Terrorism And Social Media Extremist Groups
And College Student Recruitment
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Social media is being used as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations
worldwide. From 2003 to 2017, the number of terrorist websites increased from fewer
than 100 to more than 5,000, and terrorist groups recognized the benefits of the internet,
specifically social media platforms, as a recruitment tool (Eze, 2018). Social media has
provided terrorist organizations with a cheap way to transmit radical messages to
international audiences (Kwon et al., 2017). For example, the terrorist group Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has used social media to recruit more than 30,000 fighters
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). This recruitment process includes action-packed
recruitment videos on YouTube and villainizing political speech on Twitter (Amedie,
2015). As a result of these recruitment tactics, more than 200 college-age Americans
traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight for ISIS, and they were recruited almost exclusively via
social media (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017).
Terrorist organizations that are domestic to the United States have used social
media in a manner similar to international religion-based terrorists. These domestic
organizations, called right-wing extremist organizations, that espouse White supremacy,
have also been using social media as a recruitment tool, specifically in the form of
broadcasting their message via YouTube (Dean et al., 2012). This recruitment by
domestic terrorist organizations has been effective and deadly. In 2018, right-wing
extremists were responsible for every extremist-related murder in the United States and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation made more than 100 domestic terrorism arrests
(AntiDefamation League, n.d.).
Online recruitment is possible because of the large number of social media users.
Social media provides a low-cost platform for extremist groups to disseminate
information to a global audience (Archetti, 2015). For example, more than 90% of college
students in the United States were active on social media as of 2017 (Birnbaum et al.,
2017). As such, various terrorist groups found success in recruiting American college
students (Gates & Podder, 2015; Weismann, 2014).
Heightened use of social media has presented new opportunities for terrorist
organizations and new challenges to law enforcement organizations (Khader et al., 2016).
Due to this upswing in online recruitment, global security needs to improve their
capabilities of using social networks to monitor and disrupt the activities of terrorist
organizations (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015). To better understand this, I investigated the
extent to which U.S. college students were contacted by extremist groups via social
media. In this chapter, I present the background of the problem, the problem statement
and purpose of the study, my research questions, and my theoretical and conceptual
frameworks for the study. I then present the nature of the study, useful definitions, and
my assumptions, scope, limitations, and significance of the study.
Background
Extremist groups target specific demographics. Sureka et al. (2010) discussed how
extremist groups used YouTube to radicalize young men. The authors found that 90% of
those targeted were men with an average age of 25 years old. In 2019, men between the
ages of 20 and 30 were responsible for the majority of mass shootings in the United
States (Anti-Defamation League, 2019). Extremist groups understand which groups are
most vulnerable.
College students are targeted by extremist groups. Thompson (2011) explained
that college students are targeted by extremist groups because they used social media
extensively and they are the ideal age to be recruited. Research has shown that college
students became more susceptible to recruitment efforts as new social media platforms
became available. As a result, extremist groups use innovative recruitment methods to
entice new members while law enforcement struggles to disrupt their efforts.
Social media applications are consistently evolving. Weimann (2014) focused on
the functionality and popularity of specific social networks. Extremist groups use Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube differently, according to their usefulness in
uploading videos and sending messages. Gartenstein-Ross (2015) discussed social- media
based strategies for undercutting the recruitment ability of extremist groups, such as ISIS.
The goal was to counter the group’s power and strength by publicizing their losses on the
battlefield. In doing so, their power and legitimacy were reduced, which compromised
their ability to recruit new members (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015). Effective use of social
media hinged on the ability to understand the latest updates across various applications.
There are extensive costs associated with monitoring extremist groups on social
media. Klausen (2015) explained the nature of these costs. Gathering intelligence
provides information that can help disrupt potential terrorist attacks, but this process is
complicated and costly (Klausen, 2015). Hiring security officials who understand the
intricacies of social media is another challenge.
