Transnational Threats to Maritime Systems and
Seaport Security
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Seaports, like some airports, are international ports of entry (POE) where
commercial vessels arrive to load and discharge cargo and passengers. U.S. seaports
facilitate the importation and exportation of essential foods, equipment, electronics,
medicines, chemicals, automobiles, and exotic merchandise totaling over $700 billion
annually (Downes et al. 2019; Knatz, 2017; Peckam, 2012). There are 361 U.S. seaports
that facilitate the movement of more than 95% of overseas cargo by volume (Anand &
Grainger, 2018; Bagchi & Paul, 2017) which presents an array of business and security
challenges. With a majority of goods being transported onboard ships destined for
seaports around the world, the risk of importing illicit drugs, dangerous weapons or
people into the United States increases (Rana & Moditsi, 2017; Yagoub, 2016; Zaitch,
2002). Large volumes of cargo in transit and the role of seaports in facilitating economic
growth and competitiveness makes them ideal systems for exploitation or terrorist targets
(Bagchi & Paul, 2017). Further, these large volumes of legitimate cargo repeatedly render
port security measures ineffective against transnational organized criminals (TOCs), who
routinely exploit the maritime transportation system to smuggle dangerous drugs into
seaports around the world and could one day act as a mechanism for terrorist to smuggle
a weaponized device.
The aim of this study was to explore U.S. seaports to understand why illegitimate
actors and illicit goods gain unauthorized access to restricted facilities and cargo. The
exploitation of legitimate seaport operations undermines security practices and renders
the nation vulnerable to acts of terrorism that could result in significant loss of life or
major economic disruptions (Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002). This study
included an exploration of governmental reports and data, criminal trends, an analysis of
seaport security measures, and participant interviews. In this study, I examined
information using case studies of transnational criminal organizations to understand their
frequently used methods of exploitation targeting seaports. This information provided
interrelated insights into transnational organized criminals and terrorist groups.
In addition to the background, this chapter includes the problem statement,
purpose of the study, research questions, theoretical foundation, nature of the study, and
definitions of key terms. Additionally, I identify the gap in the literature that led to this
study, as well as discuss the assumptions, scope and delimitations, limitations, and
significance of the study. I summarize key points in the chapter’s conclusions.
Background
Researchers have recognized the susceptibility of U.S. seaports to groups engaged
in illicit activity including drug trafficking, cargo theft, and smuggling of contraband and
people. The smuggling techniques used by traffickers to ship narcotics through U.S.
seaports undermines legitimate business practices, contributes to a national opioid crisis,
and exposes the nation to potential threats of terrorism. Terrorism on seaports can cause
risk to life, and the economy (Chang & Thai, 2016; Maritime Transportation Security
Act, 2002). It is estimated that a disruption resulting in the closing of a major U.S. seaport
could cost the nation more than $1 billion dollars per day (Bagchi & Paul, 2017; Leonard
et al., 2015). Further, the economic impact of a nuclear terrorist attack on a major U.S.
seaport and city would be catastrophic, resulting in disruption of U.S. trade between
$100-200 billion and 50,000 to 100,000 deaths (Abt, 2003).
Data indicates that out of 40,126 recorded terrorist attacks between 1968 and
2007, only 136 were against the maritime industry (Eski, 2016); however, transnational
criminal operations expose seaport vulnerabilities. There is also historical evidence of
terrorist interest in maritime targets. For example, in 2000, members of the Al-Qaeda
network attacked the USS Cole while it was docked in Aden, Yemen, killing 17
American sailors and injuring 42 others (Prodan, 2017). In 2002, Al-Qaeda, attacked the
MV Limburg (157,000-ton crude oil tanker) in Yemen (Prodan, 2017). These attacks
have exposed major vulnerabilities on international waterways linking commercial and
military vessels to seaport facilities. For instance, plausible threat scenarios regarding the
nation’s major seaports involve concerns of a deliberate attempt to smuggle a weapon of
mass destruction (WMD) inside of a cargo shipping container. WMDs are any destructive
device designed or intended to cause death, or serious bodily injury through explosion or
the release of toxins, poisonous chemicals, or their precursors (Department of Homeland
Security, 2018), which terrorist groups have declared their intention to acquire and use
(Maras & Miranda, 2016). Though lessons learned from the September 11, 2001, attacks
have enabled security officials to better conceptualize and anticipate the dangerous
consequences of a compromised aviation system, the maritime sector of the transportation
network has not been fully examined.
Despite the threat of potential attacks, maritime security measures have not
adequately secured seaports against unauthorized access to restricted port facilities and
cargo. There is also gap in the literature on the possible factors that allow individuals and
illicit goods entry into U.S. seaports. Although a modest body of scholarship exists on
protecting critical infrastructure, there is limited research specific to U.S. seaport security.
The lack of research on U.S. seaports, coupled with increasing exploitation of legitimate
cargo to smuggle illicit goods and increasing interactions between transnational criminal
organizations, compelled this examination of maritime security measures. Findings from
this study provides local, state, and federal authorities, including U.S. policy makers with
additional knowledge they can use towards future efforts to secure U.S. seaports against
organized crime and terrorism.
Problem Statement
Smuggling techniques used by traffickers to ship narcotics through U.S. seaports
impacts business, fuels the opioid crisis and exposes vulnerabilities that criminal
organizations or terrorist groups may further exploit to funnel illicit items, launder
money, or potentially deliver a weaponized device into the United States (Shapiro et al,
2018). Ineffective security measures at U.S. seaports exposes both industry and the nation
to substantial economic risk (Chang & Thai, 2016). It is estimated that a disruption
resulting in the closing of a major U.S. seaport could cost the nation more than $1 billion
dollars per day (Bagchi & Paul, 2017; Leonard et al., 2015). But there is limited research
specific to U.S. seaport security. Literature reviewed offers only a cursory examination of
maritime laws governing seaports and port security funding as a component of security
cost benefit analysis (Knatz, 2017; Romero-Faz & Camarero, 2017). None of the studies
reviewed examined the security of seaports from the perspective of U.S. security officials
or sought to identify factors that impact the effectiveness of seaport security measures or
those institutional factors inadvertently contributing to security vulnerabilities. This study
provides insight into why existing maritime security measures have not adequately
secured seaports against unauthorized access to restricted port facilities and cargo.
Purpose
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore seaport security
measures to understand internal and external factors that impact protection practices at
U.S. seaports. This study sought to collect data primarily through document analysis and
from participant interviews with individuals who are responsible for implementing
security practices required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).
History has demonstrated an advanced level of sophistication and complexity rooted
within the operational practices of transnational criminal organizations and terrorist
networks. Transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups are organized and
well equipped with modern communications, weapons, and watercrafts to “conduct
smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband” (Department of Homeland
Security, 2005, p. 5). The demonstrated ability and willingness of these groups to exploit
archaic or passive security measures to conduct illicit activities must not be
underestimated. Maritime drug smuggling routes and methods highlight the plausibility of
transporting and introducing foreign extremists or a weaponized device into a U.S.
seaport.
Research Questions
Research Question 1: What are the meanings, structures, and essence of lived
experience of seaport security officials, in terms of instituting security measures required
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002?
Research Question 2: What do seaport security officials perceive as barriers and
facilitators to implementing security practices at U.S. seaports?
Theoretical Framework
Seaport operations involve arrangements between separate interrelated elements
functioning together. Like living organisms that are sustained by synchronized organ
functions in which the actions of one effect the performance of others, seaports are
isomorphic systems found among the social and economic sciences. Seaport
vulnerabilities and exploitation are likely outcomes attributed to host miscalculations,
misalignments, errors, misdiagnosis, and mistreatments, allowing for invasion of criminal
organizations. In the context of this study, “seaport security” is theorized as being a social
construct requiring consistent practical application to be successful. Seaports are
governed geographic boundaries, acting as host to various interdependent elements
responsible for the facilitation of global trade. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Port Authority Police Departments, and other
local, and state agencies work semi-harmoniously to create a layer of security, protecting
the system from disruption and exploitation by criminal and terrorist organizations.
Seaport operations share homologous structures with those found in numerous complex
sciences such as physics, biology, engineering, and law. They share similarities in
principles that govern the behaviors and interactions of entities, and actors working in
U.S. seaports and are subject to invasion from rational criminal actors who seek to exploit
them. Therefore, Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s (1968) general systems theory (GST), which
is applicable to exploring the nature of complex systems, helped to analyze the complex
nature of seaports. General systems theory can be described as a science of wholeness
offering a universal set of principles that apply to any system in general (von Bertalanffy,
1968). GST is a logico-mathematical discipline applicable to all sciences that explore the
nature of complex systems (von Bertalanffy, 2008). Like weakened biological systems,
the open, competitive, and porous nature of seaports makes them susceptible to invasion
from transnational criminal organization elements. As complex systems, seaport inputs
and outputs are driven by open trade markets, consumer demand, intermodal and
logistical capabilities, and storage spaces that support the interactions of diverse organic
elements operating within the maritime environment.
I conceptualized seaports as a unique individual system within a larger global
maritime transportation system. Seaports are interconnected by waterways, vessels,
vehicles, internal and external system users. As a homologous match to biological,
psychological, mechanical, and social sciences, seaports depend on internal and external
resources to function, and to produce its projected outputs (Perry, 1972). Seaports also
share unique principles that govern interactions, and behaviors between various
interconnected elements. Seaports operate within specific boundaries and retain unique
cultural norms, structures, models, laws, language, processes, goals, and challenges.
Seaports are governmental, political, and corporate bodies with overlapping authorities
and responsibilities. Therefore, there exists various sources of motivation among people,
groups, entities, and industries interacting in seaports (Peery, 1972). Individual
motivations likely influence perceptions, methods, and the subsequent outcomes of
seaport security measures. Von Bertalanffy (1972) asserted that the main characteristics
of living things are found in their organization; therefore, important phenomena are best
understood through investigation of systems. Security measures in use at U.S. seaports
establishes required processes and procedures to restrict infiltration of unauthorized
people and illicit goods. However, despite the implementation of security
countermeasures, the system remains weakened by corrupt users. Seaport smuggling
occurs when rational actors circumvent system laws by acquiring host elements to
facilitate illicit shipments among legitimate cargo. General systems theory is useful in
studying complex organizational systems; it guided my research and aided in answering
the study’s research questions.
Nature of Study
The nature of this study is founded in qualitative research. Qualitative research is
exploratory in nature and therefore ideal for systematically collecting data relevant to
understanding why maritime security regimes have not adequately secured seaports
against unauthorized access to restricted port facilities and cargo. Qualitative research
offers flexibility and typically is not intended to prove or test a theory; however,
applicable theories emerged once the data was collected and analyzed (O’Sullivan et al.,
2017). Further, a case study design was appropriate for this study, as case studies are a
qualitative approach to explore real-life systems (Creswell & Poth, 2018), which is used
to examine people, decisions, programs, and entities with unique characteristics relevant
to a researcher’s interest (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). Documents and unclassified records
were obtained from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and used to
conduct an in-depth analysis of the nature and number of incidents involving security and
smuggling at U.S. seaports. The DHS reports were analyzed to determine what common
themes emerge as indicators of contributing factors to circumvention of security measures
and smuggling. Based on my findings, I delineated seaports as individual cases in the
study.
In addition to analyzing documents using publicly available information, I
identified current security officials, including chiefs of police, security directors, facility
security officers (FSOs), federal officers, and other homeland security leaders who were
contacted and invited to participate in an audio recorded Zoom interview. Nonprobability
purposeful sampling was used to recruit experienced participants. A sample population of
10 participants were interviewed from U.S. seaports. Using an interview guide, questions
were posed to participants; each question was open-ended and focused on beliefs,
perceptions, and opinions of institutional influences on seaport security measures and
proposed solutions to improve security practices. Responses were documented using both
detailed notes and digital audio recordings. Participants’ responses were collected,
analyzed, and verified using member checking prior to the application of open coding and
thematic coding, followed by a secondary inquiry for emergent themes using computer
assisted qualitative data analysis (Saldana, 2016). This combined approach supported
validation, corroboration, triangulation and produced a more holistic understanding of
this participant responses and the issue under study.
Definition of Terms
The terminology used in this research are common within maritime communities
and derived from the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) and the American Association
Port Authorities (AAPA). The proceeding definitions are provided for the purpose of
clarifying terminology and supporting contextual meaning throughout this study.
Breach of security: An incident that has not resulted in a transportation security
incident, in which security measures have been circumvented, eluded, or violated (33
CFR §101.105).
Container: A box made of aluminum, steel or fiberglass used to transport cargo by
ship, rail, truck, or barge. The common dimensions of a container are 20 x 8 x 8 (called a
TEU or 20-foot equivalent unit) or 40 x 8 x 8, (called an FEU, or 40 ft.
equivalent unit). In the container industry, containers are usually simply called boxes
(AAPA, n.d.).
Declaration of security (DOS): An agreement executed between the responsible
vessel and facility security officer, or between vessel security officers in the case of a
vessel-to-vessel activity, that provides a means for ensuring that all shared security
concerns are properly addressed, and security will remain in place throughout the time a
vessel is moored to the facility or for the duration of the vessel-to-vessel activity,
respectively (33 CFR §101.105).
Exploitation: The act of taking advantage of something; the act of taking unjust
advantage of another for one’s own benefit (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2009).
Facility security assessment (FSA): An analysis that examines and evaluates the
infrastructure and operations of the facility taking into account possible threats,
vulnerabilities, consequences, and existing protective measures, procedures, and
operations (33 CFR §101.105).
Facility security officer (FSO): The person designated as responsible for the
development, implementation, revision and maintenance of the facility security plan and
for liaison with the COTP and Company and Vessel Security Officers (33 CFR
§101.105).
Facility security plan (FSP): The plan developed to ensure the application of
security measures designed to protect the facility and its servicing vessels or those vessels
interfacing with the facility, their cargoes, and persons on board at the respective
MARSEC Levels (33 CFR §101.105).
Maritime security (MARSEC): The security level set to reflect the prevailing
threat environment to the marine elements of the national transportation system, including
ports, vessels, facilities, and critical assets and infrastructure located on or adjacent to
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S (33 CFR §101.105).
MARSEC Level 1: The level for which minimum appropriate security measures
shall be maintained at all times (33 CFR §101.105).
MARSEC Level 2: The level for which appropriate additional protective security
measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of a
transportation security incident (33 CFR §101.105).
MARSEC Level 3: The level for which further specific protective security
measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a transportation security
incident is probable, imminent, or has occurred, although it may not be possible to
identify the specific target of the threat (33 CFR §101.105).
Terrorism: The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives (28 C.F.R. § 0.85).
Transportation security incident (TSI): A security incident resulting in a
significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or
economic disruption in an area (33 CFR §101.105).
Assumptions
In this study, I assumed that there is a need to better understand what, if any,
impact does policy, economic practices, or politics have on security practices as U.S.
seaports. It was furthermore assumed that ongoing exploitation of the global supply chain
by transnational criminal organizations jeopardizes security at U.S. seaports, allowing for
terrorist targeting to be directed to economic infrastructure. I assumed that individuals are
willing participants in this study and that they would provide responses only based on
factual knowledge obtained through experiences and observations of the phenomenon
under study.
I also assumed that the promise of confidentiality and anonymity would result in
participants being truthful and forthcoming in sharing of information related to seaport
security within their respective geography and professional experience. All sources,
documents, and literature that were a part of this research were free of biases and were
objective and accurate. It is assumed that the information derived from secondary data
sources were thoroughly evaluated, assessed, and accurately reported based on acceptable
research and legal collection methods. It is also contended that this study’s sample size is
adequate to fulfil its stated purpose of exploring security measures at U.S. seaports. This
study adheres with research ethical guidelines; therefore, I assumed that the use of
secondary information did not skew the results of the study.
Scope and Delimitations
This study was focused on security measures in use at U.S. seaports. The study
explored maritime security measures instituted under the Maritime Transportation
Security of 2002 and other legal regimes acting in concert to prevent unauthorized entry
into regulated facilities and cargo. I was unable to conduct field observations or in person
interviews as part of this study due to geographical restraints and limited resources to
support extensive travel and basic accommodations. Moreover, the method and design of
this study inevitably led to encounters with security sensitive information that restricted
its incorporation into my findings.
I included the use network sampling, which is more respondent driven, as an
alternate strategy. Network sampling originates from a small group of initial participants
from the study population who are asked to recruit up to three new contacts from within
their network (Patton, 2015). No participants were required to participate. All participants
were adults, and no minors or members of vulnerable populations were included in this
study. Recruiting and selection of participants was fair and impartial; gender, race, age
and/or nationality were not relevant factors or of interest to this study, so participants
were not be asked to disclose such. Due to legal limitations in investigating security
sensitive measures at seaports, ports being spaced geographically, distinctions in cargo
commodities, and diffusion of authorities of the sample population, the findings from this
study should be considered exploratory and not to be generalized to other populations.
Limitations
Limitations of this study includes encounters with information that is designated
as Sensitive Security Information (SSI) or classified under 49 Code of Federal
Regulation, Part 1520.5(b). Additional potential barriers or challenges include my
professional affiliation and experience as a law enforcement practitioner. Recruiting
participants for interviews and objective separation of my role as a law enforcement
officer from my role as researcher required constant evaluation and accountability.
Challenges further included limiting or restricting access to data that is available through
personal and professional relations with intended sample populations. Additionally,
monitoring confidentiality or anonymity related to actual participants or seaport location
of the individuals who participated could influence the outcomes of this study. Lastly,
qualitative data cannot be generalized, so the perceptions and experiences of participants
only represents those who participate in the study.
Significance
Researchers have supported the reality of convergence between drug traffickers
and terrorist organizations (Bartrell & Gray, 2012; Brown, 2017; Drug Enforcement
Agency, 2020). Both transnational organized criminals and terrorists perceive global
trade as suited to meet demands for illicit drugs and transportation of illegal weapons
(Leuprecht et al., 2015). This study makes an original contribution by filling a gap in
literature, through the exploration of seaport security practices and incidents in which
individuals gained unauthorized access to port facilities and cargo. This study seeks to
increase understanding of internal and external institutional factors at seaports that may
be in contention with existing security measures.
The results of this study are intended to provide essential insights into the
perceptions of security officials and practices in existence at U.S. seaports. The 9/11
Commission’s (2004) findings included warnings that terrorist organizations are not
limited to targeting the aviation sector, but opportunities for terrorists to do harm are
equally “as great, or greater in maritime or surface transportation” (p. 392). This study
acknowledges the commission’s findings and therefore provides a more in-depth look at
security practices at seaports. Insights from this study furthers the goal of improving
security practices at U.S. seaports and contributes to the foundation of knowledge
available to policymakers, thereby supporting broader U.S. homeland security strategies.
The positive social change implication for this study provides policy makers,
industry leaders and the public with information related to seaport exploitation such that
the maritime system and communities are better protected against attacks. Through its
strategic focus on system thinking as a method for examining causes, contributing factors
and solutions to addressing complex homeland security problems, this study dissected
and explored the structures and cultures of seaports. This study’s implication for social
change is multifaceted. This study provides an increased understanding of seaport threats
and vulnerabilities through an exploration of common methods used by traffickers to
exploit legitimate cargo operations. This study is intended to intervene in the pathway of
cultural complacency, to redirect and encourage a unified approach to safeguarding U.S.
seaports. This study also provides a tool for organizational and systemic change through
comprehension of maritime threats posed to public safety and national security. This
study provides for the enhancement of knowledge for policy makers, industry leaders and
public policy awareness for local communities. Lastly, this study creates a cultural
change mechanism for stimulating social change in the general perception of seaport
security importance. As a result of this study, risk of a terrorist attack against a U.S.
seaport is mitigated.
Summary
Although the United States has taken substantial steps in increasing the nation’s
security posture at seaports, many challenges and vulnerabilities remain (Leonard et al.,
2015). Additionally, though, several Homeland Security studies have assessed how
successful seaport security officials have been in instituting strategic screening practices,
their evaluative criterion is lacking. Seaport security screening effectiveness and the
institutional frameworks that support them is therefore analyzed under scrutiny of their
failures. The enormous amount of cargo transiting U.S. seaports annually often renders
security screenings ineffective against transnational organized criminals who routinely
exploit the maritime system to smuggle dangerous drugs and other contraband.
