

lagged dependent model that measures the level of state violence after one year of

each observation of military coups and popular uprisings. Likewise, the second

model that tests the effect of the modes of breakdown on state violence five years

after the breakdown will include a lagged dependent model that measures the level

of state violence after five years of each observation of military coups and popular

uprisings. The third and last model that tests the effect of the modes of breakdown

on state violence ten years after the breakdown will include a lagged dependent

model that measures the level of state violence after ten years of each observation

of military coups and popular uprisings. The three lagged dependent variables have

2,844 observations each, with a minimum value of 0.014 and a maximum value of

0.98.

3. Control Variables

Although the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 emphasized different

factors linking military coups and popular uprisings to the likelihood of state

violence in the post-breakdown there, it is essential to include the same set of

control variables in the regression models to facilitate a direct, comparative analysis

of the relative impact of both modes of breakdown on the outcome variable.

Because control variables help account for other factors that may influence state

violence and could potentially confound the relationship between the independent

variable (military coups or popular uprisings) and the dependent variable, including

the same control variables in all models helps control these potential confounders

consistently. If the control variables differ between the models testing military

coups and popular uprisings, any observed differences in the effects of both

breakdowns can be attributed to the differences in the control variables. As such,

this analysis has opted for including common control variables that can influence

the effect of both modes of breakdown on state violence to ensure that the

differences observed in the effects of military coups versus popular uprisings on

state violence are less likely to be due to differences in the control variables. The

sections below draw on the shared contextual factors that can influence state

violence after both military coups or popular uprisings.

The models include the following control variables: GDP per capita, democracy

level, power structures, socioeconomic inequalities, civil war, and international

conflict. GDP per capita, the Gross Domestic Product of a country on a

per-person basis, reflects the country’s economic health. It quantifies the nation’s

total economic output by dividing it by the number of specified individuals. This

variable furnishes a picture concerning the general level of prosperity and its

distribution among various societal classes. Economically developed countries with

higher income per person tend to enjoy a sense of cohesion and stability in politics

(Dalgaard & Olsson, 2013). Including GDP per capita as a control variable in

regression models would allow this analysis to account for the impact of economic

growth on state violence. As per the modernization theory (Lipset, 1959), we could

assume that countries with higher GDP per capita may

experience lower violence ways down due to stronger institutions, greater access to

resources, and improved living standards. By controlling for GDP per capita, the

analysis can isolate the specific effects of military coups and popular uprisings on

state violence while accounting for the underlying economic factors.

The level of democracy is measured by the Electoral Democracy Index, which is

an instrument that evaluates how much the country is labeled with the ideas of

electoral democracy. The index compasses different indicators, which include

electoral competition, free expression, independent media, and suffrage.

Democracies manifest through political systems that center around citizens taking

an active part in the decision-making process, holding the leaders accountable, and

following the law. Incorporating the Electoral Democracy Index as a control

variable is a prerequisite for this analysis to further examine to what extent

democratic governance is an impactful factor in the matter of state violence. Higher

degrees of democracy at the level of elections could be one of the reasons for lower

levels of state violence because accountability, transparency, and peaceful conflict

resolution are just some examples (Chenoweth & Perkoski, 2018). Using the

democracy level as a control variable allows this research to assess more clearly the

unique effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while

considering the broader political context.

The concept of autocratic institutionalization refers to the degree to which a

country's political system demonstrates autocratic characteristics, including limited

political competition and highly centralized power structures. Institutionalized

autocratic characteristics can result in reduced civil rights and freedoms, lack of

political pluralism, and centralization of power in the few hands of the elite, leading

to higher levels of violence. This research accounts for the influence of

authoritarian political characteristics on state violence by including the level of

autocratic institutionalization among the control variables. Autocratic regimes may

use different repressive measures to maintain power, likely leading to higher levels

of state violence. As such, this control variable contributes to analyzing the specific

effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while considering

the broader political environment and power dynamics. Including both democracy

level and institutionalized autocratization as control variables is crucial to capture

the different dynamics that influence state violence. While democracy levels are

reflective of the degree of democratic governance and political freedoms, the degree

of institutionalization of autocratic characteristics assesses the concentration of

power within a political system.

The level of socioeconomic inequalities is controlled via the Equal Distribution

Index, which analyzes the level to which tangible and intangible resources are

distributed even within a society. This variable determines to what degree resources

are distributed in an equal manner among different social groups, including

socioeconomic classes, genders, and ethnicities. Socio-economic disparities and

unequal resource distribution can exacerbate social cleavages, destabilize political

systems, and fuel conflicts within different segments of society (Burgoon, 2006).

Including this control variable allows this research to account for the impact of

socioeconomic inequalities on state violence. Countries with a more even resource

distribution could expect lower conflict, higher social coherence, and a stronger

principal-agent relationship with state actors. By controlling for socioeconomic

inequalities, this research can isolate the effect of military coups and popular

uprisings on state violence while considering other social and economic factors.

The notion of civil war is distinct from international conflicts wherein specific clans

or tribes in a given nation engage in violent engagements with the state or each

other. Civil wars are sprouted from deeply rooted divisive political, ethnic, or socio-

economic factors and also have the potential of leading to a bloody ending for the

civilian populations. Including the dummy variable indicating whether there is an

ongoing civil war as a control variable enables researchers to investigate the effect

of ongoing internal wars on state-directed violence (Kalyvas, 2019). Conflicts in

the homeland are likely to be accompanied by toughened state policies. Increased

state violence during a civil war can be expected due to the breakdown of

governance structures, the check of power and enforcement of order becomes

perplexed with the rise of armed groups, and cases of insecurity abound in such

countries. As such, the civil war control variable enables the research to assess the

effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence while accounting

for concurrent internal conflicts.

International conflicts are the armed encounters between one country at war

against another or between states, and in the context of regime breakdown, can

indicate the lack of international support for the breakdown of the regime.

International conflicts could shape domestic policies and determine state behavior,

including the level of state violence (Gat, 2008). Including the occurrence of

international conflict in the models as a dummy control variable gives this analysis

an opportunity to account for the effect of external factors on state violence.

Countries engaging in international conflict could experience higher levels of state

violence as a result of higher security concerns, increased militarization, and

diplomatic tensions. By controlling for international conflict, this research can

analyze the specific effects of military coups and popular uprisings on state violence

while considering external geopolitical dynamics.

Part II: Findings, Discussion, and Limitations

1. Findings

Table 1: The Effect of Military Coups and Popular Uprisings on State Violence

Model (1)

Model (2)

Model (3)

Modes of Breakdown: Military

Coups and Popular Uprising

-0.072***

-0.032**

0.007

(0.011)

(0.013)

(0.014)

GDP per Capita

-0.007***

-0.002

0.004**

(0.001)

(0.002)

Democracy

1.116***

0.883***

0.744***

(0.029)

(0.034)

(0.039)

Autocratic Institutionalization

-0.0001

-0.0003

-0.0001

(0.0002)

(0.0003)

Socioeconomic Inequalities

0.068***

0.074***

0.091***

(0.018)

(0.021)

(0.024)

Civil War

-0.096***

-0.082***

-0.031

(0.139)

(0.016)

(0.018)

International Conflict

0.054***

0.029*

0.031*

(0.013)

(0.016)

(0.019)

Observations

2,305

R-squared

0.4579

0.2803

0.1834

Constant

0.118

0.147

0.152

(0.008)

(0.010)

(0.011)

* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table I presents the findings. I use OLS beta regression models as the dependent

variable is an interval variable scaled from 0 to 1 and the data is cross-sectional.

The table presented above aims to estimate the effect of the mode of regime

breakdown (either a military coup or popular uprising) and the subsequent state

violence by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown sphere. Model (1)

estimates the effect of military coups and popular uprisings with a lagged dependent

variable representing the level of state violence one year after each observation of

a military coup or popular uprising. Likewise, Model (2) estimates the effect of

military coups and popular uprisings with a lagged dependent variable representing

the level of state violence five years after each observation of a military coup or

popular uprising. Lastly, Model (3) estimates the effect of military coups and

popular uprisings with a lagged dependent variable representing the level of state

violence ten years after each observation of a military coup or popular uprising.