There is a discrepancy in how extremist groups and law enforcement use utilize
social media. Stevens and Nuemann (2009) described the cultural and generational gaps
that exist between law enforcement and extremist groups as they attempt to monitor and
disrupt on social media. Evidence has shown that law enforcement officers lacked
awareness of how people communicated on social media applications (Stevens &
Neumann, 2009). My research helps to address the gap in how students and experts in the
fields of law enforcement and homeland security communicated and interacted with
others on social media.
Problem Statement
Various social media networks are being used by extremist groups to recruit
members, organize attacks, and incite violence. Twitter was one of the primary tools used
to orchestrate the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai (Birnbaum et al., 2017). Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani, a spokesperson for ISIS, acknowledged that social media was
used to incite violent attacks against the West (Chatfield et al., 2015). Domestic terrorists
in the United States use social media to recruit new members and orchestrate attacks
(Dean et al., 2012). As a result, U.S. national security has been compromised because
security officials fail to grasp the nature and influence of extremist groups’ messages on
social media.
There is evidence that countermeasures to radicalization are effective. McDowell-
Smith et al. (2017) investigated the impact of antiextremist group messaging on
American college students. Participants viewed videos of ISIS defectors denouncing the
extremist group, which resulted in strong anti-ISIS sentiment among the participants.
(McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). McDowell-Smith et. al (2017) concluded that students
who were exposed to counternarrative messages of extremists became less vulnerable to
recruitment by these groups. Failure to address this threat represents a national security
issue.
Additional research is needed to address what college students and recent
graduates view on social media, particularly the extent to which they are contacted by
extremist groups. Further, it needs to be determined whether there is a a discrepancy
between what students and experts in the fields of homeland security and law
enforcement are subjected to online.
Purpose of the Study
My research examined the extent to which students are targeted by extremist
groups on social media. Prior researchers identified cultural and generational gaps
between online extremist recruiters and law enforcement officers who attempted to
monitor and disrupt them via social media (Stevens & Nuemann, 2009). I spoke with
students and experts in the fields of homeland security and law enforcement to evaluate
the contrast in how the groups navigate social media.
Research Question
My central research question was:
How are extremist groups using social media to recruit college students?
Framework of the Study
Social media is a vital resource for both terrorist groups and the security officials
tasked with policing these groups. Extremist groups use social media to recruit new
members, raise money, coordinate attacks, and inflict political violence, while law
enforcement uses social media to monitor, disrupt, and capture extremists (Thompson,
2011). Klausen (2015) acknowledged that security forces have failed to implement an
effective strategy for large-scale disruption of terrorist activities on social media. My
research sought to examine how college students and experts in the fields of homeland
security and law enforcement interact with others on various social media platforms.
Social media plays an integral role in shaping the minds of young people.
Typically, American college students spend more than 25 hours per week on social
media, (Huey, 2015). In my research, I sought to examine the impact of social media
interactions for college students. I hypothesized that experts in the fields of homeland
security and law enforcement lack awareness and understanding on social media. This
contributes to the failed counterterrorism strategy, which is discussed at length in Chapter
2.
I observed how individuals were affected by their interactions on social media.
Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory provided the theoretical framework for my
research. Social learning theory is used to explain behavior as a learned response to
others’ behavior (Bandura, 1977). Bandura’s model aligns with the functions and
behavior of present-day social media in terms of sharing, liking, communicating, and
motivating responses. Extemist groups identify recruits according to what posts and
videos they view and share. Recruiters from these groups prey on individuals who like
and share their posts, which represents a type of learned behavior. Social media users are
motivated by videos distributed from extremist groups, and then they become targets.
In previous studies, researchers have used social learning theory as the theoretical
framework. McDonald and Conway (2018) used social learning theory as a framework to
explore effective ways to counter violent extremism. The researchers concluded that
social media applications needed to do a better job working with law enforcement to
disrupt extremist groups from fundraising on their platforms. The scope of the research
was international, with participants from the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
Sweden, and The Netherlands (McDonald & Conway, 2018). In my research, I sought to
analyze social media usage and experiences from students and recent graduates of a
Historically Black College and University (HBCU) in the South.
