1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This work is a study of the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota in the period of 1918-
1948. The movement was both significant and unusual in nature, chiefly for two reasons. The
first was that it was the only sustained successful third party movement in the state, achieving
considerable electoral success from 1922 to 1936. The second was that this movement
represented the only successful fusion of farmer and labor elements in a political third party
that attained noteworthy electoral success in this period. Although there were other farmer-
labor movements present in other states, and even serious attempts to forge a national
Farmer-Labor Party, it was only the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party that accomplished
substantial electoral gains. Although the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party did not manage to
achieve lasting success as a third party in the long term, its implementation of at least part of
its agenda in the short term was significant nonetheless, and at least some of the party’s
general political agenda (in one form or another) would eventually became part of the
national Democratic agenda of the New Deal era under the Franklin Roosevelt
Administration during the 1930s.
1
The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party emerged soon after the Nonpartisan League
(NPL) movement had peaked in Minnesota. The NPL had been started in 1915 in North
1
Theodore C. Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,
1963), 522-529.
2
Dakota by Arthur C. Townley. The NPL used the party primary election process to nominate
and elect its own candidates within the dominant Republican Party structure, and had
achieved significant electoral success in North Dakota in the election of 1916. The NPL
movement then spread across state lines in 1917 to Minnesota, and the League relocated its
headquarters to St. Paul, Minnesota, at about the same time. Eventually, Townley’s influence
over the NPL would wane, and political organizers within Minnesota – chiefly Twin Cities
(Minneapolis-St. Paul) urban-labor-based leaders – formed a parallel organization (the
Working People’s Nonpartisan League or WPNPL). This WPNPL grew in size and
influence, gradually overtook the NPL within the state, and eventually merged the NPL into
its own structure. This shift in leadership changed the farmer-labor movement in the state
into an official political party by 1922.
2
Once the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party had been formed, it managed to successfully
elect a Senator to Congress in 1922, and began regularly running third-party candidates for
congressional and state offices. Soon after its formation, the movement quickly became the
main opposition party to the Republican Party in Minnesota – eclipsing the Democrats. In the
1930s, the party reached its peak of power within the state, capturing the governor’s office
under its candidate, Floyd B. Olson, and holding it under Olson’s leadership until 1936, and
then under Governor Hjalmar Petersen’s and Governor Elmer Benson’s leadership until
1938. The party began its decline after losing the governor’s office in the election of 1938 to
the Republican candidate, Harold Stassen. Shortly after that, the party faced swift decline and
2
Arthur Naftalin, “History of the Farmer-Labor Party,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1948, 43;
see also Millard L. Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The Third Party Alternative (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 69.
3
eventually merged with the Democratic Party of Minnesota, forming the Democratic-Farmer-
Labor (or DFL) Party in 1944.
3
It is difficult to explain the unusual success of this third-party movement. With the
possible minor exceptions of the Populist activity in the 1890s and Jesse Ventura’s election
as governor in 1998, the Farmer-Labor Party was the only successful sustained third party
movement in Minnesota, and the only one to capture both national seats in Congress and the
governor’s office. These political accomplishments raise a number of historical questions.
What were the origins of this movement? What factors made the Farmer-Labor Party
successful in Minnesota in the period of the 1920s-‘30s? What was the nature of the
movement itself, including its political agenda, its organization, its rhetoric, its leadership,
and other aspects? And last, what factors may have played a role in the decline of the party,
and just precisely when did the movement actually end?
This study claims that the Farmer-Labor Party emerged due to a lack of viable
political opposition to the Republican Party in Minnesota, and that the movement was
comprised of urban-labor and rural-agrarian voters led by multiple leaders. Furthermore, the
creation and the continuing governance of the party and its association was initiated and
administered by a Twin Cities-based urban-labor leadership. This leadership nucleus
effectively absorbed the state’s farmer protest movement, joined it to its own emerging third
party urban-labor movement, and then transformed this movement into the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party. The party’s decline was caused by several factors which coalesced in
the late 1930s, including the implementation of federal farm and labor policies under the
3
William E. Lass, Minnesota: A History, Second Edition (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1998), 221-
227.
4
New Deal, corruption, leadership troubles, and increased factional conflict based on divisions
of the rural-agrarian and urban-labor sectors of the party.
Background
The American agrarian political protest movement of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries was in fact multiple movements, parties, and organizations which waxed and waned
depending on the period and region. In general, the main issues were centered on the
perceived loss of status and economic power on the part of small farmers vis-à-vis the
growing corporate railroad, banking, and agribusiness industries. These large business
entities had achieved overwhelming economic power by the late 1800s, even as agricultural
prices in general had declined. Some historians have asserted that this decline of the
American yeomanry (and its perceived loss of economic and political status) during the late
Gilded Age was a significant factor in fueling the agrarian political movements of this era
(especially in the South, the Plains, and the Midwestern states). This trend represented a shift
in the American economic and political landscape in which traditionally predominant small
farmers were being eclipsed by the industrialization and urbanization of America – even as
the growth of railroads, banking, and agribusiness entities both supported rural areas with
railway lines and gave farmers access to national markets. However, these entities also
exploited farmers by controlling the banking sector, and the pricing and terms of the shipping
of agricultural products to market.
4
4
Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A Knopf Publishers, 1953),
23-45.
5
The word yeoman originated in England during the late Renaissance period.
Emerging from their medieval past, enterprising farmers earning sufficient income eventually
purchased their own land, and became landowning farmers (or yeomen). Later, this pattern of
yeomanry was transferred to the American colonies. The American yeoman was Thomas
Jefferson's ideal American: a citizen who owned and worked his own land, knew the value of
hard work and property, and endorsed a government that would support his property rights
and not interfere with his ability to pursue prosperity. Jefferson envisioned an American
republic largely based on a yeoman class which would form the most stable and largest layer
of the American social strata. In reality, American society even in its colonial days was far
more diverse than Jefferson’s vision of a yeoman republican utopia. Differences in class and
professions had existed in America well before the revolution, and regional differences were
significant as well.
5
As the country expanded westward in the 1800s into indigenous lands, much of the
Midwest and Great Plains were settled by Yankee Americans and Euro-American
immigrants. Agriculture was a dominant economic enterprise of the American republic in the
19th century, especially west of the Appalachian Mountains. Until about the 1840s however,
most agricultural activity was based on the subsistence family farm model, and most farm
markets were relatively local in nature. Setting off at first in wagons and then later by
railroad, aspiring yeoman small farmers took to the prairies and plains of the American
Midwest and Great Plains in search of their own slice of the American dream. They were
5
Douglass G. Adair, The Intellectual Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy: Republicanism, the Class Struggle,
and the Virtuous Farmer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 57-164.
6
aided in this quest by the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, which granted land to those
who would settle and stay on a piece of property for a given period of time.
6
The advent and subsequent extensive development of the railroad in America had a
dramatic effect on the agricultural landscape after the 1860s. The development of railroad
systems represented a revolution in the transportation of persons and products, including
agricultural goods. With the conclusion of the Civil War in 1865, and the spanning of the
entire continent by rail lines by 1869, the central importance of the railroad as a means of
transportation became firmly established. Yeoman farmers from the East Coast down through
the Southern states and into Texas, and also through the Midwest and onto the western
plains, were eventually – and significantly – affected by this change. Many farmers began
shifting from subsistence farming to cash crop farming. It was the railroad which enabled
them to make this change, since it provided a means to efficiently transport their agricultural
goods to a larger national market, and offered a potentially profitable approach for small
farmers. At the same time, beginning in about the 1850s, farm mechanization underwent a
significant and dramatic series of improvements and changes – a long-term trend that would
continue through the early 20th century and beyond.
7
This heavy increase in farm
mechanization led to a great potential increase in productivity for farmers, but it also meant a
heavy increase in capital investments. A pattern developed in the 1870s-1890s in which
many farmers would invest heavily in farm mechanization and put themselves at greater
financial risk – borrowing money at ever-increasing rates of interest. Even though
agricultural production often soared in the latter part of the 19th century to new levels, the
6
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 137-141; see also Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 341, 344.
7
Clarence H. Danhof, Change in Agriculture: The Northern United States, 1820-1870 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1969), 218-250.
7
increase in agricultural supply usually led to lower prices overall for many crop commodities.
Thus, the American farmers’ increased productivity often did not yield greater prosperity in
the period of the 1870s to the 1890s. In fact, it usually had the opposite effect.
8
As early as the 1870s, American agrarian political movements began to emerge and
advocate for farmers’ interests. The National Grange of the Order of Patrons of Husbandry
(more commonly known as the Grange movement), became a significant lobby for farming
interests in the 1870s. The Grange (initially led by the Minnesotan, Oliver H. Kelley) served
as a political lobby force with a large membership from the East Coast and into the Midwest,
the South, and Great Plains states. By the 1870s, family farmers had become suspicious of
the power of the railroads, which typically possessed a monopoly for the regions that they
served. Yet at the same time, railroads were absolutely vital for the transport of incoming
supplies and outgoing agricultural products. Much of the Grange's activities were focused on
lobbying for legislation which would curb the excesses of the railroad’s economic power.
Although the Grange did enjoy some successes (notably the creation of a large-scale farm
interest group and some railroad regulation legislation), many of these initiatives were often
fleeting or easily circumvented by business interests, and the mismanagement of the Grange
itself (along with internal divisions) led to its decline by the late 1870s.
9
Numerous other
regional pro-agrarian movements and third parties rose and fell in quick succession without
making significant or lasting gains for their farmer constituents.
10
8
Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise or Populist Moment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),
17-18; see also Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 341-344.
9
Thomas Woods, Knights of the Plow: Oliver H. Kelley and the Origins of the Grange in Republican Ideology
(Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1990), xv-xxii.
10
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 200-204.
8
Meanwhile the patterns of increased agricultural productivity, declining crop prices,
rising rates of interest, and continued tight railroad and corporate agribusiness control of the
agricultural markets continued and intensified in the 1890s. With the agrarian situation
becoming increasingly desperate (and further fueled by drought and economic recession), the
Populist movement (or People’s Party) – a third party movement – quickly gained popularity
in the rural regions of the South, some Western states, and in pockets of the Midwest in the
early 1890s. The party emerged from a series of grassroots farm lobby organizations that
eventually coalesced into an official third party. The party defined its stands most clearly in
the Omaha Platform (written by Minnesotan Ignatius Donnelly), which called for significant
government intervention in the agricultural sector on behalf of farmers, and political reforms
designed to curb the power of special interests in American politics. The Populist Party’s
power reached its climax in the election of 1892, when its presidential ticket captured over a
million votes and carried four states in the Electoral College. The party’s fateful (and
controversial) decision to merge with the Democrats (under William Jennings Bryan) in the
1896 presidential campaign robbed the movement of much of its impetus, and it fell into
decline soon afterwards.
11
The progressive reformers of the early 1900s who succeeded the Populists were
largely different in their demographics and wider in their aims, yet retained some of the
Populist goals – at least in terms of political reform. One of the Populists’ main criticisms of
the two-party system had been the domination of both of the main parties by monied
interests, which subverted the general will of the people in choosing candidates and crafting
legislation. The progressives also embraced this point of view – although they were
11
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 514.
9
motivated by other abuses of big business in addition to agrarian concerns. From about 1900
to 1920, the progressive agenda in one form or another largely dominated reform in
American politics. Its champions were numerous and influential. Such figures as Theodore
Roosevelt and Robert La Follette proudly wore the mantle. Until 1912, the “progressive
movement” was a large-scale and bi-partisan political trend. It influenced both the Democrats
and the Republicans, and was occurring at the local, state and national levels. The movement
was more often aimed at reforms within parties and government itself rather than being a
third party movement. However, in 1912, The “Bull Moose” Progressive Party was formed –
largely as a vehicle for Theodore Roosevelt to once again seek the presidency. Roosevelt lost
the election, but even so, progressivism took hold in the administration of President
Woodrow Wilson, which embraced a series of progressive initiatives ranging from labor
reform to female suffrage.
12
Unlike the Populists of the 1890s, the success of the progressives
of the early 1900s was far more significant and lasting. The progressive agenda was broad
and sweeping. It was aimed at reforming party politics and government itself, and extending
democracy further. In terms of agrarian concerns, the Country Life movement of the early
1900s was an extension of the progressive movement. Its proponents foresaw a future of
agricultural and rural renewal based on the industrialization and modernization of America’s
farms and rural regions.
13
At the same time that the long-term agrarian political protest movement was ebbing
and flowing in the late 1800s and early 1900s, organized labor was experiencing its own
parallel development. The Knights of Labor was one of the first major organized labor
12
John Whiteclay Chambers, The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900-1917 (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 140-146, 173-189, 193-197, 251-255.
13
David Danbom, Resisted Revolution: Urban American and the Industrialization of Agriculture, 1900-1930
(Ames, IA; Iowa State University Press, 1979), i-ix, 74.
10
movements of significance in America. It was formed in 1869, and reached its peak
membership in the 1880s. However, the Knights of Labor movement was labeled as being
radical in the wake of the violence of the Haymarket Riot in 1886, and its membership
declined severely thereafter. It should also be noted that business and government were
usually unsympathetic to organized labor movements in the late Gilded Age, instead
embracing laissez-faire politics, which typically championed the unrestrained power of
business and saw little use for the governmental regulation of labor issues. The labor
movement was thus largely challenged in its ability to make gains until the progressive era -
and even then faced significant continuing resistance from business and government.
During World War I, the organized labor movement experienced setbacks but also
gained additional recognition. During the war, efforts at union organization were often
associated with strike activity by local governments and the public at large– which was
viewed as sedition. It was common for individual labor activists in Minnesota to be jailed or
run out of town in the period from 1917 to 1918. Nevertheless, certain reforms of the
progressive era had aided the labor movement, and the membership of organized labor had
grown after the turn of the century. The need for labor co-operation during World War I
impelled the Wilson Administration to seek both accommodation with labor groups and
provide some recognition for organized labor as a legitimate entity (President Wilson even
appointed Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, to the Council
of National Defense). This recognition was temporary, however, as anti-union sentiments and
activities on the part of business and government increased again after World War I. The
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in late 1917 and scattered bombings throughout the United
States in 1919 created the first “Red Scare” in America. A trend of stifling labor activism
11
lasted in America throughout much of the next decade as organized labor continued to face
significant opposition from business and an unsympathetic federal government. It would not
be until the years of the Great Depression and the Franklin Roosevelt Administration of the
1930s that organized labor would see its greatest gains. These would be guaranteed in a
series of federal laws and regulations such as the Wagner Act (1935) and other legislation
and agencies which would guarantee the right to collective bargaining and herald the rise of
organized union labor in America until the early 1980s.
14
Thus, the formation of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party occurred in the context of
several long-term coalescing trends, each of which had a significant national scope. The first
was the agrarian political protest movements, which peaked in the 1890s in the form of
Populism, but would remain as a political platform within the mind of many farmers and
agrarian leaders, and would re-appear as a major force in North Dakota starting in 1915.
15
The second was the organized labor movement, which – despite numerous setbacks and a
long tradition of resistance by federal, state and local governments and business interests –
was beginning to grow in numbers and influence after the turn of the century, and this trend
would even include more support for the Socialist Party. The third was the legacy of the
progressive movement which – although its main focus was not on agrarian issues –
nevertheless provided a means for significant political reform through its advocacy of an
enhanced democratic process, specifically the party primary election and the direct election
of national Senators. Other factors included trends such as economic shifts after World War I
and the advent of new technologies (such as automobiles, telephones and radio broadcasting).
14
David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism,
1865-1925 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-8.
15
Robert Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922 (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1955), 27-41.
12
These factors would make the possibility of a successful farmer-labor movement in
Minnesota a reality by the early 1920s.
Review of Literature
There are three major American historiographical trends in the 20th century that
relate to the Populist and progressive movements. Although the rise of the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party occurred after these preceding movements, the perspectives within these
historiographical trends (especially those relating to the Populists) are related to the focus of
this study given the strong farmer protest element of the Minnesota farmer-labor movement.
The three major schools of historical interpretation about the Populists and the progressives
are the Progressive School, the Consensus School, and the New Left or Neo-Progressive
School. The Progressive School emerged first in the early part of the century, and
emphasized the importance of class struggle and conflict centered on economic issues. They
portrayed the Populists as being ardent reformers pursuing a justified crusade against an
entrenched wealthy elite. The Consensus School emerged a bit later, in about the middle of
the century. The Consensus scholars noted the presence of economic conflict, but
downplayed its importance, preferring instead to emphasize the concept of enduring
universal American values such as property, individualism, and free enterprise. In the case of
Richard Hofstadter, the Populists were further portrayed in a negative light [see below].
Later, New Left or Neo-Progressive scholars in the 1960s and ‘70s aggressively refuted such
Consensus School claims, and emphasized the importance (and virtue) of class struggle.
Since the 1980s, more subtle, varied and nuanced approaches to historical interpretation of
these movements have emerged which defy simple categorization. Some of the most recent
13
works examining the Populist movement written since then have emphasized a number of
different factors, including sociology and religion, technology, and the Populist movement’s
kinship with the nascent labor movement. It has also been claimed (rather convincingly) that
“populism” in a general sense as a rhetorical-political strategy continues on in American
politics in the present, and also has a longer history than the Populist movement itself.
16
There are numerous historical works that address the many questions and issues
which lead up to and cover the era of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party in the period
between 1918 and 1948. The agrarian political protest movement has a long history in
Minnesota and elsewhere. Indeed, one of the earliest major figures of the agrarian movement,
Oliver H. Kelley, was from Minnesota. As mentioned earlier, Kelley was one of the founding
members of the Grange movement, an early farm advocacy group with a national
membership that engaged in social networking and political lobbying on behalf of farm
interests starting in the 1870s. Some historians have characterized the Grange movement as
being the first major pro-agrarian political lobby in the United States.
17
D. Sven Nordin’s Rich Harvest: A History of the Grange, 1867-1900 (1974)
presented a revisionist interpretation of the Grange Movement, however. Nordin’s contention
was that the movement itself was mainly a social organization dedicated mostly to
agricultural education and networking. Nordin claimed that the organization’s political
ambitions and influence were quite limited. Nordin’s point is important, because if his
assertion is true, it becomes more difficult to make the argument that agrarian discontent was
significant and had coalesced as a political force as early as the 1870s. Nordin’s thesis falls
16
Robert C. McMath Jr., Peter H. Argersinger, Connie L. Lester, Michael F. Magliari, Walter Nugent and David
B. Danbom, “Roundtable on Populism: Robert C. McMath Jr., Peter H. Argersinger, Connie L. Lester, Michael
F. Magliari, and Walter Nugent” Agricultural History, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Winter, 2008), 7, 11, 23-24.
17
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 198-200.
14
into the Consensus School of thought, minimizing the historical aspect of the Grange as
being an agent of political agitation and conflict.
18
Nordin’s thesis was disputed significantly by Thomas Woods in his book, Knights of
the Plow: Oliver H. Kelley and the Origins of the Grange in Republican Ideology (1990).
According to Woods, Kelley’s efforts in the early 1870s were indeed a form of dedicated
agrarian political activism, and represented a widespread grassroots movement which sought
to improve economic conditions for farmers through collective political action. Woods
contended that differences of opinion within the Grange leadership – in which Kelley
advocated for more radical political action – was a chief source of the decline of the Grange
and its influence.
19
If Woods’ characterization of Kelley’s views and leadership in the period
of the early 1870s is accurate, one could effectively argue that the history of the political
farm protest movement against monied interests in Minnesota extends all the way back to
that era. Woods’ thesis clearly falls into the Progressive School, emphasizing class conflict,
and extending this conflict back to the 1870s.
Other historians have made claims about farmers moving into the prairies and plains
in the 1860s-1880s, emphasizing the effect of the Homestead Act and the opening of vast
tracts of free land to farmers and settlers, and the later effect of the growth of the railroads.
Allan G. Bogue’s From Prairie to Corn Belt, Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in
the Nineteenth Century (1963) makes a strong case that such prairie farm settlement was not
monetarily free nor without significant financial risk. Although Bogue’s focus is chiefly on
Illinois and Iowa, the patterns of prairie farm settlement in this era can be extrapolated to
18
D. Sven Nordin, Rich Harvest: A History of the Grange, 1867-1900 (Jackson, MS: University Press of
Mississippi, 1974), 168-182.
19
Woods, Knights of the Plow, xv-xxii.
15
adjoining regions such as Minnesota as well.
20
The main point that can be applied in this case
is that reflections of an earlier “golden era” by farmers in the late 19th century pressed by
rising corporate interests were illusory – a thesis further commented on by Richard
Hofstadter. Even so, changes in the late 1800s in the American economy saw the rise of big
business and a widening gap between farmers and laborers and the managerial class, and
these trends caused significant tensions. This is firmly evidenced by Alan Trachtenberg’s The
Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (1982). Trachtenberg
portrays an America in which corporations grew much stronger towards the end of the Gilded
Age while the average farmer and laborer tended to face reduced status and lessened
individual economic power.
21
The Populist Party of the 1890s was an important part of the political continuum
which can be collectively referred to as the agrarian movement. At the peak of its power in
the early 1890s, the Populists characterized themselves as a spontaneous third party
movement dedicated to the betterment of farmers – mostly in the South and Midwest – who
were responding politically to years of exploitation by business interests. John D. Hicks’ The
Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (1931) largely
echoed the views of the Populist leaders themselves. Hicks characterized the Populist Party
as being a political reaction to years of economic exploitation of the small farmer class in
America – a theme which fit in well with the recent onset of the Great Depression.
22
Hicks’
work is a classic example of the Progressive School of historical interpretation, which
20
Allan G. Bogue, From Prairie to Corn Belt, Farming on the Illinois and Iowa Prairies in the Nineteenth
Century (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1963), 47-66.
21
Alan Trachtenberg, The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1982), 3-10.
22
John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota, 1931), 54-95.
16
emphasized conflict among the classes due to economic disparity – and was a popular
historiographical trend until the 1950s.
Richard Hofstadter’s The Age of Reform (1953) was a major groundbreaking work
which examined reform movements stretching from Populism through the progressive era
and ending with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s. Hofstadter diverged sharply
from other historians’ views on the Populists. He characterized the agrarian movement as
being a backwards-looking conservative movement designed to maintain the perceived
traditional status of small farmers, who viewed their recent economic decline as an
unacceptable deviation from the ideal of Jeffersonian agrarian democracy. Hofstadter
emphasized that this reaction was hostile to the recent changes of industrialization, the
growth of railroads and national markets, and was not based so much on economic concerns,
but rather on the perception of small farmers that their position as vaunted yeomen was being
usurped by the new economic order. Hofstadter claimed that the Populists were backwards in
both their politics and their concepts of free enterprise, and as such the Populist movement
represented a reaction to a perceived loss of status – and not necessarily a reaction to
perceived economic exploitation. He also acknowledged the New Deal reforms of Franklin
Roosevelt in the 1930s as being the decisive factor which alleviated agrarian discontent.
Hofstadter’s book – written in the 1950s – was an important work in the Consensus School
historiographical movement, and a direct refutation of Hicks’ and the views of other earlier
Progressive historians.
23
Robert H. Wiebe’s influential and heralded work, The Search for Order, 1887-1920
(1967) represented a comprehensive reliance on social theory to explain many of the
23
Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 23-45.
17
fundamental changes in American society from the end of Reconstruction to the end of
World War I. Wiebe’s work stand squarely in the Progressive School, arguing that the wider
progressive movement was an overarching modern ideology that sought reform and order in
a society of recent and significant sociological change. Wiebe posited a great shift in the
social order between about 1880 and 1920 which was precipitated by major changes in the
American economy. These economic changes related to the growth of industrialization,
urbanization, and the emergence of national markets and large corporations (or
“modernization”) and the decline of small town businesses, farmers, and artisans. Thus, the
traditional small town culture – typically shaped by personal interactions – faced an
insurmountable threat from the growth of larger and more interdependent economic and
social trends. Wiebe contends that this economic shift led to a crisis within the existing small
town culture (or “island communities”) which eventually reacted to modernization through a
series of movements to protest the perceived unfairness of these changes. The result was the
eventual emergence of a new middle class – associated with the new economic shifts –
whose perceptions were often rooted in a more traditional ethos (“the illusion of authority”) –
yet whose economic rise often emerged from the recent shifts of the late 1800s. For Wiebe,
the emergence of this “bureaucratic” urban middle class (manifested most clearly in the
progressive movement of the early 1900s) and their ability to communicate to larger groups
(through mass media) became the new social order, and largely replaced traditional small
town culture as a driving force in social movements and politics.
24
Wiebe further contended that this trend was present for farmers as well, who – with
roots stretching back to the Farmers’ Alliance and the Populists in the 1880s and 1890s –
24
Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), xiii.
18
sought to succeed by creating larger movements to counteract the effects of growing
industrialization and corporatism. Such movements were thus a reaction to large scale
economic changes that had occurred during the Gilded Age. The goal of these disempowered
classes was to maintain their concept of economic fairness and democracy through mass
communication and organization. This trend extended to other sectors as well, most notably
labor, and Wiebe contended that the Knights of Labor movement was very similar to the
farmers’ movements in its themes of anti-corporatism and anti-plutocracy – even though
neither movement would succeed in the short term. Eventually, it would be the emergence of
the new urban “bureaucratic” middle class who would demand reforms on a grand scale, and
bring about the acceptance of interventionist government. This new bureaucratic social trend
– manifested in the progressivism of the era – created and nurtured large social associations
to further social and political aims, and eventually supported trends ranging from political
reforms and volunteerism to interventionist government by 1920. Indeed, a clear shift from
laissez-faire government towards more interventionism is a hallmark of this era, and Wiebe
contended that the successful societal organization and mobilization for the rigors of World
War I prove that not only was this new order present, but that it worked successfully to
address the issues of the day. Although the focus of Wiebe’s work ends just as the farmer-
labor movement is beginning in Minnesota, it offers a fairly comprehensive social history
theory explanation for the movement’s origin (and its later success). The Minnesota Farmer-
Labor Party followed many of the trends outlined by Wiebe, including the creation and
nurturing of the Farmer-Labor Association – a large social organization (with a mass media
component) designed to support and further the party’s political aims.
25
25
Wiebe, 71-75.
19
Lawrence Goodwyn’s Democratic Promise: The Populist Movement in America
(1976) represented a swing back towards a New Left, neo-Progressive School interpretation
which refuted Hofstadter’s views and – like Hicks – emphasized economic issues such as
falling crop prices and the crop lien system as being at the forefront of the rise of the Populist
Party. Writing in the wake of the 1960s protest movements, Goodwyn further emphasized the
effectiveness of the farmers’ ability to organize themselves on the local level, and how these
local self-led organizations transformed (and reinforced) farmers’ political consciousness,
leading to the creation of Populism as a major force. Goodwyn’s thesis thus also provides an
explanation for grass-roots political organization and its potential sudden rise, and reflects –
at least in part – the protest movements of the 1960s.
26
Charles Postel’s more recent The Populist Vision (2007) further refuted Hofstadter’s
view of the Populists as being backwards-looking rural reactionaries. Postel emphasized the
more sophisticated aspects of the Populist movement such as their embrace of science and
their commitment to the concept of progress, and made the case that at least some of the
Populist figures were indeed open to embracing the modern industrial economy – but were
unwilling to cede the economic status of small farmers in the pursuit of this modernization,
and wanted control over this transformative process.
27
Even though the Populist Party faced swift decline after the 1896 election, populism
as a political rhetorical tool did not vanish. Michael Kazin’s The Populist Persuasion: An
American History (1998) took a wider view of “populism” as being a long-term trend in
American political history – and one not tied to any specific era or even to the political left.
26
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 28, 118, 282, 299, 433.
27
Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 45-68, 173-204, 269-290; see
also Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, 514.
20
Kazin asserted that “producer” protest against powerful forces is a long-term rhetorical trend
in American history which has its origins at least as far back as the Jacksonian Era, and
which continues into the modern era with populist sentiments being expressed against
“elites” who unfairly exploit major segments of the American population. Thus, a certain
degree of political “populism” was a rhetorical thread that continued to flourish, and would
be a major part of the appeal of both the Nonpartisan League in North Dakota, and later the
Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota (and continues today as a thread in both left and right wing
anti-establishment political rhetoric). Kazin’s wider analysis of American protest politics
thus provided a broader perspective and context.
28
The progressives of the early 1900s were chiefly focused on issues other than
agrarian discontent. Nevertheless, the reforms of the progressives represented a significant
change in the American political landscape, and would enable a new kind of grassroots
political activism and demand a higher level of accountability from politicians to the general
voting public. There has been considerable discussion of the progressives, their aims, and
their effectiveness among historians. Until the 1950s, the progressive reforms were often
characterized as being sweeping, bi-partisan, tangible, virtuous, and largely successful (led
by such giants as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson). Later interpretations and
analyses added layers of complexity to this early assessment. Arthur Link’s Woodrow Wilson
and the Progressive Era (1954) portrayed progressivism as eventually becoming a major
aspect of the Wilson Administration – although Link indicated that Wilson himself was
initially not a progressive leader and was usually not the main architect of these reforms.
28
Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: BasicBooks, 1995), 1-8, 27-48,
287-290.
21
Instead, he was influenced by such administration figures as Louis Brandeis. Link also
asserted that progressivism as a force lingered throughout the 1920s.
29
Gabriel Kolko’s The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American
History, 1900-1916 (1963) offered a radically different interpretation of the progressive era
and its reforms. Kolko asserted that progressivism was essentially a conservative movement
aimed at curbing the excesses of laissez-faire capitalism while keeping its basic structure
intact. Kolko claimed that many of the progressive reforms were in fact authored or approved
by major figures of business and government as a means to restrain certain big business
excesses and forestall more radical proposals by socialists and other groups further to the
political left.
30
Kolko thus essentially labeled the progressive era as being insufficiently
reformist – a perspective of the Neo-Progressive School. Although Kolko’s intention was to
highlight the actual non-progressive nature of this era, his work (which in some ways
minimized the contentious nature of the period) could also be considered an important
Consensus School interpretation of the progressive era – although Kolko himself (a
proclaimed socialist) was critical of progressivism from a leftist perspective and frequently
sought to distance his work from libertarian conservatives who attempted to use it to justify
their point of view. Kolko himself later declared that socialism was “essentially dead” in his
more recent work After Socialism: Reconstructing Critical Social Thought (2006) – although
he remained critical of capitalism as well.
31
In John Whiteclay Chambers’ The Tyranny of Change (1980), the author asserted that
the 1890s to 1917 represented a time of great change, and that progressivism was the first
29
Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era. (New York: Harper, 1954), 54-80.
30
Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New
York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 3-9.
31
Gabriel Kolko, After Socialism: Reconstructing Critical Social Thought (London: Routledge, 2006), 1-3.
22
major social and political response to the dominance of big business and mass industrialism.
He called the progressives “new interventionists” – meaning that they wanted active
government intervention to curb abuses of corporate excess and other wrongs, and that
sometimes these sentiments even extended overseas (in the form of military intervention).
This interventionism could also be extended to volunteer (i.e., non-governmental)
organizations, but the prevailing attitude was one of social intervention in order to make
society better overall.
32
Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive
Movement in America, 1870-1920 (2003) emphasized that the progressive movement
stemmed from a sense of middle class moral outrage against perceived injustices by big
business and sentiments against the nouveau riche possessing unearned wealth on one hand,
and suspicions about the large number of immigrant laborers on the other hand. McGerr also
argued that this outrage could take many forms, including even racism and segregation. Thus,
progressivism may have had many legitimate reforms as part of its agenda. However, it
emerged largely as a middle class reaction to both the power of a growing business elite as
well as increasing numbers of non-Anglo proletarian immigrant laborers, and the perceived
loss of status by the Anglo middle class. McGerr’s work thus emphasizes class as an element
of agency (a trait of Progressive School thinking), yet does not view the movement as a
whole as being just an ideology of socio-economic reform – thus offering a more nuanced
interpretation than a conventional Consensus School perspective.
33
32
Chambers, The Tyranny of Change, 1-24, 133-139, 150-154.
33
Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-
1920 (New York: Free Press, 2003), xiii-xvi, 315-320.
23
One aspect of the progressive era specifically dedicated to agrarian and rural settings
was the Country Life movement, which sought to modernize rural towns and farms while
maintaining family farm prosperity and rural virtues. Modern historians analyzing the effect
of the Country Life movement largely agree in their conclusions regarding this ill-fated
offshoot of progressivism, which was projected by progressive theorists onto some rural
regions of America between about 1900 and 1920. William Bowers’ The Country Life
Movement in the United States (1974) painted a picture of young, enthusiastic, mostly urban-
based reformers idealizing rural America and seeking to reinvigorate it through increased
productivity based on a strong community and selective industrialization. The movement
largely failed, however, since the growing urban-dominated industrialization of American
agriculture could not be resisted, yet this transformation was largely out of the control of
small farmers, nor was it firmly tied to the revitalization of the rural settings.
34
David Danbom’s Resisted Revolution: Urban American and the Industrialization of
Agriculture, 1900-1930 (1979) further made the case that the Country Life movement was
led largely by arrogant urban outsiders who pushed an ideal that was unfamiliar to rural
residents, embraced a more industrial approach to farming which did not mesh well with
rural culture, and was largely an approach which sought to suit urban – not rural needs.
35
Deborah Fitzgerald’s Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture
(2004) added an additional chapter to the post-Country Life movement period, and noted that
34
William Bowers, The Country Life Movement in America: 1900-1920 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,
1974), 84-85, 133-134.
35
Danbom, Resisted Revolution, i-ix, 74.
24
farming trends towards greater mechanization and agricultural “industrialization” eventually
led to the rise of modern corporate farming.
36
Gilbert Fite’s George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (1954) provides
considerable perspective to the national agrarian political debate of the 1920s and 1930s. Fite
emphasized Peek’s importance as a central figure committed to federal government
intervention in crop markets as a means to stabilize American agriculture and ensure
prosperity for American farmers. Fite provided the reader not only with a profile of one of
the main national figures leading the way to federal intervention in agricultural issues, but
also outlined the unique nature of agrarian concerns as a political issue in this period. Fite
further demonstrated that American farmers in this period were not likely to abandon their
family farms as capitalist enterprises, but were frustrated by urban forces and largely united
in their distrust of agribusiness entities which continued to put them at a disadvantage.
37
However, even with their economic difficulties in the 1920s and ‘30s, American
farmers were generally unwilling to embrace unbridled political radicalism. Lowell Dyson’s
Red Harvest: The Communist Party and American Farmers (1980) is an account of the
Communist Party’s attempts to recruit farmers in America in the 1920s and ‘30s. The history
is largely one of failure by the Communist Party and its agents, and Dyson pointed out that
many members of the party itself did not view the agrarian sector as being a prime ground for
recruiting, and that their attentions were often focused more exclusively towards urbanized
industrial labor instead. Like Fite, Dyson’s work made the point that American farmers in the
1920s-‘30s represented small-time free enterprise capitalism, a factor which made them
36
Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2003), 1-9, 184-190.
37
Gilbert Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1954), 220-221.
25
unlikely recruits for a wider leftist ideological cause. In some ways, this conclusion
complicates the analysis of farmer sympathies for the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota (with
its apparent agrarian socialistic platform), but may also provide clues as to motivations for
farmers to support the Farmer-Labor Party, as well as highlight potential divisions between
the rural-agrarian and urban-labor sectors of the party.
38
Peter Argersinger’s The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism (1995) provided insight on
agrarian third party movements in the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Argersinger emphasized the lack of the responsiveness of the two major parties to farm
issues in this period, and noted how agrarian movements ebbed and flowed according to time
and region. One of his main conclusions was that these agrarian party movements – when
they managed to succeed electorally – often faced difficult circumstances once in Congress,
enduring such frustrations as being passed over for committee appointments, seeing their
bills die in committee, and even being refused recognition to speak. These conditions
hindered their ability to implement change beneficial to their constituents. The author also
noted that such third party movements had a tendency to move towards “fusion” electoral
approaches (i.e., merging with a major party), but that such tactics usually did not maintain
the third party’s interests very well, and often meant the end of the movement. Argersinger’s
observations are valuable for understanding some of the patterns of the farmer-labor
movement in Minnesota, especially in its later years when it sought fusion with the state’s
Democrats as a means of political survival.
39
38
Lowell Dyson, Red Harvest: The Communist Party and American Farmers (Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1980), 199-202.
39
Peter Argersinger, The Limits of Agrarian Radicalism (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 1-
36.
26
Catherine McNicol Stock’s Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain
(1996) took a more longitudinal view of rural dissatisfaction. The author traced a long history
of the discontent of rural “producerist” populations against powerful monied interests.
McNicol Stock claimed that this was a pattern which permeated American history all the way
back to the early years of the republic, and can even be seen in such early episodes of protest
as Shays’ Rebellion. McNicol Stock’s thesis thus provides an additional psychological and
cultural context for the embrace of a left-of-center third party movement among a group of
rural farmers in the early twentieth century, and bears some semblance to Goodwyn’s thesis
as well.