Smuggling organizations pattern their criminal operations around the legitimate and
porous cargo routes, mirroring multinational business functionality in a manner that
disguises large shipments of drugs. This presents an array of challenges and concerns
both to public safety and national security. Further, terrorists, like transnational criminals
are assumed to be rational actors who also assess risk when making determination as to
what transportation systems to exploit. Therefore, I conducted this qualitative study to
explore security measures at U.S. seaports to gain a better understanding why individuals
and groups gain unauthorized access to restricted facilities and cargo.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Smuggling techniques used by transnational criminal organizations to ship
dangerous drugs, weapons and other contraband through U.S. seaports undermines
security measures, nullifies responsible business practices, and threatens national
security. The gap in literature is that U.S. seaport security has not been evaluated in
relation to exploitation by transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups. An
in-depth review of academic literature, governmental records, and reports provided
valuable insight that allowed me to contextualize the phenomenon and make an
appropriate selection of method to further the study. The literature inquiry divulged
evidence indicating an active expansion of terrorist group involvement in the illicit drug
trade, creating and irrefutable means in which a weaponized device can be smuggled into
the United States through a seaport. A qualitative study conducted by Leuprecht et al.
(2015) observed that both transnational organized criminals and terrorists perceive the
global economy as being ideally equipped to meet demands for illegal goods and
services. The literature indicates the occurrence of a troubling convergence between drug
traffickers and terrorist organizations in relation to tactics and economic motives. A study
conducted by Levitt (2013) observed that more than 19 U.S. designated foreign terrorist
organizations are known to be involved in the global drug trade. This phenomenon was
further noted by Dishman (2016) who wrote that observable growth of the illicit
economy, and the rise of segmented markets and networks have “major implication for
terrorist and criminal collaboration” (p. 147). The purpose of this qualitative study was to
explore seaport security measures to identify factors that may adversely impact security
measures at U.S. seaports. The objective of this comprehensive literature review was to
research, collect, analyze, and fuse the literature related to maritime security, terrorism,
and drug trafficking methods used to exploit major seaports. In studying the phenomenon
of maritime drug trafficking using seaports as a conduit, contributors to failed security
measures are identified. The chapter offers an inclusive review of the theoretical and
conceptual bases of seaport security. The chapter also includes sections on my literature
search strategy and theoretical framework, followed by a review of the literature. The
chapter ends with a summary and conclusion section.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature search strategy for this study included the use of books,
peerreviewed journals from the Walden University Library, governmental and
nongovernmental documents, reports, and articles relevant to seaport security and drug
trafficking. The selected literature aided me in developing the theoretical framework for
this qualitative study. The following is a list of key terms used to review relevant
literature: seaport security, homeland and maritime security, drug smuggling,
transnational organized crime, drug cartel and terrorist convergence, narcoterrorism,
shipping container security, port governance, Rational Choice, Game Theory and
General Systems Theory (GST). The primary databases for this study were Taylor and
Francis, ScienceDirect, and SAGE Journals, Thoreau, Google Scholar and Homeland
Security Digital Library. The literature search focused on retrieving peer-reviewed
journals within 5 years of publication. However, extending the literature search beyond 5
years was necessary for a more wholistic overview and understanding of seaport security
and threats posed against U.S. seaports.
Theoretical Foundation
The GST (von Bertalanffy, 1968) grounded this study and provided specific tenets
for distinguishing maritime system structures, components, and functions both
individually and holistically. Ludwig von Bertanlanffy (1968) posited that systems are
composed of individual elements that interact with each other and the environment. In
examining the interactions of maritime system components individually, I developed a
better understanding of how unauthorized individuals and goods may gain unauthorized
access to secure seaport facilities and cargo. GST asserts that all systems have common
characteristics regardless of their internal nature (Skyttner, 2006). In the context of this
study, GST allowed for the identification, and uncoupling of system components, to
support objective examination of them individually. In examining maritime system
components individually, this study revealed characteristics that are both similar and
different. However, it is the distinguishing features of motives, functions and priorities
observed between individual elements where research uncovers potential sources of
system points of failure and literature gaps.
Developing an understanding of seaport security culture and logistical processes
supported conceptualizations and analysis, of inadvertent contributors to unauthorized
access to maritime environments. Bernard et al. (2005) noted that GST application to
social organizations focused on the nature of openness and interactions within
environments of various inputs and outputs. Maritime imports and exports represent
system inputs and outputs that replicates natural “feedback loops” in which they
continuously adapt to changes in external environments (Bernard, 2005). Seaports are
fast-paced environments where logistical operations are driven by consumer demand and
just-in-time supply business models. The Federal Maritime Commission (2015) noted that
future expansion of international trade is inevitable, and future demands on the U.S.
intermodal system will be considerable.
Although security regulations are implemented at U.S. seaports, they contend with
the financial and operational stresses of global trade. The Federal Maritime Commission
(2015) observed that increases in transportation costs caused by seaport congestion harms
the U.S. economy and adversely impacts the nation’s international competitiveness.
Bernard et al. (2005) concluded that system malfunctions affect system inputs and outputs
both directly and indirectly. In studying seaports as system components, cultural
dynamics revealed potential areas of contention between security officials and port
management responsible for logistical operations. Immediately observable in the
literature review is that container volumes (inputs) entering seaports exceed security
processing capacities, resulting in temporary security system overload (Hutchins, 2016;
Johnson, 2013; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). Only a limited number of
product inputs can be inspected while entering seaports without adversely impacting
logistical outputs. Researchers (e.g., Chang & Thai, 2016; Flynn, 2006; Shapiro, 2018;
UNODC, 2016; Willis, 2016) indicated that while strong performance and growth
indicates a properly functioning system, the growing presence of contraband amongst
legitimate cargo demonstrates that seaport security measures are insufficient. Illicit goods
move from one environment to another environment through input to output processes
facilitated through the maritime system.
Seaport operations involve arrangements between separate interrelated elements
functioning together as a whole. Like living organisms that are sustained by synchronized
organ functions in which the actions of one effect the performance of others, seaports are
isomorphic systems found amongst the social and economic sciences. In applying GST,
seaport vulnerabilities and exploitation are perceived as outcomes attributed to host
miscalculations, misalignments, errors, misdiagnosis, and mistreatments; consequently,
allowing for invasion of criminal organizations. In the context of this study, seaport
security is analyzed both physically and socially. Bertalanffy’s exploration of systems
theory finds application across a range of complex fields in which the emergence of
isomorphism clearly exists, including seaports. Bertalanffy’s systems theory is rooted in
the study of health and human systems in which physicians commonly perform diagnostic
examinations of the body (system whole) and organs (parts) individually (Tretter, 2019).
Physicians attempt to confirm the presence of disease in symptomatic patients to
formulate effective treatment strategies; likewise, an evaluation of seaport health should
include a thorough diagnostic, security examination of the maritime system as a whole
and in part. Like viruses, illicit goods pose no imminent threat to society if they do not
enter living functioning systems. However, when systems are infiltrated by illegitimate
groups, they soon replicate or expand illicit activities. Legitimate systems that have been
compromised eventually become enslaved and used for transnational organized criminal
purposes. The maritime system and global supply chain, like groups
of interlinked cells have been routinely highjacked and made to work on behalf of
criminal and terrorist networks. Viruses need host cells to replicate and expand, so they
breach legitimate cell walls, deposit, and reprogram them for expansion, then remain
within the host cell, making them impervious to medical treatment (Ruth, 2019). Similar
to complex technological systems infected by malicious software (malware), drug
trafficking organizations disguised as legitimate enterprises (shell companies) share the
maritime transportation system with legitimate members who depend on seaports to
facilitate the movement of essential goods. The frequent complex interactions between
system components are not always understood or what they appear to be. Business
practices are routinely exploited when they are lured by sophisticated trafficking and
laundering schemes in which they are deceived to believe they are dealing with a trusted
agent or source. Criminal networks behave similarly to malicious software. The most
common type of malware are worms, viruses and trojan horses, each of which exploit
system vulnerabilities for nefarious purposes. Worms exploit system vulnerabilities,
taking over a host and manipulating its own controls to launch attacks against system
networks (Brody et al., 2018; Williamson, 2004).
Seaport similarities are also found in complex ecosystems. Within ecosystems,
ecologists study behaviors and nonlinear interactions between living organisms to gain
understanding of environments, including cyclic predator and prey encounters, a potential
parallel or bridge with game theory (Tretter, 2019). Seaport security measures are
important processes in border security; however, they tend to create delays, increase
congestion, and are detested as associated or cause for inconvenience. The goal of
security measures at seaports is to detect, deter and prevent the introduction of dangerous
devices, substances, and people from gaining access to the United States. While safety
and security are important objectives, the mission of seaport organizations requires a
commitment to providing a positive customer experience and the promotion of
transportation efficiency (City of Los Angeles, 2018; City of Portsmouth, 2018; Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, 2020). The goal of drug trafficking
organizations (including terrorist organizations) is to observe, develop and employ
sophisticated strategies to exploit transportation processes to introduce dangerous and
illicit items into the United States. The main motivators of these groups center around
profitability and power. One kilogram of cocaine purchased in Colombia is estimated to
range between $1800 to $7000 per kilogram; the same amount would retail for between
$27000 to $35000 in the United States and could be sold for about $160 per gram
(Benitez, 2019; Stewart, 2016; U.S. Department of Justice, 2018). This complex
interaction of competing and coalescing priorities evolves into a dangerous positive-sum
game with drug trafficking organizations but may evolve into a zero-sum game with
terrorist organizations (Tala & Zhuang, 2018; Song et al, 2016). Systematic social
interactions between workers at seaports leads to development of both harmonious and
conflictive relationships over security and logistical priorities. While security regulations
are applicable to each component of seaport system environments, they must contend
with logistical demands. A lack of integration or system synchronization between the two
creates subsequent opportunities for criminal exploitation. The literature inquiry revealed
key concepts that focused and guided this study.
Seaports are geographic boundaries, acting as host to various interdependent
industries responsible for the facilitation of global trade. Seaports themselves are
subsystem components of the global supply chain. As subsystems, seaports share unique
vernacular or terminology to communicate processes and to convey meaning. One
commonly used term in the maritime domain and common to both the shipping and
logistical industries, and applicable to this research study is intermodal. Intermodal refers
to the transportation of goods in shipping containers by more than one mode of
transportation (Intermodal Association of North America, 2019). Intermodal
transportation is a dynamic and complex system that involves multiple actors and
decision makers. Intermodal local drayage operations involve the pickup and delivery of
loaded inbound and outbound containers in a service region of an intermodal terminal
within a specific time window (Macharis & Bontekoning, 2004).
Intermodal containers (commonly referred to as box, container or TEU) are
moved through seaports by way of commercial trucks and rail. Container cargo
operations typically involve an international freight forwarder. A freight forwarder is an
individual or business that specializes in facilitating maritime cargo shipments and
storage arrangements on behalf of a shipper (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2020).
Freight forwarders serve as an intermediate between customers and final points of
destination, and assists exporters in preparing price quotations, recommended packing
methods, preparing the bill of lading and special submission using the Automated Export
System (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2020). A freight forwarder arranges both vessel
and terminal storage space and secures cargo shipping orders. Shipping orders are
documents used to specify what items are being transferred from an originating storage
location to a new location. Shipping orders are sent to a pre-designated trucking company
that uses the shipping orders to obtain an Equipment Interchange Receipt (EIR) from a
port terminal facility. Local and over-the-road truck drivers arrive at seaports to pick-up
or deliver containers that are either empty or loaded. While seaport logistical procedures
may vary, most share similar processes for obtaining security clearance.
Security measures implemented with the passage of the MTSA, requires
presentation of proper credentials (Transportation Worker Identification Credential) for
authorization to access to a U.S. seaport. Truckers arriving at U.S. seaports interface with
either a security official or security technologies that verifies authenticity of credentials
presented by anyone attempting access to a restricted facility. Mandatory security
credential requirements managed by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
have restricted many people from obtaining access to U.S. seaports, including truck
drivers. However, drivers who are unable to access a restricted port facility will often
sub-contract container pick-ups and deliveries to a qualified driver or firm with a legal
tractor and a TWIC equipped driver. These TWIC equipped drivers perform the actual
drayage service, by delivering import loads retrieved from seaports to local yards,
predesignated warehouses, or other locations (National Academies of Science, 2011).
Trucking companies typically experience high turnover of both employee drivers and
owner subcontractors, so there is often a constant turnover, and new drivers entering
seaports. Belzer and Swan (2011) noted that although the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism (CTPAT) program, relies on importers to know their supply chain
partners and to manage risk responsibly, low-paid supply-chain workers in the United
States and abroad may provide an exploitable opening for criminal organizations. In a
study conducted by Flynn (2006), he noted that C-TPAT member companies are publicly
advertised, and their membership used as an economic marketing tool; however,
interested partners not only include legitimate businesses, but they also include
transnational criminal organizations. A drug trafficking or terrorist group would likely
target a legitimate C-TPAT member company with a trusted brand name, because its
cargo shipments would likely be less scrutinized by security officials when entering the
United States. A terrorist organization need only commit resources to exploiting weak
security measures within a trusted shipper’s company, targeting its susceptible workers to
gain unfettered access to container goods and seaports (Flynn, 2006).
Johnson (2013) explored the topic of transnational terrorism, globalization,
voluntary compliance, and U.S. ports security. Johnson used a qualitative case study
design to examine trade and terrorist interactions, as well as impacts of trade policy on
terrorist opportunities, and homeland security measures. Johnson found that the United
States is the primary target country for transnational terrorism, and voluntary compliance
programs and low container inspection rates (3%-5%) at U.S. seaports is inadequate to
protect the nation.
In a qualitative case study, Eski and Buijt (2016) explored corruption at the Port
of Rotterdam to gain insight into why port workers help in the facilitation of illegal drug
shipments. Eski and Buijt focused on the “rip-off” tactics used by drug trafficking
organizations to smuggle contraband inside of shipping containers without the knowledge
of shippers or consignees. Rip-offs involve loading cocaine or other contraband inside a
container of legal goods from a country of origin, then recovering them once the illicit
goods arrive at the port of disembarkation. The study included an analysis of rip-off cases
at the Port of Rotterdam, using files from closed criminal investigations conducted by
port police and customs agencies. The study also used transcripts from police interviews,
court records and interviews with former convicted port employees.
Eski and Buijt (2016) explained that port workers are crucial components of
criminal networks because of their ability to move around within a busy seaport without
drawing suspicion from security officials or other employees. Port workers are also able
to provide confidential information about facility layouts, container stack locations,
vessel origins, arrival, and departure times (Eski & Buijt, 2016). Corrupt port workers at
Rotterdam were found to routinely assist criminal networks in gaining access to shipping
containers by breaching security seals, deliberately positioning containers for ease of
access, or by allowing use of employee access credentials (Eski & Buijt, 2016).
As noted in the theoretical framework of this study, GST allowed for observation
of system components separate from the system wholes. This allowed me to focus on the
individual functions, motivations, and priorities of these individual elements, to look for
areas of contention that leads to gaps creating system vulnerabilities. Eski and Buijt
(2016) uncovered several key findings that informed my study, particularly in relation to
my research questions. Strategies used by transnational criminal networks to recruit port
workers are barriers to the implementation and effectiveness of security measures at
seaports. Some observed reasons uncovered by Eski and Buijt as to why port employees
become involved in trafficking drugs at seaports is personal cocaine and alcohol
addiction, financial hardship, gambling problems, greed, persuasion, blackmail, and
intimidation.
Sophisticated recruitment, manipulation and the threat of violence posed by drug
trafficking organizations as an instrument for infiltrating seaports should not be dismissed
or underestimated. Traffickers are known to target employees with drug addictions and
financial hardships associated with gambling; offering susceptible workers money and
drugs to lure them into their criminal networks. Traffickers and corrupt port employees
were found to target vulnerable employees with solicitations and promises of debt relief
and easy wealth (Eski & Buijt, 2016).
Perhaps more concerning is a qualitative case study conducted by Bloom (2017)
uncovered similarities in the recruiting cycles, priorities, and approaches of terrorist
groups, including Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Terrorist
recruiting responds to changes in the external environment influencing decisions of target
recruitment that are based on human asset availability, education, or training most
beneficial to the organization (Bloom, 2017). Collectively, researchers have suggested
that behavioral characteristics of insider threats includes vulnerability to blackmail, greed,
and financial need (Bloom, 2017, Branker, 2016; Eski & Buijt, 2016).
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and/or Concepts
Through an in-depth analysis conducted with focus on macro, meso and micro
system levels, I sought to uncover maritime enablers adversely impacting security
practices at U.S. seaports. My objective was to understand how individuals or groups
circumvented security measures and gain unauthorized access to secure seaport facilities
and containerized cargo to conduct smuggling operations. Seaports are by nature both
quasi-government institutions and highly competitive multinational corporations. While
they create opportunities for growth and development, they present significant challenges
to policing them. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2015), the
risk of security breaches increases during the transitions and exchange of containerized
cargo between ports and distribution centers.
Sergi (2020) expounded on seaport and cargo vulnerabilities by explaining that
drug trafficking involves a multilateral exchange between multiple criminal actors
including negotiators, producers, brokers, importers, distributors, and consumers. Drug
trafficking operations and methods include the use of cars, trucks, shipping containers,
cargo ships, and small boats interfacing with ports. The intersection of cargo transition
points within the global supply chain increases risk of exploitation, allowing for
dangerous drugs or weapons to be placed into a shipping container destined for the
United States. There was a gap in current research literature regarding understanding the
experiences implementing security measures at U.S. seaports. My research did, however,
reveal an abundance of literature originating in European countries related to seaports
security and included various methodologies applied by researchers to explore the full
scope of issues relevant to this topic. Most studies conducted were qualitative in nature
and included phenomenological, ethnography, and case study approaches. Several
researchers (e.g., Bagchi & Paul, 2017, Eski, 2016, Eski, 2019, Leuprecht et al., 2015,
Sergi, 2020) addressed seaport security vulnerabilities through a multitude of qualitative
methodologies and each case provided insight into the literature gaps under study.
When discussing seaport security, a review of the governing bodies and laws
exercising overlapping authority in maritime domains is essential. I discovered that the
implementation of security rules under domestic and international law, following the
September 11, 2001, attacks provided an incomplete framework for maritime security.
This study explored the International Ship and Ports Facility Security Code, Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, and the Security and Accountability For Every Port
Act of 2006. I began with an inquiry into the International Maritime Organization, a
specialized agency within the United Nations.
The International Ship and Ports Facility Security Code
The focus of the literature inquiry was on the experiences, perceived barriers, and
facilitators to seaport security measures. Security measures in use at seaports are based on
both domestic and international law, therefore, filling the knowledge gap required
understanding the maritime regulatory framework. The International Maritime
Organization (IMO) is a regulatory body of the United Nations (UN) responsible for the
institution of global standards for safety, security, and environmental performance. The
IMO implemented international maritime security measures following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks against the United States. The IMO emphasized that the threat of
terrorist acts against the shipping and port industry are real and not imaginary; and
therefore, decided that the organization should take measures to prevent acts of terrorism
which threaten the security of passengers, crew and the safety of ships (International
Maritime Organization, 2004).
While the al-Qaeda network targeted and exploited the aviation sector to carry out
the 9/11 attacks, the level of sophistication of the group, highlighted susceptibilities of the
maritime transportation system to acts of terrorism. At its 22nd session, on November
2001, the IMO adopted Resolution A.924 (22) to evaluate maritime security measures,
while focusing specifically on preventing acts of terrorism that threatened the security of
passengers, crewmembers, and the safety of ships (IMO, 2008; Trelawny, 2008). The
IMO subsequently adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
as an amendment to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) (United
Nations, 2004). The regulatory framework outlined within the ISPS are binding on
Contracting Governments, cargo ships, passenger vessels, and port facilities servicing
ships engaged in the transport of international commerce (International Maritime
Organization, 2004).
The IMO addressed security threats to the maritime transportation systems by
dividing the 1974 SOLAS Chapter XI into two parts. Chapter XI-1 for Special Measures
to Enhance Maritime Safety and a new Chapter XI-2 for Special Measures to Enhance
Maritime Security which established the International Ship and Port Facility Security
(ISPS) Code (United Nations, 2006). The Code consists of two parts: Part A which
imposes mandatory requirements, and Part B which consists of recommendations
detailing procedures to be undertaken when implementing the provisions of Part A
(United Nations, 2006). The code established three maritime security (MARSEC) levels
designed to depict incidents and security threat levels ranging from low to high
(MARSEC 1,2, and 3). MARSEC level l is required and is covered under ISPS Code
section A. MARSEC level 2 indicates a heightened threat of security incident, while
MARSEC level 3 refers to a probable or imminent threat of a security incident
(International Maritime Organization, 2004).