Nature of the Study
I used a qualitative research approach to collect data. Vandebosch and Van
Cleemput (2008) used qualitative research to gather data about cyberbullying via the
Internet and social media web applications. The researchers developed a list of what
bothered the victims the most, and they found that being contacted by unfamiliar people
on social media was the most traumatizing (Vandebosch & Van Cleemput, 2008).
Qualitative approaches were more likely to produce data, which tended to be
multilayered, nuanced data, and often revealed from in-depth interviews (Fusch & Ness,
2015). My approach sought to collect this sort of rich data.
I my research, I sought to determine the impact of extremist language and videos
on college students and recent graduates in the fields of homeland security and law
enforcement. I observed how different social media applications influenced their
thoughts, relationships, and ideas. I analyzed how they used social media to interact with
others and what impact this has on them.
Definitions
Homeland security describes the effort to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from attacks (Martin, 2018). Extremism is characterized
by political opinions that are intolerant toward others, forming the ideological basis for
political violence. Extremists are those who hold such views (Martin, 2018).
Assumptions
I interviewed students and graduates in the fields of homeland security and law
enforcement. I felt students would be able to identify extremism while providing detailed,
honest feedback, because of their subject matter knowledge and their familiarity with me
as a professor. I felt that random participants would have been hesitant to provide
personal information about social media interactions.
Scope and Delimitations
I interviewed college students and recent graduates due to their familiarity with
me, and I felt they understood the research topic. Homeland security and law enforcement
experts agreed to be interviewed because they knew me from academic conferences and
community events. There was low potential for transferability, as findings were unlikely
to be transferred to other settings. My research elicited responses from a diverse group of
students and experts in the fields of law enforcement and homeland security who would
have been unlikely to participate if they did not know me. Results were not intended to be
generalized, as participants were selected based on familiarity.
Limitations
Participants were selected via convenience sampling. Results from this sample
were not intended to make an inference about a larger population. Participants were
selected because of their familiarity with me and the research topic. This presented
potential for biased responses. Participants may have embellished their experiences
during interviews to affirm that my research was addressing a societal problem.
None of the students interviewed were current or future students of mine.
Participants did not receive compensation, promise of a letter of recommendation, or any
other type of reward for participating. I reiterated several times throughout interviews that
the vast majority of people are not targeted by extremist groups via social media. Further,
I acknowledged that familiarity with participants did not guarantee honest or accurate
responses, although I did encourage honest, thoughtful feedback throughout the process.
Significance
My research sought to measure the extent to which homeland security and law
enforcement students at Savannah State University were targeted by extremists via social
media. Law enforcement experts were included in the study to determine if they
understood what college students typically experience on social media. I felt that if
students and experts use social media differently, there would be a gap in understanding
the threats and dangers across various platforms. Results exhibited that experts fail to
comprehend the risks and complexity of social media.
Research has shown that experts struggled to grasp the extent to which college
students suffered abuse on social media. Results have demonstrated a disconnect between
experts and the extent to which young people are targeted by extremists via social media.
Lawmakers are likely influenced by information presented to them by experts in the field
of homeland security and law enforcement. Policy could be impacted by data that
provided a more accurate picture of the threat posed by extremist groups on social media.
College students should be included in the discourse on national security,
specifically in terms of addressing threats on social media. College students and recent
graduates possess a profound understanding of the complexities and dangers that exist on
various social media platforms. This population has knowledge and skills on these virtual
networks that must be communicated with supervisors and administrators of law
enforcement and homeland security in order to capture a clear picture of how people use
these platforms to inflict harm. College students and recent graduates are a vital resource
to securing the United States, but they must be afforded the opportunity to do so. My
research investigates the extent to which experts are coordinating security efforts with
college students and recent graduates.