40
Hal S. Barron’s Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural
North, 1870-1930 (1997) took a more specific look at rural reaction to the shift towards
growing corporate agribusiness and national markets. Barron asserted that the rural
agricultural producers were active agents in resisting this growing corporate power, and took
steps to create cooperatives and other ventures designed to pool the power of individual
farmers. Yet at the same time, the independence and interests of individual farmers remained,
and made it difficult for the farm sector to provide a united front against the excesses of
corporate agribusiness.
41
Steven Keillor’s Cooperative Commonwealth: Co-ops in Rural
Minnesota, 1859-1939 (2000) provided a more regionally focused study, which – like Barron
– asserted that rural farmers had significant agency in resisting the growing power of
corporate agribusiness and achieved some success in pooling their economic resources.
Keillor noted a long-running attempt by Minnesota farmers to create co-ops and run mutually
40
Catherine McNicol Stock, Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1996), 1-32, 149-162.
41
Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), xi-xiv, 7-18, 243-246.
27
beneficial enterprises such as union stores. These efforts were often successful only in the
short term and in limited cases, however. Keillor claimed that ethnic and social bonds were a
major factor in creating successful enterprises in this regard. Thus, Keillor’s viewpoint
provides an additional factor for the historian to consider (i.e., ethnic ties) when examining
the rise of a political movement in Minnesota in that period.
42
Sources covering the Nonpartisan League (NPL) in North Dakota in the period of the
late 1910s and early 1920s are also relevant to this study. Herbert Earle Gaston’s The
Nonpartisan League (1920) was an early chronicle of the movement published just after the
movement’s peak of power. Although this work was published while the NPL’s course was
still in flux and its text is undocumented, it contains a number of important descriptive details
of the movement. More significantly, Robert Morlan’s Political Prairie Fire: The
Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922 (1955) painted a complex and flattering picture of Townley
and the NPL in North Dakota in the period of 1915 to 1922. Morlan effectively chronicled
the grievances of the American prairie farm sector, and demonstrated the need for the rise of
the NPL. The author’s main assertion was that the NPL succeeded where other agrarian
movements failed because it choose to remain within the dominant party structure – in this
case, choosing to remain a separate entity which sought to infiltrate and influence the
Republican Party (instead of forming its own independent third party). Morlan also
commented however, on the success of the subsequent Farmer-Labor Party movement in
Minnesota, which he attributed to the successful fusion of farmer and labor elements. This
may seem somewhat contradictory – since Morlan attributes the NPL’s success to its non-
42
Steven Keillor, Cooperative Commonwealth: Co-ops in Rural Minnesota, 1859-1939 (St. Paul, MN:
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2000), 3-10, 100-146, 308-338.
28
third party status, while claiming that the success of the movement in Minnesota was based
on its third party strategy. Nevertheless, Morlan’s work remains the definitive account of the
North Dakota NPL movement and offers the historical reader many insights.
43
Elwyn Robinson’s History of North Dakota (1966) presented an extensive analysis of
the history of the League within the state. The author drew a somewhat equivocal conclusion.
Robinson stated that the League and its members had legitimate grievances, and that the NPL
may have initially represented an avenue for expressing discontent. However, Robinson was
skeptical of the League’s leadership overall, and seemed to view the NPL years in power as
an episode of political demagoguery – a movement which was built on legitimate grievances,
but went too far both in its political aims (which he termed “socialistic”) and in its disregard
for civic probity (suggesting that corruption – whether exaggerated by the NPL’s opponents
or not – was a major factor in its downfall in the state).
44
More recently, Michael J. Lansing’s
Insurgent Democracy: The Nonpartisan League in North American Politics (2015) presents a
fresh perspective on the NPL, claiming that the movement was not just merely a local
reaction to farm issues of the early 20th century, but was instead a model of successful
citizen-led political activism, which has enduring implications for grassroots anti-corporate
movements today.
45
The Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota in the 1920s and ‘30s was not just an agrarian
movement, however. Labor was the other main sector of the party’s base, and many have
asserted that it was the successful fusion of farmers and laborers into a broad coalition which
gave the party its electoral success in this period. Like the agrarian movements stretching
43
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 3-46, 191.
44
Elwyn Robinson, History of North Dakota (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 352-370.
45
Michael J. Lansing, Insurgent Democracy: The Nonpartisan League in North American Politics (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 2015), passim.
29
from the late 1800s to the early 1900s, the organized labor movement had a similar arc
leading from general disenfranchisement in the late 1800s to greater empowerment by the
1930s. Early efforts at organized labor in America in the late 1800s were sporadic, often
unsuccessful, marred by violence and controversy, and resisted by both business and
government. Reforms in the progressive era allowed the labor movement greater influence.
Organized labor also received a boost from legislation passed under President Wilson in
1916 (the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act and the Adamson Act) as well as a degree of
federal recognition under Wilson’s administration during World War I. Even so, the labor
movement ebbed in the 1920s. Ironically, it was in the 1930s – at the height of high
unemployment and the Great Depression – that organized labor would enjoy its greatest
gains both in terms of numbers and in political achievements.
David Montgomery’s Workers’ Control in America (1980) described a broad and
diverse proletariat of the early 20th century that was often divided between cultural and
immigrant groups, but united in their dissatisfaction of working conditions. The author
contended however, that the shared experience of labor itself created a bond which
superseded existing cultural and ethnic divisions and led to the ability of the working class to
(eventually) organize effectively. Montgomery also claimed that it was the direct intervention
of the federal government in the 1930s which allowed for the emergence of more powerful
organized labor through federal reforms supporting workers’ rights to organize and
collectively bargain, and through laws which regulated labor relations.
46
Montgomery’s later
work The Fall of the House of Labor (1989) made the assertion that the labor movement in
46
David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor
Struggles (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-8, 18-31, 153-180.
30
America was energized by the government regulation of industry and labor during World
War I, which temporarily favored the labor sector and provided a model by which the labor
movement could effectively organize across specific work environments.
47
Although organized labor would face great efforts in the 1920s by the industrialist
class to reduce or eliminate unionism (either through repression or through corporatism
designed to allay worker dissatisfaction), the 1930s would see a tilt in favor of organized
labor. Melvin Dubofsky’s The State and Labor in Modern America (1994) echoed many of
Montgomery’s observations. Dubofsky claimed that federal intervention in labor relations
(specifically, the New Deal pro-labor legislation) enabled the organized labor movement to
flourish, which in turn brought prosperity to the working class and made unionism an
enduring trend in America. Dubofsky also traced the growing influence of the labor
movement from the earlier period of the progressives and the Wilson Administration – both
of which he claimed contributed in the long-term to the growth of the movement, and were
part of a long continuum which eventually favored labor’s position.
48
In addition to the historical sources which examine wider or national trends, there is
also a body of historical literature which specifically addresses the history of the Farmer-
Labor Party in Minnesota as well. It has often been stated that “History is written by the
victors.” However, in the case of the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota from 1918 to 1948, it
seems that much of its history was written by both the movement’s victors and its defeated
figures or sympathizers. Much of the historiography which covers the Farmer-Labor Party in
Minnesota was written mainly in the period just after its peak of power and demise (between
47
David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor, 1-8, 370-410.
48
Melvin Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina
Press, 1994), xi-xviii, 61-82, 107-168.
31
about 1940 and the early 1970s). Most of these works were written either by persons who
were part of the farmer-labor movement or the newly merged DFL Party, and/or were openly
supportive of one of the movement’s major figures (and thus seemed to be making a case for
their views). The list of historical works specifically dedicated to the Farmer-Labor Party
within Minnesota is relatively short, but nonetheless includes a number of influential,
comprehensive and sometimes contradictory viewpoints. However, many of these works or
passages emphasize the movement’s origins as being the culmination of a long-term agrarian
protest movement brought about chiefly by economic conditions resulting in a farmer and
labor alliance against more powerful business interests.
This trend can be seen in such early works as Arthur Naftalin’s Ph.D. Dissertation "A
History of the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota." (1948). Naftalin was a close supporter of
Hubert H. Humphrey, and the timing of Naftalin’s work coincided with a period of conflict
within the DFL Party when the rural-agrarian wing of the party was re-aligning itself towards
Democratic leadership under Humphrey. Naftalin’s complimentary assessment of rural-
agrarian protest may have reinforced this new alignment, or at least expressed the Humphrey
wing’s desire for an alliance within the party against the old Farmer-Laborite urban-labor
faction. Naftalin’s dissertation identified the Minnesota farmer-labor movement as the
culmination of a long-term legacy of farm protest politics which could be traced back to the
1860s, beginning with Oliver H. Kelley and the Grange movement, but never reaching any
significant success until the NPL-inspired approach was used in Minnesota starting in the
early 1920s. Naftalin portrayed a party which succeeded in the 1920s-‘30s chiefly because of
its ability to effectively address economic issues which were being ignored by the other two
major parties, and by uniting the disparate farmer-labor constituencies into a significant
32
coalition. Naftalin also viewed the party as emerging from within a changing economy which
put Midwestern farmers at the mercy of economic interests beyond their control – from the
railroads to local stores. According to Naftalin, the party was eventually done in by several
factors: communist infiltration in 1935-36, the death of the charismatic leader Floyd B. Olson
in 1936, the New Deal agrarian reforms of the Roosevelt Democrats on the national level,
and the problematic leadership of Governor Elmer Benson – who lacked Olson’s charisma,
adopted a militant political stance, and experienced serious political opposition both from the
Republicans and from within his own party as well.
49
It is interesting to note that Naftalin’s
dissertation was being written at the University of Minnesota just as the conflict within the
newly-created DFL Party between Humphrey’s Democrats and Benson’s former Farmer-
Laborites was reaching its climax. It is possible that Naftalin was seeking to claim the mantle
of agrarian politics for the new DFL Party, and minimize the leadership influence of the old
Farmer-Labor Party’s urban-labor wing. Naftalin’s history can be classified as being in the
Progressive School of interpretation, and emphasizing the Farmer-Labor Party as being an
outgrowth of long-term agrarian discontent.
Biographical works which identified and praised singular figures in the farmer-labor
movement were common in the period of the 1940s to the early 1970s. These works include
Martin Ross’s Shipstead of Minnesota (1940), George Mayer’s The Political Career of Floyd
B. Olson (1951), and James B. Shields’ Mr. Progressive: A Biography of Elmer Austin
Benson (1971). Ross’s Shipstead of Minnesota is an undocumented work detailing the life of
Henrik Shipstead, one of the Farmer-Labor Party’s major figures and long-time Senator.
Ross’s work lionized Shipstead, and emphasized the idea that Shipstead had remained steady
49
Naftalin, “History of the Farmer-Labor Party,” 1-4, 342-345.
33
in his beliefs as the Farmer-Labor Party itself shifted to the left by the late 1930s. The work
is often used for research on Shipstead even today, and is largely a hagiography of Shipstead
and his political stands throughout his career up until 1940. Most of these works tend to fall
into the Progressive School, since they emphasize the sustained and supposedly heroic
stances of committed leaders driven by a reaction to existing economic injustices.
50
George H. Mayer’s The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson was written a mere fifteen
years after Olson’s death, and was largely based on newspaper accounts and interviews with
the subject’s contemporaries. Mayer portrayed Olson as a figure whose youth was shaped by
a variety of hard work experiences which molded him into a man with concerns for persons
at the lowest levels of society. For Mayer, the success of the farmer-labor movement was
chiefly attributable to Olson, who was a major figure as governor for much of the 1930s.
Mayer saw the party as a vehicle to further Olson’s ambitions and showcase his significant
political talent. Mayer also characterized Olson as an astute politician first, and ideologue
second. This political skill and calculation was critical to Olson’s success, enabling him to
balance a relatively radical base while appealing to mainstream voters. This is not to say that
Mayer characterized Olson as being insincere. Olson truly believed in reform but was
cautious in pursuing it, and was careful not to sacrifice his career for causes that had little
chance of success. Thus, Mayer viewed Olson as being the catalyst of the movement’s peak
success, and the party itself as almost secondary to the personality of Olson’s leadership.
Mayer’s work is perhaps the best example of a source which asserts that the Farmer-Labor
Party’s success was due mainly to the leadership of a charismatic figure (in this case, Floyd
50
Martin Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota (Chicago: Packard and Company, 1940).
34
B. Olson).
51
Mayer’s work influenced later historians (such as Theodore Blegen and William
Lass) who also identified Floyd B. Olson as being the central figure of the movement, and
suggested that much of the party’s success was due to Olson’s skills and personality.
Likewise, this trend of praise for a singular leading figure can also be seen in James
M. Shields’ Mr. Progressive: A Biography of Elmer Austin Benson. Shields – a close ally of
Benson in the late 1940s – presents a flattering picture of Elmer Benson as being a stubborn,
incorruptible man of the people whose short temper and political inflexibility was warranted
in the face of a significant and devious political opposition. Shields further portrayed Hubert
Humphrey as an insincere politician whose concern for the common person was less
admirable than Benson’s solid commitment to reform. There are also several useful
biographies of Hubert H. Humphrey (often credited as being the central figure in the
Democratic Party to bring about the merger with the Farmer-Labor Party in 1944), the most
compelling being Humphrey’s own autobiography The Education of a Public Man: My Life
and Politics (1976). Humphrey himself characterized the Farmer-Labor Party as a movement
split between earnest rural-agrarian reformers and an intractable, leftist urban-labor
leadership faction too closely associated with communism for his tastes.
52
Thus, much of the initial historiography of the movement was written by agents or
supporters of historical events and not by detached persons with considerable scholarly
objectivity. One early exception to this trend would be Leslie Gene Rude’s Ph.D.
Dissertation “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement” (1962),
which tended towards a methodical historical and rhetorical analysis. Rude himself (then a
51
George H. Mayer, The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press,
1951), 55-56; 119-124.
52
Hubert H. Humphrey (Norman Sherman, editor), The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976).
35
graduate student at the University of Illinois) apparently had no direct connection to the
farmer-labor movement itself.
53
More recent biographies of Farmer-Labor Party figures reflect a more scholarly trend.
Bruce L. Larson’s Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography (1971) was a well-
researched and comprehensive work documenting the life of the Farmer-Labor Party’s early
standard bearer and controversial 1918 gubernatorial candidate. The work is especially
valuable in tracing Lindbergh’s later political career with the advent of the Minnesota
farmer-labor movement.
54
Steven J. Keillor’s Hjalmar Petersen of Minnesota: The Politics of
Provincial Independence (1987) carefully documented the life of Hjalmar Petersen, the
Farmer-Labor governor who succeeded Floyd B. Olson in 1936, and whose struggles to lead
the party away from the influence of the other main party leader at that time (Elmer Benson)
contributed to the party’s factionalism in the late 1930s. Keillor’s work represented a
relatively objective, comprehensive and scholarly approach to one of the Farmer-Labor
Party’s key figures and refrained from lionizing the work’s main figure.
55
These early biographies often portrayed their central figure as being a main ideologue
or leader of the Farmer-Labor (or DFL) movement, and a main reason for the party’s success.
This is especially the case for the Ross, Mayer and Shields works – whose depictions of their
respective Farmer-Labor figures leave little doubt that the authors fully support the idea that
their subject was the party’s “great leader.” Larson’s and Keillor’s biographies avoid taking
such an approach, and are well-researched scholarly works with a balanced analysis.
53
James M. Shields, Mr. Progressive: A Biography of Elmer Austin Benson (Minneapolis, MN: T. S. Denison &
Company, 1971).
54
Bruce L. Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1971).
55
Steven J. Keillor, Hjalmar Petersen of Minnesota: The Politics of Provincial Independence (St. Paul, MN:
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1987).
36
A shift in the historiography of the Minnesota farmer-labor movement occurred
beginning in the late 1970s. Millard L. Gieske’s extensive historical narrative Minnesota
Farmer-Laborism: The Third-Party Alternative (1979) represented a break from the earlier
trend in that Gieske treated his subject matter with considerable objectivity and focused on
the movement as a whole. Gieske also demonstrated a careful scholarly method in his
political history, and seemed to have little personal agenda in writing his work. Gieske’s
work remains the most significant scholarly monograph on the Minnesota Farmer-Labor
Party. The author portrayed a wide-ranging movement consisting of both extremists and
liberal-moderates who often used radical rhetoric to attract votes, yet which often ran
candidates that practiced political moderation and compromise. Gieske asserted that the party
was a fragile coalition held together only by skillful and able figures such as Henrik
Shipstead and Floyd B. Olson. The author also claimed that it was the economic dislocation
of the Great Depression which gave the party new life starting with the 1930 election,
highlighted by Floyd B. Olson’s successful Farmer-Labor gubernatorial campaign.
Eventually, the party would be undone by its factionalism, including the growing conflict
caused by accusations of communist infiltration in the party. Gieske claimed that Olson’s
death in 1936 was not the sole reason for the party’s demise, and that Elmer Benson was both
more skilled and moderate as a politician than earlier historians had claimed. Gieske thus
took a more measured approach to characterizing the movement and its leaders, and avoided
a common school of thought advanced by some other historians (such as Mayer and Blegen)
who had characterized the movement’s success being due largely to the leadership of Floyd
B. Olson and/or its demise being due largely to Benson’s militant and incompetent
leadership. It should be noted that Gieske’s work is a political history of the movement
37
however, and as such focuses mainly on elections and does not delve extensively into party
figure personalities, national political activity associated with the Farmer-Labor Party, or
Minnesota’s changing economic and social conditions in the 1920s and ‘30s. Even so,
Gieske’s work is also one of the first to chronicle some of the activity of the urban-labor
WPNPL in the early 1920s.
56
Richard Valelly’s Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and
the American Political Economy (1989) provided a fragmented but fairly comprehensive
analysis of much of the party’s activity in the 1920s and ‘30s. Unlike Gieske’s work – with
its largely political focus – Valelly’s work also examined similar movements in other states
and regions (namely, Wisconsin and Saskatchewan). Valelly also traced connections between
the Minnesota farmer-labor movement and some trends within the national economy and
political shifts in the 1920s and ‘30s. Valelly ultimately concluded that Franklin Roosevelt’s
New Deal policies and the subsequent shift in federal policy towards intervention on behalf
of farmers and laborers essentially doomed state-level “radical” groups such as the
Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party. The focus of Valelly’s work ended before the demise of the
Farmer-Labor Party in 1944 however, and therefore offered little insight on Farmer-Labor
activities in the 1940s. Also, Valelly’s work is not exclusively focused on the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party, and as a result lacks a cohesive singular historical narrative approach.
Like Gieske, Valelly also noted the activity of the WPNPL in the early 1920s as well.
57
The later focus of John Hayne’s Dubious Alliance: The Making of Minnesota's DFL
Party (1984) is also similar in its extensively scholarly approach (but more overt in its bias
56
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, vii-viii; 154-201, 263-268.
57
Richard M. Valelly, Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political
Economy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 135-138.
38
against the party’s radical wing). Like Gieske, Haynes examined the Farmer-Labor Party as a
whole. However, Haynes extended his focus well beyond the merger of 1944. Haynes’ work
is – by far – the most instructive and detailed account of the 1944 DFL Party merger and the
subsequent struggle within the newly-formed DFL between the faction led by Hubert
Humphrey and Elmer Benson’s former Farmer-Laborites. Haynes’ work was meticulously
researched and documented, and provided details on this period of the early DFL found in no
other comprehensive source. Haynes also went to great lengths to outline communist
connections between some of the former Farmer-Laborites within the newly formed DFL.
This approach supported his main contention that the merger between the two parties was a
“dubious alliance” – meaning that the Democrats’ merger with the Farmer-Labor Party in
1944 did not truly represent a merging of politically compatible entities. Haynes examined
the merger and post-merger period in detail – although he often veered away from the history
of the end of the Farmer-Labor Party, the merger, and the early years of the DFL in order to
trace connections between former Farmer-Laborites and communists. It should also be noted
that Haynes’ work offers scant description of the party’s activities during its peak of power,
and little explanation for the party’s rise. Even so, Haynes’ work is one of the best
descriptions of the post-merger DFL Party struggle of the late 1940s, and it fits into the
Consensus School with its depiction of Farmer-Laborites as being radical and dubious
political partners.
58
The farmer-labor movement has also been addressed in a number of general works on
Minnesota history. From the 1960s to the end of the 20th century, two works stand out as
58
John Haynes, Dubious Alliance: the Making of Minnesota's DFL Party (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1984).
39
being notable sources. The first is Theodore C. Blegen’s Minnesota: A History of the State
(1963). Blegen’s work is one of the most thorough and heavily researched comprehensive
surveys on Minnesota history. Although Blegen notes the formation of the farmer-labor
movement in the 1918 election and its successes in national senatorial elections in the early
1920s, he offers little description of the party in its early period. Instead – like Mayer – his
focus is almost solely on the rise of the party within the state after the election of Floyd B.
Olson to the governor's office in 1930. Blegen credited the onset of the Great Depression as
being the decisive factor in the election of Olson. It was these economic trends – along with
Olson's newfound rhetorical approach, which Blegen termed “nonpartisan” – that enabled
Olson to be elected and the party to achieve significant influence at the state level. Blegen
thus seemed to view the movement chiefly as the rise of a charismatic individual (Olson)
who portrayed himself as a reasonable alternative during a time of great economic
dislocation, and whose campaign approach and politics were a precursor to the New Deal of
Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Blegen’s characterizations of the Farmer-Labor
Party’s success emphasized Olson’s charisma and the significant dislocation of the Great
Depression as leading voters to the third party movement. As such, he minimized the concept
of long-term class struggle, and his approach seems to fall more in the Consensus School.
59
In his comprehensive work, Minnesota: A History (1977, second edition 1998)
William E. Lass made the case that Minnesota has a long-running tradition of what he termed
“protest politics.” Like other historians, Lass traced the agrarian political protest movement
back to Oliver Kelley and the Grange movement of the 1870s, through Ignatius Donnelly and
the Populist Party, and tied a thread directly to the progressive era, highlighting such figures
59
Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 522-529.
40
as Governors John Johnson and Samuel Van Sant. Lass also asserted that Minnesota’s
Farmer-Labor Party was initially a direct outgrowth of the NPL movement in North Dakota,
and credited Arthur C. Townley as being the catalyst in creating the movement in Minnesota
as well. Lass further contended that the dynamics of World War I, combined with isolationist
sentiments among such chief figures as Charles Lindbergh, Sr., led to the rise of the
movement in Minnesota by the early 1920s. Lass also acknowledged the success of the
movement in incorporating labor elements into what had initially been an agrarian
movement, and also identified the figures of Henrik Shipstead and Floyd B. Olson as being
significant charismatic figures whose leadership and rhetoric aided the party in its electoral
victories. Lass further characterized the movement’s success chiefly as stemming from
economic dissatisfaction among farmers in the state due to the significant drop in crop prices
in the 1920s. He attributed the party’s demise to several factors, including factionalism
within the party itself, but more importantly to the shift of the Democratic Party towards a
New Deal coalition which favored farm interests, and which had largely absorbed the
Farmer-Labor platform by the mid-1930s. Like Blegen, the central focus of Lass’s coverage
is the surprise election of Henrik Shipstead and Magnus Johnson in 1922 and 1923, and the
governorship of Floyd B. Olson. However, unlike Blegen, Lass emphasized a long-term
series of agrarian protest movements that culminated in the farmer-labor movement
(adhering more to the Progressive School view). He also noted specifically how control of
the early DFL Party was an unresolved issue until Humphrey’s triumph in 1948.
60
Both of these works often give the impression that the Farmer-Labor Party was
merely the culmination of a series of agrarian protest movements in Minnesota and nearby
60
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 221-226, 229-231.
41
states. They also further imply that the party was simply the outgrowth of the state’s NPL
movement. For example, in Blegen’s influential work, he mentions the activity of the NPL
starting in the 1918 gubernatorial election, and largely implies that this farmer-labor coalition
simply continued on to become a major party by 1922.
61
Likewise, Lass describes in detail
the origins and growth of the NPL under Townley within the state, and then continues to
credit “the League” (and not the Farmer-Labor Party) with scoring an upset electoral victory
in the 1922 election.
62
Both of these passages imply that the NPL in Minnesota simply
renamed itself. However, this dissertation will show that such characterizations are
inaccurate, since the creation and continuing governance of the Farmer-Labor Party was led
and organized in the early 1920s by the state’s urban-labor leadership who formed their own
third party organization which represented a separate initiative from the Townley-led NPL.
More recent works of general Minnesota history such as Norman K. Risjord’s A
Popular History of Minnesota (2005), Steven J. Keillor’s Shaping Minnesota's Identity: 150
Years of State History (2008), and Annette Atkins’ Creating Minnesota: A History from the
Inside Out (2008) also briefly cover the Farmer-Labor Party and give the movement
sufficient credit for being Minnesota’s only real successful third party movement. Like
Theodore C. Blegen’s earlier analysis, these general histories often imply that the 1944
merger signaled a simple end to the farmer-labor movement, which – as this study will
demonstrate – is not really the case, given the struggles for control of the DFL Party between
1946 and 1948. Even when this struggle is mentioned in general histories (such as in Lass’s
Minnesota: A History), it is often described as Humphrey’s battle to “purge” communists or
61
Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 476-478.
62
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 220-222.
42
radicals from within the early DFL. Such descriptions imply that these leftist former Farmer-
Laborites were a dangerous minority within the party and/or uninvited guests to the DFL
merger – which again, was not really the case.
Risjord examined the emergence of the farmer-labor movement from its origins in
Townley’s NPL in 1917. Risjord marked 1922 as the year of the emergence of the movement
as a formal third party, but traced little of the party’s history throughout the 1920s. Much of
Risjord’s focus is on Floyd B. Olson as governor in the 1930s, and the subsequent decline of
the party under the leadership of Benson starting in 1936. The merger of the Democratic and
Farmer-Labor parties in 1944 is almost exclusively attributed to the efforts of Hubert
Humphrey.
63
Keillor covered the history of the Farmer-Labor Party in a fairly detailed
manner for a general book of this length, and also managed to aptly describe many of the
political undercurrents which enabled the party to rise. Keillor claimed that the Farmer-Labor
Party’s demise was uncertain – and that reforms sought by Hjalmar Petersen in his 1938
campaign may have been enough to rejuvenate the party.
64
Atkins’ coverage of the farmer-
labor movement in her work is minimal. She mentioned both Shipstead and Olson, but only
discussed Olson (for just a single paragraph). More interestingly, she highlighted Hubert
Humphrey’s ambition and his actions in consolidating the DFL Party under his control by
1948.
65
In short, all of these more recent general histories seem to rely largely on the
historiographical pattern established earlier by Blegen and Lass, which overlook the role of
63
Norman Risjord, A Popular History of Minnesota (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2005),
320-367, 368-409.
64
Steven J. Keillor, Shaping Minnesota’s Identity (Lakeville, MN: Pogo Press, 2008), 180-181.
65
Annette Atkins, Creating Minnesota: A History from the Inside Out (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical
Society Press, 2008), 177-178, 220-229.
43
the WPNPL’s urban-labor leadership in forming the party, and in endorsing the view that the
1944 merger was essentially the end of farmer-labor political activity.
Another related recent work is Rhoda R. Gilman’s Stand Up! The Story of
Minnesota’s Protest Tradition (2012) which focused specifically on protest activity –
political or otherwise – in Minnesota from the late 1800s up until the early 21st Century.
Gilman included a chapter on “The Rise of the Farmer-Labor Party,” however, much of the
material in the chapter focused on ancillary – though related – topics such as the Farmer’s
Holiday Association and the Great Depression in Minnesota. As a result, the descriptions of
the party’s history in this work are limited in detail. Gilman’s work also suggests that the
Farmer-Labor Party was the last of a series of Minnesota farmer protest movements which
culminated in the 1930s (although she does note that the party was a result of the fusion of
the NPL and the WPNPL). The rise of Hubert Humphrey in the 1940s and the 1944 DFL
merger is mentioned only briefly in another chapter.
66
There are a number of scholarly articles relating to the Farmer-Labor Party in
Minnesota in this period. Most of these scholarly articles were published in Minnesota
History. These articles covered a wide variety of detailed subject matter, all of which related
to the larger investigation of the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota history. Although they are
too numerous to list individually, some notable examples include pieces which profiled some
of the more obscure Farmer-Labor figures such as John T. Bernard in Barbara Stuhler’s “The
One Man Who Voted ‘Nay’: The Story of John T. Bernard's Quarrel with American Foreign
66
Rhoda Gilman, Stand Up! The Story of Minnesota’s Protest Tradition (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical
Society Press, 2012), 72-82, 97.
44
Policy, 1937-1939” (1972).
67
A similar examination is presented in Frederick L. Johnson’s
“From Leavenworth to Congress: The Improbable Journey of Francis H. Shoemaker”
(1989).
68
Also of interest were those pieces which focused on relevant topics such as anti-
German sentiments in Minnesota in 1917-1919 as examined in La Vern J. Rippley’s
“Conflict in the Classroom: Anti-Germanism in Minnesota Schools, 1917-19” (1981).
69
Other relevant secondary sources include examinations of movements, events or
figures closely related to the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party. These include two works
authored by Carl H. Chrislock. The first is The Progressive Era in Minnesota: 1899-1918
(1971) which provided a state-level overview of progressive politics in Minnesota.
70
The
second is Watchdog of Loyalty: The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety During World
War I (1991) which examined the Republican-led committee that ensured loyalty in
Minnesota in 1917-1918, and whose heavy-handed tactics repressed the fledgling NPL
movement and may have given rise to opposition politics that were the seeds of the Farmer-
Labor Party.
71
Another example of a source in this category is G. Theodore Mitau’s Politics
in Minnesota (1960), which traced major political trends and shifts in the state’s history in
the 20th century through the 1950s.
72
These existing sources on the history of the Minnesota farmer-labor movement
typically emphasized several concepts. The first is that the movement was chiefly the
67
Barbara Stuhler, “The One Man Who Voted ‘Nay’: The Story of John T. Bernard's Quarrel with American
Foreign Policy, 1937-1939,” Minnesota History, Vol. 43, No. 3 (Fall, 1972), 82-92.
68
Frederick L. Johnson, “From Leavenworth to Congress: The Improbable Journey of Francis H. Shoemaker,”
Minnesota History, Vol. 51, No. 5 (Spring, 1989), 166-177.
69
La Vern J. Rippley, “Conflict in the Classroom: Anti-Germanism in Minnesota Schools, 1917-19,” Minnesota
History, Spring 1981, 171-183.
70
Carl H. Chrislock, The Progressive Era in Minnesota: 1899-1918 (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society
Press, 1971).
71
Carl H. Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty: The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety During World War I
(St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1991).
72
G. Theodore Mitau, Politics in Minnesota (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960).
45
culmination of a long-term agrarian protest trend which was seen both in Minnesota and
many other predominantly agricultural states in the region from the late 1800s to the early
1900s. A main contention of this viewpoint is that the movement was essentially a farmer-led
political entity, and chiefly the outgrowth of the NPL movement under Townley. The second
concept is that the movement was largely successful due to the leadership of a key figure
whose political charisma made third party politics appealing to Minnesota voters in this
period. Accounts differ on which of these figures was the most influential. However, Floyd
B. Olson, Elmer Benson, or Henrik Shipstead are oft-mentioned choices. A main contention
of this point of view is that individual leadership – and not necessarily an overarching
ideology or a critical mass of support for an alternative political approach – explains the
movement’s success. A third concept that is often portrayed is that – after the Farmer-Labor
Party’s decline in the late 1930s and its merger with the Democrats in 1944 – the movement
swiftly ended, and its political aims were quickly and successfully absorbed by the newly
created DFL Party.
This study is limited to the scope of the Farmer-Labor Party within Minnesota in the
period of 1918 to 1948, with a specific emphasis on the party’s campaigns, its political
figures, its organizational structure, and the party’s agenda during this period. This study also
focuses on the Farmer-Labor Party as a uniquely successful third party movement and seeks
to explain the reasons for its rise and eventual demise. Although there were farmer-labor
movements present in other states during the 1920s-‘30s, the focus of this study is on the
Farmer-Labor political party movement that developed specifically within the State of
Minnesota in the period in question. This study is also limited in its scope to the connection
between national issues and the activities of the party and its figures, and includes an
46
emphasis on Senators and Representatives of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party elected to
Congress. The study also traces some of the connections between the national Democrats of
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration and the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota during
the 1930s and 1940s as well. This study is a chronology of the party as a political movement,
an analysis of the central figures of the party and its electoral activity in the period from 1918
to 1942, an examination of its merger with the Democrats in 1944 and the subsequent battle
for control of this merged DFL Party, and an interpretative summary of the movement as a
whole with an examination of its unique success and longevity as a third party movement.
It is the contention of this study that the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota between
1918 and 1948 went through several phases of development and represented a broad and
long-term political movement with multiple causes both in its rise to power and in its decline.
The party served the role of acting as a major party in the 1920s and ‘30s, and effectively
functioned as the second major party in a de facto state two-party system. This study refutes
the standard neo-Progressive School interpretation that the movement was brought about
simply by economic inequities alone, but instead emerged on account of multiple converging
causes, some of which were economic in nature, but some which also related to social,
political, ideological and organizational factors. It is also the contention of this study that the
state party movement was not merely the last phase of the “agrarian protest” tradition or the
direct outgrowth of the NPL movement, but was instead a state-level organizational initiative
led by a political leadership group anchored in the Twin Cities’ urban-labor base. This
leadership group built on Townley’s initial success to create a new grassroots level political
entity which eventually became the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party. These efforts were led
chiefly by the urban-labor side of the farmer-labor coalition (largely, former Minnesota labor
47
and socialist leaders), whose success at fusing the farmer and labor elements led to achieving
a critical mass of electoral support in the 1920s and ‘30s. Furthermore, this study contends
that the movement was effectively led – not by a single ambitious or charismatic individual –
but instead by a number of competing leading figures over time (each of whom reflected
varying aspects of the party’s ideology, as well as reflecting the competing divisions within
the party). Each of these figures also echoed the angry rhetoric of discontent which became a
common rallying point for their constituents. This successive series of competing leaders
initially broadened the movement and made its ideology a unifying factor, and helped to keep
the party’s rural-agrarian members aligned with its urban-labor wing for a period of time.
However, in the long run, this multiple leadership model with its competing political
viewpoints created factionalism based on the characteristically uncompromising nature of
Farmer-Labor rhetoric. Thus, the movement was neither simply a vehicle for a single
charismatic leader (such as Floyd B. Olson) nor was it a fringe third party movement – but
was instead a successful third party movement with a number of notable leading figures and
a well-developed ideology. The party succeeded as a political entity as long as it was able to
maintain its broad farmer-labor coalition, and as long as the major issues it championed
remained unaddressed by the other parties. Last, it is the contention of this study that farmer-
labor political activity did not disappear after the merger with the Democrats in 1944, but
was instead transferred to the DFL Party, where former Farmer-Labor figures sought (and
temporarily obtained) control of the DFL Party until finally being defeated by liberal
Democrats under the leadership of Hubert H. Humphrey in 1948. This study explains and
describes a comprehensive history of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party based on these
concepts.
48
The primary source material used in the research for this dissertation is largely
archival material housed in a number of collections, including state and local historical
societies, libraries, and other collections. These materials include the archival papers of a
number of central figures in the movement (including Charles Lindbergh, Sr., Henrik
Shipstead, Floyd B. Olson, Hjalmar Petersen, Elmer A. Benson, and Hubert H. Humphrey,
and others). Other primary sources used include government documents, Farmer-Labor Party
(and Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party) materials (including campaign speech texts and other
party-generated content), local and national newspapers, and other publications. The scope of
the primary materials is necessarily limited, and because the period of study in question is
now about 70-100 years old, oral history sources are largely limited to transcript texts or
audio recordings conducted earlier.
No historical movement or trend begins in a vacuum. In the case of the Farmer-Labor
Party in Minnesota, at least some of its origins can be traced to the economic conditions of
farmers in the northern prairie regions in the early 1900s. These conditions in turn gave rise
to the Nonpartisan League movement in North Dakota starting in 1915. It is there where we
begin our history.
49
CHAPTER II
THE PRAIRIE FIRE SPREADS: 1915-1918
Farm issues continued to be at the forefront of politics in many agricultural states
during the 1910s, including Minnesota and the Dakotas. Although several concerted attempts
at agricultural reform had been attempted at both the state and national levels since the
1890s, farmers still suffered from many of the same circumstances that had ignited the rise of
the Populists some time earlier. These issues related to prevailing economic trends, existing
laws which favored laissez-faire capitalism (including a lack of significant regulatory
entities), and the continued de facto monopoly of many railroads and agribusiness entities in
the various regions that they served. The high cost of farm mechanization, a relatively high
tax burden for land ownership and improvement, high rates of interest for farmers, and a
fluctuating national market for crop prices (often stagnant or even deflationary) also
continued to play a negative role in American agrarian prosperity.
