The Question of Homeland Security in Rural America

The Question of Homeland Security in Rural

America

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Background

Almost 14 years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and another half

dozen years following the issuance of the National Preparedness Guidelines (Department

of Homeland Security [DHS], 2009), the question of whether a homeland security

program has been consistently implemented on a nationwide basis remains unanswered.

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security

Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), which directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to

develop all-hazards preparedness guidelines designed to organize and coordinate national

preparedness strategies, to facilitate a capability and risk-based planning process for use

by all government levels, and to establish readiness standards to measure progress as well

as a system to assess the nation’s preparedness capability to respond to major incidents,

including acts of terrorism (DHS, 2009). Limited available literature on this subject

indicates that rural communities in previously surveyed Midwest states had not complied

with those federal guidelines for a variety of reasons. Although the U.S. Constitution

places primary responsibility on the central government to provide for the safety and

security of all Americans (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives, 2011), in a 2006 lecture at the

Heritage Foundation, then-DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff made it clear that the essence

of Homeland Security was recognizing and managing risks. He followed that statement

with the explanation that the DHS would focus more on risks that were probable and less

on those that were possible. Secretary Chertoff added that it would be physically and

financially impractical to guarantee every person and every property protection from all

risks, at all times, in all places (Chertoff, 2006). In his closing remarks, Secretary

Chertoff stressed that the role of state and local government in disaster preparedness and

response is one of primacy and common sense, not just a matter of federal responsibility

as stated in the Constitution. Secretary Chertoff argued that any attempt to execute a

national plan not built on state and local capabilities is unlikely to succeed (Chertoff,

2006).

The reported reasons for noncompliance varied; they included lack of funding

(Marion & Cronin, 2009), concerns related to cost effectiveness (Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010), insufficient personnel, inadequate training and equipment (Bryant, 2009), local

officials not understanding their responsibilities (Oliver, 2007, 2009), and separation or

remoteness (Stigler, 2010). This variety of rationales for noncompliance reflected

inconsistent and inconclusive findings by previous studies, all of which called for further

research on this subject. An identified pattern of noncompliance in other selected rural

Midwest towns, villages, or hamlets following the completion of this study confirmed a

condition that poses a threat to U.S. national security and to the public safety of those

affected communities.

The intent of this case study was to confirm or disconfirm the validity of previous

research findings with the purpose of developing a common rationale for noncompliance

or compliance, as well as the objective of projecting common generalizations to other

affected rural communities (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014). Since the nation’s inception in

1787, a primary responsibility of the central government has been to provide for the

safety and security of all Americans as stated in Article 4, Section 4 of the U.S.

Constitution, which specifies, in part, that the central government will guarantee each

state of the union a Republican form of government as well as protection against invasion

and domestic violence (Kozak, 2011, p. 58; U.S. Archives, 2011, p. 7). On the Tuesday

morning of September 11, 2001, however, the central government failed to fully

implement the safety and security measures necessary to prevent 19 Islamist terrorists

from ramming three hijacked U.S. commercial airliners into the Twin Towers in New

York City and the Pentagon in Alexandria, Virginia, and to cause the crash of a fourth

airliner into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Passengers on United Airlines Flight

93 believed that their airliner was intended to be flown into the White House or Capitol

Building in Washington, DC, and therefore caused it to crash (Ward, Kiernan, & Mabrey,

2006).

On August 16, 2001, some 26 days earlier, Zacarias Moussaoui, who would have

been the 20th hijacker, was taken into custody by U.S. Immigration agents after he

attracted the attention of a flight instructor at a Pan Am Flight Academy in Minneapolis,

Minnesota. Moussaoui, a native Moroccan, had expressed an interest in learning how to

fly an airliner but not in how to take off or land. During questioning, he admitted to being

an al-Qaeda member and confessed that his role in the attacks was to fly a fifth

commercial airliner into the White House at some later date. Of the 20 identified

terrorists who took part in the 9/11 attacks, one was from Lebanon, another was from

Egypt, and a fourth was from the United Arab Emirates (Ward et al., 2006). The 16 other

terrorists were all from Saudi Arabia, a country the United States regards as an ally in the

Arab world (Mahan & Griset, 2008).

The attacks of 9/11 reflected a degree of commitment, involving detailed

longterm planning, funding, training, and collaboration by al-Qaeda leaders in

Afghanistan who coordinated the joint operations beyond two continents and an ocean.

The attacks were executed effectively in spite of a pattern of terrorist activity against U.S.

interests worldwide that had developed and escalated since the Iran hostage crisis in

1979. On 9/11, the intended targets were symbols of America’s financial, economic,

military, and political strength (McEntire, 2009). These previously undetected attacks

against the homeland served to shatter the prevailing illusion that America was

invulnerable to attack from external forces. They happened despite previous

implementation of what were deemed impregnable security measures designed to prevent

attacks such as those inflicted on the U.S. Navy fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941 (Piddock,

2014). Much as U.S. political and military leaders had either ignored or misread the

incidents that led up to the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. intelligence, diplomatic, military,

and law enforcement communities failed to make critical connections between seemingly

separate incidents that eventually led to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Although both

attacks shook the foundation of America’s national security networks, the attackers’

objectives differed. After these disasters, blame and responsibility for the attacks were

rightly placed on the inability of U.S. political leaders and heads of the key intelligence,

diplomatic, and military organizations to effectively read the threats as they developed at

the time. In the case of the September 11 attacks, however, independent researchers such

as Bergen (2011), and members of the 9/11 Commission (2004), found that blame must

also be shared by the federal law enforcement community, which simply failed to shift its

focus from the conduct of primarily criminal investigative work to investigating terrorist

threats, as well as by the George W. Bush administration, which chose to disregard the

threats that had developed over the preceding decade (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola,

2011).

Almost immediately after the attacks, the George W. Bush administration and

Congress proceeded to direct, enact, and implement a number of security measures

designed to prevent any such future attacks and to bring the perpetrators of the 9/11

attacks to justice. Among the measures enacted were the USA Patriot Act of 2001; the

Transportation and Security Act of 2001; and, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which

established the U. S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. Upon becoming

operational in March 2003, the new DHS was directed by President Bush to produce and

distribute the National Preparedness Guidelines for use at all government levels to help

in developing preparedness strategies and reporting major incidents (DHS, 2009). These

guidelines included the initial National Response Plan (NRP), which was subsequently

replaced by the National Response Framework (NRF), and the National Incident

Management System (NIMS). The NRP and the NIMS were completed in 2004 and then

issued nationwide to all levels of government, including Tribal Nations, in 2005 to help

them in the development and implementation of preparedness programs designed to

protect residents and critical infrastructure in urban areas, small towns, and rural

communities. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the Katrina Hurricane disaster in 2005,

states such as California, Nevada, Texas, Florida, and North Carolina saw the safety and

security value of adopting the federally proposed guidelines, along with the revised NRF

to tailor state preparedness programs suited to their needs (DHS, 2009).

Some of those programs, like one implemented by the State of Florida (presented

in this paper as Appendix D), are regarded as models for other states to copy. Most states

chose to develop and implement measures designed to protect urban areas having high

population density and vulnerable infrastructure. Others determined that the

implementation of emergency preparedness measures in small towns and rural areas was

not justified by the cost (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009). As a result, some states, including

New York, decided to apply available homeland security resources primarily in their

urban areas (Bryant, 2009). This inconsistent implementation of the National

Preparedness Guidelines appeared to have prevailed in a number of Midwest states, thus

creating a national security and public safety problem (DHS, 2009). As stated, the intent

of this case study was to examine the rationales cited by rural leaders in those areas that

had not adopted the national preparedness guidelines despite the probability that their

rural communities could be subject to future natural or manmade disasters. The

previously described condition of noncompliance explained the study’s identified

problem. The study’s purpose illuminated the reasons for the prevailing national security

and public safety problems in the studied rural communities. This study’s findings may

be compared with those of compliant communities to foster improved safety conditions

that promote positive social change. Positive social change may result from new policies

that emerge following the identification, exploration, and understanding of the reasons for

noncompliance with national preparedness guidelines that affect national security and

public safety in rural areas (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2009).

As stated above, the identified inconsistency in compliance created two social

problems related to public safety and security. One weakened national security by failing

to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatened public safety in

Midwest towns and rural communities where local leaders had not established any

additional safety measures since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (DHS, 2009).

This problem was underscored by an apparent lack of literature addressing

noncompliance in some rural areas. The available literature was limited to five studies

concerning this subject published within the past 5 years. Second, the findings in those

five studies provided different reasons for noncompliance. A study by Bryant (2009)

generalized the challenges of emergency management in rural communities and small

towns, underscoring their historical lack of compliance with the national preparedness

guidelines. Bryant’s study stressed the theoretical relevance of social capital to the

concept of emergency management in rural areas. Marion and Cronin (2009) found that

22% of Ohio’s small town and rural police chiefs had not established any new safety and

security measures since the 9/11 attacks due to lack of funding. In his study, Oliver

(2009) concluded that the primary reason for noncompliance was likely a lack of

understanding by local leaders of their roles, duties, and responsibilities in the post-9/11

era. Chenoweth and Clarke (2009) asserted in their study that federal resources allocated

to the states were not being distributed evenly by state and urban leaders, who appeared

predisposed to protecting their own jurisdictions. Stigler (2010), however, determined

that noncompliance in small towns and rural communities in Wisconsin might have been

due in part to a lack of local resources but had just as likely been due to regional

remoteness. The purpose of this case study was to resolve these disparities by finding

consensus regarding the reasons following face-to-face interviews, instead of through the

conduct of surveys (Yin, 2014).

Problem Statement

In spite of the fact that terrorism and natural disasters continue to pose serious

threats to homeland security and emergency preparedness, some questions have been

raised as to why the National Preparedness Guidelines of 2009 have not been adopted by

many small towns or rural communities in some Midwestern states, whereas they have

been implemented by the vast majority of the nation’s metropolitan and urban centers

(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; DHS, 2009; Florida Division of Emergency Management

[FDEM], 2008-2013). A preliminary review of available literature led to the conclusion

that the inconsistent condition of compliance created two social problems: (a) weakened

national security due to failure to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and (b)

threats to public safety in Midwest towns and rural communities where local leaders had

not established any new safety and security measures since the 9/11 attacks. The problem

was also made apparent by the limited literature available on the subject of

noncompliance with the implementation of emergency preparedness strategies in some

rural areas. Even more so, the problem was apparent in the lack of consensus among the

researchers who published those studies on the reasons for noncompliance in their areas

of inquiry (Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). A study

by Bryant (2009) generalized that challenges of emergency management in rural areas

were related to resource limitations, separation and remoteness, low population density,

and a general lack of communication.

Marion and Cronin (2009) found that 57 of Ohio’s 260 small town and rural

police chiefs had not established any new security measures since the 9/11 attacks due to

a lack of funding. In his study, Oliver (2009) concluded that the primary reason for

noncompliance was a lack of understanding of local leaders’ specific roles,

responsibilities, and duties in the post-9/11 era. Chenoweth and Clarke (2009) asserted in

their study that federal resources allocated to the states were not being distributed evenly

by state and urban leaders, who appeared predisposed to protecting their own

jurisdictions, leaving rural areas to manage with available resources. A more recent study,

Stigler (2010), determined that the status of noncompliance in small towns and rural

communities in the state of Wisconsin might be due partly to a lack of resources but was

more likely attributable to regional remoteness. This is generally what was known about

the problem; what were not known were the common reasons for continued

noncompliance in rural communities and small towns in some Midwestern states. Absent

a law or regulation to mandate the implementation of preparedness strategies in rural

areas, universal compliance becomes an ethical, moral, and commonsense responsibility

for local leaders. Compliance, then, is based on the need to provide equal safety and

security for all Americans, whether they live in urban or rural areas. The existing

literature, although limited, provided the foundation for this study, which focused on

exploring the reasons and examining the differing rationales for varying levels of

noncompliance with national preparedness guidelines (DHS, 2009).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and describe the reasons

that a number of rural communities in the Midwest were not complying with

implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009).

By extension, the guidelines applied to all rural and remote communities throughout the

U.S. and its territories. As developed, the guidelines provide strategies intended to help

rural communities and small towns develop security plans that prepare them for, respond

to, and recover from manmade or natural disasters. When viewed in this context, this

study was unique because it addressed an under-researched area that available literature

was unable to fully explain (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; Marion & Cronin,

2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), and also because it explored the potential implications

that noncompliance may have for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2008b,

2009). Results of the study findings will be shared with participating communities, as

well as with other local, county, state, and federal emergency planners, for use as a basis

for comparison. Other practical contributions likely to be derived from the study’s results

include enhanced knowledge of the underlying forces that currently resist the concept of

compliance (Yin, 2014).

Research Questions

Qualitative Central

How did rural civic leaders (mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, emergency

managers, and city attorneys) in selected Midwest communities justify noncompliance

with National Preparedness Guidelines that were issued for implementation in 2009?

Subquestions

RQ1—Qualitative. How had noncompliance with the National Preparedness

Guidelines in the post-9/11 era reflected in the ability, or inability, of the studied rural

communities to meet their governing goals and resource needs as they related to local

public safety and national security matters?

RQ2—Qualitative. What role did funding play in the ability or inability of these

rural communities to fully implement the National Preparedness Guidelines? RQ3---

Qualitative. What role did regional remoteness play in decisions made by these civic

leaders not to implement the National Preparedness Guidelines in their communities?

RQ4—Qualitative. What understanding did civic leaders have about their

responsibilities and duties regarding the implementation of the National Preparedness

Guidelines in rural areas?

Theoretical Framework for the Study

Currently, no established theory exists for homeland security or emergency

management (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004). This is due to the multifaceted

responsibilities of the DHS. The same reason holds true for the discipline of emergency

management, the primary function of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) within the DHS, which comprises only one of those facets (DHS, 2008a; Reese,

2013). McEntire (2004) examined 19 theoretical elements and established theories he

thought reflected a relationship to the discipline of emergency management. McEntire’s

final analysis failed to find one theory or combination of elements that encompassed the

full range of the discipline’s functions. Since then, academics and practitioners from the

Naval Post Graduate School in Northern California (Bellavita, 2010) and the

Congressional Research Service in Washington, DC (Reese, 2013) have found and

adopted a theoretical relation between Putnam’s (2000) social capital theory and its

positive benefits when applied in rural communities. The origin and source of social

capital can be traced to the works of Alexis de Tocqueville (1835) as he traveled through

early America. Among other things, he observed that Americans were prone to meet

periodically in public squares to discuss issues of mutual concern in furtherance of the

democratic process. During the 20th century, L. J. Hanifan (1916) made a reference to

social cohesion and personal investment in the community as goodwill, mutual sympathy,

and social interaction, which normally result in benefits for individuals as well as for the

community as a whole (Smith, 2001-2009). Along with the exploration of rationales for

noncompliance with emergency preparedness guidelines in the studied rural

communities, a collateral effort was made to determine the extent that those communities

had adopted the principles of social capital theory (Putnam, 2000).

More currently, the three authorities most commonly associated with social

capital are Bourdieu (1983) with regard to social theory, Coleman (1988) in discussions

of social context in education, and Putnam (2000), who launched social capital as a

popular focus for research and policy discussions (Smith, 2001-2009). The resurgence of

interest in social capital as a remedy for today’s social problems draws on the assumption

that those problems are reflections of a weakened civil society. The argument promoted

by supporters of social capital theory is that a low level of social capital in a given

community leads to a rigid and unresponsive political system. Putnam, writing from a

political perspective, argued that it is better to have more social capital than less as a

precondition for effective government and economic growth. Putnam explained that

social capital is about the value of social networks that tend to bond people with similar

interests and bridge diverse people with norms of trust and reciprocity (Claridge, 2004).

These are the social values that facilitate collaboration, cooperation, coordination, and

communication during emergencies, particularly in rural communities (Bryant, 2009).

Nature of the Study

The qualitative approach to this inquiry involved a multisite single-case study that

aligned with the inquiry’s stated objectives. This approach provided for the formulation

of interview protocols designed to facilitate the development of answers to the research

questions, the coding of the data collected, and the analysis and interpretation of the data

to develop themes that would lead to an understanding of the meaning of the case. The

selection of this design followed the rationale that the concept drives the research, and

that the study’s purpose drives the analysis (Patton, 2002). The research questions were

open ended and formed to elicit specific answers from eight to 12 rural civic leaders in

four Midwestern states. Those answers provided varying reasons for noncompliance with

emergency preparedness guidelines that were developed to enhance the safety and

security of communities (Creswell, 2013). However, lack of funding was likely to be

offered as the primary reason for noncompliance with federal preparedness guidelines

based on an assessment of threat, risk, vulnerability, and population in a given

community. As such, the levels of threat, risk, vulnerability, and population varied within

each study site, but regardless of funding, it was still important to determine the particular

reasons for noncompliance at each of the studied sites. The research findings provided a

view of the noncompliance problem in the studied sites from a regional perspective.

Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Emergency Management Defined

Given the widespread use and misuse of terminology in politics and the media, for the

purposes of this study, it is important to define the meanings of certain terms that are

commonly used within the disciplines of homeland security and emergency management,

such as terrorism, antiterrorism, and counterterrorism, as well as to clarify the roles they

play in the disciplines of homeland security and emergency management.

Terrorism has many usable definitions, and its meaning often depends on what

federal agency is defining the term. Regardless of their individual definitions, they are all

based on the federal law, which is codified as follows:

Title 22, of the U.S. Code, Section 2656 (d) defines terrorism as the premeditated,

politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub

national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

International terrorism involves citizens or the territory of more than one country.

Terrorist groups are groups or sub-groups that practice international terrorism.

(White, 2006, p. 6)

Antiterrorism can be said to emerge from an understanding of, and considered

responses to, terrorism and therefore includes those measures designed to protect

populations and infrastructure from terrorist acts. By its nature and design, antiterrorism

is a defensive measure or series of measures intended to reduce the vulnerability of

possible targets to such acts. These defensive measures often include limited response

and containment capability by DHS or FBI officials (DOD, 2007). Conversely,

counterterrorism can also refer to offensive strategies intended to prevent, deter, preempt,

and respond to acts of terrorism (White House, 2011). These offensive measures can be

established strategies designed to deny terrorists opportunities to carry out their tactics

(Department of Defense [DOD], 2007).

Curiously, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 does not contain a specific

definition of homeland security. However, the National Strategy for Homeland Security

of 2002 defined homeland security as “concerted national efforts to prevent terrorist

attacks within the United States, to reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize

the damage, and recover from attacks that do occur” (Office of Homeland Security

[OHS], 2002, p. 2). This, however, is not so much a definition as it is a strategy. As

comprised, the enterprise of homeland security is difficult to define because of its many

facets, of which emergency management is but one (Bellavita, 2010; Reese, 2013).

The discipline of emergency management is simpler to define, due not just to its founding

in policy statements, but also to the articulated principles that guide the process.

Simply defined, emergency management is the discipline in which practitioners identify

and assess risk and develop strategies to avoid that risk. The federal government plays a

key role in the process when state and local jurisdictions are unable to deal with a disaster

because its scope overwhelms available resources. In summary, emergency management

is the discipline that deals with the identification and analysis of public hazards, assesses

the public’s mitigation of and preparedness for that risk, and coordinates the resources to

respond and recover from natural or manmade disasters (Bullock, Haddow, Coppola, &

Yeletaysi, 2009, p. 2).

The External Threat Defined

Al-Qaeda, which is Arabic for “the base,” was established by Osama bin-Laden in

1988 for Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, whose troops

invaded that country to support a faltering procommunist government. Once the jihadists

succeeded in expelling the Soviet forces, bin-Laden sought other goals through which he

could use his army of followers. Among his developed goals were to expel all Westerners

and nonbelievers from Muslim countries, fighting the United States and its allies, and

overthrowing Muslim governments deemed apostate or nonIslamic (Gunaratna, 2003).

Al-Qaeda’s ultimate goal, however, remains the establishment of a Pan-Islamic Caliphate

based on Sharia law that extends from the Iberian Peninsula to the Philippine

Archipelago. This is the geographical area that comprised the Empire of Islam during its

peak of conquest between the 7th and 11th centuries (Karsh, 2006; O’Connor, 2009).

Psychologists such as Post (2004) and Victoroff (2005) have observed that although

terrorists tend to form a heterogeneous group, there are some common traits among

substate group members. For example, they hold extreme opinions and emotions

regarding their belief systems. Terrorists are driven by personal stakes such as perceived

oppression, persecution, or humiliation at the hands of identified governments. In

addition, they seem to exhibit a low level of cognitive flexibility, which includes low

tolerance for ambiguity, distaste for complexity, and disregard for multiple layers of

reality that lead to a mistaken sense of causality and a need to blame others. Finally,

terrorists harbor a capacity to suppress all moral constraints against harming innocents

due to acquired, individual, or group influences. Terrorists’ belief system allows them to

constrain individual morals as long as they believe that they are doing God’s work

(Mahan & Griset, 2008; O’Connor, 2009).

The Internal Threat Defined

Just as dangerous as the threats posed by foreign nonstate actors, are those posed

by homegrown terrorists. Americans were first introduced to international terrorism in the

early 1970s, but it was not until the early 1980s that terrorists began to produce a rising

number of victims in the United States. Although the overwhelming number of

bombings and shootings were single-issue terrorist acts and criminal vendetta shootings,

those incidents involved criminal low-level activity that still served to capture public

attention and teach the lesson that terrorism is not just something that happens

somewhere else. A general typology of domestic terrorist groups operating at the time

included White leftists, Black militants, and right-wing extremists. In 2002, an FBI Joint

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) arrested six suspects in Buffalo, New York, for supporting

known jihadists. This incident was labeled as domestic terrorism because it occurred in

the US (White, 2006). In contrast, the 9/11 attacks were classified as international

terrorism because of their origin outside the US. White leftist and Black militant groups

such as the Weathermen and the Black Panthers were driven by a revolutionary ideology

and the aim of changing political policy through direct threats against the central

government. They tended to embrace Marxism, target the economic status quo, select

symbolic targets of capitalism, and be based in urban areas. By 1989, these groups had

been eradicated by law enforcement through penetration, conviction, and imprisonment

(White, 2006). White right-wing extremist groups such as the Aryan Nation, Christian

Identity, and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) are antigovernment, anti-Marxist, and very

religious. Their purpose is to defend the status quo, or return to an earlier period. Their

common belief is that the Bible will guide their actions, and a gun will defend those

actions. These groups support the economic system but not the concept of distributing the

nation’s wealth. They prefer to establish bases in rural areas and focus their attacks on

symbols of federal and state government authority. Their political beliefs accept only the

county sheriff as the legal authority, and their social views reflect anti-Semitic, antiBlack,

anti-Catholic, and anti-minority sentiments (White, 2006). Unlike left-wing groups of the

1980s, right-wing extremist groups prevail to this day as neo-Nazis, Skinheads,

Survivalists, Christian Patriots, Posse Comitatus, the New Order, Militias, and

perpetrators of “Hate” crimes. Although these groups’ ideologies may differ, they tend to

employ the same tactics with the use of arson, bombs, and firearms. What is important to

understand about these internal and external threats is that they are ever present in

America’s urban and rural areas (Doak et al., 2014; Piddock, 2014).