Summary
I identified the social problem as extremist groups targeting college students via
social media. Prior researchers have discussed this topic, but my research was focused on
college students and recent graduates with backgrounds in homeland security and law
enforcement. Participants were selected based on their familiarity with me and their
ability to identify extremism.
I included experts in the fields of homeland security and law enforcement to
compare their experiences on social media with the experiences of college students and
recent graduates. I hypothesized that a gap exists between the two groups in
understanding the threats and dangers of social media. Social learning theory provided
the theoretical framework for my research.
My research was not intended to draw inferences about how larger populations of
students used social media. The aim was to gather rich data from a group of college
students who were able to recognize extremist language on social media, to gain a deeper
understanding of the research problem. I conducted interviews with students, recent
graduates, and experts in the fields of homeland security and law enforcement to
determine the extent to which college students are targeted by extremist groups via social
media.
Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature for my research topic. I will
describe how I gathered relevant information about the subject matter, which provided a
basis for the theoretical framework. An explanation of how prior research influenced
research design and methodology will be included. Information will be integrated to
inform how research questions were formed and how key concepts were investigated
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
I identified the social problem as college students being recruited by extremist
groups via social media. My research sought to determine the extent to which college
students perceive they are affected by extremists across various social media platforms.
The primary focus of this chapter will be the literature review. I will also discuss how I
compiled the literature review and provide the theoretical framework for my research.
Social media is the primary tool for extremist groups to recruit new members,
raise money, and incite political violence. College students are particularly vulnerable to
recruitment by extremist groups on social media (Thompson, 2011). Dean et al. (2012)
explained that domestic terrorists in the United States use social media to expand
membership and coordinate attacks. Birnbaum et al. (2017) acknowledged that the 2008
terrorist attacks in Mumbai were coordinated via Twitter. ISIS officials have claimed
social media is instrumental in organizing violent attacks against the United States and its
allies (Chatfield et., 2015). Sureka et al. (2010) identified YouTube as the primary
method extremist groups use to connect with young people. Klausen (2015) described the
challenges of tracking and disrupting extremist groups on social media. Social media is a
vital resource for various types of extremist groups, which presents several challenges to
counterterrorism agencies.
Literature Search Strategy
I used Google Scholar to compile literature related to my research topic, which
addressed how extremists use social media to recruit college students. I searched the
following terms: social media and extremism, extremist groups and social media, college
students and social media, social media and terrorism, counterterrorism and social
media, and social media and radicalization. I also broadly searched for qualitative
research on extremist groups and social media, and extremism on social media at
historically Black colleges and universities. I reviewed and selected articles from the
following journals: Journal for Deradicalization, Journal of Terrorist Research, Harvard
National Security Journal, and the Journal of Strategic Security.
My research focused on college students and recent graduates with backgrounds
in homeland security and law enforcement. Prior researchers have addressed the social
problem, but I did not find similar studies conducted at historically Black colleges and
universities. I felt it appropriate to include participants who are historically
underrepresented in research.
There has been extensive research regarding social media and radicalization.
Thompson (2011) provided an overview of social media and radicalization. Archetti
(2015) described how extremist groups use social media to circulate radical ideas and
messages. Chatfield et al. (2015) explained how ISIS uses Twitter to radicalize new
members. Mather (2017) discussed various campaigns designed to counter the radical
messages from extremist groups on social media. McDowell Smith et al. (2017) discussed
strategies to combat the radicalization efforts of ISIS on social media. Social media is a
vital resource for extremist groups, while counterterrorism forces use it to disseminate
information designed to counter radicalization efforts.
Social media is an essential aspect of effective counterterrorism strategy. Dean et
al. (2012) provided an overview of how terrorists communicate via social media. Hardy
(2018) discussed methods for combating radicalization via social media. Khader et al.
(2016) described the challenges associated with combating extremist groups on social
media. Klein and Flinn (2017) discussed the role of social media networks in combating
terrorism. Van Brunt (2017) explored the risks of online violent extremism on college
populations. Waldman and Verga (2016) explained various methods for countering
violent extremism on social media. Social media is the primary tool used by extremist
groups to incite violence, while security forces use it to deradicalize individuals and
capture terrorists.