The Progressive Roots of the Nonpartisan League Movement
The progressive reforms of the early 1900s would have an effect on agrarian politics
starting in the 1910s. Most significant of these was the development of the party direct
primary system, which allowed ordinary citizens the opportunity to vote directly for
candidates for party nominations. These primary systems were implemented in many states
in this period (including North Dakota and Minnesota). Thus, by the early 1910s, for the first
50
time in American history, movements or candidates with wide popular support now had the
opportunity to infiltrate the major parties and nominate candidates sympathetic to their views
– regardless of the preferences of party bosses or the party machine system.
1
Progressive sentiments were significant in many north-central agricultural states,
including Wisconsin (with its governor – and later Senator – Robert La Follette often serving
as a national leader of progressive reforms). Progressivism also took root in Iowa, Minnesota,
and the Dakotas. In addition to the passage of primary laws in these states, in 1913, the
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified by a majority of states and became federal law. This
amendment provided for the direct election of Senators by the people via a popular vote
(with the exception of women, who had still not been granted universal suffrage). Until that
time, the Constitution had specified that Senators were to be elected or appointed by
members of state legislatures. Although some states had been moving towards the direct
Senate election model earlier, the Seventeenth Amendment made the practice universal.
Together, these two reforms would fuel both the Nonpartisan League (NPL) movement in
North Dakota starting in 1915, and later the farmer-labor movement in Minnesota.
2
Other progressive reforms specifically intended for the rural setting were far less
successful in transforming the agrarian sector, most notably the Country Life movement. The
Country Life movement reached its peak of activity in the years before World War I. As
noted earlier in Chapter One, this movement was an offshoot of the wider progressive
movement and sought to revitalize rural and small town regions through effective education
1
Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920
(New York: Free Press, 2003), 216.
2
Carl H. Chrislock, The Progressive Era in Minnesota: 1899-1918 (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society
Press, 1971), 17, 49; see also Alan Ware, The American Direct Primary: Party Institutionalization and
Transformation in the North (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117-123.
51
and small-scale modernization and industrialization. Its main aim was to create a new level
of prosperity in rural regions through innovations in farming, while leaving the small town
and family farm social structure in place. Liberty Hyde Bailey’s The Country-Life Movement
in the United States (1911) became a primer for the movement. Bailey contended that the
growth of urban centers had led to decline in rural areas, and that – unless action was taken –
America’s agricultural regions would suffer irreversible decline. The movement was largely
a failure and made few significant inroads – although the trend of the increasing
mechanization of agriculture (and its continued integration into national markets) continued.
3
Other changes from the early 1900s to 1915 helped to lay the groundwork for a new
agrarian political movement. The Equity Cooperative Exchange was created in 1902. This
was a national effort to create holding or storage facilities as a means to either stabilize or
increase crop prices. It later merged with several small private grain marketing companies,
and by 1912 it was doing business in North Dakota. The Equity group set a precedent for
some of the Nonpartisan League’s aims in North Dakota when it successfully got a
referendum on the ballot in 1912 (and again in 1914) that sought to establish the right of the
state to erect grain storage facilities (not dissimilar to earlier efforts by Populists of the Texas
Cooperative). Neither of these referenda attempts was successful. However, it did put the
issue forward for consideration for much of North Dakota’s farming population, and set a
precedent for the idea of state intervention in the realm of agricultural business. The
3
Liberty Hyde Bailey, The Country-Life Movement in the United States (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1911), passim; see also McGerr, A Fierce Discontent, 106-107 and David Danbom, Resisted Revolution: Urban
America and the Industrialization of Agriculture, 1900-1930 (Ames, IA: The Iowa State University Press,
1979), 138.
52
organization also attracted wide attention: the 1915 Equity convention was attended by
Robert La Follette of Wisconsin and Representative Charles A. Lindbergh of Minnesota.
4
The Nonpartisan League in North Dakota
There seems to be little question that the success of the Nonpartisan League (NPL)
movement starting in 1915 in North Dakota was due chiefly to one man’s vision and efforts.
That man was Arthur C. Townley, who not only conceived of the movement, but also served
as its chief organizer, president, and prominent orator during its formative and most
influential years. Townley began these efforts in 1915 at the age of 35, but not before he had
compiled a varied professional background. Townley had been raised in Brown’s Valley,
Minnesota – near the point at which the borders of Minnesota, South Dakota and North
Dakota converge. He graduated from high school further east, in the town of Alexandria,
Minnesota. Townley had taught high school for a couple of years around the turn of the
century before partnering with his brother to develop farming land further to the west.
Together, they developed plots in western North Dakota and then Colorado, raising wheat
and then flax. By early 1912, Townley had returned to North Dakota and had taken over the
entire business himself. Between 1907 and 1912 he was so successful at flax production that
he became known as the “flax king of North Dakota.” However, Townley’s success was not
to last. In the harvest of 1912, he faced a catastrophic loss due to an early frost and a sharp
drop in flax prices. His recent ambitious expansion of flax production in that season left him
4
Millard L. Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The Third Party Alternative (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1979), 1-10.
53
vulnerable with highly overextended credit. By the end of the year, he had gone bankrupt
from over $80,000 in debt.
5
Although Townley’s career as a cash crop farmer was over, his career as a political
speaker and organizer was just beginning. He was apparently familiar with some of the
elements of socialism, and this factor – in combination with his own recent financial collapse
– was enough to attract him to an affiliation with the Socialist Party of North Dakota. In
1914, he became the main organizer for a branch (or “department”) within the state’s party to
canvass farmers across the state. The Socialist Party in North Dakota had recently enjoyed
some minor electoral successes in several local elections, and it hoped to broaden its base by
appealing directly to farmers – who at that time comprised roughly 70% of the state’s
population. Townley’s mission was to encourage farmers to support the agricultural planks of
the party. Townley was supplied with a Ford Model T and some political literature, and was
given the task to canvass the state. His department’s main goal was to align farmer votes
towards the socialist platform without attempting to directly recruit them as members of the
party (which apparently many farmers considered too radical an association).
6
Townley enjoyed swift and significant success in his new venture. Much of this was
due to his energetic and persuasive speaking style and his own experiences as a farmer
(which no doubt shored up his credibility with other farmers). Townley began his campaign
in a humble fashion – at first riding a bicycle – and even walking and hitchhiking – before he
was finally granted the use of an automobile.
7
Eventually, four other organizers were added
5
Robert L. Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922 (Minneapolis, MN: University
of Minnesota Press, 1955), 22-23.
6
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 24.
7
Walter Quigley, "Out Where the West Begins," typed manuscript, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family
Library, St. Paul, MN, 7.
54
to Townley’s branch. Almost all of the main elements of Townley’s later NPL campaign
approach in 1915-16 were developed during his time working for the Socialist Party. This
included canvassing the state via automobile, making personal appearances and giving
speeches on farm policies, distributing political literature, and asking farmers to make a small
contribution in exchange for membership in a state-wide group. Townley himself became a
Socialist candidate for the state Senate in the 1914 elections, but was not elected. Even
though Townley’s efforts bore immediate fruit, the party did not approve of these trends.
Despite Townley’s success in recruiting farmers (or perhaps because of it – fearing that the
party might be overwhelmed by an outside faction), the Socialist Party leaders in North
Dakota decided to discontinue Townley’s department in January 1915.
8
However, by this time, Townley had perfected his canvassing approach and saw its
potential for organizing farmers into a political force. The party’s rejection of his efforts led
him to conclude that – despite its platform – the Socialist Party was just as conservative in its
own way as the other major parties (and was therefore of little use to the average farmer). He
decided instead to build his own agrarian political organization. In January 1915, he met with
A. W. Bowen (the former Socialist candidate for governor) in Minot, North Dakota. Townley
explained his idea of using his canvassing approach as a means to organize farmers to create
a farm lobby group that would infiltrate the Republican Party in North Dakota through the
open primaries. Bowen agreed to serve as Townley’s lieutenant. Building on a network of
persons sympathetic to his aims, Townley also approached Fred B. Wood – a farmer and
Equity figure from Deering, North Dakota – in February 1915. However, it was Wood’s son
8
James Weinstein, The Long Detour: The History and Future of the American Left (Cambridge, MA: Westview
Publishing, 2003), 65; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 24-25.
55
Howard who expressed the most enthusiasm for Townley’s plan. Townley and Howard
Wood sat down at a kitchen table in the Wood farmhouse one February evening and outlined
the overall mission, structure and platform of new organization – the Nonpartisan League.
The younger Wood was so excited about the plan, that he and Townley began their mission
the next day – traveling by bobsled to several local farmer neighbors and pitching the
concept of the League to them. Townley met with immediate success – almost every farmer
that he met in the first few days of his campaign signed on. It was the beginning of the
Nonpartisan League’s rise to power in North Dakota.
9
Townley continued these efforts and the League started to enjoy a rapid growth in
membership. His successful approach was based on several factors. He and his organizers
would canvass the state in person, often using automobile transportation. Many of his early
organizers were either former members of his branch within the Socialist Party, or others
from the party who saw the movement’s potential and acceded to Townley’s leadership.
These NPL organizers would speak to small groups of farmers, outline the platform and aims
of the NPL, and ask the farmers only for their political support and membership in the
League. Townley and his organizers charged yearly membership dues ($6 a year), and
promised to provide members with a league publication in the near future. Post-dated checks
(payable after the harvest) were also accepted – and provided a means of extending credit to
farmers eager to join but who were short on cash. This money provided the League with its
base funding, but Townley also believed that farmers were more likely to “stick” with the
League and its agenda if they had a vested interest in it (the phrase “We’ll Stick” became a
9
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 25, 367. There seems little reason to doubt this quaint account of the NPL’s
humble origins. This story was presented by Morlan after fact-checking the circumstances of this initial meeting
with both Townley and Howard Wood in interviews and correspondence conducted in 1948.
56
popular league slogan). The NPL pitch was mainly confined to agricultural economic
matters, and specifically focused on proposed political solutions to the problems that much of
the farming population was facing. Among these main planks were: state ownership of most
agricultural goods storage facilities (elevators, cold storage plants, packing houses, and even
flour mills); state inspection of grain dockage (a major issue for farmers who felt that these
measures were usually performed unfairly by the agribusiness entities); exemption of farm
improvements from increased taxation (to encourage farm productivity without paying extra
taxes); state hail insurance based on acreage; and rural credit banks to be operated at cost for
the benefit of farmers.
10
Figure 1. Arthur Charles Townley in about 1920. Townley made
his persuasive appeals directly to farmers – both in person through
speaking appearances (which were by all accounts, dynamic) and
through the NPL’s main organ The Nonpartisan Leader, which was
published starting in 1915. Photo courtesy of the St. Paul Pioneer
Press and Dispatch and reprinted from Robert L. Morlan’s Political
Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League 1915-1922.
Townley’s success was instant, and the League’s membership – a “political prairie
fire” – grew quickly throughout 1915. At first, Townley and his associates attempted to keep
their recruiting efforts quiet, in an attempt to limit potential opposition. However, it was not
long before the League’s activities attained notice in the state. Small town newspapers soon
questioned the League and its methods, often suggesting that it was a ruse designed to bilk
farmers out of their hard-earned money. They pointed to the NPL’s non-existent publication
10
Herbert Earle Gaston, The Nonpartisan League (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 60. Note that
the overwhelming majority of the flour mills which served North Dakota wheat farmers were located in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Thus, “state ownership” in this case presented the league with an issue that crossed
state borders (and was at least one reason for the NPL’s expansion into Minnesota and elsewhere after 1915).
57
as evidence. In response, in August 1915 the NPL began publishing the Nonpartisan Leader
(four months ahead of its intended start) and distributing it to members by mail. In the
League’s first year, many members even proudly called themselves “six dollar suckers” as a
retort to newspaper reports that they had been swindled by the NPL. By September, the
League had 18,000 members, and the Leader quickly became the most widely distributed
periodical in North Dakota. By the end of the year, the League had over 26,000 members.
11
The Nonpartisan Leader became the NPL’s main method of mass communication to
its member audience from 1915 to 1921. It was typically published on a weekly basis, and
contained news relating to agrarian politics with a heavy bias favoring NPL positions. It also
contained political cartoons, an editorial section, and a generous amount of advertising. The
illustrations in The Nonpartisan Leader were very consistent in their depiction of farmers and
the villains who bedeviled them. The archetypal farmer character was often portrayed as a
lean, humbly-dressed, white-bearded man with a stern and determined countenance (a sort of
agrarian “Uncle Sam” figure) alternately enduring or fending off the exploitations of such
scoundrels as “Middle Men,” “Profiteers,” “Old Guard,” or “Big Biz” – characters often
portrayed as portly men in fancy clothing.
12
11
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 27, 35; see also Gaston, The Nonpartisan League, 64-65.
12
There are many examples of this in the The Nonpartisan Leader in issues dating from 1917 and 1918,
including: April 19, 1917; December 24, 1917, January 24, 1918, and June 10, 1918.
58
Figure 2. A political cartoon reprinted from The Nonpartisan Leader (April 19, 1917).
The illustration depicts an honest farmer (representing “85% of the people”)
overthrowing “Private Monopoly” – a privileged position upon which the portly “Big
Biz” rests. Illustrations like this were frequently presented in The Nonpartisan Leader as
a means to both emphasize the exploitation of farmers and their ability to fight
perceived economic injustice through collective action under the auspices of the NPL.
Note also that the farmer is making a favorable reference to the recent “February
Revolution” in Russia which overthrew the czar and instituted a democratic provisional
government there.
The Nonpartisan League thus began as a grassroots organizational effort with a very
specific focus on agrarian political issues. The term “nonpartisan” referred to the fact that the
League would accept members who professed any party affiliation (or none at all). Also, the
League itself specifically had no intention to form its own party, but would instead constitute
a lobby that would support candidates for office of either (actually any) party who endorsed
its platform and who were in turn endorsed by the League’s leadership. This political support
would come in the form of member votes in primary elections and party caucuses. An
59
excerpt from The Nonpartisan Leader dated January 6, 1916, provides a fuller explanation of
the NPL’s concept of its “nonpartisan” activity:
The mission of the League is to unite the farmers of this state – regardless of past
party affiliations – into an organization that will stand apart from every political
party, every political machine and free from every political boss and put men in office
that will legislate in the interests of the members of that organization.
13
The NPL would eventually attain great success in its efforts to determine major party
nominations through its members’ votes in the primaries. In 1916, the NPL was able to
influence the primary campaigns substantially and NPL candidates won almost all of the
major party nominations.
14
Then in the 1916 general election, NPL candidates won most of
their races and took control of the North Dakota Governor’s office, most of the other state
executive offices, and the state House of Representatives.
15
In 1917, an NPL-backed
candidate, John Baer, was elected to Congress in an off-year election.
16
Starting in early
1917, the NPL would start to enact much of its program in North Dakota. At about the same
time, the League started its expansion across state lines, and Minnesota was one of the first
states chosen for this purpose.
17
The Political Career of Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr.
Well before the political prairie fire of the NPL began to spread into Minnesota, other
figures within the state had successfully challenged the existing “Old Guard” party system.
13
“It Has All Come To Pass,” The Nonpartisan Leader, January 6, 1916, 7.
14
“Nonpartisan League Wins Entire State Ticket of Candidates Nominated” The Daily People's Press, July 1,
1916.
15
“North Dakota Sways From One To Other” The Mantorville Express, November 10, 1916, 3.
16
Baer was the illustrator for The Nonpartisan Leader, and was one of the most well-known names in North
Dakota at the time because of his art work in that publication – see Robert G. Boatright, Congressional Primary
Elections (New York: Routledge, 2014), 51.
17
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 126.
60
One the most prominent of these was Charles August Lindbergh, Sr. (father of the famous
trans-Atlantic aviator). Lindbergh was the son of Swedish immigrants who had homesteaded
the Minnesota prairie near Melrose (about 35 miles east of Alexandria). Lindbergh graduated
with a degree in law from the University of Michigan and later established himself as a
farmer and prominent lawyer near Little Falls, Minnesota, by the late 1800s. After a
prosperous early career (and a second marriage which included the birth of his son, Charles,
Jr. in 1902), Lindbergh decided to run for Congress in Minnesota’s Sixth District in 1906. He
successfully challenged the Republican incumbent by exploiting an existing split within the
party. Lindbergh won the primary race in September of 1906, and – given the fact that the
Republican Party candidates almost always won elections in this district – his victory in the
general election in November was assured. In early 1907, Lindbergh headed to Washington,
D.C., to take his seat in the House of Representatives. He would hold the seat until early
1917.
18
Once in Congress, Lindbergh showed a consistent and passionate outlook which
tended to favor regular farmers’ and laborers’ interests. He often disdained the influence of
banks, corporations, and the “monied interest.” In his early years in Congress, Lindbergh
attached himself to President Theodore Roosevelt’s wing of the Republican Party, which
entailed support for government intervention in “trustbusting” and generally progressive
stances on many issues. Lindbergh was also part of a Midwestern contingent in the House
known as the “insurgents” who opposed the Republican Speaker of the House (Joseph
Cannon) and later many of the policies of President Taft (who succeeded Roosevelt in 1909).
18
Bruce L. Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1971), 42-54.
61
Like many of his Midwestern colleagues, Lindbergh often spoke out in favor of agrarian
interests and criticized the power of the trusts. His frequent targets included the railroads and
the large banks, whom he often depicted as benefitting unfairly from their position of power
(although he took pains to acknowledge that every business had the right to earn a profit, and
often championed the free enterprise of small business). In 1910, he was publicly profiled by
several prominent newspapers as a leading Republican “insurgent” and he described himself
with this label because he refused to follow the congressional Republican leadership of
Speaker Cannon and Senator Nelson Aldrich. He also became an outspoken advocate of the
party’s progressive wing and sought to become a leader of reform within the Republican
Party – even to the point of disdaining the idea of forming a third party as an alternative. At a
public forum in Duluth in October 1910, Lindbergh stated: “It is better to take an organized
party, like the Republican party, [sic] and rehabilitate it to make it up-to-date, than to form a
new party.”
19
At about the same time, he began his foray into the publishing industry as a
means of distributing his own political literature, with the specific intent to distribute a
periodical focusing on “the problems of labor interest, the relation of government to daily life
and farming interests.”
20
Although it would be some time before he would actually publish
this periodical, Lindbergh’s literary ambitions in this regard were in place well before the rise
of the NPL movement in North Dakota.
During 1911-1912, the Republican insurgents looked to the coming presidential
election as a means to reinstate a more progressive executive in the White House. Lindbergh
initially supported Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette for the Republican nomination.
19
“Gray Challenges Eberhart,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, October 27, 1910, 6; see also Larson, Lindbergh
of Minnesota, 76-88.
20
“Mr. Lindbergh Becomes Editor,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, October 14, 1910, 17.
62
However, Theodore Roosevelt’s entry into the Republican presidential primary caused
factionalism among the party’s progressives. Roosevelt immediately eclipsed La Follette as
the progressive candidate in the race against Taft. In the end, Taft managed to retain the
party’s nomination by barring many of Roosevelt’s delegates from voting at the convention,
including some from Minnesota. Lindbergh had expressed his support for a Roosevelt
campaign in earlier discussions with the former president. However, Lindbergh was
unwilling to leave his own party in order to support an independent Roosevelt campaign.
Although he was dissatisfied with the convention’s results, Lindbergh remained within the
Republican Party. Roosevelt however, did not, responding with his “Bull Moose”
Progressive third party campaign in the 1912 general election. Roosevelt’s campaign
effectively split the national Republican vote and put the Democratic presidential candidate,
Woodrow Wilson, in the White House instead.
21
During his time as a congressional Representative, Lindbergh’s published rhetorical
themes often reflected Jeffersonian ideals and aspects of both Populism and the
contemporary progressive reformist trends. Lindbergh was an acerbic critic of the corrupting
power of trusts both within the economy and in politics. He often decried the inequity of
wealth in the country and the prevailing trends which favored corporate interests at the
expense of the “producers” (often farmers) and the common American consumer. He
regularly called for federal government intervention on several economic fronts to distribute
wealth more equally, and he was sympathetic to many of the ideas represented by the NPL.
Although he was not the only Republican “insurgent” nor was he the most radical politician
21
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 1910-1917 (New York: Harper and Brothers
Publishers, 1954), 14-24; see also Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 141-144.
63
in Congress, he was a high profile congressional Representative from a Midwestern rural
district with very outspoken (even extreme) views, and he achieved a degree of national
recognition (or notoriety) based on the nature of his rhetoric.
22
Overall, Lindbergh’s stances were outspoken, relatively extreme, and – at least by
modern standards – straddled a mixture of both conservative and leftist/populist principles.
He often supported organized labor in its causes, and noted that humanity was in danger of
becoming “industrial slaves” – though he himself had little official connection to organized
labor. He openly embraced the concept of socialism, but declared that humanity was not
evolved enough to make it work. In the meantime, he believed that government intervention
was needed to prevent corporate abuse and halt the inequitable distribution of wealth. He
portrayed himself as the champion of the common man – farmer, laborer and townsperson,
yet often subscribed to reactionary nativist views – which included overt anti-Catholic
sentiments – in which he saw a vast conspiracy in the Catholic Church in America, and even
made these accusations publicly in Congress.
23
Between 1913 and 1917, Lindbergh’s activity in Congress was most notable for two
of his major stances. The first was his vociferous opposition to the creation of the Federal
Reserve Bank in 1913. A major recurring theme of Lindbergh’s rhetoric was that the
common producer – i.e., farmers – were being systematically exploited by trusts and monied
interests which unfairly earned a profit off of the risk and labor of millions of ordinary
Americans. To Lindbergh, the proposed Federal Reserve Bank would entrench this system
and continue to perpetrate what he considered to be an exploitative situation. Lindbergh was
22
Charles A. Lindbergh, Banking and Currency and the Money Trust (Washington, D.C.: National Capital
Press, Inc., 1913), passim; see also Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 107-113.
23
Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 206-208.
64
also concerned about the power of the proposed Federal Reserve Bank as being able to
control or dictate policy and interest rates to smaller state and local banks – which he often
championed and identified as being closer to agrarian interests. Although Lindbergh initially
strongly opposed the Federal Reserve bill, and made several unsuccessful attempts to amend
it, he ended up voting for it in the end in September 1913. Apparently he believed that –
though the bill was flawed – it somehow represented an improvement over the existing
banking system, and that he might still have a chance to amend it in a later draft. This did not
happen however, and by December 1913 Lindbergh was once again denouncing the act, and
would continue to do so until the end of his tenure in Congress.
24
One of Lindbergh’s last
acts as a Representative in early 1917 was to introduce articles of “impeachment” against the
Federal Reserve system in Congress, accusing it of colluding with a number of prominent
national banks in creating a private-public money trust whose purpose was to defraud the
American monetary system. Lindbergh’s attempt to impeach and roll back the Federal
Reserve Bank went nowhere – nor did he expect that it would. His actions were taken largely
as a symbolic act of defiance during his final lame-duck term to make his on stand on the
issue clear.
25
The second of Lindbergh’s notable stances in this period was his opposition to
America’s entry into the Great War (or World War I). Lindbergh publicly stated his
opposition to American entry into the war early, starting in September 1914. Later, he spoke
out against the war again when Congress was considering raising taxes internally to make up
for an external tax revenue shortfall that had been caused by wartime conditions in Europe.
24
Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 161-165.
25
Lindbergh’s own letters from early 1917 attest to this, Lindbergh Family Papers, Box 16, Minnesota Historical
Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Lindbergh Papers]; see also Larson, Lindbergh of
Minnesota, 208-209.
65
Lindbergh’s opposition to the war was related to his views that common Americans were
constantly being manipulated and cheated by large corporate entities. He contended that the
war itself was a machination designed by the monied interests and armaments industry to
generate profits while sacrificing American lives for a distant cause in which Americans
should not be involved. At one point before American entry into the war, Lindbergh even
proposed the idea that war production industries should be banned from making a profit.
Later, just before the Wilson Administration asked for a declaration of war against Germany
in April 1917, Lindbergh attempted to publish a book denouncing the concept of American
intervention titled Why Is Your Country at War and What Happens To You After the War?
The work alleged that America was being pushed into the Great War by “Wall Street” and
the monied interests to generate business and to secure American loans that had been made to
Britain and France. Before the work could be published however, the plates were seized from
the printer’s office in Washington, D.C. The manuscript survived and was later published
after being edited to leave no doubt that Lindbergh fully supported the American war effort.
26
Figure 3. Charles August Lindbergh was a farmer, lawyer
and Republican “insurgent” politician from Little Falls,
Minnesota. Lindbergh was first elected to the U.S. House of
Representatives in the Sixth District in 1906, and held that seat
until early 1917. Later, he was the Farmer-Labor coalition’s
choice for governor during the Republican primary in 1918.
Photo courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society.
26
“Lindbergh Writes Two New Books – One Book Has Just Come Out of Press. Its Title Is: Why Is Your
Country At War?” advertisement circular, Lindbergh Papers, Box 16; see also Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota,
179-190.
66
Before these controversies had developed fully, Lindbergh had been studying his
options for advancing his political career. He made a decision in 1915 not to seek re-election
for his own Sixth District House seat. Apparently, Lindbergh was aiming for a higher office
with greater influence, and had determined that ten years in the House was enough.
27
He
initially focused on the Minnesota governor’s race, going so far as to announce his intention
to run in 1915. However, the sudden death of the sitting governor – Winfield Scott
Hammond, a Democrat – elevated the Republican lieutenant governor, Joseph A. A.
Burnquist, to the governor’s office.
28
Lindbergh was then confronted with the more delicate
task of running against a fellow Republican and an incumbent. After consulting with
Burnquist (whom he declared at the time to be largely in agreement with his own views),
Lindbergh publicly withdrew from pursuing the governor’s office in late 1915.
29
Seeing few options for his political advancement, in early 1916 Lindbergh made the
decision to run for the Senate instead. The 1916 election was the first openly contested
Senate election in Minnesota history (the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct
election of Senators having been passed only recently). The incumbent Senator, Republican
Moses Clapp, was a moderate progressive, and there seemed to be little rivalry between the
two men in Washington, D.C. Even so, Lindbergh apparently made the decision that his
record and appeal to the electorate would favor him in the primary, and that it was time for
him to make his move to the Senate or face the end of his political career. It was anticipated
27
He had also dropped in his percentage of votes in the 1914 election – winning by only a plurality for the first
time in his congressional campaigns – and he may have sensed that he would not win another congressional
election in 1916; see Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 178.
28
In this period of time, elections in Minnesota for the governor’s office were every two years, and the
lieutenant governor’s office was granted to the gubernatorial candidate with the second highest number of votes
– typically a member of the opposition party. Hammond’s death allowed the office to come under the control of
the Republicans without an election and Burnquist would be governor of Minnesota until early 1921.
29
Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 191.
67
that the primary would be a close two-way race between Lindbergh and Clapp. Instead, the
Republican field was crowded with four viable candidates – each with their own base of
support within the party. Thus, Lindbergh was unable to portray himself as the lone
opposition to the established party figure, and could not repeat the success of his 1906
campaign in attempting to unseat an incumbent Republican. Worse, of the four major
candidates for the Republican nomination for the Senate, Lindbergh came in last in the
primary. In the end, the nomination was won – not by Clapp – but by St. Paul lawyer Frank
B. Kellogg, who in turn won the general election and became the Republican Senator from
Minnesota until his defeat at the polls six years later in 1922 [see Chapter Three].
30
In early 1917, Lindbergh served out the remainder of his House term in Washington,
D.C. It was also at this time that his book which railed against American intervention in the
war was seized by government agents. There was a brief suggestion that he would be
appointed to the War Commission and continue working in Washington, D.C. However, this
proposed appointment was attacked by his opponents and it became politically unfeasible for
him to be offered the position.
31
Lindbergh then returned home and began to seek new
opportunities for his political ambitions. As it turned out, he did not have to wait very long.
Townley’s NPL movement was gaining steam in Minnesota just as Lindbergh returned from
Washington, D.C., and the movement’s need for sympathetic, visible political figures would
provide Lindbergh with new opportunities.
30
Theodore Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1975),
468; see also Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 192-197. Note that Blegen mistakenly refers to the 1916
Republican Senate primary as a “three-cornered” race.
31
Lindbergh authored several letters during this period stating his willingness to serve, and then later claimed
that such an appointment had been blocked by his political opponents, Lindbergh Papers, Box 16.
68
The Emergence of the Farmer-Labor Coalition in Minnesota
Even as Townley’s political “prairie fire” was expanding and spreading out from
North Dakota, other entities were moving towards forming a new political coalition in
Minnesota as well. These included a number of leaders within Minnesota (some of whom
were established political figures like Lindbergh). However, it also included a coalescence of
organized labor groups, who – up until 1917 – had remained largely separate from each other
both in terms of their organization and their political lobbying. Although the NPL was well
prepared to enroll farmers into its program, approaching and incorporating labor elements
was outside of its experience. Yet, as Townley himself would recognize by 1918, such an
alliance was critical for the success of the movement in Minnesota. Thus, the pursuit of some
kind of political alliance between the NPL and the labor movement in Minnesota would
become a major theme of the effort to create a new political opposition in the state, and a
significant reason for the different trajectory that the movement took in Minnesota (as
opposed to North Dakota).
There were significant differences between Minnesota and North Dakota in the
1910s, and these differences had major implications for organizing an effective opposition
political movement. Although the farm sectors of both states shared similar characteristics
and had similar grievances against “big biz,” Minnesota had a more varied economic
landscape than North Dakota. Although Minnesota had a significant number of wheat
farmers in the northwest part of the state, much of the southern part of the state was
dominated by corn and dairy producers. In addition, the economy was more diversified and
included a significant urban-labor base. Indeed, there was major urbanization and
industrialization in the Twin Cities region (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Duluth, and on the Iron
69
Range (which stretched roughly from Hibbing to Virginia). The NPL leadership recognized
that the voter demographic in Minnesota was different than North Dakota: “In Minnesota . . .
the city and rural vote is about evenly divided . . . the farmers can not [sic] win without the
help of labor, and labor is powerless without the help of the farmers.”
32
In these industrial
urban zones, there were significant numbers of workers – some unionized, some not. Taken
altogether, they were a significant voting bloc within the state. Minnesota's labor movement
was not united as a bloc in the 1916 elections, and by early 1918, organized labor had created
a number of umbrella groups which served only as loose associations. These movements
were typically small and were often separated by skills and other differences, especially
ethnicity.
33
Initial plans to expand the NPL into Minnesota were formulated as early as July 1916
in the aftermath of the League’s success in the North Dakota primaries.
34
Shortly after the
NPL’s stunning success in the 1916 general election, the League’s organizers spread across
North Dakota’s borders to Montana, South Dakota and Minnesota. As early as December
1916, Townley was in St. Paul planning an NPL political strategy for Minnesota which
included pursuing seats in the state legislature, running a Senate candidate, and targeting a
sitting member of the state Railroad and Warehouse Commission.
35
In January 1917, the
NPL announced that it was establishing its “national” NPL headquarters in St. Paul,
Minnesota. This move was made both to establish a more central location for a national
headquarters (with ambitions to spread across much of the entire nation), and to deliberately
counter the presence of the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce (a major supporter of the
32
“The Eyes of the Nation on Minnesota,” The Nonpartisan Leader, June 10, 1918.
33
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 20.
34
The Princeton Union, July 13, 1916, 4.
35
The Northfield News, December 22, 1916.
70
Minneapolis “flour ring” who directly opposed NPL interests). Townley was quoted as
stating, "We intend to sail right into them with our program of state owned elevators, flour
mills and packing plants." Interestingly enough, it was also stated that the NPL: “Ultimately .
. . planned to have Federal ownership of grain elevators and other important and necessary
adjuncts to marketing.” In other words, from as early as January 1917, Townley and the NPL
had set their eyes on a national political strategy aimed at pursuing the NPL’s version of the
agrarian cause at the federal level, which included government ownership of agribusiness
entities.
36
The move to St. Paul in 1917 was also a signal that the NPL was about to begin its
major organizational efforts in Minnesota. Sure enough, these recruitment efforts were
realized effectively, and by 1918, the League had over 80 organizers in Minnesota, each
equipped with a Ford Model T and working to sign-up members and promoting the League’s
membership.
37
The NPL’s approach in Minnesota was generally the same as it had been in North
Dakota. This included the use of automobiles as a chief means of transportation for the NPL
organizers, holding meetings with small groups of farmers, and then encouraging them to
join the organization and pay their dues (either in cash or with post-dated checks). The
northwestern counties of Minnesota in the Red River region – close witness to the NPL
success in North Dakota in November 1916 – became an early area of recruitment.
Meanwhile, in North Dakota, the NPL continued to grow even after the 1916 election. By
early 1918, the NPL claimed that it had over 150,000 members in that state alone. But even
with this success, the League maintained its policy of charging members only about $8-$9 a
36
“Four States Added To League List: National Headquarter of Farmers' Organization to be at St Paul,” Willmar
Tribune, January 24, 1917.
37
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 18, 13.
71
year for membership. The NPL’s The Nonpartisan Leader remained the main organ of NPL
mass communication, even as its focus became spread over other states, and it was even
occasionally published in such languages as German and Swedish.
38
The NPL’s swift growth in Minnesota in early 1917 did not go unnoticed by its
opponents. Fearing the same “prairie fire” that had taken place in North Dakota the previous
year, some opposition figures devised the plan of creating an alternative “Non-Partisan
League” as a means to confuse farmers or compete with the NPL and blunt its activity in
Minnesota. In March 1917, articles of incorporation were filed for this new “Non-Partisan
League” – however the scheme was uncovered by the press and denounced as being
deceptive – one of the few instances where the Minnesota mainstream press took the side of
the NPL.
39
In less than five months, the phony “Non-Partisan League” had run its course.
40
Thus, this effort to confuse farmers had little effect on the NPL’s growth.
The NPL’s growth attracted the attention of labor groups in Minnesota, who began to
regard the NPL as a separate but fraternal movement with some common political goals.
After April 1917, labor groups began to increasingly consider joining the NPL in an effort to
create a wider anti-“Old Guard” coalition in Minnesota. Many of these groups were
connected to organized labor elements in Minneapolis, St. Paul and Duluth. One signal of
emerging farmer-labor cooperation can be seen in the May 26, 1917 edition of the Duluth-
based The Labor World. The newspaper noted that Samuel Gompers and Townley were
starting to converge in their opinions on the issue of unproductive land use owned by wealthy
individuals. Gompers called for the tax on such idle lands, while Townley called for it to be
38
Charles E. Russell, The Story of the Nonpartisan League (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 230-231.
39
Martin W. Odland, “No Primary Legislation At This Session,” Little Falls Herald, March 30, 1917, 4.
40
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 128.
72
“distribute[d] . . . among the hundreds of thousands of farmers who will make this land
productive." Such editorials are proof that labor elements and the NPL were starting to regard
each other more favorably in Minnesota.
41
This alignment of organized labor with the NPL movement was not immediate,
however, and took place in phases and only because of several factors. The initial collection
of labor groups which showed an interest in collaborating with the NPL was not significant.
According to the Minneapolis Journal, reporting on the NPL convention in St. Paul in March
1918, the labor groups joining the NPL in its early caucus and convention meetings were the
most leftist. Many of these were associated with socialist leaders or organizations. In this
case, the NPL’s supposed association with the Socialist Party may have given it some
credibility with these groups, who aimed to broaden their base and were willing to join in
with what was becoming a swiftly growing political lobby.
42
Most of Minnesota’s organized labor groups – many under the umbrella of the
Minnesota branch of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) chose to participate in the
Democratic Party primary in 1918 instead of influencing the Republican race. There, a
struggle was occurring in the gubernatorial nomination race between the more liberal figure,
Willard L. Comstock, and the conservative, Fred E. Wheaton. The AFL groups strongly
supported Comstock in the primary. However, Wheaton defeated Comstock in the primary,
and the AFL groups were disillusioned by the idea of Wheaton as a gubernatorial candidate.
Soon after the primary, these labor groups began to look for political alternatives. By August,
41
The Labor World, May 26, 1917.
42
Clark Miller, “Unlucky Lindy: The Nonpartisan League and the Origins of the Farmer-Labor Coalition in
Minnesota,” paper prepared for presentation at the Social Science History Association third annual meeting at
Columbus, Ohio, November 3-5, 1978, 28.
73
they had begun to gravitate towards the NPL, making the loose alliance between the growing
agrarian movement and the established labor groups more significant.