Homeland Security Strategies in the Post-9/11 Era

Among the George W. Bush Administration’s immediate domestic reactions to

the 9/11 attacks were implementation of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which provided

U.S. intelligence and federal law enforcement agencies with enhanced authority to

conduct investigations of suspected terrorist activity; and implementation of the

Homeland Security Act of 2002, whose provisions created the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security (Bullock et al., 2009; McEntire, 2009). In international affairs, on

October 7, 2001, President Bush, with consent from Congress as required by the War

Powers Resolution of 1973, ordered the invasion of Afghanistan after U.S. intelligence

advisors determined that the architect of the 9/11 attacks was al-Qaeda leader Osama

binLaden, who was being provided a safe haven by the Taliban, a terrorist organization

controlling the government of that country at the time. The George W. Bush

Administration promoted the invasion of Afghanistan as a war of necessity. The public

was informed that the reason for the invasion was to capture bin Laden, dismantle

alQaeda, and remove its safe haven by eliminating the Taliban. During the following 2

years, the Taliban was diminished as a military threat, and although many members of the

al-Qaeda leadership were killed, bin-Laden and his second in command, Ayman

Zawahiri, were able to escape into Pakistan due to a change of focus by the Bush

Administration (Kamien, 2006; Mahan & Griset, 2008; Woerner, 2013).

In March 2003, as the DHS was becoming operational, the George W. Bush

Administration shifted military forces from the war in Afghanistan to be used in the

invasion of Iraq. The reasons provided to the world for the invasion of Iraq were to keep

Saddam Hussein from acquiring or building a nuclear weapon and to prevent Iraq from

becoming a future base for terrorist attacks against the US and its Western allies. Critics

of the George W. Bush Administration, however, have pointed out that because no U.S.

interests were being directly threatened, and no evidence of nuclear production was

revealed, the invasion of Iraq was one of choice because it did not meet the requirements

of a just war under international law. In spite of its false premise, the Iraq war did not end

until December 2011, following the loss of thousands of American and allied lives, at a

cost of over a trillion dollars in the 8-year period. The legacy of the Iraq war is that

political issues were not resolved and Iraq is again on the verge of a civil war between

Sunni and Shiite factions due to divisions underscored by centuries of sectarian violence

(Crowley, 2014; De Luce, 2014).

In a recent statement regarding the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama

announced that it would end for the US in December 2014. The president signaled that

with the killing of Osama bin-Laden in May 2011, and the training of that nation’s

security forces to control a potentially resurgent Taliban, there was no justification for the

continued presence of U.S. military forces in that country beyond an advisory role, and

then only if requested by the host country (Borosage, 2014; Crowley, 2014; De Luce,

2014). However, following an agreement signed in December 2014 between President

Barack Obama and Afghanistan’s newly elected President, Ashraf Ghani, the US will

continue to maintain a force of 10,000 troops in that country for another 2 years, with

these troops serving primarily in support and training roles. To some observers, President

Obama’s decision to authorize a more active role for the remaining U.S. forces suggested

a lingering concern about the Afghan army’s ability to fight. The agreement also

authorizes the U.S. forces remaining in that country to carry out military operations

against al-Qaeda and Taliban targets (O’Donnell, 2014).

Assumptions

However scientific or objective it may be, any attempted study is likely to be

grounded on a particular researcher’s assumptions, which are usually the byproducts of

ingrained socialization, personal observations, education, and experience, all of which

serve to form the researcher’s specific set of core beliefs and overall worldview. Whether

individually accepted as aligned paradigms that are proven, assumptions are difficult to

leave at the door before commencing research on a scientific research project. A

researcher benefits from open recognition of these personal philosophies to ensure that

the study is not influenced in a way that prevents a valid outcome. In this study, my

personal assumptions were based on my observations, experience, and formal training,

which led me to the original idea that developed into my study’s premise (Simon, 2011).

In turn, that original idea helped form the research problem, as well as the research

questions and how the information was to be sought to answer those questions (Patton,

2002). One such assumption was that I would employ the logic of inductive reasoning

while studying the topic in context to generate an outcome. In the end, this process

allowed me to describe my study findings in detail, just as the research questions drove

my field experiences (Creswell, 2013).

Assumptions are not always within a researcher’s control but should be used to

guide the study’s purpose when they are recognized (Creswell, 2013). However, simply

recognizing assumptions is not sufficient to justify their probable truth. Appropriate

action must be taken to address them; otherwise, the study may not progress as originally

planned (Simon, 2011). For example, an assumption brought to this study was based on

the concern that rural civic leaders would not answer the interview questions honestly in

order to avert blame for lack of compliance with implementation of national emergency

preparedness strategies if a disaster did strike their rural or small town community.

Having recognized this assumption, I determined that an expressed promise of

confidentiality and anonymity would more likely preserve the validity of their responses

and thus the integrity of the study (Creswell, 2013). Another assumption recognized in

this study was that some civic leaders in communities without implemented emergency

preparedness plans might not have been able to develop those safety and security

strategies for valid reasons. They might have been noncompliant not necessarily because

they did not care about their residents, but because they actually lacked the necessary

funding, personnel, equipment, and/or training to implement any preparedness guidelines.

I also assumed that rural residents should not be treated differently than large city

dwellers simply because of their choice of habitat. In applied research, it is assumed that

societal problems can be understood and solved with knowledge. In action research, it is

assumed that people in certain settings can solve problems by studying themselves. In

summary, during the literature review, I examined ideas, likely theories, methods, and

various interpretations as an evaluator. Throughout this study, I questioned the validity,

reliability, and generalizability of my evaluation, as well as the hidden assumptions that

surrounded my data collection efforts (Patton, 2002).

Scope and Delimitations

Delimitations are the characteristics that tend to limit the scope and define the

boundaries of a study (Simon, 2011). Unlike assumptions, however, where the researcher

may only have some control, or study limitations, where the researcher has no control, a

study’s delimitations and scope are in a researcher’s control. This is so because a study’s

characteristics include the choice of objectives, the research questions, its theoretical

perspectives, the population selected, and the method of inquiry chosen to examine the

problem. From the initial abstract idea to the study methodology, findings, and analysis,

delimitations work to set a boundary on what the research questions will be able to

determine (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002).

For this study, I chose to pursue my conceptual idea, which was that disparities

exist between the nation’s urban and rural areas in how post-9/11 emergency

preparedness strategies are being implemented. This idea was only partially confirmed by

limited available literature. In addition, the findings of those few studies were determined

to be inconclusive and inconsistent. The identified problem was followed by the aligned

theory of good governance and mutual assistance during times of need (Montoya, 2011;

Putnam, 2000). To collect the information required by the research questions, I

determined who the selected participants should be based on the professions and

positions that they held in their respective rural communities (Creswell, 2013). Finally, I

decided to delimit my study to a geographical four-state area in the nation’s Midwest

(Simon, 2011). Even with these imposed delimitations, I remain optimistic that the study

findings will prove useful in filling the current literature gap and providing potential

remedies that may be applicable to rural communities in other states (Patton, 2002;

Rudestam & Newton, 2007).

Limitations of the Study

Limitations are those variables that will always be out of a researcher’s control

and are readily evident in all components of the dissertation process. For example, if a

researcher’s problem requires an investigation of only a single facet of the national

preparedness guidelines as they apply to rural communities, then the information that is

collected will only be as good as the questions being asked. In this case, the findings may

not be applicable to medium-size or larger metropolitan areas, and if the study calls for

the purposeful sampling of preselected civic officials, then validity of the findings

becomes dependent on the truthfulness of their responses. In addition, the findings may

be limited to only those rural towns and communities to which the study’s findings may

be generalized (Simon, 2011). This study was limited by a specific geographical area

because it would have been impractical to examine the entire 97.5% of land area the U.S.

Census Bureau has classified as rural (US Census Bureau, 2010). This land area is home

for approximately 55 million people, or 18 % of the entire U.S. population (National

League of Cities [NLC], 2014; US Census Bureau, 2010). An evident limitation of the

dissertation process is that a study usually reflects only a review of the stated problem

during the short period of its examination (Simon, 2011).

Significance of the Study

The significance of this qualitative case study resided in the aim of discovering

and describing the reasons why an undetermined number of rural communities in the

Midwest were not complying with implementation of the 2009 National Preparedness

Guidelines (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2009; Stigler, 2010). The study’s findings may also

apply to rural communities in other U.S. states and territories. The issued National

Preparedness Guidelines provide strategies intended to help rural communities develop

security plans that will prepare them to respond to, recover from, and mitigate against,

manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). A prevailing perception in the field of

homeland security and emergency management is that the nation’s safety net, even

following the presidential directive of 2003, is still in a state of mixed compliance, with

most urban jurisdictions complying whereas leaders in rural communities do not seem to

know what their duties and responsibilities are in regard to the implementation of

emergency preparedness measures in their jurisdictions (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010;

Oliver, 2007, 2009). This study was designed to collect data from identified civic leaders

that were analyzed and interpreted to gain an understanding of the factors influencing

noncompliance in some areas of the nation’s rural regions and not in others (National

Association of Development Organizations [NADO], 2005). Intended practical

contributions of the study were to advance knowledge about the subject, to provide

guidance to homeland security officials and emergency managers in affected states, and

to offer instructional value to local and rural civic leaders, who may use the study’s

findings for comparison with their current programs or simply use them to develop new

and appropriate strategies for their rural communities.

Humankind has suffered terrorism in one form or another for thousands of years

(Chaliand & Blin, 2007), and although militant Islamic terrorism has only been practiced

by certain Middle East groups for the past 35 years (Mahan & Griset, 2009; McEntire,

2009), it is likely to continue until the current generation of terrorists is eliminated,

educated, or provided some economic, social, or political concessions (Crenshaw, 2005;

Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism experts Crenshaw and Hoffman have argued that terrorists

simply want a seat at the policy-making table, while others counter that the current strain

of terrorists wants access to the table only to blow it up. In either case, it seems unwise for

concerned rural civic leaders to ignore the continuing threat from terrorism, and too

dangerous for them to turn their backs on the threat it poses to all the nation communities,

regardless of size (Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009).

Implications for Social Change

This study was purposeful not only because it addressed an under researched area

that the available literature did not fully explain (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), but also because it explored

the implications that noncompliance with the DHS preparedness guidelines might have

for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2009). Results of the study will be

shared with the participating communities, as well as with other local, county, state, and

federal emergency planners for use as a basis for comparison. Other contributions likely

to derive from the study’s results include enhanced knowledge of the underlying forces

that currently resist the concept of compliance (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Several

other implications for social change may result from addressing a problem that concerns

national security and the status of rural public safety, in that the study may prompt the

development of new policies or studies (DHS, 2009). As long as humankind has to deal

with earth, wind, fire, and rain, the nation will experience some form of natural disaster

(Pfeiffer, 2014). And as long as the current strain of terrorist activity remains a threat,

Americans will continue to see acts of terrorism committed in civilized settings. In a

more peaceful world, preparedness guidelines would likely not be necessary, but in the

currently conflicted international environment, they have become a necessity for all of the

nation’s communities, urban and rural (Giblin, Schafer, & Burruss, 2009).

Summary

The intent of Chapter 1 was to describe the study’s focus; to introduce the

problem as it developed following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and to

state the central government’s responsibility to serve and to protect Americans from the

continuing threat of terrorism. This description was followed by an explanation of the

strategies developed to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against all

natural or manmade hazards (DHS, 2009). Through description of the terrorist attacks of

9/11, the chapter established the need for today’s homeland security strategies to counter

the continued threat of terrorism (Piddock, 2014). This chapter also defined related

operational terms, as well as the continuing problem of noncompliance with nationally

issued preparedness measures in some rural communities (Bryant, 2009; McEntire,2009).

Definitions were followed by discussion of the study’s purpose, as well as its nature,

scope, limitations, significance, and implications for social change (Simon, 2011; Yin,

2014). In summary, this chapter served as an introduction to the safety and security

problems that the nation’s emergency managers face today (McEntire, 2009; O’Connor,

2009). In addition to providing background on the problem and stating its significance to

the homeland, this chapter set the foundation for a more in-depth exploration of the causal

reasons for the prevailing safety and security issues confronting rural America. The

chapter also described the considerable efforts U.S. counterterrorism experts and

emergency managers have made to prevent future terrorist attacks on the homeland, as

well as to prepare for and recover from natural disasters effectively (Bullock et al., 2009;

Haddow et al., 2011). Although emergency preparedness has become a less urgent matter

for some observers in the years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a report

by the Heritage Foundation reminds counterterrorism experts as well as the public that the

threat continues, by recounting 60 terrorist plots that have been thwarted since the initial

9/11 attacks (Piddock, 2014; Zuckerman et al., 2013). An objective observer can only

speculate as to when committed terrorists will abandon their efforts to attack hardened

targets in urban centers, and instead turn their attention toward unprotected rural areas. In

Chapter 2, I analyze, synthesize, and assess the available literature on the question of

homeland security in rural America.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The 9/11 attacks served to introduce the concept and probable permanence of

what Americans have now come to understand as homeland security, by exposing the

vulnerability of a free and open society to foreign and domestic threats (Piddock, 2014).

Although it can be assumed that the American illusion of invulnerability existed prior to

September 11, 2001, the thought that a rational foreign government would ever consider

exploiting it did not seem to occur to this nation’s leaders at the time (Piddock, 2014).

History has also shown that American political leaders did not give much thought to the

possibility that a group of irrational nonstate actors would attempt such a bold operation.

Upon reflection, the 9/11 attacks illuminated the confliction of a national sense of

security based on illusion, with an act designed to produce insecurity, driven by the

seemingly delusional goal of reviving a long-lost Islamic empire (Gunaratna, 2003;

Karsh, 2006; Piddock, 2014). In spite of its organizational reach in 2001, core al-Qaeda

was unable to achieve that goal. In June 2014, however, a former al-Qaeda affiliate in

Iraq declared itself to be a worldwide Caliphate and renamed itself the Islamic State in

Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Although the Obama Administration, the United Nations, and some

news organizations refer to the same terrorist group as ISIL, which stands for the Islamic

State in Iraq and the Levant, the group decided to rename itself the Islamic State during

the same period (Sanchez, 2015).

Understanding the threat to the homeland in general and to the nation’s small

towns and rural communities in particular requires an understanding of the ideological

motivations behind terrorism (FEMA, 2004), as well as the groups that pose that threat by

adopting those ideologies. Implications for the nation’s adaptation toward homeland

security are primarily derived from public unease regarding the threat of terrorism, which

was of little concern before the 9/11 attacks but is now one of five major federal law

enforcement issues facing the country today. The other four are drug trafficking, firearms

trafficking, financial fraud, and human trafficking (Department of Justice [DOJ], 2011).

Americans now agree that the central government should address these problems with all

the resources at its disposal (PEW, 2013; TIME, CNN/ORC Poll, 2013).

Almost immediately after the 9/11 attacks, homeland security assumed a new

meaning following the actions of the George W. Bush Administration and Congress. The

rush to assess and control damage was not the product of forethought, but a reaction to

the fear of a follow-up attack. In the wake of the initial attacks, Congress and the Bush

Administration were propelled to act quickly in efforts to develop strategies that were

specifically designed to prevent any follow-up attack. They acted without the benefit of

knowing when or where such an attack might occur, but they did direct federal

intelligence and law enforcement agencies to initiate investigations with the purpose of

identifying perpetrators of the attacks and bringing them to justice. The government’s

reaction was conducted in tandem with the invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s home

base (Hashim, 2006).

The Afghanistan war continued even after the killing of Osama bin-Laden, the

chief architect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Similarly, on the domestic

front, the concept of homeland security remains an evolving process. Much has been

written about the causes and reasons for the 9/11 attacks, along with underlying questions

of how U.S. joint internal security systems allowed them to happen. As in most passing

events of this nature, the view always seems to be clearer in retrospect. In this study, I

was peripherally concerned with the consequences of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars; and

more in the legacy of militant Islamic ideology adopted by Islamic groups such as the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),

which have been spawned by the now diminished al-Qaeda central organization that is

still operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Crowley, M. 2014; Crowley, P. J. 2013;

O’Donnell, 2014). This study’s intent was to examine the levels of implementation of the

National Preparedness Guidelines in some of the nation’s rural communities and small

towns following the review of available literature that specifically addressed the subject

of preparedness for natural and manmade disasters in those remote areas (Bryant, 2009;

Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

In spite of the threats that natural and manmade disasters continue to pose to the nation’s

communities, the question of homeland security for all rural communities and small

towns remains unanswered. In light of this unanswered question, I sought to determine

what valid rationales prevailed to explain why a majority of the nation’s communities had

adopted the National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2005 and 2009 (DHS, 2009)

whereas many rural areas in the Midwest had not (Bryant, 2009; Caruson & MacManus,

2005). The prevailing condition of inconsistent compliance has created two related social

problems. First, it has affected national security by creating a gap in the nation’s

antiterrorism network by failing to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas.

Additionally, it has threatened public safety in Midwestern communities where local

leaders decided not to implement any new safety and security measures following the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The problem was identified in five previous

studies, which resulted in five different findings concerning rationales for noncompliance

(Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009;

Stigler, 2010).

The purpose of this case study was to further explore and describe the rationales

offered by rural civic leaders for noncompliance in previous studies, as well as to

compare their dependability and confirmability with those provided by participants in the

Midwestern rural areas that were studied. The National Preparedness Guidelines, which

were first issued in 2005, then revised and reissued in 2009, outline strategies intended to

help rural communities develop and implement programs that will prepare them for

effective response to and recovery from manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). This

study addressed an under-researched social problem and, by extension, explored the

social implications that continued noncompliance may have for national security and

public safety. The available literature served to establish the relevance of the identified

problem. For example, studies by Bryant (2009) and Caruson and MacManus (2005)

listed the many challenges of implementing emergency management strategies in small

towns and rural communities, emphasizing their historical lack of compliance with other

national programs and implying a degree of separation from rural and national center

direction. Bryant’s study addressed the practice of separation in rural communities, which

the U.S. Census Bureau (2010) describes as the physical distance between households,

and drew a relationship between the theory of social capital as defined by Putnam (2000)

and the concept of emergency management as practiced in rural communities. This

relationship also served to illustrate what is known about the problem in rural areas, but

left unknown the common reasons for noncompliance in the rural communities that were

previously studied. What I intended to do in this study, then, was to explore that question

further in order to arrive at a common understanding of those reasons.

The underlying consequences of the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq

are that although one provided Americans with a sense of justice following the death of

Osama bin-Laden, both seem to have created a proliferation of terrorist off-shoots that

embrace the al-Qaeda ideology. That ideology is driven by the desire of ISIL to establish

an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East based on Sharia Islamic law (Kamien, 2006;

Karsh, 2006; Sanchez, 2015). This was Osama bin-Laden’s and al-Qaeda’s initial and

continuing goal in other areas of operation within the Middle East and Africa (Gunaratna,

2003). After the expulsion of Soviet forces from Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1989,

alQaeda and its off-shoots considered the US the main obstacle to achieving their stated

goal. In addition to their primary goal, militant Islamists have demanded that all U.S.

troops be removed from what they consider sacred Muslim land, that apostate leaders of

Muslim countries be eliminated, and that the Jewish state of Israel be expelled from

Palestinian lands (Kamien, 2006). Because none of those goals have been realized,

Islamic jihad is likely to continue for the foreseeable future unless and until the current

generation of militants is captured, killed, or pacified through education or economic

assistance (O’Connor, 2009; Woerner, 2013).

The events of September 11, 2001 were a manifestation of al-Qaeda’s held intent.

This prompted the central government to develop and implement strategies designed to

deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the homeland (Bullock et al., 2009). Just

as the foregoing background information has served to provide a chronology of the events

that led to the necessity for homeland security, it is just as important to understand the

evolution of emergency management in America as it relates to external and internal

threats. Thus, it should be understood that homeland security is the direct result of

terrorist threat recognition and its applicability to domestic manmade or natural disasters

(Doak et al., 2014; McEntire, 2009). Since 1997, the U.S. Department of State has

identified and listed 62 groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Most of those

terrorist groups have claimed to be Islamic based (Department of State [DOS], 2013a).

However, only a small number of those groups are considered direct threats to the

homeland or to U.S. interests abroad (DOS, 2013a; Piddock, 2015). The groups that do

pose a direct threat to U.S. interests are Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

(AQ), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

(AQAP), and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which broke away from core al-Qaeda in 2014 and

renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A related group operating in

Syria is the al-Nusrah Front, which has merged with ISIS (DOS, 2013b; Sanchez, 2015).

Recently, al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group that operates in Sudan and

Somalia, has urged Muslims throughout the world to attack shopping malls in the US,

Canada, Great Britain, and other Western countries just as that group did in Nairobi,

Kenya in 2013 (DOS, 2013c; Meldrum, 2015).

Literature Search Strategy

Much effort was expended on the search for pertinent studies on the status of

homeland security and emergency management in rural America following the issuance

of the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2005 and 2008 (DHS, 2009). Among the

Walden University Library sites searched were Academic Search Premier, American

Constitution Society for Law and Policy, American Journal of Political Science, Criminal

Justice Policy Review, Journal of Criminal Justice and Behavior, National Interest

Online, Political Research Quarterly, Southwest Journal of Criminal Justice, Journal of

Conflict Resolution, and the ProQuest Dissertation and Thesis Database. The Walden

Homeland Security Digital Library (HSDL) database provided only one source that

originated from a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School of Homeland Defense and

Security (HLDS). This source was one of the five studies I was able to locate during the

literature search that supported my initial hypothesis that noncompliance in rural America

was likely due not only to a lack of resources, but also to remoteness and perceptions of

separation (Stigler, 2010). Those studies helped me to gain an understanding of the

rationales for that noncompliance and provided a basis for comparison of those rationales

with those developed in this study. As a result of finding few general sources and no

dissertations on the topic of inquiry in the Walden Library databases, it was necessary to

use other sites such Google Scholar and rely heavily on textbooks, academic articles, and

government documents to support my initial concept. These combined sources helped me

understand the probable reasons for the problem of noncompliance and provided a sense

of direction on how to address the problem. Among the government sources relied upon

for pertinent information regarding threats to the homeland, along with reactive and

proactive strategies to confront those threats, were the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the

Center for Homeland Defense and Security (HLDS), and the Homeland Security Digital

Library (HSDL).