Theoretical Framework
My research focused on observing the behavior of college students on social
media. Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory provided the theoretical framework.
Social learning theory is used to assert that learning occurs in four stages: attention,
retention, reproduction, and motivation (Bandura, 1977). This correlates to the
functionality of social media applications. Extremists targete college students on social
media according to their likes, shares, and page views (Thompson, 2011). Members of
extremist groups produce videos and posts to capture the attention of their targets.
Extremists understand that these individuals would reproduce material with likes,
retweets, and shares on social media. Thompson (2011) explained this process is
replicated to portray a sense of power across various social media platforms. Research
has shown that the motivation for political violence and other attacks is generated from
communicating on social media (Amedie, 2015), which aligns with Bandura’s (1977)
theory of learned behavior. There are several research projects that have focused on social
media and radicalization in which social learning theory provided the theoretical
framework.
One example is a study in which the researchers analyzed a group of American
college students who were radicalized on Facebook and Twitter. McDonald and Conway
(2018) found that participants were motivated by learned behavior on social media, which
supports Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory. My research sought to build on this
research by examining the extent to which college students are affected by extremists on
social media.
Social media shapes the course of society. Sabatier and Weible (2014) described
social networks as important tools for producing societal change. My research viewed
social media as a mechanism for promoting positive or negative social change. Social
media is a tool used by terrorists to organize their efforts and commit acts of violence,
while law enforcement uses social media to track and prevent acts of violence. I
interviewed college students and recent graduates to gain a better understanding of their
experiences on social media to determine if the platform is being used more effectively
by those working to protect society or those attempting to incite violence.
Literature Review Related to Key Variables and Concepts
Social media plays a vital role in the radicalization process. Martin (2014)
discussed the link between extremism and terrorism explained that someone could hold
extremist beliefs without being a terrorist. Martin (2014) wrote that extremism becomes
terrorism when an individual commits an act of political violence, threatens the use of
political violence, or inspires another to commit or threaten an act of violence. Van Brunt
et. al (2017) described how individuals moved from holding radical beliefs to committing
acts of terror. In both cases, social media is the primary tool used to precipitate this
change.
Social media is an integral aspect of counterterrorism efforts. Archetti (2015)
discussed the threat of radicalization by extremist groups via social media and
acknowledged that most who viewed extremist videos and read terrorist propaganda are
not radicalized by the material. Thus, law enforcement needs to focus on counter-terror
initiatives with potential targets, rather than working to remove content from social media
(Archetti, 2015). Archetti also addressed the challenge in accounting for cultural norms,
specifically in parts of the world where anti-US sentiment is pervasive. Security forces
struggle to adapt to the ever-changing nature of social media.
Extremist groups adapt as security forces implement new counterterrorism
strategies. Weimann (2014) explained that the internet used to be the primary tool for
extremists to recruit new members, spread their message, and orchestrate attacks. As
internet sites were shut down by counterterrorism agencies, social media provided a more
convenient way to reach large audiences. Weimann (2014) discussed the growing threat
of lone-wolf terrorism, members of which are often radicalized on social media. He
suggested that security officials look beyond current challenges to understand the nuances
of social media to better anticipate and preempt violent attacks. Social media platforms
present new challenges each day for security forces.
College students are attentive to upgrades and advancement across various social
media applications. Amedie (2015) discussed why college students are vulnerable to
recruitment by extremist groups on social media. College students use social media to
meet new people and stay connected to old friends (Amedie, 2015). Amedie (2015)
portrayed social media networks as providing benefits and challenges to law enforcement
officers working to combat extremist groups. More research is necessary on college
students and their social media interactions to gain a better understanding of the threats
that exist on various social networks (Amedie, 2015). Extremist groups are mindful of the
extent to which college students rely on social media.