The ISPS Code was adopted in 2002 and entered into force on July 1, 2004
(United Nations, 2006). The ISPS Code enhanced maritime security on board ships and at
port facilities where the vessel interface occurs. The ISPS Code provided a standardized
framework for evaluating and countering risks. Among the main objectives of the code
was to establish an international framework involving cooperation between contracting
governments, government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port
industries. The objectives of the ISPS Code focused on the detection of security threats
against ships and port facilities engaged in international trade and the establishment of
respective roles and responsibilities of the parties involved (International Maritime
Organization, 2003). While individually comprehensive, the Code required Contracting
Governments to enact the new security standards in their respective countries. Under the
ISPS Code, Contracting Governments are responsible for ensuring the completion of
Facility Security Assessments (FSA) and Facility Security Plans (FSP) for seaport
facilities within their respective jurisdictions. These assessments were required to be
undertaken by either the Contracting Government, or a designated authority. FSA
findings require the approval of the Contracting Government or designated authority and
are used to support development of the FSP and to determine which facilities require
appointment of a designated Facility Security Officer (FSO).
The FSO is responsible for the development of an FSP and oversees all aspects of
facility security for the assigned facilities. The FSP requires security levels to reflect
actions to address prevailing threat conditions impacting maritime facilities. Level 1
indicates minimum operational and physical security measures; level 2 indicates
additional security measures implemented to address elevated threats; and level 3 outlines
further specific actions required to support response efforts to imminent threats to a
maritime facility (International Maritime Organization, 2020). The FSO also ensures that
security provisions are implemented and monitors the continuing effectiveness and
relevance of an approved plan, including conducting internal audits of the application of
the plan. The effectiveness of a security plan is required to be tested by governing
authorities. A facility’s FSA in which an FSP is based and developed must also be
reviewed every 5 years. Major amendments to an approved plan require submission and
approval of governing authorities. International agreements require ratification to become
legally binding domestically, therefore, a detailed inquiry of U.S. maritime laws was
necessary.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act
The United States, as a Contracting Government member of the United Nations,
implemented the ISPS, through the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002. The MTSA was signed into law on November 25, 2002, by President George W.
Bush (Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002). The MTSA was purposed to protect
the nation’s ports and waterways from acts of terrorism. MTSA regulations are applicable
to vessels and facilities operating on or adjacent to waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. The MTSA directed the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to assess the
effectiveness of antiterrorism measures implemented in foreign ports from which U.S.
documented vessels and foreign vessels depart on a voyage to the U.S. and any other
foreign ports the USCG believes poses a security risk to international maritime
commerce. According to the National Response Center (NRC) approximately 157
suspicious activity reports and more than 300 security breaches were reported to have
occurred at U.S. maritime facilities in 2015; 500 breaches of security were reported in
2014; and more than 400 breaches were reported in 2013 (National Response Center,
2015). (See Figure 1 for reporting trends of incidents involving suspicious activity and
breaches of security at U.S. seaports).
Figure 1
National Response Center Data Summary 2015
Figure 1. National Response Center Data Summary from 2001 to 2015 (does not include
information from all sources). Hampton, E. (2015). An Analysis of the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code: A Multilateral Agreement to Secure the Global
Supply Chain.
Lloyds of London estimated that approximately 112,000 merchant vessels link the
world’s 11,892 international port facilities in 155 coastal nations (Cox, 2013). About half
a billion containers move throughout international waterways each year, and one out of
nine containers are destined for U.S. shores (Cox, 2013). U.S. seaports handle more than
50,000 international vessels receiving more than 10,000,000 containers by ship annually
(Cox, 2013). The sheer volume of container traffic into the United States annually clearly
indicates a need for greater scrutiny of maritime security measures. Cox (2013) also noted
that both the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) have recognized the global shipping network as the most viable and
logistically feasible conduit for terrorist groups to maneuver weapons and operatives. The
MTSA was followed by a host of new amendments and programs to strengthen maritime
security, including the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act.
The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act
On October 13, 2006, the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006
(SAFE Port Act) was signed into law, creating, and codifying new security programs and
initiatives, and amending portions of the original provisions of the MTSA. The SAFE
Port Act established new standards and was a catalyst for the implementation of radiation
scanning of all imported containers entering the United States. The SAFE Port Act
included new requirements for emergency response protocols, and encouraged
cooperation between local, state, federal government, and the private sector. The SAFE
Port Act required the inspection of “high-risk containers” before their arrival to the U.S.,
and implementation of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program (GAO,
2007). Enacted in October 2006, as an amendment to the MTSA 2002, the SAFE Port
Act instituted several programs within the supply chain security framework. The SAFE
Port Act (2006) amended portions of the MTSA, requiring area maritime transportation
security plans that focus on swift restorations of trade operations following a
Transportation Security Incident (TSI). A TSI is an incident or event that results in
significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption or
economic disruption in a geographic area (U.S. Congress, 2006).
The SAFE Port Act requires that both vessel and facility security plans regulate
access control measures of persons engaged in surface transportation or intermodal
containers operations. The Act imposed requirements for the issuance of secure
transportation security cards, commonly referred to as Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC). The SAFE Port Act required the Secretary of
Homeland Security (Secretary) to institute and make available risk assessment tools to be
used for updating maritime security plans and allocated funding resources to support the
development of plans, under the port security grant program (U.S. Congress, 2006).
The SAFE Port Act directed the Secretary to develop and implement strategic
plans to enhance the security of the international supply chain and to “establish minimum
standards and procedures for securing containers in transit to the United States” (U.S.
Congress, 2006, Sec. 204). The Act directed the Secretary to establish and implement a
Container Security Initiative (CSI) that identifies and “examines or search maritime
containers that pose a security risk before loading in a foreign port for shipment to the
United States” (U.S. Congress, 2006, Sec. 205). The SAFE Port Act included provisions
that (a) codified the CSI and the C-TPAT; (b) required interagency operational centers
where agencies organize to fit the security needs of selected ports; (c) set an
implementation schedule and fee restrictions for the TWIC; (d) required that 100% of the
containers entering high volume U.S. ports be scanned for radiation sources by December
31, 2007; and (e) required additional data be made available to CBP for targeting inbound
cargo containers for inspection (GAO, 2013).
The C-TPAT is a voluntary government initiative that established a program of
shared responsibility based on cooperation between CBP and trusted importers.
Businesses who partner by signing program agreements are required to comply with
specific terms and conditions in exchange for certain cargo benefits. Business partners
who implement specific security measures to protect the global supply chain are less
likely to face strict examination by the CBP, saving members valuable time and cost
(Bagchi & Paul, 2017).
Nearly $750 billion of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is attributed to the
Marine Transportation System (MTS). The MTS facilitates the transportation of global
commerce and enables the projection of U.S. military forces around the world in defense
against and in pursuit of foreign enemies. The MTS is one in which, its necessary
complexities essentially render it, its own Achilles Heel. The system’s porous nature and
operational characteristics presents many challenges for seaport security officials who are
responsible for its protection (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Maritime
operations comprise multiple distinct and independent components working
synchronously: seaports, vessels, waterways, facilities, intermodal (rail) and users (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2005). U.S. seaport security has evolved as an area of
interest and concern of the country since the signing of the Tariff Act of July 4, 1789.
Bagchi and Paul (2017) explained that seaports have many characteristics that
make them ideal targets of terrorist, because their operations are essential to the vitality
and competitiveness of national economies. An imbalance between seaport security and
the facilitations of global goods creates logistical and security challenges, that when
mismanaged may result in both direct and indirect consequences. Inspecting container
cargo is time consuming, burdening on security resources, and likely disruptive to the
global supply chain.
One security measure in place to balance security and facilitation is the use of
advance tracking systems. Under CBP regulations, importers are required to submit an
Importer Security Filing (ISF), that includes information about any cargo destined for the
United States before it is loaded on a vessel. CBP operates Automated Targeting Systems
(ATS) to review container shipments destined for U.S. seaports to identify cargo that may
be at risk for containing terrorist weapons or other contraband prior to being loaded on a
commercial vessel. The frequency wherein transnational criminal organizations have
successfully smuggled large quantities of illicit drugs amongst legitimate goods onboard
commercial vessels remains a major concern for seaport security officials. The ability of
these groups to move enormous amounts of dangerous narcotics from source countries,
across international borders and into local communities, presents an imminent threat to
public safety and health.
The security requirements imposed under SAFE Port Act of 2006, provided a
cursory glance into the vulnerability concerns at U.S. seaports, including their
susceptibility to drug trafficking organizations. The Act required the CBP Commissioner
to establish performance indicators related to the seizure of methamphetamine and
precursor chemicals and to extensively study the movement of drugs into the United
States on an ongoing basis. A comprehensive summary report is required to be submitted
to the U.S. Congress outlining measures for “targeting high risk drug smuggling
operations or circumvention of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005”
(U.S. Congress, 2006, Sec. 707).
Case Study: Maritime Security and European Seaports
In an ethnographic study, Eski (2016) scrutinized port security by focusing on
micro-level, occupational identities of frontline security officials at the port of Rotterdam
and Hamburg. The study included explication of port security governance and
conceptualization of port security. The strengths of this study center on the in-person
experiences and insight gleaned from the researcher’s ability to walk, drive, sail, and
perform administrative duties alongside seaport security officials. This study is significant
to my research of seaport security measures and factors inadvertently contributing to
security vulnerabilities, principally indicating social dynamics that were present and
important factors relevant for academic scrutinization. Eski explored seaports as an
ethnographic study of social spaces, networks, cultures, and practices which facilitated a
better understanding of interrelationships within the global maritime transportation
system. Eski (2016) participated in the daily activities of 85 participants in Rotterdam (N
= 52) and Hamburg (N = 33), consisting of 30 operational port police officers, 31 security
officers, 10 customs officers and 14 others who were involved in port security-related
matters” (p. 3).
Eski (2016) found noteworthy thematic responses amongst some participants that
informed my qualitative study of U.S. seaport security. Local law enforcement and
security officials without access to intelligence information were limited in their
perception of threats posed to the Port of Rotterdam and Hamburg. This suggestion is
consistent with barriers identified by Frittelli (2005) who found that while effective
intelligence sharing with local port authorities is important to port security, state and local
officials may not have the required security clearances. While participants in Eski’s study
acknowledged the reality of terrorism, their ability to conceptualize active threats posed
to the Port of Rotterdam or Hamburg were dismissed as being unlikely. Several
participants noted that their cognitive construction of terrorism is primarily based on
media depictions of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, and images of beheadings (Eski, 2016). The absence of encounters with
individuals and incidents at seaports that meet the 9/11 terrorist criteria likely contributes
to a distorted view of what terrorist attack planning or covert surveillance operations look
like. Some participants however, perceived their ports to be ideal targets for an attack,
and routinely engaged in scripted scenarios that created tangibility in seaport security
measures and their contribution to the global war on terrorism. This literature inquiry
suggests the absence of consistency amongst security officials in relation to terrorist
threat perceptions. The study suggests that the absence of effective information and
intelligence sharing amongst security officials creates perceptions of exclusion and may
be a factor or barrier to the implementation of security measures at seaports.
The ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg was described as physically closed-off
corporate domains where one small disruption caused by policing initiatives significantly
impacts business operations (Eski, 2019). A disturbing finding of Eski (2019) revealed
that security officials contend that internal cultures within the port of Rotterdam and
Hamburg, has resulted in the commercialism of policing, rendering protective measures
secondary to logistical operations. Eski uncovered the existence of a highly contentious
environment where management is perceived by line officers as market-oriented, power
hungry and inept. Eski identified important social dynamics in existence at Rotterdam and
Hamburg, whereas the decisions and actions of management potentially serves as an
inhibitor to effective security measures. Security duties within the ports are shared
amongst groups with varying levels of authorities including private security officers,
police officers and customs officers. Participants indicated that low morale and inside
quarrels are potential barriers in existence inside seaport environments (Eski, 2019).
Participants almost uniformly condemned management and managerial
rationalities in commercializing policing and security practices. Eski (2019) also revealed
internal division amongst the ranks of line officers at lower levels. Participants explained
that they are compelled to adopt a commercial outlook of policing within the ports,
particularly when interacting with port officials, shipping companies, truckers,
dockworkers, and vessel crewmembers. This was an important discovery as it highlighted
similarities and distinctions between the perceptions of port police officers and customs
officers. This study aided in identifying key factors for further analysis comparatively
against U.S. seaports. Some participants (port police and security officers) perceived the
ports as “safe havens for drug trafficking,” but perceived policing of drug trafficking not
their responsibility, instead, viewed it as strictly a customs agency task and responsibility
(Eski, 2019, p.10). While ports of entry are considered secure when security officials
interdict (seize) contraband before it makes entry into a country, security measures are
often perceived as a burgeoning cost and not as a resource for businesses (Malcom, 2016;
Sergi, 2020).
Findings from Eski (2016) postulated that while seaports are vital transportation
hubs instrumental in the global movement of goods, they may lack terrorist allure,
because they do not align with the reality of the threats posed by terrorist groups. This
contrary opinion is divergent from a Congressional briefing prepared by Parfomak and
Frittelli (2007) who stated that information recovered from an Al Qaeda suspect suggests
that terrorist groups have indeed targeted and planned attacks against a “wide range of
Western maritime targets” (p.23). Historical data indicates that out of 40,126 recorded
terrorist attacks between 1968 and 2007, only 136 were against the maritime industry
(Eski, 2016). These totals suggest that history contradicts those who perceives seaports as
target locations prone to terrorist attacks. Eski (2018) argued that declaring seaports as
alluring targets fails to contribute to global efforts to prevent acts of terrorism in
maritime, instead only serving occupational meaninglessness. This assumption is based
solely on the absence or limited data of historical incidents of terrorist attempts to target
seaports and ignores the well documented convergence of terrorist and transnational drug
trafficking organization’s activities and their imperial capacity to exploit seaports
worldwide. The 9/11 Commission pointedly noted historical lessons from Pearl Harbor; it
underscored that although the U.S. government had intelligence of an impending
Japanese attack in 1941, it failed to anticipate or prevent it from happening. The
Commission cited historians who observed that despite evident warning, alert measures
bowed to routine assumptions and practices (9/11 Commission, 2004). Any assumptions,
that dismisses U.S. seaports as conduits or targets to transnational criminal and hybrid
terrorist organizations, breeds cultural barriers of complacency. These assumptions
automatically instill perceptions of “low risk” assertion despite clear indicators of threats
and vulnerabilities. The social, bureaucratic, corporate, and political nature of seaports
complicates routine decision-making in relation to maintaining a balance between
security and logistics. Maritime smuggling methods highly resembles a game of
“PacMan” in which obstacles and open doors shape the operating system environment
(Sergi, 2020). The ability of criminal organizations to successfully import-export
contraband is highly influenced by both the rules of global trade and maritime security
practices instituted at seaports.
Terrorist groups, like more common transnational criminal organizations are
rational actors who assess risk when making decisions as to what transportation systems
to exploit. The effectiveness of any security measures in countering threats of U.S.
seaport exploitation, is conditional, based immensely on the ability of security officials to
anticipate, prepare, and adapt tactical responses. Institutional culture, directs proactive
measures, including investments in infrastructure, and technology and prioritizing the
implementation of security practices into routine business and social practices (Malcom,
2016). The methods used by drug trafficking organizations to smuggle large quantities of
illicit narcotics are the same likely methods that will be used by groups who are terrorist
oriented. Zaitch (2002) described cocaine traffickers as illegal entrepreneurs who are
innovative and constantly exploring means in which to maximize profits. Terrorist
organizations too, share a need for financial resources to support future operations. This
entrepreneurial point of view influences the business models and strategies of criminal
networks and encourages continued exploitation of seaport vulnerabilities. Zaitch asserted
that traffickers preferred to conduct operations at port facilities where the likelihood of
detection is low. Traffickers avoid hanging around port facilities, instead, preferring to
send representatives to negotiate with harbor personnel; make pickup or monitor
shipments (Zaitch, 2002). The researchers (Eski, 2016; Eski, 2019; Sergi, 2020; Zaitch,
2002) found security gaps that may have disastrous effects on the United States and the
global supply chain. Some of the seaport security concerns raised by the researchers
include cultures of complacency, internal contention between national counterterrorism
strategies, maritime security, and supply chain priorities. There is an ongoing knowledge
gap in understanding the impacts of security official’s perceptions of terrorist targeting,
from a nontraditional viewpoint of physical attacks to exploitation for indirect support of
attacks.
Seaport Exploitation for Narcotics Smuggling and Terrorism
The multilateral application of GST contributed to this study. The isomorphic
nature of GST assisted in understanding that much like the human body does not always
display indicators of underlying health conditions, the vibrancy of transportation systems
may not exhibit indicators of imminent threats. Instead, infiltration of criminal or terrorist
organizations may be gradually realized, overshadowed, intoxicated by the economic
successes of industry. The U.S. Department of Transportation (2005) observed that in the
months preceding the 9/11 attacks, the airline industry experienced record highs in the
number of airline passengers for a given month with 65.4 million travelers. After the
attacks, the airline industry experienced dramatic decline that took nearly 3 years to
recover. As U.S. seaports experience unprecedent growth, the tendency to dismiss
symptoms of exploitation and imminent threats are likely to occur, resulting in a public
safety and public health crisis.
The National Drug Control Strategy observed that between 2014 and 2017, U.S.
death rates attributed to synthetic opioids like fentanyl increased 413 percent (U.S. White
House, 2019). This is particularly noteworthy as U.S. overdose rates rose to a record level
in 2017 with more than half of the 72,000 overdose deaths being correlated with Mexican
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) expansion into the opioid markets (Drug
Enforcement Agency, 2017). The Drug Enforcement Agency (2017) emphasized that
Mexican, Columbian, Dominican, Venezuelan, and Puerto Rican trafficking
organizations are becoming more sophisticated and are major facilitators of maritime
drug shipments to the United States. The Drug Enforcement Agency (2017) openly noted
that methods employed by TCOs to smuggle dangerous drugs into the United States
includes the use of U.S. ports of entry (POEs).
In this study, I addressed important gaps in the literature by utilizing
governmental reports to develop an understanding of the complexities of drug trafficking
at seaports and to identify common methods used to gain unauthorized access to ports and
cargo. On June 19, 2019, CBP announced the seizure of 17.5 tons of cocaine at the Port
of Philadelphia. CBP officials, along with Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and
U.S. Coast Guard detected anomalies while examining shipping containers aboard the
MSC Gayane, a Liberian-flagged container ship, transiting from South American and
Caribbean ports. Security officials recovered a total of 15,582 bricks, totaling 35,000
pounds of cocaine (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2019; U.S. Department of
Justice, 2020). The subsequent investigation revealed that on multiple occasions crew
members helped load bulk cocaine onto the vessel from speedboats that approached
during the night. Crew members used the vessel’s crane to hoist cargo nets full of cocaine
onto the vessel and then stashed the drugs in various shipping containers (Department of
Justice, 2020). This literature filled a significant portion of the gap by suggesting that
illicit drugs are loaded directly from speed boats on waterways, bypassing security
procedures required for entry into seaports. This method suggests that legitimate cargo
may enter a seaport, be loaded onto a commercial vessel, then later compromised onboard
a commercial ship with the assistance of corrupt vessel crew. This exploitation strategy
would further indicate that container seal tampering is an issue requiring further
exploration.
Another example: February 22, 2019, CBP in Savannah, Georgia announced the
seizure of 450 packages of cocaine with an estimated street value of $19 million. The
illicit drugs were concealed inside shipments of pineapples that originated in Cartagena,
Columbia (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2019). Then, on June 11, 2019, the Drug
Enforcement Agency announced the arrest of two individuals in Augusta, Georgia, on
charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. The arrest included the
seizure of 20 kilograms of cocaine shipped through the port that was recovered after it
was delivered to an Augusta warehouse (Drug Enforcement Agency, 2019).