Key search terms used to locate pertinent literature regarding the topic of inquiry

included terrorism, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, homeland defense, homeland

security, emergency management, and related theories. These terms were also used in

combination with rural areas or communities and interchangeably in Walden’s Library,

as well as in the Internet databases queried. I considered it fortunate that each of the five

studies located provided a basis for a developed research question. Despite the paucity of

pertinent literature regarding the subject of inquiry, I was able to structure the study to

describe the problem, explain its contradiction to compliant rural areas, and welcome the

opportunity to generalize findings in noncompliant communities to other regional rural

areas, which may serve to enhance national security and rural public safety.

Literature Related to Theoretical Foundation

Theory frames how individuals view their social world, whether they do so

inductively or deductively. Because a theory’s primary purpose is to explain, my study

was to focus on a theoretical explanation for noncompliance or compliance with the

implementation of emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, which would

inform me about the reason why either process is occurring. The theoretical foundation

that aligned with my study was social capital as advanced by Putnam (2000). Social

capital theory is based on the concept that community cohesion and stability rest on a

firmer foundation when residents establish networks of exchange that promote mutual

trust through cooperation, collaboration, and communication. The more common

community exchanges and networks become, the healthier a community becomes, both

politically and socially. The underlying assumption, then, is that a community that

cultivates and nurtures the “civic virtues” of social capital will be healthier in all ways, as

opposed to one that does not (Putnam, 2000, p. 7).

For much of the past decade, experts in the fields of homeland security and

emergency management have made efforts to develop theories to guide these disciplines

without success (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013). The consensus among

experts is that homeland security is a multifaceted enterprise involving many disciplines,

of which emergency management is one (Reese, 2013). Even when considered

separately from homeland security, emergency management incorporates multiple

principles and disciplines involving players from first responders to political leaders,

which have been difficult to isolate into one common theory (McEntire, 2004). Experts at

the Naval Postgraduate School, North Texas University, Eastern Kentucky University,

and the U.S. Congressional Research Service have found that the theory of social capital

provides a related and workable theoretical base that is applicable to all communities, but

particularly to rural areas (Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013). The concept of

community governance has been present since early Americans began living in small

communities for the necessary reason of survival that is made possible by mutual aid

under various conditions (Putnam, 2000). Historically, this mutual aid was formed on the

basis of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust. Although other contemporary theorists such

as Bourdieu (1983-1989), Coleman (1986-1990), and Fukuyama (1995) have measured

success in education, social class inequalities, and economics through the application of

social capital, it was Putnam (1995-2004) who, writing from a political perspective, drew

a relationship between social capital and community cohesion (Smith, 2001-2009).

The selection of this theory was made on the basis of its applicability to the study and the

absence of any other theory that was specifically developed for this topic of inquiry. In

addition, social capital theory made sense in terms of its history, its simple application,

and practice. Social capital theory relates to the present investigation of the question of

compliance with nationally directed emergency preparedness measures in rural

communities. The value of social capital becomes more meaningful when a local leader

considers the challenges of applying such emergency measures in remote and separated

rural communities where cohesion based on cooperation, reciprocity, and trust is essential

to a community’s general welfare and development (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Rural

emergency managers, when designated as such, must therefore rely on volunteerism,

limited funding, limited training, and often inadequate equipment to meet the challenges

posed by seasonal natural disasters or potential manmade incidents. Among other

objectives, this study determined the extent to which the practice of social capital in a

rural community affected the overall welfare of that studied community. To that end, the

research questions were structured to elicit responses from participants that reflected the

general health of the community they represented.

The previously cited sources representing topical peer reviewed literature were

journal articles published by Marion and Cronin (2009) who found that 57 of Ohio’s 260

small town and rural police chiefs had not established any new security measures since

the 9/11 attacks due to a lack of funding. That same year Oliver (2009) contended in his

study that the primary reasons for noncompliance in many of the nation’s rural towns and

communities were due to local civic leaders’ lack of understanding of their roles and

responsibilities in the post-9/11 era. Oliver’s contention seemed to be based on the

rationales offered by that study’s participants that although added responsibility had been

assigned to them, it came with no sense of direction or added resources. Contemporary

researchers Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) argued that the primary reason for a general

lack of compliance with emergency preparedness guidelines in rural areas was the result

of a governance decision made by state and urban leaders more interested in protecting

their densely populated metropolitan centers than adjoining less populated rural areas.

Chenoweth and Clarke argued that federal resources allocated to the states were not being

distributed evenly by state and urban leaders apparently predisposed to protecting their

particular jurisdictions. A more recent study by Stigler (2010) concluded that a lack of

resources might not be the primary reason for noncompliance with implementation of the

national guidelines in Wisconsin’s small towns and rural communities. Following field

work that allowed him contact with civic leaders in the state’s rural areas, Stigler’s study

added that noncompliance in those remote areas may not be due to a lack of resources,

but more likely to regional remoteness and separation. Although limited, the existing

literature provided the essence of the research questions by articulating what is known

about the problem. What this literature did not provide were consistent reasons for

noncompliance, thus setting the foundation for this study, which focused on exploring the

reasons and rationales for noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines

(DHS, 2009).

Bryant’s (2009) in-depth study in Missouri identified the challenges of emergency

management in rural areas as resource limitations, regional separation and remoteness, a

low population density, and a general lack of communication. Those findings lent

credence to the reasons cited in her colleagues’ studies, but as a group they failed to

explain why some states had successfully implemented emergency preparedness

strategies in their rural communities and others had not (FDEM, 2008-2013). Bryant

explained that resource limitations included a lack of available human, financial, cultural,

political, and social capital. Human capital, she argued, is limited in rural areas due

historically to urbanization and decades-long declines in population as a result of young

educated people moving to urban areas seeking better job opportunities. Bryant added

that financial capital was usually concentrated in aging rural populations, and lost when

urban heirs inherited and moved those assets. She concluded that these declines in human

and financial capital tend to limit the preservation of rural culture, as well as the general

development of political and social capital. Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) further argued

that the lack of political will in a small rural town was evident in instances of unequal

access to the basic resources necessary to maintain a vibrant community. The principles

of social capital theory thus become essential to the social cohesion and political health of

rural communities when it is necessary to meet the challenges of emergency

management. Similar findings were reported earlier by Caruson and MacManus (2005) in

their study of Florida’s homeland security preparedness issues prior to that state’s

adoption and implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009;

FDEM, 2008-2013).

The National League of Cities (NLC, 2013) defined rurality by the distance

between residents, or separation and remoteness. During disasters, this remoteness results

in longer response times, less favorable outcomes for residents in need of emergency

attention, and longer periods of recovery due to the cost ratio of allocating resources to

residents served. Based on this economic equation, urban centers are served first. Federal

and state funding programs take into consideration population density when allocating

funds; as a result, densely populated areas receive more funds for recovery and mitigation

purposes. The consequence for rural areas is that recovery following disasters is usually

addressed reactively instead of proactively. In those instances, limited local financial

capital will be spent on an unanticipated disaster response, thus requiring the marshaling

of local social capital to facilitate recovery after an event; with little human or financial

capital left to spend on mitigation. Preparedness activities are also difficult to fund when

populations are small and spread out, thus making it difficult to alert and educate remote

households about an impending incident. Rural communities must therefore rely on radio,

television, or telephone messaging to receive such impending disaster information timely

(Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Giblin, Schaefer, & Burruss, 2009).

In efforts to improve their emergency preparedness standards, some small town

and rural communities have sent their emergency services volunteers to free federal or

state training programs, only to find that the training materials and lessons reflected the

meeting of urban needs which were based on urban resources. This was discovered after

volunteers had attended training sessions at their own expense. While at the training site,

they became part of training scenarios that did not test rural incidents, that also assumed

equipment and personnel capabilities that were unrealistic in rural areas, and involved

mass casualties, or acts of terrorism not common in their small towns. The assumption by

trainers appears to be that rural emergency managers are smaller versions of their urban

counterparts. The reality is that rural emergency managers are faced with challenges that

are unfamiliar to their urban counterparts (Giblin et al., 2009). For those reasons, rural

communities must rely on trust and social capital (Putnam, 2000). They need support

from their volunteers, as well as training and equipment that is tailored to their needs.

Yet, federal government guidelines require training and preparation for hazards that may

never occur in rural areas. This condition supports the argument that local hazards and

needs should dictate local resource allocation. To resolve this issue there will have to be a

better understanding by federal and state agencies of the realities facing rural emergency

managers (Bryant, 2009; Caruson & MacManus, 2005; FDEM, 2008-2013).

However accurate the foregoing findings were in generalizing the challenges of

establishing emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, they did not answer

the question of why some states had included rural communities in their emergency

preparedness plans, and others had not. Those previous studies did, however, provide an

introduction to the relationship between social capital principles and their value to rural

communities in meeting their emergency management challenges (Bryant, 2009; Caruson

& MacManus, 2005; Giblin et al., 2009). In describing social capital theory, Putnam

presented that society’s bonds tend to break down when people stop supporting one

another through participation in common social and political activities. Putnam’s social

capital theory focused on the various aspects of social relations, which include local

norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in community cohesion. To Putnam,

community is central to his theory of social capital, which he related to civic virtue, or a

network of reciprocal social relations that included political participation and being active

in local associations. These social relations, he argued, tend to form community ties, as

well as develop tolerance and the trust of others. Putnam went on to explain how social

capital has a positive effect on educational performance, public health, crime rates, race

relations, economic productivity, community development, and even human happiness.

Putnam offered that these are some of the virtues that benefit communities when they

connect with friends, neighbors, and co-workers.

Throughout his work, Putnam (2000) argued that a civic community is usually

characterized by the degree of civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust,

tolerance, and the associational life it practices. To summarize the validity of his theory,

academics, scholars, and government analysts throughout the nation are in consensus that

interaction enables people to build communities, to commit themselves to each other, and

to knit a strong social fabric (Reese, 2013). Absent any existing theories on homeland

security or emergency management, some institutions have found a relational link

between Putnam’s social capital theory and emergency management. They base the link

on the science of social institutions and relationships that develop structure and stimulate

interaction of collective behavior within a community for the common good, which

includes safety and security (Bellavita, 2012; McEntire, 2004). In qualitative studies, the

link between the research literature, the research questions, and a theoretical relationship

is not always self-evident. As a way of confirming this link, my field research determined

that noncompliance or compliance with emergency preparedness measures within rural

communities was due, in large part, to the degree of adopting and exercising of social

capital principles (Putnam, 2000).

Literature Review Related to Key Concepts

The few studies found that related to key concepts of this study were quantitative

in nature, except for two which were qualitative case studies (Marion & Cronin, 2009;

Stigler, 2010). The quantitative studies sought to confirm the hypotheses of preparedness

noncompliance in rural communities within the states of Florida, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri,

and other unnamed Midwestern states through the use of survey instruments. Each of the

quantitative studies (Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Giblin,

Schafer, & Burrus 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009) reported a different finding as a causal

reason for noncompliance, which ranged from a lack of funding, training, personnel, and

equipment, to a misunderstanding of roles in the post 9/11 era. Short of repeating those

studies at the same sites, there was little evidence to confirm the validity of those

findings. A mixed-methods study conducted by Pelfry (2009) applied that methodology

to identify and assess areas of strengths and weaknesses regarding the application of

emergency preparedness guidelines in local communities. Pelfrey used interviews, as

well as surveys, to collect research data from local agency representatives in an unnamed

Midwestern state. The two qualitative case studies conducted by Marion and Cronin

(2009) and Stigler (2010), reflected the most reliable findings. That was due to the

researchers’ fieldwork, which involved interviews and observations of participants and

peers who were rural chiefs of police in the states of Ohio and Wisconsin. Those studies

revealed the additional rationale of geographical separation and remoteness as a likely

cause for noncompliance. The strengths derived from those studies were the basis for this

study’s research questions, which recognized a previous problem related to the issue of

noncompliance in the studied communities. That recognized strengths, along with the

stated willingness of local officials to adopt applicable preparedness guidelines in their

rural communities, provided the basis for this study’s research and interview questions.

What those previous studies also articulated in common was a need for further study of

this particular subject. Those same strengths, however, also revealed the weaknesses of

those previous studies as reflected in their inconclusive and inconsistent findings, which

served to justify the need for this study. What is known about those previous studies

(Caruson & MacManus, 2005; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Giblin, Schafer, & Burrus,

2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Pelfrey, 2009; Stigler, 2010) is that the

rationales for noncompliance varied from a lack of funding, equipment, and personnel, to

remoteness, and local leadership not understanding their roles and responsibilities in the

post 9/11 era. The previously reported conditions were critical to my determination of the

type of approach for this inquiry, and why I believed that a qualitative case study would

provide the most meaningful results (Yin, 2014).

A Brief History of U. S. Civil Defense and Homeland Security

Homeland Security Described and Defined

The phrase “National Homeland Security Agency” first appeared in a January

2001 report submitted by the 14-member Hart-Rudman Commission formed during the

Bill Clinton Administration in 1998 (Bullock et al., 2009; Reese, 2013). The phrase

homeland security not only serves to describe a nation’s civilian security concept, but

also its common purpose. Homeland defense refers to the military aspects of national

security, and although assigned different missions the two functions normally work

together in efforts to keep the nation safe and secure. Absent a statutory or regulatory

definition, the meaning of the phrase must be derived from a variety of scholarly and

legal sources. Foremost among the sources reviewed is the meaning stated by President

George W. Bush in 2002 as contained in the National Strategies for Homeland Security,

which define homeland security as a concerted national effort to prevent any terrorist

attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, minimize

damage, and help recover from attacks that may occur (Caudle & Yim, 2006; DHS,

2008b; Reese, 2013). The initial understanding of risk assurance between the central

government and the states, which required local governments to assume a primary role in

domestic security with the federal government assuming a secondary role, begin with the

birth of the nation and continued throughout the 20th century. During that time, however,

much confusion affected Civil Defense and emergency preparedness due to the lack of a

single national operating plan. This organizational condition resulted in uncoordinated

responses from agencies with differing policies, leadership, and operating agendas (DHS,

2006).

Homeland Security 2001-Present

The civil defense philosophy continued throughout the Cold War, through the first

World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and after other attacks against US interests in East

Africa and the Middle East (Ward et al., 2006). Immediately following the September 11,

2001 attacks, a significant change in the concept of homeland security took place as the

phrase Civil Defense was displaced by the phrase Homeland Security (Haddow et al.,

2011). Congressional legislation and executive orders enacted and issued after the 9/11

attacks led to implementation of strategies designed to protect the homeland with a more

proactive concept. That new concept incorporated all aspects of national power, which

included diplomatic, intelligence, federal, state, local, and tribal organizations, as well as

the private sector which owns 85% of the nation’s critical infrastructure (Bullock et al.,

2009). In 2002 the U.S. military also assumed an expanded role in national security.

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established under the direction of the

Department of Defense (DOD) with the mission of homeland security, homeland defense,

and civil support. NORTHCOM’s primary mission is to defend the land, sea, and air

approaches to the US from Alaska to Central America and surrounding water 500

nautical miles beyond those land areas (Haddow et al., 2011). NORTHCOM’s duties are

to deter, prevent and defeat threats, as well as and any type of aggression aimed at the

US, its territories, and interests. For that purpose NORTHCOM has established and

maintains quick reaction forces of highly trained Army and Marine Corps personnel

ready to respond to a range of potential threats. NORTHCOM’S authority is specified in

Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which states in part that “the Congress shall

provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States…and to call

forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel

invasions” (Kozak, 2011, p. 47; U.S. Archives, 2011, p. 9). Except under certain

conditions, and with limitations, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits any U.S.

military branches from becoming directly involved in law enforcement operations other

than in logistical support. The Posse Comitatus Act excludes the U.S. Coast Guard, which

serves as a subagency in the DHS, and the National Guard, which serves under a state

governor’s authority, unless mobilized by the president to maintain order during a

national incident (Bullock et al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011; Schertizing, 2009). After

the 9/11 attacks, the concept of homeland security no longer assumed a reactive response

to natural or manmade disasters. Those attacks made homeland security a proactive

concept to be carried out by first responders from different organizations, whose interests

were national security, antiterrorism, counterterrorism, emergency preparedness and

management, crime prevention and investigation, intelligence, strategic and tactical

coordination, as well as threat mitigation and risk assessment (Kamien, 2006; Ward et al.,

2006). This concept included the principle of balancing domestic safety and security with

civil liberties, and public safety with freedom, an operational challenge that continues to

this day (ACLU, 2009; DOJ, 2009). Liberal critics have complained that the current

balance weighs more to safety and security than to civil liberties and freedom (ACLU,

2009).

Emergency Preparedness in the Post-9/11 Era

The most significant laws enacted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, were the

Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001; the USA Patriot Act of 2001; the

Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002; the Maritime

Transportation Security Act of 2002; the Homeland Security Act of 2002; and the Public

Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness, and Response Act of 2002 (Bullock et

al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011). Of these laws the most controversial have been the USA

Patriot Act, the establishment of the TSA and support of state-run, but DHS funded

Fusion Centers (ACLU, 2011; Andino, 2008). In addition to granting new discretionary

powers to the federal executive to immobilize any future attacks, the Patriot Act made

specific changes to existing federal statutes. Those changes broadened the definition of

terrorism, increased the penalties for terrorists, and expanded the government’s authority

to use electronic monitoring devices when terrorism was suspected. The Act facilitated

the practice of information sharing among and between intelligence and law enforcement

agencies, and also granted police surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (FISA). Objections to the Act have centered on the expanded authority

granted to law enforcement, which critics argue restrict the civil rights of citizens and

non-citizens alike (Kamien, 2006; Ozdogan, 2007; White, 2006).

The USA Patriot Act of 2001 is codified into 10 titles, each containing descriptive

sections of the law. The most controversial sections of the law reside in Title II, which

was designed to improve surveillance by granting federal agents authority to intercept

communications between suspected terrorists (DOJ, 2009). Title II also facilitates the

application of roving wiretaps, allows criminal justice agencies to share information, and

expands intelligence gathering. The Act’s authority allows agents of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation (FBI) to seize materials and records from private businesses and public

institutions are of particular concern to civil rights groups. For the past 14 years, Title II

of the Patriot Act has been at the center of a controversy where critics see it as a symbol

of government expansion, particularly within the executive branch (ACLU, 2011; CATO,

2011b). Critics not only viewed the expansion of authority as a threat to civil liberties, but

tend to equate the potential for abuse with actual abuse of that power. This view is

formed on the concept of a limited government that fears any expansion of executive

authority is likely to lead to abuses of power, which will outweigh any potential benefits.

Coupled with this view is the idea that the access to expanded information sources

increases executive power, and what follows with that increase in efficiency is more

effective use of that power (Kamien, 2006). Critics argued that the Act’s provisions go

too far in threatening civil liberties while expanding police powers. They also expressed

concerns regarding the government’s ability to collect and share noncriminal or

nonterrorist information with other agencies during the conduct of investigations. Their

most pressing concern, however, has been the enhanced authority of the government to

monitor the activities of its own citizens (ACLU, 2011; CATO, 2011a; White, 2006).

Supporters of the Patriot Act, in contrast, have asserted that counterterrorism is

strengthened by combining intelligence and law enforcement to form a more effective

national defense system (Kamien, 2006). Proponents of the Act further argued that the

law provides critical tools to law enforcement in their efforts to counter the threat of

terrorism. They also advance the argument that this merger creates an intelligence conduit

among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to eliminate the information gap

that existed prior to the 9/11 attacks (9/11 Commission, 2004). Supporters of this view

point out that those critics fail to draw a distinction between a potential for abuse, and the

actual abuse of power. They add that the few abuses of federal powers that have been

reported and identified since enactment of the law have been corrected (Kamien, 2006).

Proponents of the law caution that proposing a prohibition against such expansion of

executive authority would be a mistake in the face of the terrorist threat still confronting

the nation, and that a more appropriate response to this conflict of interests is continued

vigilance and oversight (Rosenzweig, 2006). Supporters of the Patriot Act cap their

argument with documentation showing that 61 terrorist plots have been thwarted since

September 11, 2001 through application of the law’s provisions (DOJ, 2013; Heritage

Foundation, 2011; Zuckerman, Bucci, &

Carafano, 2013).

Although the Patriot Act made significant amendments to more than 15 federal

statutes, it was passed in the House and Senate without hearings or debate, and was not

accompanied by any committee reports (ACLU, 2011; Ozdogan, 2007). Specific changes

to the existing federal statutes included: a broadened definition of terrorism; increased

penalties for terrorist acts; expanded government authority to use pen registers and

wiretapping devices; increased scope for search warrants and subpoenas by lowering

standards for probable cause; facilitated sharing of information between law enforcement

agencies; expanded police surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Act (FISA); and, restricted some civil rights of citizens and noncitizens alike

(CATO, 2011a; CATO, 2011b; Ozdogan, 2007). There is little argument that the attacks

created a post-9/11 era that required examination and reevaluation of the implications the

attacks had on the American psyche. While Americans examined their commitment to

democratic principles, the central government was working in haste to protect them from

further attacks. Those government efforts, however, required Americans to accept some

restrictions on their freedoms of speech and movement. The most notable of these

restrictions have been increased surveillance of personal communications, more searches

of homes and personal belongings, the potential detention without the benefit of habeas

corpus, and the facing of possible proceedings before a military tribunal without the

standard protections of due process as guaranteed by civil courts (DOJ, 2009; Ward et al.,

2006). Under these conditions, the tradeoff between civil rights and personal security

seems to rest on the notion that although the nation’s openness may have added to the

planning and execution of the terrorist attacks, Americans’ desires to live in a peaceful

and orderly society should favor greater acceptance of limitations on personal freedom of

movement, freedom of association, freedom from unlawful searches and seizures, and

freedom of speech. Three years after the 9/11 attacks, Davis and Silver (2004) asked the

question of how many rights Americans were willing to sacrifice in exchange for

perceived safety and security from the threat of terrorism. That study’s findings indicated

that the greater the perceived threat by participants, the lower became their support for

civil liberties. Those findings, however, tended to be offset when study participants

indicated their trust in government was low, and the lower that trust was, the less willing

they were to give up their civil liberties, regardless of the threat level faced (Davis &

Silver, 2004).

In the initial aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the American public was more

receptive to the government’s new security measures than it was about civil liberties. As

time passed, however, the older attachments to privacy and individual liberty steadily

regained their rightful position in public opinion polls. Although recent polls indicate that

security still trumps civil liberties, this gradual shift in public opinion reflects the nation’s

long-term commitment to their civil rights and liberties. A poll by TIME/CNN/ORC in

May 2013, confirmed this trend. To the question of whether participants were willing to

give up some civil liberties if they were necessary to curb acts of terrorism, 57% of all

respondents in 1995 answered yes, but in 2013 that percentage was down to 40%. In

response to the question regarding government monitoring of personal communications,

the response in 2001 was 54% in favor, but down to 38% in 2013 (PEW, 2013). Finally,

to the question of what concerned participants more, the enactment of new and stronger

antiterrorism policies, with the potential for more excessive restrictions of civil liberties.

Of the respondents, 61% indicated they were opposed to enactment of new excessive

policies, and 31% hoped the government would not enact any new antiterrorism laws or

policies that affected their civil liberties (TIME/CNN/ORC Poll, 2013).