College students are vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups via social
media for numerous reasons. Huey (2015) explained why college students are commonly
targeted by extremist groups on social media. The author described how memes, videos,
satire, and other counter-culture norms found on social media appealed to young people.
ISIS and other groups are successful in recruiting college students because they
understand that these individuals gained a sense of development and growth from their
experiences on social media (Huey, 2015). Additional research is necessary to gain a
better understanding of what attracts young people to extremist groups. Extremist groups
manipulate various social media applications to attract young people.
International terrorist groups use social media to connect with college students.
Eze (2018) discussed how the extremist groups Boko Haram and Al-Shabab use social
media to plan attacks and incite violence. Nigerian defense forces attempted to gather
intelligence on the groups and warn citizens of potential attacks. The extremist groups
made effective use of various social media platforms, while government forces were
unable to do so (Eze, 2018). Eze (2018) recommended that the Nigerian government
develop counterterrorism strategies rooted in effective planning and communication via
social media. Recruiting young people on social media represents a threat to global
security.
Domestic terrorists use social media in a similar manner. Dean et al. (2012)
described the role of social media in recruiting, planning, fundraising, and disseminating
information for homegrown terrorists. Homegrown terrorists rely on Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube to build and expand their networks. Dean et al. (2012) recommended a
counter-terrorism approach that improves intelligence gathering using practitioner-based
knowledge and integrating this knowledge with appropriate technological support
systems. Terrorist organizations exploit social media regardless of country of origin or
type of terrorism.
European countries have been victimized by political attacks that were initiated
via social media. McDonald and Conway (2018) discussed how extremist groups in
Europe used social media to expand membership and raise money. There is a need for a
partnership between security forces and social media companies (McDonald & Conway,
2018). Social media companies should be compelled to provide law enforcement with
relevant and timely updates of extremist language violations on their platforms
(McDonald & Conway, 2018). Social media companies play a critical role in national
security.
ISIS has garnered international notoriety for committing acts of political violence
in multiple countries. McDowell-Smith et al. (2017) described the social media
recruitment effort by ISIS, which has resulted in more than 30,000 people leaving their
homes to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight for the extremist group. ISIS uses social media
to recruit new members, circulate their message, and orchestrate attacks (McDowellSmith
et al., 2017). Furthermore, the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism
conducted interviews with 43 ISIS defectors and showed these videos to a sample of 75
college students (McDowell-Smith et al., 2017). Results demonstrated that the project
was effective; college students found the videos appalling and developed strong feelings
against the extremist group. Effective counterterrorism strategy, therefore, involves
efforts to dimmish the influence of extremist groups via social media.
Social media accounts are often linked to extremist groups. Chatfield et al. (2015)
described the role of social media in spreading propaganda and radicalizing new
members. The researchers analyzed social media messages and posts from global mass
media, regional Arabic media, ISIS supporters, and ISIS fighters (Chatfield et al., 2015).
Chatfield et al. (2015) identified one Twitter account that tweeted 3,039 times in support
of ISIS. Security forces continue to work to identify users affiliated with extremist groups
on social media networks.
Social media allows people to connect, regardless of whether they speak the same
language. Gates and Podder (2015) explained that ISIS relies on social media to recruit
international combatants. Social media allows them to recruit on a global scale, using
technology to overcome language barriers. Typically, ISIS uses recruits born outside of
Iraq and Syria to engage in suicide attacks. This allows homegrown soldiers to fight on
the front lines as snipers (Gates & Podder, 2015). Social media allowed ISIS to recruit
thousands of recruits to travel to Iraq and Syria. Further, there was no meaningful
intervention from global security forces on social media platforms to counter this
development.
Effective counterterrorism efforts require consistent monitoring and awareness on
social media by security officials. Thompson (2011) discussed the need for law
enforcement officials to be engaged on social media so they can fully understand the
threats posed by extremist groups. Challenges are presented by the rapidly changing
nature of social media. At an Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance conference
with 150 national security officials in attendance, only five attendees were active on
Facebook and only one used Twitter (Thompson, 2011). Thompson (2011) explained that
law enforcement officials failed to comprehend the threat capabilities of social media
because they are not actively engaged. As a result, national security is not only
compromised but also out of touch with younger generations and their use of social
media.