Another example occurred in June 2020, when law enforcement officials
investigating contraband shipped from the Dominican Republic, seized 50 kilograms of
cocaine, with an estimated street value of 1.75 million, shipped through a seaport in
Savannah, Georgia (Drug Enforcement Agency, 2020). Law enforcement officials
arrested three men after the container was picked up and delivered to a local warehouse,
where three men from Florida opened the container and began to unload boxes (Drug
Enforcement Agency, 2020). This literature contributed to filling the gap by implying that
illicit drugs are smuggled from U.S. seaports by criminal networks who infiltrated a
restricted facility using legitimate credentials.
Further contributing to fulfilment of the gap is a March 2010 arrest at a southeast
seaport. Port Authority police officers became aware that three men disguised as
dockworkers had boarded a taxicab and were attempted to exit the seaport facility. As the
three men approached the terminal exit gate they jumped out of the taxi and ran from
police. The three men were arrested after a brief chase and charged with smuggling about
$500,000 worth of heroin and cocaine (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010).
The subsequent investigation revealed that the men were stowaways from South America,
who dressed in safety equipment meant to impersonate authorized vessel crewmembers,
carrying illicit drugs hidden under their clothes. The men reportedly ferried from a beach
in Panama, to the commercial vessel. The group conspired with a sophisticated network
in the United States who planned to pick them up, conceal them and transport them once
outside of the seaport. This literature contributed to filling the gap by implying that illicit
drugs are smuggled from U.S. seaports by vessel stowaways who gain access to restricted
facilities from commercial vessels.
The threat of drug trafficking as a conduit for smuggling a weaponized device
through a U.S. seaport was substantiated in the literature. The literature inquiry confirmed
the need to further study and understand how individuals gain unauthorized access to
seaports and cargo. This literature inquiry validated the legitimacy of concern and
urgency to fill gaps regarding seaport security, as terrorist organizations have now
expanded their involvement of transnational organized crime. Illicit drugs follow the
pathways of legal trade, so it is the demand, business models and flow of commerce that
determines, unwillingly, the course of illicit shipments. This study, therefore, did not
focus on distinctions between TOC groups and terrorists, but instead focused on their
shared motives and methods of operation as a means of exploring seaport security
capabilities and vulnerabilities. Eski (2011) contended that globalization has created ideal
trans-ocean pathways to support the international drug trade. Smuggling organizations
pattern their criminal operations around legitimate cargo routes, mimicking business
functionality in a manner that disguises large shipments of drugs. Transnational criminals
are “well organized, well equipped, often possessing advanced communications,
weapons, and high-speed craft to conduct smuggling of people, drugs, weapons, and other
contraband” (Department of Homeland Security, 2005, p. 5).
Lichtenwald et al. (2012) warned against assumptions of an absence of evidence
of cooperation between drug trafficking organizations and terrorist. Lichtenwald et al.
(2012) instead, argued that interrelationships between the two groups can be seen in their
shared motives and common methods of operation. While several terrorist organizations
could potentially provide valuable insight for this study, Hezbollah (Party of God) is the
central focus, as its current activities most appropriately aligned with the purpose of this
study. Members of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shia Islamist political party and
militant group is a designated foreign terrorist organization that engages in amongst other
illegal activities, drug trafficking and counterintelligence operations targeting maritime
interests. Levitt (2016) explained that Hezbollah's expansion into the South American
area narcotics industry has grown significantly, particularly the Tri-State Border areas.
Hezbollah collaborates with drug cartels, producing substantial revenue streams,
facilitating money laundering and drug shipments into the United States and Europe. In
2017, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of Ali Kourani and Samer
Eldebek, in acting as agents of Hezbollah; they were convicted in 2019 for committing
acts in support of terrorism. According to the DOJ, the two men are members of the
Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) and conducted intelligence gathering operation of
security procedures at U.S. airports, the Panama Canal and transiting commercial ships
(Department of Justice, 2017). The Panama Canal was built in 1914 to shorten navigation
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans; and was widened in 2016 to accommodate large
ships carrying containers to U.S. seaports. The Panama Canal Authority’s decision to
invest more than $5 billion in improvements, widening the Canal shifted the pathways of
trade between Asian ports, Mexico ports, West Coast ports, Gulf Coast ports and East
Coast ports. As Park, Richardson & Park (2020) explained, an increasing flow of
container trade between Asian countries and the U.S. will continue for the foreseeable
future as shippers seek to avoid West Coast port congestion. This changing dynamic
highlights an urgency to broaden U.S. seaport security measures and capabilities, to
investigate, detect, and disrupt acts supporting and facilitating terrorism against maritime
targets. The emergence of convergence establishes an urgent need to understand how,
with the institution of mandatory security measures in place, do rogue TOCs undermine
legitimate seaport security practices. Literature supports the existence of convergence
between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations.
Exploitation of U.S. seaports requires traffickers to first, connect with a criminal
broker within a source country and to secure sufficient funding to pay the broker’s fee.
The drug broker will likely liaise with drug cartel or clan members to facilitate
arrangements of drug shipments. The illicit drug operation will involve secondary
sourcing between the broker, Mexican drug cartel and Colombian drug producers or
depending on the type drugs being smuggled, may involve Australian brokers in
Myanmar for shipments moving through Thailand (Sergi, 2020). Traffickers who utilized
the services of a drug broker often pay more; however, their risk of arrest is minimized
with this method (Sergi, 2020). The broker is knowledgeable of seaport operations and
oversees the shipment's logistical details, including terminal facility details, and shipping
containers manifest information. Drug trafficking brokers contract with criminal networks
or individuals working inside the exporting seaport. These individuals provide logistical
and human support for the drug shipment while in port and may involve external freight
forwarders who help to ensure that the illicit cargo is successfully loaded onboard a ship
in port. Once loaded on board a container vessel the illicit drugs then travel amongst
legitimate cargo bound for markets or a target location within the United States, Europe,
or other destinations.
Once the illicit drug shipment arrives at a U.S. port of call the shipment is then
offloaded along with other legitimate goods. The drug shipment maybe removed from the
container while inside the port, however this method increases risk of arrest and is
potentially more expensive, often requiring the assistance of a local criminal network or
individual working within the local port (Sergi, 2020).
One example was highlighted in a June 8, 2020 press release from the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida announcing the arrest of three
individual working for a Mexican drug trafficking organization. Members of a criminal
network operating in Florida and Georgia pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin, and attempted possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine and heroin. According to the plea agreement, between October 2018
and March 2019, members of the drug trafficking organization organized and coordinated
the shipment of numerous containers of methamphetamine and heroin aboard a cargo ship
(Department of Justice, 2020, para. 1).
This domestic network (broker and co-conspirators) arranged arrivals and pickups
of illicit drug shipments from a seaport in Tampa, Florida using a rental truck, then
transported the illicit cargo to a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. (Department of Justice,
2020). This case underscores the sophistication of transnational criminal networks and the
threats they pose to seaports, local communities, and the nation. This group infiltrated and
exploited an otherwise secure system to facilitate movement of illicit items. The global
supply chain is composed of active interconnected subsystems that link communities and
commodities from around the world; however, its reliance on open access and speed
creates ideal conditions for criminal exploitation.
A product manufactured in one country may be composed of multiple components
outsourced by another manufacturing factory in the same country or one from outside the
country. Once assembly of the product is complete, a manufacturer would then load the
product into a shipping container at an inland facility, after which it likely will travel by
truck or rail to a major deep-water seaport in the region. In many instances, due partially
to constant changes in freight handling, shipping containers are subject to tampering
before its arrival at the seaport. Belzer and Swan (2011) noted that gaps in supply chain
security increases risk of freight tampering the further inland it originates. Twenty-four
hours before being loaded and departing on a commercial vessel, operators must notify
U.S. authorities of the nature of the freight being shipped in each container, to receive
authorization for loading onto a ship.
Belzer and Swan (2011) noted that although most containers will safely travel
unimpeded, threats of piracy or a terrorist group gaining access to containers are
increasing. A study conducted by Frittelli (2005) concluded that security initiatives
implemented after 9/11 have not changed the intermodal transportation environment
sufficiently to fundamentally reduce vulnerability to cargo containers, as a means of
facilitating terrorism. Frittelli (2005) asserted that major credibility problems associated
with shipping container loading and screening processes exits overseas, primarily in
ensuring the integrity of cargo as it transits to the United States from its overseas origin.
Effective port security measure at point of origin is necessary, as inspecting cargo on the
once it is loaded onboard commercial vessels is practically impossible and inspecting
cargo upon its arrival at a U.S. seaport “could be too late to prevent a terrorist event”
(Fittelli, 2005, p. 17).
In March 2006 retired U.S. Coast Guard Commander Stephen Flynn, testified
before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee. As part
of his testimony, Flynn outlined a plausible terrorist smuggling scenario in which a U.S.
seaport might be used to introduce a radiological device into the country, while hidden
amongst a container shipment of shoes made in Indonesia. Flynn explained that a local
truck driver sympathetic to al Qaeda, would be a participant actor who transported a
legitimate sealed loaded container of sneakers to a bogus warehouse location. Though the
container is sealed when it departs from the manufacturer, a trusted C-TPAT member, the
seal is removed by the terrorist operatives and later replaced with a clone. Terrorist
operatives would remove some of the legitimate commodities from the container, then
load a radiological device, shielded in lead wrapping (Flynn, 2006). The sympathetic
coconspiring driver would then drive the loaded container to the Port of Surabaya,
Indonesia, gain access, make the delivery to handlers who would load the concealed
bomb onto a smaller feeder ship destined for Jakarta, Indonesia (Flynn, 2006). The
container could then be loaded onto a larger container ship destined for the Port of Hong
Kong. Once at the Port of Hong Kong, the container would be offloaded and then loaded
onto a new Panamax container ship destined for Vancouver, British Columbia. Once in
Canada, the container would be off loaded and placed onto a railcar bound for Chicago,
IL (Flynn, 2006). The container would then arrive at its destination; when opened by
unwittingly cargo handlers, a triggering device attached to the door could detonate the
bomb in the American heartland (Flynn, 2006).
In May 2020, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced that a former member of the
Venezuelan National Assembly was criminally charged with narcoterrorism, drug
trafficking and other weapons offenses. According to officials, Adel El Zabayar conspired
and participated in the illegal importation and exportation of cocaine to the U.S. with
members of the Venezuelan Cartel de Los Soles, Foreign Terrorist
Organization Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), Hezbollah and Hamas
(Drug Enforcement Agency, 2020). Hezbollah’s expanding convergence with drug
traffickers poses an imminent threat to the United States and the global supply chain; it is
a dangerous communal relationship. Bartrell and Gray (2012) described networks of drug
cartels as force multipliers for Hezbollah, instrumental in facilitating their acquisition and
smuggling of weapons, weapon components and even operatives into the United States.
Conversely, Cartel de Los Soles for example is believed to have directly recruited
terrorists from Hezbollah and Hamas to assist in planning attacks against the United
States (Drug Enforcement Agency, 2020).
On January 2, 2020, the United States killed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-
Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qasem Soleimani in a targeted drone strike. Iran’s
Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani both have “vowed revenge”
for Soleimani’s killing (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 3). This is noteworthy,
as Iran’s primary terrorist proxy group is Hezbollah; it provides Hezbollah with
thousands of rockets, shortrange missiles, and small arms, and has trained “thousands” of
Hezbollah fighters at camps in Iran (Congressional Research Service, 2020, p. 6).
Hezbollah’s expanding ability to facilitate large drug shipments in convergence with
transnational criminal organizations onto vessels and into U.S. seaports presents an urgent
need for attention to maritime vulnerabilities.
Yagoub (2016) declared Columbia, Brazil, and Venezuela as significant departure
points for enormous quantities of drugs being shipped onboard commercial vessels that
are bound for European and likely U.S. markets. According to Yagoub, maritime
smuggling using shipping containers onboard commercial vessels is the preferred options
for narcotic traffickers. The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addition
(EMCDDA) noted a significant increase in the use of shipping containers to smuggle
large quantities of drugs into major seaports, accounting for over two-thirds of European
Union seizures between 2011-2013 (EMCDDA, 2016). According to Insight Crime
(2019) authorities in the Netherlands seized more than 73 metric tons of cocaine in 2018
at both the Port of Rotterdam and the Port of Antwerp, a 35 percent increase from 54
metric tons seized in 2017. These accusations highlight an urgency for seaport security
officials to explore and understand the nature and methods of narcotics traffickers in
undermining security practices at U.S. seaports. In 2016, the DEA announced the arrest of
members of the Lebanese Hezbollah’s External Security Organization Business Affairs
(BAC), for its involvement in international criminal activities such as drug trafficking and
money laundering in which proceeds were used to purchase weapons for Hezbollah (U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency, 2016). The group was targeted as part of Project Cassandra,
an international enforcement operation focused on dismantling global networks
responsible for the movement of large quantities of cocaine into the United States and
Europe (U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2016). In 2016, former DEA Operations Chief,
Michael Braun testified before the Committee on Financial Services of the House of
Representatives. Braun reported that Hezbollah and South American drug trafficking
organizations have moved, “hundreds of tons of cocaine, over a 15-year period and have
moved massive amounts of currency, hundreds of, millions, perhaps billions of dollars in
currency around the world in the most sophisticated money laundering scheme that we
have ever witnessed” (United States, 2018).
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2018) estimates that more than
750 million TEUs are moved at seaports worldwide each year; and approximately 5% are
physically inspected. Dishman (2016) noted that the “growth of the illicit economy,
coupled with the rise of segmented markets and networks, has significant implication for
terrorist and criminal collaboration” (p. 147). Dishman expressed concerns that since the
20th century, relationships between Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) leaders
and terrorist groups have evolved to support network operational and logistical needs.
Criminal organizations have acquired “explosives and weapons training, assassination,
and other services, while terrorist organizations obtain fraud and smuggling services”
from transnational criminal organizations (Dishman, 2016, p. 147).
The U.S. Department of State (2020) noted the exploitation of seaports in
countries such as China, Jamaica, Pakistan, Europe, and Brazil as facilitators in “the
movement of drug shipments across borders” (p. 174). The U.S. Department of State
(2020) emphasized that Brazil “remains a major transit route for cocaine from the source
countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru” (p. 110). Seaports in Pakistan act as one of the
world’s top transit corridors for illicit drugs, allowing for the illicit distribution of drugs
globally (U.S. Department of State, 2020). According to the U.S. Department of State
(2020) the Philippines is also a regional transshipment and destination point for illicit
drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. While its airports and vast coastlines are exploited,
transnational criminal organizations continue to exploit the Philippine seaports for major
drug shipments (U.S. Department of State, 2016).
Another example of seaport vulnerability is found in a May 2020, seizure by
Customs officials at the port of Havre, France, of 1.4 tons of cocaine that was hidden
inside of a shipping container loaded with coffee. The dangerous drugs were loaded
onboard a commercial vessel in the port of Puerto Cortes, Honduras. The illicit shipment
was then swapped to another vessel in the Dominican Republic, before departing for its
destination in France. The estimated street value was $110 million (Papadovassilakis,
2020). The United States is an allied partner with Honduras, and routinely works together
to fight against transnational criminal networks engaged on narcotics trafficking, money
laundering and trafficking of persons (U.S. Department of State, 2020, para. 1). In 2019,
during a routine inspection onboard a commercial vessel docked at Port Newark, security
officials discovered a shipping container with indicators of tampering. Officials noticed
that the doors of the shipping containers, manifested with dry fruit, appeared to have been
manipulated. A search of the container led to the discovery of 3200 pounds of cocaine,
with an estimated street value of $77 million (Watson, 2019). This illicit shipment of
drugs arrived from Columbia.
Drug trafficking and organized crime funds terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and
FARC, providing the necessary financial resources to purchase weapons and pay the
salaries of fighters (Thachuk & Lal, 2017). The cross pollination of terrorism and drug
trafficking reveals a dangerous convergence that demands a change in maritime
counterterrorism strategy. Seaport security measures appear to be inadequately equipped
to detect, deter, or prevent exploitation of transnational criminal organization or terrorists.
The shared financial motives, structures and criminal tactics represents a dangerous
fusion in which convergence has happened. Thachuk and Lal (2017) cautioned it is
increasingly difficult and arguably fruitless to continue to classify terrorism and
organized crime separately. According to Shelly and Picarelli (2005) regions such as the
Tri-Border area of Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina are saturated with organized crime
and terrorist activity and it “is often difficult, not to say meaningless, to draw a distinction
between groups. Many individuals belong to both terror and organized crime groups and
conduct a variety of tasks for both” (p. 5).
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia – People’s
Army (FARC) for example, became involved in the cocaine supply chain following the
toppling of the Medellin and Cali cartels. By the 2000s, the FARC, an antigovernment
guerrilla group formed in 1964, was identified as the largest supplier of cocaine in Latin
America (Thachuk & Lal, 2017). While the group has undergone transition into a political
party, the appetite of ex-guerilla members (dissidents) still engaged in organized crime
has led to expansion of the FARC’s trafficking enterprise. The group has expanded its
criminal enterprise and altered many of its drug trafficking routes to include routine
shipments to West African seaports. In 2013, the DEA arrested members of al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and FARC involved in an elaborate scheme whereas
cocaine was exchanged for drugs and weapons. The smuggling operation involved the use
of fake export licenses for commercial ships used to traffic large quantities of drugs to
major West African ports (Thachuk & Lal, 2017). Shelley & Picarelli (2005) noted that
an increasing number of criminal organizations are serving the financial or logistical ends
of terror groups and thus serve as nodes of interaction. By analyzing criminal penetration
of seaports, research may provide “an important tool for assessing terrorist risk, both from
the perspective of straight piracy, and because of the larger problem of penetration of
ports by terrorists” (Shelly & Picarelli, 2005, p. 47).
Suspicious Activity and Breach of Security Reports
I gathered existing records of seaport security activity from the USCG, to support
the methodology of this research study. Due to the sensitive nature of this research, and
potential restriction in the sharing of information by security officials, I obtained the data
using a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The data assisted in appraising and
evaluating U.S. seaport security cultures prior to conducting interviews with security
officials. Under federal law (33 CFR § 101.305) U.S. seaports are required to report
breaches of security to the National Response Center (NRC) without delay; and are
required to report suspicious activities that may result in a Transportation Security
Incident (TSI).
The objective of this data analysis was to identify patterns in security threat
activities, pinpoint incident locations and to help guide the development interview
questions. I gathered unclassified information by submitting a FOIA request to the NRC
(United States Coast Guard). The FOIA provides access to federal agency records or
information that are not exempted from disclosure due to a governmental need for
protective measures related to national defense and security (U.S. Department of Justice,
2020; 5 U.S.C. § 552). I formally requested all data explicit to maritime border security,
specifically focusing my request on seaport security. I requested that the NRC compile
and provide the annual total number of security breaches and suspicious activity incidents
reported to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (NRC/USCG) from seaport
officials. My request included specific dates encompassing periods beginning July 1,
2001 to the date of request, April 21, 2020.
I included a formal inquiry into the actual nature of each reported incident, and the
actual incident locations by zip code from which each report generated. My request
included a statement of purpose for my request, and a general explanation of my intent to
satisfy a research gap as part of academic doctoral studies at Walden University.
Recognizing the sensitive nature of my request, I clarified my intent was not to acquire
information protected or classified as Sensitive Security Information (SSI) under 49 Code
of Federal Regulation, Part 1520. After several follow up requests, I received the needed
records to conduct my analysis and to gain additional understanding of the phenomenon
under study. However, while the records were sufficient for my study, I was not provided
any information specific to the nature or actual locations of these incidents. I sought to
explore, collect, and analyze the data relevant to seaport threats, security activities and
behaviors of security officials.
Through this collection of governmental records and analysis of the data, I made
several important observations. The first observation I made was that an earlier study
(Hampton, 2015) presented data indicating that incidents and activities were significantly
lower than data currently being reported in this study for the same evaluation periods. A
comparative analysis of both studies discovered the difference in data collection methods.
The original 2015 FOIA request, limited the search criteria by only seeking data from the
NRC database instead of records of all archived data recording breaches of security and
suspicious activity as seaports. The second observation was that on July 1, 2004, both the
ISPS Code and the MTSA became effective. In that same year (2004) there were a total
of 418 incidents reported by U.S. seaports, in which security measures were
circumvented, eluded, or violated. In 2005 the number of reports nearly doubled to a total
of 803 security breaches that were reported to have occurred at U.S. seaports, followed by
991 in 2006; 880 in 2007; then averaging 868 incidents annually through 2015. Annual
averages from 2016 to 2019, increased to 969 incidents annually. Third, I found that
suspicious activity reporting steadily increased from 62 incidents in 2003 to 2482
incidents in 2019. The data records for periods beginning in 2016 and ending in 2019,
were most notable with a peak of 3026 suspicious activity incidents at U.S. seaports being
recorded (See Figure 2).