43
Labor endured setbacks in Minnesota with the onset of war in April 1917. The
creation of the new state agency known as the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety
(MCPS) quickly instilled a controlling presence within the state that typically stifled political
dissent – including labor agitation. Alternative political rhetoric and union activity – never
popular among the established order, but tolerated more freely in a peacetime environment –
became wholly unacceptable during a time of war. Acts of “disloyalty” – loosely defined and
often aligned along existing socio-economic or political lines – were often used as an excuse
by the commission and its supporters to suppress free speech, break up meetings, harass
groups and individuals, or even conduct interrogations and arrests. Radical labor groups
such as the Industrial Workers of the World (the I.W.W. or “Wobblies”) were considered
especially suspect since they were known to be associated with socialism (which was hostile
to the war effort) and their organizing activities often bordered on the disruptive. Since the
war depended on production, strike activity – or even the threat of it – was enough to bring
charges of disloyalty or even “pro-Germanism” against any group or person embracing
unionism or significant political change. Most of the mainstream labor groups complied with
the war production demands. However, labor groups in Minnesota typically resented the
commission’s heavy hand and were further alienated by the lack of a sympathetic labor
representative on the commission’s board. In October 1917, a serious strike broke out among
the St. Paul street railcar workers. The main issue was over wages and the right to unionize.
The strike went through many phases of walkouts and mediation between October 1917 and
43
Miller, “Unlucky Lindy,” 28.
74
April 1918. As a result of this ongoing strike, organized labor groups in the Twin Cities
began to increasingly look for political allies. After labor’s attempt to influence the
Democratic primary had failed in the primary races of June 1918, many labor groups began
to increasingly seek an alliance with the growing NPL, forming a loose anti-establishment
coalition.
44
The Great War: Tensions on the Home Front
In April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war
against Germany and its allies. This action was taken after a long period of tension in which
many American ships had been sunk in the Atlantic Ocean by German submarines
(especially in the waters around the British Isles), and the recent German announcement that
they would resume “unrestricted” submarine warfare there. The Zimmerman Telegram – in
which the Germans encouraged Mexico to attack the U.S. in an alliance with Germany – was
another factor in Wilson’s decision. Since the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, the United
States had tried to remain neutral, but had been increasingly pulled towards the Entente side,
regularly providing materiel and food supplies mainly to the British and French. American
loans to Britain and France were also substantial between 1914 and 1917. After two and a
half years of walking a thin line between neutrality and a pro-Entente stance, the United
States declared war against Germany in April 1917 and thus committed itself to an Entente
(or Allied) victory in Europe.
45
44
Carl H. Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty: The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety During World War I
(St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1991), 49-51, 85-86, 123-124, 183-205.
45
Thomas Fleming, The Illusion of Victory: America In World War I (New York: Perseus Books, 2003), 1-3.
75
The effect of this declaration of war within the United States was immediate and
dramatic. The Democratic Party and Republican Party leaders assumed a solid pro-war
stance, and encouraged support for the war both officially and unofficially. This included
increased spending on the army and navy, a draft intended to increase the size of the
American armed forces, a public relations campaign (often conducted through posters and
demonstrations) underlining patriotism and support for the war effort, and the
implementation of a federal system of coordinating production for industry and agriculture.
The United States was about to undertake the transition of mobilization for war and the
transfer of large numbers of troops across the Atlantic to fight in Europe. Citizens were
encouraged to enlist in the military or auxiliary corps, work hard, conserve food and
resources, purchase Liberty Bonds, openly demonstrate their loyalty, and to be on the lookout
for enemy agents.
46
However, participation in the war was not universally welcomed by all segments of
American society. Many German-Americans (some of whom were recent immigrants that
still spoke German as their chief language) were especially opposed to America’s entry into
the war. Many Scandinavian-Americans (especially Swedes) also tended to favor a stance of
continued neutrality. Few of these Nordic-Americans openly favored German aggression in
Europe, yet at the same time many did not see the need for American armed intervention
there. In the 1910s, a large number of German and Scandinavian communities were
concentrated in the upper Midwest, especially in the Dakotas, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
47
They soon came under close scrutiny by state and local governments starting in April 1917.
46
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 275-278.
47
Hammond United States History Atlas (Maplewood, NJ: Hammond Inc., 1984), U39.
76
Significant numbers of young men in the German-American community also faced a
dilemma about confronting their ethnic brothers on the battlefield – and some German-
American leaders actively called for exemptions in this case. A letter from George S. Viereck
– the editor of a large German-language periodical – addressed to Minnesota Governor
Burnquist on June 15, 1917, stated in part:
Viereck’s Weekly advocates on purely humane grounds that we should spare German
Americans the horror of fratricide . . . It seems to me that the conscientious objection
of the man who shrinks from putting a bullet into his brother is as weighty as the
scruples of . . . a Quaker . . . It seems to us that we should offer such men a generous
and humane solution . . .
48
Burnquist kept the letter in his files – apparently as evidence of a manifest representation of
the questionable loyalty of the German-American community.
The war also had its political opponents. Many socialists and organized labor figures
viewed America’s entry into the war with suspicion. In Europe – where socialism was more
prominent – the socialist party leaders of many European countries had denounced the war in
1914 and identified the coming struggle as an “imperialist” conflict as a bid for power or
colonies in which the proletariat had little interest. The socialists in Europe had failed to
achieve international worker solidarity and stop the outbreak of the war in 1914. Their
American cousins had taken a similar attitude towards the war before April 1917. The
American Socialist Party publicly committed itself to opposing the American war effort in
the months before the declaration, and this stance even included the suggestion of
48
Letter from George S. Viereck to Governor Burnquist, June 15, 1917, Joseph A. A. Burnquist Papers, Box 13,
Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Burnquist Papers].
77
encouraging draft resistance. Even after the American entry into the war, some socialists had
continued to actively speak out against American intervention.
49
The federal, state and local governments were aware of this potential dissent, and
took steps that were specifically designed to quell it. In Minnesota, these approaches were
largely led by the aforementioned Minnesota Commission of Public Safety (MCPS), formed
in April 1917. The commission consisted of Governor Burnquist, the state attorney general,
and five appointed members (including former governor John Lind, a noted progressive). The
commission was granted wide authority by the legislature. In theory, it was legally granted
the right to exercise any power not directly in contradiction with the state and federal
constitutions. Its purpose was to support the war effort, ensure compliance with the draft,
suppress anti-war dissent, maximize production for the war effort, and guard against “alien”
or hostile persons or influences. The commission became the most powerful branch of the
state government beginning in April 1917, and did not officially disband until 1920.
50
The commission also authorized local sheriffs and county-level councils to carry out
its mission as well. It established an independent police force of over 600 officers – and it
used this force to ban or disrupt meetings which it deemed questionable or “disloyal” and to
combat union organization efforts. This force was later complemented by a much larger force
of about 7,500 armed personnel known as the Home Guard. In the eyes of the commission
and Governor Burnquist – any efforts to express dissent or organize workers (or farmers)
against the power of the government and the economic status quo came to be viewed as
highly suspicious. Union leaders were particularly singled out, and were often associated
49
Weinstein, The Long Detour, 68-69.
50
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 89-102.
78
either with efforts to sabotage the war effort, or as being an extension of a radical socialist
agenda (which either opposed the war or sought to overthrow the government itself). The
commission also targeted and surveilled “suspect” populations, most notably the German-
American community in Minnesota.
51
In addition, the MCPS specifically targeted the
Swedish-American community as well, keeping files on Swedish language publications.
52
A
member of the MCPS, John McGee, even affirmed the commission’s anti-German and anti-
Swedish policy publicly before the U.S. Senate in April 1918.
53
The commission also railed
against “alien” influence and sought to remove German language teaching from the schools,
banned certain German books, and strongly encouraged the instructional use of English in all
schools.
54
There seems to be significant evidence to suggest that German-Americans and
Swedish-Americans did indeed tend to be the most skeptical of the war effort in Minnesota in
1917-1918. This was recognized both by the loyalist faction within Minnesota and often by
these groups themselves – although there is some dispute as to how deep or uniform these
sentiments were within these ethnic communities, and whether or not such sentiments
warranted persecution by the MCPS. There also seemed to be a correlation between a higher
personal connection to the ancestral homeland and anti-war sentiments: for first-generation
immigrants (whether older or younger), opposition to the war was stronger. For those who
were second-generation or even more removed from their ancestral homeland, these anti-war
sentiments seemed to be less pronounced. Even so, as a whole these two ethnic communities
51
Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 470-473.
52
The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety Papers, Box 3, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family
Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter MCPS Papers].
53
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 299.
54
La Vern J. Rippley, “Conflict in the Classroom: Anti-Germanism in Minnesota Schools, 1917-19,” Minnesota
History, Spring 1981, 171-183.
79
in Minnesota were often less than enthusiastic in their support of the war – and they
constituted a significant portion of Minnesota’s population. According to a report compiled
by the MCPS from the 1910 Census, over 70% of Minnesotans were either foreign-born
immigrants or the children of such during this period. Of these, almost 25% were of German
heritage.
55
The commission took these figures seriously and began to operate on the assumption
that persons of German or Swedish background were justifiable targets of surveillance and
even repression. Governor Burnquist’s office was encouraged in this view by many sources
outside of the state government which encouraged the MCPS to aggressively pursue reports
of “suspicious” or “disloyal” persons and groups. A number of letters were sent to (and
collected) by the governor’s office which demonstrated the supposedly suspicious nature of
many persons in the German-American and Swedish-American population. These messages
point to significant support for the activities of the MCPS in this period.
56
Along with suspected pro-German elements and radical labor groups, the MCPS also
saw a danger in the growing NPL movement. The rhetoric of Townley and the NPL (and
later its gubernatorial candidate, Charles A. Lindbergh) was strongly anti-establishment,
initially skeptical of the American entry into the war, and prone to accusing the ruling
political figures of collusion with war “profiteers.” For the conservatives of the MCPS and
their supporters, such expression was tantamount to disloyalty, since it suggested the re-
arrangement of the economic status quo – a condition that the war’s supporters had identified
55
Report of the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety (St. Paul, MN: Louis F. Dow Company, 1919), 31; see
also D.J. Tice, Minnesota's Twentieth Century: Stories of Extraordinary Everyday People (Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 24.
56
Burnquist Papers, Box 13; letters were commonly sent directly to the MCPS or to the governor’s office,
naming specific individuals as being suspicious. These reports were often followed up by MCPS personnel.
80
as crossing a line into disloyalty. Many in the MCPS viewed the NPL as a mere front for
“pro-Germanism” and often assumed or suggested the association of the NPL with socialism
or disloyalty.
57
The commission itself was a wide organization with branches in every county of
Minnesota, and the political factors supporting its operations were significant. Burnquist was
under considerable pressure starting in April 1917 to ensure Minnesota’s compliance with the
draft and to meet production goals set by the Wilson Administration. Patriotism and loyalty
were the watchwords of the day. Attitudes towards suspect groups or persons were highly
intolerant. The commission itself was often responding to charges or complaints launched by
other entities or individuals within the state. Many of these charges were spurious, and may
have been nothing more than personal vendettas. Others resulted from simple
misunderstandings. One case in point was the Finnish-American community (largely
concentrated on the Iron Range region) many of whom resisted the draft because they were
under the impression that conscription meant deportation back to Russia to fight for the
dreaded czarist regime.
58
Such misunderstandings were apparently frequent in communities
where English was not commonly spoken. One of the purported main purposes of a major
German-American rally in New Ulm in July 1917 was to properly instruct German-American
men on their obligations under the current draft laws.
59
By June 1917, the commission had recognized the suspicious nature of the NPL when
it concluded that the League was blocking efforts to conduct a farm census in the area around
New Ulm. Even so, the commission did its best to publicly portray itself as being officially
57
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 14-15, 167.
58
From 1808 to November 1917, Finland was an outlying province of the Russian Empire.
59
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 122-123, 154.
81
neutral in its judgment of the NPL and continuing to supposedly observe the League’s First
Amendment rights. A letter sent in August 1917 from the MCPS to one citizen concerned
about the NPL’s loyalty stated that the commission had no “official opinion of the character
of the Non-Partisan League.”
60
This was well after the MCPS had identified the League as
being a target of its anti-disloyalty efforts.
The commission’s suppression of the NPL, organized labor and German-Americans
and Swedish-Americans in Minnesota in 1917-1918 alienated a significant number of voters
away from their Republican Party affiliation and into the arms of the growing farmer-labor
coalition. The emergence of the commission’s growing powers – and its willingness to use
them – often polarized the voting public and turned increasing numbers of persons away
from the mainstream Republican Party, then under the leadership of Governor Burnquist.
61
Figure 4. Governor Joseph A. A. Burnquist in the early 1920s.
Burnquist had assumed office upon the death of Governor Hammond in
1915. Burnquist chaired Minnesota’s Commission of Public Safety
starting in April 1917, an entity which is often cited as being one of the
most repressive in the state’s history. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota
Historical Society.
The outbreak of war in April 1917 had presented the NPL with a dilemma, since its
organizing efforts were now increasingly viewed with suspicion by the state government.
Even so, such activity was absolutely essential to its mission. The NPL leaders continued to
focus on domestic agrarian issues in their recruitment efforts, and contended that such a
discussion of domestic issues was warranted and protected by the Constitution and the First
Amendment. However, the League’s critics and opponents viewed their actions differently. It
60
Letter from the MCPS to C. H. Chader, August 29, 1917, MCPS Papers, Box 9.
61
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 22, 25.
82
did not help the NPL’s position that its main base of recruitment – the largely German and
Scandinavian farmer base of rural Minnesota – was more likely to be opposed to the war than
the critical mass of public opinion. In retrospect, it seems apparent that the leaders of the
NPL did not initially recognize the importance of the war issue, and often continued in their
anti-establishment rhetoric – which after April 1917 began to sound suspicious to many.
Some NPL rhetoric continued to contend that the war was being fought for the benefit of
banks and profiteers. Nevertheless, the American entry into the war forced the NPL to shift
from a position of supporting neutrality to paying at least lip service to support for the
American war effort.
62
Despite this shift, opponents of the League both in North Dakota and
Minnesota did their best to portray league members as being disloyal agents. As the NPL
stance was quickly adjusted, Townley and the NPL leaders began to publicly offer their
unqualified statements of support for the United States in its war efforts. League recruiters
began to fly the American flag on their cars at about the same time.
63
In this atmosphere, the NPL did its best to continue its campaign while avoiding open
criticism of the war. In the platform for their 1918 convention, the League specifically stated
their loyalty to the U.S. government and its support for the war effort. The NPL also started
to begin their meetings with an overt pledge to the flag. Furthermore, the NPL continued to
state its official support for the war in the The Nonpartisan Leader and other printed
materials. Despite these measures, some NPL speakers were not successful in avoiding
controversy. In 1917-1918, several NPL figures were arrested and charged with sedition
because of allegedly disloyal statements they had made. The NPL’s political activity thus
62
Chrislock, The Progressive Era in Minnesota, 147.
63
Russell, The Story of the Nonpartisan League, 232-234.
83
continued to attract MCPS scrutiny, and the League and its leaders remained highly suspect.
Furthermore, many of the NPL leaders (and associated politicians such as Robert La Follette
and Charles A. Lindbergh) typically had a long track record of denouncing American
intervention overseas and had expressed skepticism about the existing economic order before
April 1917. Once America had entered the war, it became more difficult for these figures to
portray such former statements and stances in an acceptable light. In the meantime, critical
incidents between the MCPS and suspect groups increased in frequency and severity.
64
An incident in New Ulm on July 25, 1917 became critical in creating a rift between
the German-American community and the Republican Party in Minnesota. New Ulm was a
center of the German-American community in Minnesota, and a source of considerable
discontent about American participation in the war. A parade and rally was organized there
featuring several prominent speakers (including the mayor, Dr. Louis A. Fritsche and the city
attorney, Albert Pfaender). A main theme of the speakers at the rally was the question of
whether or not America should be involved in the war and how the situation was causing
unfair stress on the German-American population. Some speakers also called for a
referendum on the war itself to determine if it was truly supported by popular opinion. The
rally’s speakers did not openly advocate draft evasion or sabotage of the war effort, but even
so, the anti-war sentiments of the event’s participants were clear. When news of the rally
reached the MCPS, an investigation was quickly conducted. After the major figures of the
rally had been directly questioned by the MCPS, a number of New Ulm and Brown County
officials were “removed” from office by the MCPS. Governor Burnquist himself would later
head a “loyalty” rally in New Ulm in early September which pointedly refuted the themes of
64
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 167-175.
84
the July 25 rally, and which called for unqualified patriotic support of the war and openly
denounced German aggression in Europe.
65
The local press hailed the loyalty rally as a great
success. Interestingly enough, none of the main political figures who spoke at the rally were
figures from the New Ulm area.
66
Less than two weeks after the rally, Dr. Fritsche’s own son,
William H. Fritsche, was drafted into the army and was part of the first contingent of draftees
to leave New Ulm.
67
Figure 5. Dr. Louis A. Fritsche first rose to prominence
during World War I when – as Mayor of New Ulm – he helped
stage the infamous rally which raised the ire of the MCPS.
Fritsche remained popular as a leader for German-Americans
however, and he would later seek office under the Farmer-
Labor banner. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota Historical
Society.
On the same day as the New Ulm rally (July 25, 1917), another critical incident
occurred further north which likewise alienated labor groups from the Burnquist
administration. In Bemidji, a large mob had formed and had forcibly deported the I.W.W.
organizers present in that town. Under the threat of force, the I.W.W. organizers were herded
onto a train (their tickets paid for) and told to leave and never return again. This action was
taken in response to the impression that a fire which had burned down a local lumber mill on
July 21 had been started by Wobblie saboteurs. However, there was no evidence in this
regard, nor was there any legal proceeding. Instead, a well-organized mob (with apparent
wide public support) simply rounded up and deported the union figures. Thus, within one
65
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 133-135, 150-152.
66
“Loyalty Meeting Is Great Success: Thousands Gather in City to Hear Governor Burnquist’s Talk,” New Ulm
Review, September 5, 1917.
67
“Drafted Men Will Leave Wednesday: Brown County Contingent to Start From New Ulm Next Week,” New
Ulm Review, September 12, 1917.
85
day, both organized labor and the German-American community experienced incidents
which created significant grievances and began the process of pushing these groups closer
towards each other in a loose political alliance.
68
The war economy brought both increased prosperity and frustration for Minnesota
farmers. While higher crop prices provided economic gains, many had grievances against the
federal government’s price controls on wheat instituted shortly after April 1917. This action
was designed to stabilize markets and prevent extreme fluctuations in supply and demand.
However, the way the controls were implemented were controversial, and often benefitted
the agribusiness industry but not the common farmer. Specifically, price ceilings were put on
payments to farmers for their crops, but no similar controls were placed on agribusiness
concerns. Thus, the power of the federal government was used to stifle profitable market
forces for farmers, but imposed no such control in the pricing of wheat and other crops for
larger business entities. The price of wheat itself had increased since the outbreak of war in
Europe in 1914, and was rising more during the period of 1917-1918. However, even with
this relatively beneficial rise in wheat prices, farmers were often dissatisfied with being
unable to collect higher prices for their crops when the market warranted it. The United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) wheat price figures for these years indicate a limit
of just over $2 a bushel for farmers imposed by Herbert Hoover’s U.S. Food Administration.
No corresponding price limits were placed on millers and other food processors. Instead, the
administration relied on agribusiness entities to show patriotic “restraint” in their pricing.
69
68
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 136-139.
69
Russell, The Story of the Nonpartisan League, 235; see also Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 169; see also
USDA “Table 18--Wheat: Average price received by farmers, United States”
http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/Wheat_Wheat_Data/Yearbook_Tables/Domestic_and_International_Prices/
WheatYearbookTable18.xls, accessed October 14, 2013.
86
By August, the NPL and some of the labor leaders of the Twin Cities were in close
contact with each other and discussing the possibility of forming a unified political
movement. Although significant differences existed between the farmer and labor branches
of this emerging coalition, there was enough interest and cooperation between the two to
move forward with joint meetings. The continuing repression of union leaders and the NPL
by the MCPS further encouraged these ties. This trend would eventually lead to a unified
farmer-labor coalition movement that would take its first official political steps in the 1918
elections.
70
A critical episode in forging these farmer-labor ties occurred in September 1917,
when the NPL organized a “Producers and Consumers Convention” in St. Paul. A major
theme of this conference centered on the issue of “war profiteering” but it was also intended
to address a main issue that divided farmers and laborers: disagreement over food pricing.
Townley and the NPL leadership saw the issue as critical in bringing both sides together into
a political alliance. Farmer demands tended to call for higher pricing for food – since they
often wanted more money for their agricultural products. However, labor – or more
accurately, proletariat consumers – wanted lower food prices in order to achieve or sustain a
higher standard of living. The convention arrived at a compromise position in which the NPL
members accepted the federal ceiling on wheat prices in exchange for a plank in the
movement which called for federal control of food pricing and distribution.
71
During the convention, the NPL speakers themselves scrupulously proclaimed
statements of loyalty, going so far as to state: “We pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our
70
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 34-35.
71
Chrislock, The Progressive Era in Minnesota, 149.
87
sacred honor to our country and our flag in this, OUR WAR.” However, the closing keynote
address was to be delivered by Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette – quite possibly the
war’s greatest critic in Congress. Both the NPL and the local newspapers anticipated
controversy regarding La Follette’s speech, and the crowds both inside and outside the
auditorium were large. La Follette himself offered to withdraw from speaking, but it was
agreed instead that he would confine his rhetoric to a set of statements that had been
reviewed by the NPL. However, La Follette was unable to confine his speech to just these
prepared remarks. In response to several hecklers, La Follette stated that America did not
have enough reason to be at war with Germany, and that the sinking of the Lusitania did not
warrant a declaration of war – since the ship was in fact carrying munitions. La Follette’s
comments were taken out of context and he was misquoted in both the local and the national
press – and this caused an instant furor. He was immediately branded a “traitor.” A motion
was even introduced into the Senate by Frank B. Kellogg to have him removed from
Congress. Without question, the League – already suspect in the eyes of Governor Burnquist
and the MCPS – now came under even greater scrutiny.
72
This scrutiny began with the commission summoning Townley himself to undergo
questioning in late September in St. Paul – just after the conclusion of the “Producers and
Consumers Convention.” For the first time, Townley and the MCPS – overt and bitter
political opponents – faced each other directly. The transcript of this session however,
reveals a degree of restraint on both sides, with the MCPS interrogator, Ambrose Tighe,
focusing on the origins, finances and structure of the League and Townley’s role within in.
72
Richard M. Valelly, Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political
Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 24; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 142-146.
88
Townley was factual and restrained in his answers. Both sides avoided overt accusations. At
the deposition, Townley insisted that La Follette had been briefed before the rally to avoid
any discussion of the war issue, and that La Follette had broken his word.
73
On September
26, the MCPS passed a resolution condemning La Follette and asking the U.S. government to
expel him from the Senate. Any efforts to prosecute La Follette under Minnesota law were
ruled out. Townley himself escaped without any official condemnation. However, the eyes of
the MCPS were watching him more closely than ever, and it even assigned a special branch
to surveil the League and its activities.
74
Evidence of this increased MCPS surveillance can be seen in some of the
commission’s subsequent communications with its county branches and field agents. Within
a month from Townley’s questioning before the MCPS, the commission was authorizing its
field agents to shadow Townley at NPL rallies. The apparent purpose for this activity was for
agents to capture any inflammatory or seditious statements that Townley might make, write
them down, and then submit these transcripts directly to the MCPS.
75
From the period of late 1917 to early 1918, the NPL continued its recruitment efforts
in Minnesota under great duress. The MCPS had given authorization to county sheriffs to
block or prevent their rallies – which occurred frequently. The mainstream press within the
state – as well as a significant portion of the non-NPL constituent population – was becoming
more hostile to the NPL and Townley. Newspaper articles from the influential Minneapolis
Journal and Minneapolis Morning Tribune in this period often mentioned the NPL, socialists
73
“Testimony of A. C. Townley, President of the Nonpartisan League taken in the office of Governor Burnquist
at a meeting of the Public Safety Commission, September 25, 1917,” MCPS Papers, Box 9.
74
“Want La Follette Ousted: Safety Board Make Demands on U. S. Senate,” Aitkin Independent Age, September
29, 1917; see also Report of the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety, 163-164.
75
Letter from the MCPS to J. B. Ludlow, October 15, 1917, MCPS Papers, Box 9.
89
and disloyalty in the same headings or paragraphs.
76
A delegation of NPL representatives
(led by Magnus Johnson) to the governor’s office in February 1918 received a polite
reception from Burnquist, but little promise of action to protect their rights. Even so, on
several occasions in this period, the governor did go on record to publicly state that the
League’s political activity was protected on constitutional grounds. However, this seemed to
be a thinly veiled nod to First Amendment rights – which, in fact, the MCPS had strongly
worked against in recent months.
77
Likewise, the mainstream press in Minnesota took its cue
from the MCPS, and denounced the NPL, noting – even applauding – the increased hostility
and difficulty that the League was encountering:
Since the notorious meeting in St. Paul, at which Senator La Follette and A C.
Townley, head of the Nonpartisan league [sic], hurled so many incendiary missiles at
the government, and especially at the conduct of the war, the League is having a hard
time to find communities in the state where they receive a very hearty welcome. The
League speakers have been refused permission to hold meetings in several cities, it is
reported, and in many others have been compelled to give assurance that the meeting
would be loyal.
78
Despite increasing pressure from the MCPS in Minnesota, Townley and the NPL
continued to gain members and influence throughout late 1917. The culmination of
Townley’s rise to power can be seen in his visit to New York City and the White House in
late November and early December where he spoke at Cooper’s Union and then conferenced
with President Wilson and Herbert Hoover over national farm policy. At the White House,
Townley made the case for federal loans to farmers as a means to support continued high
levels of production and aid the war effort: “The Northwestern farmers are not asking for any
76
“Nonpartisan’s Aim is to Seize All Land, E. H. Nicholas Says,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, June 2, 1918,
16; this is but one of many examples where the NPL is maligned and labeled as both socialistic and disloyal by
the mainstream press in Minnesota during this period.
77
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 179-180.
78
“The State Buys Liberty Bonds,” The Northfield News, October 19, 1917.
90
bonus. We merely ask that special legislation be passed to permit federal funds to be loaned
to farmers.” Townley pointed out that millions in government funds were being loaned to
Russia and to support the munitions industries, but that farmers were struggling and needed
aid as well. Upon his return to Minnesota, Townley further asked farmers to write to their
congressional representatives to support such a policy, and even asked the press – which he
acknowledged was often hostile to the NPL – to join in the campaign as well.
79
Townley’s
meeting seemed to have some impact on the President. In a message to Congress shortly after
his meeting with Townley, President Wilson stated that:
“. . . farmers complain with considerable justice that while regulations of food
products restricts their incomes, no restraints are placed upon the prices of most of the
things they purchase . . . profiteering still runs impudently rampant."
80
When the NPL met in March 1918 to begin its process of endorsing candidates for the
1918 primaries, it made one final (and inexplicable) effort to reach out to Governor
Burnquist. The NPL leadership invited Burnquist to address its convention during the
opening ceremony in St. Paul on March 19, 1918. Burnquist – like the MCPS itself, normally
restrained in his written statements – responded directly and without any hint of diplomacy to
the League’s invitation. He stated that he would never appear at a League event, accusing the
NPL of connections to the “I.W.W.” and the “Red socialists.” Burnquist further alleged that
evidence of league treachery and its disloyalty could be traced back to the League’s
September 1917 convention in which the NPL members had openly applauded La Follette’s
treasonous statements. If the NPL leaders expected their invitation to embarrass the governor
79
“U. S. Loans Asked To Help Farmers: Nonpartisan Head Tells Wilson Aid is Needed to Prevent Shortage in
Food,” Willmar Tribune, December 12, 1917, 10.
80
President Woodrow Wilson, Fifth Annual Message to Congress, December 4, 1917,
http://millercenter.org/president/wilson/speeches/speech-3799, accessed June 2015; also quoted in Joseph J.
Sperl, Letter to the Editor, New Ulm Review, December 26, 1917, 4.
91
or to generate sympathy for their cause, they were gravely mistaken. The governor’s remarks
were printed in newspapers across the state, and support for Burnquist’s sentiments was
reinforced by much of the mainstream press.
81
Even so, the MCPS did its best in the following months to avoid officially authorizing
the repression of NPL meetings in the state on paper, embracing a policy of apparent
plausible deniability instead. Nevertheless, the wishes of the commission in regards to such
activities were obvious. In a letter to one of its agents in May 1918, the MCPS advised its
agent that it would not ban outright a planned NPL rally. Instead, the matter of “stopping
meetings of a disloyal or seditious nature is left with the sheriff and proper local
authorities.”
82
In other words, local authorities and commission branches were encouraged to
enact the enforcement of the commission’s aims without its overt official authorization.
The Primary Campaign and Election of 1918
The year 1918 marked the first attempt by the NPL to influence the Republican
Party’s choice of candidates in Minnesota. The NPL strategy attempted to replicate the
success that it had experienced in the 1916 North Dakota elections. Like North Dakota,
Minnesota was dominated by the Republican Party in most districts, and most of the state and
national offices were held by Republicans (including the state legislature). In the 1918
primary campaign, the NPL’s specific focus was on the governor's office, which was
considered a viable electoral target due to the controversies caused by Burnquist and the
MCPS. The NPL also made a weaker challenge to unseat Republican Senator Knute Nelson
81
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 294.
82
Letter from the MCPS to A. M. Crandall, May 15, 1918, MCPS Papers, Box 9.
92
(and ran candidates for several other prominent congressional seats as well). Nelson had been
elected governor in 1892, and then had later moved to the Senate. However, Nelson had the
good fortune of being known both as a moderate and as one of the first Scandinavians to
attain high political office in Minnesota. He traditionally had a strong rapport with farmers
and was much less accusatory than Burnquist in targeting the NPL as being troublemakers.
As a result, the League was unwilling to confront him as directly as it confronted Governor
Burnquist.
83
The NPL made no attempt to contest primary elections within the Democratic Party
in 1918. During the period of 1917-1918, the Democratic Party within Minnesota was a mere
shadow opposition. It typically performed poorly in most elections in Minnesota, frequently
losing races and earning only a small percentage of the vote. The sole exception to this trend
was its ability to win congressional seats in the mainly urban districts of Minnesota (such as
Ramsey County, where St. Paul is located). Some analysts claim that the party was in a state
of internal conflict in this period, had too small of a party base (much of it based in the Irish
Catholic community in St. Paul), and hence could not provide a significant opposition to the
Republican Party in Minnesota as a whole. As mentioned earlier, it had also experienced a
divisive primary in June 1918 [see above]. Thus, any real opposition to the mainstream
Republican Party in 1918 would emerge through a primary challenge for control of the
Republican Party itself, and this was precisely the NPL’s intent.
84
The Socialist Party also had a presence in Minnesota during this period – as it did
nationwide. The party had reached a national peak of influence during the 1912 elections
83
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 38-41.
84
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 36-37.
93
when its presidential candidate, Eugene Debs, had received 6% of the vote. Although the
party’s base was relatively small and concentrated in urban regions, it was fairly well
organized and had achieved some success. One of the most notable of these successes was
the election of the Socialist Party candidate Thomas Van Lear to the Minneapolis Mayor’s
office in 1916. As mayor, Van Lear often stood in opposition to the city’s business interests
(championed by the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce, the sheriff, and the newly formed
Citizen’s Alliance – an anti-union coalition of Minneapolis businesses). Van Lear was openly
sympathetic to labor and even refused to allow Minneapolis police to aid in breaking up
strikes during his tenure. There was also a tenuous political association between the Socialist
Party and some labor groups in the Twin City area. Outside of the urban regions however, the
Socialist Party had little support in Minnesota. Van Lear would serve only one two-year term
and would be narrowly defeated in the 1918 general election.
85
Later however, he would later
play a major role in forming the Farmer-Labor Party in Minnesota.
In March 1918, the NPL held its convention in St. Paul to nominate candidates to run
in the Republican primaries. Organized labor groups were also invited to attend, and they
formed a separate but coordinated shadow convention. Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr. was
selected to be the NPL-endorsed gubernatorial candidate.
86
Lindbergh was known as being
opposed to the war, had actively associated with NPL leaders, was sympathetic to farmer and
labor interests, and enjoyed significant name recognition among the state’s farmers and
Scandinavian population. Townley himself addressed the convention on March 20 during the
closing rally. He ended the session dramatically, asking farmers and laborers to literally stand
85
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 40-42; see also Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 33, 48.
86
“Want Mr. Lindbergh To File - Nonpartisans Also Endorse Sheldon And Jacobson For House,” Little Falls
Herald, March 15, 1918.
94
up for each other. They met his rhetorical demand with great applause and enthusiasm. The
appearance onstage of a striking St. Paul street railcar worker holding his baby (and weeping
spontaneously) added to the drama of the event. The elements for a new significant political
opposition had now been put together. Townley had managed to expand the NPL into
Minnesota in 1917-18 despite the repressive atmosphere created by the war. Labor groups –
alienated by Burnquist and the commission’s heavy hand – were increasingly associating
with the NPL in an effort to form a viable opposition coalition. Townley himself literally
welcomed them onto the stage. Although it would be some time before a critical mass of
labor voters would defect from other parties, the structure for the new coalition had now been
put into place.
87
From late March to June 17, 1918, Lindbergh and his NPL supporters undertook an
all-out effort to win the Republican primary and campaigned continuously across the state.
This political campaign was possibly the most controversial and bitter one in the state’s
history. NPL members and Lindbergh supporters saw in their candidate a true hero willing to
stand up against a powerful opposition and seek economic equity for the common man
against the privileged class. Lindbergh’s critics and opponents – and they were many in
number – portrayed the former congressman as a bona fide traitor and disloyal anti-war
leader. Although Lindbergh’s rallies often drew thousands of people to hear him speak, they
also attracted nasty hecklers and local mobs that perpetrated petty acts of violence against his
entourage and occasionally hung him in effigy.
88
The mainstream press also condemned the
League and its candidates, one newspaper declaring the primary race to be an: “issue . . .
87
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 191.
88
Carol Jenson, “Loyalty as a Political Weapon: The 1918 Campaign in Minnesota,” Minnesota History,
Summer 1972, 55-56.
95
squarely and unequivocally between loyalty to the country and disloyalty.”
89
Even worse for
the movement, Lindbergh himself was arrested on June 8 in Martin County (in the southern
part of the state) and charged with “unlawful assembly.” Lindbergh was arraigned in
Fairmont before Judge J. A. Everett and was released on $1,000 bail.
90
It should be noted that the war in Europe had entered a new phase almost at the exact
same time that the League had concluded its convention. This factor may have affected
domestic tensions negatively. The Russians had effectively surrendered to the Central
Powers, and had formalized their surrender with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.
The Central Powers had then gained significant territory – including grain producing regions
in the Ukraine – which made their military posture on the Western Front much stronger. The
Germans would launch a new offensive in the west starting on March 21, 1918, and the
outcome of this offensive (the Second Battle of the Marne) was far from certain. The threat
of a German victory in France was very real at this time, and Paris itself came under German
artillery fire in late March. It was not until July 1918, when the Allied forces had pushed the
Germans back to the Marne River and then later began their encroachment towards Germany
itself that the war’s outcome became evident. Lindbergh’s campaign – occurring at the exact
time when this German offensive was reaching its peak – no doubt raised domestic tensions
on the war issue.
91
The Republican primary election was held on June 17, 1918. The incumbent
Governor Burnquist defeated Lindbergh and carried 54% of the vote. For the moment, the
89
“The Issue” Rochester Daily Post and Record, June 14, 1918.
90
“Lindbergh Arrested: Candidate is Held for Unlawful Assembly in Martin County,” Little Falls Herald, June
14, 1918.
91
Michael S. Neiberg, The Second Battle of the Marne (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 2008),
26-118.
96
party’s “Old Guard” seemed safe from the kind of insurgency that had been witnessed in
North Dakota two years earlier. But these results were not indicative of the League’s demise,
since their candidates had done very well overall – often scoring in the 40% range. Thus
despite Lindbergh’s defeat, the farmer-labor movement was gaining steam. The success of
the North Dakota experiment in 1916 had not been replicated in Minnesota yet – but the
struggle was just beginning.
92
In fact, a week after the primary, The Nonpartisan Leader
declared that the movement had done well overall, having generated 150,000 votes for its
candidates in the state.
93
Even so, much of the mainstream press often portrayed Lindbergh’s
defeat as devastating, and proclaimed such statements as: “The Nonpartisan and Townley
element met utter defeat . . .”
94
Such pronouncements implying permanent defeat of the
farmer-labor movement turned out to premature, however.
With Lindbergh’s bitter defeat in the Republican primary, he ended his attempt to run
for governor. However, the League’s leaders and the growing farmer-labor coalition were not
willing to give up so easily. After Lindbergh’s defeat in the primary, they organized a new
series of meetings in St. Paul in August 1918. Separate committees met for the labor side and
for the NPL, but efforts were made to arrive at a consensus over support for candidates.
Significant disagreements existed at these meetings – not only between the labor
representatives and the NPL representatives, but between those who favored the formation of
a third party and those who simply wanted to endorse sympathetic “independent” candidates
for office in the 1918 elections. The results of these efforts in August 1918 were a series of
joint farmer-labor endorsements for a number of candidates for many state and federal
92
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 27.