To guard against abuse and excessive use of these executive powers, provisions of

the Patriot Act included 4-year sunset dates for purposes of legislative and executive

review. Debates regarding the law’s provisions, therefore, were the most vociferous

during the sunset years of 2005 and 2009 (ACLU, 2009; DOJ, 2009). Arguments for the

law’s continued implementation were led by a majority of Congress, the president,

members of the intelligence and law enforcement communities, noted legal and social

scholars and conservative think tank members, who have argued that since its date of

enactment the law has helped prevent over sixty terrorist attempts against the homeland

(DOJ, 2013; Heritage Foundation, 2011; Zuckerman, Bucci, & Carafano, 2013).

Arguments from those opposed to all or some of the law’s provisions and prefer to have

them repealed or revised include ethicists, a smaller number of Congressmen, and

organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the CATO

Institute. They present that government agents have consistently abused the additional

powers granted to the executive branch by the law. In an effort to moderate these

opposing arguments law professor Paul Rosenzweig (2006) at George Mason University,

reviewed the Patriot Act’s provisions, along with other related government programs

regarding civil liberties. Rosenzweig concluded that instead of posing a threat to civil

liberties, the laws and programs he reviewed promised a significant benefit in the current

terrorist environment. And rather than focusing on the possibility of executive abuse,

Americans should instead make efforts to construct suitable oversight and response

mechanisms that will serve to empower executive action and effectively check abusive

practices. In the long-run, that effort will be more “likely to enhance Americans’ security

and liberty” (Rosenzweig, 2006. p. 1027).

Although that advice was offered in an attempt to moderate opposing positions, it

does not appear likely that either argument will be quieted soon. For practical purposes,

al-Qaeda central, the group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, has been decimated and most

of its top leadership has been killed. In addition, al-Qaeda central no longer has the

organizational and logistical reach it had in 2001 (Baker, 2014; Borosage, 2014; Zakaria,

2013). However, its legacy is an ideology that has spawned a new generation of terrorists

now operating in the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and much of Africa, with a

revisionist worldview driven by a radical delusion of reestablishing a lost Islamic empire

(Karsh, 2006). As long as they view the US as their primary obstacle to that goal, the

Patriot Act will continue to be implemented with the accepted justification that it keeps

America secure. In a terrorist free environment, Americans would choose civil liberties

over security, but in the currently conflicted world, public sentiment indicates that they

prefer enhanced security now, with minimal government intrusions into their civil

liberties (PEW, 2013; TIME/CNN/ORC Poll, 2013).

Public complaints lodged against the DHS are focused primarily on its funding of

state-operated Fusion Centers (ACLU, 2007; ACLU, 2008; Andino, 2008). As defined

by the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, Fusion Centers are effective and

efficient mechanisms designed to exchange critical law enforcement and intelligence

information, maximize all participant resources, streamline operations, and to improve

the ability to fight crime and terrorism by merging data from a variety of sources (CRS,

2007; DOJ, 2006). In this definition, fusion emerges as the fundamental process by which

the sharing of homeland security related information and intelligence can be facilitated

(9/11 Commission, 2004). The idea is to manage and disseminate the information to the

responsible agencies for appropriate action. The short-term goal of Fusion Centers is to

provide a colocated mechanism where intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, and

all private sector partners can come together for the common purpose of safeguarding the

homeland and preventing major criminal activity (FBI, 2009a; FBI, 2009b). A regional

policeman, fireman, agricultural inspector, or financial sector representative should not

have to search his agency’s database or other sources for information when it is likely

that the intelligence has already been collected by a Fusion Center in his jurisdiction

(Masse & Rollins, 2007). Following a specific recommendation by the 9/11 Commission,

Fusion Centers have been established in every state of the union (DHS, 2008b). Some

large states have established four or more centers to comply with information sharing

mandates after the 9/11 attacks. They are state owned and operated (DHS, 2008b), but are

primarily funded by DHS grants, and thus the basis for complaints from liberal groups

that contend these centers collect information on people who may not be involved in

criminal or terrorist activities (Carter & Carter, 2009; Rollins & Connors, 2007).

Unlike Fusion Centers, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) normally do not

generate public complaints, although they too are ancillary products of the 9/11 attacks.

Essentially, a JTTF is a law enforcement unit that uses an interagency approach to

counter domestic terrorism. These units are led and funded by the FBI (DOJ, 2013) and

are comprised of representatives from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

The Department of Justice defines a JTTF as a cell of highly trained, locally based, and

committed investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT members, and other experts from

dozens of domestic law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Their primary purpose is

to investigate leads from all sources, including area Fusion Centers, and to insure the

timely collection and sharing of intelligence critical to antiterrorism and major crime

prevention. JTTF members may also provide security at major events, work undercover,

and conduct surveillance of suspected terrorist or criminal activity. Certain types of

illegal activity such as money laundering, drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun

trafficking, extortion, smuggling, and corruption of public officials often involve

coordination with other offices over a large geographical area. This type of cooperation is

also necessary during the conduct of counterintelligence to detect espionage, sabotage, or

assassinations planned by a foreign government or nonstate actor. During the conduct of

these types of investigations, the exchange of information on a vertical and horizontal

plane is critical to the operation’s success (Doak et al., 2014).

Today there are over 100 JTTFs throughout the country permanently staffed on a

full-time basis by members of the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &

Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA), the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Secret Service

(USSS), the U.S. Marshal’s Service (USMS), the intelligence branches of the Army, Air

Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as by members of regionally assigned state and local

law enforcement agencies (Ward et al., 2006). At last count, total nationwide JTTF

membership was estimated at 4,000 participants with over half of those being federal

agents (DOJ, 2013). Prior to joining, all participants must sign a memorandum of

understanding accepting the JTTf’s joint mission of reacting to terrorist-related activity

and proactively investigating domestic and foreign terrorist groups or individuals who

may be targeting people or infrastructure in the particular JTTF’s operating area. All

nonfederal agents are subjected to background investigations to gain top secret clearance

before they can participate in a task force. JTTFs work under the FBI’s definition of

terrorism, which the agency defines as an unlawful act, a threat of force or violence, that

is committed by a group of individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce

a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political

or social objectives (Doak et al., 2014; DOJ, 2013).

The difference between a Joint Terrorism Task Force and a Fusion Center is that a

JTTF is sponsored, led, and funded by the FBI. A JTTF is both regionally and nationally

focused and deals exclusively with terrorism matters (DOJ, 2013). A Fusion Center, is

sponsored, led, and funded by the host state with grant support from the DHS (DOJ,

2006). Fusion Centers are state and local-centric, but deal with terrorism, criminal, as

well as public safety matters. And most importantly, Fusion Centers produce intelligence

for dissemination to appropriate agencies, including JTTFs, for determined action, but

they do not conduct investigations. Some Fusion Centers are colocated with JTTFs or

FBI Field Intelligence Groups throughout the country, but more commonly situated

regionally within a state (DOJ, 2013). The foregoing descriptions of laws and strategies

were designed to deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist activity in the immediate aftermath of

the 9/11 attacks. The most visible of these strategies were enacted and implemented by

the George W. Bush Administration and continue in the post 9/11 era with only minor

changes. Some have proven to be effective, others have created internal debate, and the

DHS, which comprises the largest component of this antiterrorism effort, is still a work in

progress (Carter & Carter, 2009; DHS, 2006; Kopp, 2012).

Emergency Management As Prescribed by the DHS

The preceding pages have presented the threats that terrorism, as well as natural

disasters, continue to pose to the homeland. Also described above are some of the most

high-profile strategies that the U.S. has developed and implemented to counter those

threats. Further description of these strategies, along with explanations regarding their

intent and anticipated effect, is provided in the following pages. These then, are the

emergency management methods and procedures that the DHS has prescribed with the

objective of securing the homeland (DHS, 2008b; DOJ, 2013). Constitutional scholars

point out, however, that although the central government may prescribe the national

implementation of such strategies and procedures, the 10th amendment to the U.S.

Constitution makes that process a states’ rights prerogative (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives,

2011). Essentially, the DHS has little leverage, other than funding, to force states to adopt

and implement strategies and procedures deemed effective to secure their urban and rural

areas (Bullock et al., 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009). To withhold homeland security funds

from noncompliant states would defeat the purpose of filling the gap in the nation’s

security network. This policy would then shape the question of whether homeland

security is intended only for high population urban centers, and not for low-density rural

areas, such as those in some Midwestern states (Bryant, 2009; Ward, et al., 2006).

Although some of the laws and policies that were enacted and implemented in the wake

of the 9/11 attacks did provide the intelligence and law enforcement communities more

effective tools to track and apprehend terrorists, those laws and policies did not resolve

the organizational problems dealing with homeland security and emergency management.

To rectify this condition, in December 2003, President George W. Bush issued Homeland

Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD), which directed the DHS Secretary to take a

leading role in the development of a National Preparedness Goal to define preparedness

as a coordinated national effort involving all levels of government, the private sector,

nongovernment organizations, individual citizens, and called for the strengthening of

capabilities that would address the full range of homeland security missions, including

preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation (Bullock et al., 2009). The National

Preparedness Goal was first released in March 2005, along with a revised version of the

National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

The NRP was an all-hazards plan designed to establish a single, comprehensive

framework for the management of domestic incidents (DHS, 2009). The plan addressed

the prevention of terrorist attacks and the reduction of vulnerability to all natural and

manmade disasters. In addition, the NRP provided guidelines for minimizing the damage

and seeking assistance in recovering from an incident. NIMS was created in tandem with

the NRP to provide a systematic and consistent nationwide procedure for use by all

federal, state, and local government representatives during the conduct and reporting of

incidents that would also work effectively and efficiently when preparing for, responding

to, and recovering from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity

(GAO, 2014; Haddow et al., 2011; TISP, 2006).

The National Preparedness Guidelines

Since their initial issuance date of 2005, the National Preparedness Guidelines

have been stated as a process to organize and synchronize federal, state, local, tribal, and

territorial efforts to strengthen national preparedness against all-hazards (DHS, 2009).

Critical elements of the guidelines are the establishment of readiness metrics to measure

progress for assessing the nation’s overall preparedness capability to respond to all

incidents, especially those involving acts of terrorism. Two other important elements of

the guidelines are the Target Capabilities List, which defines 37 specific capabilities that

all communities, the private sector, and all levels of government should possess in order

to respond effectively to disasters, whether natural or manmade (DHS, 2009). And the

other is the Universal Task List which provides a menu of some 1,600 tasks that can

facilitate efforts to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from the major events

represented by the National Planning Scenarios provided by FEMA (DHS, 2009). Of

course no single community is expected to perform every task. In summary, the National

Preparedness Guidelines adopt an all-hazards approach to preparedness, and are

riskbased, but primarily they are a unified and systematized call to action at all levels of

government, with the mission to plan, organize, equip, train, and evaluate effectiveness

(Bullock et al., 2009; Haddow et al., 2011).

The National Response Framework and National Incident Management System

The National Response Framework (NRF), a revision of the National Response

Plan, was developed to provide basic emergency management strategies at all levels of

government as a common structure (DHS, 2009; White House, 2003). The NRF’s basic

purpose is to ensure that all levels of government, the private sector, and nongovernment

organizations, work together and operate under a common set of emergency principles

(DHS, 2009). In addition, the NRF provides guidelines for first responders, decision

makers, and supporting entities on how to conduct a unified response to an incident

(Bullock et al., 2009). The NRF was partly written for appointed political leaders,

governors, mayors, county and city officials, and those who have a responsibility to

provide effective disaster preparedness and response capability to a community (Bullock

et al., 2009). While the NRF provides the structure and operating mechanisms for a

national-level policy that concerns incident management, the National Incident

Management System (NIMS) provides a systematic and proactive approach that guides

departments and agencies at all levels of government and the private sector to work in a

collaborative effort to prevent, prepare for, respond to, recover from, protect against, and

mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, with

the objective of reducing loss of life or injury, damage to property, and damage to the

environment (DHS, 2009). Due to its importance in NIMS and emergency management,

the Incident Command System (ICS) was designed as a flexible management system that

enables effective and efficient control of an incident by integrating the combination of

personnel, facilities, equipment, procedures, and communication at a given site (DHS,

2009).

Most incidents are handled adequately by local first responders and emergency

managers, but the system becomes more applicable during disasters that may traverse

multistates and jurisdictions, in which cases command and control becomes an issue. A

major earthquake in California, a great flood or extensive tornado damage in the Midwest

(NOAA, 2014a), a Category 4 Hurricane that churns in the Gulf of Mexico, or travels up

the East Coast (NOAA, 2014b), requires emergency management leadership at the same

or different sites to ensure coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and communication

of all response units at affected locales. The ICS provides structure to facilitate activities

in the five major functional response areas that include operations, command, planning,

logistics, and finance administration (DHS, 2009; Moteff, 2014).

Emergency Management in Rural Areas of the Midwest

Some experts, such as Oliver (2007, 2009), contended that although state and

local officials now play a critical role in the post-9/11 era of homeland security, they

remained unsure of their specific responsibilities and duties in the current threat

environment. Marion and Cronin (2009) argued that if rural leaders’ new role is to

become law enforcement and intelligence officers, they lacked the necessary funding,

training, expertise, and equipment to do the job right. Yet Oliver, Marion, and Cronin did

not explain how it is that states such as Florida have been able to develop a

comprehensive plan with the same formulaic allotment of homeland security funds as

other states, and implement the National Preparedness Guidelines as they were originally

issued in 2008 (FDEM, 2008-2013). These arguments prompted the study question: Why

the National Preparedness Guidelines that were first issued in 2005, and which were

revised and reissued in 2008, have not been consistently implemented in all of the

nation’s municipalities, including small towns and rural communities? Finding the

answer to this question drove the premise of this inquiry. The proper place to begin the

search for that answer was a review of the available literature that addressed the topic,

along with federal and state documents that clearly present preparedness guidelines for all

communities. Following a review of that pertinent literature, an objective researcher will

conclude that the guidelines are understandable, that state and local responsibilities are

clear regarding their application, and that funding is allocated nationally to states, based

on assessed threat, risk, vulnerability, and population (DHS, 2009). The same researcher

could also review an example of their effective adaptation and implementation of the

guidelines in model states such as Florida (FDEM, 2008-2013).

The issued guidelines provide strategies intended to help rural communities and

small towns develop security plans that deter, detect, respond to, and recover from

manmade or natural disasters (DHS, 2009). Their intent, purpose, and function have been

described in the foregoing sections and supported by the government and academic

sources referenced, but when compared to findings of the various studies, the results of

those studies do not provide entirely valid responses to the question of noncompliance.

For example, as described in the foregoing sections, the guidelines are specific in how to

prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against disasters. They also provide

guidance on the structure and set-up of incident command, along with descriptions of

responder duties and responsibilities in all hazards regardless of size and scope.

Essentially, the National Preparedness Guidelines were developed to provide any size

community the flexibility to adopt, borrow, and establish broad or limited emergency

preparedness measures in direct relation to its security needs (Bullock et al., 2009; DHS,

2009). Yet Bryant (2009) pointed out in her findings the many challenges of establishing

emergency preparedness measures in rural communities, at the same time underscoring

rural communities’ historical lack of compliance with nationally issued guidelines (NLC,

2013; NADO, 2005).

The challenges of emergency management that Bryant (2009) presented in terms

of differences between rural communities and urban centers can be categorized into four

major themes of challenge: a limitation of resources; separation and remoteness; low

population density, and a lack of communication with neighboring communities. These

are some of the basic themes that underscored the research questions and drove this

study. Bryant’s conclusions, however, did not explain how states such as Florida and

Maryland (FDEM, 2008-2013; Kamien, 2006), have been able to adopt, develop, and also

implement variations of the National Preparedness Guidelines on a statewide basis that

utilized funding allocations based on threat, risk, vulnerability, and population; a formula

applicable to all communities nation-wide, whether large, small, or rural. Although

Congress has recognized that small towns and rural communities do not receive the same

attention as urban centers do, no changes have been made regarding the way homeland

security funds are allocated (Bryant, 2009; DHS, 2008b; FDEM, 2008-2013). In their

article, Chenoweth and Clarke (2010) argued that the primary reason for the general lack

of compliance with national preparedness measures in rural areas was a governance

decision made by state and urban leaders more interested in protecting their jurisdictions.

To sustain their argument they presented data showing that from 1993 to 2000, 94 % of

injuries and 61% of deaths resulting from a terrorist attack occurred in urbanized areas

throughout the world (Chenoweth & Clarke). Their argument is premised on the idea that

if terror strikes, it will occur in an urban setting high in population with more available

infrastructure targets. What they failed to understand is that terrorists continue to adjust

their target selection from hard to soft. As urban area targets are hardened and the threat

is reduced, the risk to rural or softer targets increases in proportion. The 9/11 attacks and

the Boston Marathon bombings in urban areas lend credence to the argument presented

by Chenoweth and Clarke. However, that argument ignored the physical and moral need

to protect residents and infrastructure in a given state’s rural communities.

The major themes surfaced by these studies were that noncompliance with the

National Preparedness Guidelines prevailed in some rural Midwestern communities, but

the rationales for noncompliance differed with participants and geographical regions.

What is known about the problem is that it has created national security and public safety

issues. What are not known about the problem are the common rationales for existing

noncompliance. Each study presented findings that varied from a lack of funding,

personnel, training, equipment, to separation and remoteness. This study’s findings have

done much to fill this knowledge gap following purposeful contact with those participants

responsible for the implementation of such security and safety measures in the rural sites.

The above cited sources and related literature review were used to determine the

saturation point regarding the question of homeland security in the nation’s rural areas.

Their reported themes underscored the questions that drove this study. Their conclusions,

however, failed to explain how some states have been able to adopt variations of the

National Preparedness Guidelines on a state-wide basis without the type of concerns

voiced by the respondents in the reviewed studies. Compliant states have done so by

utilizing funding allocations based on the formula that was established by Congress in

2006 (Kopp, 2012; Moteff, 2014), that is based on assessed threat, risk, vulnerability, and

population. The formula is applicable to all communities nationwide, whether they are

large, small, or rural. The literature search strategy involved the use of all Walden

University databases, the Internet, as well as articles and books that focused on the topic

under investigation. Academic sources provided the bulk of references used in this study,

followed by government publications and textbooks previously read during coursework.

Walden University databases provided many of the sources cited in this study.

Summary

The preceding pages restated the problem and purpose of this case study, along

with a background and brief history of homeland security, its definition, and why it is

necessary in today’s conflicted world (DHS, 2009). Following those presentations were a

brief description of the threat that external and internal terrorism continues to pose to the

security of the homeland, and how the US is responding to those threats (DOJ. 2009).

This chapter’s introduction cited the central government’s constitutional responsibility to

protect the homeland from invasion and domestic violence (Kozak, 2011; U.S. Archives,

2011), then explained some of the cited reasons for militant Islamists’ avowed hostility

toward the US following its involvement in Central Asia and the Middle East. The

involvement exposed the nation to external and internal terrorism, which prompted the

development of domestic countermeasures following the 9/11 attacks, including the USA

Patriot Act, and establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2008a;

DOJ, 2009). These countermeasures have thwarted 60 terrorist attempts against the

homeland since the 9/11 attacks (DOJ, 2013; Zuckerman et al., 2013). In exchange for

the enhanced security these countermeasures have provided, Americans have had to limit

some of their civil liberties (DOJ, 2009; TIME, CNN/ORC Poll, 2013). That explanation

was followed by a short history on the evolution of US civil defense and homeland

security (DHS, 2008a; Schertzing, 2009). Following an overview of the external and

internal threats that confront the nation today (DOJ, 2011), the discussion then provided a

description of the emergency management disciplines as prescribed by the DHS (DHS,

2009). That discussion also provided an explanation of the operational principles most

states have adopted from the National Preparedness Guidelines, as well as what has not

been implemented in noncompliant states and rural communities. The degree of

noncompliance, as noted by previous studies, was compared to successful adaptations of

the National Response Framework by states such as Florida and Maryland (FDEM,

20082013; Kamien, 2006). Inconsistencies that resulted from that comparison informed

the research questions that drove this study to determine the reasons for those

inconsistencies (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009;

Stigler, 2010). In summary, this chapter discussed the social problems of noncompliance

that were revealed by the limited available literature, which addressed them (Bryant,

2009). Chapter 3, which follows, describes the methodology that was employed in an

effort to arrive at a more definitive answer to the question of homeland security in

America’s small towns and rural communities (Yin, 2014).

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

Following a review of available literature and evidence of what appears to be a

pattern of inconsistent implementation of emergency preparedness strategies in some

rural communities throughout the Midwest (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010;

Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), I sought to identify the key factors

that have precluded full compliance in the selected study areas, with the objective of

developing common reasons that can be generalized to other rural regions to improve

implementation. The attacks of 9/11 served to shatter the prevailing illusion that America

was invulnerable to attack from external forces. They happened despite the previous

implementation of what were deemed impregnable security measures designed to prevent

such attacks (Piddock, 2014). An immediate response from the George W. Bush

Administration and Congress resulted in the enactment and implementation of security

measures designed to prevent future attacks and to bring the perpetrators of the 9/11

attacks to justice. Among those measures was enactment of the Homeland Security Act of

2002, which established the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In March

2003, President George W. Bush directed the newly formed DHS to develop and

distribute National Preparedness Guidelines for use by all government levels in

implementing protective strategies and reporting major incidents (DHS, 2009). These

guidelines included the initial National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident

Management System (NIMS). In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, most states, such as

California, Texas, Illinois, Florida, and New York, accepted the value of adopting the

federally proposed guidelines to tailor preparedness programs suited to their needs

(FDEM, 2008-2013). Other states such as Ohio, Wisconsin, and Missouri chose to

develop measures designed primarily to protect urban areas having high population

density and vulnerable infrastructure (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion

& Cronin, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Yet others determined that implementation of emergency

preparedness measures in small towns and rural areas were not justified by the cost

(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010). This inconsistency of implementation created two social

problems in affected areas: one concerns national security in general and the other relates

to public safety in rural communities in particular (DHS, 2009).

Prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, responsibility for protecting the nation from

external threats fell within the purview of the Department of Defense (DOD). During this

same pre-9/11 period, responsibility for the response to, and recovery from, internal

disasters was assigned to a number of federal agencies, each with varying agendas, which

responded reactively to natural and manmade disasters with minimal cooperation,

collaboration, coordination, or communication (DHS, 2008a). Soon after the 9/11 attacks,

however, homeland security became a proactive endeavor conducted by professionals

from many fields in the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The

DHS also inherited the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), the

primary federal agency responsible for the establishment and conduct of emergency

management protocols designed to deal with all hazards that may affect the nation’s

communities (DHS, 2008b). This case study focused directly on the question of

emergency preparedness in rural communities, and collaterally on the causative

relationship between the central government and its responses to the continuing terrorist

threat. Establishment of the DHS and subsequent enhancement of FEMA’s emergency

response and management responsibilities are evidence of this causative relationship

(DHS, 2009; FEMA, 2011; Yin, 2014).