It remains crucial to reiterate that the independent variable is coded as a dummy

variable, wherein 0 corresponds to observations for regime breakdowns via popular

uprisings, and 1 corresponds to observations for regime breakdowns via military

coups. Therefore, a negative coefficient would imply that instances of regime

breakdowns enabled by popular uprisings are associated with decreased violence

by the incoming regime in comparison to regime breakdowns via military coups.

Conversely, if the coefficient is positive, it suggests a higher likelihood of state

violence by the incoming regime following regime breakdowns via military coups

when compared to regime breakdowns via popular uprisings.

Model (1), which examines state violence by the incoming regime one-year post-

regime breakdown, shows that regime breakdowns via popular uprisings are

associated with a decrease in state violence by the incoming regime in comparison

to breakdowns enabled through military coups. Keeping all variables constant, the

coefficient (-0.072) indicates that a regime breakdown via a popular uprising is

associated with a 7% decrease in the probability of state violence by the incoming

regime compared to regime breakdowns via military coups. This result is

statistically significant at the 1% level. All control variables included in Model 1

demonstrate a statistically significant association with state violence at the 1% level

except for the control variable measuring the institutionalization of autocratic

features, which fails to reach significance. First, GDP per Capita shows a

statistically significant negative association with the likelihood of state violence by

the incoming regime, which indicates that higher economic prosperity is correlated

with reduced violence by the incoming regime one year after the regime

breakdown. This finding supports existing theories highlighting that economic

development has a stabilizing effect on the behavior of state actors. Second, the

level of democracy exhibits a notable positive association with the probability of

state violence by the incoming regime, suggesting that higher levels of democracy

and democratization efforts may initially be associated with increased state

violence. This unexpected relationship can indicate the potential complexities

related to democratic transitions post-breakdown. Third, higher levels of

socioeconomic inequalities, measured by the level of inequality in the distribution

of resources within society, are associated with an increase in the probability of

state violence by the incoming regime. This finding suggests that the inequalities

that result from unequal resource distribution, such as wealth, education, or

opportunities, can intensify state-society relations and contribute to higher levels of

repression or conflict. Additionally, the dummy variable indicating whether there is

an ongoing civil war is associated with a decrease in the probability of state violence

by the incoming regime one year after a regime breakdown. This unexpected

finding may suggest that the focus of the state actors may be shifting toward

managing internal conflict rather than exerting violence against civilians during the

first periods of their rule. Contrarily, the dummy variable for ongoing international

conflict shows a positive relationship between the occurrence of international

conflict and an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime. This

can be attributed to different factors, such as heightened security concerns or

changes in state-society relations due to international conflict. Notably, autocratic

institutionalization does not yield statistical significance in this model, suggesting

that a decentralized power structure does not affect state violence by the incoming

regime one year after regime breakdown.

Model (2), which examines state violence by the incoming regime five years after

regime breakdown, also shows that regime breakdowns via popular uprisings are

associated with a decrease in state violence by the incoming regime in comparison

to breakdowns enabled through military coups. Keeping all variables constant, the

coefficient (-0.032) indicates that a regime breakdown via a popular uprising is

associated with a 3% decrease in the probability of state violence by the incoming

regime five years after the breakdown, when compared to regime breakdowns via

military coups. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. As for the

control variables, higher levels of democracy remain associated with a higher

probability of state violence, higher levels of socioeconomic inequalities also

remain associated with a higher probability of state violence, and the occurrence of

a civil war remains associated with a decreased probability of state violence. All of

these results are significant at the 1% level. The occurrence of international conflict

remains associated with a higher probability of state violence by the incoming

regime and is statistically significant at the 10% level. Contrarily, the relationship

between GDP per capita and state violence loses its significance when measuring

state violence by the incoming regime five years after the breakdown. Lastly, the

relationship between state violence and the extent to which autocratic features are

institutionalized remains statistically insignificant.

As the empirical analysis points to a casual correlation between a regime

breakdown enabled via a military coup and a higher probability of state violence

by the incoming regime one year and five years following an observation of a

regime breakdown (when compared to a regime breakdown enabled via a popular

uprising), I reject the first null hypothesis (“H1: A regime that emerges after a

military coup is more likely to instigate violence in the short term than a regime

that emerges after a popular uprising”).

Model (3), which examines state violence by the incoming regime ten years after

regime breakdown, shows notable changes in the relationship between military

coups or popular uprisings and state violence. Similar to Models (1) and (2), regime

breakdowns enabled via popular uprising continue to be associated with a decrease

in the probability of state violence compared to regime breakdowns enabled via

military coups. However, the magnitude of this effect diminished significantly over

the ten-year timeframe. With a coefficient of 0.007, the effect of the mode of regime

breakdown is no longer statistically significant at the conventional levels of 1%,

5%, or 10%. This finding indicated that the effect of the mode of breakdown on the

probabilities of state violence by the incoming regime diminishes after ten years

and dissipates the initial effect observed after one and five years. It is interesting to

note that several control variables maintain statistically significant associations

with the probabilities of state violence, such as the level of democracy,

socioeconomic inequalities, and international conflict.

The relationship between the occurrence of civil war and the likelihood of state

violence by the incoming loses its significance. In contrast, the relationship between

GDP per capita and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime regains

significance. Lastly, the relationship between the occurrence of civil war and the

likelihood of state violence remains insignificant, as is the case in Models (1) and

(2).

As the empirical analysis does not point to a statistically significant correlation

between a regime breakdown enabled via a military coup and a higher probability

of state violence by the incoming regime ten years following an observation of a

regime breakdown (when compared to a regime breakdown enabled via a popular

uprising), I cannot reject the second null hypothesis (“H2: A regime that emerges

after a military coup is more likely to instigate violence in long term than a regime

that emerges after a popular uprising”).

2. Discussion

Model (1), which examines state violence by the incoming regime one year after

the regime breakdown, demonstrates a statistically significant negative coefficient

for popular uprisings, indicating a 7% decrease in the probability of state violence

compared to military coups. Similarly, Model (2), which examines state violence

by the incoming regime five years after the breakdown, shows a negative

coefficient for popular uprisings, though less pronounced at 3%, but still

statistically significant at the 5% level. The findings confirm the hypothesis that

regime breakdowns enabled by military coups are associated with an increased

probability of state violence by the incoming regime compared to popular uprisings,

particularly in the short to medium term (one to five years). This finding is

consistent with the notion that the mode through which the regime breaks down

creates a political environment that influences the level and duration of state

violence perpetrated by the incoming regime.

In the case of regime breakdowns via military coups – which are characterized by

the abrupt overthrow of the existing regime, the fast consolidation of power, and

the militarization of institutional and governance structures – the findings confirm

that the nature of this process is associated with an increased probability of state

violence by the incoming regime one and five years after each breakdown.

However, in the case of popular uprisings, which create a different political

environment due to their participatory nature – which influences the level of

legitimacy, democratic governance structures, and the level of international support

– the findings confirm that the nature of this process is associated with a decreased

probability of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after each

breakdown one and five years after each breakdown.

However, in Model (3), which examines state violence by the incoming regime ten

years after each breakdown, the coefficient for the mode of breakdown is no longer

statistically significant. This indicates that the impact of the mode of

the

101

breakdown on the level of violence by the incoming regime diminishes over long

term. This finding raises important questions on the sustainability of the initial

impact of the mode of breakdown on the likelihood of state violence by the

incoming regime. The diminishing effect of popular uprisings or military coups on

state violence by the incoming regime after ten years can be attributed to different

factors, potentially such as institutional changes or shifts in the state-society

relationship, which may erode the extent to which the regime resorts to the use of

violence.

As such, this analysis has not only emphasized the effect of military coups and

popular uprisings on the level of state violence by the incoming regime but also

outlined the significance of temporal dimensions. While this analysis serves as an

initial effort to understand the relationship between the mode of breakdown and

state violence by the incoming regime, there remains plenty of room for future

considerations. First, this analysis allows for future considerations and research on

other modes of breakdown, such as breakdowns enabled by civil wars,

international wars, foreign interventions, loss of election, pacted transitions, or

death of the incumbent leader. Second, this analysis paves the way for a more

nuanced understanding of temporal dimensions. In other words, it provides an

initial understanding of the duration of state violence by the incoming regime that

can be attributed to how the mode of breakdown occurred. The cut-off points

the

102

chosen for this analysis demonstrate in the abovementioned analysis that the effect

of military coups or popular uprisings on the level of state violence by the incoming

regimes is only statistically significant until five years after breakdown. As such,

this analysis has provided an initial springboard of understanding that can be built

upon in future research by choosing different cut-off points that can offer more

insight into the statistically significant duration of state violence that the mode of

breakdown can explain.