Figure 2
National Response Center & USCG Data Summary 2020
This data validated the rational for studying the effectiveness of security measures
instituted at U.S. seaports, and warranted pursuit of qualitative interviews. The data
informed this study by proposing that measures implemented at U.S. seaports since July
1, 2004 have not been effective in eliminating unauthorized access to restricted facilities.
There has been no notable decline in security breaches since 2003, when reporting was
not mandatory. Also noted was a significant increase (3026) in suspicious activity
occurring at U.S. seaports between 2014 and 2017. The collective findings supported the
rationale for this study, guided this research and supported the selection of its
methodology.
Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed literature pertaining to seaport security, maritime drug
trafficking and terrorism convergence. I also reviewed literature about transnational
organized crime and maritime laws instituted in response to acts of terrorism committed
against the United States. This study was not overly concerned with the collection of
empirical data related to cargo volumes or number of security incidents occurring at
seaports, but rather, I focused on exploring factors that allowed authorized people and
illicit goods access to restricted facilities and cargo. In this qualitative analysis the focus
of my study was on understanding why security measures failed to adequately secure U.S.
seaports against smuggling and to explore the risk of a weaponized device being
introduced through a port of entry. The literature illustrated that vulnerabilities do exists
within cargo import and export processes that allows criminal organizations to
successfully smuggle large quantities of drugs through seaports. The literature also
illustrates that the intercoupled nature of the maritime transportation system renders
current seaport security measures futile against criminal infiltration. Literature also
revealed a lack of uniformity in terrorist threat perceptions amongst security officials at
European ports; resulting in contentious interactions that contributed to know morale.
Lastly, the literature illustrated an expanding convergence of DTO and terrorist
organizations in international drug trafficking. The major theme in the literature
encompassed the urgent need to prioritize and synchronize seaport security measures
across all system components.
U.S. seaports directly support over 23 million American jobs and 4.6 trillion in
economic activity. Seaports facilitate the movements of goods totaling approximately
26% of the U.S. economy, and anticipates trade volumes to quadruple by 2030 (United
States, 2018). Acknowledging threats posed to U.S. seaports, in a 2017, Homeland
Security Committee Hearing, Chairman Michael T. McCaul publicly emphasized that the
security of U.S. seaports and cargo containers is vital to homeland security and the
nation’s financial health (United States, 2018). The Committee noted that security threats
have evolved from piracy to complex smuggling operations, transnational organized
crime, and terrorism (United States, 2018). While terrorist organizations are ideological,
their reliance on illegal activities to fund attacks and support operational expenses has led
to transformation into transnational criminal organizations (Thachuk & Lal, 2017). A
false dichotomy of terrorism and organized crime as separate phenomena threatens the
evolution of U.S. seaport security and the global supply chain.
The emergence of evidence indicating a correlation between counter-drug and
counter-terrorism measures demonstrates that policy and practical countermeasures must
also evolve and overlap to adequately eliminate seaport security vulnerabilities. The U.S.
Coast Guard is touted as the first line of defense against drug traffickers seeking to
smuggle illicit substances into the United States through seaports and waterways. The
USCG coordinates with other federal agencies and countries to disrupt and deter the flow
of illegal drugs and accounts for more than half of all U.S. government seizures of
cocaine each year (USCG, 2020). U.S. CBP is responsible for more than 11 million
maritime containers arriving at U.S. seaports annually, and is responsible for knowing
what is inside, or whether they pose a risk to national security (U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, 2019). Port Authority police departments in the U.S. are specialized local and
state law enforcement agencies responsible for protecting seaport from all threats whether
by land, sea, or air (GPAPD, 2020; LAPP, 2020; PANYNJ[PAPD], 2020). Recognizing
that narcoterrorism “embodies the merger of two phenomena, an even actual cooperation
between two criminal networks, can make security theories more encompassing and more
relevant and useful for policy making” (Bjornehed, 2004, p. 315).
The literature review included the collections of data from an in-depth research of
academic literature; an analysis of archival records, governmental reports, and
documents; and concluded with a series of open-ended interviews with seaport security
officials. The combination of data collection methods used in this study supports
triangulation, in which verification and corroboration of my findings is objectively
accomplished. Additionally, data source triangulation used in this study strengthens its
credibility (Yin, 2016). Although the literature on port operations is comprehensive, few
studies pertain to seaport security measures and their capacity to prevent unauthorized
access to restricted facilities and cargo. The lack of research presents a serious gap within
the literature. In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodology used to determine the best course
of action for securing U.S. seaports against transnational criminal and terrorist groups.
Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore seaport security to understand
what internal and external factors impact protection measures. Qualitative research is
exploratory in nature, focused on meaning and understanding; therefore, it is ideal for
gaining an understanding of existing maritime security measures and the phenomenon of
unauthorized access to restricted port facilities and cargo. I used a qualitative research
design because it offers flexibility and typically is not intended to prove or test a theory;
however, elements of established theories did emerge during the literature review and
may be observed during collection and analysis of the data (O’Sullivan et al., 2017). I
used variants of a case study design to focus the study on the examination of seaport
security measures as an individual function in a system with unique characteristics
relevant to my research interest (O’Sullivan et al., 2017).
Transnational criminal networks routinely exploit the maritime transportation
system to smuggle illicit goods into seaports around the world. Smugglers routinely
infiltrate legitimate export processes to hide dangerous drugs, weapons, and other
contraband inside of shipping containers from source countries, then retrieve them by
exploiting import cargo processes at a port of destination. To explore and understand why
seaport security measures have not adequately prevented unauthorized people and cargo
from gaining access, I examined the maritime system as a whole and its subsystems
individually, with strategic focus on seaports. Chapter 3 includes an overview of the
research methods I used in conducting my investigation. In the research design and
rationale sections, I discussed the use of a case study approach and explained why it was
important to this study. The research questions are also restated, and the role of the
researcher is discussed. Lastly, the chapter includes the methodology that I followed in
collecting and analyzing the study’s primary data source.
Research Design and Rationale
The following research questions guided this study:
Research Question 1: What are the meanings, structures, and essence of lived
experience of seaport security officials, in terms of instituting security measures required
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002?
Research Question 2: What do seaport security officials perceive as barriers and
facilitators to implementing security practices at U.S. seaports?
The complexity of seaport security, terrorism, crime, public policy, and global
trade requires an approach, and strategy that offers both sufficient latitude, and capacity
for understanding processes, people, events, and experiences (Yin, 2016). By
conceptualizing U.S. seaports as both a system whole and subsystem component, I was
able to explore with specificity, individual components and functions interacting in the
maritime environment to identify barriers and facilitators. Seaports are social
organizations that employ highly technological systems to facilitate the movement of
goods and people. Therefore, human factors and processes were analyzed as part of this
study because they influence overall system performance (Caws; 2015; Tin, 2016). The
literature and secondary data sources indicated the prioritization of seaport security
diverges dramatically amongst system components who rely upon each other to ensure
system efficiency. Accordingly, it was logical and necessary to pursue insight through the
primary data source, participant interviews. Seaports are diverse in nature and vary
significantly across geographical and political spheres, so findings from individual
participants vacillated significantly; so, insight may not be generalizable and but may
support theoretical propositions (Yin, 2018).
Role of the Researcher
As the inquirer, and primary research instrument, I was responsible for designing
the interview protocol, interview guide, selecting participants, and conducting interviews
with seaport security officials. I was responsible for the interview questions and
disseminating consent forms to each participant. My role further included answering
questions, addressing concerns of the participants, and transcribing all the data. While I
had no personal relationships with any of the participants, careful consideration was given
to my professional affiliations. One important task for the study was to bracket myself by
acknowledging my personal and professional experiences as a law enforcement official. It
was important to ensure that my relationships, knowledge, and experiences do not
influence or interfere with reality expressed through study participants. The study did not
include anyone in my direct chain of command. There were no power based supervisory,
differential or instructor relationships involved in this study. Lastly, I had no recruitment
interactions with the intended study pool prior to initiating contact for this study, nor were
incentives offered as a condition for participation.
As an actively serving senior law enforcement officer (with over 20 years of
experience) specializing in areas of maritime security, antiterrorism, investigations, and
emergency management, I had preconceived ideas about my topic. To avoid bias, and to
ensure consistency, I used a standardized set of questions for each interview. I used a
digital audio recorder to record all interviews, took detailed notes, and provided each
participant an electronic copy of their responses (within 72 hours of the interview). As an
important mechanism to support and preserve the ethical values of this study, data
exclusion was strictly scrutinized, and participant responses were verified using member
checking. Member checks are procedures whereby a study’s findings are shared with
participants to ensure the accuracy of a study and reinforce ethical and collaborative
relationships (Yin, 2016). Participants were asked to review their responses and to
confirm that they were accurately transcribed before beginning analysis. Finally, there
were no monetary incentives for participants to avoid the appearance of response
influence or bias during interviews.
Methodology
This qualitative research study was conducted to explore and understand factors
that adversely impact seaport security measures. The research used case study variants as
an analysis approach for corroborating findings from multiple sources (Yin, 2016). The
literature review of academic journals, articles and governmental reports led to findings
indicating that U.S. seaports are at risk to exploitation by transnational criminal
organizations, including hybrid terrorist organizations. An in-depth review of
governmental records validated the academic literature findings, expanded my
understanding, and increased my intellectual interest in perceived barriers and facilitators
to seaport security. Both the literature and secondary data sources confirms the existence
of the problem and the existence of a literary gap.
To help in identifying concepts, and relationships existing in seaports, I used
general systems theory. The theoretical framework is instrumental in allowing me to
conceptualize seaports as complex systems, comprised of various independent
components working together to sustain the viability of global commerce. The theoretical
framework provides a mechanism from which I observed isomorphism between the
maritime transportation system and other areas of science. This is critical, as it allowed
me to focus and evaluate the relationships in existence between seaport components to
uncover conflicts, weaknesses in processes, barriers, and to identify inadvertent
contributors to unauthorized access.
According to Yin (2016) qualitative research is conducive for exploring social,
institutional, cultural, and environmental conditions that influences perceptions, and
actions of people. This study aimed to capture those experiences and perceptions from
frontline security officials responsible for seaport security. Qualitative research samples
(or instances) are chosen in a deliberate manner to yield both sufficient and relevant data
specific to the topic under study (Yin, 2016). Qualitative studies seek to obtain maximum
variations through broad ranges of information derived from samples with different
viewpoints and perspectives on topics under study. The literature review (Chapter 2)
indicates the existence of potential opposing viewpoint amongst line officers and
management, regarding security threats and practices at seaports. Therefore, this study
included participant interviews with various levels of authority, ranks, and seniority, to
facilitate the collection of potential opposing experiences and perspectives (Yin, 2016).
According to Yin (2016) data collected as part of qualitative research is more vastly
compiled from conversational interviews, as opposed to by use of classic instruments. My
goal was to capture the objective (untainted) experiences and perspectives of security
officials most knowledgeable of barriers and facilitators to security at U.S. seaports. An
important component to the methodology is the development of a robust protocol;
therefore, I examined the number of security incidents occurring at U.S. seaports between
2001 and 2019. My findings from that examination assisted in determining my line of
inquiry for participant interviews.
The primary data collection method was participant interviews. Participants
included U.S. seaport security professionals in current or former positions of subject
matter authority. Participant selection criteria included a mandatory minimum
combination of 2 years law enforcement and/or security experience in a maritime
jurisdiction. First, using public information sources, I identified top ranked U.S. seaports
by container volume, cross referenced them, and identified security professionals with
current or former security (law enforcement) responsibilities within them. The target
sample population included various levels of authorities amongst Chiefs of Police,
Security Directors, Facility Security Officers (FSOs), first line officers and other
homeland security professionals. As a contingency plan, I used the social media platform,
LinkedIn, to identify participants and to solicit participation. This study used
nonprobability purposeful sampling to recruit experienced participants who could provide
a broad range of information and perspectives. Prior to conducting interviews, I obtained
approval from Walden’s University Institutional Review Board (IRB).
After obtaining IRB approval, using public sources, I identified and contacted
participants from the sample population by email (or second email as needed).
Participants received a consent form (see Appendix B) by email for their review; an email
reply indicating their willingness to voluntarily participate in the interview was required.
The informed consent form detailed the study’s nature, and purpose, my contact
information, potential risks to participants, and methods of confidentiality between the
participants and the researcher. The privacy and confidentiality of participants was
prioritized in this study. Therefore, no real names were used, and each participant was
assigned an alphanumeric number to protect their privacy and for de-identification
purposes. Participation in this study was voluntary, therefore, contributors were not
required to participate, and each were consenting adults; no minors or members of
vulnerable populations were included in this study.
This research applied the redundancy (saturation) principle in sample estimates for
this study. Redundancy refers to qualitative data collection focused on maximizing
information, whereas little or no new information is forthcoming (Patton, 2015; Yin,
2016). Yin (2016) stated that the purpose of data collection is to maximize information,
therefore, the study concluded when no new information was provided by the
participants.
Instrumentation
The qualitative interview protocol was produced by me and adhered to Walden’s
University interview guidelines. The qualitative interview questions (see Appendix A)
were based on information obtained through literature sources and governmental archival
records reviewed as part of this study. A series of structured but open-ended questions
related to the central research questions were used to better understand security measures
from the perspective of security officials. The interview questions were arranged in a
semi-structured manner, and probes and follow-up questions were used to stimulate
participant response, when elaboration to comments were necessary (Rubin & Rubin,
2012; Yin, 2016). Each interview lasted approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes, and
written notes were taken throughout each session to assist in illuminating insight and
summarizing the study’s findings.
Potential issues that might arise when using interviews as a data collection
method, included insufficient sampling of a population, sampling bias and errors due to
convenience, and purposive sampling. Convenience sampling was deemed inappropriate
for generalizing with any degree of certainty and therefore, not used as part of this
research study (O’Sullivan et al., 2017; Yin, 2016). While it was important that the
number of participants in this study reach a point of sufficiency, participants were not
selected based on convenience. Lincoln and Guba (1985) asserted that in contrast to
traditional sampling, redundancy is the primary criterion for purposive studies. Yin
(2016) noted that a researcher may be able to estimate and state, ahead a likely range of
sample for a study. Therefore, I estimated that a sample of 10 – 18 participant responses
may result in maximization of information, sufficient for answering the research
questions.
Data Analysis Plan
The study’s data analysis included a combination of open codes (level 1) and
category codes (level 2), followed by an inquiry for emergent themes using computer
assisted qualitative data analysis (Saldana, 2016). The study followed five qualitative
analytical phases: they included compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting,
and concluding (Yin, 2016). The analysis plan was based on an immersion into each of
the participant’s responses (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). Informal analysis was
performed during the initial collection to assist in assessing the adequacy of participant
responses and overall data obtained. Notes and transcriptions from each interview were
formally arranged and sorted (Yin, 2016). The compiled data was then disassembled and
further arranged with level 1 codes being assigned. The data was then subjected to level 2
coding, then later followed by an inquiry for emergent themes using computer assisted
qualitative data analysis software (Saldana, 2016). The data was then reanalyzed,
interpreted, and used to create a summarized narrative of my findings, before drawing my
conclusion (Yin, 2016).
I used NVivo, to assist in managing data and to support the prioritization and
honoring of participant voices (Saldana, 2016). The use of NVivo, allowed me to transfer
documents, and audio files from secondary analysis and information management. The
pre-coded data from the interview transcriptions were uploaded into NVivo software and
a systematic query was performed to assist in identifying emergent themes. The combined
analysis approach assisted in establishing and maintaining validity, rigor, trustworthiness,
and dependability in my findings. My observations and interpretation were subjected to
the scrutiny of expert review by assigned research committee members and external audit
by knowledgeable consultants who has no relation to this study (Rudestam & Newton,
2015). To manage data, I stored interview data in a password protected external hard
drive. As a contingency plan in case data is loss, I stored an additional copy of data in an
encrypted format on a password protected USB Flash drive. Both devices were secured in
a safe location and kept for at least five years as proposed by Walden University’s
Research Ethics guidelines.
Issues of Trustworthiness
The trustworthiness and validity of this study was prioritized throughout its
components, including topic selection, literature review, approach, data collection, and is
strictly maintained to its conclusion. This study’s trustworthiness is based and reflected
on four major components: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). I explicitly, and methodically convey the challenges in
collecting data relevant to topic, and techniques that I used for overcoming them. Patton
(2015) stated that reflexivity reminds the qualitative researcher be attentive, conscious of
one’s own perspectives, and to undertake in an ongoing examination of what is known
and how it is known. Reflexivity necessitates in-depth introspection of individual
thinking patterns and exploring our understanding interpretations (Patton, 2015).
Reflexivity requires self-awareness and actively monitoring of the role and influence a
researcher may on a study’s outcomes (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). It necessitates and
assessment of a researcher’s positionality and subjectivities as they relate to a research
topic (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Recruiting and selection of participants was fair and
impartial; gender, race, age and/or nationality was not relevant factors or of interest to
this study; therefore, participants were not asked to disclose such. To minimize the
potential of overlooking risks, overestimating benefits, or assuming consent is informed
and voluntary, I followed the advice and guidance of the Institutional Review Board
(O’Sullivan et al., 2017). The trustworthiness of this study is central to its research
design, methods, and findings; therefore, deliberate attention and strategic measures were
taken for its assurance.
Credibility
Qualitative research produces highly creditable results when incorporated into a
study’s design (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Shenton, 2004). This study disclosed its use of
thick rich descriptions to report participant responses, implements the use of
triangulation, and member checks. This study incorporates measure to acquire familiarity
with the culture of each participant by consultation, a review of appropriate documents
and through the researcher’s own experiences (Shenton, 2004). I devoted substantial time,
energy and focus on becoming oriented with the phenomenon under study. Through
comprehensive academic research and practical experience, prolonged engagement is
accomplished and contributes to the credibility of this study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Rubin and Rubin (2012) noted that credibility is strengthened in part when a researcher
demonstrates that findings are based on information obtained from people knowledgeable
about the study topic. A person’s formal position is not always a good representation of
their knowledge of a research topic; therefore, I determined the sufficiency of each
interviewee’s experience based on the selection criteria. Rubin and Rubin (2012) also
noted the importance of transparency, and its role in allowing a reader to see the
processes used for data collection and analysis. This study was careful and intentional in
instituting measures to encourage honesty. Participants were given the opportunity to
refuse to participate in the study, as a mechanism for vetting and retaining willing
samples (Shenton, 2004).
Transferability
Transferability references the ability of results to be applied to a wider population.
The goal of qualitative research is to develop descriptive relevant statements that may be
applicable or transferable to broader context while maintaining its original contextspecific
richness (Ravitch & Carl, 2016; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Yin, 2016). The application of
GST as the theoretical framework and the triangulated findings from collected data
uncovered potential replicable findings that may be extrapolated to other areas of study.
In conceptualizing seaports as both complex systems and subcomponents of a larger
maritime system, the study’s finding are comparable and potentially applicable to various
other systems. As Shenton (2004) noted however, transferability inference should be
made readers of the work. This study used sufficient thick description of the phenomenon
under investigation to provide its readers proper understanding, thereby enabling them to
make appropriate comparison (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004).
Dependability
Qualitative research is considered dependable when it is consistent and stable over
time (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Dependability is established through detailed reporting of
the study’s processes. This study outlined its processes for collecting, analyzing, and
reporting its findings. The study’s data collection and management techniques remained
robust throughout a logical, and traceable process. The appropriateness of my chosen
methods to answer the core constructs and concepts of the study supported the
trustworthiness of this study (Ravitch & Carl, 2016).
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the neutrality or the degree findings are consistent and
repeatable (Connelly, 2016). Qualitative researchers acknowledge that the world is a
subjective place; therefore, its goal is to ensure its findings can be confirmed (Ravitch &
Carl, 2016). Confirmability aims to ensure a study’s findings are the result of experiences
and responses of participants and not characteristics and preferences of the researcher
(Shenton, 2004). Therefore, confirmability was established in this study by maintaining a
robust audit trail, in which the details of data collections, data analysis, and interpretation
were clearly outlined. Throughout this research study, I maintained detailed records of
documents, electronic recordings, observations, and process notes (Lincoln & Guba,
1985). Confirmability was supported using triangulation to address potential biases that
are likely to subconsciously influence my beliefs, and directing underlying decision
making, including the selection of methods. Lastly, confirmability was further established
and maintained through reflexivity. I included reflexive analysis to supplement
interviews, observations, and analytical notes, as a technique for maintaining awareness
of my own influence on the data.