93
“Minnesota Farmers Win the Legislature,” The Nonpartisan Leader, July 1, 1918, 5.
94
“Election Results” The Twin City Star, June 22, 1918.
97
offices. This included the endorsement of David H. Evans for governor. Unlike Lindbergh,
Evans was a Democrat known for his support of Wilson and the war, and was even an
ancillary member of the MCPS. Evans and the other NPL-backed candidates then filed the
necessary paperwork for running in the general election. Although the intention was to run
these candidates as endorsed “independents,” the state attorney general refused to accept
such listings, and demanded that they list a formal party affiliation. Thus, the label of
“Farmer-Labor” was first used in an electoral contest in Minnesota – even though the
formation of an official party was really just beginning.
95
Despite his less controversial background, Evans still endured criticism and scrutiny
from the Burnquist campaign and the MCPS. During the general election campaign, the
MCPS published a series of letters exchanged in 1917 between William Haywood (an
I.W.W. leader and Socialist Party figure who had been convicted in 1918 for violating the
Espionage Act of 1917) and Arthur LeSueur, then Secretary of the NPL. This publication
was an attempt to connect the I.W.W. to the NPL and discredit the League in general and
Evans’ gubernatorial campaign in particular.
96
Thus, the first Farmer-Labor electoral campaigns took place in Minnesota between
August and early November of 1918. Although the coalition managed to field candidates in a
number of races and run their campaigns, the party met only with limited success. In the
general election, the established Republican Party candidates were able to prevail in almost
all of the major races (losing only two congressional seats to Democrats in traditionally
Democratic districts). Governor Burnquist was re-elected. Nevertheless, the Republican
95
William E. Lass, Minnesota: A History Second Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 221-
222; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 207-208.
96
“More Letters Showing LeSueur’s Connection with the I.W.W. Gang” [MCPS publication] (1918), MCPS
Papers, Box 9; see also Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 309.
98
electoral majorities were relatively slim in some of these races, and Burnquist won the
governorship with only a plurality of 44%. More significantly, the Democrats were largely
eclipsed by the new farmer-labor bloc in most of the state’s districts, and the fledgling
movement essentially became Minnesota’s second largest political bloc. A brief third party
movement founded by pro-war former socialists and prohibitionists – the National Party –
also made a showing in this election but failed to make any serious inroads and finished a
distant fourth in most races. It was in the state legislature races that the NPL-backed farmer-
labor candidates really showed their strength, however. The NPL endorsed 37 state Senate
candidates (of 67 total seats), of which 11 won their races. In the House, 22 NPL candidates
won election out of 49 endorsed (in a 131 seat chamber).
97
The NPL candidates did even better in North Dakota in the 1918 elections, holding
their legislative majority in the state House and capturing the state Senate as well, further
enhancing their position there.
98
However, shortly after the 1918 election in North Dakota,
anti-NPL forces would rally and would soon conduct a successful campaign there against the
League’s hold on the state’s power.
In Minnesota, it was now apparent that the farmer-labor movement had significant
potential, and had even become what might be termed the main political opposition force
within Minnesota. Supporters of the new movement were encouraged by the gains they had
made and became determined to continue their political activity. Beginning in 1920, the real
political contest in Minnesota would be between the Republican Party and the emerging
farmer-labor coalition – a coalition which would soon form its own official third party.
97
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 47-48.
98
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 208-211.
99
Thus, the years 1917 to 1918 were crucial in the formation of the Farmer-Labor Party
in Minnesota. The growth of the NPL in Minnesota starting in 1917 had largely coincided
with the onset of the war, and proved to be controversial activity during wartime – especially
since the aims of the agrarian movement were to agitate on behalf of farmers. The repressive
policies of the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety – supposedly justified by the war –
created an atmosphere of intolerance and intimidation that would have long-lasting effects.
The MCPS targeted the NPL movement, organized labor leaders, and much of the German
and Scandinavian population in Minnesota during this time. As the MCPS and the
Republican administration of Governor Burnquist railed against supposed disloyalty, political
activity became highly polarized, and the farmer and labor sectors – seeking similar gains
against a prevailing status quo, and experiencing a similar foe in the MCPS – grew closer in
response. A significant shift had now occurred in which many rural voters had moved away
from the mainstream Republican Party, and the labor elements of the state were favorably
viewing a political alliance with the NPL-led crusade.
This trend would prove to be an enduring one.
100
CHAPTER III
A VIABLE THIRD PARTY: 1919-1922
The election of 1918 had signaled the emergence of the new farmer-labor political
coalition in Minnesota. Although this new “Farmer-Labor” ticket had not replicated the
dramatic success of Townley’s Nonpartisan League (NPL) in North Dakota, the movement
was still significant and had quickly overshadowed the Democratic Party as being the main
political opposition to the Republican Party within the state. From early 1919 to November
1922, a number of factors would shift and coalesce, leading to the creation of the Farmer-
Labor Party as a long-term third party. The emergence of this Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party
would occur chiefly through the leadership efforts of Twin Cities urban-labor leaders in the
state beginning in 1919. These figures were able to create a labor-oriented grassroots
membership group similar to the NPL while maintaining a connection with the agrarian wing
of the movement, and eventually transform this coalition into a full-fledged political party.
Although the Republicans had triumphed in the 1918 general election overall, the
results had been too close for them to take much satisfaction in their victory. Six days later,
on Monday, November 11, the Great War officially ended at 11 AM on Armistice Day. Thus,
the main reason for many of the tensions during the 1918 campaign (which had stretched
from March to November of that year) became relatively unimportant in less than a week’s
time after the general election – or so it would seem. In fact, the divisions exacerbated (or
created) by the war and the state government’s response to political dissent and ethnic
101
associations between 1917 and 1918 had created rifts which would have long-term effects on
the politics in the state well after the end of the war.
Transitions: 1919-1921
The role of the Minnesota Commission of Public Safety (MCPS) changed almost
immediately at the war’s end – yet it did not cease its activities right away. One of the
unofficial goals of the MCPS in 1918 had been to defeat the NPL challenge in the 1918
elections and re-elect Joseph Burnquist governor. In this, they had succeeded. They had done
so even with Burnquist’s “non-campaign” of 1918 (in which he claimed to be so focused on
running the state that he could not afford to waste his time campaigning). Despite
Burnquist’s declaration, both the Republican Party machinery and the MCPS apparatus had
exerted great effort to extend publicity for the Burnquist gubernatorial campaign under the
guise of “loyalty” messages and demonstrations as a means to encourage electoral support
for their candidate. Although the MCPS did not officially disband immediately after the
war’s end, in his 1919 inaugural address, Governor Burnquist referred to the MCPS in the
past tense, praising it for its work during the war but implying that its tenure was almost
over. Indeed, the Commission met officially only a few times after the war’s end, and mainly
to wrap up its business.
1
Even so, there is some evidence to suggest that the commission was still in the
business of following up on suspected cases of disloyalty – even after the war’s end. A letter
sent to the editor of the Minneapolis Morning Tribune in February 1919 which expressed
1
Carl H. Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty: The Minnesota Commission of Public Safety During World War I (St.
Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1991), 314-315, 326-327.
102
extreme criticism of Governor Burnquist and the war itself was forwarded by the
newspaper’s editor directly to the MCPS. The MCPS in turn forwarded the letter to the local
division of the U.S. Department of Justice in St. Paul for possible further investigation. This
activity seems to suggest that at least some of the commission’s figures sought to continue its
mission in some way after the war’s end.
2
Nationally, there were significant changes on the social and political scene. It is
generally thought by most historians that the war brought about the end of the progressive
movement in the United States. This was due to several factors. Much had changed in the
American political and social landscape between 1917 and 1920. Foremost of these factors
was the American experience with the war and the tensions it had caused at home. American
military intervention in 1917 had caused serious rifts in many left-leaning organizations, such
as unions and political parties. Although some elements of organized labor (such as the AFL)
had supported the war effort fully, others (such as the I.W.W.) had not. A split had also
occurred in the Socialist Party over the war issue, and its membership declined significantly
after 1917. Eugene Debs (the Socialist Party’s leader) continued to oppose the war after
America’s entry, and was convicted in 1918 of sedition and was imprisoned just after the war
ended.
3
Furthermore, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 had caused considerable
concern in America (and a “Red Scare” fueled by the rise of communism there). Some
bombings in the spring of 1919 led to an atmosphere of political intolerance and enhanced
2
Letter of Mrs. Lon Dickenson to the Minneapolis Tribune (forwarded to the MCPS by the editor), February 17,
1919, Minnesota Commission of Public Safety Papers, Box 3, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family
Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter MCPS Papers].
3
David L. Sterling, “In Defense of Debs: The Lawyers and the Espionage Act Case,” Indiana Magazine of
History, Vol. 83, No. 1 (March 1987), 17-42.
103
security. The Palmer Raids in 1919-1920 resulted in the detention and deportation of more
than 500 American residents without trial (most of whom were suspected radicals and many
of whom were deported to Soviet Russia). There was indeed a continuing extension of
wartime intolerance towards leftist persons and movements. The progressives also found
themselves without a renewed agenda and major leadership (Theodore Roosevelt had died in
1919, Woodrow Wilson was ailing by 1920, and Robert La Follette was at least somewhat
discredited by his anti-war stand). Also, much of the progressive agenda had been
accomplished by 1920, the last major initiatives of the movement being the passage of
universal female suffrage and Prohibition in 1920. Progressive initiatives in general became
less popular in the 1920s – a decade which would be characterized by isolationism, nativism,
and suspicion of leftist ideologies (with communism becoming one of the most widely feared
ones). There was also increased intolerance along racial and ethnic lines. The KKK rose
again starting in 1915 and would reach a peak in America in the 1920s – and was even active
in northern states such as Minnesota. Nativism, anti-immigration sentiment, and a strong
sense of mainstream Americanization became social norms as well. Politically, the elections
in 1918 had brought both the House and the Senate under Republican control, and President
Wilson was unable to win Senate approval for the Peace of Paris and America’s entry in the
League of Nations. Isolationism – perhaps even encouraged by regret over intervention in the
Great War – would be the American policy for much of the interwar period. Ironically, this
position now gradually shifted from the left end of the political spectrum towards the right
end as well. The 1920 presidential election would sweep the Republican candidate, Warren
G. Harding, into office and usher in a long era of the Republican domination of Congress and
the Presidency. The 1920s would be a decade of individualism, commerce, and the pursuit of
104
leisure. These trends would become the norm – reactions of a new generation against the
continuous – and perhaps stifling – righteousness of the progressive era and the sacrifices of
the war.
4
For those Americans who choose to continue to embrace leftist politics, their choices
were narrowed by the factionalism which was present on the left end of the political
spectrum. In general, support for such left-of-center groups as the Socialist Party went into
decline (although Debs – running for President in 1920 from his prison cell – managed to
poll almost a million votes in the general election). Those parties and groups which remained
on the left were often forced to either face a significantly diminished base, and/or align
themselves with the communist regime in Moscow as a means of achieving some support or
legitimacy. The Soviets had created the Comintern after their revolution as a means of
“coordinating” workers’ revolutions in other countries around the world. Many leftist parties
in America were forced to either follow the Moscow-led Comintern and its strict vision of
socialism, or faced a rapid decline in influence. Membership in leftist parties in general fell
in America during the 1920s (the growing farmer-labor movement in Minnesota would be
one exception to this trend). The Socialist Party – which had made decent showings in many
state and national elections until then – lost a significant portion of its voter base.
5
4
Michael McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920
(New York: Free Press, 2003), 304-315; see also David J. Goldberg, Discontented America: The United States
in the 1920s (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1-65; see also Elizabeth Dorsey Hatle,
The Ku Klux Klan in Minnesota (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2013), 47-72.
5
Ray Ginger, The Bending Cross: A Biography of Eugene Victor Debs (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 1949), 404; see also John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933 (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1960), 16; see also “Application of the Socialist Party of America for Membership in the
Communist International: A letter from Otto Branstetter to Grigorii Zinoviev” March 12, 1920, Document in
the Comintern Archive f. 515, op. 1, d. 37, l. 2. (one of several examples of American leftist parties cultivating
ties to the Comintern in an attempt to be recognized by Moscow as being the official party of American Soviet-
sponsored socialism) http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/spusa/1920/0312-bran-
applicationtoci.pdf, accessed December 20, 2013.
105
Oppression by the political establishment of “Bolsheviks” and “agitators” was in full
force – both nationally and in Minnesota in 1919-1920. After the war’s end, the anti-union
Minneapolis Citizen’s Alliance was freed from its ties to the National Labor Board (which
often discouraged confrontation with organized labor) and faced a much friendlier mayor in
Minneapolis with the defeat of Thomas Van Lear in the 1918 election. The Citizen’s Alliance
would remain a major obstacle to unionization in Minneapolis well into the 1930s. The result
of the 1918 election had temporarily reinforced mainstream Republican politics in the state.
However, the swift growth of the NPL-labor vote had been significant. This farmer-labor
coalition would become increasingly well-funded, organized and determined during the
period of 1919 to 1922. The experience of the war – and the polarization caused by the
MCPS – lived on in the memories of many and became a rallying point for many anti-
establishment voters – including German and Scandinavian-Americans resentful of their
treatment during the war.
6
In Minnesota, the question of how much the state government under Burnquist would
continue to stifle political dissent in the absence of war initially remained an open question.
The MCPS was in the process of being disbanded by early 1919. However, Governor
Burnquist attempted to keep a state paramilitary force in place (the “Motor Corps”). In
January-February 1919, he made efforts to retain the Motor Corps (an armed group originally
organized by the MCPS) specifically as a means of combatting “socialism.” Although the
Motor Corps (under the auspices of the MCPS) had committed acts of anti-labor and anti-
NPL repression which had crossed constitutional lines during the war, its supporters were
6
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 315, 318-319; see also Millard Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism: The
Third Party Alternative (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), 50-51.
106
apparently willing to overlook such actions as a necessary price to pay for maintaining public
security. Even so, in two events in late 1918, the Motor Corps had also been afforded an
opportunity to highlight its more beneficial nature, and this was noted by Governor Burnquist
when he praised the Motor Corps in his inaugural speech in January 1919:
One of the best institutions, organized under the Safety Commission is what is known
as the Minnesota Motor Corps. Our state is the only state in the country that has a
uniformed, armed and organized military body of this kind. It is composed of 124
officers and 2,450 enlisted men. Nearly all of them are professional and business
men, who have unselfishly given their time and the use of their cars without expense
to the state. They have furnished their own uniforms and equipment. The services
performed by these officers and men at the time of the Tyler tornado and during the
recent forest fires are well known. The war has not developed in Minnesota a more
useful body of men for all emergencies than the Motor Corps.
7
Despite Burnquist’s continued support for the role of the Motor Corps, in February
1919 a bill authorizing its continued existence was defeated in the Minnesota Legislature and
the group was disbanded. Although there seemed to be some support for continuing the
group as a paramilitary force, the issue of its cost appeared to be the major factor in its
demise. Thus, despite the victory of the Burnquist faction in the 1918 election, the end of the
war had caused a shift in the political atmosphere of the state. Although there were those
willing to continue to use state-funded paramilitary forces to suppress “questionable”
elements, a critical mass within the legislature would not support the cost to maintain such an
approach.
8
Political changes were in the offing in Minnesota. In May 1919, the death of
Democratic Representative Carl C. Van Dyke provided the first electoral test in Minnesota
7
Inaugural Message of Governor Joseph A. A. Burnquist to the Legislature of Minnesota, 1919, 6.
http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/NonMNpub/oclc18196670.pdf, accessed September 13, 2013.
8
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 316.
107
for a national office since the 1918 election. A special election was called for the Fourth
District congressional seat, which was chiefly composed of urban Ramsey County and the
City of St. Paul. Once again, the Republican primary saw a struggle between the Old Guard
and an outside challenger. The outsider candidate, Oscar E. Keller, was a St. Paul city
commissioner, council member and utilities executive who was an outspoken supporter of
organized labor. Keller had strongly supported labor’s causes during his political career and
his actions were not forgotten by this constituency.
9
He openly supported the right to
unionize, government provision of health insurance, and government ownership of
transportation and communications facilities – significant issues in the Fourth District. He
was also an active and outspoken supporter of St. Paul labor during the controversial street
railcar strike in 1917-1918.
10
Keller was defeated in his bid for the Republican nomination –
but just like the Farmer-Laborites in 1918 – he ran as an independent in the general election.
Keller was not endorsed by the NPL, and his platform did not focus on agricultural issues.
However, his positions on labor issues reflected those of the labor wing of the farmer-labor
coalition, and his candidacy was viewed favorably by them. In the general election, Keller
beat his Republican-endorsed and Democratic-endorsed rivals by a significant margin,
earning a plurality of the vote.
11
He then became an “Independent Republican” until he was
officially endorsed by the party in the primary the following year (when he ran again and
won as a Republican-endorsed candidate). Keller would remain an outsider to the party,
however, and although he never officially aligned himself with the Democrats or the Farmer-
9
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 52.
10
“St. Paul Labor Elects Keller: Organized Labor in Minnesota Scores Another Political Victory by Naming
Solon,” The Labor World, July 5, 1919.
11
The Appeal, July 5, 1919, 3.
108
Labor Party, he became a Farmer-Labor de facto ally. In many ways, his success in 1919 was
indicative of some of the political changes to come in Minnesota in the early 1920s.
12
Figure 6. Oscar Keller had served as a St. Paul City council
member and a utilities executive. His strong support for labor causes
made him an unusual candidate in the Republican Party, but very
popular with the labor contingent in St. Paul. Keller used this base to
win election in 1919 over his major party opponents in the general
election. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society.
Decline of the NPL and the Rise of the WPNPL
Even as the Burnquist faction’s power over the Minnesota Republican Party and state
government started to fade in 1919, other factors were emerging which would also have a
significant effect on politics in the state in the coming decade. Keller’s victory in 1919 had
highlighted an important fact concerning the main political opposition in the state. Namely,
that the NPL was not the sole major agent of potential political change in Minnesota, and that
opposition based on labor-oriented platforms had significant potential. Keller had won the
election based on his associations with labor; his ties to the NPL were virtually non-existent.
At the same time, there were substantial changes between 1919-1922 within the NPL
that weakened its influence in Minnesota, North Dakota and elsewhere. A number of NPL
representatives had been accused of sedition during the war, and several had been formally
charged and prosecuted. These cases were often instances of local justice applied with
extreme prejudice, and in most cases the charges did not stick. Arthur C. Townley himself
was very careful in crafting his comments and writings during the war, constantly
12
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 319.
109
emphasizing the NPL's support for the war and his own personal role in the Liberty Bond
campaign. Even so, in 1918, several local prosecutors attempted to indict Townley for
sedition. One of these cases was carried forward to trial. In 1918, Townley and a codefendant
(Joseph Gilbert, another League leader) were charged with sedition in Jackson County,
Minnesota. The trial was scheduled for early 1919 in the county seat of Fairmont. The judge
presiding over the trial had gone on record with his anti-NPL stance and had even been
quoted in the local press labeling the NPL as a treasonous organization. The prosecutor was
also known to harbor anti-League views. Yet despite this, no change of venue was granted,
and none of the hand-picked jury members were NPL members. Townley’s lawyers
attempted to pursue a capable defense. However, the judge in the case was biased and often
sustained the prosecution’s objections. Thus, much of the evidence in Townley’s defense was
either not heard or not considered. Townley's lawyers eventually resigned in protest over the
situation. Townley then asked the judge if he himself could make a closing defense
statement, but was denied even this concession.
13
Incredibly, the hand-picked jury initially
had trouble coming to a decision, but after several hours of deliberation found Townley and
Gilbert guilty. The Nonpartisan Leader ran a scathing editorial condemning the verdict (“a
trumped-up charge of conspiracy”) and shoring up support for Townley with statements from
prominent liberals who denounced the trial’s outcome.
14
Townley soon filed for a new trial
and made a series of appeals.
15
He would remain free until these efforts were finally
exhausted in late 1921. However, the trial and the many resulting legal proceedings took time
and energy away from his main duties of managing the NPL, and this was occurring just as
13
The reason given for this decision was that Townley could not be cross-examined after his own defense
summation, see Little Falls Herald, July 18, 1919, 4.
14
“National Leaders on the Townley Trial,” The Nonpartisan Leader, August 18, 1919.
15
The Tomahawk, December 25, 1919, 2.
110
the organization was facing its greatest threat.
16
The Townley-Gilbert case went on for some
time, finally ending up before the state supreme court, where the defendants were denied
their petition to re-argue their case. A stay of ninety days was then granted for Townley’s
lawyers to file an application for review with the U.S Supreme Court. However, the case was
not accepted there.
17
Townley finally served his sentence starting in November, 1921 – more
than two years after he had been found guilty.
18
Also, between 1919 and 1921, the structure of the League itself began to shift and
change as well. In its early days, the NPL had been a centralized organization with Townley
at its head, concentrated geographically mostly in the Dakotas and Minnesota. From 1915 to
1919, the League had enjoyed the prospects of swiftly increasing membership (along with the
continual increase in funding from dues payments). NPL success in the North Dakota
elections of 1916 and 1918 had enabled the spread of the organization to other states in the
west and Midwest by 1920. However, this expansion came at a price. State branches of the
NPL began to assert more control over their own League chapters at this time, and
increasingly began to collect the bulk of membership dues. The amount passed on to the
national organization located in St. Paul decreased over time. This trend also occurred at
about the same time that an agricultural recession set in after the end of the war. The drop in
crop prices meant fewer farmer dollars were available for spending on political activity.
16
Robert Morlan, Political Prairie Fire: The Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922 (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 1955), 255-261.
17
“Townley Plea Denied,” New Ulm Review, July 20, 1921.
18
“Jailing Townley,” The Labor World, November 26, 1921.
111
Thus, NPL membership and revenue declined starting in about 1920 – just as the national
office was losing its control over the state branches.
19
The political situation in North Dakota also began to change starting in 1919.
Although the NPL-endorsed candidates had won an even larger sweeping victory in 1918
than they had in 1916, opposition to the NPL was growing substantially. The “New Day” of
the NPL faction was increasingly challenged by a well-funded citizens’ group (the
Independent Voters’ Association or IVA). The IVA was dedicated to the sole purpose of
opposing the NPL agenda and the League itself – just as the NPL was reaching its peak of
influence. From 1917-1921, the NPL was constantly berated by its critics and many of the
mainstream North Dakota newspapers. During the war, it had been accused of harboring pro-
German sympathies, being socialistic and disloyal (as it had been in Minnesota). Once the
war had ended, the League was accused of complicity with Soviet “red” communism and of
even harboring “free love” principles. Possibly the most damning criticisms however, were
accusations of financial mismanagement (both within the League itself and within some of its
newly created state enterprises in North Dakota). Some of these accusations seemed to have
some validity. It was these factors – combined with Townley's reputation for running the
League in a dictatorial fashion – that eventually began to lead to factionalism within the
League and larger opposition to its activities in North Dakota.
20
A severe break occurred within the North Dakota NPL in 1919, when three of its
original candidates from 1916 – led by the state attorney general, William Langer – publicly
and vociferously broke with the League. Overnight, Langer and his companions became the
19
Richard M. Valelly, Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political
Economy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989), 32; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 338.
20
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 208-209.
112
League’s strongest opponents and confirmed at least some of the criticisms that had been
leveled against the NPL. Langer himself published a scathing “tell all” book in 1920
denouncing the League’s dishonesty and its “socialist” leadership. The IVA jumped in to
support these accusations, and between 1919 and 1921, North Dakota was awash in
accusations and wild political rhetoric. Much of the controversy centered on newly created
state entities such as the Bank of North Dakota. Charges of ineptitude, insolvency and
cronyism tarnished the NPL image.
21
Worse, because of the instability and politics associated
with North Dakota’s new state-owned enterprise initiatives, the buying of state bonds by
outside sources was negatively impacted, with major financial institutions often refusing to
make investments in such controversial entities.
22
To add to the North Dakota NPL’s miseries, a power struggle broke out between the
remaining League leaders at about the same time. Although the North Dakota NPL
triumphed in most of its electoral races in 1920, its opposition was now stronger than ever
and the League’s margins of victory were slipping statewide. Soon after the 1920 election,
the IVA planned a new strategy. Namely, they decided to undertake the process of initiating
a recall election through petition – ironically, made possible by one of the reforms that had
been implemented earlier by NPL legislators. Their goal was to force another election in the
hopes of undoing the results of the 1920 election. The IVA then pursued a statewide initiative
to gather the necessary number of signatures, which they succeeded in doing by September
1921. In late October of 1921, the recall elections were held and the NPL stalwart, Governor
Lynn Frazier, was removed from office (until 2003, the only state governor ever to be
21
William Langer, The Nonpartisan League: Its Birth, Activities and Leaders (Mandan, ND: Morton County
Farmers Press, 1920), passim; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 317, 322-324.
22
Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 307.
113
successfully recalled).
23
IVA candidates also made gains in other races. Although it was too
early to decipher the NPL’s long-term future, the League had been dealt its worst setback and
would never fully recover. Even so, NPL (and former NPL) figures such as William Langer,
Lynn Frazier and William Lemke would continue to be prominent figures in North Dakota
politics for many years (often championing the agrarian cause). The 1921 recall campaign
also attracted the support of Minnesota Governor Jacob A. O. Preus, who had faced his own
NPL challenge in the 1920 elections in Minnesota [see below]. Preus campaigned in North
Dakota on behalf of the IVA candidates – an indication of cross-state anti-league ties.
24
Elsewhere, the NPL had made gains in several states by 1921, including Montana,
Colorado, and Wisconsin. However, the movement never attained a critical mass in those
regions and – as in North Dakota – suffered decline after 1921. The national NPL office
continued to exist, headquartered in St. Paul, Minnesota. However, the League was in decline
there after 1920 as well. Much of this was due to the tarnish of league scandals, factionalism
and accusations of “socialism.” However – as mentioned earlier – another practical and
measurable reason for decline in NPL membership in Minnesota was a drop in crop prices
starting in about 1920.
25
Although this economic squeeze made the farmers’ conditions
worse, it also had the effect of limiting their ability to pay optional expenses – including
membership in the League. Membership dues began to dry up, and even some of those that
were pledged were often not honored. Since membership dues were the most direct source of
NPL funding, this had a detrimental effect on League finances. By the early 1920s, the NPL
23
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 32.
24
“Farm League Not Out Yet: Nelson and Preus of North Dakota [sic] Say It Has Been Defeated but Not
Finished,” New York Times, November 6, 1921, 83.
25
Douglas R. Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, IL: Ivan R.
Dee, 2002), 42-43.
114
membership overall was in serious decline. By 1921, The Nonpartisan Leader itself would
even cease publication.
26
The decline of the NPL contributed to Townley’s loss of influence in Minnesota, and
some of the movement’s leaders there began asserting their leadership even before 1920.
27
After the League’s defeat in the 1921 North Dakota recall election, Townley came under
increasing criticism from members of the farmer-labor coalition in Minnesota, and his
leadership lost any significant influence. By 1922, even the NPL convention in North Dakota
refused to allow him a leadership role. As Townley and the NPL declined, support for his
“nonpartisan” approach declined as well. As early as 1920 there were open discussions
within the Minnesota farmer-labor coalition about forming a permanent official third party.
Townley continued to oppose this approach, however, communicating directly to William
Mahoney in early March that:
The purpose of the Non-Partisan League was not to develop or establish a political
party . . . its main object was and is, to popularize and secure the realization of a
definite legislative program . . . public sentiment in favor of political demands is more
easily created when the effort is coupled with a minimum of partisan politics.
28
At the Minnesota NPL convention in 1922, Townley spoke vehemently against the
creation of a third party, believing that it would simply absorb the League’s interests without
taking appropriate actions. At the same time, Townley realized that his stance was now in the
minority and that his leadership role in the movement was ending. He resigned the League
president’s position in 1922. This action further strengthened the hand of those within the
26
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 32; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 347.
27
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 67.
28
Letter of Arthur C. Townley to William Mahoney, March 11, 1922, National Nonpartisan League Papers,
Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter National Nonpartisan League
Papers].
115
Minnesota farmer-labor coalition who wanted to create a third-party. This effort would be led
mainly by urban-labor leaders under the direction of William Mahoney (a noted labor lawyer
and former Socialist Party candidate for Congress) and Thomas Van Lear (a former union
figure and the former Socialist Mayor of Minneapolis). They had begun their efforts earlier
with the creation of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League (often abbreviated
WPNPL) in 1919.
29
Both Mahoney and Van Lear had a long history of championing the cause of labor in
the political realm. Mahoney had graduated with a degree in law from the Indianapolis
College of Law in 1902. His thesis addressed the issue of the law and social justice, and
included the somewhat prophetic statement: “The law is conservative and changes slowly,
compared with the social and industrial conditions . . . such tendency is overcome by the law
of self preservation [sic] which . . . compels the adoption of such course as best subserves
[sic] its own life and well-being.”
30
Mahoney established himself in St. Paul as a lawyer
specializing in labor causes and rose to lead a number of organizations, including eventually
becoming the President of the St. Paul Trades and Labor Assembly. In 1914, Mahoney had
run for Congress as a Socialist candidate in the Fourth District (with the campaign phrase
“Defeat Capitalism: That Is The Labor Issue Today”) – but lost the election.
31
Mahoney had
also been an outspoken supporter of Charles Lindbergh during his 1918 primary campaign,
29
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 69.
30
William Mahoney, “Indianapolis College of Law: Law School Thesis” (1902), 14, Mahoney Papers, Box 1,
Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Mahoney Papers].
31
Mahoney 1914 campaign ad, Mahoney Papers, Box 2.
116
and had even drafted a letter to the editor of the St. Paul Daily News which strongly defended
Lindbergh’s campaign.
32
Van Lear was originally from Maryland, had worked in the Appalachian coal mines
as a youth, and then served in the U.S. Army during the Spanish-American War. Van Lear
later settled in Minneapolis, where he became a machinist and the leader of a local union
branch. From there, he moved into politics, running for Mayor of Minneapolis several times
in the 1910s and for Congress in 1914 (all under the Socialist Party banner). He had a
reputation as a dynamic speaker and energetic campaigner. Van Lear won the 1916
Minneapolis mayoral race, and served a two-year term as Mayor of Minneapolis starting in
1917, but was narrowly defeated in the 1918 election.
33
Mahoney and Van Lear had both separated from the Socialist Party in 1917 because
of the party’s opposition to the war. However, both men remained committed to the concept
of government intervention in the economy, and had always strongly favored the cause of
labor. In 1920, Mahoney responded in writing to questions about whether or not he
considered himself to be a socialist. Mahoney responded in a detailed and articulate manner,
rejecting doctrinaire classifications of his political views but also giving an indication of his
belief in interventionist government. He also emphasized his belief that political education of
the masses was a necessary step for bringing voters around to supporting leftist causes:
I am not a member of the Socialist Party. I severed my connection with it at the
beginning of the world war at the time the Socialist Party ensured an attitude of
hostility toward the United States government.
32
William Mahoney, Letter to the Editor (St. Paul Daily News), 1918, Mahoney Papers, Box 1.
33
David Paul Nord, “Minneapolis and the Pragmatic Socialism of Thomas Van Lear,” Minnesota History,
Spring, 1976, 3-4, 6.
117
During my connection with the Socialist Party, I never considered the organization of
any practical political significance. I always deemed it an educational movement in
which study and discussion of great economic and social questions were promoted.
The term “socialism” is a vague and indefinite one, and I have found a great range of
diversity of ideas and beliefs among those connected with the party organization.
34
Thus, although both Mahoney and Van Lear had a previous strong Socialist Party
association, by 1919, they had moved towards a wider definition of themselves and their
movement. This was somewhat similar to Townley’s transformation (from 1914 to 1915)
who – like Mahoney and Van Lear – had originally been a Socialist Party figure but had
moved beyond the confines of that party towards a broader-based mass appeal political
approach. Mahoney and Van Lear would take the same path, but in the realm of labor – as
opposed to Townley’s agrarian approach.
The recent rise in union membership in Minnesota was another reason why labor
groups were beginning to exert a stronger influence over the farmer-labor coalition after
1919. Between 1916 and 1919, union membership within the state had grown significantly,
and by 1919, the unionization rate of labor within Minnesota had risen to about 50%.
Although Townley’s NPL had initially exerted more influence within the farmer-labor
coalition, the WPNPL’s membership would grow quickly between 1919 and 1922, while the
NPL membership would stagnate and then decline after about 1920. Eventually (and
unquestionably) this trend would make the WPNPL the main body of the farmer-labor
movement membership by 1922.
35
34
Letter of William Mahoney to H. K. Soule, April 12, 1920, Mahoney Papers, Box 1.
35
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 54.
118
The origins of the WPNPL sprang from existing labor organizations and their
associated leading figures. These organizations had often conferenced on a regular basis, but
rarely took steps to undertake sustained political efforts. For example, the Minnesota State
Federation of Labor had met annually for over thirty years. However, it had never undertaken
any extensive deliberate partisan political strategy. This changed during the 1919 convention,
when – under the strong urging of Mahoney and Van Lear – the body decided to undertake
sustained collective political action.
36
Figure 7. Thomas Van Lear in 1918. Van Lear had a long history of
Socialist and pro-labor political activity in the 1910s. In 1916, he had
been elected the first (and only) Socialist Mayor of Minneapolis. Later,
he officially separated from the Socialist Party because of the war
issue. Even so, he was unpopular with conservatives and business
owners and was narrowly defeated in the 1918 mayoral election. Photo
courtesy of the Hennepin County Historical Society.
Just before the Minnesota State Federation of Labor conference in July 1919,
Mahoney and Van Lear drafted a working document outlining the purpose and goals of their
proposed new organization, then titled the “Working People’s Non-Partisan Political League
of Minnesota.” This document included a preamble, which asserted that the recent war had
been caused by “military, industrial and political imperialists” and that concerted effort by
organized labor was needed to prevent wars in the future. The document’s “Declaration of
Principles” further claimed that the wealth and resources of the country were “capable of
supplying abundantly all the wants of the people” but that “comparatively few individuals . . .
arbitrarily determine the share of wealth that the mass of people shall receive.” The
36
Rhoda R. Gilman, Stand Up! The Story of Minnesota’s Protest Tradition (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical
Society Press, 2012), 71.
119
document further outlined a twelve-point “Political and Legislative Program” which called
for – among other things – the right of collective bargaining, workman’s compensation,
“complete equality of men and women” and “public ownership and operation of” most
utilities, banks, modes of transportation, and “stockyards, packing plants, grain elevators,
[and] terminal markets.” Mahoney and Van Lear then presented this plan at the convention.
37
The July 1919 New Ulm convention was attended by over 300 labor representatives.
The agenda was dominated by Mahoney’s and Van Lear’s proposal to create their new
league – the WPNPL – and ally it politically with the existing NPL movements of North
Dakota and Minnesota. Like the NPL, this new WPNPL was to be “nonpartisan” – and its
executive officers (which included Mahoney as President and Van Lear as Secretary-
Treasurer) were officially required not to be “affiliated with any other political party.” This
implied – in a sense – that the new organization was a sort of political party itself (even
though it invited persons associated with all existing parties to join). In fact, some media
accounts labeled the new group a “New State Political Party.” Mahoney also claimed that
meaningful political reform must be enacted since people were losing faith in the democratic
process and ''something must be done because there is a trend toward direct action" instead.
The delegates of the convention expressed overwhelming support for the proposed League,
and the WPNPL was thus born.
38
From that point on, Mahoney and Van Lear would lead the
political arm of the organized labor movement in Minnesota, eventually moving it towards
the formation of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party.
37
Working People’s Non-Partisan Political League of Minnesota: Declaration of Principles and Platform of
Organized Labor of Minnesota, July 20, 1919.
38
“Labor Delegates Organize New State Political Party,” The Labor World, July 26, 1919.
120
Shortly after the July 1919 convention, Mahoney and Van Lear – now officially
President and Secretary-Treasurer of the newly-formed WPNPL respectively – sent out a
form letter to labor groups throughout the state. This action represented the first major
organization effort by Mahoney and Van Lear under the auspices of the WPNPL. They
declared the advent of the WPNPL and invited all labor groups present at the convention –
and those who were not – to join in “one great movement” to “exercise united action at the
ballot box.” Mahoney and Van Lear further claimed that the WPNPL had been sanctioned by
the Minnesota Federation of Labor in its mission, and that the goal was to enroll “every local
labor union or lodge in the state.” In addition, unorganized workers and persons sympathetic
with the WPNPL’s mission were invited to join as well. Membership dues were low, and
were set at 25 cents a year for each member of any participating group. Though membership
dues would increase over time, these dues remained substantially lower than NPL dues, and
as a result presented less of a barrier to membership.