There are significant costs associated with tracking extremists across multiple
social networks. Klausen (2015) described the extensive costs of monitoring extremist
groups via social media. Law enforcement officials collected intelligence, which helped
to apprehend suspects and prevent attacks, but the process was complicated and costly.
Sureka et al. (2010) described methods for law enforcement to detect and disrupt
extremist groups on YouTube. The approach resulted in the discovery of hidden
communities on the social network by searching users: their friends, subscriptions,
favorites, and related videos. It also helped to reduce costs. Security forces are
continuously working to employ cost-effective counterterrorism strategies.
Efficient use of resources is another focus of national security. Gartenstein-Ross
(2015) discussed the inability of security forces to disrupt the work of ISIS, whose power
and legitimacy were diminished each time news of their losses were circulated on social
media. Further, U.S. security forces needed to expose the myths associated with ISIS on
social media. Gartenstein-Ross (2015) acknowledged the importance of countering the
power of extremist groups on social media and suggested that security officials
disseminate information on social media to help demoralize and destabilize the extremist
group. ISIS relied on social media propaganda to convince potential recruits of the
group’s strength and success on the battlefield. The response needed to be concentrated
and swift, because the race to combat social media propaganda is a battle against time and
content (Gartenstein-Ross, 2015). The reactionary response represents the problematic
nature of policing social media.
Collaboration among stakeholders is another crucial aspect of national security.
Waldman and Verga (2016) discussed methods for governments to combat extremist
groups on social media. They suggested that governments incorporate the private sector
to establish a grass roots campaign in local communities to counter extremists on social
media. Waldman and Verga (2016) recommended that researchers continue to conduct
large-scale qualitative and quantitative research projects to gather relevant data regarding
countering violent extremists. Lawmakers require relevant information to make informed
decisions regarding effective counterterrorism strategies.
Governments work together with private companies to secure the nation. Klein
and Flinn (2017) discussed the role of social media companies in combating violent
extremism. The authors explained that while Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube
already had rules against extremist language and videos, they should be legally required
to report violations to federal authorities without delay. Klein and Flinn (2016) argued
that social media companies who failed to report extremist speech violations in due time
be charged with a federal crime. Compelling social media companies to share information
regarding extremists could enhance national security.
There are challenges associated with collecting data in extremist environments.
Atran et al. (2017) discussed the challenges in researching terrorism from the field. The
authors felt that research on the topic should be centered upon young people, since they
are ones who are most likely to be targeted by extremist groups. Young men were
regarded by researchers and security officials as problematic, while their group
understood the extent of the problem. Antran et al. (2017) suggested that counter
extremist violence initiatives be locally based to allow for personal engagement,
considering cultural norms. It is standard to implement initial security measures at the
local level and counterbalance the lack of data on the ground from remote parts of the
world.
The nature of social media makes it problematic to research. Winter et. al (2020)
addressed the challenges of conducting research on how extremist groups use social
media, specifically the rapidly changing technological aspect of social networks. The
landscape was likely to change dramatically in the 2-3 years it took to collect data and
publish findings. It was vital for academics and experts in the field to collaborate on
future research. National security is enhanced by effective communication and
information sharing among stakeholders.
Summary and Conclusions
Relevant literature established that social media was the primary tool used by
terrorist organizations to recruit new members, orchestrate attacks, and commit acts of
political violence. College students were particularly vulnerable to recruitment on social
media. Numerous studies exhibited that security officials failed to grasp the severity of
the threat that existed on social media. One recommendation to address this gap was for
future research to include college students as participants, to gain a clearer understanding
of what they experienced on social media. Other recommendations focused on the
relationship between social media companies and the federal government. Researchers
felt that federal governments should compel social media companies to report users who
violate rules, and they recommended that companies who failed to report such violations
be penalized. In Chapter 5, I discuss tactics to improve U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
My research sought to address the gap in understanding what college students
experienced on various social networks. College students and recent graduates were
interviewed to enhance my understanding of what they faced on Snapchat, Instagram,
Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and other social media applications. Chapter 3 will describe
the research design and methodology implemented to explore this research problem.