Summary
This chapter presented the research design and rationale, methodology for the
discovery and analysis of data. It discussed the collection and management of data,
codification, method of analysis, and outlined ethical considerations. The rationale and
methodology described in this chapter summarized the design and research steps used for
data collection, organization, analysis, and protection. Through this qualitative study I
investigated seaport security measures to understand why individuals continue to gain
unauthorized access two seaports and cargo. In Chapter 4, I discuss the findings of the
research, emergent themes, and the implications from the analysis.
Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
In chapter 4, I present the findings of my research. This qualitative study was
focused on the effectiveness of seaport security measures in preventing unauthorized
access, and countering transnational threats posed to maritime systems. Scholarly
research into the phenomenon under study is limited, therefore, I sought to make an
original contribution to knowledge by bridging the gap in literature. Through research of
seaport security and data collection, I gained an understanding of the phenomenon under
study, potential factors that inadvertently allow unauthorized access to restricted seaport
facilities and containerized cargo. The study was guided by two central research
questions:
Research Question 1: What are the meanings, structures, and essence of lived
experience of seaport security officials, in terms of instituting security measures required
by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002?
Research Question 2: What do seaport security officials perceive as barriers and
facilitators to implementing security practices at U.S. seaports?
Data was collected for this study through 10, Zoom audio interviews that were
digitally recorded. The chapter includes a general description of participant demographics
and includes articulation of the interview setting. The chapter includes a presentation of
the data, data analysis, and highlights of observed patterns and themes amongst
participant responses. The chapter concludes by outlining the study’s findings in relation
to my research questions.
Setting
The study population consisted of seaport security officials (SSOs) representing
geographical areas from across the United States. Interviews were conducted on dates and
times chosen by participants, which supported and promoted sharing of personal, and
professional experiences, observations, and perceptions relevant to the study. Some of the
challenges that I experienced during this study on seaport security were locating
participants who were willing to speak openly about security practices (successes or
failures) and balancing the use of probes to reveal information likely to be deemed as
security sensitive, personally, or professionally embarrassing.
As I discussed in Chapter 2, a significant number of security breaches were
reported to have occurred at U.S. seaports since the implementation of the MTSA. While
specific facilities are not disclosed in this study, fear of criticism may have also deterred
some security officials from participating in this study. Rubin and Rubin (2012) explained
that a potential participant must trust that a researcher will not make public what could be
embarrassing or harmful to an interviewee. Creswell and Poth (2018) explained that
potential participants are often fearful that their issues may be exposed to people outside
their communities. I addressed and mitigated these challenges through several actions.
My background in law enforcement and seaport security helped to establish and maintain
trust with potential and actual participants. I alleviated concerns about the intentions of
this project and stimulated interest of potential participants, by providing a thorough
description of the study and the research process during initial communication with
participants. Lastly, by providing participants with official consent forms, I validated the
legitimacy of the study and encouraged participation. There was no indication that the
study participants felt pressured, concerned, or other negative feelings during the
collection phase.
Demographic
My target sample population involved SSOs representing geographic areas from
each maritime border region of the United States, including northeast, southeast,
southwest, and western borders. Participants were identified using open-source
information (public records) and professional networks. I used Zoom audio to conduct the
study because of the geospatial location of participants. A comprehensive description,
including positions of the study's participants cannot be divulged because it may lead to
their identification. The participants included senior SSOs, comprising local, state, and
federal levels of government. I used pseudonyms to identify each participant listed in
Table 1, based on the invitation dissemination order sequence; 10 of the 44 invited SSOs
agreed to participate. For example, an invitation was sent first to SSO 1, who agreed to
participate. SSO 2, and SSO 3, were invited, but did not participate. SSO 4 and SSO 5
were invited and did participate. SSO 6, SSO 7, and SSO 8 were invited, but did not
participate; SSO 9 was invited and did participate. This continued until saturation was
achieved. See Table 1 (on the next page) for participant demographics.
Table 1
Participant Demographics
Participant Gender Length of
Employment
U.S. Region Representative
Level
SSO 1 Male 33 Years Southeast Federal
SSO 4 Male 20 Years Southeast Local
SSO 5 Male 30 Years Northeast State
SSO 9 Male 20 Years West Local
SSO 13 Male 24 Years Northeast State
SSO 16 Male 27 Years Southeast Local
SSO 17 Male 29 Years Southeast Federal
SSO 37 Male 17 Years West Local
SSO 38 Male 38 Years Southwest Local
SSO 41 Male 20 Years Southwest Local
Data Collection
After receiving Walden University IRB approval (No. 12-07-20-0344611), I
began participant recruitment by searching and identifying potential participants using
open public sources, including seaport websites, maritime port directories and the
professional network, LinkedIn. Qualitative data were collected from 10 participant
interviews; and while this was slightly fewer than initial estimates, the sample size proved
to be more than sufficient to achieve data saturation. Based on data acquired from the
U.S. Department of Transportation (2020) my sample population represented 40% of the
top 25 U.S. seaports responsible for 96% of all loaded TEUs. In addition, my study’s
sample population represented the collective experiences of officials working at facilities
that accounted for 47.7% of 55.5 million TEUs handled by the top 25 U.S. seaports in
2019. The sample population was therefore, more than adequate to contribute rich insight
into the phenomenon under study.
Yin (2016) explained that saturation occurs when themes are repeated from
participant’s interviews. After completing 10 interviews, I observed redundancy in
participant responses. I reached a point of data saturation when no new information was
being generated. To recruit participants, I extended research invitations by email
correspondence. I sent a total of 44 invitations to potential participants who possessed a
job title with responsibilities for seaport security. Of the 44 invited recipients, 10
individuals (22.7%) responded as interested participants for the study.
Data collection was conducted over the course of 60 days, beginning in December
2020, and continued through February 2021, with weekly interviews being conducted
with on average 1 - 2 consenting participants. The IRB authorized research collection
method I used was audio recorded interviews; with reflective journaling being used as a
bracketing strategy throughout the interview sessions. Before the start of each interview, I
expressed appreciation for their participation and provided a brief overview of my study.
The consent form was briefly discussed, and I reemphasized the right to withdraw from
the study at any time without negative consequences. After obtaining assurance from each
participant of their willingness to participate and their consent to be audio recorded, I
initiated the interview, each of which lasted approximately 90 minutes. Interview
questions were open ended and designed to invoke replies, while allowing for use of
probes to solicit expanded information specific to the research design and focus of the
study. I used Zoom as the primary recording device and a Sony PX Series Digital Voice
Recorder as a secondary (backup) device. Zoom allowed me to schedule meeting times,
control access to each interview and allowed me to record my conversations with
participants. Zoom also provided participants the ability to call in using a telephone or
computer. During each interview, I made handwritten notes of significant and most
notable responses from each participant. The participants were informed that the
interviews would be confidential and, to ensure confidentiality, their names were replaced
with alphanumeric characters in all transcription documents and within the findings of
this study. There was no variation in data collection from what was presented in chapter
3.
Data Analysis
After completing the participant interviews, I transcribed the recordings using
both manual methods and Otter.ai transcription software. I employed a careful and
intense analysis strategy involving reading and re-reading the transcripts and listening to
the interview recordings, to gain understanding of participant feedback relevant to their
experiences and perceptions and to ensure attentiveness to prevailing themes. I then
initiated member checking by sending a copy of the individual participant transcript to
their preferred email for review. The interview transcriptions were redacted of participant
names and supplemented with alphanumeric characters randomly assigned to each
participant. Once transcription accuracy was determined, I compiled the data (audio and
notes) together identified only by the assigned alphanumeric characters. I then
disassembled the data, reading each transcript and applying open-coding (level 1)
methods to assist in developing initial codes from the written text with specific focus on
relating data amongst each participant.
I emersed myself in the data collected from each transcription and audio recording
and created additional handwritten notes of significant or repetitive words or phrases used
by participants. I then reassembled the data using substantive themes that were created
based on the combinations of disassembled items that I coded. This second application of
coding allowed me to better understand how the data from each participant related to
broader conceptual issues expressed by all participants. I further analyzed the data, using
the most frequently found themes amongst participants responses, that enabled me to
better conceptualize and contextualize commonalities. I then reanalyzed and interpreted
the reassembled data, obtaining a more holistic understanding of the shared participant
experiences.
Although initial conclusions could be drawn from this iterative analysis, I
followed up by recompiling the coded data and further analyzing them using NVivo
software. I selected this software to assist in managing the large amounts of data, support
primary analysis, assist in characterizing themes and revealing patterns that emerged from
the collective responses to the interview questions. Using the software, I was able to
visualize frequently used words, phrases, and concepts to identify and extract the most
common themes and explore their associated meanings. Through this in-depth evaluation
of the themes collected from participant responses to the semistructured interview
questions, I was able to uncover common patterns and expand the themes more broadly,
contributing to a more refined understanding of seaport culture, facilitators, barriers, and
challenges to maritime security. This study was based on qualitative research and presents
the collected data using direct quotes from participants to support the identified and
observed themes. Quotes are recognized as the primary way to bring participants’ voices
into written reports (Ravitch & Mittenfelner, 2016; Yin, 2016). This study incorporated
use of direct quotes to provide rich descriptions when discussing this complex
phenomenon; this was to ensure readers are provided clear and insightful descriptions of
participants’ actual experiences and perceptions (Creswell & Poth, 2018).
Yin (2016) explained that all qualitative studies contain information about the
actions and voices of individual participants. This study conveys the perceptions, beliefs,
and observed behaviors of seaport security officials. Therefore, it was important and
necessary to accurately portray the real-world events and participant perspectives about
the phenomenon under study. The organization of the study's findings are presented in a
cross-case presentation manner, in which interspersing quotes from participants were
intended to use their voices to draw attention to the specific interview topics (Yin, 2016;
Creswell & Poth, 2018).
There were four themes identified: (a) social systems (b) threat perception, (c)
regulatory scope, and (d) barriers and facilitators. Social systems reference complex
arrangements and interactions between separate but coalescing elements, including their
individual beliefs and perceptions in relations to the whole. Threat perceptions are
defined as the conscious and unconscious assessment of impending harm or disruption.
Regulatory scope references the specific application, range, and authorities of a law.
Barriers are conceptualized as inhibitors to progress and facilitators are conceptualized as
enablers of progressive actions. There were no discrepant cases.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
The trustworthiness and validity of this study was prioritized throughout each of
its components, including topic selection, literature review, approach, data collection, and
was strictly maintained to its conclusion. This study’s trustworthiness is established on
four major components: credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I
communicated the challenges encountered in collecting data and outlined the techniques
that I use to overcoming them. I utilized reflexivity to ensure attentiveness to personal
biases and to undertake in an ongoing examination of what is known and how it is known
(Patton, 2015). Reflexivity necessitates in-depth introspection of individual thinking
patterns and exploring our understanding interpretations (Patton, 2015). Recruiting and
selection of participants was fair and impartial; gender, race, age and/or nationality were
not relevant factors or of interest to this study. To minimize the potential of overlooking
risks, overestimating benefits, or assuming consent is informed and voluntary, I consulted
and adhered to the guidance of Walden University’s Institutional Review Board.
Credibility
Qualitative research produces highly creditable results when incorporated into a
study’s design (Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Shenton, 2004). I employed the use of thick rich
descriptions to report participant responses and the findings of my study. Comprehensive
academic research practical experience, and prolonged engagement with the data
contributed to a more holistic understanding and credibility of this study (Lincoln &
Guba, 1985). The participant’s time in employment ranged between 17-38 years. Rubin
and Rubin (2012) noted that credibility is strengthened in part when a researcher
demonstrates that findings are based on information obtained from people knowledgeable
about the study topic. I was intentional in instilling confidence in the study and in
encouraging honesty and transparency. Participants were given the opportunity to refuse
to participate in the study, as a mechanism for retaining only willing participants
(Shenton, 2004).
Transferability
Transferability references the ability of results to be applied to a wider population.
The goal of qualitative research is to develop descriptive relevant statements that may be
applicable or transferable to broader context while maintaining its original contextspecific
richness (Ravitch & Carl, 2016; Rubin & Rubin, 2012; Yin, 2016). This study used
sufficient thick description of the phenomenon under investigation to provide readers
proper understanding, thereby enabling them to make appropriate comparison
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004).
Dependability
Qualitative research is considered dependable when it is consistent and stable over
time (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Dependability was established through detailed reporting of
the study’s processes. I thoroughly explained the processes for collecting, analyzing, and
reporting the study’s findings. The study’s data collection and management techniques
remained robust throughout a logical, and traceable process.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the neutrality or the degree findings are consistent and
repeatable (Connelly, 2016). Qualitative research acknowledges that the world is a
subjective place; therefore, its goal is to ensure its findings can be confirmed (Ravitch &
Carl, 2016). Confirmability aims to ensure a study’s findings are the result of experiences
and responses of participants and not characteristics and preferences of the researcher
(Shenton, 2004). Therefore, confirmability was established in this study by maintaining a
robust audit trail, in which the details of data collections, data analysis, and interpretation
are preserved. Throughout this research study, I maintained detailed records of
documents, electronic recordings, observations, and process notes (Lincoln & Guba,
1985).
Results
During interpretation, the four dominant concepts emerged from the participant
responses and aided in delineating recurring themes: (a) social systems (b) threat
perception, (c) regulatory scope, (d) barriers and facilitators. My analysis found seaport
security officials to be highly motivated, passionate, and expressive in their commitments
to the success of global commerce and U.S. seaports. Each participant communicated a
desire to provide high level security services to their respective seaport and perceived
their work as a critical element of homeland security service to their communities and the
nation. The participant’s backgrounds were extraordinary, including some who have
military, intelligence and counter-terrorism work experience obtained globally. An
average of 26 years of service (experience) exists amongst the 10 participants. Participant
responses included rich, in-depth descriptions of observations and their perceptions of
risk and threats posed to U.S. seaports. Participants were forthcoming in sharing their
experiences in relation to challenges associated with integrating security practices into
organizations with logistical and operational missions and priorities.
Research Question 1
The meanings, structures, and essence conveyed by participants encompassed
their personal observations, encounters, and assessments, all of which contributed to
responses that provided a more holistic understanding of their perceptions and formulated
opinions. RQ1 focused on the meanings, structures, and essence of lived experience of
seaport security officials, in terms of instituting security measures required by the MTSA.
To explore and answer this question, the semi-structured interview questions were
designed to explore internal cultural phenomena, to elicit natural responses in which
participants expound on their individual realities derived from personal experiences. A
series of associated probes also focused on threat perceptions of security officials
including the smuggling of illicit items through seaports. Lastly, probes were used to
explore the perceptions of information sharing amongst local, state, and federal officials
since the implementation of MTSA.
Theme 1: Social Systems
The overarching research question investigated the meanings of lived experiences
of SSOs who are responsible for implementation of security measures mandated by
MTSA. These officials lived experiences are unique because they occur in the context of
a securitized maritime work environment positioned within national ports of entry, where
their security obligations consume significant time and personal resources. Understanding
the experiences of SSOs as a process of understanding the phenomenon under study was
consistent with the framework inclusive of concepts of self, relationships, and
observations of institutional climate (Ravitch & Mittenfelner, 2016).
Participants were asked to describe the security culture of their seaports, and its
impact on how they exercise security measures. Participants were also asked to describe
the internal relationships between SSOs and port management in relation to the balancing
of security and operational priorities, and to describe their perception of threats to U.S.
seaports. Participant data suggested that the lived experiences of SSOs includes a shared
interest in cargo security and facilitation. Six participants (SSO 1, SSO 4, SSO 5, SSO 17,
SSO 38 and SSO 41) described cultures of collaboration and collective security
consciousness. For example, SSO 5 described his facility’s security cultures as robust,
and credits its success in achieving security objectives, to the support of managerial
leadership who have direct access to the State’s Governor’s Office. He also attributed
success to a highly trained nationally accredited police force and engaged contract
security services. SSO 4 described his facility’s security culture favorably, explaining that
the complexities of balancing security practices with enterprise priorities is challenging.
He stated:
I would say security is embraced. You know, especially with the port director,
he's got two job functions. One, he runs an enterprise, so he's got to carefully
weigh security with not disrupting the flow of commerce. So, he has to tread that
very, very lightly. But here culture is very good when it comes to security. We
work hand in hand with our civilian security partners.
SSO 17, described his seaport as having a culture that reflects strong partnerships
and collaboration with port authority police, and operations. He stated:
I hate to keep patting ourselves on the back, but, you know, we've kind of become
a model port partnership across the board, up to the point where it has recognition
all the way up to our headquarters. People from our top are reaching down, you
know, asking how are you doing, what you're doing, and what's the best way to go
about doing that.
While participants shared similar beliefs that their facilities do a “good job” in
maintaining secure facilities, four participants (SSO 9, SSO 13, SSO 16 & SSO 37)
diverged by explaining their perception of security as being a tolerant measure that is
strictly compliance focused. SSO 16 explained that security staff are constantly pressured
not to hold up cargo operations and are regularly asked to accommodate customers and
clients. SSO 15 explained, “we are business driven, so much that we are very business
conscious, and it's harder on security forces to accommodate sometimes.”
Another participant (SSO 9) described a culture that strictly compliance focused
and void of motivation or desire to engaged in proactive security operations. SSO 9
described the security culture and his relationship with the operational workforce as good;
however, he elaborated by explaining, “as far as facility security goes, I do believe the
terminals are not motivated to do a lot more than is required by the Coast Guard.” SSO 9
and SSO 13 both explained that while their port facilities effectively prioritize security,
they have witnessed port officials whose actions demonstrate that they simply want to
satisfy basic USCG requirements. SSO 13 explained, “they are not interested in doing
real security.” Participants explained that security practices at seaports are viewed as too
costly and adversely impactful to business. For example, SSO 37 said, “they are only
focused on their bottom line, and most cargo operations and financial services personnel
negatively view security as a threat to their budgets.” SSO 37 further described seaports
as organizations that “embraces security only to the extent that it benefits them
financially. They are looking at the bottom line, and almost everyone looks at security as
a hit to that bottom line; we are not revenue generating.”
SSO 37 further elaborated by explaining that the security profession as a whole is
not view favorably and described the differences in hiring practices and pay disparities
with other professions. He explained:
The problem I think, in corporate America and in governmental systems is we do
not trust the professionalism of our security professionals. In the medical
profession, you are going to get your checkups. You hire people who are
experienced, have education in doing what they do, and you trust their advice, and
you support them. You may not want to pay the money to have, you know,
whatever surgery it is, in order to keep you going, but you pay it because you
want to have that quality of life or improve your quality of life.
After exploring the social system interactions between SSOs and operations
personnel at U.S. seaports, I developed a better understanding of the SSO lived
experiences. I then turned my focus to the motivations and perceptions of threats as
perceived by SSOs.
Theme 2: Threat Perceptions
One of the core responsibilities of seaport security personnel is to screen people,
vehicles, and cargo. The main objective of this practice is to prevent the introduction of
dangerous devices and substances that are potentially concealed and smuggled, from
gaining access into a seaport facility or onto a vessel. All participants demonstrated
strong familiarity, and an in-depth comprehension of the sophisticated techniques used by
transnational criminal organizations in smuggling illicit items through the maritime
system. Security officials assess the illicit activities of TCOs as a tangible variable of risk.
Bullock et al. (2016) posited that, “the uncertainty component of risk, contained within
the probability of disastrous event occurrences place is the greatest burden on those who
are treating a full portfolio of risks that must be compared in relation to each other” (p.
510). The risk perception of SSOs was based on perceived vulnerabilities and potential
consequence of exploitation for transnational illicit smuggling.
Seven participants (SSO 5, SSO 9, SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 17, SSO 37 and SSO
41) described their perceptions and experiences with smuggling and the perceived
implications to seaport security. For example, SSO 17 explained that while his
observations of large-scale drug trafficking originating from high-risk countries have
typically targeted European seaports, he explained that eventually, those same drugs and
methods are used in the return of illicit drugs back to the United States. SSO 17 further
explained that:
Drug organizations can get more money for the narcotics in Europe, they can get
it for twice the price tag of what they can get in the U.S., but, as always, those
narcotics going to Europe are eventually going to find its way back to the US.,
because not all narcotics are coming across the southern border; you're still going
to have that come back through the seaport in some way shape or form.