39
Mahoney then later also authored what appears to be the original draft of the Farmer-
Labor Party constitution. This type-written document outlined would become the basis for
the main structure of the party in the near future. This draft included defining the general
purpose of the party (“to provide a political agency . . . to secure the enactment of laws that
will promote the common welfare”) and membership procedures. Mahoney also outlined the
organizational structure of the new party with a state central committee at the top, and
extending down to the congressional district, county, and township/precinct level. The
39
Letter of William Mahoney and Thomas Van Lear of the WPNPL to “Organized Labor of Minnesota,” [likely
August 1919], William Mahoney Papers, Box 2.
121
proposed constitution also established that a party state convention would meet in March of
every election year.
40
Both Mahoney and Van Lear also signaled a strong partisan approach with their own
campaigns for major offices. In March 1920, St. Paul held elections for mayor and the city
council. The WPNPL sponsored a slate of five candidates (four for city council, and one for
mayor). It was William Mahoney himself who was chosen as “Labor’s Candidate” for
mayor.
41
Although Mahoney lost the mayoral race, three of the four “Labor’s Candidates”
won election to the city council.
42
This episode can be viewed as the WPNPL’s first
successful political victory – and also evidence of an increasing lean towards open
“partisanship” on the part of the organization.
Figure 8. William Mahoney in 1932. Mahoney had a long career as
a labor lawyer and political organizer. It was mainly through the
combined efforts of Mahoney and former Minneapolis Mayor
Thomas Van Lear that the labor element eventually became dominant
in Minnesota’s farmer-labor coalition through their formation of the
WPNPL in 1919. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society.
In May 1920, Mahoney called members of the fledgling WPNPL to a July conference
at Rochester.
43
It was obvious that the WPNPL as an organization had done well in the past
year. Even The Rochester Daily Post and Record – normally critical of the farmer-labor
coalition – uncritically proclaimed the impending conference to be a meeting of the “Leading
40
William Mahoney, “Proposed Constitution and By-Laws for Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, Jan. 23”
Mahoney Papers, Box 1, undated [likely 1919].
41
The National Advocate, March 6, 1920, 4.
42
Proceedings: Second Annual Convention of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League of Minnesota
(July 18, 1920), 4-5.
43
“Labor to Help Early Closing: Union Men and Families to Patronize No Store After Six O'clock Saturdays,”
The Labor World, May 29, 1920.
122
Men of Labor.”
44
The resulting Second Annual Convention of the WPNPL met on July 18. A
summary of the previous year’s progress was presented by Secretary-Treasurer Thomas Van
Lear. Van Lear revealed that 75% of the organizations that had signed up with the WPNPL
since 1919 had done so merely through correspondence. In other words, an effective letter
campaign had saved the organization significant funds by using mail instead of directly
sending speakers and organizers to recruit members (i.e., the old NPL method). Even so, this
approach had managed to build a membership of 45,000 persons by July 1920. Van Lear also
pointed out that – despite the coalition’s recent loss in the Republican primaries – “the fact is,
we made very substantial gains. We have never carried in the state more than 30 counties
before, now we have carried 54 counties out of a possible 86.”
45
There seemed to be little
doubt in Van Lear’s mind that the WPNPL was growing substantially in both its membership
and influence – and that political victory was just on the horizon. It was also evidence that –
within a short period of time – the new WPNPL had eclipsed the NPL in terms of
membership and organization. Mahoney and Van Lear then advocated joining with the NPL
in the general election, and once again fielding farmer-labor coalition candidates in the
November general election.
46
It should be noted that the new WPNPL structure extended its membership drive into
the black communities of Minneapolis-St. Paul as well as into the realm of newly
enfranchised female voters. The WPNPL included a women’s auxiliary league, and attracting
female members and voters was a priority for Van Lear. Van Lear also personally courted
44
“Leading Men of Labor To Be On Hand,” Rochester Daily Post and Record, July 14, 1920.
45
Proceedings: Second Annual Convention of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League of Minnesota
(July 18, 1920).
46
“Labor Holds Sway in Rochester: Nonpartisan Political Men Hold Meeting At The Armory,” Rochester Daily
Post and Record, July 19, 1920.
123
black voters by making speaking appearances at black churches.
47
He and Mahoney also
authorized the creation of a “colored” branch of the WPNPL (including a “Colored Women’s
Nonpartisan Club”). These efforts were later rewarded when Van Lear ran for Mayor of
Minneapolis in 1921 and he received the open support of the black community.
48
Over time, it became clear that Mahoney and Van Lear preferred the partisan strategy
and had developed a strong desire to form an official third party. As the WPNPL membership
grew, this view became more dominant within the movement as a whole as well. In 1921,
Van Lear ran again for mayor of Minneapolis in an election centered chiefly on the issue of
the unionization of the streetcar industry. He was again narrowly defeated. However, the
WPNPL faction did well in the city council elections and would continue to make gains there
until 1923.
49
Like the city council elections in St. Paul the year before, this trend seemed to
indicate a rise in WPNPL power, and provided the earliest examples of farmer-labor electoral
success. For the WPNPL base, these early victories validated their strategy of sustained,
permanent political action. Their conclusion was not only to continue such activity, but also
to form a third party to challenge the major parties more effectively. The growing influence
of the WPNPL – as well as their early electoral victories – now became the main impetus for
continued farmer-labor political activity. By 1921, the WPNPL dominated the Minnesota
farmer-labor coalition – just as Townley’s leadership and the NPL itself was heading into
serious decline.
47
The National Advocate, January 31, 1920.
48
The Appeal, June 11, 1921, 4; Van Lear’s popularity with the black community in Minneapolis can be traced
all the way back to his term as mayor, when he sided with the black community in their opposition to a live
staging of a production of The Birth of a Nation.
49
David Paul Nord, “Minneapolis and the Pragmatic Socialism of Thomas Van Lear,” Minnesota History,
Spring, 1976, 10; see also Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 37.
124
The 1920 Election
Republican-led legislative efforts to blunt the rising edge of the farmer-labor
movement began as early as 1919, when the legislature attempted to pass a bill that would
have repealed the direct primary vote. However, House-Senate differences over the bill
eventually ensured its defeat.
50
The defeat of this initiative meant that the Republican Party
would face the same challenge that it had faced from the farmer-laborites in 1918. And so, in
1920, the farmer-labor coalition once again sought to infiltrate the Republican Party during
the primary races in a bid to nominate their candidates. The coalition had made
improvements in both organization and planning since the 1918 election, and seemed
convinced that success was on the horizon. In the 1920 primaries, they ran candidates in all
the congressional districts, and contested all of the major state offices.
The Republicans had largely fended off the farmer-labor challenge in 1918, but there
was a realization that concessions needed to be made in order to shore up their electoral
position. There was disagreement within the Republican Party over the nature and degree of
such accommodations, however. The party was divided into several factions with competing
interests. One was a steel faction based in Duluth and was centered on the iron mining
industry located there and on the Iron Range. Another faction was centered on the milling
industry in Minneapolis. The party also had its reformist wing, led by such figures as Jacob
A. O. Preus and others. Despite these divisions, the Republicans did undertake to offer some
reforms which appealed to both farmers and progressives. These included a tax on iron ore
production and some tax relief for farmers. The iron ore “tonnage” tax was designed to
50
“Making a Legislature Change Its Mind: Primary Repeal Measure Killed by Minnesota Lawmakers at
Demand of 100,000 Voters – Governor Vetoes Tonnage Tax,” The Nonpartisan Leader, October 6, 1919.
125
extract more money from the iron industry, the idea being that the permanent extraction of
such a finite and non-renewable resource should not be suborned without proper
compensation to the state. In 1919, the tax had been proposed by the legislature but vetoed by
Governor Burnquist. The party’s eventual change on this issue positioned it to better appeal
to undecided voters and defanged some of the anti-corporate rhetoric of the farmer-labor
insurgency in the 1920 elections.
51
During the 1920 primaries, the farmer-laborites actively sought to infiltrate the
Republican races using all legal – but some potentially dishonest – means. State laws in place
in 1920 dictated that major parties could require that their voters had voted for a “majority”
of their party’s candidates in the last election in order to qualify as bona fide party voters in
the current primary election. This law was openly challenged by the farmer-labor leaders,
however. Thomas Van Lear led the strategic charge in April 1920 by urging NPL and
WPNPL members to answer only questions that were legally posed by party officials and
judges during the primary, and – if questioned about their past vote for a “majority” – to
simply “swear” that they had in fact done so. Van Lear’s emergence as a leader in this
instance is further evidence of the rise of the Mahoney-Van Lear leadership of the farmer-
labor coalition, since Van Lear spoke on behalf of the entire movement, replacing Townley
as chief spokesperson in this case.
52
In addition, the farmer-labor coalition also undertook an unusual failsafe strategy in
the 1920 elections. They created a “Farmer-Labor party” shell organization as a means to
create official nomination positions – in the event that their candidates who contested the
51
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 48-49.
52
“Townleyites Told How Law Can Be Evaded: Nonpartisans Advised to Swear They Voted Republican Ticket
in '18,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, June 15, 1920, 1, 7.
126
Republican primaries did not win them. These “nominations” were merely holds placed in
case the NPL/WPNPL candidates would need to run in the general election outside the
Republican Party. The plan was to withdraw these fake candidates in the general election,
and then either throw all of their support to their candidates who won the Republican primary
races or replace them later with more popular figures of the movement (i.e., those figures
who were running in the Republican primaries but who might lose their primary race).
53
Although the Burnquist ticket had succeeded in winning the 1918 primary and
general election, the race had been too close for comfort and the threat of NPL insurgency
remained credible. By 1920, the Republicans were seriously concerned about another
primary threat and had taken pains to make their candidates more attractive to the political
center. Burnquist – one of the longest serving governors in Minnesota history and the icon of
the Republican state war administration – was forced aside by party leaders in favor of his
more moderate State Auditor, Jacob A. O. Preus. Preus himself was not sympathetic to NPL
aims, nor did he hesitate to label “Townleyism” a dire socialist threat. However, Preus was
more moderate in his platform than Burnquist and made an active effort both to appeal to
undecided voters and to offer solutions that represented a significant change in Republican
policies. Preus was openly sympathetic to farmers, proposing support for farmers’
cooperatives and rural credits. Preus also championed the “tonnage tax” to be assessed on
iron ore mined in the state. The tax was not popular with the iron mining Republicans, but it
was a necessary price to pay for Preus’s tack towards the political center. This strategy paid
off, and Preus defeated his NPL-endorsed opponent in the Republican primary in June 1920.
53
The failure of this strategy was addressed by Mahoney at the subsequent WPNPL convention in 1921, see
Proceedings: Third Annual Convention of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League of Minnesota
(July 17, 1921), 3.
127
The iron ore tonnage tax then became a major issue in the governor’s race during the general
election. The state Republican Party – now under the more moderate tutelage of Senator
Knute Nelson and Preus – then tacked back towards the right, labeling the League and its
candidates a “socialist menace.” The phrase “Stop Socialism” became the major theme of the
1920 Republican campaigns in Minnesota.
54
Figure 9. Jacob A. O. Preus in 1918, running as a candidate for
the State Auditor’s office. Although strongly associated with the
mainstream Republican Party, Preus took great pains to portray
himself and his gubernatorial agenda as being moderate and
friendly to farmers’ interests. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota
Historical Society.
Despite Van Lear’s strategy of encouraging voting in the Republican primaries
whether or not league members were qualified to do so, the farmer-labor coalition candidates
did not achieve wide success in the 1920 primaries. The lone exception to this was Oscar
Keller’s winning the Republican primary in the Fourth District. Although Keller had not been
an officially-endorsed NPL/WPNPL candidate in 1918, his positions on labor issues attracted
enough labor support within his district to earn him the nomination. Keller would remain an
official Republican for the remainder of his congressional career, even though his stance on
many issues were opposed to his own party and he was not supported by the Republican
Party establishment during subsequent elections. Even so, the NPL/WPNPL base took pride
on their decent showings in the primaries (since their margins of losses were often slim) – but
substantial electoral victory remained an elusive goal.
55
54
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 319-321; see also Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 62.
55
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 55, 57, 59.
128
After its defeat in the Republican Party primaries, the NPL/WPNPL coalition decided
– once again – to run independent candidates in the general election (as they had in 1918).
However, several events transpired which weakened their general election efforts. Both the
NPL and the WPNPL were planning to join forces in a single campaign for 1920. However,
efforts by some national political activists to create a nationwide farmer-labor movement
were being made at the same time in Chicago, and the controversy associated with this
convention would have reverberations in Minnesota. This national gathering was dominated
by radicals with little connection to the Minnesota movement but who sought to use the
“Farmer-Labor” label as a cover for creating a new party dedicated to Soviet-style socialism.
Both the local NPL leaders in Minnesota and Townley himself opposed any association with
this national group. They widely believed that joining with the national movement would
label the Minnesota movement radical as well (a label they desperately wanted to avoid). The
WPNPL wing was less vehement on this issue, however. As a result, the WPNPL and the
NPL were unable to agree on a coordinated general election strategy. The WPNPL-endorsed
candidates took on the label of “Farmer-Labor” while the NPL-endorsed candidates simply
ran as “Independents.”
56
Although the two factions did not compete against each other (the
NPL ran candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General, while the
WPNPL ran candidates for the offices of Secretary of State, Treasurer and Railroad and
Warehouse Commissioner), their efforts were not coordinated and they ran their campaigns
as two separate organizations. The 1920 general election resulted in a Republican sweep of
power in which the Republicans won all of these major offices. However, many of the NPL
56
Although the label of “Independent” had been disallowed in the 1918 elections, apparently this approach was
allowed in 1920. This may have been due to Andrew Volstead’s disqualification as an official Republican
candidate and his own run as an “Independent” – a situation which necessitated the legal inclusion of this label
in the 1920 general election by the Republicans.
129
“independent” candidates had finished in close second place, pushing the Democrats into a
distant third place in many districts. The other “Farmer-Labor” faction members – those
associated with the WPNPL – were clear losers in comparison to the NPL “independent”
candidates. This indicated that rural farmer support for the movement was still alive and well
– despite the slipping influence of Townley and the NPL itself. It was obvious however, that
the movement needed more unity between the rural-agrarian wing and the urban-labor wing
in order to win elections. Also, disassociation with the Chicago Farmer-Labor group was a
further necessity (since the radical nature of that convention had tarred the Minnesota
“Farmer-Labor” candidates during the campaign). Thus, the future of the party in Minnesota
would hinge on the state movement asserting its complete independence from any association
with the national Farmer-Labor Party in Chicago. However, this disassociation would not be
complete until 1924 – and even then, charges of political extremism against Minnesota
Farmer-Laborites would continue.
57
The 1920 election also saw the emergence of Henrik Shipstead as a statewide
political figure for the first time. Of all of the Farmer-Labor candidates and political figures,
Shipstead was initially the most prominent (next to Charles Lindbergh, Sr.), eventually
becoming the longest-serving Farmer-Labor politician, and quite possibly the most capable
political figure in the entire Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party. Primary sources relating to
Shipstead’s early years are scanty, but an authorized biography of him written by an admirer
(Martin Ross) in 1940 provides an extensive background of Shipstead’s journey from humble
farmer to political giant. The work – Shipstead of Minnesota – was published in 1940 without
57
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 61-62.
130
any bibliography or references, so it is impossible to verify its veracity. It seems clear that the
work was intended to lionize Shipstead during his transition out of the Farmer-Labor Party
and presents a very flattering picture of him. Even so, it is the singular biographical source
used by almost all historians who describe Shipstead’s political emergence.
Shipstead was one of eleven children born to Norwegian immigrants who were
farmers in central Minnesota (in Kandiyohi County). As a boy, Shipstead learned both the
ways of farming and the value of education. Taking after his father, he was a voracious
reader from his early days, often taking a book out to the fields with him to read during
breaks. As a young man, he came into contact with another young farmworker who had
ambitions to attend dental school. Inspired by this other young man's ambition, Shipstead
determined to go to dental school himself. He enrolled at Northwestern University in the
early 1900s. In Chicago, he was influenced by the big city environment and the progressive
political strains of the city, immersing himself in the debates of the time. In 1903, he
graduated with a degree in Dentistry from Northwestern University. Shipstead then returned
to Minnesota and set up a dental practice in the small town of Glenwood, in Pope County in
the west-central region of the state.
58
Shipstead built his dental practice in Glenwood through hard work and networking,
serving both the townspeople and local Scandinavian farmers. In a period of about nine
years, he had become a popular figure in the town – known not just for his dentistry but also
for his willingness to engage in political conversation (specifically, his support for farmer’s
causes and for Theodore Roosevelt's progressive aims). His popularity led him to become
58
Martin Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota (Chicago: Packard and Company, 1940), 24-34; see also Barbara
Stuhler, Ten Men of Minnesota and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968 (St. Paul, MN; Minnesota Historical
Society, 1973), 76-77.
131
mayor of Glenwood in 1912, and he was re-elected in 1914. As mayor, he oversaw the
authoring of a new charter for the town and worked cooperatively with city council members
of both major parties. In 1916, he was chosen by the Republicans to run for state
representative of the region, a race which he won handily. In November 1917, shortly after
America entered the war, an NPL organizer came to Glenwood to hold a rally. Initially, the
town’s NPL supporters had rented the local opera house in order to hold their gathering.
However, when the town’s leading citizens and the local MCPS chapter heard of the
impending meeting, the opera house owners canceled the rental and refused to host the rally.
Some NPL supporters then approached Shipstead and asked him to intervene. Shipstead
walked down the street to the opera house and rented it himself – and then turned control of
the space over to the NPL organizers. The meeting was then held as planned. The sheriff and
members of the local branch of the MCPS upbraided Shipstead for this action, but he simply
replied that the Constitution guaranteed the right of free speech. Later that same day,
Shipstead intervened again to escort the NPL speaker safely out of town when the threat of
mob action emerged after the rally.
59
However, this dramatic account offered by Martin Ross
in 1940 cannot be verified. In fact, an investigation performed by a local journalist in 1994
revealed no evidence of an NPL rally or disturbance in Glenwood during November 1917
(although it is uncertain whether or not such an event would have been chronicled by the
local newspaper, the Glenwood Herald).
60
Even so, NPL meetings were officially banned in
Pope County in February 1918.
61
Whatever the veracity of this episode in Shipstead’s life,
there was apparently enough connection between him and the NPL to boost his credibility
59
Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, 34-38.
60
Dallas Ouren, “Shipstead may be one of Glenwood’s most famous people: City dentist went on to become
U.S. Senator for 24 years,” Pope County Tribune, July 18, 1994.
61
“County Public Safety Director Bars Non-Partisan Meetings,” Glenwood Herald, February 7, 1918.
132
within the movement – even though he himself was not a member and apparently had no
desire to become closely associated with the organization itself.
In 1918, the NPL had approached Shipstead and asked him to run for Congress in his
district against the Republican incumbent, Andrew Volstead. Shipstead accepted this
challenge and ran in the primary against Volstead as the NPL-endorsed candidate. Shipstead
performed better in his race than his more famous colleague, Charles Lindbergh, Sr., did in
the governor’s race. Although Shipstead lost the primary, the percentages were so close that
for some time, it seemed that he may have won an upset victory. However, Shipstead paid a
heavy price for his campaign. Like Lindbergh, he was labeled a traitor. His opponents in
Glenwood even painted his house yellow in retribution. After the campaign of 1918,
Shipstead became a controversial figure in Glenwood – and his dental practice there began to
decline.
62
Shipstead continued pursuing political issues, however. His profile had now been
raised to a higher level, and by 1919, he was one of the more prominent figures within the
growing farmer-labor movement. As Townley’s NPL came into closer coordination with Van
Leer’s and Mahoney's WPNPL after 1919, the coalition began looking for established
candidates with a proven track record to run in the Republican primaries. Shipstead was high
on their list. In 1920, the coalition looked for a gubernatorial candidate with broad appeal.
Both Van Lear and Shipstead were considered, but in the end, it was Shipstead’s candidacy
that prevailed.
63
Van Lear graciously accepted defeat, going so far as to discourage his
62
Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, 38-39.
63
“Victory Ticket Named in Minnesota: People’s Forces Ready to Go Over the Top in Winning Fight for
Democracy,” The Nonpartisan Leader, April 12, 1920.
133
supporters from challenging the decision and later even campaigning alongside Shipstead.
64
Shipstead plunged into yet another Republican primary campaign. This was his first
statewide campaign, and he undertook it with humble means, often driving himself in his
own car from town to town, stopping to speak at meetings and church socials, and asking for
campaign donations in the form of “gas money” to get him to his next destination.
65
As in
1918, Shipstead faced significant hurdles from the Republican opposition – including being
shut out of an auditorium in Duluth.
66
Even so, Shipstead was so popular a figure, that there
were a number of predictions that he would win the primary race.
67
In the end however,
Shipstead lost the primary – but he had built up a state-wide voter base and had honed his
campaign skills. Following the strategy used by the coalition in 1918, he was then endorsed
by the NPL as an “Independent” for Governor in the 1920 general election, and he continued
to run a similar campaign in the general election.
68
This double campaign of 1920 would
bring him into direct contact with thousands of Minnesota voters and help to propel his
reputation as a candidate of note.
Figure 10. Henrik Shipstead in an undated photo from the late
1920s. Shipstead was one of the Farmer-Labor Party’s earliest
and most dynamic candidates. Shipstead would eventually
become the longest-serving Farmer-Laborite in Congress. Photo
courtesy of the Library of Congress.
64
“Nominees for State Offices Named by Labor and Farmers,” The Labor World, April 3, 1920 and “Shipstead
Meeting at Woodman Hall Thursday,” The Labor World, October 23, 1920.
65
Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, 40-43; see also Stuhler, Ten Men of Minnesota, 77-78.
66
“Does The Shrine Refuse?” The Labor World, May 29, 1920, 4.
67
Freeborn County Standard, June 3, 1920, 6.
68
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 61-62.
134
Shipstead’s aspirations for the governor’s office in 1920 left a vacancy for a viable
Farmer-Labor candidate in the Seventh District. This vacancy was filled by the political
newcomer, Ole J. Kvale. Kvale was born and raised in northeast Iowa, near Decorah. After
completing college at nearby Luther College, Kvale had faced career indecision. Strongly
influenced by his father and his faith, he entered the Lutheran theological seminary in
Minneapolis several years later. After he was ordained, Kvale served most of the time as a
minister between 1894 and 1917 in rural Wisconsin. In 1916, he graduated with an advanced
degree from the University of Chicago. In 1917, he was re-assigned to be the pastor of a
Lutheran Church in Benson – the county seat of Swift County – about 30 miles southwest of
Glenwood in west central Minnesota. Kvale’s immersion in the Lutheran religion and rural
life no doubt influenced his outlook. Shortly after his arrival in Benson, Kvale became
connected to the NPL movement, emphasizing the moral aspects of non-exploitation as a
campaign theme. Kvale’s speaking skills – no doubt honed by years of speaking in front of
congregations – were enough to generate sufficient support within the regional NPL
constituency to attain their endorsement for the congressional seat in the Republican
primary.
69
Kvale’s primary campaign in 1920 was the most successful of all of the major NPL
candidates. In the primary contest in June, he actually beat the incumbent Representative
Andrew J. Volstead, polling 17,369 votes to Volstead’s 15,059.
70
It looked as though the
Farmer-Laborites might have their first victory for a national office. However, a group of
“contestants” (plaintiffs) led by I. P. Flaten swiftly brought suit against Kvale in July,
69
Ole J. Kvale Papers, Box 2, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Ole J.
Kvale Papers]; see also Bruce L. Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), 259, 261.
70
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 59.
135
alleging that the Lutheran minister had violated a 1913 campaign law which forbade any
candidate to “knowingly make false statements” against their opponent. Kvale was accused
by these contestants of labeling Volstead “an atheist” in both speech and print during the
primary campaign. Indeed, Kvale had distributed literature with the following quote: “If, as I
understand, Mr. Volstead is a pronounced atheist and opposed to the Bible, that is his affair.”
The case eventually wound up on the Minnesota Supreme Court, which found in favor of
Flaten et al in October and invalidated Kvale’s nomination.
71
Even so, the court refused to
allow an official Republican endorsement of Volstead. The timing of this decision was
detrimental to the efforts of both campaigns, and neither side was satisfied with the ruling.
Even so, the incumbent Volstead ran as an “Independent” in the 1920 general election, and
Kvale did essentially the same thing. In the end, Volstead won the general race – but only by
a slight margin.
72
Figure 11. Ole J. Kvale in the 1920s. Kvale first ran for Congress in
the 1920 Republican primary and had outpolled his opponent by a
considerable percentage. However, the primary result was successfully
challenged by his opponents, who accused him of falsely labeling
Volstead an atheist. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota Historical
Society.
Charles Lindbergh, Sr. also returned as a farmer-labor candidate in the 1920 election.
After his unsuccessful primary campaign in 1918, Lindbergh had turned his attention to the
publication of Lindbergh’s National Farmer – initially a large and attractively colorful
magazine. The magazine’s content covered some issues of concerns to farmers, but was
71
Ole J. Kvale Papers, Box 2; a set of court documents relating to this case are in his papers.
72
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 62.
136
mostly a vehicle for Lindbergh’s political editorials – which maintained many of the themes
that he had enunciated in earlier years [see Chapter Two]. Low subscription numbers (never
more than a few thousand) along with a rise in printing costs forced Lindbergh to scale back
the publication until it was no more than a three-by-six inch black and white pamphlet by
January 1920. After losing money on the project and seeing no hope for turning a profit,
Lindbergh discontinued the publication in March 1920.
73
The drama of the 1920 Republican primaries attracted Lindbergh’s attention, but not
his participation. Shipstead’s failure to capture the Republican nomination had essentially
mirrored his own experience two years earlier. However, after being approached by several
groups, Lindbergh agreed to consider running in the general election as the NPL-endorsed
“Independent” candidate for his old Sixth District congressional seat – with the stipulation
that a sufficient number of signatures were gathered to demonstrate enough voter support. By
August 1920, these signatures had been collected and Lindbergh was on board – if even only
reluctantly. During the campaign, Lindbergh emphasized his “independent” status. His
opponent, Republican Harold Knutson, emphasized his own party affiliation and his
opposition to radical politics – an obvious barb aimed at Lindbergh and his associations with
the NPL. No Democratic candidate was fielded in this race and the results were much more
lopsided than Lindbergh’s 1918 campaign. Lindbergh lost to Knutson by a ratio of more than
2 to 1, earning less than 31% of a vote contested only by himself and Knutson. In fact,
Lindbergh – once the standard bearer of the fledging farmer-labor coalition – had one of the
73
Lindbergh Family Papers, Box 10, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter
Lindbergh Papers], a copy of the January 1920 edition of Lindbergh’s National Farmer is in his papers; see also
Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 255-256.
137
worst showings of any farmer-labor candidate, even though he was running within his own
home district.
74
The mainstream press trumpeted the Republican Party’s 1920 triumphs, going so far
as to declare “the rout of Townleyism” and that “the nonpartisan league . . . has ceased to
exist as a dangerous factor in Minnesota politics.” Interestingly enough, it was also
recognized that – despite the label of “Townleyism” – that the movement was increasingly
under the leadership of Mahoney and Van Lear as well.
75
However, the farmer-labor movement was far from finished. Although defeated in the
1920 general election, measurable gains had been made. Many within the NPL/WPNPL
ranks could sense future impending victory. In fact, The Nonpartisan Leader – always eager
to depict the movement in a positive light – trumpeted that the movement had earned a
million votes in 1920 – a figure which had increased in size by a factor of four since the 1918
election.
76
The farmer-labor coalition thus began to look to the next election. Some NPL-
endorsed candidates had been elected to the state legislature in 1920, and this was taken to be
a good sign. Many of the other races had been close. The Democratic Party appeared to be
continuing to head towards insignificance – at least on the statewide level and in most
districts outside of St. Paul. Their voter percentages were consistently and significantly lower
than most of the farmer-labor candidates, especially in the western and northwestern parts of
the state.
An early electoral test came in 1921 with a special election for the Mayor’s office in
Minneapolis. As noted earlier, Thomas Van Lear ran for his former position, but was
74
Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota, 259-260.
75
“The Rout of Townleyism,” Rochester Daily Post and Record, November 8, 1920, 8.
76
“A Million Votes Cast for the League Program!” The Nonpartisan Leader, November 15, 1920.
138
narrowly defeated. Even so, between 1920 and 1923, WPNPL candidates made gains on the
Minneapolis City Council, and would eventually constitute a majority. This signaled a shift
in Minneapolis from 1916 to early 1920s when much of Van Lear’s original voter base
moved from supporting Socialist candidates to supporting Farmer-Labor figures instead. This
trend also established the strength of the urban-labor voter base even before 1922.
77
The Republican Exclusion Strategy of 1921
The close elections in Minnesota in 1920 had been yet another stern warning to the
Republicans within the state, and it underlined their need to take action to prevent future
NPL/WPNPL insurgencies within their primaries. Their eventual solution was an
exclusionary primary law, which they would legislate in 1921. In fact, the planning for this
initiative had begun much earlier (in March 1920), when 1100 Republicans “voluntarily” met
at an unofficial statewide convention to consider the question of how best to deal with the
growing farmer-labor challenge.
78
At this time, the NPL faction in North Dakota had reached
the peak of its power, and it had become apparent that the NPL would be running candidates
in the Republican primaries in Minnesota in the 1920 races as well. Leading Republicans
thus recognized that they needed a defensive strategy against them.
79
Upon his election as governor in late 1920, Jacob A. O. Preus began working on a
proposal which he presented to the legislature in his inaugural address in early 1921. In the
77
Nord, “Minneapolis and the Pragmatic Socialism of Thomas Van Lear,” 10.
78
The term “voluntarily” should be interpreted to mean unofficially, since an official meeting might attract
persons who favored the growing farmer-labor coalition.
79
Jacob A. O. Preus, “Stillwater Speech,” June 12, 1922, Jacob A. O. Preus Papers, Box 23, Minnesota
Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Preus Papers].
139
first section of his speech titled “Election Reform,” the incoming Governor Preus announced
on January 5, 1921:
That the laws relating to primary elections are defective is universally conceded. Any
law which permits a party candidate who is defeated at the primary election of his
party to become a candidate of another party for the same office at the ensuing
general election is not only absurd and politically dishonest, but it makes a mockery
of the oaths of party allegiance voluntarily taken by all candidates who file at the
primary.
The Republican platforms of March 20th and May 8th, 1920, each specifically
declares in favor of legislation providing for the nomination of party candidates by
the convention system and prohibiting the misuse of the party name. Legislation
covering these points should be promptly passed. The convention system can be
easily safeguarded at its source by requiring delegates to be elected by the primary
method, and by having the returns of the election of the delegates officially canvassed
and declared, contests can be eliminated, and honest conventions fully representing
the people assured.
Under our law the members of the legislature are elected without party designation.
This is a paradox. Political parties are a necessity in representative government, and
will exist whether recognized by law or not.
To illustrate, an organization exists in Minnesota the foundation of which is political.
Not only has it avoided recognition as a political party, thus evading the legal
obligation of every political organization to give due publicity to its expenditures, but
it has deliberately disregarded and ignored the will of the majority of a great political
party as expressed at the primary election. At the last primary election, it undertook to
nominate its candidates on the Republican ticket and failing to do so caused its
candidates' names to be printed upon the election ballot as nominated by petition.
I call attention to this fact to show that whether the law provides for the recognition of
political parties or not, they will exist just the same. Political parties exist so far as the
legislature of the State of Minnesota is concerned notwithstanding the fact that the
members thereof are elected without party designation. But whether members of the
legislature should be elected upon party tickets and party platforms is peculiarly a
question for the legislature itself to determine, and I refer the question to the
legislature believing that in its wisdom, it will find the correct answer.
80
80
Inaugural Message of Governor Jacob A. O. Preus to the Legislature of Minnesota, January 5, 1921,
https://books.google.com/books?id=XFURAQAAMAAJ&pg=RA3-
PA3&dq=Inaugural+message+Preus&hl=en&sa=X&ei=OwCSVY__O5T_yQTblLfoDQ&ved=0CCwQ6AEwA
Q#v=onepage&q=Inaugural%20message%20Preus&f=false, accessed September 24, 2013.
140
With this declaration, the intent and strategy of the Republican Party vis-à-vis the
growing farmer-labor coalition became abundantly clear. Given the experience of the recent
elections, this exclusion strategy seemed to have merit, since the proposed approach would
either prevent farmer-labor candidates from running in the Republican primaries or prevent
those who did from running as opponents in the general elections. Either way, the Republican
Party leadership had calculated that it would benefit from this approach and that with this
primary exclusion law the farmer-labor challenge could be headed off. Unfortunately for
Preus and his Republican allies, this bit of legislation would have unintended consequences,
and these would become obvious very quickly starting in 1922.
The Republicans held a majority in the 1921 legislature and they concurred with the
governor on the issue of primary exclusion strategy. In 1921, the Minnesota Legislature
officially passed the new primary law – much as it was outlined in Preus’ inaugural speech.
At first, it seemed that the Republican Party had triumphed with their legislative efforts and
had achieved the security for their primaries which had eluded them in the last two elections.
In addition, by April the Minnesota Legislature under Preus’ “masterful leadership” had also
passed the iron ore tonnage tax and extended the state Department of Agriculture to oversee
more aspects of the agricultural sector, allowing for some expansion of cooperatives within
the state.
81
Together, it was hoped that this “carrot and stick” approach would satiate farmer
demands and stem the rising tide of farmer-labor politics in the state.
However, instead of ending the farmer-labor challenge, the primary exclusion law
simply encouraged the farmer-laborites to form their own official party. In addition, all of the
81
George E. Akerson, “State Legislation Ends Record Session: Pledges Made By G.O.P. All Carried Out,”
Minneapolis Morning Tribune, April 21, 1921, 1.
141
major parties later complained about aspects of the primary exclusion law, many of which
were unwieldy. Since the law had the opposite effect that was originally intended by its
Republican authors, and because the law was unpopular within all of the major parties, it was
repealed in 1923 – but not before the damage to the Republican Party had been done.
82
In the meantime, between 1921 and 1923, the implications of this new law would
become clear. Far from discouraging challenges, the passage of the exclusionary primary law
had a decisive nurturing effect on the formation of the new Farmer-Labor Party. Since the
farmer-labor coalition was essentially excluded from running in the major party primaries,
and because a critical mass of the coalition had by now abandoned Townley’s embrace of the
“nonpartisan” approach, the decision to form an official third party was almost a foregone
conclusion. The farmer-laborites – now led largely by Mahoney’s and Van Lear’s WPNPL –
would begin these efforts in earnest in 1921, sowing the seeds of their new party and reaping
the harvest of their efforts in the 1922 elections.
83
The Creation of the Farmer-Labor Party
The economic grievances of both the farmer and labor constituencies remained
significant in the early 1920s and continued to fuel political discontent within the state. Crop
prices had dropped after World War I, creating a renewed agricultural recession starting in
the early 1920s. While it is true that this greatly impinged upon the NPL’s membership drive
and its funds, it also increased farmer discontent with the economic situation and seemed to
stiffen their political resolve. In other words, the NPL itself may have begun to fade away
82
William Watts Folwell, A History of Minnesota (St. Paul, MN; Minnesota Historical Society, 1926), Volume
III, 374.
83
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 37-41; see also Morlan, Political Prairie Fire, 343-344.
142
after 1921, but the grievances of many ordinary farmers did not. This increased farmer
discontent enabled the agrarian wing of the coalition in Minnesota to gain members through
1920, and then retain them as voters in the 1922 election. At about the same time, union
membership had increased in the state, and although many of these unions were relatively
new (“mushroom unions” that had sprouted quickly), they nevertheless represented a wide
base of organized labor that could be mobilized for political action. Whereas Townley had
been the first to suggest a farmer-labor fusion, it would be Van Lear and Mahoney who
would take the lead on cementing this alliance, and see this initiative through to completion.
They would achieve this by maintaining farmer support for a wider movement as the rural-
agrarian constituency essentially abandoned the NPL and its nonpartisan approach, and
instead openly embraced the creation of a new third party – the Farmer-Labor Party.
84
After the failures of the 1920 general election, the leaders of the farmer-labor
movement worked to keep its most successful elements while rejecting those which clearly
did not work. What worked was the formation of a broad political coalition based on farmer
and labor demands, which commanded a significant portion of the electorate and could
become a major political base. Grassroots organization and campaigning in communities
advocating the farmer-labor political agenda also worked, and was retained. What did not
work was an association with radical politics. A clear stand against radicalism – or socialism
or communism, etc. – was thus necessary for the party’s advancement. This meant the
disassociation of the fledgling Minnesota party from the national Farmer-Labor groups in
Chicago. What had also clearly not worked was the primary insurgent strategy of 1918 and
84
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 65-66.