Last but not least, addressing the additional insights offered by the control variables

across the different models is noteworthy. The relationship between GDP per capita

and the likelihood of state violence by the incoming regime does not seem to be

consistent throughout the cut-off points. Although there is a statistically significant

negative association between both variables one year after the breakdown, the

relationship loses its significance initially five years after a regime breakdown but

regains statistical significance after ten years. While the findings of the models

measuring the level of state violence one and ten years following a regime

breakdown indicate that higher economic development is correlated with reduced

violence by the incoming regime, the fluctuation of significance over time can be

indicative of the evolving nature between economic factors and state violence

during transitional periods. Another unexpected finding is pertinent to the

relationship between the level of democracy and the likelihood of state violence by

the

103

the incoming regime. The results exhibit a consistent positive and significant

association between both variables, suggesting that higher levels of democracy

efforts may be initially associated with increased state violence.

However, as initially expected, higher levels of socioeconomic inequalities are

consistently associated with an increased probability of state violence by incoming

regime across all models measuring the three different cut-off points: one, five, and

ten years. This finding is a clear indication that disparities in resource distribution

within society exacerbate state-society relationships and contribute to higher levels

of state violence. On another note, the occurrence of an international conflict is

associated with an increased probability of state violence by the incoming regime

after one or five years. This finding suggests that external factors in the international

arena can shape domestic factors by fueling violent state behavior due to heightened

security risks or shifts in state-society relations. However, the influence of

international conflicts on state violence by the incoming regime loses its

significance after ten years, suggesting that this influence may be attenuated as the

incoming regimes stabilize their power. Lastly, the occurrence of a civil war is

unexpectedly associated with a statistically significant decrease in the likelihood of

state violence by the incoming regime one year and five years after the breakdown.

However, the relationship loses significance ten years after a regime breakdown.

While civil wars are typically associated with high levels of state violence, as seen

the

104

in Chapter 1 (Literature Review), this finding suggests that incoming regimes that

assume power might shift their focus on managing internal and societal conflicts

rather than exert violence against civilians during the initial phases of their

takeover.

105

3. Limitations

While this study carefully examines the intricate relationship between regime

breakdown and the level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime, it

remains important to recognize certain limitations that may constrain the scope and

depth of the findings.

First, the analysis primarily relies on data from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)

Index, which is a dataset widely used in different research studies. Yet, like any

other dataset, it does not come without its limitations. As is the case with any other

dataset, V-Dem (2024) can include gaps in data coverage, potential data

inaccuracies, and inherent biases that could raise uncertainties when it comes to the

validity of the results. While relying on one single dataset for the independent and

control variables is perceived as a pragmatic approach in this thesis due to the time

constraints for conducting this study, it is imperative to acknowledge that it can also

raise concerns about dataset-induced biases.

Second, the analytical approach centered around using Ordinary Least Squares

(OLD) beta regression models, which is a fairly common method for regression

analyses with interval control variables. Using OLS regressions to analyze complex

political phenomena, in this case, mode of regime breakdown and state violence

can result in a few methodological challenges related to the ability of the model to

truly capture the dynamics inherent in these political processes. While diagnostic

106

tests were run for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity and the regression

models were run with robust standard errors, the methodological constraints may

remain. Likewise, despite the efforts exerted above to account for different

compounding factors that can affect the relationship between the independent and

dependent variables, the possibility of unobserved variables raises endogeneity

concerns for this study.

Another potential limitation related to the directionality of control variables is

noteworthy. While the theoretical model in Chapter 2 has two different explanatory

mechanisms linking (A) military coups and (B) popular uprisings to the likelihood

of state violence by the incoming regime, it was paramount from an econometric

perspective to include the same set of control variables in both models to enable a

direct comparison between all coefficients. As such, methodological comparability

was prioritized in the quantitative analysis. Therefore, I have opted to include the

common control variables between both modes of breakdown and omitted other

theoretically relevant variables that are not relevant for both modes. As such, it is

pivotal to underscore that the

directionality of the control variables included in this analysis does not fully align

with the broader theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter 2, making the

interpretation of the analysis challenging and highlighting the dynamic nature of

political processes.

107

Moreover, it is important to circle back to the cut-off points chosen for this analysis

(one, five, and ten years after regime breakdown). As this study offers a panoramic

view of the modes of breakdown from 1900 to 2013, it was essential to choose

specific cut-off points for an initial analysis of the effect of the mode of breakdown

on state violence. It remains important to note that while the cut-off points were

chosen from a logical perspective as a meaningful timeframe to measure short- and

long-term state violence patterns post-regime breakdown, exploring other cut-off

points with additional lagged dependent variables could furthermore enhance the

robustness of this analysis.

On a similar note, the measurement of the independent and dependent variables is

also important to discuss. Although the index employed to measure state violence

accurately measures what this study is looking at – namely, physical violence from

the state’s end –, the complexities of prolonged violence have a multifaceted nature.

This nature can pose challenges in precisely defining and categorizing which form

of violence is being used. As such, the categorization into distinct types of violence

(in this case, physical violence by the incoming regime) may overlook the

intricacies of political violence in which different forms and manifestations of

violence occur simultaneously. As for the measurement of the independent variable,

the quantitative assumption of homogeneity within both modes (especially after

including the same control variable for purely econometric reasons) may overlook

considerable variation in the country-specific circumstances and contributing

108

factors to regime breakdown, potentially influencing the levels and persistence of

political violence.

Lastly, I would like to illuminate another limitation that stems from the inherent

variability in the temporal dynamics of military coups and popular uprisings.

Because this analysis compares both modes of breakdown to each other with the

same cut-off points, it is automatically associated with an assumption of a uniform

temporal timeline for the transition period. While both modes of breakdown can

have similar starting points, the transition time can be different. For example,

military coups are characterized by abrupt power seizures and subsequent power

consolidation efforts and can have prolonged periods of transition when compared

to popular uprisings, whereafter, the incoming regime can enjoy a faster transition

to stable governance structures. The divergence in transition timelines can

introduce complexities uncaptured in this analysis as it can partially explain why

military coups are associated with higher probabilities of state violence compared

to popular uprisings.

Conclusion

This analysis has provided valuable insights into the effect of the mode of regime

breakdown and the subsequent level of state violence perpetrated by the incoming

regime. After running different Ordinary Least Squares beta regression models, this

analysis has found that military coups are more likely to be associated with higher

levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five years after regime

109

breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. These findings underscore the

importance of taking into account the mode of regime breakdown when discussing

post-breakdown state violence and the implications for state-society

relations.

Furthermore, this analysis underscores the evolving nature of state violence

dynamics. While the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of violence by

the incoming regime is significant until five years following a regime breakdown,

the impact diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant at the ten-year cut-off

point after a regime breakdown enabled by a military coup or popular

uprising.

However, in light of the limitations of the analysis as outlined above, it has become

evident that the relationship between the mode of regime breakdown and the

subsequent state violence by the incoming regime necessitates a multifaceted

analysis. Therefore, the next chapter aims to complement this quantitative analysis

with a qualitative examination of the intricate dynamics of this relationship. The

aim of the qualitative study is to balance out the limitations of the quantitative

analysis and provide a nuanced understanding of different contextual factors and

mechanisms that might have been left unobserved

quantitatively.

110

Chapter 5 - Qualitative Analysis

Introduction

The quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter 4 has shed light on the correlation

between the mode of regime breakdown, namely military coups and popular

uprisings, and subsequent levels of state violence by the incoming regime.

Specifically, the analysis has found that military coups are more likely to be

associated with higher levels of state violence by the incoming regime one and five

years after regime breakdown, compared to popular uprisings. After a regime

breakdown, the impact diminishes at the ten-year cut-off point and becomes

statistically insignificant. However, the inherent limitations within the quantitative

analysis in this context necessitate a complementary qualitative analysis for the

following reasons;

While characterized by statistical robustness and generalizability to broad

applicability, the quantitative analysis discussed in the previous chapter can be

criticized for its failure to capture the relevant contextual factors and its

shortcomings in analyzing all the mechanisms discussed in the theoretical

framework presented in Chapter 3. By embracing a qualitative approach, this

chapter seeks to illustrate pivotal aspects in understanding the relationship between

the mode of breakdown and state violence by the incoming regime – which need to

be underscored beyond the interpretation of coefficients and the discussion of

111

statistical significance. A notable limitation of the quantitative model is

the assumption of homogeneity within both modes of breakdown:

military coups and popular uprisings. This limitation becomes particularly evident

when the same set of control variables are included for econometric

comparaiblity. This may lead to considerable variation in the country-specific

circumstances and contributing factors to regime breakdown, potentially

influencing the levels and persistence of state violence.