Participants explained that both foreign and domestic intelligence suggests that
terrorist organizations have shifted to the drug trade to support their operations. Seven
participants (SSO 5, SSO 9, SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 17, SSO 37 and SSO 41) perceived
the potential manipulation (conversion) of common smuggling methods used by drug
trafficking organizations, to exploit and conceal a weapon of mass destruction as the
greatest threat to seaports.
When asked to describe perceived risk associated with drug smuggling at seaports,
SSO 5 explained that federal agencies (CBP and USCG) do a great job overall, but they
are “terribly understaffed,” and over the past five years, most newly hired CBP officers
have been sent to the southern border versus seaports. Participants (e.g., SSO 5, SSO 9,
SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 17, SSO 37, SSO 38 and SSO 41) explained that the plausibility of
drug trafficking methods and routes being exploited poses a major risk to seaports. For
example, SSO 5 even cautioned that foreign governments, intelligence agencies, and
terrorist organizations, “know how to get a nuke into the country.”
SSO 5 provided a plausible strategy that may be used by a terrorist group seeking
to exploit smuggling methods and routes. SSO 5 explained:
When China and Russia, tried to or did steal technology from the U.S. military
they used to always go after, this was long time back in the 50s and 60s, they'd go
after the whole kit and caboodle. What they smartly began to do is take one bolt,
one spring, one gasket at a time, then put it together later. I’m afraid they have the
same mentality with a nuclear weapon.
This data suggests the perceived potential for transnational criminal organizations
to gradually smuggle items through legitimate transportation systems is a major concern
of some SSOs. This response also highlights the enormous challenges confronting SSOs
in detecting illicit items from amongst legitimate goods. When asked what he perceived
as the greatest threat posed to a U.S. seaport, SSO 9 explained:
If you can move drugs and people, which we know they do on the west coast here
in pangas and yachts and sailboats from Mexico; the government's getting better
at detecting them; there's more radar stations, but if you can bring that, you could,
you know, in a worst-case scenario, you could bring an explosive device or a nuke
in to.
Data collected from other participants suggested agreement that legitimate cargo
operations may be exploited to import a dangerous device, or to launder money
associated with criminal and terrorist activities. For example, SSO 13 stated:
The other thing that’s not really addressed is what's going out. You know, if drugs
are coming in, there's probably money going out. And matter of fact, we know
there's money going out. Certainly, some ports, more than others. We know
there's weapons going out as well.
When asked to describe risk associated with drug smuggling as seaports, SSO 16
suggested that no difference exists between drug smuggling and weapons smuggling. He
explained:
Smuggling routes have been around for hundreds of years and they've smuggled
everything from donkeys to gold, to cocaine to weapons. I think, though, that part
of it is knowing that the commodity could change. It’s not like I am not worried
about drugs, I mean, I spent most of my career doing drug interdiction, but I think
just whatever method you're using, if you're successful bringing drugs in, just
change the commodity and that's what scares me the most about the drug
smuggling piece.
When asked to describe risk associated with drug smuggling as seaports, SSO 37
described an incident in which weapons were smuggle on board a ship:
In the 1980s, in Seattle, there was a parasitic element that had been welded to the
side of a ship in Seattle, the welding was done offshore someplace else. But long
and short of it was there was a very large cache of firearms that had been put into
a fairly hydrodynamic shape and well into the hull. It was making its way
eventually over to the Middle East. So, firearms are being smuggled from Far
East, to the Middle East, the long way. That particular ship was eventually
destined to go through the canal and get over into the Mediterranean. So you
know, it's not unusual.
SSO 16 further elaborated by outlining a plausible strategy likely to be used by a
group seeking to exploit smuggling methods and routes. He explained:
From a practical standpoint, knowing that they're successful, moving narcotic
products, and they could supplant that with anything else and get through, you
know, they're honing their craft with drugs if you will, but they could put, and
same with migrant smuggling, same thing. You could be putting, you know, 100
migrants through, and you're getting through every time, and then all of a sudden,
four special interest aliens come over.
SSO 37 explained that he was not worried about a nuclear device being smuggled
into a U.S. seaport, but expressed concern about organized crime, transnational threats,
and radiological devices being used against a seaport. SSO 37 stated:
I am concerned about what I would call normal, everyday crime. I'm concerned
about organized crime, both by you know, gang type or organized gang, you
know, mafia type things. And I'm also concerned about international crime, that's
very well organized; that I'm concerned about. I am concerned about dirty bombs,
or radiological dispersal devices, and biological and I am very concerned again
about the normal everyday day to day crime of smuggling, because that's what
nickels and dimes us to death.
All participants acknowledged and agreed that seaports may be exploited by
terrorist organizations engaged in drug trafficking. While all participants agreed that
smuggling is a major threat, three participants (SSO 4, SSO 13, and SSO 41) believe that
cybersecurity threats pose the most immediate threat to a U.S. seaport. These participants
suggested that U.S. seaport cargo manifests may be manipulated to facilitate illicit
shipments or technological systems may be compromised to facilitate an unintended
closure.
While conducting the participant interviews, it became immediately evident that
while all SSOs remained conscientious of the need to balance their duties with the
facilitation of cargo, their coalescing responsibility to protect life and property seemed to
create an occupational identity dilemma. SSOs seemed to genuinely value their
relationships with port partners responsible for logistical operations; however, their
responses seemed to express at least some frustration with what they perceived as
complacency or dismissiveness of potential threats by port officials. After exploring SSO
threat perceptions, I developed a more holistic understanding of SSO meanings,
structures, and essence of lived experiences. I then turned my focus to the strengths and
weakness of the MTSA, as perceived by SSOs.
Research Question 2
RQ 2 focused on the perceived barriers and facilitators of security practices at
U.S. seaports. To explore and answer this question, participants were asked a series of
questions to explore the perceived capabilities of security officials to institute mandates
under the MTSA, and to describe their overall effectiveness in preventing unauthorized
access to restricted facilities and containerized cargo. This series of questions also
provided access to a more refined understanding of potential barriers and facilitators to
security at U.S. seaports.
Theme 3: Regulatory Scope
All ten participants agreed that the MTSA has significantly strengthen the security
of U.S. seaports, however, each participant noted some weaknesses within the Act that
warrants immediate attention of policymakers. For example, SSO 13 stated:
I think the system made huge strides after the implementation of MTSA and its
pretty effective. I think there's issue still with TWIC readers. We, in fact have had
issues with people using other people’s work cards, or even a couple of guys
trying to use, like paper versions.
When asked if the implementation of MTSA has made U.S. seaports more secure
against unauthorized access, SSO 37 replied:
No, I will tell you right now, I tell everybody the same thing; number one, I hate
the TWIC program. I think it’s a completely worthless waste of time and money.
Number two, MTSA as a whole is security theater. It's a lot of legislation, written
ultimately by lawyers, even though I had a lot of input to it, by the time the
lawyers and legislators got ahold of it, it does nothing, or very, very little. It
allows us to apply for grants. And I am tired of the grants, getting, you know, toys
for boys, for who spent millions of dollars on buying things that never get used
and just go away.
SSO 16, SSO 37 and SSO 38, explained that several weaknesses exist within the
MTSA and TWIC program. One of the perceived problems with the law, is a lack of a
comprehensive background checks associated with the TWIC program. SSO 37 and SSO
38 explained that TWIC does very little to enhance security measures at U.S. seaports
because backgrounds standards are inadequate to uncover and eliminate high risk
applicants. For example, SSO 37 stated:
Anybody can get a TWIC card. So, all of our 9/11 hijackers would have qualified
for a TWIC card, even today, all right. They had no background, they have never
gotten themselves into trouble, nothing is going to stick out on the radar and say,
hey, will you take a look at this guy or this gal. I can live in the middle of Nevada
and get a TWIC card. So, there is no correlation between having the credential
and actually having access.
SSO 38 said, “unless an individual is on a terrorist list, they are going to get a
TWIC.” SSO 38 further described an incident that occurred at his seaport facility in
which an individual was arrested and convicted for stealing military equipment but was
later issued a TWIC. This suggestion indicates the belief that possession of a valid TWIC,
does not negate a potential insider threat to a U.S. seaport.
SSO 38 explained that the subjective nature of facility security plans and the
absence of counter smuggling authority and capabilities restricts the ability of local
security officials to prevent unauthorized access of people or illicit (dangerous) items. He
explained:
MTSA does nothing to address a narcotic or other illicit material threat. It's meant
it's poised squarely at fences, gates, TWIC cards. I mean, when you look at all the
stuff in there, and none of its prescriptive, for example, you know, you're just
maintaining a secure perimeter. Well, what's a secure perimeter? define it? Well,
it's whatever. It's whatever you put into your facility security plan.
SSO 16 and SSO 37 explained that some incidents in which individuals gained
unauthorized access to the port were associated with long haul truckers, particularly in the
summertime, “when children are out of school or their spouse, boyfriend, or girlfriend”
were concealed inside the sleeper cab of a truck.
SSO 13 expressed concern that access control measures are tied to databases that
can be manipulated by insider threats that allow access by unauthorized individuals. SSO
13 described one observation he made while working in a seaport outside of the United
States, but warned the same may occur at U.S. seaports:
A lot of it was access to databases, including the terminal operating system or
cargo management system where all the important information about cargo was
kept. They could even manipulate it to move the cargo around the terminal to
areas. I had cases where they move the containers to areas where the camera
coverage was poor so that they could access it, or where they got access to seal
numbers on the computer system, so they could get the duplicates set up; there's
tons of stuff going on.
SSO 37 explained that large volumes of trucks entering seaports daily, has led
many ports to transition to automation. The participant explained that the access control
process requires a presentation of a valid TWIC but explained that the truck cabs are not
being inspected for other occupants. This participant further explained that even prior to
the recent changes in processes associated with coronavirus disease (COVID-19),
concerns of security screeners related to contagions from needles or dangerous objects,
caused many to avoid detailed screening of truck cabs. SSO 37 explained by stating:
I don't know anybody that's going to be asking to really do anything to get to the
back part of a tractor trailer and the sleepers to see what's going on. And the
probability of coming across something that is really going to be a major security
risk factor versus the factor of being sued by your security guard that’s injured,
it’s not worth it. So, to be honest, putting stuff out there, just the way I see it.
When asked to describe risk associated with drug smuggling as seaports, SSO 41
said the MTSA was effective in countering drug traffickers. SSO 41 explained his
reasoning:
I will say that MTSA helps that and I will give you an example of that. The drugs
that we see here, wash up outside of the port, they don't come through the port.
The reason is, because our screenings are so high with the interaction that we do
with Customs, that, you know, the traffickers won't bring it to the port, they'll
drop it outside the port, and somebody else will pick it up, if you understand what
I'm saying. I attributed that to strong screening and customs interaction here at
MTSA facilities.
Five participants (SSO 4, SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 37 and SSO 38) noted that while
access control measures are more robust, several reoccurring incidents involving
undeclared passengers in trucks and porous perimeters undermines efforts to prevent
unauthorized access to restricted facilities. “We still have our breaches, you know, its
people walking in the wrong way where there is no security guard and he missed it. One
guy actually jumped a barbed wire fence. I couldn't believe he actually did it” (SSO 4).
After exploring SSO perceptions of the MTSA, I developed a better understanding
of the perceived strengths and weaknesses of seaport security regulation. I then turned my
focus to the perceived barriers and facilitators of security, as perceived by
SSOs.
Theme 4: Barriers and Facilitators
Participants were asked about relationships, resources and types of support
received in keeping their facilities secure against unauthorized access, and to explain
what they perceived as barriers and facilitators of security. Participant responses were
concentrated around five main issues: (1) leadership engagement, (2) MTSA limitations,
(3) information sharing, (4) civil penalties and (5) federal funding.
Leadership
Two participants (SSO 5 and SSO 13) emphasized the importance of the USCG
and senior management as major facilitators in maintaining a culture of security within
the ports.
SSO 5 described the role of the USCG, he explained:
They take it extremely seriously. They do a great job, you know; the Coast Guard,
they get a lot of things dropped in their lap, when things happen, you know, after
9/11, they got a lot of things placed on their table, including antiterrorism…The
leadership of those ladies and gentlemen has been fantastic. So, they are the ones
that set the initial posture.
SSO 13 explained the security must be prioritized amongst port management to be
effective. SSO 13 elaborated by saying:
Nothing will happen if the top folks don't buy into it. And the way they buy into it
is by getting exposed to it, and the way to get exposed to it is by having security
be something that's placed in front of them. So, the biggest thing is that is I guess,
characterized as a seat at the table with the senior management.
SSO 5 suggested that the leadership and oversight of USCG contributes to
accountability at the highest levels of port management. SSO 5 also emphasized the
importance of “buy in” and support from executive management as being essential to the
effectiveness of seaport security practices.
SSO 5, SSO 37, SSO 9 and SSO 16 also remarked that being vested with
authorization to hire, contract, train, and develop collaborative partnerships between
security and law enforcement personnel helps to creating a strong security culture.
MTSA limitations
All participants agreed that the MTSA does not adequately address and does not
institutes sufficient measures to provide security officials the means to counter complex
smuggling methods or defend against cyber threats potentially associated with or
orchestrated by criminal or terrorist organizations. This is perceived as a barrier by some
participants. For example, SSO 13 described the MTSA as follows:
So, its focused-on terrorism and less focused on cargo and supply chain security,
so less effective when you're talking about issues like trafficking and smuggling,
more effective when you're talking about trying to stop attacks against ships and
ports. So, the way I always describe it, is the MTSA is focused on ports and ships
as targets, but not as conduits of illicit activity, so, it has been very, very effective.
But it's also, you know, limited in its scope.
SSO 16 identified language barriers between drivers and security personnel have
often been factors associated with attempted access of undeclared passengers or weapons
into the restricted port facilities.
Sharing
Six participants’ (SSO 5, SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 17, SSO 37, and SSO 41)
responses were consistent with findings uncovered as part of this study’s literature
review, where indication of frustration exist because of a lack of access to adequate
intelligence information for port directors. All participants noted that a lack of access to
basic intelligence information hinders, depletes, or detracts from full capacity of port
authority officials, police, and other security officials to conceptualize real threats to
maritime. This concern is perceived by all (ten) SSOs as counterproductive to the
objective of maritime domain awareness and was identified as a major barrier to seaport
security.
Each participant noted the negative impact of poor information sharing as being a
barrier to building trust. SSO 1 cautioned that building trust is a timely process that is
complicated when agencies are territorial and do not share information. SSO 1 explained:
“I'd say that probably the biggest barrier, both locally, statewide and nationally, is getting
and continuing to foster relationships and that integration amongst the various groups.”
The MTSA briefly addressed prevailing threats to seaports and emphasized the
need for improvements in information sharing. “Criminal organizations are exploiting
weak security at ports to commit a wide range of cargo crimes. Intelligence and
information sharing among law enforcement agencies needs to be improved and
coordinated at many ports” (Maritime Transportation Security Act, 2002, sec. 101).
SSO 41 has observed improvements in information sharing; however, he said
more improvements are needed from federal agencies to local and state agencies.
Information sharing from the federal level to the state and local level, tends to be a large
drop off; it has gotten better, especially in cybersecurity, but it could use a much stronger
improvement. There is that disconnect between federal and state level with information
sharing.
While all (ten) SSOs acknowledged and commended significant progress in
strengthening of informal communication between local, state, and federal agencies since
September 11, 2001, one dominant recuring theme is that sharing barriers, associated with
unclassified information, and the need to broaden access to security clearances remains.
SSO 5 emphasized that port directors should not be limited to a reliance on news media
outlets to know what threats are posed to the United States. SSO 5 perceives the lack of
secret clearances to port directors as, “a real failing of the federal government in taking
security serious; how can you set up security landside, or waterside, to meet the threat,
when you don't even know what the threat is.”
This perspective, however, was not fully shared by all participants. Four SSOs
(SSO 1, SSO 5, SSO 16, and SSO 17) perceived intelligence sharing as being
significantly improved. However, good communication appears to be perceived and
measured laterally amongst federal and state agencies only, and not factored with
inclusion of port authority officials and police agencies responsible for port security. SSO
1 acknowledged the existence of some concern regarding the legality of information
sharing outside of federal jurisdictions, despite noting the need to maintain relationships
of shared trust with local and state partners. SSO 17 explained that sharing information
horizontally and vertically is imperative to countering criminal or terrorist exploitation of
seaports. SSO 17 highlighted the effectiveness of local, state, and federal joint taskforces
as a significant facilitator of information sharing and broader seaport security.
SSO 4 identified good communication with “port partners” as a significant
facilitator of security, specifically crediting the DHS See Something, Say Something
program as highly effective in facilitating the reporting of suspicious activity at the
seaport.
USCG Penalties
Four participants (SSO 9, SSO 37, SSO 38, and SSO 41) perceived U.S. Coast
Guard civil penalties as a barrier to security. SSO 37 explained:
When some knucklehead hops a fence someplace and you call it into Coast
Guard, depending on the Petty Officer responding they show up and they check it
out. Some will write you a notice of violation; you're in violation for allowing
someone to circumvent your security. Well, the reason we caught them is because
we were paying attention and the person trespassed, they had to climb over a
barbed wire fence or whatever the barriers are, circumvent those security
measures. Why are you punishing me?
SSO 41 agreed and explained what he perceives as unfair civil action against
seaports, and how it creates a barrier of trust that results in some officials refusing to
report security breaches when they occur.
You know if we report a violation to the NRC and then the NRC or the TSA or
Coast Guard dubs us at fault, well it's an automatic fine. So, it stops ports from
wanting to tell that they've had a violation, that violation could be a violation of
information; let's say it happened at another port, it may be information that I
need, well I'm not going to get that information because they don't want to tell on
themselves and risk a fine.
Port Security Grant
Eight participants (SSO 4, SSO 5, SSO 9, SSO 13, SSO 16, SSO 37, SSO 38, and
SSO 41) identified the Port Security Grant (PSG) as being a major facilitator of seaport
security. “We are very fortunate down here to get funding through the port security grant.
Without access to those funds, we would be very well under secured, that has been a huge
benefit to us.”
SSO 5 agreed, and explained, “the federal ports security grant program is vital to
my port and all ports in the United States in order to provide funding for certain projects.”
When discussing resources needed to strengthen seaport security, SSO 4 said,
“there are a lot of gaps, a lot of gaps. I would like to see more federal funding for ports,
even though we do get grants. I just don’t think it's enough.”
While all (ten) participants expressed enthusiasm and optimism about the current
state and future state of seaport security, they conveyed four main issues relevant to the
research questions: (a) 80% of participants relayed that security priorities are ambiguous
and often secondary to cargo facilitation priorities; (b) 100% of all participants perceived
the threat landscape of seaports as being multifaceted and in a constant state of change
driven by the illicit activities of transnational criminal organizations; (c) 70% of
participants perceived that the MTSA was too narrow in scope, and not adequate to
posture seaports to counter exploitation; and (d) 80% of participants perceived the lack of
intelligence sharing as a barrier, and multilateral communication and collaboration as a
major facilitator to seaport security.
This was an exploratory study composed of a nonprobable, purposeful sample
population. The main intent of the study was to explore and understand the experiences
and perceptions of seaport security officials. Rival thinking was applied throughout the
study process and involved a deliberate continuing application of skepticism to the data
and my assumptions. There were no discrepant cases.
Summary
This chapter contained the results of the analysis, connected the analysis back to
the research questions, and demonstrated the consistency of the thematic analysis with the
qualitative case study methodology. I interviewed 10 participants for this qualitative
study, using a self-developed interview guide designed to explore and understand SSOs
perspectives of security measures. The results of this study were divided by two research
questions and generated four major themes. In the first research question I explored the
meanings, structures and lived experiences of security officials by exploring their
perceptions of seaport cultures. Participants expressed enthusiasm, support, and a
balanced understanding of the function and importance of both seaport security and
logistical operations. However, some officials perceived security measures to be a
secondary priority to port logistical operations.