143
1920. Since the implementation of the 1921 primary law precluded the insurgency approach
for 1922 anyway, the necessity to form a political party now became obvious. This initiative
was joined with new efforts to portray the movement as populist but not radical. Farmer-
Labor figures such as Henrik Shipstead (and others) would increasingly portray themselves
as representing significant but reasonable reforms intended to address legitimate economic
grievances.
85
By the time that the WPNPL held its annual convention in July 1921, a definite
change was in the offing for the League’s political strategy. In his report to the delegates,
President Mahoney noted that the strategy used in 1920 of running candidates in the
Republican primaries and then switching out these failed primary candidates to run in the
general election had not only caused tension within the movement’s ranks but had simply not
worked. That fact – in conjunction with the recent Primary Exclusion Law and the need to
focus efforts on a single campaign strategy – led Mahoney to forcefully advocate for a
change in the WPNPL’s “nonpartisan” approach. Mahoney further suggested that farmer-
labor voters would never carry NPL/WPNPL candidates in the Republican primary races
because they could not “hold their noses” and “stomach the thought of asking for a
Republican ballot” during the primaries, In other words, in order to maximize the
movement’s electoral support “The wisdom of continuing as a nonpartisan organization has
85
Leslie Gene Rude, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Illinois, 1962, 46; see also Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 71.
144
been brought into question . . .” and that the time had come to seriously consider forming a
third party.
86
Led by the WPNPL, the farmer-labor movement undertook the task of unifying its
organizational units and establishing party headquarters in all of the state’s counties.
Believing that the essence of their agrarian agenda had been retained by the state movement,
by late 1921 most of the NPL membership had embraced the third party approach as well and
looked to the WPNPL leadership to create this new party structure. Although Townley
continued to speak out against the third party strategy, a critical mass of the movement’s
members were now firmly in support of creating a new political party in Minnesota. By late
1921, there were discussions about the party’s name. The label “Progressive Party” was one
choice that was offered. However, in the end – and despite the potential association with the
national movement in Chicago – a majority of leaders and members decided to keep their
original name: “Farmer-Labor.” It was at this point that the party was officially born. A set of
women’s auxiliary organizations was formed from within both the NPL and WPNPL which
complemented the new structure, and actively sought to recruit female supporters. The party
itself then established central committees in various regions of the state to coordinate and
authorize party activity. Funds were also diverted from the NPL/WPNPL to create the new
Minneapolis Daily Star newspaper, which became an early media outlet of the party, and
from its inception had a significant circulation.
87
86
Proceedings: Third Annual Convention of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League of Minnesota
(July 17, 1921), 3-5.
87
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 38-40.
145
The organizational gains of the movement were made obvious by the time of the joint
NPL/WPNPL convention in Minneapolis in March 1922. This meeting would prove to be the
final debate about both pursuing the third party strategy and about combining the two groups
into the Farmer-Labor Party. Delegates from both sides agreed that any candidates endorsed
by the convention would be filed solely on the Farmer-Labor Party ticket, and would run
only as Farmer-Labor candidates. It took several meetings in April to finalize the party’s
choice of candidates, and coordinate the official merging of the two groups. In July 1922, the
WPNPL held its last statewide convention, at which point it effectively liquidated its assets
entirely into the Farmer-Labor Party organization (“Resolution No. 1”), and sent messages to
the NPL groups across the state to do the same. These NPL groups complied with the
WPNPL directive as well – further proof that the Mahoney-Van Lear leadership was the
driving force behind the creation of the party. These groups would retain their NPL and
WPNPL titles for some time; however, it was now understood that they were essentially
chapters of the new Farmer-Labor Party.
88
The Election of 1922
The Minnesota Farmer-Labor campaigns of 1922 were different from the earlier
elections simply because the path to victory – or defeat – was clear from the beginning.
Unlike the 1918 and 1920 elections, there was no two-pronged strategy – either in terms of
splitting the farmer and labor support for different candidates, or in running separate
88
Proceedings: Fourth Annual Convention of the Working People’s Nonpartisan Political League of Minnesota
(July 16, 1922), 3-5, 7, 10.
146
campaigns for the primaries and the general election. This enabled the party to concentrate
all of its efforts on recruiting both voters and viable candidates, spread its campaign message
to the voting public, and place most of its emphasis on the general election race. In addition
to running candidates for the state legislature, the Farmer-Labor Party also contested the
highest state offices – including the governor’s seat. On the congressional level, the party
reduced its ambitions in 1922, running candidates in only eight of Minnesota’s ten districts.
However, the real prize was the open Senate seat, and this race would become the most
visible campaign in Minnesota in 1922.
89
As before, the leading statewide figure of the Farmer-Labor campaign in 1922 was
Henrik Shipstead. From 1920 to 1922, Shipstead had established himself in Minneapolis and
had agreed to become part of the Farmer-Labor third party strategy. Even so, his nomination
for the Senate was not assured until he pushed for it himself. When delegates at the statewide
convention had waivered in nominating him, Shipstead showed up and urged them to “stick
to their guns.” Without question, Shipstead was sufficiently well-known, a great speaker, an
experienced campaigner, and followed a careful path in his rhetoric which passionately
called for meaningful reform but avoided the “hot button” phrases and planks that might
label him as a socialist radical – although he did assert that neither the Republicans nor the
Democrats could serve the voters effectively.
90
He presented a program called “the new deal”
which was friendly to farmer and labor interests without suggesting the dismantling of
capitalism. He avoided association with the radical elements of the Farmer-Labor Party (his
main opponents within the party) and any oratory that called for building a new social order
89
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 41.
90
Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, 56.
147
or other obviously socialistic planks. His credibility was also enhanced by his Norwegian
background and his Minnesota rural-agrarian roots.
91
In the general election, Shipstead faced the Republican incumbent, Senator Frank
Kellogg. Kellogg had strong support from within his own party, and had made significant
contacts in Washington, D.C., since his arrival there in early 1917. Kellogg was also known
to be relatively friendly to agrarian interests. However, Kellogg had an image problem that
was hard to dispel. Shipstead and other critics portrayed Kellogg as the ultimate tool of
corporate interests, a bought-and-paid for politician (he had worked directly for U.S. Steel for
a number of years, even prosecuting a competitor in the name of “trustbusting”). Kellogg was
lambasted for consistently voting in favor of corporate interests and for being chauffeured
around in an expensive Pierce-Arrow automobile – an image which represented the epitome
of an out-of-touch elitist politician. In fact, Kellogg had advocated strongly for some farm
issues between 1920 and 1922, but the image of his earlier years in office and his consistent
alignment with the steel interest hounded him. In contrast, Shipstead conducted his statewide
campaign by driving himself around in his own car (as he had in 1920), appearing at church
socials and outdoor gatherings, making speeches, and often winning over undecided or even
opposed voters. There is little doubt that Shipstead spoke to more voters and projected a
“common man” image much more ably than Kellogg did. Shipstead’s oratorical abilities –
even in the face of a hostile audience – were also impressive, and he was often able to win
over critical crowds when he spoke to them in person.
92
91
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 73.
92
Ross, Shipstead of Minnesota, 48, 52-53.
148
Kellogg was also hurt by a personal rivalry with Preus and by the defection of the
Republican Representative from the Tenth District, Thomas Schall, who openly supported
Shipstead in the Senate race. The reasons for Schall’s support for a Farmer-Labor Senator
stemmed from his liberal tendencies and personal opposition to Kellogg.
93
Schall also had
some supporters within the NPL, and his name had even been suggested earlier for NPL
support. Schall was even praised by The National Leader during the campaign for his efforts
in aiding Shipstead’s campaign.
94
Figure 12. Frank Kellogg in about 1925. Although Kellogg’s Senate
career would end in the early 1920s, he would return to the national
political stage in the mid-1920s when he became Secretary of State
under President Calvin Coolidge. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota
Historical Society.
Kellogg was further plagued by lingering associations with the wartime Republican
establishment in the state. Specifically, a question arose over the appointment of former
MCPS member John McGee to a federal judge’s seat in Minnesota in 1922. The former
MCPS hardliner (who had testified before a congressional committee during the war and had
suggested that dissenters should be shot) sought support for this new position from his
Republican colleagues. However, McGee faced stiff opposition in his efforts, and his
attempts to win the judge’s seat began to bring up sore issues from the recent past, since
sentiments against McGee and the MCPS remained strong. Some Republican figures had to
back away from openly supporting him. This included Senator Kellogg, who refused to push
93
Stuhler, Ten Men of Minnesota, 79.
94
“League Farmers Score Great Victories,” The National Leader, November 1922, 7.
149
for McGee’s appointment during the 1922 campaign. In the end, McGee received the federal
judge’s appointment anyway – although he later committed suicide in 1925, citing his
extreme workload and a high degree of anxiety.
95
Figure 13. John McGee in 1918. McGee had been one of the
most ardent enforcers of the MCPS during 1917-1918. McGee’s
attempt to secure a federal judge’s seat in 1922 became an
embarrassment for the Republican Party in Minnesota, who
preferred not to endorse such a controversial figure. Photo
courtesy of the Minnesota Historical Society.
Shipstead was also helped in his campaign by the appearance of Robert La Follette at
rallies in Mankato and St. Paul. Although controversial, La Follette was still a big national
political name with considerable influence and drawing power. His well-known progressive
and isolationist sentiments had once again become popular with many after the end of World
War I. La Follette's impassioned attacks against Kellogg created a stir, and generated more
voter sympathy for Shipstead.
96
In the gubernatorial race, the Farmer-Labor Party nominated Magnus Johnson to run
as their candidate. Johnson had been born in Sweden in 1871 and had immigrated to the
United States as a young man, obtaining his citizenship in 1898.
97
Johnson had long been a
leading figure within the NPL, and had in fact been one of the NPL emissaries sent to
petition Governor Burnquist during the war to request the MCPS’s restraint in suppressing
95
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 327-332.
96
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 75.
97
Magnus Johnson Papers, Box 1, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter
Magnus Johnson Papers].
150
NPL rallies (a petition which fell on deaf ears). Johnson proudly boasted of his farming
background and spoke with a Swedish accent – an asset for obtaining Nordic agrarian votes
within the state. Unlike Shipstead, Johnson was specifically aligned with the NPL agrarian
branch of the party and had a long association with the NPL before entering politics.
Governor Preus thus faced another difficult challenge from the farmer-labor coalition.
However, he had made good on some of his campaign promises from 1920 and would
continue in these efforts, even later signing a bill which expanded farming cooperatives in
Minnesota.
98
Figure 14. Magnus Johnson in about 1920. Johnson had been one of the
earliest NPL leaders in Minnesota and proudly (and deliberately)
emphasized his agrarian roots. Johnson would become the Farmer-Labor
Party’s candidate for governor in 1922. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota
Historical Society.
The Farmer-Labor Party also fielded seasoned candidates in the congressional races,
most notably Ole J. Kvale in the Seventh District and Knud Wefald in the Ninth District.
Both had run for Congress before in their respective districts in 1920, and both had done well
(even though both had lost). Wefald was a Norwegian immigrant who had come to the
United States in 1887, and had lived in the Hawley region (just east of Fargo) since 1896.
There he had taken up farming and had managed a local lumber business. In the early 1900s,
Wefald had served on Hawley’s council and as its president. In 1912, he had been elected to
the Minnesota House of Representatives. The Ninth District’s proximity to North Dakota –
98
Theodore Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1975),
477-478.
151
and its similar farm economy – undoubtedly played a role in support for Wefald, since
knowledge of the NPL’s success in North Dakota had made the region one of the earliest in
Minnesota to sign up for the NPL cause. Farmer support for Wefald was significant, as
Wefald had effectively attacked his Republican opponent for supporting bills unfavorable to
farmers (most notably, the Transportation Act of 1920, which had set higher rates of freight
transport and induced additional costs to many farmers).
99
For obvious reasons, the Farmer-Labor Party decided not to contest the congressional
seat in the Fourth District, which was the base of Republican insurgent Oscar Keller, a
vigorously pro-labor figure whose upset win in 1919 (and subsequent re-election in 1920)
provided the farmer-laborites with a firm ally. Republican Party support for Keller in 1922
was virtually non-existent, even though he had won the primary again in that year. In fact,
Governor Preus sent messages asking that Keller’s name and image be removed from all
statewide campaign posters and literature, and the party complied.
100
An attempt at Democratic-Farmer-Labor fusion in 1922 almost changed the political
landscape that year. The Democrats, led by former governor and MCPS member John Lind,
approached the agrarian wing of the Farmer-Labor convention in March with a proposal for
union. The Democrats proposed fusion with the new party as a means of creating a united
front against the Republican Party. Lind and the Democrats proposed that the Farmer-Labor
group withdraw their gubernatorial candidate. In exchange, the Democrats would then drop
their own Senate candidate and endorse Shipstead for Senate instead. At first, the agrarian
wing representatives thought this to be a reasonable offer and they initially agreed. However,
99
Jon M. Wefald, “Congressman Knud Wefald: A Minnesota Voice for Farm Parity,” Minnesota History, 38
(December 1962), 177-178.
100
Letter from Governor Preus to Republican Party officials, 1922, Preus Papers, Box 23.
152
when word of the proposed fusion reached the WPNPL leaders, a strongly worded statement
from William Mahoney to the agrarian caucus accused the farmer wing of selling out their
cause and the deal was quickly scuttled. Thus, the Democrats left the Farmer-Labor
convention without a fusion arrangement and instead ran their own candidates in every major
race. John Lind declined taking on the Senate nomination, however. Seeking a new direction,
the Democrats then nominated Anna Dickie Olesen of Cloquet for the Senate race. The
Democrats also nominated a female candidate for Lieutenant Governor as well.
101
Olesen was a highly qualified candidate – having been the first female to serve on the
National Democratic Committee. She had been part of the Wilsonian contingent of
Minnesota Democrats during the war. She had also been an extended member of the MCPS –
part of the “Winter Organization” group, which had been a women’s auxiliary branch.
102
Olesen had campaigned in the primary very much like Shipstead did in the general election –
with meager funds, and often driving from one campaign stop to the next in a humble sedan.
Olesen was not only the first female Senate candidate to run in Minnesota, but she was also
the first female to run for the Senate on a major party ticket in the United States.
103
Indeed, the issue of gender was an unknown electoral variable in 1922. The 1922
Senate race was the first Senate election in Minnesota after the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920, and there was some question among all parties as to the effect of
female votes on electoral outcomes. Olesen captured 17.3% of the vote in the 1922 general
election – less than the Democratic candidate in the 1916 election (Daniel Lawler), who won
101
“Mrs. Peter Olesen Indorsed for Senate by Democrats: Cloquet Woman is Named After Nonpartisan-Fusion
Hopes Fail,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, April 1, 1922, 1; see also Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 69.
102
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 248.
103
“Woman Nominated For U.S. Senator; Mrs. Olesen, Named by Minnesota Democrats, Is All for "Common
People; Says She’s Eager To Serve, Wife of a School Superintendent, She Campaigned the State in a Little
Sedan,” New York Times, June 20, 1922.
153
almost 31% of the vote. However, Olesen outpolled every other major Democratic candidate
in the state in 1922, so it is possible that her gender may have indeed worked in her favor.
104
Since Olesen’s numbers were about twice as high as they were for any other major
Democratic candidate, it is possible that Olesen’s gender may have pulled at least some
female votes away from Kellogg. Contemporary local media coverage after the election
seemed to support this view.
105
Figure 15. Anna Dickie Olesen was the first female to ever run
for the U.S. Senate on a major party ticket. Although she did not
win the general Senate election of 1922, her campaign raised the
Democratic percentage of the vote to one of its highest levels for
a state race in that year. Photo courtesy of the Minnesota
Historical Society.
The general election was held in November 1922. All of the results were not
immediately known, due to the various rates of vote reporting (and the slower means of
calculating votes typical of that period). However, as the votes were counted, it became
apparent that the Farmer-Labor Party had finally scored some major victories. By mid-
November, all of the results had been tabulated, and the news for both the Republicans and
the Democrats was not good.
The big upset was in the Senate race, in which Henrik Shipstead beat the incumbent
Republican Frank Kellogg and won with a plurality of 45.5% to Kellogg’s mere 33.8%.
Olesen came in a distant third with 17.3 % of the vote. Even so, the Republicans retained
104
Lass, Minnesota: A History, 219.
105
“State Election Results,” Minneapolis Morning Tribune, November 13, 1922, 6.
154
control of the major state offices, including the offices of Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Auditor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General. Preus was narrowly re-elected to the
governor’s office, but only with a plurality of 43% against Magnus Johnson’s 41%. The two
would face each other again in an election much sooner than either of them expected.
106
Further north and west, the Farmer-Labor ticket met with additional success on the
congressional level as well. Ole J. Kvale won the House race in the Seventh District,
unseating the well-known Republican incumbent, Andrew Volstead. Kvale’s victory there
was a culmination of an electoral struggle that had begun with the controversies of the 1920
election. The Farmer-Labor candidate in Minnesota’s Ninth District, Knud Wefald, was also
elected to Congress by a wide margin.
107
On the state level, the results were more mixed, but the trend was still leaning
towards Farmer-Labor gains. Although Preus had been re-elected, the Farmer-Labor Party
had increased its number of seats in the state legislature. Although the state government
would remain largely under the control of Governor Preus and a thin Republican-majority
legislature in 1923, the Farmer-Labor representation in the state legislature had grown, and
this factor would impact legislation (though in some cases, this aided Preus in some of his
reform efforts).
108
Also, in urban Hennepin County, the Farmer-Labor Party was able to elect
106
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 75-77.
107
Minnesota had ten congressional districts before 1933. This number was reduced in 1933 from ten to nine,
and then again in 1963 from nine to eight; for election figures, see Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 75-76.
108
Chrislock, Watchdog of Loyalty, 330; see also “Legislature Narrowly Republican,” Aitkin Independent,
November 11, 1922.
155
six candidates to the state legislature – proving definitively that the movement was not just
agrarian-based.
109
The results of the 1922 election officially signaled the realignment of Minnesota
politics. The Farmer-Labor candidates had won three national offices: Shipstead had been
elected to the Senate, and Kvale and Wefald had been elected as congressional
Representatives. Jacob A. O. Preus had defeated Magnus Johnson, but his margin of victory
had been slim. The Republicans retained control of the state offices and a slight majority in
the state legislature, but the opposition Farmer-Labor Party had made impressive gains.
Overall, even with the notable exception of Anna Dickey Olesen, the Democrats had done
poorly, and were confined to a distant third place in state politics. For much of the next two
decades, this would remain their position in most of Minnesota’s districts and in the
statewide and congressional races.
The instincts of Mahoney and Van Lear had turned out to be correct: the third party
approach was viable and the movement had triumphed as a third party and without any
fusionist compromises. The strategy of joining the farmer and labor lobbies into an official
party had finally been validated by the 1922 election results. Townley’s NPL and the
“nonpartisan” approach were forever finished. From this point on, the impetus would be to
expand the party structure and to reach out to the voter base through a broad grassroots
approach. The nascent Farmer-Labor Party would now officially become the main opposition
to the dominant Republican Party in Minnesota. What had started out as a protest movement
109
“County Elects Six Laborites to Legislature: Nolan Gets Largest Vote – Conservatives Elect Eight in Senate,”
Minneapolis Morning Tribune, November 10, 1922, 9.
156
of farmer and labor groups to infiltrate the major parties had now become a viable third party
of its own.
Although Mahoney and Van Lear’s WPNPL wing had initially been the junior
partners in Townley’s farmer-labor crusade, this relationship had changed entirely between
1919 and 1922. By 1922, the labor tail was wagging the farmer dog, and there seems little
question that the push to create a third party and the subsequent formation of the Farmer-
Labor Party itself was due to the strenuous leadership efforts of Mahoney and Van Lear –
and not to the fading influence of Townley and the NPL.
The November 1922 edition of The National Leader (Arthur Townley’s then current
media outlet), applauded the election of Shipstead and proclaimed the recent election a
triumph in general for the cause. However, in the same edition, Townley himself authored a
full-page editorial which rejected the idea of forming a third party, declaring that third
parties: “. . . never come near to carrying one state” and are “unable to show any result[s].”
He thus concluded that “two parties . . . are the most that I can see doing business in
America.” In other words, Townley expressed his complete rejection of the third party path –
even in the wake of the Farmer-Labor Party’s success in the 1922 election – which he
himself trumpeted. Such sentiments would signal his increasing removal from the leadership
of the farmer-labor movement in Minnesota.
110
What Townley did not see was that the Farmer-Labor Party had become more than
just a viable third party. By 1922 it had essentially become the real second major party in
Minnesota’s de facto two-party system of the 1920s and ‘30s.
110
A. C. Townley, “Should We Restore a Party or Build a New One?” The National Leader, November 1922, 5.
157
CHAPTER IV
THE OPPOSITION: 1923-1929
The election results of 1922 had signaled the unquestioned rise of the Farmer-Labor
Party in Minnesota. Many questions remained, however, about the potential longevity of the
movement and the effectiveness of its elected representatives. In early 1923, Henrik
Shipstead, Ole J. Kvale, and Knud Wefald all journeyed off to Washington, D.C. to take their
seats in Congress. The Republican insurgent, Oscar Keller, had also been re-elected in 1922
and – although not a Farmer-Labor Party member – was sympathetic to many of the Farmer-
Labor aims, and was considered an ally to the Farmer-Labor Party.
1
It would be some time
before the efforts of these men and their positions on a variety of issues would become fully
manifest. In the meantime, changes were occurring nationally – and within Minnesota – that
created favorable conditions for the continuation of the Farmer-Labor Party as a third party
movement.
Minnesota in the 1920s
One of the major trends on the national level that affected Minnesota in the early
1920s was the decline of agricultural prosperity in general. This trend was most pronounced
in the regions of the South, the Midwest and the agricultural areas of the Great Plains states.
1
“Our Progressive Congressmen,” The Minnesota Leader, November 18, 1922; Keller was saluted by the
Farmer-Labor press for his 1922 victory, along with Ole J. Kvale and Knud Wefald.
158
This economic decline was due to several factors. First, a fall in agricultural demand after the
end of the war had led to a significant drop in crop prices in the early 1920s. Second, the
Transportation Act of 1920 had set higher rates of freight transport and had increased
transport costs to farmers.
2
Third, the prevailing social and political atmosphere of the 1920s
had turned away from reform impulses, leaving farmers largely to struggle on their own, or at
most only with the support of their now dwindling political lobbies (the Farmer-Labor Party
in Minnesota being one of the few successful exceptions to this trend). Crop prices would
fluctuate throughout the 1920s, alternating between deflated prices early in the decade and
more stabilization in the latter part of the decade. In general however, the 1920s was not a
period of great agricultural prosperity. Rural regions also lagged behind in electrification and
other infrastructure services considered standard for most urban areas.
3
Last, the cost of new
(and ever more expensive) farm machinery (the tractor was becoming increasingly
ubiquitous in this period) and enhanced taxation on farmsteads (money which was often used
to fund new highway and road construction) placed additional financial burdens on farmers.
Expanded production undertaken during (or just after) the war – along with mortgages taken
out to finance such ventures – were also a common pattern that pressed farmers
economically. In short, the 1920s was a tough economic decade for many Minnesota
farmers.
4
2
Jon M. Wefald, “Congressman Knud Wefald: A Minnesota Voice for Farm Parity,” Minnesota History, 38
(December 1962), 177-178.
3
Edmund Lindop and Margaret J. Goldstein, America in the 1920s (Minneapolis, MN: Lerner Publishing Group,
2010) 52-53.
4
Richard M. Valelly, Radicalism in the States: The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party and the American Political
Economy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 73.
159
Some significant statistics bear out the nature of this agrarian economic decline. In
1919, Minnesota farm crops as a whole were valued at $506 million. By the end of the 1920s,
this figure had been reduced to $310 million. This drop in crop values was not due to reduced
productivity. In fact, the 1920s saw a significant increase in acreage use. A lack of overall
demand coupled with overproduction was largely to blame for this crop price deflation.
Farmers who had obtained more land or increased their acreage use during the war years
often found themselves overextended in the early 1920s. Mortgage defaults on farm
properties rose. Farmers were also affected by the default and consolidation patterns of small
banks within the state (which was part of a larger regional trend during this period). In
Minnesota between 1921 and 1929, 320 state banks and 58 national banks went bankrupt.
Such bank failings were serious events in this era before the FDIC, and depositors (in many
cases, from rural or small town areas) often lost their bank balances if their bank failed. This
bank failure trend would accelerate after October 1929, placing even more strain on the rural
farm economy. Even so, larger banks would expand throughout the 1920s in Minnesota,
consolidating and growing in this period. However, these larger and centralized banks often
lacked the same personal connection to rural communities as the smaller banks which had
preceded them.
5
Likewise, the labor constituency suffered setbacks during the 1920s. After reaching a
historic high point during the peak production years of the war (1917-1918), union
membership in America as a whole swiftly declined. Organized labor in general would be on
retreat during the 1920s, ignored or even targeted by business and government. The fears of
5
Theodore Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State (St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1975),
480-481.
160
radicalism which had emerged in 1919 and 1920 continued to characterize much of the
political mainstream’s reaction to labor activism, as did the association between labor
movements and the fledgling Soviet Union (which many saw as a political and social anti-
thesis to the American way). Unionism would swiftly decline in the early 1920s and remain
at relatively low rates for the remainder of the decade. From 1919 to 1929, the ranks of
organized labor fell sharply, as did strike activity. In 1920, there were about 5 million
unionized laborers in America, but this number had declined to 3.5 million by 1923. By
1929, that number had fallen to about 289,000 (or a total drop from 1920 to 1929 from about
21% to 1.2% of the workforce).
6
Specific unionized labor statistics for Minnesota are
lacking; however, these national trends were reflected in Minnesota as well, and encouraged
by government policies and business organizations (such as the Minneapolis group, the
Citizens’ Alliance) which strongly discouraged unionization.
7
Politics on the national level
were also unequivocally pro-business. However, the general prosperity of the 1920s led to
relatively low rates of unemployment and stable (even rising) wages for labor overall, and
the “welfare capitalism” approaches of some businesses sought to address employee needs
outside of a union structure. All of these were factors in discouraging strong unionization
during this period.
8
The 1920s also saw major changes in media and transportation in Minnesota. Radio
became commercially viable in the early 1920s. The first commercial radio stations were
6
Robert Zieger, American Workers, American Unions, Second Edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1994), 5; see also David J. Goldberg, Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 66-88.
7
William Millikan, "Maintaining 'Law and Order': The Minneapolis Citizen's Alliance in the 1920s" Minnesota
History, Vol. 51, No. 6 (Summer, 1989), 219-233; see also Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 79.
8
Lindop and Goldstein, America in the 1920s, 51-52; see also Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 108; see also
John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1960), 16, 70-74;
see also see also Goldberg, Discontented America: The United States in the 1920s, 66-88.
161
established in Minnesota at this time and the growth in popularity of radio broadcasting
would increase exponentially by the end of the decade. Although much of radio broadcast
programming in the 1920s was not political in nature, during the campaign seasons – or
during periods of political controversy – radio would become an increasingly used and
effective tool for reaching wide audiences by some political figures. Those candidates or
parties with compelling or dramatic rhetorical messages often benefitted accordingly, and the
growth of the radio medium changed the campaign process during this period. Many Farmer-
Labor candidates and figures would use radio broadcasts throughout the 1920s and 1930s as
a means of reaching mass audiences, capitalizing on their bold and dramatic rhetoric.
Transportation underwent significant changes in the 1920s as well. With the mass production
and consumption of automobiles and other vehicles for the first time in American history, the
need for building a road infrastructure system became apparent. Road and highway
construction became a major emphasis of the state government throughout the 1920s. These
initiatives would allow greater access to and from rural areas, but would also raise taxes – not
just on licensed vehicles but also on property owners of rural districts (especially farmers).
9
The Election of 1923
The election of 1922 had resulted in surprise wins for the Farmer-Labor Party. Even
as the party leaders scrambled to create a more cohesive organization, another electoral
opportunity swiftly emerged which presented them with yet another chance to prove their
growing influence. In April 1923, the aging Republican Senator, Knute Nelson, passed away.
9
Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 483-485.
162
Nelson’s death would lead to another struggle in Minnesota between Republicans and the
Farmer-Laborites in the form of a special senatorial election. The sitting Republican
governor, Jacob A. O. Preus, viewed the Senate seat as a means of political advancement.
Preus had expressed senatorial ambitions earlier (in 1922), but had been discouraged by party
elders from challenging Kellogg at that time. In fact, Preus’ ambitions for the Senate seat in
1922 had been one of the main reasons why Preus’s support for Kellogg in the 1922 race had
been nominal. But now – with no incumbent Republican competitor for the seat – Preus saw
his opportunity. As governor, Preus had the power to appoint a Senator to the open seat (even
himself). However, he wanted to win the seat through an open election and demonstrate both
his general popularity and the Republicans’ ability to stem the Farmer-Labor challenge.
Apparently, Preus and his supporters perceived that Shipstead’s victory in 1922 had been
more of a fluke rather than an emerging trend, and did not anticipate a significant challenge
from another major Farmer-Labor figure in 1923.
10
Preus called for a special Senate election and quickly made preparations to run for the
primary election which was to be concluded in June, with the general election to be held in
July. Unfortunately for Preus, a number of other Republicans wanted the Senate seat as well.
Eventually, the Republican primary turned into a race of no less than eight major party
figures, including Preus, Representative Thomas Schall, and even former governor Joseph A.
A. Burnquist. Preus eventually prevailed in the primary with a high plurality – enough to win
the race, but not quite the ringing endorsement that he had hoped for.
11
10
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 41.
11
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 78.
163
The Farmer-Laborites likewise seized the opportunity to occupy the open Senate seat.
Still flush from their victory several months earlier, the Farmer-Labor leaders saw the chance
to consolidate their gains and achieve what had been inconceivable only a few months
earlier, namely, electing two Farmer-Labor Senators. Winning the Senate seat would cement
the party’s position as the main opposition in the state, and open the doors to a long-term
future. There was, however, some disagreement on strategy, and three prominent Farmer-
Labor figures rushed to run in the party primary and win the party’s endorsement. These
included Magnus Johnson (the 1922 Farmer-Labor gubernatorial candidate), Dr. Louis
Fritsche (the infamous former Mayor of New Ulm who had been removed from office by
Governor Burnquist in 1917), and the aging Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr. As a result, this race
would become the most hotly contested Farmer-Labor primary to date. According to Magnus
Johnson’s son, Francis, Lindbergh attempted to dissuade Magnus Johnson from entering the
race. Lindbergh’s reasoning was that Preus had defeated Johnson in a statewide race less than
six months earlier, and as such, Johnson had little chance of winning. However, Johnson was
not swayed by this thinking, since he had come very close to beating Preus in November
1922, and felt certain that his showing would improve (or at least certainly be better than
Lindbergh’s). Despite this intra-party competition, the primary campaign on the Farmer-
Labor side was civil. The decision hinged on matters of voter preference and image. In this
regard, Johnson held the edge and he emerged the clear winner in the June primary.
12
In a
12
Bruce L. Larson, Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,
1971), 271-272; 274.
164
show of support of party unity, Dr. Fritsche enthusiastically campaigned on Johnson’s behalf
during the general election.
13
The general election race between Preus and Johnson lasted only about a month.
During the campaign, Johnson was labeled a “dirt farmer” by his Republican opposition. The
label was meant as an insult – i.e., that Johnson was unsuited for office and supposedly
lacking in his intellectual capacity. As a first generation immigrant, Johnson spoke with a
Swedish accent. However, the label sounded mean and worse – smacked of the kind of
Republican elitism that the Farmer-Laborites had just handily defeated in the 1922 election.
Johnson reinforced this point by proudly embracing the label (emphasizing his close
identification with Scandinavian farmers) and turned his apparent disadvantage into a show
of strength: “The only issue our opponents have raised so far is the cry that a plain farmer
like myself is unfit for such an important office.”
14
He also used a creative sense of humor.
During the many speeches that he delivered in farm settings, he would stand on a manure
spreader and proclaim that it was “the first time he ever stood on a Republican platform.”
15
Johnson also received the strong support of the movement’s friendly newspapers, including
the Minnesota Union Advocate and the Farmer-Labor Advocate – which by July was
praising him in no uncertain terms, and reminding voters that the party’s mission was to
address “widespread dissatisfaction with the present economic conditions” – and that
Johnson represented the voter’s choice for “change.”
16
Johnson was further aided by a
defection of some progressive Minneapolis Republicans who supported the Farmer-Labor
13
“Fritsche Asks Friends to Aid Magnus Johnson,” The Minnesota Leader, July 14, 1923.
14
“High Spots in Johnson Speech,” The Minnesota Leader, July 14, 1923.
15
William E. Lass, Minnesota: A History Second Edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 222.
16
“The Voice of Labor for Magnus Johnson: Why Magnus Johnson Should be Sent to Washington,” Farmer-
Labor Advocate, July 11, 1923.
165
candidate as well.
17
Johnson’s campaign strategy paid off: he won the general election by a
wide margin and became the second Farmer-Labor Senator elected in Minnesota. Preus
continued on as governor; however, he had now become a political liability to the Republican
Party and would not seek re-election in 1924.
18
The Farmer-Labor vote in the rural counties
was significant, and Johnson’s victory was considered a setback for the Republicans and
even the Harding Administration.
19
At the same time, Johnson’s candidacy received
significant majorities in Minneapolis, where he carried eight of thirteen wards – further proof
of strong urban-labor support for the Farmer-Labor cause.
20
In the meantime, Henrik Shipstead had taken his seat in Congress in the spring of
1923. Knute Nelson’s death in April had prevented the senior Senator from officially
introducing Shipstead to the Senate. Instead, that duty was performed by Senator Robert La
Follette of Wisconsin. During much of the early part of that year, there had been speculation
about Shipstead’s upcoming activity in the Senate since he had a reputation as a radical and
was a third party politician. There was a considerable expectation that Shipstead would begin
his career in Washington, D.C., with a series of high profile speaking engagements and
episodes of “grandstanding.” However, in this sense Shipstead’s detractors were to be
disappointed, since the new Senator behaved with tact, restraint, and even decorum during
official and unofficial functions.
21
Likewise, Magnus Johnson had also reinforced his
reputation as a moderate soon after his election by giving a speech before a progressive labor
forum at Carnegie Hall which was covered by the national newspapers. His rhetoric was
17
“Local G.O.P. Progressives Join in Johnson Campaign,” Minnesota Daily Star, July 6, 1923.
18
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 79.
19
“Johnson Swamps Preus: Farm-Labor Candidate for United States Senator Gets Large Majority in Country,”
Minnesota Daily Star, July 17, 1923.
20
“Preus Vote in City Badly Shattered,” Minnesota Daily Star, July 17, 1923.
21
Stuhler, Ten Men of Minnesota, 80.
166
moderate in its tone and made no mention of socialist or radical policies or proposals –
although he did complain about the Republican and Democratic parties in general, and he
attacked the role of the Federal Reserve.
22
For a brief period between mid-1923 and early
1925, Minnesota’s two Senators would both be Farmer-Laborites, and this represented a peak
of national influence in the Senate for the fledgling third party.
The Farmer-Labor Federation and the Farmer-Labor Association
The Farmer-Labor victories in 1922 – along with the swift victory in July 1923 –
were cause for much celebration within the party. Townley’s “nonpartisan” approach had
been permanently refuted and the third party approach validated by these victories. With
Townley’s resignation as state league president in May 1922, the influence of William
Mahoney and Thomas Van Lear had grown and the movement had established itself as a
formal third party. However, Van Lear and Mahoney – the party’s chief architects –
remained concerned about the party’s structure and its lack of hierarchy. In fact, throughout
much of 1922 and 1923, the Farmer-Labor “Party” was really a coalition of political
caucuses, grassroots organizations, and even politicians from other parties who had agreed to
accept or run on a Farmer-Labor endorsement. Much of the party structure between 1921 and
1923 had been formed from local NPL and WPNPL cells, along with their women’s auxiliary
groups. There were divisions and disagreements within the movement itself – despite its
recent electoral successes. Mahoney especially worried about the cohesiveness of the party –
both in a bureaucratic sense and in terms of its platform and ideology. The movement had
22
“Sees Us Drifting Toward Autocracy; Magnus Johnson Tells Progressive-Labor Audience Plain People Are
Nation's Hope,” The New York Times, September 30, 1923; see also "'I'm Some Guy' Says Senator Johnson, In
From The West," The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, September 30, 1923; see also Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-
Laborism, 80.
167
demonstrated that it could win elections; it was still uncertain whether it could maintain its
coalition, formulate an agreed upon and consistent platform, or even keep its own candidates
under its control.
23
Mahoney took the lead on consolidating the party’s structure and unity in 1923. He
envisioned a strong unified party organization (one without separately labeled farmer and
labor groups), a central party authority, a uniform platform, and candidates fully accountable
to the party (and not “independent” candidates – or worse, candidates from other parties).
Mahoney also continued to reject the “fusionist” approach and continued to proclaim the
failure of Townley’s earlier “nonpartisan” tactic.