As such, this chapter conducts a process-tracing analysis to illustrate two critical

factors left uncaptured in this study so far. First, it seeks to delve deep into the

implications of state violence when two successive regime breakdowns occur

within temporal proximity. To elaborate more extensively, this chapter aims to

elucidate the levels and durations of state violence in cases where multiple regime

breakdowns occurred via different modes shortly after one another. The question at

the forefront of this chapter can be formulated as follows: Does the probability of

state violence by the incoming regime increase after a coup that was preceded by a

breakdown instigated by a popular uprising? Second, this chapter observes the

causal process of the mechanisms linking each mode of breakdown with state

violence by the incoming regime. Because the quantitative analysis maintained

uniform control variables across models for the sake of direct coefficient

112

comparison, this chapter seeks to illustrate the different mechanisms that could

influence the incoming regime's use of violence in the post-breakdown

environment.

An integral aspect of this qualitative approach is the utilization of a case study to

conduct the process-tracing analysis. Therefore, this study has opted to analyze the

case of Egypt to (A) examine the implications of state violence perpetrated by the

incoming regime that arose following a regime breakdown via a military coup in

2013, which was preceded by a regime breakdown via a popular uprising in 2011,

and (B) utilize the contextual factors to illustrate the different mechanisms and

variables which link the occurrence of military coups or popular uprisings with the

perpetuation of state violence by the incoming regime in the post-breakdown

sphere. A case study serves as a means to examine the hypothesized complex causal

chains, and the choice to utilize Egypt as a case study serves this purpose twofold.

First, the Egyptian context sheds light on the extent to which a post-coup regime

exacerbates its use of violence against any perceived threat. However, it must be

acknowledged that the utilization of Egypt compromises the analysis because the

post-uprising regime had not consolidated itself enough and was overthrown by a

coup after a year. As such, while the process-tracing analysis is only able to examine

the violence instigated by Morsi’s regime for one year, the weight of the analysis

lies in the examination of the post-coup regime and the unprecedented levels of

violence that accompany it. Second, the utilization of Egypt allows for a

comprehensive analysis of how the post-coup regime clearly utilized the sentiment

113

of the previous uprising to instigate violence. This analysis furthermore enhances

our understanding of the complex interconnectedness of successive regime

breakdowns.

The Egyptian contexts of 2011 and 2013 present a case study that can advance this

thesis’ analysis to account for the complex causal chains that explain the

quantitative results demonstrating that post-coup regimes are more likely to

instigate more violence than post-uprising regimes. The theoretical mechanisms

that were outlined in Chapter 3 linking the modes of breakdown to state violence

are as follows: For regime breaks enabled by popular uprisings, these mechanisms

are touched upon: legitimacy, governance structures, institutional continuity,

democratic transition, economic development, and international support. As for

regime breakdowns enabled by military coups, the following factors are dissected

in this analysis: power consolidation and repression, institutional erosion, political

polarization, international response, economic growth and domestic resource

allocation, and transitional justice processes.

The narration of Egypt’s case study supports a number of these mechanisms. When

analyzing the post-2011 revolution regime, the following mechanisms are

discussed: mass mobilization, international support, democratic transition,

economic factors, coalition building, and the fight for legitimacy. The analysis also

addresses country-specific factors, which in this case were: cooptation by the

military, civil-military relations, and the transitional judicial process. When

114

analyzing the post-2013 coup regime, various theoretical mechanisms are

examined: legitimation strategies, power consolidation, repression, political

polarization, institutional erosion, economic development, and domestic resource

allocation.

In light of the aforementioned considerations, this study's quantitative lens further

provides an even more nuanced illustration of the relationship between the mode of

breakdown and state violence, which enriches our understanding of why the mode

through which regimes breakdown can significantly impact post-breakdown

political dynamics.

1. Illustrating the Events: Egypt's 2011 Popular Uprising in Review

The Egyptian Revolution of 2011 arguably had deeper roots that emerged before

the outbreak of the uprising on January 25. Different movements and forms of

mobilization dating back to a decade pre-2011 have possibly cultivated the road for

the revolution. Among those are the movements against the Iraq war in 2003 and

Gaza in 2008, the pro-democracy moments, notably Kefaya, and the movement

supporting judiciary independence throughout 2004-2005. Another pivotal catalyst

that paved the way for the 2011 revolution was the series of labor protests that

emerged in 2006 and spread nationwide. Lastly, the response to the church bombing

in early January 2011 also led to anti-sectarian protests (Korany & El-Mahdi, 2012).

115

On January 25, 2011, thousands of Egyptians initiated a series of mass protests by

pouring into Tahrir Square and marching along the Nile Corniche. Initially, the

protests were centered around socioeconomic issues, commonly referred to in

Egypt as “eish (bread), horreya (freedom), and aadala egtemaeya (social justice),”

and spread within hours to 15 out of Egypt’s 27 governorates. When the protestors

arrived at Tahrir Square, despite outnumbering the heavily armed riot police due to

the unpreparedness and underestimation by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, the

present riot police officers shot tear gas and rubber bullets at the demonstrators who

were yelling “Silmiya (peaceful)” Many contend that starting at this very moment,

the protest seeking socioeconomic reforms had swiftly transformed into a

revolutionary uprising demanding the end of police brutality and the resignation of

President Hosni Mubarak (Ketchley, 2017).

On January 26 and 27, smaller marches, demonstrations, and sit-ins were responded

to with significant repression by riot police, which resulted in the temporary

demobilization of anti-regime opposition (The New York Times, 26 January 2011).

However, this was not the case in El-Suez, wherein activists continued to escalate

their demands and inspire the re-outbreak of anti-regime protests nationwide (The

San Diego Union-Tribune, 27 January 2011). In

retaliation to ongoing police brutality, different Egyptian activist groups called for

another day of national protest on January 28, dubbed the “Friday of Anger.” The

Friday of Anger is considered one of the most violent days of the 2011 revolution,

116

during which protests armed with Molotov cocktails and self-assembled weapons

were engaged in pitch battles with police and security force units after attacking

police stations and vehicles (Mukhtar et al., 2012).

In the following days, demonstrators continued taking to the streets. On the evening

of February 1st, Mubarak delivered an emotionally charged speech in which he

promised not to re-run for office again in the following September, which earned

him the sympathy of many demonstrators and led them to head home. However,

those who did not leave were confronted the following days by pro-Mubarak thugs

on horses and camels attacking them in Tahrir Square. Dubbed the “Battle of the

Camel,” public opinion turned irreversibly against Mubarak and gave the

demonstrators the necessary momentum to continue their sit-ins and

demonstrations at Tahrir Square (and nationwide) (Wynne-Hughes,

2021). A week later, on February 11, 2011, the Vice-President announced

Mubarak’s resignation and the end of his thirty-year rule over Egypt (CNN, 11

February 2011). After his resignation, the Security Council of the Armed Forces

assumed interim power in their capacity as the “Guardians of the Revolution” until

President Mohamed Morsi was elected in Egypt’s 2012 procedurally free and fair

elections (Lutterbeck, 2013).

2. Analyzing Theoretical Mechanisms Behind the 2011 Popular

117

Uprising

After President Mubarak was ousted in February 2011, the Supreme Council of the

Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed a pivotal role in navigating Egypt’s

transitional phase and positioned itself as the steward of Egypt’s democratization

process. Having been previously marginalized for decades, the Muslim

Brotherhood was closely coopted by the SCAF during this period – which led to

their re-emergence in the electoral sphere as they

officially established the

Freedom and Justice Party as their political arm (Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 1 June 2011)

Central to the democratization process and the reshaping of Egypt’s political

landscape was the amendment of the Constitution, which has been closely

associated with the authoritarian rule under the Mubarak regime. The national

referendum held on the amendments to the 1971 Constitution (which have been

modified by SCAF and presented as the new interim Constitutional Declaration) in

March 2011 served as a reminder that there are profound ideological differences

within the Egyptian society on the pace and scope of democratic reforming, with

the MB advocating for a “yes” and other secular groups advocating for a “no” (The

New York Times, 20 March 2011). While in the early stages of the post-uprising

landscape, there were coalition-building efforts by

forming the Democratic Alliance in Egypt, which was comprised of

118

pro-revolution parties and was intended to present a unified front, challenges arose

within the alliance as a result of different priorities, power struggles, and strong

reservations related to the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially

in light of their parliamentary electoral victories (Ketchley, 2017).