A qualitative case study approach was chosen as the most effective method to

explore and describe the reasons why some rural communities in the Midwest (Bryant,

2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010)

were not complying with implementation of the national preparedness guidelines, first

issued in 2005, then revised and reissued in 2008 (DHS, 2009). Since their first issuance,

the national guidelines have provided strategies intended to help rural communities and

small towns develop security plans that prepare them for and allow them to respond to as

well as recover from manmade or natural disasters. These strategies were recommended

for national adoption in accordance with a community’s particular needs in relation to

assessed risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and available resources. When viewed in this

context, this case study addressed an under researched topic that available literature had

not fully explained (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009;

Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010) and also explored the implications that noncompliance might

have for national security and public safety issues (DHS, 2008b, 2009). When the study is

complete, the findings will be shared with participating communities, as well as with

other local, state, and federal emergency planners for use as a basis for comparison. Other

practical contributions likely to be derived from this study’s results include enhanced

knowledge of the underlying forces that previously resisted the concept of compliance,

along with findings that may lead to the adoption of generalized practices by other

currently noncompliant communities (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014). In spite

of the fact that acts of terrorism and natural disasters continue to pose serious threats to

homeland security and emergency preparedness, questions have been raised by the above

cited experts (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Stigler, 2010) as to why the

National Preparedness Guidelines of 2008 have not been adopted by small towns and

rural communities in some Midwestern states while they have been implemented by the

vast majority of the nation’s metropolitan and urban centers, as well as most rural areas

(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; FDEM, 2008-2013). This inconsistent condition of

compliance creates two social problems. One weakens national security by failing to

protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatens public safety in

Midwestern towns and rural communities where civic leaders did not establish any new

safety measures following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Marion & Cronin,

2009; Oliver, 2009). This problem was highlighted first by an apparent gap in the

literature specifically addressing the subject of noncompliance in some rural areas, and

second by a lack of consensus among the cited researchers on the reasons for that

noncompliance (Bryant, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

As is common in qualitative research, in my role as the researcher I functioned as

the primary tool for purposes of data collection and analysis. An interview protocol was

developed posing a set of open-ended questions based on the reasons for noncompliance

previously reported in the five cited studies that made up the core literature for this study

(Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009;

Stigler, 2010). The interview questions were posed to rural civic leaders selected by

purposeful sampling methods responsible for implementation of emergency preparedness

measures. To assist in the analysis process, the qualitative data analysis software named

Atlas.ti was used. Constant vigilance was employed throughout the study to ensure and

maintain the ethicality and trustworthiness of the research process. Particular attention

was also devoted to ensuring the internal and external validity of the study. Selected

study participants were asked to execute an informed consent form that stated their rights

and guarantee of confidentiality. Because I did not intend to target vulnerable or

protected populations, it was not anticipated that any challenges with ethics,

confidentiality, or human subject issues would be of concern.

Research Design and Rationale

This qualitative research was based on a holistic single case study design that

aligned well with the inquiry’s stated objectives of developing an in-depth description

and analysis of an identified problem by examining the operational processes at selected

sites of suspected noncompliance (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014). This approach provided

for: the formulation of interview protocols designed to answer the research questions;

coding of the data collected; and, analysis and interpretation of the data to develop

themes that led to an understanding of the study’s findings. The selection of this design

followed the rationale that the concept drives the research and the study purpose drives

the analysis. The interview questions were open-ended and formed to elicit specific

answers from eight to 12 civic leaders in four states who provided reasons for

noncompliance with emergency preparedness guidelines that were developed to enhance

the security and safety of their rural communities (Patton, 2002; Rudestam & Newton,

2007; Yin, 2014).

Since 2001, Pew Research Center surveys have reflected the concerns of

Americans when over 53% of respondents have indicated that they believe it is necessary

to give up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism. Another 81% have favored the

use of undercover activities to penetrate suspected terrorist groups, and over 67% have

favored closer monitoring of banking, credit, and funding sources as well as Internet chat

rooms to reveal any indications of terrorist activity (PEW, 2013). With this indicated

public support, it seems that preventing terrorism, mitigating its impact on the nation’s

communities, and responding effectively to any attack that occurs should be a high

priority for federal, state, and local leaders (PEW, 2013). Yet the question remained: Why

did civic leaders in some rural communities choose not to provide proper security to their

residents? This reported condition prompted the bases for the research questions. The

Central Question that drove this study was as follows: How do rural civic leaders in the

selected Midwestern communities, which include mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs,

emergency managers, and city attorneys, justify noncompliance with the National

Preparedness Guidelines that were issued for implementation in 2009? In my personal

experience, I have found that some sheriffs in Midwestern states do not have significant

emergency preparedness responsibilities. In other instances, the sheriff is the chief law

enforcement officer in the county and carries out those duties. As such, sheriffs’ law

enforcement training is usually determined by the status they hold in the county, as is

NIMS and other emergency preparedness training in the post-9/11 era. More often than

not, counties rely on state troopers or large police departments to provide any mutual-aid

during major incidents. Law enforcement jurisdiction and response was a question I

asked of rural leaders during the interview process to determine what they had done since

the 9/11 attacks to make their communities safer. Responses reflected the variable

perspective of each respondent, but it was anticipated that their justifications would

center on issues of funding, training, personnel, remoteness, or lack of understanding of

their respective roles in the post-9/11 era. However, it was also anticipated that valid

justifications for exposing their communities to public safety threats would not be

forthcoming. In addition, their responses were not expected to explain how other rural

communities in other states have implemented appropriate emergency preparedness

strategies with similar limitations. To seek the proper answers, I based the subquestions

on findings developed by the core studies cited in the literature review. Each subquestion

reflected a particular finding from each of the studies as a reason for noncompliance.

For example, Subquestion 1 was stated as follows: How was noncompliance with

the National Preparedness Guidelines in the post-9/11 era reflected in the ability or

inability of those rural communities to meet their governing goals and resource needs as

they related to local public safety and national security issues?

Subquestion 2 was posed as follows: What role had funding, or lack thereof,

played in the ability or inability of those rural communities to fully implement the

National Preparedness Guidelines?

Subquestion 3 was stated as follows: What role had regional remoteness played in

decisions made by local rural leaders not to implement the national preparedness

guidelines in their communities?

Finally, Subquestion 4 was posed as follows: What understanding did rural civic

leaders have about their duties and responsibilities regarding implementation of the

National Preparedness Guidelines in their communities?

The intent of these subquestions was to further specify the purpose of the central

question by refining its intent. The subquestions were considered a means of asking the

central question in a piecemeal fashion to further analyze the issue of noncompliance as it

related to the research process (Creswell, 2013).

Much of the literature reviewed that addressed the question of noncompliance

with the National Preparedness Guidelines in some of the nation’s rural communities

was published by academics who based their conclusions on survey-based studies and

government documents. Those peer-reviewed articles were explored in the preceding

chapter. The reviewed government publications that addressed the benefits of compliance

with the National Preparedness Guidelines included those produced by the DHS

(20082013) and FEMA (2011). These documents provided the legal history for

establishing the DHS in 2002, along with the subsequent issuance of the National

Preparedness Guidelines in 2005, which were revised and reissued in 2008. Their initial

ineffectiveness was made public during the disorganized response to Hurricane Katrina in

2005. The DHS (2009) described the provisions of the National Preparedness

Guidelines, along with outlines for the development of strategies specifically applicable

to state and local governments. A good example of how the guidelines can be adopted,

tailored, and implemented effectively by states that are confronted with seasonal disasters

are the guidelines developed by the Florida Department of Emergency Management

(20082013). The FDEM guidelines describe the state’s plan following implementation of

its version of the National Preparedness Guidelines. This example shows what a model

state can do with the national guidelines to create statewide interoperable response plans

for its urban and rural areas.

Role of the Researcher

The credibility of a qualitative research study hinges on the skill and competence

of the researcher conducting the fieldwork and ongoing analysis of the information being

developed. Among the qualities I possess as an effective researcher are a grounded

understanding of the subject and the setting under investigation. Following a long career

as a federal agent, I also developed good investigative and interview skills that proved

useful with individuals from various social levels and different professional settings.

Through these skills, I honed my ability to draw people out with a sense of empathetic

engagement while maintaining a balance of nonjudgmental and objective awareness

regarding interviewees. I collected data by examining documents and interviewing the

participants. As the primary data-collecting instrument, I used a self-designed interview

protocol to answer my research questions, with the objective of developing a holistic

account of the subject I was investigating. I accepted that a well-conducted case study

would place demands on my intellect and personal biases due to the interaction between

theoretical issues and the data being collected. As a case study researcher, I exercised my

ability to ask purposeful questions, be a good listener, remain reflexive and adaptive,

have a good understanding of the topical issues, and avoid biases by being aware of them,

all in an effort to ensure that the conduct of the research remained ethical.

The conceptual origin of this study was evidence that some rural civic leaders had

not implemented recommended safety and security measures in their communities to

protect local residents. This study was designed with the objective of confirming or

disconfirming that original concept. This research, however, can also be considered a

valid premise for a study seeking social change. By triangulating multiple data sources,

observations, collection methods, and relational theories, I was able to overcome the

question of bias that can surface from the single-theory, single-research-method,

singleperspective, and single-analysis interpretations that are usually associated with

these types of studies. In addition, I anticipated that any personal research bias would be

checked by the exercise and maintenance of high research ethics that complied with

Walden University’s IRB standards. These standards include honesty and responsibility

for original scholarship to ensure study validity and reliability. Controlling my personal

biases involved an in-depth understanding of the research problem and purpose, as well

as respect for participants in their normal sites. Checking my research biases required

constant awareness of their presence throughout the research process, as well as

immediately addressing their potentially negative consequences for the study if and when

they surfaced. During the development of the study proposal I had no contact with

anticipated participants who were to be purposefully interviewed as a result of the

positions they held in the selected communities. A review of the research proposal

revealed no ethical operational issues or any challenges to the field interview process.

The participant interviews were voluntary, and the documents reviewed were sources

open to the public. I projected that the study findings would justify the study premise and

also produce sufficient data to answer the research questions. Primary biases that drove

my role as the researcher derived from 23 years of experience as a federal agent and a

familiarity with antiterrorism. Another was a related belief in the value of national

security. This belief encompassed the moral conviction that the safety and security of

rural residents are every bit as important as those of urban dwellers.

Methodology

This case study focused primarily on the question of noncompliance with

federally issued preparedness guidelines. The theoretical framework that aligned with this

study was Putnam’s (2000) theory of social capital, which refers to connections among

individuals within a community who develop social networks with norms of reciprocity,

and the trustworthiness that arises from them (Yin, 2014). Putnam articulated a series of

“civic virtues” (p. 7) that emanate from this type social exchange. Among those virtues

are political and civic engagement, informal social ties, tolerance and trust, social justice,

mutual aid, and communal coherence (p. 19). Putnam added that social capital becomes

especially relevant in meeting various emergency management challenges in small towns

and rural communities, and that these civic virtues are stronger when they are embedded

in a community’s network of reciprocal social relations. Putnam cautioned, however, that

a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital

(p. 19). The theoretical premise of this approach is that the reason why civic leaders in

some Midwestern rural communities had not taken steps to adopt National Preparedness

Guidelines is that levels of engagement and social ties are stronger in a local setting and

can cause resistance to federal and state directives (Caruson & MacManus, 2004; DHS,

2009; Putnam, 2000). After considering this theoretical premise, the reasons for

noncompliance with implementation of safety and security measures in some small towns

and rural communities remained unclear, but the theory of social capital shed some light

on the resistance to change (Putnam, 2000). The intent and purpose of this study,

therefore, was to develop the necessary information that would explain the reasons for

noncompliance in the identified small towns and rural communities. This theoretical

framework holds that lives and infrastructure in rural communities are just as vital as

those in urban centers, and offered insight into the reasons for the reported

noncompliance.

Sample Selection Strategy

I used purposeful sampling to identify and recruit participants. As is common in

this type of qualitative research, small samples of uncertain population representation

were taken with the objective of saturating the concept, and to explore its relationship to

other concepts so that it became theoretically meaningful (Reynolds, 2007; Rudestam &

Newton, 2007). The framing of research questions specific to participants was found to

be beneficial to the research process. This strategy limited inappropriate generalization

and helped me to recognize the diversity among participants. Finally, it also helped me

focus on the specific actions, events, and processes in the actual context that they were

researched and studied (Maxwell, 2013).

Participants in this study were unknown to me, and were selected on the basis of

the positions they held in the rural communities selected for this study. These participants

were mayors, city attorneys, emergency managers, fire chiefs, or police chiefs. They were

identified by the positions they occupied and the authority they held to develop and

implement emergency preparedness programs in their communities. The number of

interviews was limited to 12 or no more than two representatives from each of four sites

in the Midwestern states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and Kansas. The recruitment of

participants began with their identification from state and local records, followed by

telephone calls to confirm names, addresses, and their willingness to participate in the

study. That process was followed with presentation of a formal letter extending individual

invitations to each representative of the communities selected for study, who expressed

an interest in participating. An acknowledgement of acceptance was secured with a

signed consent letter, which informed them that participation was voluntary. This was

followed with a conversation confirming the place, date, and time for the interview

(Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002). The literature review revealed no indication that these

prospective participants were ever used as subjects in past studies. I anticipated that the

samples chosen for this study would suffice to provide saturation of the data sought. To

summarize, the study participants were contacted by telephone, then presented with a

consent letter if they decided to participate in the study. Three prospective participants

refused my invitation to participate once the field research process had begun (Patton,

2002).

Instrumentation

The data collection process was preceded by a review of emergency management

documents, which pertained to the particular state and rural communities selected for the

study. That review identified the prevailing policies for the adoption and implementation

of emergency preparedness measures statewide, and whether they were inclusive of rural

communities. Applicable federal documents detailing National Preparedness Guidelines

were also reviewed and are clear as they apply to all municipalities nationwide. For the

most part, however, the reviewed documents imply that states that adopted the national

guidelines also implemented strategies inclusive of small towns and rural communities.

Although federal homeland security funds are allocated to states based on threat, risk,

vulnerability, and population density, the federal government cannot force states to

ensure that rural areas are protected from natural or manmade disasters (DHS, 2009;

Kozak, 2011; Reese, 2009). These documents, along with the studies described in the

literature review, were instrumental in the formulation of this study’s research and

interview questions. The interview protocol guided the data collected from participants

and established the extent of compliance with emergency preparedness measures in the

selected research sites. The interview protocol is referenced in Appendices A and B.

I conducted all participant interviews professionally and in accordance with ethics best

practices. The interview protocol was formulated with open-ended questions that

followed a careful assessment of the available literature and the various federal policies

currently in effect, to determine what local policies were in place. I was confident that

interviews conducted with rural civic leaders would develop the necessary information to

answer the research questions. My written notes of the interview process supplemented

the recorded interviews, which varied in duration from 30 to 45 minutes. The interviews

were conducted in participants’ choice of setting. Following their analysis, the data

collected from the interviews produced a better understanding of the reasons why some

rural communities had not complied with implementation of National Preparedness

Guidelines. Findings of this study will be provided to participant communities for their

comparative and adaptive use. At the time the study was initiated, it was not anticipated

that follow-up contacts would be necessary after completion of the initial interviews and

data analysis except to offer the study’s findings (Creswell, 2013; Patton, 2002).

Data Analysis Plan

My data analysis plan aligned the research problem, the research method, and the

study’s results. The plan included the issues of identifying and soliciting participants, of

preparing research protocols and other data collecting tools, as well as the formulation of

procedures pertaining to the study as recommended by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana

(2014). The research analysis began with the first piece of information collected and

continued until the subject was saturated (Patton, 2002). Although I could not guarantee

that I would be able to completely saturate the subject, I anticipated collecting sufficient

information to answer the research questions. In this case study, I analyzed information

related to programs and processes conducted by individuals in the Midwest region. This

data analysis plan specified a method of collecting, organizing, and analyzing data, which

was aligned with my case study approach. Although some of the sources reviewed held

that there is no fixed formula for the conduct of analysis (Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2002;

Yin, 2014), my intent was to conduct data collection and analysis concurrently, as

suggested by Miles et al. (2014).

This case study employed the basic strategies of first reading all pertinent notes,

memoranda, documents, and interview transcripts. These readings were followed by

open, axial, and selective coding, which helped describe, classify, and interpret data

collected (Creswell, 2013). The final step in this study’s analysis plan involved the

development of patterns and themes from the data collected in order to formulate a valid

narrative of the interpreted information. To facilitate this process, qualitative computer

software was used to help with the coding, analysis, and interpretation of the collected

data. However, it was understood that I would be responsible for the actual coding and

the analysis of that data (Patton, 2002). Miles et al. (2014), noted that coding drives

ongoing data collection as a form of continuing analysis, which I adopted as a strategy.

Issues of Trustworthiness

The purpose of trustworthiness is to support the argument that my research

findings are valid. By accepting this premise I believe that the trustworthiness of this

study design is the standard by which my research results will be judged. For this reason,

trustworthiness in this case study was an ongoing process requiring constant bracketing

of my biases and assumptions, along with the corroboration and confirmation of collected

data. By extension, validation of the research provided judgment of the study’s overall

trustworthiness, which added value of substance and ethical standards to the process. The

validation strategies I employed in this qualitative study stressed quality, credibility,

transferability, dependability, and confirmability. To summarize, the trustworthiness of

this study was founded on the credibility and validity of my research, which required me

to be especially mindful of validity issues during the data collection and analysis

processes. The issues of external and internal validity, reliability, and construct validity

required my awareness during the entire research process, but they did not consume too

much of my concern because I ensured the study’s integrity by practicing truth and

honesty in all that I did. That way I assured future readers that nothing in my study would

be false or invalid.

The exploratory process of this case study took place in a specific region of the

country to determine the extent of compliance with National Preparedness Guidelines in

rural communities. This exploratory research examined emerging patterns that formed

themes, reviewed document explanations, and addressed rival explanations, in efforts to

test the study’s internal validity. The research design ensured the study’s construct

validity and reliability. Indications are that this study’s results may be transferable, and its

operational process reliable to the extent of providing similar results in other regions,

such as the four state areas of Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, and Idaho (Yin, 2014).

Transferability may also be applicable to the four-state region encompassing Colorado,

Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona. Both of these regions have similar patterns of densely

populated urban centers and dispersed populations in rural areas, which may indicate

similar noncompliance issues. These are the demographic conditions that prompted the

research questions that drove this study. To ensure proper documentation of this study’s

dependability and repeatability, pertinent data will be maintained in research logs, tapes,

and computer external drives. Digital records reflecting the analysis that was conducted

will be maintained in a selected computer software program (Miles et al., 2014).

Ethics Procedures

Prior to and during the research process, I addressed ethical concerns with the

simple commitment to do no harm. Another effective practice I adopted following years

of experience as a federal agent, is to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

truth. Abiding by these professional codes guided me to be true to this study, thereby

preventing it from becoming false. By adding respect and consideration, along with an

assurance of confidentiality, to participants, validation of the study was also assured.

Before arriving at that point, however, the start of formal research required the review

and approval of the study proposal and related protocols by the Walden University’s

Institutional Review Board (IRB), which granted approval on June 25, 2015, with the

assigned number of 06-25-15-0275903. Because the study involved the conduct of

interviews with selected participants, the execution of an Informed Consent agreement

with the study participants was necessary. This consent agreement is required by the U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and is intended for the protection of

all study participants from abuse and liability. Potential risks for study participants may

include unintended discomfort, as well as physical, emotional, or psychological stress.

From the researcher’s perspective, the consent agreement also serves to shift some

responsibility to participants who may experience negative results from their

participation. A copy of the consent agreement has been made part of Appendix A that is

attached to this study (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014).

In efforts to prevent ethical issues, this study did not involve vulnerable members

of the population, nor was data collected from my own workplace. This study’s selected

interviewees were public employees serving in elected or appointed positions in the

selected rural communities. The information sought from them was open-source, and thus

available to the general public. At no time were questions asked of participants about

their work that might have led to the disclosure of behavior or views, which may have

affected their employment status. All participant identities remained confidential during

the research process and will throughout the storage period at conclusion of the study.

This confidentiality will be extended to include the locations and names of the

communities they represented. Interviewees and site locations will be identified and

cataloged by code words and numbers known only to me.

During and after completion of this study, that information will be stored

separately from other study documents and the data that was collected for analysis. The

recordings and transcriptions of participant interviewees will be similarly stored in digital

format, with copies saved on external drives. Encryption will preserve the data and also

ensure privacy for the required 5-year period following completion of the study. This

study was conducted in the region that encompasses the four-state region of Nebraska,

Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. All participants were interviewed in their own settings, and

remained unknown to me until the scheduled interview date (Yin, 2014).

Summary

In the initial paragraphs of this chapter, I reintroduced the threat that terrorism

still poses to the nation. I also stressed that the threat justifies the need for heightened

vigilance by all Americans, but particularly by counterterrorism experts and emergency

managers. Vigilance involves the need for implementation of preparedness strategies to

counter that threat, as well as those threats posed by natural causes. The introduction was

followed by a description of the research methodology employed to explore the reasons

for noncompliance with implementation of National Preparedness Guidelines in rural

communities within the selected Midwestern states. The study’s research design and

rationale reflects a strategy that aligned well with the investigation’s objectives of

developing an in-depth understanding of the reasons for noncompliance with safety and

security emergency management measures as implemented by a majority of the nation’s

communities. The decision for selecting this study design followed the rationale that the

initial concept drives the research, and the study’s purpose drives the analysis. With an

enhanced understanding of the reasons for noncompliance in some rural communities, it

became possible to develop a consensus of rationales that influenced their compliance or

noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009; Yin, 2014).

This study involved a review of all pertinent government documents, laws, and policies,

as well as findings in available literature identified in Chapter 2, all of which provided

the basis for the open-ended research questions. The Midwest region was ideal for this

type of research due to literature confirmation that no similar research studies had been

previously conducted in the states of Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, or Kansas. This

environment provided sites that reflected responsiveness to a holistic, single case study

that assessed levels of compliance in rural areas, and offered opportunities for the

application of emergency management strategies designed to meet the various needs of

the affected communities (Yin, 2014). The assessment also gauged the level of social

capital involvement in those communities to measure the level of preparedness and the

response capability to manmade or natural disasters (Putnam, 2000). As the primary

research tool, I was responsible for maintaining the validity and trustworthiness of the

study. This was ensured by personal integrity and through the application of various

triangulation techniques, as well as compliance with required IRB guidelines (Patton,

2002; Yin, 2014). Those measures were employed despite personal assurances that the

study would be free of validity concerns. Chapter 4, which follows, provides an accurate

description of the data collected, its analysis, and interpretation of the information which

revealed the reasons for noncompliance with emergency management strategies in rural

communities that were part of this case study (Yin, 2014).