24
In February 1923, a faction aligned with
Mahoney founded the Farmer-Labor Educational Association. The official purpose of the
organization was to promote political education designed to instill “values of democracy and
citizenship” and resist the influence of corporate interests. The headquarters for this new
branch of the party was the St. Paul Labor Temple building located at 411 South Main Street
in downtown St. Paul – yet another strong indication that the farmer-labor movement was
under the direction of urban-labor leaders.
25
This group (which controlled the publication of the Farmer-Labor Advocate) became
a strong center of support for what later became known as “the Mahoney Plan.” The branch
worked to convince members within the movement to abandon their separate factions and
instead embrace a wider, more unified party structure under centralized leadership.
23
Rude, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement,” 82; see also Gieske, Minnesota
Farmer-Laborism, 81.
24
Even so, Townley was too important a figure to ignore completely, and he was given a prominent spot at the
1923 Farmer-Labor Conference, see Arthur C. Townley, “What is the National Producers’ Alliance?” Farmer-
Labor Convention Proceedings, 1923, 34.
25
The corporate charter documents for the Farmer-Labor Educational Association can be found in the Floyd B.
Olson Papers, Box 2, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Floyd B.
Olson Papers].
168
Mahoney’s long-term plan was ambitious. He sought to first consolidate the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor Party, and then eventually seek an alliance or cooperation with other leftist
groups across the nation, and possibly form a nationwide third party movement. A key
element in the first phase of the plan was the abandonment of the old separate grassroots
groups and organizations in Minnesota, and the creation of a new body – the Farmer-Labor
Federation (or FLF) – which was to become the umbrella for all local party membership. The
FLF was to be separate from the party itself, although the party would control the leadership
of each local chapter. Each FLF group would work to enlarge its membership, collect dues,
and “educate” potential voters on issues in such a way as to make them become loyal party
supporters.
26
The establishment of such an organization would also help the party get around
strict state laws (passed in 1912) which had originally been designed to weaken the power of
party central committees over local party cells. In other words, the new Farmer-Labor
Federation would serve the purpose of recruiting members and driving voter support for
party-selected candidates, but was technically not part of the party’s central committee
structure.
27
Mahoney’s plan was presented at a statewide conference – the “Farmer-Labor
Convention” in early September of 1923. By this time, Mahoney had drafted a proposed
constitution and set of by-laws for the new federation. These nine articles outlined the
purpose, membership, structure and governance of the proposed organization. The FLF was
to “carry on an intensive program of education and organization, incidental to participation in
the political campaigns of the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota” [emphasis in the
26
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 82.
27
Paul S. Holbo, “The Farmer-Labor Association: Minnesota's Party within a Party,” Minnesota History, Vol.
38, No. 7 (Sep., 1963), 302.
169
original]. In other words, the FLF was technically a separate entity – even though its obvious
purpose was to support the Farmer-Labor Party’s campaigns. Membership was open to NPL
and WPNPL members, as well as union members and members of various farmer
organizations. Article II, section 3 specifically stated that affiliated organizations would
retain their “autonomy” but would pledge to co-operate in political campaigns under the
direction of the “State Committee.” The Farmer-Labor Party State Committee would have
authority over the FLF, and were to be elected at annual conventions, however an “Executive
Committee” consisting of five persons were to “handle any routine matters” on a daily
basis.
28
The proposed plan was generally supported by the WPNPL and the urban-labor wing
of the party. However, the NPL wing and some other figures were less enthusiastic in their
support. Mahoney was even opposed by his former partner, Thomas Van Lear, who –
apparently suspecting communist influence in taking such an approach – spoke out against
the formation of the proposed federation at the conference.
29
In addition, the Mahoney plan
was also criticized by the state party chair, Frederick Pike, who thought that the federation
might become too strong in its influence on the party, and that instead the central committee
should remain the controlling entity. Pike – like Van Lear – was also concerned about
communist influence since the new federation was likely to be dominated by Mahoney and
his urban-labor leader allies.
30
The most open opposition however, came when Mahoney’s plan – and his character –
was vehemently attacked by “Delegate Lush” who stridently accused Mahoney of deception
28
Constitution and By-Laws of Proposed FARMER-LABOR FEDERATION, 1923, Minnesota Historical
Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul.
29
Farmer-Labor Convention Proceedings, 1923, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, 17.
30
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 43.
170
and of pushing the plan “down the throats” of the delegates. Mr. Lush had little support in
this show of protest however, and Mahoney himself dispatched Mr. Lush’s arguments
succinctly – and received an ovation from the delegates in doing so. In the end, the plan was
approved, and a committee which included Mahoney was set up to coordinate
implementation of the new federation.
31
Even so, the debate over the implementation of the
FLF would continue for almost a year within the party.
32
For a short time, Van Lear continued his opposition to the creation of the FLF. By
1923, Van Lear had settled into the job of editing the new Minnesota Daily Star, and he used
this outlet to campaign against Mahoney’s proposed federation. In an editorial on September
11, 1923, the Star denounced the Mahoney Plan, asserting that such a process of
consolidation would allow for communist infiltration and influence – and would eventually
mean the death of the party since it would be tarnished with a label of bona fide radicalism.
33
Van Lear and Mahoney never resolved this conflict, and Van Lear retired from politics and
publishing altogether shortly thereafter and relocated to Florida.
34
Despite this significant initial resistance, Mahoney’s plan advanced steadily. In late
1923, Mahoney officially changed the name of the existing WPNPL to the Farmer-Labor
Federation. This was the first step in creating a consolidated infrastructure. In early 1924, the
majority of NPL chapters finally accepted Mahoney’s concept of consolidation and voted to
abandon their NPL structure and take on the FLF label as well (although some chapters of the
31
Farmer-Labor Convention Proceedings, 1923, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, 17, 42.
32
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 82-83.
33
Minnesota Daily Star, September 11, 1923, 6.
34
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 48.
171
NPL would remain independent and outside the FLF).
35
Then, in March 1924 at the state
Farmer-Labor Party convention, the delegates of the party agreed to recognize the Farmer-
Labor Federation as being the main local departments of the party’s structure.
36
In theory, the
new FLF groups would be grassroots cells with an agenda driven by its members. The main
purpose of the FLF was to recruit and retain members (and collect dues), “educate” members
on social and political issues, conduct caucuses to discuss policy, and support Farmer-Labor
candidates during campaigns. However, the party itself would maintain control over each
group’s finances, and much of the agenda of each chapter would be driven by the party and
federation leaders in St. Paul.
37
In March 1924, Mahoney tried to shore up support for his plan by stating that "A
political party in Minnesota is a mere formal shell. Special interests, supported by well-
meaning reformers, have emasculated party organizations."
38
Mahoney’s statement
emphasized the need for a broad-based grassroots organization to not only maintain the
party’s existence, but to also prevent it from being infiltrated by special interests that might
be hostile to the party’s goals. Furthermore, at the March 1924 state convention, Mahoney
and his supporters prepared an extensive platform which outlined the nature of the Minnesota
Farmer-Labor cause. The platform did not shy away from socialist-tinged rhetoric, declaring
that “government . . . [had been] used by both the old parties for the enrichment of the few at
the expense of the many.” The platform included calls for “Public ownership of
transportation and industrial utilities, including stockyards . . . grain elevators, terminal
35
Despite the clause in Article II, Section 3 of the Farmer-Labor Federation Constitution which guaranteed
“sovereignty” for participating member organizations.
36
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 44-45.
37
Holbo, “The Farmer-Labor Association,” 301-309.
38
Minnesota Union Advocate, March 6, 1924; see also Holbo, “The Farmer-Labor Association,” 302.
172
warehouses, pipe lines and tanks . . .” This also included public ownership of public utilities
and “principal natural resources” such as coal and oil. As part of its concept of “Equal
economic, political and legal rights for all,” the platform also included specific planks
supporting labor rights and equity for farmers. The document further “deplore[d] the present
situation of the farmers . . .” and pledged efforts to “substantially and permanently aid” them.
This included open calls to enact state and federal legislation to “enable cooperative agencies
to acquire and operate the marketing machinery” of agriculture and to also create a pool for
storing agricultural surpluses for sale on the world market.
39
The platform was ambitious and
significantly leftist in nature. The party’s desires for state and federal activism also
necessitated some kind of national strategy, and Mahoney would pursue that as well.
As the debate over the consolidation of party-associated groups into the proposed
Farmer-Labor Federation continued into 1924, Mahoney turned his attention to national
efforts at party organization, seeking the possibility of the creation of a nationwide Farmer-
Labor Party. Eventually, a conference was organized in St. Paul in June 1924 which included
leftist delegates from many states and parties. The purpose of the meeting was to attempt to
organize a nationwide movement and possibly even extend the Farmer-Labor Federation
outside of Minnesota. The presidential elections of 1924 were looming, and there were strong
sentiments among the left that a unified campaign led by Robert La Follette of Wisconsin
would be a worthwhile effort. However, the convention would prove to be highly
problematic for Mahoney and the Minnesota farmer-labor movement.
40
39
“Platform of the Farmer-Labor Federation,” typescript draft, March 25, 1924, Farmer-Labor Association
Papers, Box 1, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter Farmer-Labor
Association Papers].
40
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 82.
173
A national Farmer-Labor Party had existed since 1918, and was headquartered in
Chicago. However, this Chicago-based party was strongly associated with hardline labor
groups and even communists. Membership in the movement was small, but meetings had
been held regularly since its founding. This national group went through several stages of
mergers, name changes and consolidations. A coordinating arm, known as the Conference for
Progressive Political Action (CPPA) had also attempted to unify various parties and
movements. In 1923, the Chicago branch was renamed the Federated Farmer-Labor Party.
Like the Minnesota Farmer-Laborites, this group faced controversy in including communists
in its ranks – however, the national movement was more closely aligned with radical leftist
groups and individuals, and had more of its base in that sector (as well as within labor in
general). Despite these issues – and in a reversal of strategy from the 1922 elections –
Mahoney now saw the Chicago group as a potential partner in creating a national third
party.
41
The national conference met in St. Paul in June 1924, and caused considerable
controversy in Minnesota. The meetings were dominated by left-wing labor interests and
communists, and factionalism was rampant. The communists – instructed by the Comintern
to use the opportunity to seize control of the movement – suddenly asserted themselves and
made attempts to take control of the convention and its agenda. The convention then
embraced a platform which included the nationalization of industries and backed radical
candidates – rejecting the more moderate progressive figures. In the end, the national
convention signaled the end of the Farmer-Labor organization as a significant national
41
James Weinstein, “Radicalism in the Midst of Normalcy” The Journal of American History, Vol. 52, No. 4
(March 1966), 775-778; see also “Labor Party of the United States; Farmer-Labor Party of the United States;
Federated Farmer-Labor Party: 1918-1925, Organizational History”
http://www.marxisthistory.org/subject/usa/eam/farmerlaborparty.html, accessed February 12, 2014.
174
movement, since it had now become indelibly tainted with a radicalism and communism. It
was the end of Mahoney’s effort to unify the state party with the national movement, and the
end of open accommodation with radical elements within Minnesota. From this point on, the
national Federated Farmer-Labor Party would remain a small and radical group
headquartered in Chicago, while the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party would continue on its
own, entirely as an entity within the State of Minnesota. In the meantime, the radical nature
of this convention would spill over into local politics and create significant issues for the
Minnesota Farmer-Laborites in the 1924 elections.
42
One of the original intentions of the conference had been to align a base behind La
Follette’s run for the White House. However, La Follette himself had turned away from the
conference upon learning of communist infiltration, seeing the danger of being labeled as too
extreme. He disavowed the convention and denounced it as a meeting of radicals. He further
refused their endorsement or support for his presidential run in 1924. Instead, La Follette
created a national Progressive Party movement just for his run for the presidency in the 1924
election.
43
The now-chastened Mahoney and his Minnesota Farmer-Labor followers salvaged
their relationship with La Follette in September, when they agreed to unite with him in a
common statewide campaign strategy.
44
However, this rush to embrace La Follette’s third
party candidacy would not result in the hoped-for victory for either the Minnesota Farmer-
Labor Party or La Follette.
42
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 85-87.
43
Nancy C. Unger, Fighting Bob La Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical
Society Press, 2008), 288-302.
44
“La Follette, State Central and F-L Federation Groups Unite on Minnesota Plans,” Farmer-Labor Advocate,
September 10, 1924.
175
Despite his setbacks in forming a national coalition, Mahoney’s plan for the state
party organization successfully moved forward. As the Farmer-Labor Federation became the
dominant aspect of the party’s infrastructure throughout 1924, the NPL and WPNPL groups
were largely absorbed and the movement was unified and consolidated. Chapters were set up
in every county in the state. Mahoney’s goal of driving the farmer-labor movement towards a
unified and separate third party course did indeed come to pass. Beginning in 1924, the party
would run all of its own candidates in the general elections. Endorsements for allied (non-
party member) candidates or any hint of “fusionist” deals were now off the table.
However, the successful implementation of the Mahoney Plan throughout 1924 was
not achieved without dissent. At least some of this dissent came from dissatisfied NPL
figures who either questioned the loss of NPL influence within the wider movement or
challenged the party leadership headquartered in St. Paul. One of the most notable of these
cases was that of the former editor of The Minnesota Leader, A. B. Gilbert. Gilbert clashed
with the St. Paul leadership in July 1924, demanding that communists be removed from the
party and claimed that the farmer wing would not stick with a movement which espoused
“communist doctrines.”
45
He was eventually removed from his position in October. Gilbert
then denounced the farmer-labor movement in its entirety, and openly embraced the
Republican slate of candidates in the general election. Gilbert proclaimed that farmers had
been fooled by “conspirators” in the Farmer-Labor Party who had consolidated their control
over the party since March, and further implied that farmer representation on the state-level
committees was woefully insufficient. Gilbert’s charges were refuted by other former NPL
45
Letter of A. B Gilbert to Farmer-Labor Candidates, July 10, 1924, Henry G. Tegan Papers, Minnesota
Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, Minnesota [hereafter Teigan Papers]; see also Gieske, 89.
176
leaders, but the accusations stung, and highlighted a lingering schism between the rural-
agrarian wing of the party and the urban-labor wing.
46
In addition to Gilbert’s attacks, the farmer-labor movement was still in retreat from
the controversy of the national conference, and the scandal of association with the radicals of
the June convention had to be addressed. This would not occur until after the 1924 election,
however. In January 1925, William Mahoney (as President of the FLF) called an official
conference with the overt intention of amending the federation’s constitution.
47
As part of
this re-structuring, the Farmer-Labor Federation was re-named the Farmer-Labor Association
in early 1925.
48
After some months of negotiations and adjustments, the newly-constituted
body was then put under the control of a new executive committee under the leadership of
Magnus Johnson. Also present on this committee was Floyd B. Olson, a rising Farmer-Labor
figure [see below]. William Mahoney also remained a member of the committee – still
present but diminished in his leadership role – since he was now no longer president of the
organization itself. The constitution of this new Farmer-Labor Association (or FLA) publicly
proclaimed that membership in the organization was officially closed to communists at the
same time.
49
Thus, the party’s official position on rejecting radicals was now clearly outlined.
Over time, the Farmer-Labor Association (or FLA) would become the main
grassroots branch of the party and would be responsible for representing the party platform to
46
“A. B. Gilbert Turns Traitor to F-L Cause,” Farmer-Labor Advocate, October 15, 1924 and “N.P.L. Executive
Knocks Gilbert’s Attack on Party,” Farmer-Labor Advocate, October 22, 1924.
47
“Buckler and Mahoney Call Farmer-Labor Conference Saturday, Jan. 17, 10 A.M.” Farmer-Labor Advocate,
January 14, 1925.
48
The radical national Farmer-Labor group based in Chicago eventually billed itself as the “Federated Farmer-
Labor Party” during the 1924 campaign; it is likely that the FLF’s name change in 1925 was done to further
disassociate it from the more radical national party; see also Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 47.
49
Farmer-Labor Association: Constitution, Adopted March 20, 1925, Article II, Section 1; see also Valelly,
Radicalism in the States, 47.
177
its various constituents, conducting caucuses, and endorsing candidates for the primary
elections. Since the 1912 election laws forbade a party central committee from dictating local
party caucuses, the Farmer-Labor Association fulfilled this role by proxy instead. The
association would also continue to recruit members, gather dues, and promote the Farmer-
Labor Party agenda. The association leadership itself remained largely under the control of
the state party leaders. However, by establishing itself as a separate entity, it gave the party
much more control in determining endorsements than was typical. In this regard, the Farmer-
Labor Association would prove to be successful, since Farmer-Labor-endorsed candidates
typically had a consistent advantage in primary elections. Ernest Lundeen’s successful
primary challenges against endorsed candidates in 1928 (for the governor) and in 1930 (for
the Senate) were two major exceptions to this trend [see Chapters Four and Five].
50
The Mahoney Plan organizational approach survived despite setbacks in the 1924
election and lingering associations with national radicals as a result of the 1924 conference.
Yet, even as the FLA was developed and became the party’s dominant arm, the movement
itself started to face issues which sapped its strength and limited its growth. Beginning in
1925, enthusiasm within the ranks started to ebb. Many of the party’s leaders had staked
much of their efforts and fortunes on the creation of the party. By 1925, the party and its
association structure had been firmly established. However, funds were now becoming more
scarce. One early indication of this trend was the bankruptcy of the Minnesota Daily Star in
1924. The squabbles of 1924, La Follette’s poor showing in the election, dwindling party
50
Holbo, “The Farmer-Labor Association,” 302.
178
finances, rising crop prices, and a general decline in labor political activity in the Twin Cities
all contributed to this Farmer-Labor ennui from 1925 to 1929.
51
At the same time, divisions remained between the rural-agrarian and urban-labor
wings of the party. Remnants of the Minnesota NPL continued to operate independently,
even continuing the publication of their own newspaper, The Minnesota Leader throughout
much of the 1920s. Efforts undertaken by the Farmer-Labor Party and FLA leadership to end
this independent NPL activity were not successful.
52
Worse, this NPL sector of the agrarian
wing overtly contradicted the official Farmer-Labor Party line in 1927. In what can only be
described as a bizarre turnabout, The Minnesota Leader – which had scathingly criticized
Thomas Schall in the 1924 Senate election [see below] – held him up in September 1927 as
being a brave lone defender of virtuous principles against a vast “conspiracy” of devious
enemies that supposedly included Republican Governor Theodore Christianson and Magnus
Johnson, among others. Although Schall was not up for re-election in 1928, the sympathy for
him generated by this editorial stance may have played a role in suppressing the farm vote for
other Farmer-Labor candidates in 1928 – and these accusations did nothing to raise the
profile of the Farmer-Labor Party in general.
53
The Platform and Rhetoric of the Farmer-Labor Party in the 1920s
The platform of the Farmer-Labor Party was officially formulated and authored as a
series of planks at its major conferences, which typically occurred every two years. Much of
51
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 46-49.
52
Gieske, Minnesota Farmer-Laborism, 100.
53
“Amazing Conspiracy To Oust Tom Schall From Senate Is Revealed,” The Minnesota Leader, November 1,
1927.
179
the foundation for this platform in the 1920s was drawn from earlier labor and agrarian
movements (such as the NPL). The Farmer-Labor Party platform was adjusted according to
the times and the rise of various sentiments and factions within the party, and it was
articulated or accepted to varying degrees in the 1920s by its main political figures (such as
Charles Lindbergh, Sr., Henrik Shipstead, Ole J. Kvale, Magnus Johnson, Knud Wefald and
others). Since the party candidates were elected from their Minnesota base to both state and
national offices, the party had an agenda at both levels of government – but with similar
themes. This agenda was reflected in the party’s platform and often in the rhetoric of its main
political figures. It was also largely supported by its official and semi-official news organs of
the 1920s such as the Farmer-Labor Advocate (the newspaper most closely aligned with the
Farmer-Labor Party from 1923 to 1927), The Minnesota Leader (the newspaper of the
remnants of the Minnesota NPL), and the Minnesota Daily Star which – though founded and
edited by Thomas Van Lear and Herbert Gaston – operated more as a multi-paged,
mainstream newspaper. During the 1920s, these publications constantly struggled with
financial issues. The Minnesota Daily Star folded in 1924, and the Farmer-Labor Advocate
folded in early 1927.
54
Farmer-Labor domestic policy in the 1920s focused mainly on perceived issues of
economic exploitation, both with an agrarian and a labor (and even a consumer) emphasis.
Although these issues were separate on the surface, there were connected themes of
exploitation which had a long history within both the agrarian and the labor movement.
Much of the proposed Farmer-Labor policy was based on perceptions of economic injustice
54
Iric Nathanson “'Newspaper with a soul': The short-lived Minnesota Daily Star launched in 1920” MinnPost,
March 23, 2015, https://www.minnpost.com/media/2015/03/newspaper-soul-short-lived-minnesota-daily-star-
launched-1920, accessed July 14, 2015.
180
which both the party’s leaders and its members saw being committed by entrenched
corporate interests in league with a corrupted (or corruptible) government at the expense of
the common farmer and laborer. The solutions often proposed in answer to this situation was
government intervention into the economic sphere as an agent that would put common
“producers” and “consumers” on even ground with the corporate giants, while turning state
and federal government into guarantors of economic fairness and opportunity, chiefly
through government intervention into the economic sphere. On the state level, this included
support for tax reforms aimed at easing farmers’ tax burdens due to large acreage or
improvements. It also included plans for state ownership of agribusiness grain terminals,
mills, warehouses, creameries and other storage and exchange facilities. Since these facilities
were often the main point of contact between farmers and agribusiness, the goal was to create
holding and transfer facilities under government regulation or control (which would in theory
treat farmers more fairly). The platform also included a tonnage tax on the iron ore mined
within Minnesota both as a means to shift tax burdens more towards big business, but also as
a means to encourage further development in Minnesota through increased tax revenue. This
tax proposal also emphasized a major concept of the platform that natural resources should
be shared more equally. The party was also committed to increasing economic opportunity at
the federal level. There were calls among the party’s main figures for the construction of a
navigable Great Lakes to the St. Lawrence Seaway connection – which would give farmers
of the region better (and more direct) access to world agrarian markets.
55
In the 1920s, this
55
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 74.
181
was a distant pipe dream, however, in the long-term the plan would eventually be realized as
a grand engineering feat completed in the 1950s.
56
Some more specific planks from the 1924 Farmer-Labor Association platform draft
included the call for “Equal economic, political and legal rights for all, irrespective of sex or
color” and for the “abolition of the injunction in labor cases . . .” and of “labor’s right to
organize and bargain collectively . . .” The platform further called for the “conservation of
natural resources” including forests and mineral deposits. Electric power was identified as
being “the power of the future” and as such, the party sought to enact legislation making it
possible for the state to own and operate electric power plants, and set reasonable rates for
consumers. The platform also “deplore[d] the present situation of the farmers” and
condemned “the merciless deflation policy of the Federal Reserve Board.”
57
From about 1924 to 1928, the Farmer-Labor Party and its congressional allies
supported a proposal that became known as the McNary-Haugen Plan. This was actually a
series of bills passed several times by the House and the Senate in this period. The main aim
of the plan was to enable the federal government the means to purchase excess grain or other
agricultural stock and remove the excess supply from the national market for each
commodity in order to drive up and stabilize prices. The excess held by the government
would then be turned around and sold overseas. The amount of grain that would be stored
would be varied in order to first raise and then stabilize the market.
58
One of the main
56
In 1959, this transportation route was finally completed, and Duluth became one of the largest interior ports in
the world, see Blegen, Minnesota: A History of the State, 561.
57
“Platform of the Farmer-Labor Federation,” typescript draft, March 25, 1924, Farmer-Labor Association
Papers, Box 1.
58
John D. Black, “The McNary-Haugen Movement,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 18, No. 3
(September 1928), 406-427; see also R. Douglas Hurt, Problems of Plenty: The American Farmer in the
Twentieth Century (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 59.
182
architects of this plan was George N. Peek, who tirelessly sought to promote the concept of
the federal government as a sort of national merchant as a means to provide economic
“equalization” for farmers.
59
This plan was praised by the Farmer-Laborites as suitable
national agricultural policy. The plan also had significant support among farmers in other
states and from a number of congressional figures such as Southern Democrats and some
Western and Midwestern Republicans, who formed a “Farm Bloc” in Congress. Since corn
prices experienced a price drop similar to wheat until 1924 (and continued at low prices for
much of the 1920s), there was significant support for McNary-Haugenism in corn states such
as Iowa as well.
60
Such broad support for the plan ensured its prominence. Although the bill
was formulated and passed by Congress several times, it was vetoed twice by President
Calvin Coolidge (first in 1927 and then again in 1928). Despite a serious attempt to override
Coolidge’s veto in 1928, the bill was ultimately defeated and the plan was never
implemented.
61
The response from the Farmer-Labor congressional caucus was predictably
negative on the failures between 1926 and 1928 to enact this major farm bill. Shipstead,
Wefald and other Farmer-Labor figures denounced these congressional defeats and
presidential vetoes as major setbacks to agrarian policy. Magnus Johnson responded to the
defeat of an early draft of the bill in Congress in June 1926 by declaring that farmers had
been “betrayed.”
62
59
Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1954), 38-150.
60
Kimberly Porter, “Embracing the Pluralist Perspective: The Iowa Farm Bureau Federation and the McNary-
Haugen Movement,” Agricultural History, Vol. 74, No. 2 (Spring 2000), 381-392.
61
David Greenberg, Calvin Coolidge (New York: Times Books, 2006), 149; see also Amity Shlaes, Coolidge
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), 324, 354 and Fite, George N. Peek, 193-196.
62
“Congress False to Farm Cause: Agriculture Betrayed by Failure to Enact Haugen Bill,” Minneapolis Morning
Tribune, June 4, 1926.
183
The issues of the labor movement in this period were different, but similar in their
patterns of demands for government-led reform. As noted earlier, the 1920s was a decade of
retreat for organized labor due to several factors. These included Republican presidential
politics under Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover that favored a
laissez-faire economic policy. In addition, the taint of radicalism after 1919 also tinged the
organized labor movement and made its leaders and goals less palatable to the political
mainstream. Court injunctions were often used as a tool against organized labor protests or
strikes, and both local and national governments were typically not sympathetic to the
organized labor cause. Even so, labor continued to agitate for improvements, and the Farmer-
Labor Party was consistent in its support for many of these aims. On the state level, the party
had opposed efforts just after the war to create a permanent constabulary. The actions of the
Minnesota Commission of Public Safety and its deployment against organized labor efforts
during the war were fresh in mind. The party also influenced the creation of the new State
Highway Patrol division and the new Bureau of Criminal Apprehension in the early 1920s.
Because of Farmer-Labor influence in crafting this legislation, both agencies were banned for
use as tools against labor. The party also supported efforts to create jobs through public
works projects beginning in the 1920s and would later expand this emphasis during the Great
Depression in the 1930s. Direct government job creation in public works was seen as an
avenue to reducing unemployment, and remained a long-term plank of the party as well. On
the federal level, the party sought to remove the power of the federal courts in imposing
injunctions against labor during disputes with management. These efforts would bear fruit
starting in 1928, when a bill which supported this approach (authored by Henrik Shipstead)
184
was first introduced into the Senate. Shipstead’s bill did not pass, however a later version of
it – the Norris-LaGuardia Act – would pass in 1932.
63
On issues of foreign policy in the 1920s, the Farmer-Labor Party’s stance and the
sentiments of its political figures seemed to be shaped as much by the experience of the Great
War as by their suspicion of a government with imperial powers and ambitions. The
fledgling farmer-labor movement had suffered government persecution during the war and
this experience was not forgotten. For the early party figures and the NPL in 1917-1918,
American participation in the war had been a questionable policy at best. Figures such as
Charles Lindbergh, Sr. and Robert La Follette had openly labeled the war unnecessary and
empowering to corporate interests. These continuing Farmer-Labor suspicions of war,
foreign entanglement, and the enhancement of government powers remained ensconced
within the Farmer-Labor Party’s ranks. As a result, isolationism was the norm for the party’s
figures throughout the 1920s. Such sentiments were typical for the political mainstream in
this period of time. Thus, efforts by the federal government to pass treaties, engage in
international arrangements, or undertake foreign military missions (especially in Latin
America and the Caribbean) were often opposed and loudly criticized by Farmer-Labor
figures. This included the American entry into the League of Nations, military conscription,
and harsh Allied policies against Germany (all of which were seen as preludes to another
war). Another related case in point was Senator Shipstead’s denunciation of American
participation in the World Court – an issue which reached a peak in 1926. Shipstead voted
against American involvement with this plan, and the volume of letters in his personal papers
63
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 80-81.
185
strongly express agreement with this position.
64
In essence, the Farmer-Labor figures saw
interventionist foreign policy as a distraction and an excuse for the continued status quo of
economic exploitation. This appeal would play well throughout the 1920s and even the years
of the Great Depression in the early and mid-1930s, but would eventually lose its appeal as
America edged closer to intervention against the Axis powers in the late 1930s.
The rhetorical messages employed by the Farmer-Labor Party and its associated
figures had a number of common themes, and typically changed little in the 1920s in terms of
issues and their proposed solutions. This rhetoric took many forms in this period. Much of it
was campaign oratory, some of which survives in archival collections and other sources.
Some of it can also be found in the many publications associated with the party, the Farmer-
Labor Association, and the various individual candidates and leaders who ran under the
party’s banner. Much of this rhetoric centered on economic issues of importance to the main
base of the party, namely the rural-agrarian and urban-labor wings. Many of these major
themes had emerged from earlier trends, such as the Populist Party movement of the 1890s,
the sentiments represented by at least some of the progressive reforms of the early 1900s, and
more recently, the NPL movement. Arthur C. Townley himself had been a master orator and
rhetorician – especially in terms of formulating visions of agrarian discontent and identifying
a set of villains and solutions. In fact, many of Townley’s NPL rhetorical messages would
make a relatively easy transition into the farmer-labor movement after 1922.
64
Henrik Shipstead Papers, Box 1, Minnesota Historical Society, Gale Family Library, St. Paul, MN [hereafter
Henrik Shipstead Papers]; A number of blank form letters had been created and distributed to citizens by an
unknown organization, urging them to sign the letters to protest American involvement with the World Court.
Shipstead kept dozens of these letters, possibly as evidence of popular support for his position; see also Senator
Shipstead quoted in the Congressional Record, Volume 67, 2658, 2676-2677, and 2820-2821.
186
The main themes of the Farmer-Labor rhetoric focused on economic injustice in the
agrarian and labor realms, and proposed a wide array of solutions to be instituted by
government on the state and federal level in order to alleviate these conditions. In general,
the party purported to represent the needs of the “common man” in his struggle with big
business. According to this view, the recent decades of change which had brought large-scale
industrialization and had created national markets through the expansion of railroads, had led
to farmers and laborers facing the threat of permanent economic decline and exploitation.
Government intervention (under the control of a party or individuals sympathetic to the needs
of common persons) was needed to regulate big business and its controls over the economy
to allow individuals (often known as “producers” – i.e., those who actually produced the
crops or goods) to be rewarded fairly for their efforts. At the same time, the aim was to
ensure fair prices for the common buying public (or “consumers”) that depended on
reasonable prices in order to maintain a decent standard of living. Farmer-Labor rhetoric thus
assumed an important role in the movement, since it depicted a society in great need of
significant economic reform. The main emphasis was to convince its members and
sympathetic voters that they – the common producers and consumers – were being robbed of
their fair share of proceeds of their own production. Because of this, much of the Farmer-
Labor rhetoric cast a gloomy picture of the current state of the economy, and strongly
implied that governmental action along the lines of the party’s platform was the only
practical means of empowering the agrarian and laboring classes. This plan would then lead
to the salvation of American democracy by denying excessive power (both political and
economic) to the monied and corporate interests and empowering the common citizens.
65
65
Leslie Gene Rude, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement,” Ph.D. Dissertation,
187
In the agrarian sphere, the movement had a longer history and a well-established
rhetorical pattern which explained both the dysfunction of the current system and proposed
solutions. Much of this agrarian rhetorical heritage can be seen in the messages of Townley
and the NPL movement which preceded the Farmer-Labor Party. In general, the messages
charged that there was an agribusiness monopoly (or near monopoly) and a lack of fair
access to markets for farmers. Railroads, banks, and agribusiness entities (which actually
purchased and transported crops in the rural areas) were squeezing the farmers and were
systematically exploiting them. The price of crops had risen during the boom years of World
War I – but the price ceiling imposed by the government at that time had impinged on farmer
prosperity – even during this time of great demand. Then, in the early 1920s, crop price
deflation caused hardship after farmers had been encouraged to increase their production
during the war but then faced a soft market afterwards. They were then often unable to
recoup their investments (or even faced possible bankruptcy or foreclosure). The interest on
loans to farmers was high and was influenced by the villainous Federal Reserve System –
which often figured as a major culprit in Farmer-Labor rhetoric (especially for such figures
as Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr. and Henrik Shipstead) since it was alleged to be behind the
monetary policy which caused deflation and set interest rates.
66
In the sphere of labor, the themes were similar in some ways, but addressed a
different type of exploitation and perceived economic injustice. The party’s urban-labor wing
had concerns after the war regarding ample job opportunities, sufficient wages, the right to
University of Illinois, 1962, 275.
66
Charles Lindbergh Sr., The Economic Pinch (Costa Mesa, CA: Noontide Press, 1923), 77-98; Arthur C.
Townley, “What is the National Producers’ Alliance,” Minnesota Farmer-Labor Convention Proceedings
(1923), 34; see also Arthur C. Townley, The National Producers’ Alliance (1922) excerpts reprinted in James
M. Youngdale (editor), Third Party Footprints: An Anthology from Writings and Speeches of Midwest Radicals
(Minneapolis, MN: Ross & Haines, Inc., 1966), 122-123 and 182-185.
188
unionize, workmen’s compensation, and a general concern over the cost of living. Although
the 1920s represented a time of relatively low unemployment and slowly rising wages, there
was a longstanding perception on the part of the labor sector that wages were not increasing
sufficiently to keep up with the cost of living. Accusations of excessive corporate greed and
exploitation were common, as were charges that these business interests had placed regular
politicians under their influence. Like the agrarian-oriented rhetoric, the labor-oriented
rhetoric targeted big business and corrupt government (as ruled by the two major parties).
This system was portrayed as being beyond reform and under the constant influence of
money from big business – who sought to protect their existing privileges. The Farmer-
Laborites often labeled the major parties as being in cahoots with the businesses who sought
to quell labor unrest and prevent organization that would benefit the common worker. More
specifically on the local level, the Farmer-Labor rhetoric disdained the approach of using the
National Guard or any other official constabulary as a means of suppressing labor during
disputes. Since this approach had been used in Minnesota during World War I, the party
leaders had had direct experience with this, as had their labor constituency. This particular
Farmer-Labor plank was seen as being very friendly to labor – since it sought to prohibit the
state from using coercion to end labor disputes.
67
Farmer-Labor rhetoric also espoused a number of recurring themes, which centered
on the unfairness of the current economic situation and which perpetuated a system of
continuing exploitation. These themes were also angry in tone and were meant to solidify
farmer and laborer discontent, and feed a sense of economic injustice that would lead to
electoral support for the party. Such rhetorical appeals of the party and its leaders allowed the
67
Valelly, Radicalism in the States, 77-80.
189
farmer-labor movement in Minnesota to effectively gain control of the mainstream
“dissident” political discontent in the 1920s and become the main opposition party in the
state.
68
Even so, such approaches necessitated a careful rhetorical balance between dissent
and sedition – and between reform and radicalism. In its formative years during the war, the
movement had been accused of harboring treasonous sentiments or of even advocating
revolution. The Farmer-Labor rhetoric had a tone of outrage and called for decisive – even
extreme – political action. Yet (as its leaders generally acknowledged), the movement’s
rhetoric could not be so extreme as to confirm the charges of unfettered radicalism that were
often leveled against them by their opponents. In the 1920s, such figures as Henrik Shipstead
and Magnus Johnson were avid practitioners of this approach. As such, Farmer-Labor
rhetoric was both offensive and defensive in nature. In its offensive vein, it sought to create
or give voice to dissatisfaction and lead to government intervention and possibly even
ownership of important means of economic exchanges and distribution. In its defensive vein,
the Farmer-Labor rhetoric denied being communist or subversively radical. It also defended
itself against frequent charges that socialism was its main influence or goal. Instead, its
defensive rhetoric often posited that the movement was an assertion of true American
democracy (i.e., equality, economic fairness, and Jeffersonian ideals of the agrarian republic,
etc.), that it represented the compassionate and genuine nature of Christianity (i.e., the
movement was not “godless” or excessively secular – trends often associated with socialism
and communism), and that its planks were practical and achievable.
69
68
Rude, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement,” 276-277.
69
Rude, “A Rhetorical Analysis of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Movement,” 198-205.