One year later, when the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohammed Morsi ran for the

presidency and assumed power after the 2012 presidential elections, the prospects

for democratization slowly died in light of the growing tension between the Muslim

Brotherhood and SCAF. The sequence of the judicial battle and the battle over the

constitution-drafting process between both entities is presented here in a snapshot:

Since the constitutional referendum in March 2011, Egypt had been ruled by the

Constitutional Declaration issued by SCAF, which was drafted to serve as an

interim constitution until the new one is written. Different debates were taking place

between the SCAF, the MB, and other political parties about the sequence of events:

Should the presidential elections be held first, or should the constitution be drafted

before the elections? After having decided to schedule the presidential elections

before the constitution's finalization, the newly elected parliament elected the

members of the Constituent Assembly to draft the new constitution. Because the

Assembly was majorly comprised of MB-affiliated members, Egypt’s Higher

Administrative Court ruled to dissolve the Constituent

Assembly’s first incarnation due to membership irregularities in April 2012 (BBC,

10 April 2012). In June 2012, the Supreme Constitutional Court, which was still

119

comprised of judges appointed by Mubarak, ruled in favor of the dissolution of the

lower house of parliament six months after it was elected and a few days before the

second round of the presidential elections (The Guardian, 14 June 2012). In

November 2012, after Morsi was elected, he issued a constitutional declaration,

shielding himself from judicial oversight by placing his presidential decrees beyond

the scope of jurisdiction for the Egyptian courts until (ostensibly until the new

constitution was drafted) (Ahram Online, 22 November 2012). This declaration was

made just a couple of weeks away from the Supreme Constitutional Court’s

scheduled ruling on the legitimacy of the Constituent

Assembly, which Morsi tasked to draft a new constitution. In December 2012,

Morsi signed a new Constitution into law, which was widely perceived as

controversial among Egyptian society and different political factions (The

Guardian, 26 December 2012).

Numerous factors have contributed to the strained relationships of the Muslim

Brotherhood. Beyond the tension with SCAF, it can be argued that the Muslim

Brotherhood failed to cultivate positive partnerships with the different political

factions after the failed attempts to establish a Democratic Alliance. This arguably

led to enduring repercussions during Morsi’s presidency, in which he only had the

support of the Muslim Brotherhood but none from other political parties, the

security apparatus, the judiciary forces, and the military forces. The overreliance

120

on solely Islamist allies and the focus on electoral legitimacy, while simultaneously

neglecting mass mobilization among revolutionaries and coalition building, led to

(A) the detriment of democratic gains and (B) heightened tensions from different

fronts for Morsi, to which he responded to with the November 2012 constitutional

declaration – which ultimately paved the way for the 2013 military coup.

It is essential to underscore that in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, there was

an absence of international support for the ousting of Mubarak, as his Western allies

maintained their support for the fledgling (Way, 2011). A byproduct of this

continuous support was that the United States' foreign policy in Egypt was

criticized for not actively supporting the democratization process. In this absence

of international support, the success of the democratic transition was contingent on

the outcome of the struggle between the pro-democratic political factions and the

anti-democratic (Brownlee, 2012). As described above, with the Muslim

Brotherhood’s inability to maintain a coalition spanning the ideological spectrum,

Morsi’s regime did not last more than one year in power. At the same time, while

Morsi’s legitimacy was being undermined domestically, international support was

not forthcoming. Despite Morsi’s internationally recognized status as the legitimate

democratically elected leader of the most populous Middle Eastern state and his

attempts to broaden Egypt’s alliances beyond its traditional partnership with the

121

Washington-the EU bloc and towards Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia (Roll & Jannis,

2012), his overthrow was not condemned by the

international community at large. In retrospect, this lack of international support

casts doubts on the veracity of international democracy movements surrounding the

Arab Spring. It highlights the prioritization of stability, maintaining the status quo,

and a prospect that was severely undermined by the Morsi regime, namely its failure

to expand its base of power beyond the Muslim Brotherhood and other similarly

minded fundamentalist factions. The international community's priorities were laid

bare when presented with a choice between support of an unpopular, though

democratically legitimate regime or the acceptance of an illegitimate military

takeover promising to restore stability.

In the period between Mubarak’s ousting and Morsi’s election, SCAF continuously

responded to demonstrations and sit-ins with significant use of violence, which

ultimately resulted in hundreds of Egyptians having been extrajudicially killed and

thousands injured or detained. While the country’s pro-democracy activists had

temporarily gone silent starting Mubarak’s ousting in February 2011, thousands

gathered for the first time in Tahrir on 19 March to protest against the results of the

national referendum, which approved the Constitutional Declaration drafted by

SCAF. This specific demonstration marked the start of SCAF’s journey of

perpetuating violence and its insistence to “pursue policies of suppressing freedom

of expression and using the military judiciary as a tool to subjugate civilians and

122

harass peaceful activists” (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, 7 May 2012).

SCAF’s consistency in the use of violence to repress any expressions of

dissatisfaction – which was ultimately rooted in the belief that the demands of the

2011 revolution were not close to being met – was significantly condemned by

different organizations, such as the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (20

October, 2011). Notable examples of SCAF’s

systematic violence against peaceful demonstrators are the following incidents:

Maspiro (October 2011), Mohamed Mahmoud (November 2011), and Abbasseya

(April 2012). On October 9th, 2011, peaceful demonstrators demanding the rights

of Coptic citizens in Egypt were brutally attacked by military police and central

security forces in the Maspiro Area, which is situated in the heart of Cairo. The

violent attack initiated against the demonstrators is estimated to have led to more

than 25 deaths, 300 injuries, and the arrest of detainees and their referral to the

military prosecution (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2011). The

Mohamed Mahmoud incident, considered among the deadliest protests under

SCAF’s rule, had begun when peaceful demonstrations erupted on Mohamed

Mahmoud Street, next to Tahrir Square, to advocate for a faster political transition

in Egypt. In response to this, military and riot police forces used live ammunition

and rubber bullets to attack the demonstration over six days, killing hundreds and

severely injuring thousands (Human Rights Watch, 19 November 2012). Against

the backdrop of the increasing dissatisfaction with SCAF’s rule, which prevented a

123

democratic transition, a peaceful sit-in in Abbaseya Square took place in April

2012. In response to the sit-in, military officers and individuals in civilian clothing

embarked on a violent attack to dismantle the peaceful sit-in in the

Square by shooting live ammunition at them (Egyptian Initiative for Personal

Rights, 7 May 2012).

As illustrated above, SCAF’s rule over Egypt had (A) resulted in significant levels

of state violence perpetuated against any civilian expression of dissatisfaction with

the political developments in Egypt and (B) cast significant doubt on the prospect

of democratization in Egypt. Given the Muslim Brotherhood’s political

opportunism, which was evident when they were co-opted by the military and failed

to respond to popular demands seeking a genuine political transition, it was initially

not clear to which extent Morsi’s regime would resort to the use of violence against

any form of dissent. Whereas it is essential to note that Christians and seculars

mainly opposed Morsi’s election at first, the degree of opposition had reached its

peak in early 2013 in light of the deteriorating socio-economic situation,

characterized by the EGP losing its value against USD and shortages in both,

electricity and gas. However, the state’s reaction to the ongoing opposition and

protests became increasingly violent over time (Prat and Rezk, 2019). Most

infamously, an incident which he was later referred to Egypt’s criminal court, took

place in December 2012 surrounding the Al-Itihadaya Presidential Palace in Cairo.

124

Against the backdrop of Morsi’s issuance of the Constitutional Decree (as discussed

above), a peaceful protest erupted in December 2012, in which Morsi incited

violence against the demonstrations by allegedly ordering his supporters to use

violence against the assembled protest (Ahram Online, 1 September 2013).