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The general intent of this study was to seek an answer to the question of whether

the National Preparedness Guidelines had been consistently implemented in selected

rural communities within the Midwestern states of Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri and Kansas

since the last issuance of the policy in 2008 (DHS, 2009). More specifically, the purpose

of this case study was to explore and examine the various rationales rural civic leaders

offered in response to the five studies previously conducted in other Midwestern states

regarding the question of compliance with the national guidelines (Bryant, 2009;

Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

For example, Bryant (2009) reported that the challenges of rural emergency management

were based primarily on resource limitations, low population density, and aged or absent

communications warning systems, coupled with separation and remoteness. Chenoweth

and Clarke (2010) advanced an argument for cost effectiveness, noting that decisions had

been made by urban leaders to apply homeland security allocations to metropolitan areas

where denser populations and more critical infrastructure are situated. Marion and Cronin

(2009) simply reported that noncompliance in their region of study was attributed to a

lack of funding. In his studies, Oliver (2007, 2009) contended that the primary reason for

noncompliance with national guidelines in the nation’s small communities was a lack of

understanding by local leaders of their duties and responsibilities in the post-9/11 era.

And in his study, Stigler (2010) found that although the rationale for a lack of resources

had validity, geographical remoteness and separation also played an important role in

how rural communities viewed and accepted nationally issued guidelines.

The related intent of this case study was to confirm or disconfirm the validity of

the findings reported in the previous studies, and to establish a common rationale for

noncompliance or compliance at the end of this study. One objective was to develop

generalizations that would be applicable to other national regions having similar

demographics. The above studies reported variances in the rationales for noncompliance

that reflected inconsistent and inconclusive findings. What those studies shared in

common, however, was a recommendation for further study on this subject. The overall

purpose of this study, then, was to identify a pattern of noncompliance in the selected

rural hamlets, villages, and towns within the four-state region of Iowa, Nebraska,

Missouri, and Kansas, to confirm or disconfirm the common conditions that may pose a

threat to national security and the public safety of the affected communities. If the

findings of the previously reviewed studies were valid, then the prevailing inconsistencies

in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines had created two social

problems related to security and public safety. One problem weakened the nation’s

security by failing to protect critical infrastructure in rural areas, and the other threatened

public safety in those same communities.

During the field research, I expected confirmation of general public perceptions of

backwardness and poverty in rural communities. Among the perceived phenomena were

lacks of good health care and treatment facilities, low-paying agricultural, manufacturing,

or retail jobs, and limited educational and employment options, coupled with an exodus

of younger residents seeking better educational and employment opportunities in urban

areas (Bryant, 2009). These conditions reportedly contribute to the designation of “last

served” when a state allocates funds for emergency preparedness and recovery in case of

a disaster. Even if these conditions are generally true, I was prompted to ask whether the

general welfare and safety of rural residents are less important than those of people who

live in urban areas (Bryant, 2009). Field research confirmed some of these perceptions

but also disconfirmed others. The field research involved gaining an understanding of the

nation’s small towns, hamlets, villages, and townships following a review of literature

provided by the National League of Cities (2014) and the U.S. Census Bureau (2010).

These agencies estimated that 97.5% of the nation’s land area is regarded as rural and is

home to about 55 million people, or about 18% of the U.S. population.

My field research included a complete review of federal and state documents

related to homeland security and emergency management (DHS, 2009; State of Iowa,

2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri, 2015; State of Nebraska, 2014-2016). The

document reviews were followed by interviews with emergency managers as well as law

enforcement officials and fire chiefs at the local level in the selected communities. The

document reviews revealed that the state emergency plans were mirror reproductions of

the federal guidelines, as they outlined the National Response Framework (NRF) and

National Incident Management System (NIMS). Emergency managers at state regional or

district levels were directed to comply with NIMS requirements to ensure annual funding

for homeland security, and qualify for special needs grants. The specific object of the

interviews was to determine the levels of emergency preparedness in selected small rural

communities along Tornado Alley. Tornado Alley is a wide corridor that runs north from

Texas and Oklahoma through Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa that also affects Missouri.

This particular part of the Heartland was chosen for the study due to its continuing cycle

of extreme weather patterns, which include tornadoes, severe storms, lighting strikes,

flooding, fires, heat, cold, and drought, as well as the presence of antigovernment groups

such as the Sovereign Citizens who do not recognize federal law, only the authority of the

county sheriff. Communities selected for this study were situated along this corridor and

were limited to those with small populations that numbered between 2,500 and 10,500

residents. See Figure 1 below for a rendering of wind currents that form tornado alley.

Figure 1. Illustration showing how Tornado Alley develops. From Tornado Alley

diagram, by D. Craggs, 2009, retrieved from

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tornado_Alley_Diagram.svg

The interview questions were designed to elicit information that revealed how the

selected communities coped with the seasonal series of natural weather extremes

commonly caused by the confluence of high cold air streams flowing down from the

Northwest, meeting with low warm air masses coming up from the southeastern part of

the United States (NOAA, NWS, 2015). Although I intended to interview at least two

participants from each state, by the end of 1 week I had interviewed four in Missouri, five

in Kansas, and one in Iowa. The interviews revealed comments from participants that

were rich with descriptions of the civic “virtues” of cohesion, cooperation, collaboration,

and exchange prompted by a sense of reciprocity that is firmly based on common need

(Putnam, 2000). For example, while I was interviewing an emergency manager in a rural

Kansas community, he recounted how a week prior to my visit, a tornado had touched

down on a neighbor’s farm, destroying a large two-wing barn and uprooting a livestock

fence, causing cattle to scatter. According to the emergency manager’s account, soon

after the tornado passed, neighbors appeared with the necessary machines to rebuild the

fence, corral the livestock, and build a temporary shelter for the roofless farming

vehicles. The temporary repairs would secure the tornado victim’s property until his

homeowner’s insurance compensated him for permanent fixtures. This was the type of

reciprocity and trust that appeared to bind residents of the studied communities. This

finding alone could serve as a positive generalization to other regions with similar

demographics in the U.S. and its territories.

The general research objective sought by this study centered on the unresolved

question of compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines in rural America that

were issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). Initially, these guidelines were designed and issued in

the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to protect all communities from

manmade and natural disasters. They were then revised following the response to the

Hurricane Katrina disaster in August 2005 (DHS, 2009). In particular, this study was

driven by the Central Question of how civic leaders in rural communities justified

noncompliance with the issued guidelines. That research question was influenced by the

previously reviewed literature, and although presumptive in nature, it was intended to

address only those communities that were actually found to be noncompliant. This study,

however, found that all of the studied communities were compliant with the National

Preparedness Guidelines. No evidence of noncompliance was found in any of the

communities visited during the study period. This central question was answered by

participant responses to interview questions that described the nature of disasters that had

occurred in the community (Interview Question1), the threats they posed to local

infrastructure (Interview Question 2), the protocols in place to respond to those threats

(Interview Question 7), and acceptance of federal guidelines and assistance (Interview

Question 15). Those responses indicated that the studied communities had already

implemented the National Preparedness Guidelines and had been compliant with the

guidelines’ provisions since their initial issuance. A number of the emergency managers

interviewed in Kansas and Missouri stated that they had been involved in the disciplines

of homeland security and emergency management for the past decade.

Research Question 1 addressed how noncompliance with national guidelines

reflected the ability or inability of rural leaders to meet their governing goals as they

related to public safety and national security. In their responses to Interview Questions 3,

4, 5, 6, and 8, all of the participants described the natural conditions and types of groups

that threatened their communities. They explained how they jointly conducted their threat

assessments in line with national and state guidelines, established mutual-aid agreements,

and identified the county, state, and federal agencies available for assistance. Members

attending threat assessment meetings usually involved the Mid-America Council, which

is composed of representatives from the four-state region, FEMA, state regional

emergency coordinators, local emergency managers, law enforcement officials, and

members of area National Guard units. At those meetings, attending members share their

concerns concerning particular emergency incident needs.

As an example, a community in southwest Missouri experienced a particularly

heavy snowfall last year that immobilized the town. The deep snow prevented the town’s

emergency vehicles, business owners, and residents from traveling safely over the roads.

The town’s emergency manager called the National Guard unit in the next county and

asked the Guard to bring the necessary equipment to clear the town’s roads, which it did.

The question that was discussed at the following regional assessment meeting was

whether it would be practical for FEMA to purchase a large snowplow for that town and

house it in the local fire station, or enter into an agreement with the National Guard unit

to make its equipment available when needed. The decision was made to submit a grant

to FEMA requesting a snowplow to be used as needed and housed in a centrally located

firehouse. The reasoning was that if the roads were impassable during a heavy snowfall,

National Guardsmen who operated the unit’s equipment would also have difficulty

getting to the Armory and make the equipment operational.

Research Question 2 concerned the role that funding played in the ability or

inability of rural leaders to implement the national guidelines. Participant responses to

Interview Questions 9 and 11 indicated that funding and lack of resources were always

issues but that those shortcomings were usually overcome by local volunteerism, mutual-

aid, and federal grants. The emergency managers interviewed in Iowa, Kansas, and

Missouri offered the same response to these interview questions. Accepting that they had

no control over the question of funding, they had long ago committed to carry out their

duties as best as they could with the resources the state made available to them. Those

resources, coupled with eligibility for FEMA grant applications to acquire special needs

equipment, met all their funding needs. For example, interviewees M3-EM and K3-EM

stated almost verbatim during their interviews that “additional funds were always

welcome to fill vacancies and acquire more current equipment, but their limitation was

not having a negative impact on their ability to perform effectively.” To the specific

question of whether direct funding from the federal government would improve their

operational effectiveness, all of the participants responded that direct funding would have

a negative effect on their operational flexibility due to administrative accounting

requirements they deemed time consuming and nonoperational. This consensus was best

explained by interviewee M2-LE/EM, who stated that “assuming responsibility for the

receipt of direct funding from either the federal or state government would have a

negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency operations due to the

preoccupation of field coordinators with the maintenance of additional records for the

expenditures of those funds.” He added that “the two functions were incompatible

because both were full-time jobs.”

The intent of Research Question 3 was to elicit information about the role that

regional remoteness played in rural leaders’ decisions not to implement the National

Preparedness Guidelines in their communities. Participant responses to Interview

Questions 10 and 12 described a long history of cooperation with other local and regional

emergency response agencies and indicated that a remote lifestyle was a matter of choice.

As a result, rural residents found it easy to work with other like-minded people during

times of need, thus expressing an active form of social capital to complement their chosen

status of remoteness and separation (Putnam, 2000). In response to Interview Question

12, M4-EM, M5-EM, and K3-EM stated that they had no communication limitations with

their regional coordinators or state capitals in case of an emergency. In fact, they proudly

exhibited their state-of-the-art telecommunications systems, which they stated were

satellite driven. Those emergency managers followed their presentations with the

statement that, due in part to this capability, their overall effectiveness in response and

recovery efforts regarding emergencies that occur in their communities had been

significantly enhanced. Informal conversations that I had with local residents while

waiting for a scheduled participant interview reflected confidence in the ability of their

local leaders to provide for their safety and security prior to, during, and following an

incident. A curious finding in response to this question was that none of the participants,

whether emergency managers or law enforcement officials, considered themselves

separated from urban centers or disconnected from social contacts in those areas due to

their relative remoteness. Participants M5-EM, K1-EM/LE, and K3-EM stated that they

often travelled to regional urban centers to remain socially connected, or to participate in

refresher training in their respective disciplines.

Finally, Research Question 4, which addressed the issue of whether rural

community leaders understood their duties, roles, and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era,

was fully explained by participant responses to Interview Questions 13 and 14. In their

responses, none of the participants expressed concerns about limitations due to

remoteness, having learned to be self-reliant following years of being confronted with

natural disasters, regardless whether their population numbers ranged from 2,500 to

10,500. In their responses to Interview Question 13, participants stated that their personal

roles in local emergency matters were those of on-site directors of operations. All

participants expressed a clear understanding of their public safety and security roles in the

post-9/11 era.

Table 1

Relationship of Study’s Research Questions to Participant Interview Questions

Research questions Interview questions

Central research question Interview Questions 1, 2, 7, & 15

Research Subquestion 1 Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, & 8

Research Subquestion 2 Interview Questions 9 & 11

Research Subquestion 3 Interview Questions 10 & 12

Research Subquestion 4 Interview Questions 13 & 14

Note. From Dissertation Chapter 1, p. 11, and Appendix B, p. 160.

This chapter will next review the setting where the field research was conducted,

along with the demographics particular to this study. These general explanations will be

followed by a specific description of the data collection and analysis phases of the study,

and then a discussion about developed evidence of the study’s trustworthiness. That

discussion will be complemented with a description of the analyzed data’s results. The

final section will provide a summary of this chapter’s contents, and offer a transitional

introduction to Chapter 5.

Setting

Following the June 2015 approval by the University’s IRB to conduct this study, I

contacted potential gatekeepers in the selected states of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and

Nebraska. After making travel arrangements, I began the field research phase of this

study in July 2015. The geographical setting for this study was the corridor that extends

from Texas and Oklahoma through Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Iowa. This corridor

is commonly referred to as “Tornado Alley.” The physical locations for the conduct of

face-to-face interviews were the public offices of regional law enforcement officials and

emergency managers who were situated in small rural communities along that corridor. In

one instance the interview was conducted by telephone with M4-EM who was in route to

his office from a regional conference. The field research revealed no organizational or

personal conditions at the time of the study that may have influenced interpretation of this

study’s results. When presented to preidentified participants, the letter of consent proved

effective not only as my introduction, but also in outlining the purpose and scope of the

study. As a result, participants expressed an interest in participating in the study, all of

whom consented to a recorded interview, except for three, although all signed a consent

form and agreed to answer the interview questions. A fire chief who also served as an

emergency manager was interviewed outside his fire station as he prepared to answer a

call.

During the field research phase I conducted 10 formal interviews and participated

in several informal conversations with local residents regarding the state of emergency

preparedness in their rural communities. Prior to initiating contact with participants, I

took the time to study the pertinent federal, state, and regional documents concerning

emergency preparedness policies, operational practices, and organizational structures in

effect within each state. That preparation proved helpful during the interview process,

especially in those instances when participants accepted my knowledge base. Due to a

developed rapport with participants along with my understanding of the study issues, no

conditions were noted that would have influenced the final interpretation of this study’s

results.

A remarkable finding during my informal conversations with local residents was

the expressed faith and confidence in the ability of their local leaders to provide for the

general safety and security of their respective communities. These informal conversations

were held with state, county, and city employees, as well as local residents in the states of

Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. As a group, their comments reflected an understanding of

the threats they faced seasonally and accepted the likelihood that at one future time or

another they would be part of the volunteer group that responds to an incident. Contrary

to previously reported findings by Oliver (2007, 2009) the field research confirmed that

local rural leaders did understand their roles and responsibilities prior to, during, and after

a disaster, whether the cause was natural or manmade. At those times, local residents tend

express a bonding with affected neighbors, often bridging social diversity to assist in the

response, recovery, and mitigating processes. According to participants and residents of

the communities studied, assistance during times of need is never an issue. As explained

by K3-EM, what does create a series of logistical problems during an incident is an influx

of uninvited volunteers from adjoining regional areas. Those problems are related to the

provisions of sleeping and hygiene facilities, food, water, fuel, as well as with traffic

congestion, coordination, communication, and conflicts in leadership. These types of

problems became evident in 2011 after a deadly tornado devastated the western part of

Joplin, Missouri, a town of 50,000 people situated in the Tornado Alley corridor. To

prevent such future recurrences of uninvited volunteers, local and regional emergency

managers from Kansas and Missouri were invited by the emergency manager in Joplin,

Missouri to participate in a Mid-America Council meeting shortly after the tornado

passed. At that meeting, operational guidelines for all contiguous states, adjoining

communities, and regions, were established which directed outside emergency services

not to respond to an incident site unless they are invited, and to bring only the personnel

and equipment that is requested.

Demographics

The statistical characteristics of the populations studied included white,

middleaged, emergency managers, fire, and law enforcement officials who choose to live

in the Heartland’s rural communities selected for this study. The communities studied

ranged from 2,500 to 10,500 residents, most of who have lived in the same homes where

they were born. This observation included the majority of the study participants. Newer

residents were retirees or transfers from urban centers who sought a more pastoral setting

in which to live. An example of such a resident was a participant who retired as a U.S.

Marine Colonel and decided to buy a farm in rural Kansas along the Tornado Alley

corridor. By circumstance he was elected county sheriff and also became the area’s joint

emergency manager. All of the formal interviews involved local professional emergency

managers or law enforcement officials responsible for the implementation and execution

of safety and security measures in their respective rural communities. All the participants

interviewed were active, full-time professionals serving as emergency managers, fire

chiefs, or law enforcement officers. Other local leaders such as mayors and city attorneys

were not available for interviews, and those who were contacted indicated they had little

to do with emergency management or preparedness programs in their communities.

Data Collection

As the primary tool for data collection, I conducted face-to-face interviews with

ten rural civic officials responsible for the implementation and execution of emergency

preparedness measures in their communities within the Midwestern states of Nebraska,

Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas. From federal Internet sites I collected and reviewed those

public documents related to emergency preparedness for use by all of the nation’s

communities. From state sites I collected and reviewed those documents dedicated to a

particular state’s adaptation of the National Preparedness Guidelines. In all instances, the

state documents were mirror versions of the federal publications. Although each of the

studied states had developed its own organizational structure in response to incidents, as

well as a messaging system to alert citizens of impending threats, their operational

manuals, such as the NRF and NIMS, were printed in language identical to that of the

federal documents. At the state district or regional levels, which are comprised of 12 or

more counties, the operational policies under which they currently operate strictly follow

the state’s guidelines. As an example, the State of Missouri lists nine appointed regional

coordinators assigned to administer and ensure compliance with the state’s guidelines in

114 counties. That level of compliance is necessary in order for the state to qualify for

federal homeland security funding and to maintain eligibility for FEMA grant approval

(State of Iowa, 2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri, 2015; State of Nebraska,

2014-2016).

Prior to initiating the field interviews, I purchased a binder with eight pockets in

which I inserted maps of the selected study states, and copies of each state’s emergency

preparedness plans, along with 10 sets of consent forms and interview questions that were

assigned identification codes. The locations for conducting interviews were participants’

offices in Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas. Most of the interviews lasted between

25 to 45 minutes, depending on the participant’s schedule. The interview data was

recorded and stored in an Olympus digital voice recorder, model number WS-821. A

variation to the initial interview protocol occurred when a Nebraska participant referred

to me by a gatekeeper declined to participate. This happened one other time in Kansas.

Responses to the interview questions reached the level of redundancy by the tenth

interview, so I determined it unnecessary to continue the process. The only unusual

circumstances encountered during the data collection phase were the refusal by a law

enforcement official to allow me a telephone interview after he previously agreed to a

face-to-face interview. Another was the failure of a rural emergency manager who

granted me a telephone interview, but never returned the consent form. Other than those

two variations, the field research was deemed successful after ten participants produced

the data to answer the research questions sufficiently.

Data Analysis

The inductive nature of qualitative research analysis led this study from specific

pieces of data to larger patterns of similar information, which helped form themes that

facilitated the interpretation of that data. A review of the Stanford University (20102012)

publication on the use of Atlas.ti for qualitative data analysis proved useful in the coding,

analysis, and interpretation of the data collected. Following the user-friendly booklet, I

was able to code types of threats to the studied rural communities, how to manage those

codes, and align them by type, frequency, severity, and region. Patterns of codes included

the extreme degrees of cold and heat, duration of droughts, the frequency of electrical

storms and fires, storms that cause flooding, and extremist groups of the political right.

According to local law enforcement officials and emergency managers, a militant group

known as Sovereign Citizens, which is active in the Midwest, has created problems

through acts of civil disobedience in local communities by refusing to obey first

responder directives during emergencies. Sovereign Citizens do not recognize civil law

because they consider themselves independent of government authority except for that of

the county sheriff. In regard to the natural threats that the studied communities experience

seasonally, participants M2-EM and K3-EM conceded that although Nature’s threats

cannot be prevented, they have learned to prepare against and recover from their effects

through the application of best emergency management practices.

An example can be drawn from National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s

(NASA) ability to track massive storms, bearing 80 to 100 mile fronts, across Kansas in a

converted DC-8 that sends messages to regional ground stations. Those messages alert

local emergency managers before the storm hits their area. A curious finding regarding

this storm-chasing effort was that these storm fronts form in the late afternoon, at which

time the plane circles and begins tracking them to report their direction. These high wind

fronts may travel from Kansas to Iowa where they may drop six inches of rain in a short

period of time, accompanied by multiple lightning strikes and flooding by morning. I had

a chance to witness this type of overnight flooding while conducting field research in

Iowa. When I asked local residents if the flooding qualified for regional or federal aid,

they responded that it did not, that they were used to it and knew how to deal with the

problem. Historically, the geographical area between Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas

City, Missouri averages 50 days of such torrential storms each year (Bavley, 2015;

Montgomery, 2015). The stated objective of the NASA experiment is to collect sufficient

data to more accurately pinpoint where and when the next downpour will occur, thereby

allowing emergency managers on the ground more time to prepare for the likely flooding

that will follow, and to move people to safer areas (Bavley, 2015).

Due to the Midwest region’s lack of mountains, hills, wooded areas, or large

bodies of water, and the presence of other climatologically determined conditions as

illustrated in Figure 1, nature uses the void of those natural elements to provide dramatic

scenes that reflect those conditions. Figure 2 below presents an illustration of a storm cell

hovering over the Kansas plains. This is the type of storm cell that NASA tracks by

aircraft throughout the Midwest during the stormy season. Figure 3 that follows, is a

photo illustration of a lightning storm over Kansas City, Kansas as referred to by the

above cited sources.

Figure 2. Photo image of super storm cell over Kansas plain. Open source print retrieved

from Sean Heavey, Barcraft Media. Article 1334672-OC511.

Figure 3 that follows illustrates a photo image of an evening electrical storm over

Kansas City, Kansas as it is viewed from Kansas City, Missouri (Antle, Lauria,

MirriamGoldberg, & Locke, 2015). These storms can appear with little notice and bring

with them massive fronts that drop great amounts of water after they introduce

themselves with such electrical activity. The point being made is that rural and urban

residents of the Midwest must not only contend with these threats, but also with the

flooding they bring and the tornadoes they create. M3-EM/LE stated that the main

concern for emergency managers during the winter months is snow removal and an

occasional accidental fire caused by an unattended appliance. He added, however, that if

snowfall is heavy, then the spring thaw is prone to flood communities near rivers and

lakes.

Figure 3. Storm cell preceded by lightning activity over Kansas City, Kansas, viewed

from Kansas City, Missouri. Retrieved from the Kansas City Star, (November 5, 2015, p.

3C).