The lived experiences of SSOs encompasses dynamic cultures driven by customer
demand. While collaboration was identified as a critical element to accomplishing
security objectives, some SSOs described a lack of prioritization of security, lack of
awareness and understanding of transnational threats as being major risk factors to the
security culture. The internal culture relies on partnerships of collective vision for both
logistics and security; however, a lack of intelligence sharing was found to restrict
development of a shared vision and understanding of transnational threats.
Within the second research question I explored the perceived effectiveness of the
MTSA, barriers and facilitators of security measures at seaports. Some participants
perceived the limitation of authorities granted to owner operators as a barrier. These
participants believe that the MTSA should be amended to expand the authorities of port
security directors to empower them to legally, under CFR authority, to act against
violators of their FSPs. Additionally, the current level of funding under the Port Security
Grant (PSG) program ($100 million) is perceived as insufficient, and the overall award
process is viewed as disproportionate, unfavorably to smaller (Tier II, III & IV) seaports.
Lastly, according to interviewed security officials, current security measures at
U.S. seaports are inadequate to prevent or deter activities of transnational criminal
organizations, including those converged with or facilitated by terrorist groups. By
exploring the recurring themes, I concluded that seaport security measures have enhanced
seaport security from the pre 9/11 era, however, these measures are inadequate to
eliminate security risks. Maritime security measures must evolve to focus not only on
U.S. seaports as targets, but must focus more on supply chain security, and threats of
exploitation by TCOs. In the next chapter the results are discussed in relation to the
literature and its implications for improving security at U.S. seaports.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the experiences and
perceptions of SSOs, to understand what factors impact security measures, and
inadvertently allows unauthorized access at U.S. seaports. The sophisticated networks of
transnational criminal organizations and their demonstrated ability to smuggle illicit items
creates new challenges to U.S. seaports. Maritime drug smuggling divulges transportation
pathways and methods that may be used by extremists to exploit a U.S. seaport to
introduce a dangerous device or substance into the country.
This study included the collection of data through participant interviews with
individuals who are responsible for preventing unauthorized access of people and illicit
items. I used an exploratory case study design to focus on the meanings and lived
experiences of security officials to better understand existing maritime security measures
and to identify barriers and facilitators of security. The interview questions provided
detailed insight into the perceptions, observations, and experiences of security officials. I
used a self-developed interview guide to obtained qualitative data through in-depth,
semistructured individual interviews.
The results of the data from 10 SSOs supported previous research (Eski, 2016;
Eski, 2019; Fritteli, 2005; Sergi, 2020; Zaitch, 2002) that suggested systematic social
interactions between security and operations personnel results in the development of both
harmonious and conflictive relationships over security and logistical priorities. The data
also affirms the perceived existence of an evolving threat landscape within the maritime
domain. The data also suggests that despite its improvements to seaport security, the
MTSA has not adequately equipped security officials to counter sophisticated smuggling
operations orchestrated by TCOs and have not effectively implemented the TWIC
program. Lastly, the study affirmed previous findings that gaps in intelligence and
information sharing between local, state, and federal officials continue to be an obstacle
to enhanced security effectiveness at seaports.
The results of the study provided new perspectives into the experiences of SSOs;
however, further research should be conducted. In this chapter, I discussed the findings in
relation to the literature review. Social change implications resulting from the study’s
findings are discussed. Lastly, this chapter presents my recommendations for further
study and provides a conclusion to the study.
Interpretation of the Findings
Social Systems
This study’s findings include important observations in maritime that parallels
those observed in the aviation industry by the 9/11 Commission. The Commission (2004)
noted that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), had been vested by Congress with
dual and sometimes incongruent mandates: regulating safety and security and promoting
the aviation industry. This study found a similar dynamic at play within the maritime
transportation industry. The primary mission of SSOs, much like the FFA, is twofold,
security and facilitation of global commerce. This study’s participants uniformly
described U.S. seaports as organizations with cultures in a constant pursuit of
equilibrium. Although all participants identified collaboration as the most essential
element needed to balance operational and security objectives, some participants
described a disproportionate balance between logistical priorities and security.
This study’s data confirmed peer-reviewed literature findings outlined by Eski
(2016) and Eski (2019) who identified important social dynamics in existence at the Port
of Rotterdam and the Port of Hamburg, whereas the decisions and actions of management
was perceived as an inhibitor to effective security measures. This data also confirmed
findings of Malcom (2016) who identified institutional culture as a significant influencer
in the prioritization of routine security practices. All participants described the
importance of cooperation with various subgroups working within a seaport. Social
relationships and interactions between port employees, employees of unions, tenants
another industry partners, were identified as a central premise and major element of
business productivity and security effectiveness. This study did not uncover any evidence
or indicators of low morale amongst SSOs.
The 9/11 Commission (2004) testified that the Inspector General of
Transportation told them of “great pressures from the air carriers to control security costs
and to limit the impact of security requirements on aviation operations so that the industry
could concentrate on its primary mission of moving passengers and aircraft” (p. 85). The
study confirmed the literature findings of disparities in security and operational
management. Participants noted the perceived burdening cost of security, as a factor
resulting in port officials exploring ways to reduce security measures.
The theoretical framework provided by von Bertalanffy (1968) informed this
study by postulating that the fundamental character of organizations that replicates
characteristics of living things, is understanding it as an isomorphic system. Von
Bertalanffy (1968) explained that systems are readily distinguishable by their reliance and
steady exchange with the external environment. Participant depictions of their respective
seaports aligned with von Bertalanffy (1968); appropriately each participant described
ports as open systems interacting with the environment and being comprised of various
inputs, throughputs, and outputs. Investigations solely of individual parts and process,
without an understanding of complex interactions does not sufficiently contribute to
understanding phenomenon impacting a system. Therefore, this study used a holistic
approach to explore, investigate, and discover all factors relevant to the phenomenon.
Threat Perceptions
SSOs are homeland security professionals whose knowledge and experiences
inform their conscious and unconscious estimations of threats and risk posed to maritime.
They are responsible for the anticipating, countering, preventing acts that may be
orchestrated by domestic or international rational actors. SSOs are responsible for
securing large open areas, designed to facilitate expedited movement of people and
goods. These officials routinely encounter attempts to circumvent security measures at
seaports, many of which are determined to lack a known terrorism nexus. While federal
officials employ target analysis capabilities, credential authentication measures, random
screenings, roving patrols, and CCTV are the predominant measures in use by local and
state port officials to detect and deter the introduction of dangerous devices and
substances into a seaport. Often with limited security staffing and intelligence resources,
port authorities are responsible for stopping threats that are not fully understood or even
perceived.
Comparably, the Commission noted that in the years before 9/11, the FAA did not
perceive hijacking as the prevailing threat to aviation, but instead sabotage was perceived
as the greatest threat. The absence of domestic hijackings in the previous decades; and the
perceived greater susceptibility to explosives than firearms led to miscalculations that
created and environment conducive for exploitation. Security measure implemented after
the 9/11 attacks effectively postured U.S. seaports to defend against a more traditional
threat against critical infrastructure. However, while Vehicle-Borne Improvised
Explosive Devices (VBIED) is certainly plausible, 21 century threats have evolved and
become far more sophisticated and elusive.
Significant enhancements have been made through the installation of physical
security measures such as access gates, cameras, fencing, and barricades; however, in
most instances more must be done. Improvements are needed to secure dockside
waterways surrounding seaports, airspace above seaports and network systems
connecting them to the world. However, the greatest vulnerability confronting seaports to
date, is their susceptibility to illicit use by transnational criminal organizations. The
evolution of definition and conceptualization of maritime threats appears to lag in time,
constrained by archaic comprehension of terrorist tactics used by the pre-9/11 al Qaeda
network. While historical lessons are a cornerstone for future response preparedness, they
must not stifle the ability of security officials to image, as noted by the 9/11 Commission.
Regulatory Scope
A distinct layer of security employed within U.S. seaports is administered under
the USCG and TSA managed TWIC program. This study uncovered opposing viewpoints
on the effectiveness of the TWIC program. The TWIC is perceived by some security
officials as highly effective in establishing a standard framework for identifying port
workers, however, card authentication and holder vetting remains a major challenge,
particularly, in addressing potential insider threats.
Furthermore, passenger prescreening at airports, pre-9/11 failed to align FAA
“no-fly” list with the government’s broader watchlist of known and suspected terrorist.
Likewise, this study’s findings uncovered no reliable mechanism or resources that
provides local and state level SSOs capabilities to screen entrants to restricted facilities
who may pose a higher risk, except those on the Canceled Card List (CCL).
The Commission (2004) noted that several years prior to 9/11, FAA requirements
for screeners to conduct continuous and random screenings had been replaced by
explosive detection and even simply ignored by air carriers. This study observed a need to
re-envision and redefine the definition of security breaches, including any attempts to
smuggle “illicit” items, as acts in support of terrorism. The need to expand regulatory
comprehension of convergence, and to expand the scope of the MTSA to better align with
broader efforts at countering drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering and
weapons smuggling, should be encompassed as a mandate for all seaport security plans.
Barriers and Facilitators
Both the literature and participant responses describe a “layered” approach to
security at U.S. seaports, as being the most effective to protecting people, facilities, and
vessels. A layered approach infers that a failure in one layer of security would not be
fatal, because additional layers would provide backup security (Commission, 2004, p.
83). Seaport security was found to encompass multiple layers, including credential
verification, random screenings, and inspections, roving patrols, CCTV, and some
internal intelligence capabilities.
The levels of organizational structures, resources and motivations were found to
fluctuate quite significantly. Most notable, were varying levels of subjectivity in
interpretation of security effectiveness that appeared to influence objectives and intensity
of efforts. Even with a robust security program, multiple layers in place at airports were
insufficient to prevent the 9/11 hijackers from exploiting aviation by gaining access and
weaponizing four commercial aircrafts. Like airports, seaports were found to focus
resources and effort on access control measures. However, despite the thousands of
vehicles and people entering the restricted areas of seaports daily, unlike aviation, X-ray
technology is mostly nonexistent. Instead, seaports rely on randomized screenings
conducted by humans who strengths and limitations are noted in chapter 4 of this study.
All participants acknowledged improvements in information sharing amongst
security officials; however, most noted was a deficit in intelligence sharing between
federal agencies and SSOs. Participants emphasized that a lack of information sharing
diminishes security officials’ capacity to accurately conceptualize the threat landscape.
This perspective confirms findings of Eski (2016) and Frittelli (2005) who postulated that
a lack of sharing is a barrier to security.
In the months preceding the 9/11 attacks, the FAA’s policy was to use intelligence
to identify plots and threats posed the civil aviation. Unfortunately, most of the
informational data received by the FAA contained little pertaining to presence and
activities of terrorists in the United States (Commission, 2004). Intelligence was not
prioritized amongst FAA leadership, so, the deployment of appropriate countermeasures
was inadequate. Participants in this study noted that without sufficient intelligence
information, protecting landside maritime assets and reducing exploitation vulnerabilities
to smuggling is nearly impossible. SSOs at the local and state level often encounter
information through field interviews and arrests, that may contribute significantly to the
federal intelligence cycle and subsequent investigations; however, as noted by several
participants in this study effective information and intelligence sharing must be mutually
reciprocated, both horizontally and vertically.
Limitations of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore seaport security measures to
identify and understand factors that may impact security measures at U.S. seaports,
including those that inadvertently contribute to unauthorized access to restricted facilities
and cargo. It was my intent to interview participants who are security officials, working at
local, state, and federal agencies within U.S. seaports. My intent was to interview
participants from each U.S. maritime border, so I could collect and evaluate unique
geographic (regional) experiences.
While my sample did represent each geographical area from across the United
States, only 10 participants were interviewed. The sample size was small, as the pool of
willing participants proved to be extremely difficult to access. I attributed this to the
sensitivity of the study topic and the potential for unfavorable information to be disclosed
by some potential participants. The question of whether the findings of my study could be
extended across all U.S. seaports remains open and requires further research. The
research was not large enough to represent all U.S. seaports; however, even in studies
composed of large samples, it is impossible to include the entire target population.
Therefore, research is always limited, and generalizations are not absolute. According to
Yin (2016) the purpose of data collection is to maximize information, therefore, a study
may conclude when little information is forthcoming.
All responses to the interview questions were similar in nature, and sufficiently
detailed. The participant responses were collected until no new information was
conveyed, and I was confident that saturation was achieved. The self-developed interview
guide was robust and effective in facilitating open conversations. However, at the
conclusion of the data collection, during transcription and analysis, I felt that too much
data outside of scope and interest of the study was collected. Lastly, the study was further
limited by my position as an instrument of data collection, analysis, and reporting. My
position within the study subjected to findings vulnerable to the influence of my own
biases and preconceptions on the findings.
Recommendations
The focal point of this study aimed to explore the experiences and perceptions of
SSOs to gain an understanding of how individuals gain unauthorized access to restricted
maritime facilities and cargo. Due to the study’s exploratory nature, more research is
needed to continue the growth of knowledge of seaport security. The findings from this
study discovered several important factors requiring further study. Participant perceptions
and experiences coupled with research data supported the notion that U.S. seaports may
not be adequately secured against transnational threats. The data suggested that security
measures instituted under the MTSA have made seaports more robust; however, they are
inadequate to secure them against sophisticated exploitation tactics orchestrated by TCOs,
including those who may be associated with terrorist groups.
Security measures currently in use account for differences in cargo import
volumes and type cargo; however, the uniqueness of U.S. seaports is not limited to
commodities and performance but encompasses far more complex issues. Unfortunately,
current security measures do not account for likelihood of DTO and terrorism
convergence. Therefore, based on the results of this study, I have several
recommendations, each based on the proposed expansion of academic research to
examine seaport security cultures, maritime threat perceptions, regulation effectiveness,
and evaluation of security grant allocations.
My recommendations from this research study begin with proposing that further
comprehensive academic research supported and funded by the U.S. government be
conducted at all U.S. seaports. I recommend that future research be expanded to include a
sample population large enough to generalize its findings. It became apparent early in the
study that the maritime culture is controlled by priorities that support its fundamental
purpose to facilitate the movement of global commerce. However, participants conveyed
an expectation of port management to prioritize security objectives uniformly with those
of logistics priorities.
The study’s findings suggest however, that nonsecurity personnel (including
management, labor, and truckers) may lack full comprehension of the sophistication of
maritime threats and risks, thereby subjecting their routine practices to potential
exploitation. Some officials described a shared understanding between security staff and
executive management of the importance of security whereas, others described an obliged
relationship. Therefore, I recommend that future qualitative studies be conducted to
collect additional data on the levels of domain awareness, and threat perceptions of both
SSOs and nonsecurity personnel working in U.S. seaports. I recommend that future
studies include an evaluation of the MTSA to determine if amendments are needed to
strengthen the security posture of U.S. seaports. Future studies should include an
evaluation of the TWIC program to determine if a need exists to institute greater
accountability measures for individuals who violate security regulations at seaports.
Next, to address the perceived lack of information sharing, I recommend that
mixed methodology research be conducted to explore and evaluate current practices of
information sharing between local, state, and federal officials. Future research should
capitalize on participant surveys and questionnaires to collect data in support of in-depth
analysis of rates and direction of sharing, performance and to identify areas of potential
improvements in information sharing. I further recommend that academic research be
governmentally funded and conducted to provide the U.S. Congress a comprehensive
report evaluating the actual use of funds allocated under the Port Security Grant Program
(PSGP), with specific attention being given to how funds are used by individual seaports.
Implications
U.S. seaports serve local communities, states, regions, and the nation by
facilitating access to essential goods and services, including food, medicines, and other
supplies, therefore, families, organizations, and society as a whole benefit from a more
robust maritime system. Designated U.S. seaports also serve an integral role as part of the
National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), acting as a critical link to the achievement of
national security objectives by supporting military force deployments. Therefore, the
implications of this study are not limited to focus on economic consequences of
exploitation but may include broader societal ramifications is its findings are ignored.
There are many elements of this study that supports Walden University’s vision of
social change. Positive social change can be achieved through the rigors of academic
research designed to identify and fill knowledge gaps through data collection on a topic
of study. This study provided a comprehensive literature review that included
background, and historical context that increased awareness of maritime threats and
security challenges. The general systems theory guided this study by providing a robust
theoretical framework from which I examined the phenomenon of seaport security. The
framework challenged the conventional conceptualizations of systems analysis and
provided a new perspective and approach for researching system wholes. The theory
offered valuable insight into the behaviors of isomorphic systems. This enabled me to
identify parallels with other complex systems and provided a comprehensive avenue of
approach for generating new ideas. The study findings determined that countering
transnational threats posed to U.S. seaports and the maritime system requires a 21st
century holistic approach between both government and the maritime industry. This study
contributes to positive social change within the maritime industry by highlighting lessons
learned from SSO experiences, observations, and perceptions.
The study findings increased comprehension of maritime threats, and identified
security barriers, better preparing policymakers and practitioners to work concertedly in
countering transnational threats and rectifying inadvertent barriers to security. Public
policy directly impacts operational and security practices, influences behaviors and
perspectives associated with public safety, homeland security, and civil liberty. This
study may be used to direct organizational and systemic change in the perspectives and
practices in use at U.S. seaports. This study findings may be leveraged to draw attention
to seaport vulnerabilities and the importance of refocusing attention from 20th century to a
21st century conceptualization of terrorism. As a result of this study on seaport security,
policy makers, and practitioners are better positioned to assess risk to the economy,
public safety, public health, and national security.
Conclusion
History is embroidered with an incomputable number of examples of
susceptibility within maritime to criminal and terrorist use. In 2017, USCG Vice
Commandant, Admiral Charles W. Ray testified before a House Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security. Admiral Ray testified that while small
in numbers, USCG has encountered special interest aliens, those from countries
associated with terrorism (C-SPAN, 2017). Admiral Ray acknowledged and underscored
his belief that transnational criminal organizations are capable and willing to smuggle
special interest people into the United States for profit. Technological advancements (e.g.,
internet Wi-Fi, cellular, two-way radio, and satellite communications) have increased the
speed of commerce and communications, empowering, and strengthening business
models of not only legitimate businesses, but criminal and terrorist organizations also.
The world watched in horror as the 2008 Mumbai attackers who traveled by sea,
sailing from Karachi, Pakistan on a cargo vessel, launched deadly attacks in Mumbai,
India. The terrorist group hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, murdered its crew except for
the captain, and then proceeded to Mumbai, where 164 people were killed and more than
300 were injured (Rabasa et al., 2009; Finseraas & Listhaug, 2013). The attackers used
cell phones, blackberry devices, and satellite phones to maintain contact with their
handlers located in Pakistan, during the attack (Rabasa et al., 2009).
U.S. seaports are irrefutably one of the nation’s most important transportation
resources, if not the most important. The reliance of U.S. seaports on speed has allowed
them to remain competitive but has also inadvertently made them less safe. The maritime
environment has become increasingly complex, altered by the adaptative nature of trade
and global conflicts between rational actors, some of which are engaged in illicit
activities that distort finite rules of trade with infinite greed.
The MTSA is unquestionably one of our nation’s greatest legislative
accomplishments, a culmination of strategic thinking and strongly rooted in lessons
learned in combatting terrorism. The MTSA capsulates history’s most horrific moment
and provided a pathway for success based on 20th century threat behaviors. What is before
us now, is a new 21st century threat, one that is unconventional, decentralized, and
sophisticatedly positioned.
According to Maltz (2017), while conducting a large money laundering
investigation involving a criminal group in Medellin, Colombia, DEA agents uncovered
elements of the terrorist group Hezbollah who were being funded by worldwide cocaine
sales. The Agent further explained that in 2016, DEA working with European law
enforcement officials previously identified a massive Hezbollah drug and money
laundering scheme, where the group was in fact involved in shipping multi-tons of
cocaine around the world (Maltz, 2017). It is now necessary to unlearn some of what we
have come to understand about terrorism and drug trafficking. The time is now to
dissolve barriers, restructure security forces and adopt a shared consciousness of maritime
threats before we are forced to accept that convergence is a real thing.
The 9/11 Commission report noted that the former Central Intelligence Agency
Director, George Tenet, described pre 9/11 intelligence warnings as a system “blinking
red.” There is tendency amongst some in the maritime industry to underestimate or even
dismiss what is perceived as minor, unfounded, or inconsequential violations; however,
record drug seizures facilitated through the exploitation of commercial vessels, coupled
with the susceptibility of U.S. seaports, may represent significant system alerts,
symptoms or underlying conditions associated with deadly impending acts of terrorism.