The sections above illustrate the sequence of events following the 2011 Revolution

in Egypt and the ousting of Mubarak. In doing so, it highlights several factors that

were discussed in the theory on the mechanisms linking popular uprisings to state

violence (See above: Chapter 3), namely mass mobilization, international support,

democratic transition, economic factors, coalition building, and the fight for

legitimacy. It also addresses country-specific factors, which in this case were:

cooptation by the military and civil-military relations. While the theory in this study

suggests that a popular uprising creates a political environment that mitigates the

use of state violence by the incoming regime, this was not the case in Egypt for

various reasons. First, when SCAF undemocratically appointed itself as the steward

of Egypt’s democratic transition, granting itself interim rule over the country, it

undermined the very nature of a democratic transition. While the theoretical model

presented in my paper is designed to predict the level of state violence perpetuated

by the first incoming regime post-regime breakdown, the sequence of the post-

revolution political developments in Egypt necessitates an analysis of the violence

perpetuated by

125

SCAF during their interim rule before the “incoming regime” was even elected. The

exceptionally high level of state violence in this period was a sign of SCAF’s

unwillingness to allow any expression of opposition to its rule and laid the

groundwork for the eventual coup, which overthrew the president of the incoming

regime. Second, the analysis above points to the conclusion that the Muslim

Brotherhood’s inability to engage in broad coalition building and mass mobilization

beyond maintaining its initial supporters with a similar religious belief led to Morsi

resorting to the use of disproportionate violence against protesters in an attempt to

keep his grip on power. Although the theory in this study does not de facto

encompass the violence perpetuated in the interim rule post-regime breakdown and

only zooms in on the level of state violence after a new regime is in power, the

analytical process tracing the events during this timeframe in Egypt points to the

argument that the level of violence perpetrated by Morsi is a direct result of his

judicial and ideological battle with SCAF, despite his initial cooptation. Although

the Morsi regime and SCAF both perpetuated state violence against non-state

actors, in comparison, the level of violence used by Morsi (“the incoming regime”)

showed to be significantly less intense than that of SCAF (“interim rule”).

Moreover, the dynamics explained above serve to demonstrate how the military’s

actions during their transitional rule (characterized by the unwillingness to respond

to the popular demands of pro-democracy activities and the cooptation of the

Muslim Brotherhood) have ultimately prevented the prospect of democratization in

126

Egypt. Even after Morsi was appointed as president after procedurally free and fair

elections, the military hampered any hope for democratization by overthrowing

him. These dynamics explain why Egypt does not show the hypothesized results

that initially suggest a decreased likelihood of state violence by the incoming

regime in the short term following a regime breakdown. As for the hypothesis on

long-term violence by the incoming regime, the analysis was not possible in Egypt’s

case, given the fact that Morsi was overthrown after his first year in office.

In the following sections, this analysis illustrates the short- and long-term patterns

of state violence by the incoming regime led by Al-Sisi, which emerged from the

military coup overthrowing Morsi. It aims to analyze the level and duration of

violence by a regime that emerged after a military coup that was orchestrated

against the backdrop of a popular uprising. At the forefront of the following sections

illustrating the sequence of events during this timeframe is the following question:

Are the hypothesized results on short- and long-term state violence by the incoming

regime post-regime breakdown via military coup affected if the military coup is

orchestrated against the backdrop of a popular uprising?

3. Illustrating the Events: Egypt's 2013 Military Coup in Review

Before the 2013 military coup is discussed, it is essential to gain a deeper

understanding of the roots of this coup and the different factors that enabled the

military to orchestrate a successful intervention. First, this section zooms in on the

127

escalating tensions and power struggles between Morsi and SCAF prior to his

overthrow. Before Morsi assumed the presidency, SCAF dissolved the

Islamist-dominated lower house of parliament in June 2012 (The Guardian, 14 June

2012) – a move that has been widely perceived as an effort of power

consolidation from their end before handing over authority to civilian leadership

(Bou Nassif, 2017). After Morsi’s election, he dismissed key influential military

figures, notably Field Marshal Tantawi and Lieutenant General Sami Anan (The

Washington Post, 14 August 2012) – a move that has also been perceived as an

attempt to assert civilian control over the military and resulted in increased

animosity within the military (Bou Nassif, 2017). A testimony of the slowly but

surely growing tension was the widely spread rumors of the souring relations

between Morsi and El-Sisi, back then in his capacity as the Minister of Defense

under Morsi’s rule. In February 2013, when different sources reported Morsi’s plan

to dismiss El-Sisi. These rumors were still circulated until June 2013, when Morsi’s

intention to replace Sisi with Major General Ahmad Wasfi added more fuel to the

ongoing tension (Gad, 2013). The military dissent was clearly expressed in March

2013, when the armed forces refused to enforce a curfew imposed by Morsi

surrounding the Suez Canal Zone cities, indicating silent mutiny within the military

(Ashour, 2015).

Against the backdrop of the straining civil-military relationship, the military proved

to strategically support and back the emergence of the civilian-led Tamarrod

128

movement as an oppositional force against Morsi’s regime. First, the organizers of

the Tamarrod movement were protected against any disruptions or crackdowns by

the Muslim Brotherhood through intelligence channels within the military. Second,

pro-military circles contributed to the provision of sufficient media coverage and

financial backing to amplify Tamarrod and increase its domestic and international

visibility (Gad, 2013; Bou Nassif, 2017). The success of the Tamarrod campaign

was unambiguous when the movement managed to collect 15 million signatures by

June 2013 on their petition advocating for Morsi’s resignation. Most notably, it is

important to highlight that the movement was the first to call for the 30 June protests

(Gerbaudo, 2013).

Subsequently, after the widespread support garnered by the Tamarrod movement

lent legitimacy to calls for intervention against Morsy's presidency, millions of

Egyptians took to the streets in June 2013, demanding an immediate end to Morsi’s

presidency, the military intervened on July 3rd by deposing Morsi, detaining him

and his top aids and shutting down Islamist broadcasters (Gad,

2013). The military’s intervention not only leveraged this public sentiment but also

framed their actions as an answer to the people’s will in an effort to gain legitimacy

and avoid the stigma around a traditional coup. Moreover, the coup led by El-Sisi

clearly framed its interventions with a nationalist narrative concerned with Egypt’s

national security and stability, namely by justifying the overthrow of Morsi as a

step necessary to prevent widespread chaos, economic collapse, and civil conflict

129

(as stated by Major General Ahmad Wasfi, 2013) To sum it up, the military’s

mobilization of civil society actors against the Muslim Brotherhood and its isolation

of Morsi in the political realm led to the scenario in which military interventionism

became a viable option (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, 2015).

The Sisi-led coup appointed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Adly Mansour

as interim President, while arguably, SCAF control over the decision-making

processes remained significantly high (Housden, 2013). After the coup, high-

ranking military officers proclaimed that Egyptians would be able to choose to vote

for their new president after a new parliament was elected and seated. However, as

SCAF had suspended Morsi’s new constitution and the interim president only

issued a Constitutional Declaration to pave the way for a transition through

constitutional reform, the Supreme Constitutional Court needed to review the new

electoral law before the parliamentary elections could be held (Brown, 2013).

Despite claims made by El-Sisi shortly after overthrowing Morsi in July 2013,

underscoring that he had no intention to assume Egypt’s presidency, his statement

in March 2014 proved differently. Just two months before the scheduled

presidential elections, El-Sisi announced his intention to run for president with the

following statements: "Today is the last time you’ll see me wearing this [military]

uniform. I was honored to wear it to defend the nation and today, I am also leaving

it behind to defend the nation (...) no one could be president without the people’s

will (...) my determination to run in the election does not bar others from their right

130

to run. I will be happy if whoever the people choose succeeds” (Ahram Online, 26

March 2014). Shortly after, he won the presidential race with a staggering 96.91%

(Ahram Online, 3 June 2014).

4. Analyzing Theoretical Mechanisms Behind the 2013 Military Coup

Shortly after El-Sisi assumed his rule over Egypt, it did not take long before many

scholars started referring to it as a new form of authoritarianism. He created a new

political order that is more authoritarian and repressive than anything Egypt has

witnessed throughout its history (Armbrust, 2017; Rutherford, 2018), which is

characterized by systematic repression and violence perpetuated against the Muslim

Brotherhood and any kind of opposition – whether manifested within the civil

society actors or on social media platforms – and coupled with the creation of a

monopoly in which the military controls the economic, social and political

landscape (Rutherford, 2018; Shahata, 2018). As such, the sections below delve

deep into the characteristics and mechanisms that emerged immediately after the

military coup, which could explain the short- and long-term level of violence

perpetrated by the El-Sisi regime.