The only discrepant qualities that may require mention were the noted differences

between participant statements and findings in the previously cited studies, which will be

more fully contrasted in the Results section of this paper. The major themes that emerged

from data analysis were the identification of the emergency management and law

enforcement personnel who serve the rural communities that seasonally experience

extreme heat, cold, drought, lightning storms, fires, flooding, tornadoes, and extremist

groups of the political right. The services provided by local law enforcement are the

protection of life and property. Emergency managers help rural policy makers plan for

response and recovery operations following an incident. Firefighters and emergency

medical technicians complete the quartet of first responders in these rural areas where

immediate response is critical. Atlas.ti was used to collect, organize, review, and interpret

the data. This guidance simplified the coding process, which I eventually reduced from

172 to 10 major codes. One code identified and aligned the purposes and functions of the

first responders in the local Homeland Security effort. Eight other codes defined the

threats particular to each of the studied sites, and the tenth code described the actual

services provided to each rural community.

The purposeful application of axial and selective coding allowed me to utilize

categorical aggregation to facilitate the interpretation of the collected data with specific,

issue related meaning (Creswell, 2013). Because this case study involved multisites, I

was able to apply a variance of cross case synthesis of the collected data from different

sites as an analytical technique (Yin, 2014). Although I have provided an explanation of

the data collection process as a separate function from data analysis, I found the two

processes closely related in purpose, due partly to the constant development of patterns

and themes as the data were being collected (Patton, 2002). This iterative process is

reflected in the analysis process I utilized during the study. My familiarity with the

studied region, coupled with my subject knowledge base, proved instrumental in

facilitating the analysis and interpretation of the data collected. These advantages helped

me focus on the issues being addressed through the interview questions. This avoided

being led into local issues not pertinent or relevant to the subject under investigation. The

interview questions served to develop the codes, patterns, and themes, which ultimately

led to an interpretation of the data that was responsive to the study’s research questions.

The resulting interpretation allowed me to begin shaping the study’s story. Participant

responses to the interview questions were transcribed, after which the transcripts were

processed and analyzed on my computer’s hard drive. The data will be stored securely for

the required five years in a file safe located in my home office.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

As stated in Chapter 3 of this paper, the primary purpose of trustworthiness is to

support the argument that a study’s findings are valid. The validation strategies applied in

this study stressed quality, credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

By extension, validation of the study research provided judgment of the study’s overall

trustworthiness. In this study I viewed the implementation of credibility as assurance that

the study was believable and trustworthy from the participants’ perspective. Participants’

openness and confidence in the accuracy of their responses to the interview questions did

much to assure that they had provided honest answers to the inquiries. A review of each

state’s guidelines prior to conducting interviews was helpful in confirming the accuracy

of participant responses. Although credibility represented only one criterion for judging

the quality of this study by establishing trustworthiness from each of the participants’

perspectives, it proved the transferability of the study’s findings, and established the

extent to which the results could be generalized to other settings. The study’s exploratory

process took place in the four states of Iowa, Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas, a region

with urban centers and rural areas that are afflicted by extreme weather patterns and

extremist groups. Indications from this study’s results are that the findings are reliable

and transferable to other regions situated in various parts of the US and its possessions.

My review of the four state’s documents, and subsequent conduct of participant

interviews, served to ensure this study’s construct validity and reliability by using

multiple sources of data, establishing a chain of evidence, and using key interviewees to

review each participant’s emergency management practices (Yin, 2009, 2014). In regard

to confirmability, reviewers should be able to corroborate this study’s findings through

the use of triangulation, not only to reduce assumptions and biases, but also to recognize

methodological limitations through the use of audit trails. In summary, no adjustments

were necessary to the implemented strategies that provided evidence of this study’s

trustworthiness. This explanation conforms to the study’s standards of validity and

trustworthiness as initially presented in Chapter 3.

Results

This final section addressed each research question and its relation to each of the

interview questions. In addition, each of the field interview questions was supported by

the collected data, which included transcriptions and government documents. Also

provided in this section are discussions of discrepant data found to be disconfirming of

previously held assumptions. This discussion includes appropriate tables and figures

designed to facilitate understanding of the relationships between research and interview

questions. The following narrative discusses the themes first introduced during the data

analysis phase of the study, and how each of the field interview questions served to elicit

information necessary to answer the research questions. Because all of the participants

interviewed were professional first responders directly involved in executing state policy

and directing operations, their statements gave credibility to the interview question

responses. Upon arrival at the setting, I assigned codes to each of the states, sites, and

participants. For example, M1-EM/F is code for participant one in the state of Missouri,

whose primary position was emergency manager, with a background in fire fighting.

Participant number five in Kansas, who was a certified emergency manager, as well as a

captain of detectives, was coded as K5-EM/LE. Other participants were coded in

accordance with their primary training and background. As an example, M3-EM was the

third interviewee in Missouri experienced and trained solely in emergency management.

The Central Question that drove this study concerned how rural civic leaders justified

their noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines. This question was

influenced by the five previous studies, which found varying degrees of noncompliance

in each of the other studied Midwestern states (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010;

Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Seemingly presumptive in nature,

the question was found to be invalid in this studied region. This research question was

disconfirmed by all participants in their responses to Interview Questions 1, 2, 7, and 15.

Those interview questions addressed the issues of disaster occurrences in their respective

communities since the 9/11 attacks, their responses to those incidents, the assessed risk to

and vulnerability of their infrastructure, the type of regional assistance available, and

general acceptance of federal guidelines. In their responses to Interview Question 1,

interviewees M1, M2, M3, M4, I1, and K1 through K5 stated that the threats their

communities faced seasonally were primarily natural and involved preparation and

recovery from tornadoes, flooding, droughts, deep snow falls, wild fires, and wind

storms. Emergency managers in Nebraska did not return my consent forms or telephone

calls, so their comments will not be included in these findings. Another threat reported by

M1 was the phenomenon of micro bursts, a form of linear wind shear that tears whatever

is in its path when it touches the ground. Participants K1, K2, K3, and M1 reported that

law enforcement occasionally encountered various forms of civil disobedience from

members of the Sovereign Citizen militant group. In response to Interview Question 2,

all participants, except I1 and N1, reported that their critical infrastructure included local

government buildings, electric grids, wastewater plants, area lakes and dams, as well as

bridges, schools, school buses, and water supplies. Also critical to their rural status were

clear ingress and egress roadways to their communities for emergency and supply

vehicles. Participants’ responses to Interview Question 7 confirmed the implementation

of mutual-aid agreements and letters of understanding with contiguous counties and states

during a major disaster. Participant K4 added that Kansas state law required that in-state

agencies should be contacted first during such major emergencies. To Interview Question

15, all participants, except I1 and N1, responded that they welcomed the issuance of

federal homeland security funding and the National Preparedness Guidelines. As a

whole, all participants stated that direct state or federal funding to their communities

would not be practical due to the cumbersome requirements to account for program

funds. They added that the National Preparedness Guidelines provided them

standardization for the preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation phases before,

during, and following an incident. Participants acknowledged that the same guidelines

provided protocols for setting up universal command centers and common reporting

standards so that all responders become familiar with field operations when assigned to

an incident.

Research Question1 concerned how noncompliance with the national guidelines

affected local rural leaders’ ability to meet their governing goals and resource needs as

they related to national security and public safety. Participant responses to Interview

Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 provided sufficient information to conclude that local leaders’

ability to govern was not compromised in spite of having to develop threat assessments,

execute mutual aid agreements, and also deal with area militant groups. In their responses

to Interview Question 3, participants M1, M2, K2, and K4 stated that members of the

Sovereign Citizens group had a history of challenging local laws by disobeying them. To

Interview Question 4, participant M1 responded that the Mid-America Council conducted

his area’s threat assessments. Participants M2, M3, and M4, stated that they personally

conducted the threat assessments for their areas of responsibility, as did I1, K1, K3, K4,

and K5. Interview Question 5 was posed to determine what federal, state, or county

agencies had been contacted to help with threat assessments. All of the participants

responded that their assessments followed the guidelines provided by FEMA. As a follow

up to the previous question, Interview Question 6 was written to elicit information about

the federal, state, or county agencies that offered assistance during actual disasters or

threats. Participant M1 responded that he relied on the National Weather Service and the

State Fire Marshal’s Office. The other Kansas and Missouri participants from M2 to M4,

and K1, K3 to K5 stated they relied on mutual-aid agreements and volunteers. Participant

K1 added that in the past he had called for specialized expertise from federal agencies in

Kansas City, Missouri.

Research Question 2 concerned participants about the role that funding, and a

lack of resources, played in local leaders’ ability to implement emergency measures in

their rural communities. Interview Question 9 addressed how funding and remoteness

affected their community’s implementation of emergency preparedness measures.

Interview Question 11 pertained to what mutual-aid agreements communities had with

regional agencies. In response to Interview Question 9, participants M1, M4, and K1

stated they relied on FEMA grants for any funding above what the state allows them for

homeland security purposes. Participants I1, M2, K3, K4, and K5 stated that funding had

always been an issue, and with additional funding they would be able to update their

communications systems and provide their first responders with additional training. They

added that more funding would also allow for the placement of more law enforcement

officers to deal with area militant groups. Despite funding shortages, they stated that

current operational funding was adequate and felt secure in the knowledge that FEMA

grants were available when specific equipment was justified. Mutual-aid provided

additional assistance when it was needed. In his response to Interview Question 11,

participant I1 stated that he was part of the Homeland Security Council, and a six-county

mutual-aid response unit with shared communication radio frequencies. Participants M1,

M2, M3, and M4 stated they were part of the regional Fire Chiefs Association, the

MidAmerica Council, and state-wide mutual-aid groups. Kansas participants K1, K3, K4,

and K5, stated they were part of regional and state-wide mutual-aid groups that

responded to meetings when called.

Research Question 3 was worded to ask what role remoteness played in rural

leaders’ ability to implement emergency preparedness measures in their communities

since the attacks of 9/11. Interview Question 10 was phrased to elicit information about a

rural community’s ability to respond to and recover from major incidents. Interview

Question 12 addressed the issue of limitations that rural communities experienced with

communications due to their remoteness. In their responses to Interview Question 10,

participants M1 through M4 stated they were part of local task forces comprised of fire,

police, emergency medical technicians, and emergency managers. In addition, they stated

that they were also part of disaster preparedness committees led by the Missouri Office of

Emergency Management (MOEM) and FEMA. Kansas participants K1, K3, K4, and K5,

stated they were part of local task forces comprised of first responders, as well as regional

groups committed to developing emergency preparedness strategies. Iowa participant I1

stated that he relied on support from local volunteers, first responders, as well as regional

mutual-aid members.

In response to Interview Question 12, participants K1 and K3 stated that rurality

and remoteness limited their ability to hire a hazardous materials expert because they

could not justify his expertise on an annual basis. As a consequence, they normally

secured a contaminated area until such an expert was provided by an urban center.

Kansas participants K4 and K5 pointed out that because they served primary emergency

managers for their communities, their greatest concern was to become ill or disabled and

not be able to conduct their duties in case of an incident. Their other concern was that as

local emergency managers, they were responsible for their own deployment and local

coordination efforts when responding to an incident. Missouri participants M1 through

M4 expressed their concerns with remoteness in terms of hours before mutual-aid could

arrive to supplement their local resources. They pointed out that the nearest regional

center was hours away and perhaps even longer if the incident affected highways and

local ingress roads to their communities. Curiously, although their communities were

often situated long distances from the nearest urban centers, not one participant

considered himself as separate or remote from people in those regional centers. As a

group, participants held the common belief that responses to emergency incidents should

be a local matter unless the incident overwhelmed their capability, at which time they

would rely on area volunteers and mutual-aid from the nearest urban center.

Finally, Research Question 4 related to what understanding local leaders had about their

duties and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era regarding the implementation of

emergency preparedness measures in their communities. This study’s results found that

rural civic leaders had a complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities

regarding the protection of life and property in their communities. Their responses to

Interview Questions 13 and 14 attest to that understanding. Interview Question 13 was

worded to determine what role each of the participants played in case of a manmade or

natural disaster. Interview Question 14 related to the size of the population their offices

served. All the participants responded to Interview Questions 13 and 14 with the

statement that they were solely responsible for the overall coordination of disaster

preparation, response, recovery, and mitigation plans in their respective communities,

which numbered between 2,500 and 10,500 residents. A concern expressed by

participant M1 was that too often other responding agencies tended to overstep their

authority and allow parochial interests to limit cooperation. Participant K2 offered that a

command center established in accordance with NIMS guidelines overcomes incident

leadership issues. In all, participants expressed few limitations to the conduct of their

public safety roles and responsibility to those they serve.

Table 2 below, shows how the interview questions served to disconfirm or to

confirm the research questions. Table 2

Analysis Showing How Interview Questions Disconfirmed or Confirmed the Research

Questions

Research questions Interview questions

Central research question Disconfirmed by IQs 1, 2, 7, & 15

Research Question 1 Disconfirmed by IQs 3, 4, 5, 6, & 8

Research Question 2 Confirmed by IQs 9 & 11

Research Question 3 Disconfirmed by IQs 10 & 12

Research Question 4 Disconfirmed by IQs 13 & 14

Note. From Dissertation Chapter 4, pp. 112-118.

What these findings revealed were that the conclusions reported in the previous

studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009;

Stigler, 2010), were not generalizable. They were not transferable from the other

Midwestern states because the identified problems and findings must have been exclusive

to those regions. In any case, this study proved that compliance with the National

Preparedness Guidelines was ongoing and systematically implemented at the state,

regional, district, and local levels of government in these four states. This study also

proved that emergency management and disaster response is a career held by college

educated and experienced personnel in these fields. At this point in the discussion, it was

important to draw a contrast between discrepant cases and disconfirming information that

was presented in the previously reviewed studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010), and the resulting findings of

this study.

Although acknowledged that the study problem, purpose, research method, and

interview questions developed for this study were influenced by the findings of previous

studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009;

Stigler, 2010), this study revealed some discrepancies and illuminated disconfirming data

that contradicted the findings of those previous studies. By accepting this study’s analysis

and interpretation of the data collected as trustworthy, these findings indicated that the

conclusions reached by authors of the previous studies may have been relevant only to

the sites being investigated at the time. Except for the role that funding has played in

local leaders’ ability or inability to implement viable emergency measures in their rural

communities, as stated in Research Question 2, neither of the previous study findings

proved dependable or reliable. For example, in this study’s Research Question 1, rural

leaders did not have to explain how they justified noncompliance with national security

and safety measures because it was found that they were already in full compliance.

Local leaders’ ability to meet their governing goals, as they related to public safety and

national security, appear not to have been compromised as implied in that research

question. Research Question 3 was phrased to determine what role regional remoteness

played in decisions made by rural leaders not to implement the National Preparedness

Guidelines in their communities (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009;

Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010). This study found that regional remoteness or separation had

little or no bearing on rural leaders’ willingness or ability to implement adaptations of the

National Preparedness Guidelines as directed and supported by their state-designated

regional or district emergency managers.

Research Question 4 was concerned with the understanding local leaders had in

regard to their duties and responsibilities to provide safety and security measures for

residents of their rural communities (Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler,

2010). The results revealed that local leaders have had a very good understanding of their

responsibilities to provide for the safety and security of their rural communities. The

initial intent of these research and interview questions was to gain new information

regarding the issue of noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, and to

confirm levels of compliance in the region’s rural study sites. Participant responses to the

interview questions disconfirmed the Central Research Question as well as Research

Questions 1, 3, and 4. Only Research Question 2, regarding the issue of funding, was

confirmed.

Contrary to the findings reported by the previous and mostly quantitative studies,

this qualitative case study found that the studied rural communities in the four-state

regions of Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri had adopted applicable versions of the

National Preparedness Guidelines issued in 2009 to achieve compliance with guideline

provisions. The study also found that funding limitations had not restricted the ability of

rural leaders to govern in relation to public safety and concern for national security.

Another finding established that remoteness was a matter of choice, and that rural

communities customarily relied on one another for mutual-aid during times of need with

expressions of social capital (Putnam, 2000). An important finding in this study was that

rural civic leaders had a good understanding of their roles and responsibilities in the post

9/11 era.

Initially, I had some concern that study participants may regard a few of the

interview questions as affronts to their sense of professional competence and civic

responsibility. As the professionals they represented themselves to be, the questions were

accepted as candid academic critiques of their established operational standards. The

participants interviewed were college trained and experienced emergency managers or

law enforcement officials. Their normal responses to the interview questions reflected an

in-depth knowledge of their respective duties, noting that a few had received training and

earned experience in both disciplines. As the sole data collector for this study, I could not

avoid making a mental note of the pride participants exhibited about their professions,

and the openness with which they shared their understanding of the principles related to

homeland security and emergency management. Those observations were reinforced by

the constant analysis of the data they provided, which seemed redundant after the 10th

interview. At that point, I determined that the data being collected had reached the

saturation point (Patton, 2002). The findings provided convincing evidence that despite

being interviewed at different sites, and often in different states, the study participants

expressed a clear understanding of their joint and individual roles in providing competent

and effective emergency response capability to all the residents of their respective rural

communities.

Summary

The introduction to this chapter provided a brief review of this study’s purpose

and the developed research questions. This review was followed with a preview of the

chapter’s structure and organization. The next major section described the study’s setting

in Tornado Alley along the Kansas, Missouri and Nebraska, Iowa borders. The study’s

purpose was to conduct field research along that corridor to determine how residents of

rural communities, with populations between 2,500 and 10,500 coped with the threats

posed by a seasonal cycle of disasters that include extreme cold, heat, rain, fire, drought,

lightning strikes, tornadoes, and extremist groups of the political right. Face-to-face

interviews with local emergency managers and law enforcement officials in selected rural

communities explained that despite limited resources, they were able to meet all of the

threats that nature and extremist groups imposed on them. When incidents overwhelmed

local capabilities, mutual-aid and volunteers supplemented local first responders.

Participant demographics relevant to this study reflected primarily white Middle

Americans of all age groups in a pastoral environment that was either their place of birth,

or to which they later gravitated. Other than the variances in generational representation,

no other evidence of ethnic diversity was noted.

The data collection process involved face-to-face interviews with participants in

ten rural communities within a four-state area in order to a gain a richer narrative

concerning operational policies and emergency management practices at each of the sites.

There were no variations or unusual circumstances present in the data collection process.

As the sole data collection tool, I was obligated to make unannounced visits to meet with

participants after previously contacted gatekeepers proved ineffective. This solicitation

technique proved useful as one participant offered to provide an introduction to a

counterpart in another region or state. The data collected was recorded on a digital

recorder and also written in response to a previously prepared questionnaire. My presence

at all interviews, coupled with a good subject knowledge base, facilitated my ability to

analyze and interpret the data collected. The discrepancies or variances in this study’s

findings were the result of contrasts with findings in previous studies that addressed the

same problem, which initially shaped this study’s problem and purpose statements, as

well as the research questions. The face-to-face interviews of participants, coupled with

my developed knowledge of the subject, formed to provide sufficient evidence of the

study’s trustworthiness.

This study’s results confirmed one of the previous studies’ findings (Bryant,

2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2009; Stigler, 2010),

as they related to funding and resources, and disconfirmed the others. I remind the reader

that each of the above cited studies provided the basis for this study’s primary research

questions. The four that were disconfirmed related to questions of local leaders justifying

noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, how noncompliance affected

rural leaders’ ability to govern in relation to public safety and national security, and

whether rural leaders understood their roles and responsibilities in the post 9/11 era. What

this study’s results also presented was the likelihood that the previous studies’ findings

were exclusive to the other Midwestern states and therefore not transferable to this

study’s research sites. Based on the results of this study’s findings, it may be appropriate

to expand on them for potential adoption by other US regions and its possessions having

similar demographic profiles of urban centers and multiple rural areas. In Chapter 5, I

make recommendations on how rural communities in those regions can implement

effective emergency preparedness measures despite limited resources. The final chapter

presents an interpretation of the study’s findings, lists the study’s particular limitations,

and explains recommendations applicable to rural areas. Chapter 5 also discusses the

study’s implications for social change, and presents conclusions drawn from the field

research findings.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Recommendations, and Conclusions

Introduction

The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore and to describe the

various rationales that rural civic leaders in Upper Midwest states offered as their

justification for not complying with the National Preparedness Guidelines that were

issued in 2008 (DHS, 2009). The guidelines were issued after the terrorist attacks of

September 11, 2001, with the intent of providing assistance to all of the nation’s

communities in the development of their own security plans to prepare them for and

allow them to respond to, recover from, and mitigate against natural or manmade

disasters. The only available works in the literature on the subject of compliance with the

national guidelines in rural communities are five studies conducted by Bryant (2009),

Chenoweth and Clarke (2010), Marion and Cronin (2009), Oliver (2007, 2009), and

Stigler (2010). Those studies presented findings that indicated that the primary reasons

for rural noncompliance with the national guidelines were lack of funding, concerns

related to cost effectiveness, rural leaders misunderstanding their roles in the post-9/11

era, and regional remoteness. The intent of this study was to confirm or disconfirm the

validity of those previous studies’ findings with the purpose of developing a common

rationale for the findings of compliance or noncompliance. By extension, if these

rationales were proven valid throughout rural America, which is estimated to represent as

much as 97.5% of the nation’s land area and is home to 18% of the nation’s population

(NLC, 2014; U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), the previous studies’ conclusions implied that

national security and rural public safety were being compromised. This implied condition

justified further research on the question of homeland security in rural America and thus

influenced the purpose and title of this study.

The nature of this study derived from a qualitative multisite single-case approach

that aligned with the inquiry’s stated purpose and objectives. The selection of this

approach followed the rationale that the concept drives the research and the study purpose

drives the analysis (Patton, 2002). Each of the previous studies’ findings influenced the

formulation of open-ended research questions for this study that were designed to elicit

the necessary information to achieve the study’s objectives. For example, participant

responses to the interview questions provided the necessary information that ultimately

led to a clear understanding of the reasons for compliance. Indeed, this study’s findings

were instrumental in disconfirming a greater number of the previous studies’ findings and

confirming only a smaller number (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion &

Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), suggesting that the nation’s security and

rural public safety are intact and that programs in those areas are operating more

effectively than earlier studies suggested.

Interpretation of the Findings

As stated in the previous paragraph, this study’s key findings can be summarized

as objective results that answer the stated research questions. For example, the central

question, which was shaped by previous studies and addressed how rural civic leaders

justified their noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines, was

disconfirmed (Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

All participant responses to the interview questions reflected a pattern of compliance by

rural leaders, who described how they had used the national guidelines to prepare for and

respond to disasters since the 9/11 attacks. Their descriptions included the types of

incidents experienced, the vulnerability of their infrastructure, their response plans, and

local mutual-aid agreements, all of which are components of the National Preparedness

Guidelines. Research Question 1, which was also influenced by the previous studies

(Bryant, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), concerned

how the issue of noncompliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines affected

participants’ ability to fulfill their governing roles as they related to national security and

public safety. This study’s findings disconfirmed this question following purposeful

interviews with participants, who responded from 10 different sites indicating that their

ability to govern had never been compromised because they had been in compliance since

the issuance of the federal guidelines. Those responses suggested that the studied

communities had been compliant with the National Preparedness Guidelines since they

were first issued in 2009 by their state emergency management directors in Iowa,

Nebraska, Missouri, and Kansas.

This study’s findings did confirm the assumption of Research Question 2, which

presumed that lack of funding and lack of resources hindered rural leaders’ ability to

implement emergency measures in their communities. In all of the previous studies,

participants had indicated that one of their rationales for noncompliance was related to

the lack of funding (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009;

Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). In this study, all participants responded that although

more funding would allow the hiring of additional personnel and purchase of new

equipment, what was allotted by the state adequately served their needs. They presented

the view that resource limitations were challenging, but that collective aid by first

responders, area volunteers, mutual-aid units, and federal grants to fund training and

special equipment made up for resource or funding deficiencies.

This study’s findings disconfirmed Research Question 3, which was also

influenced by three of the five previous studies (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010; Stigler, 2010). This research question asked what role remoteness and separation

played in local leaders’ decisions not to implement emergency preparedness measures

within their rural communities. Statements by interviewees K2-EM/LE and K3-EM

offered that theirs was a style of living based on personal choice and a desire to assist

neighbors and community members in times of need (Putnam, 2000). In their responses

to Interview Questions 9 and 12, these same participants did not consider their rural

communities separated or remotely situated from a major urban center. As a whole, they

expressed strong feelings that responses to rural incidents are handled more effectively

locally. Participant K4-LE/EM explained that the policy of a county sheriff assuming

responsibility for responding to all emergency incidents within a county applied only to

those jurisdictions where rural towns had no police departments and that the sheriff had

also established substations in those communities.

This study’s findings also disconfirmed Research Question 4, which concerned

what understanding participants had about their duties and responsibilities in the post9/11

era regarding the implementation of preparedness guidelines in their communities.

One of the previous studies influenced this question (Oliver, 2007, 2009). This research

question was summarily discounted by the findings derived from participants’ responses

to the interview questions. Contrary to the previous studies’ conclusions, this study’s

findings clearly indicated that rural leaders in this Midwestern four state region had a

complete understanding of their roles and responsibilities regarding national security and

public in the post-9/11 era.

The findings also determined that most of the conclusions reported in the previous

studies were not only inconsistent and therefore inconclusive, but also nongeneralizable.

In this regard, the current study’s findings have extended knowledge in this particular

discipline when they are compared to those in the peer-reviewed literature as described in

Chapter 2. Unlike the previous studies’ conclusions (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010), this study’s findings

produced consistent and conclusive rationales for the studied communities’ relative levels

of generalizable and transferable preparedness.

For this study, I chose Putman’s (2000) theory of social capital to help understand

the phenomenon. Experts in the field of homeland security and emergency management

(Bellavita, 2010; McEntire, 2004; Reese, 2013) examined a score of theories during the

past decade in attempts to find a relationship between those theories and these disciplines

without success. The problem appears to be that both homeland security and emergency

management encompass too many multifaceted responsibilities and functions to be

defined by any single theory. I did find Putnam’s theory of social capital and its civic

benefits useful as an analytical lens, particularly when its principles appear to have been

adopted by and adapted to the studied rural communities. Putnam promoted the concept

of social capital theory by presenting the argument that minimal adaptation of social

capital in a given community will lead to a rigid and unresponsive political system.

Writing from a political perspective, Putnam argued that social capital in effect is a

precondition of effective government and economic growth in a particular community.

Claridge (2004), a supporter of Putnam’s theory, explained that social capital represents

the value of social networks that tend to bond people with similar interests and to bridge

otherwise diverse members of the community with norms of reciprocity and trust. These,

then, are the values that facilitate collaboration, cooperation, coordination, and

communication in all communities during emergencies, particularly in rural areas

(Bryant, 2009).

When viewed in this context, the theory of social capital aligned well with this

study. Because a theory’s primary purpose is to explain a particular phenomenon, this

study’s initial focus was providing an explanation for the variance of rural rationales

concerning local levels of compliance or noncompliance with the National Preparedness

Guidelines. This focus addressed not only about why either process was occurring, but

also why it was occurring in such an affirmative way. Social capital theory, as described

by Putnam (2000), is based on the concept that cohesion and stability within a community

rest on a firmer foundation when local residents establish social networks that promote

trust through cooperation and reciprocity during times of need. Putnam argued that the

more widespread these networks are the healthier a community becomes, both socially

and politically. An assumption underlying this theory, then, is that a community that

cultivates and nurtures the “civic virtues” of social capital will be healthier socially,

politically, and economically, as opposed to one that does not (Putnam, 2000, p. 7).

Putnam explained that social capital represents the various aspects of social relations,

which include local norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in community

cohesion. This community cohesion is what Putnam relates to civic virtue, which is

characterized by civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, tolerance, and the

associational life those virtues represent. The principles of social capital theory were thus

recognized as essential to the social cohesion and political health of the studied rural

communities when it was necessary to meet the challenges of emergency management

posed by seasonal incidents. In summary, what this study’s research determined was that

compliance with national and state preparedness guidelines in the studied rural

communities was due, in great part, to their general adaptation of social capital principles

(Bryant, 2009; Claridge, 2004; Putnam, 2000).

As the field research developed, this adaptation was reflected in the responses all

10 participants made to the interview questions. For example, the make-up of Interview

Questions 1, 2, 7, and 15 and their responses supported the central question. Following

the study’s intended structure, Interview Questions 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 were aimed to support

Research Question 1. In keeping with this research sequence, Interview Questions 9 and

11 were used to support Research Question 2. To confirm compliance in the studied

communities, the analyzed responses to Interview Questions 10 and 12 expressed support

for Research Question 3. And finally, Interview Questions 13 and 14 related support for

Research Question 4. Essentially, the study’s findings indicate that all of the studied

communities were in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines.

Table 3, which is depicted below, encapsulates this study’s results following analysis and

interpretation of the findings.

Table 3

Status of State and Site Compliance With the National Preparedness Guidelines

Following Interpretation of the Study’s Findings

States and sites Compliance status according to findings

________________________________________________________________________

State of Kansas Full compliance

Sites K1, K2, K3, K4, K5 Full compliance

State of Missouri Full compliance

Sites M1, M2, M3, M4 Full compliance

State of Iowa Full compliance

Site I1 Full compliance

State of Nebraska Full compliance

Site N1 *Unconfirmed

*The State of Nebraska was found to be compliant, but the regional director for

emergency management in Lincoln, Nebraska did not respond to requests to participate in

this study. Because he is a graduate of the Emergency Management Institute at Central

Missouri University, it seems likely that Nebraska Site 1 is also compliant.

Limitations of the Study

Study limitations are those variables or restrictions that are always out of a

researcher’s control (Patton, 2002; Rudestam & Newton, 2007). Fieldwork involves

multiple sources of information because no single source should be trusted to provide a

comprehensive perspective on an issue (Patton, 2002). Interview data can be distorted by

participants’ personal biases, politics, or simple anxiety. Public records and documents

may also bear limitations if they are incomplete or inaccurate. From its initial stages, this

study was bounded and framed by a number of limitations. They included an

investigation of a single facet of the National Preparedness Guidelines as they applied to

rural communities, which meant that the findings would not be applicable to the nation’s

urban centers. This study’s unique and purposeful geographical site was also a limitation

if it is accepted that there is only one Tornado Alley in the U.S. This is the corridor nature

has shaped across Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, and Iowa that perennially produces

extreme weather patterns throughout the region (see map on p. 93). The study was also

limited by the purposeful interviews of participants who chose to live in that part of the

Midwest and work as law enforcers, first responders, or emergency managers. All of

the participants indicated that they had earned college degrees along with years of

experience in their particular fields. At no time during the field research process was any

evidence revealed that raised any question about the interviewees’ honesty or

trustworthiness. Indeed, the candor and competence exhibited by the study participants

convinced me that their responses reflected pride in their roles and responsibilities. Their

responses to the interview questions contributed much to the study’s trustworthiness

because their accuracy helped to validate the overall findings. The credibility or

believability of their responses provided assurance that the study results were

trustworthy, from both the participants’ and my perspective. In turn, the study’s

dependability and repeatability were supported by the triangulation of participant

interviews, use of official documents, and my personal interpretation of data being

investigated. This explanation is offered with the understanding that a limitation in the

dissertation process is that a study usually reflects only a review of the stated problem

during the period of its examination (Simon, 2011; Yin, 2014).

Recommendations

As stated in Chapter 1, the purpose of this case study was to explore and describe

the reasons why a number of rural communities in the Midwest were previously reported

as noncompliant with implementation of the National Preparedness Guidelines reissued

in 2009 (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2009; DHS, 2009; Marion & Cronin, 2009;

Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). Previous studies found that general noncompliance in

other Midwestern study sites was due to lack of funding and resources, to local leaders

not understanding their roles and responsibilities in the post-9/11 era, and to remoteness

and separation from urban areas. The major themes presented by those previous studies

were that the rationales for noncompliance varied with participants and geographical

regions, resulting in inconclusive and inconsistent findings. Those studies also failed to

explain how other states, such as Florida (FDEM, 2008-2013), have been able to

implement the national guidelines with the same formulaic allotments of homeland

security funds and include the state’s urban and rural communities in their emergency

incident plans. Florida, like all other compliant states, has implemented the national

guidelines using allocated funds based on the national formula of assessed threat, risk,

vulnerability, and state population (Kopp, 2012; Moteff, 2014). That initial contradiction

shaped the premise that drove this study with an objective of confirming or disconfirming

those initial findings. The study’s objective proved valid by disconfirming most of the

previous studies’ findings and confirming only a small number of them. This outcome

could create opportunities for their transferability and future research. Examples include

similar geographical regions of the U.S. Southwest and Northwest, as well as other rural

areas in U.S. territories and possessions.

This study’s strengths and limitations have proven valid and transferable to those

four-state regions having a number of urban centers and multiple rural areas. Among this

study’s strengths are revelations of compliance by all the participants in the four-state

region that was studied. For example, Oliver (2007, 2009) contended in a previous book

and article that in spite of the publicized roles that rural leaders were to play in the

post9/11 era, they remained unclear regarding their understanding of the responsibilities

and roles they had assumed following issuance of the National Preparedness Guides in

2009 (DHS, 2009). This study’s findings appear to contradict Oliver’s conclusions with

statements from participants that indicated they knew exactly what their duties and

responsibilities were prior to, during, and after an incident. In addition, the same findings

confirmed that all of this study’s participants had been compliant with the national

guidelines since they were issued (DHS, 2009). The studies by Chenoweth and Clarke

(2009) and Marion and Cronin (2009) reported that the lack of funding and equipment

prevented rural communities from developing and implementing effective emergency

preparedness measures. Those findings were also discounted by the current study, which

found that although participants conceded a need for additional funding to hire more

trained personnel, they were able to respond to all hazards with their current staff. When

certain tools or equipment were needed, acquisition was usually realized following a

grant from FEMA.

The two other studies that influenced this research were published by Bryant

(2009) and Stigler (2010). Those studies reported on the challenges that local leaders

faced when confronted with efforts to implement emergency preparedness measures in

their rural communities. Among the challenges those studies reported were resource

limitations, ineffective or aged communications systems, separation, remoteness, and low

population density. All of which, they reported, made it difficult for rural communities to

develop all-hazards capabilities at the local level. To some extent, those findings have

been found to be valid. For example, low population density and remoteness tend to limit

response and recovery times. Resource limitations may not allow a local response unit to

have a hazardous materials (Hazmat) expert on its payroll, or to invest in more efficient

communications technology and rural broadband initiatives.

This study’s findings, however, made those challenges surmountable because all

participants reported that low population density also made it easier for them to identify,

locate, and respond to area residents during incidents with the current communications

systems. These systems include National Oceanic Atmospheric Administrative (NOAA)

battery operated radios capable of receiving alerts from regional emergency managers.

Remote dwellings can also rely on conventional telephones, television and radio, as well

as satellite-capable radios operated by emergency managers which provide information

regarding ongoing weather or incident conditions. Participants K1-LE/EM and K3-EM

explained that area residents within a local response unit’s jurisdiction were often within

minutes of assistance. In those instances when the incident was beyond local capabilities,

contacted regional mutual-aid units were only hours away. This included local requests

for special equipment and expertise, such as a Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) specialist.

The ability of the rural emergency managers to meet reported challenges despite the

limited resources available to them reflected strength of organization and effective

response to all hazards that may have befallen their communities. Those two studies

touched on the concept of social capital as an effective alternative to response and

recovery involving incidents in their rural communities, although Stigler (2010) did not

recognize it as such (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000; Stigler, 2010). The strength of

organization and response effectiveness underscored above raised the question that

addressed: Why social capital principles revealed in this study were not considered as

recommendations for change by authors of the previous studies?

An added strength of the study’s findings was the applicability of its findings to

other rural regions. The findings could also be applicable to the states that were subjects

of the previous studies. They can be employed regionally, or state-by-state as a measure

of comparison depending on the researcher’s qualitative study purpose. The research

method, time, purpose, and geography were added strengths to this study’s outcome. The

rural referred to above are regions with similar patterns of densely populated urban

centers and dispersed populations in rural areas, which may also experience compliance

issues with the National Preparedness Guidelines (DHS, 2009; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2014).

Although the transferability of this study’s findings may be problematic to other regions

due to geographical, political, or economic reasons, the adaptability of social capital

principles to local emergency management practices in rural communities remains a

subject worthy of further study. Figure 4 below illustrates the nation’s regions as they

are configured by the U.S. Census Bureau.

Figure 4. U.S. Census map showing separation of regions with inclusive states. Retrieved

from the Census Bureau website; http://www.uscensus.gov.

Among the social capital principles commonly found in the studied rural

communities were cooperation, collaboration, coordination, and communication which all

of the participants stated were key components of effective emergency management. An

important finding of this study is that all participants interviewed held the common belief

that responses to emergency incidents are a local matter, to be supplemented only when

rural capabilities and resources are overwhelmed. To summarize then, the findings that

revealed this study’s strengths also served to discount the conclusions reported by the

studies examined during the literature review. In light of these findings it would appear

appropriate to expand on this study’s findings with the objective of applying them in

other states or regions with similar demographics (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke,

2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

Implications for Social Change

This study’s findings have provided the potential to impact social change at the

societal-policy level in a contributing way. Policymakers who adopt new ideas based on

this study’s findings are likely to issue policies that direct organizational behavior, which

in turn affects the general welfare of local families and individuals. For example, this

study’s findings, which related to operational effectiveness despite resource limitations,

rural separation and remoteness, low population density, and inefficient communications

systems, would have a beneficial effect in other regions with similar demographics. The

findings that local civic leaders were able to conduct emergency management operations

effectively, despite limited resources, reflects the process of creating ideas to promote the

safety and security of rural residents.

If presented as reported, this study’s findings could foster new policies in those

previous study sites, as well as in the similar regions of the Southwest and Northwest.

Awareness and training that takes the findings into consideration would make emergency

management planning and operations more cost-effective by applying allotted homeland

security funding more efficiently, thus making each adoptive state’s rural communities

safer. In addition to providing operational guidance to an individual state’s homeland

security officials and emergency managers, this study’s findings also offer instructional

value to rural civic leaders who want to compare the study’s findings with their current

programs to determine if revision is needed. Yet another potential impact for positive

social change at the societal-policy level would be an enhanced understanding of the

underlying forces that resisted the concept of compliance in previous studies, particularly

if any future studies show similar conclusions (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010;

Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver, 2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010).

To effectively address the study’s purpose, the method chosen for this research

was a case study that allowed a concentrated examination of multisites in four states

which may have been in noncompliance with implementation of National Preparedness

Guidelines issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). The characteristics of this chosen method

allowed me to investigate in-depth a current phenomenon in its real-world context. This

method set my investigative boundaries, which included the research time period, the

geographic locations where the phenomenon was occurring, and identified professional

individuals who became subjects of the study. The implication of selecting this research

method was that upon completion of the study it allowed me to present an in-depth story

of my findings in a narrative form (Creswell, 2013; Yin, 2014).

The theoretical foundation that aligned with this multisite case study is social

capital theory as advanced by Putnam (2000). This theory is based on the concept that

communities, particularly those in rural areas, experience greater degrees of cohesion and

stability when local residents establish networks that promote mutual trust through

cooperation, collaboration, communication, and reciprocity. Putnam argued that the more

common these networks and exchanges are present, the healthier communities become,

politically and socially. Social capital theory focuses on the various aspects of social

relations, which include local norms, values, networks, and the roles they play in

community cohesion. The rationale for selecting this theory was based on its alignment to

the study’s purpose and its relation to the study of investigating compliance with the

National Preparedness Guidelines in rural communities. The alignment of this theory to

the study becomes evident when the reviewer considers the challenges of implementing

emergency measures in remote areas with limited resources and where rural community

cohesion is sometimes an existential requirement. In many cases, rural communities must

rely on cooperation, trust, and reciprocity as essential elements to their social welfare and

development (Bryant, 2009; Putnam, 2000). Although some sources have speculated that

these local networks and social ties may be the reason why some rural communities resist

outside directives, this study’s findings revealed that this speculation was not valid

(Bryant, 2009; Caruson & MacManus, 2004; Stigler, 2010).

When presenting a general description of recommendations for best practices, as

they relate to this study’s findings, requires an understanding of the evolutionary process

of the concepts that American public understands as homeland security and emergency

management. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the process of civil defense was reactive, not well

organized and inefficient. After the 9/11 attacks, the concept of homeland security and

emergency management became a proactive effort carried out by experts in many fields.

During the post-9/11 era, however, it is accurate to point out that homeland security and

emergency management as administered by the DHS and FEMA have been a work in

progress, too often prone to administrative and operational mistakes. A prime example

was the mishandling of the response to the Katrina Hurricane disaster in August of 2005.

After-action reports of that response led Congress to enact the Post-Katrina Emergency

Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 2006 (Haddow et al., 2011).

That law was critical to the effort of regaining public trust in the government’s

ability to protect its citizens. One of the most notable changes this law made was to

delegate more autonomy to FEMA. The law further ensured a separate budget for FEMA

and required certification that all newly appointed administrators were college trained,

with at least five years experience in emergency management. An important requirement

directed that all regional FEMA offices develop close working relationships with their

state counterparts. In addition, the Office of Grants and Training was moved to FEMA

with a Citizen’s Corps coordinating office placed under its supervision. To coordinate

national operations, the law also established a State and Rural Advocate, a law

enforcement advisor, and National Advisory Council to advise the Administrator on all

aspects of emergency management (Haddow et al., 2011). When considering the extent

and nature of extreme conditions that threaten the studied rural communities, it should be

done with the knowledge that there is no way to prevent those conditions, but they can be

mitigated through effective emergency management practices. Rural localities can protect

themselves against militant groups through more effective partnerships with state and

federal law enforcement agencies. They can also protect themselves and property by

establishing clearly marked evacuation routes during impending storms and sealing their

homes against wind and water whether residents choose to shelter in place or evacuate.

Emergency managers should identify secure shelters for the elderly, infirm, and the poor

who must shelter in place. When an incident overwhelms local resources, local, state, and

federal assistance should be requested to provide the necessary foodstuffs, equipment and

the resources needed to make effective recovery possible. If available, state response

teams should make efforts to establish statewide communications interoperability that

allows responding agencies to communicate with one another during the response and

recovery phases following an incident (see Appendix D).

These are noted recommendations for best practices that should be revisited as

natural and manmade threats evolve, as the nation witnessed during the Boston Marathon

bombing in 2013 (Piddock, 2014). A 2012 survey showed that 57% of Americans in

urban areas believed that occasional acts of terrorism are the new norm. Michael Hayden,

the former director of the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA), has stated this

“new normal” means that all types of people, not just Muslims, could fit the profile of the

Tsarnaev brothers (Harmon, 2013). In a recent article, the New York Times reported that

since September 11, 2001, almost twice as many Americans have been killed by White

supremacists, antigovernment fanatics, and other nonMuslims, than by radicalized

Muslims. These lethal attacks have been carried out by people espousing racial hatred,

hostility toward the government, and theories such as those of the Sovereign Citizen

movement, which denies the legitimacy of most statutory law. The assaults have taken

the lives of police officers, members of religious minorities, as well as random civilians

(Shane, 2015). The U.S. Constitution states that a primary responsibility of the central

government is to protect the lives and property of its citizens (Kozak, 2011). From a more

practical standpoint it is important for citizens to understand that the government cannot

protect everyone and everything from all threats all of the time. For that reason, it has

become essential that all Americans learn to function with heightened vigilance, and to

make homeland security every citizen’s responsibility. Nature will likely continue to

challenge the nation’s emergency managers with extreme weather patterns that will result

in various types of incidents. In line with the need for Americans to practice vigilance,

the 9/11 Commission stated in their report of the September 11, 2001 threats will be

defined more within societies than by the territorial boundaries drawn between them. The

commission’s report added that from terrorism to global disease or environmental

disaster, the challenges have become not only national and transnational, but also

international in scope. This seems to be the defining nature of the threats that will

challenge homeland security specialists and emergency managers in the 21st century (9/11

Commission, 2004). Over 14 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the

9/11 Commission’s conclusions remain as valid today as they were then. As stated in the

previous chapter, it would be appropriate to expand on this study’s findings with the

objective of applying them in other states or regions with similar demographics.

Conclusion

This study’s results answered the research questions that disconfirmed most of the

findings reported in the previous studies that influenced this study’s purpose and research

method (Bryant, 2009; Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010; Marion & Cronin, 2009; Oliver,

2007, 2009; Stigler, 2010). This study’s results provided evidence that refuted most of the

findings from the previous studies that were based on those rural leaders’ rationales for

noncompliance with nationally issued preparedness guidelines. This study’s findings

added understanding to the subject’s knowledge base because they answered the broader

question of whether homeland security is present in these Midwestern rural areas. That

answer affirmed that homeland security measures and emergency management principles

have been in place and in compliance with the National Preparedness Guidelines since

their issuance (DHS, 2009; State of Iowa, 2015; State of Kansas, 2014; State of Missouri,

2015; State of Nebraska, 2014-2016). This study’s findings confirmed that the national

security safety net had not been weakened by leaders of rural communities studied in the

four-state regions of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Nebraska. The current findings also

provided information, which served to establish that the value of public safety is as much

a concern to civic leaders in rural communities as it is to civic leaders of urban centers. In

spite of the findings and recommendations reported in previous studies conducted in

Upper Midwestern states, this study found that the studied rural communities in Kansas,

Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska have been in compliance with the National Preparedness

Guidelines since issued in 2009 (DHS, 2009). This study’s findings concluded that the

nation’s ability to deal with natural and manmade threats is preparation and vigilance.

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