El-Sisi’s pursuit of legitimacy involves considering various theoretical mechanisms

as presented in Chapter 3. These mechanisms suggest that regimes following

military coups are more inclined to perpetuate state violence. By examining El-

Sisi’s legitimation strategies; the following mechanisms are automatically also

131

discussed: power consolidation, repression, political polarization, economic

development, and domestic resource allocation.

El-Sisi’s quest for legitimacy and efforts to consolidate his power after

overthrowing Morsi via a military coup was strategized through different

dimensions, including his narrative as a protector and leader, economic promises,

and repression mechanisms (Yefet and Lavie, 2021). While initially, his legitimacy

was closely tied to the 2011 revolution, El-Sisi swiftly capitalized on his perceived

threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to rebrand his image as the guardian of Egypt

against internal and external threats. What came with being the “protector of the

nation” was a series of unprecedented authoritarian strategies tailored toward

seeking personal legitimacy (Hijazi, 2018). To gain personal legitimacy, El-Sisi

embarked on a journey to establish a military electoral authoritarian system with a

non-dominant party electoral system (Aziz, 2017).

In terms of economic legitimacy, El-Sisi assumed power when Egypt coincided

with Egypt facing severe economic challenges – varying on the spectrum of

recession, rising debt, and high unemployment rates. While on the one hand, he

made a number of economic promises when he first assumed power (Aboushady &

Aboushady, 2018), El-Sisi quickly championed mega-scaled infrastructure projects

like the expansion of the Suez Canal and the building of a new capital city. While

the announcement of these mega-projects in 2014/2015 was met with immediate

controversy, El-Sisi portrayed these projects as a crucial step towards Egypt’s

132

much-needed economic growth and presented himself as a leader capable of

steering Egypt towards economic prosperity (Yefet and Lavie, 2021).

At the same time, ElSisi’s legitimation strategy heavily relied on controlling

political narratives and repressing/delegitimating oppositional forces (Rutherford

et al., 2018). This entailed rejecting the promises pertaining to 2011 and

delegitimating the Muslim Brotherhood while posing them as a threat to Egypt’s

stability and national security. The increased terrorism threats in Sinai post-2013

also allowed El-Sisi to claim his legitimacy as the protector of Egypt against

terrorism and internal unrest (Edel & Josua, 2018).

Regarding international support, Egypt's economic difficulties highlight a

significant level of backing for the coup and Sisi's government, as evidenced by the

provision of international financial assistance. The international community's

priorities were laid bare when presented with a choice between support of an

unpopular, though democratically legitimate regime or the acceptance of an

illegitimate military takeover promising to restore stability. Following the political

developments centered around the coup in July 2013, Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, swiftly proceeded

to provide economic assistance to Egypt. Having perceived the Muslim

Brotherhood’s rule over Egypt as a threat to regional political stability, the three

countries pledged grants and in-kind donations to Egypt worth $12 billion in July

133

2013. Further signaling the support for the military coup, Saudi Arabia and the

UAE provided Egypt with an additional total of $4 billion in early 2014. Likewise,

after El-Sisi was elected, Saudi Arabia called for an international conference to

mobilize financial assistance to Egypt (Amin, 2018).

Taking a similar approach, the European Union also maintained its longstanding

assistance framework agreement with Egypt after the 2013 coup. However, the

United States took a more cautious approach by initially suspending the provision

of military aid and delaying previously scheduled military transfers. Despite this,

the Department of State refrained from classifying Egypt’s political developments

as a military coup, as that would have constitutionally led to legal restrictions on

military aid. The United States' continued engagement with Egypt and their

relatively prompt delivery of military equipment also indicated tacit support for

El-Sisi's regime (Amin, 2018).

5. The Dynamics of State Violence: Post-2013 Military Coup in Egypt

While the escalation of state violence patterns after the uprising by SCAF was

perceived as a “preservationist” form of state violence by the military to destroy all

revolutionary forces seeking democratization, in the aftermath of El-Sisi’s coup in

July 2013, resorted to more aggressive state violence, namely constituent state

violence to demobilize the protestors and establish governing structures and

processes (Stacher, 2020). When El-Sisi assumed power, state violence strategies

diverted from defensive to offensive, and Egypt has been witnessing an

134

unprecedented level of state violence and repression since (Stacher, 2018)

As the pact between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood was clearly broken,

the military created a political environment that dehumanized the Muslim

Brotherhood and garnered domestic support for the use of state violence against

them. As a reaction to the ousting of Mubarak, Morsi’s supporters and allies

assembled sit-ins and protests across Egypt, which were met with lethal violence

by state authorities. In July 2013, in a televised speech, El-Sisi asked Egyptians to

take to the streets to mandate the military to act against political violence and

terrorism, undertaking the narrative that the military stands ready to act upon the

“will of the people” (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Following the speech, millions took to

the streets, providing the military with the necessary political cover for the new

regime to instigate lethal violence against the Muslim Brotherhood. On July 30, the

cabinet mandated the Ministry of Interior to proceed with the necessary legal

measures to confront terrorism and road-blocking, which came in light of the

ongoing large sit-in still assembled by Morsi supporters in Rabaa and Nahda

Squares (Pratt and Rezk, 2019). Two weeks later, police forces dispersed the sit-ins

over 12 hours, killing approximately 800-1000 individuals (Human Rights Watch,

2014). In the following months, repressive measures were taken against the

Brotherhood, which included their condemnation, imprisonment, and mass death

135

sentences – actions that were endorsed by different segments of the population after

feeding into the military’s propaganda (The Guardian, 8 July 2013).

Although the state violence instigated by El-Sisi in the immediate short-term was a

direct result of the securitization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime quickly

started widening repression and violence beyond the Brotherhood to anyone who

expressed any form of opposition or criticism towards El-Sisi and the regime at

large. Particularly civil society actors, human rights groups, journalists, and any

participants in peaceful protests – including individuals who initially supported the

overthrow of Morsi, have been direct targets of state violence since July 2013

(Hamzawy, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; Guerin, 2018). To institutionalize

the repression tactics, new laws and legal amendments were initially introduced in

2013 (Hamzawy, 2017). For example, in November 2013, a law was signed into

implementation that forbids any protests taking place without a permit from state

authorities. Shortly after, high-profile activists closely tied to the 2011 Revolution

were imprisoned, such as Alaa Abdel-Fatteh (Guerin, 2018). The detention,

disappearance, and torture of activists were exacerbated when Egypt’s public

prosecutor was assassinated in August 2015. Against this backdrop, a terrorism law

was introduced, which allowed the state authorities unprecedented measures to

control the media while simultaneously offering the security apparatus and military

officers impunity in their fight against “terrorism” in Egypt (Human Rights Watch,

136

2015). In light of the new law, more than 400 media outlet platforms have been

blocked, an increase of political prisoners have been detained, mass death sentences

have been implemented, and a staggering number of disappearances and torture

have been reported (Human Rights Watch, 2018;

Amnesty International, 2014; Howeidy, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2017).

Specifically, more than 1500 enforced disappearances have been reported between

2014 and 2018, and 17 new prisons have been built in light of the unprecedented

amount of political prisoners (Guerin, 2018). Moreover, laws undermining the

independence of non-governmental organizations and the de facto criminalization

of human rights organizations were implemented in 2017 (Human Rights Watch,

2018). The degree to which state violence has been institutionalized in Egypt has

resulted in protests becoming rare despite significant opposition to El-Sisi’s policies

– for example, the controversial transfer of sovereignty of the Red Sea Islands to

Saudi Arabia (Ketchley and el-Rayyes, 2017). Simultaneously, media discourse

until around 2019 – which is primarily owned by the state now in light of the

monopoly of the military in practically all industries – had been centered around

depicting Egypt to be in a state of permanent emergency and would spread

conspiracy theories around hypothetical state collapse perpetrated by Islamists and

foreign governments (Hamzawy, 2017). In spite of growing opposition and

widespread discontent, mainly due to the evolving economic crisis, El-Sisi secured

a second term in 2018 and a third one in 2023. As this year (2024) marks ten years

137

since El-Sisi was elected president, one could reasonably say that the civil society

in Egypt has been experiencing an unprecedented level of state violence and

repression against any expression of opposition.

The illustration of the trajectory of state violence in post-coup Egypt presents a

complex narrative – one that is rooted in the circumstances of a military coup

backed by the sentiment of a popular uprising. While El-Sisi’s regime initially

enjoyed widespread support, it ultimately diverted to unprecedented levels of state

violence, coupled with propaganda and constitutional backing for its use of

violence. Against the backdrop of the confluence of the military coup in 2013

following the uprising in 2012, El-Sisi’s regime leveraged narratives of stability,

protection, and meritless economic promises to consolidate its power and justify its

aggressive state responses to popular dissent. In the immediate aftermath of the

coup and El-Sisi’s consequent election as president, the targets of mass state

violence were the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi’s supporters. As discussed

above, the military capitalized on and leveraged popular sentiment from the 2011

revolution to garner support to “act based on the will of the people” to instill

violence against the Muslim Brotherhood, consolidate its power, and gain its

legitimacy without facing the stigma centered around “traditional” coups. As the

military regime solidified its power and managed to sign laws into implementation

that outlaw different types of opposition (such as banning protests, blocking media

138

outlet platforms, crackdown on activists, and undermining NGOs), state violence

evolved from Muslim Brotherhood-targeted to being proactively strategized at

stifling any perceived threats and created a political climate of fear and limited

public discourse. Moreover, the regime’s ability to maintain continued international

support and leverage backing from strategic and regional alliances contributed to

its ability to maintain its repressive structures in the past ten years. The escalation

of state violence by SCAF and the persistence of state violence perpetuated by El-

Sisi since 2014, which eventually led to the normalization of repression and limited

avenues for dissent, would not have been possible in the post-coup atmosphere if it

were not for the popular mass support for the military. It would not have been

possible had the military not embarked on a journey of dehumanization of the

Muslim Brotherhood and the simultaneous adoption of the popular narrative in

which the military was positioned as the “protector of the people’s will”.

Conclusion

This chapter illustrates the events surrounding Egypt’s political upheaval periods,

namely the 2011 popular uprising and the consequential 2013 military coup. It

presents a process-tracing analysis underpinned with theoretical mechanisms to

illustrate the level of violence instigated by the incoming regime after a military

coup that emerged following the popular uprising and its duration.

139

By narrating Egypt’s case study, the following complex causal chain mechanisms

are discussed to examine the relationship between the mode of breakdown and the

level and duration of state violence by the incoming regime. In the context of

Morsi’s regime, these mechanisms were examined: mass mobilization,

international support, democratic transition, economic factors, coalition building,

and the fight for legitimacy. The analysis also addresses country-specific factors,

which in this case were: cooptation by the military, civil-military relations, and the

transitional judicial process. When analyzing El-Sisi’s post-coup regime, various

theoretical mechanisms are examined: legitimation strategies, power consolidation,

repression, political polarization, institutional erosion, economic development, and

domestic resource allocation.

This analysis demonstrates that the emergence of El-Sisi’s military regime in post-

coup Egypt, which succeeded a period of military interim rule after the ousting of

Morsi, El-Sisi leveraged the symbolism of the revolution for legitimacy and

presented narratives of stability, security, and economic promises. However, when

the regime diverted from its initial wave of optimism into a cycle of democratic

erosion, authoritarian consolidation, violence, and repression, the popular support

that once bolstered his regime has since been supplanted by widespread popular

discontent.

140

Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis embarks on a journey to explore the dynamics surrounding regime

breakdown and political violence. It specifically navigates the complexities

inherent in the post-breakdown sphere by examining how different modes of regime

breakdown impact the level and duration of state violence instigated by the

incoming regime following a breakdown. By focusing on the different mechanisms

that link military coups and popular uprisings to the likelihood of state violence by

the incoming regimes, this thesis has challenged conventional theories in the realm

of comparative politics studies.

An interdisciplinary lens has been central to this thesis's theoretical framework,

which presents an alternative perception of the modes of regime breakdown. Rather

than treating the mode of breakdown as a peripheral aspect surrounding the regime

breakdown process, this thesis places military coups and popular uprisings at the

heart of its analysis. It has sought to fundamentally understand the distinct factors

that emerge in military coups and popular uprisings, the manner through which they

shape the post-breakdown political environment, and the extent to which these

newly emerged political environments influence the incoming regime's propensity

for instigating violence in both the short and long term.

141

The empirical journey traversed in the chapters above involves an in-depth analysis

of cross-sectional data, which yields substantial insights into the likelihood of the

incoming regime instigating violence following a regime breakdown. Statistically,

regimes that emerge after breakdowns facilitated by military coups are found to

exhibit higher levels of violence compared to those emerging from popular

uprisings when the level of state violence is assessed one year after the breakdown.

This pattern is consistent even when the level of state violence is assessed five years

post-breakdown. However, the analysis reveals that the impact of the mode of

breakdown on state violence diminishes over time, becoming less pronounced when

tested ten years after the breakdown.

In addition to empirical validation, this thesis presents a process-tracing analysis of

the sequence of events surrounding Egypt’s 2011 and 2013 regime breakdowns and

compares the consequent levels of violence perpetrated by each incoming regime.

This analysis, through a lens of realpolitik, has demonstrated that regimes emerging

after a breakdown facilitated by a military coup and against the backdrop of a

previous regime breakdown facilitated by a popular uprising demonstrate

significantly higher levels of violence that persist over time. In the case of El-Sisi

regime, the analysis clearly indicates that leveraging the symbolism and legacy of

the 2011 uprisings, coupled with the subsequent voluntary political mandate

granted to his regime by the public, has paved the way for his regime to instigate

violence initially against the Muslim Brotherhood and eventually against all

142

expressions of dissent, to an extent that is unprecedented in Egypt’s history. In sum,

the mixed-methods approach has added volume to the empirical approach by

fostering a contextualized understanding of how the mode of regime breakdown

can affect the level and duration of state violence. It has also contributed to this

thesis by elucidating an additional angle in the analysis that had been unobserved

quantitatively, namely the examination of a case study in which two successive

regime breakdowns occurred within temporal proximity. This is not only reflective

of the complexities surrounding the nature of regime breakdown processes, but it

has also, in a way, illustrated the extent to which regimes emerging from military

coups instigate violence in the post-coup environment. This was specifically

interesting in El-Sisi’s case, as initially, his regime justified the use of violence by

presenting themselves as the guardians of the popular uprising that had broken out

two years prior to the coup.

In the future, this thesis paves the way for various avenues of future research and

scholarly attention. By placing the modes of breakdown at the forefront, this thesis

represents an initial endeavor to understand the nuanced dynamics that can emerge

after different modes of breakdown. By analyzing only military coups and popular

uprisings, this thesis has been designed in a manner that invites future contributions

and refinements to this study in different ways. Firstly, future contributions to this

thesis can refine the existing analysis by using different quantitative measurements

and contrasting additional case studies. Secondly, future research endeavors can

143

also capitalize on the current results and delve into a deeper analysis regarding the

chosen cut-off points to measure the level of violence instigated by the incoming

regime. Future studies can adopt other cut-off points to understand exactly at which

year the impact of the mode of breakdown on the level of state violence by the

incoming regime loses its significance. Thirdly, the inclusion of other modes of

breakdown can provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between

state violence and modes of breakdown. Notable examples of other modes include

but are not limited to loss in an election, civil war, interstate war, and the natural

death of the sitting leader. Last but not least, the results can be enhanced once other

types of political violence are taken into account. While this thesis focuses solely

on physical violence perpetrated by state actors against non-state actors, future

research can include other types of political violence for a more comprehensive

analysis.

In conclusion, this thesis lays the initial groundwork for future analyses measuring

the effect of the mode of breakdown on different variables in the post-breakdown

sphere – beyond political violence. The analysis developed in the preceding

chapters provides sufficient merit to believe that the mode of breakdown can

influence micro-level trends in the post-breakdown environment, such as elite

strategies, social mobilization dynamics, and international interventions. By

offering a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the mode of breakdown on

various variables arising in the post-breakdown political arena, future research

144

endeavors would take a step closer to unraveling the intricacies inherent in regime

breakdown processes.

Chapter 1 Background and Problem Statement Introduction

Students also viewed