Chapter 3: Research Method
In my research, I sought to analyze how college students are affected by
extremists on social media. In Chapter 3, I provide the rationale for my research design. I
will discuss my role as the researcher. The methodology will be described in a manner
that allows other researchers to replicate the study. I will discuss data collection
instruments used and include a description of procedures for participation, recruitment,
and data collection. Issues of trustworthiness and ethical concerns will be addressed. The
Institutional Review Board (IRB) process and relevant information regarding IRB
approval will be included.
Research Design and Rationale
I felt that interviews would allow students to describe their experiences on social
media in a detailed manner. Fusch and Ness (2015) explained that qualitative approaches
are more likely to produce multilayered, nuanced data, which is obtained primarily from
interviewing participants. I found several studies in which scholars used qualitative
research to analyze how extremist groups use social media to recruit new members.
Vandebosch and Van Cleemput (2008) used qualitative research to investigate
cyberbullying on social media web applications. Participants in the study reported being
distressed because of interactions with extremist groups on social media. The authors felt
the qualitative approach was instrumental in gaining this insight. My research design
provides students the opportunity to express their experiences on social media.
In similar studies, researchers employed qualitative research designs. Quan-Haase
and Young (2010) used a qualitative approach to gain a better understanding of how
college students rely on social media to fulfill personal needs such as growth and
belonging. Of course, terrorist organizations are aware of this. Huey (2015) explained
that extremist groups targeted college students because they understand their reliance on
social media to meet new people and grow as individuals. College students are
particularly vulnerable to being recruited by extremist groups on social media. My
research sought to determine the extent to which extremists use various social media
platforms to recruit college students in the United States. My research question was:
“How are extremist groups using social media to recruit college students?”
Role of the Researcher
I was able to recruit college students and recent college graduates with
backgrounds in homeland security and law enforcement because I am a professor in the
homeland security emergency management program at a historically Black college and
university in the South. Students and recent graduates agreed to participate because of
their familiarity with me as a professor at the university. None of the students who
participated were current or future students of mine. Experts in the fields of homeland
security and law enforcement agreed to participate because they knew me from our work
together at trainings, conferences, and other community events.
I explained my role as researcher to all the participants. Throughout the process, I
reiterated that I was not acting in my role as professor, but rather, as a doctoral research
student at Walden University. I made this distinction to encourage open and honest
responses to interview questions.
When students agreed to be interviewed, I explained their participation would not
affect their ability to receive a letter of recommendation, nomination for any university
organization or club, or any type of recognition or preference within the campus
community. Throughout the process, I reiterated that participation was voluntary, and
participants could remove themselves from the study at any point. I explained several
times that choosing to participate or opt out of the study at any point would not impact
their relationship with me or other professors at Savannah State University.
Methodology
I took a qualitative approach to gathering data. I sought to determine the impact of
communication between extremist groups and college students via messages, posts,
videos, and other forms of communication on social media. I used convenience sampling
to collect data. I interviewed 12 students and recent graduates from Savannah State
University with backgrounds in law enforcement and homeland security. I also
interviewed five law enforcement and homeland security experts who had at least 10
years of experience in the field. Both participant groups were asked same questions. I
gathered data from these experts to help identify differences in how the two groups
interact with people on social media. My aim was to determine if they use social media
differently. I sought to identify gaps between students and experts in terms of what they
experienced on various social media applications. I sought to identify gaps in social
media usage, awareness, and understanding between the two groups.
I used telephone and WebEx interviews to collect data. Time spent on social
media each week, social media applications used regularly, and preferred social media
apps were the independent variables. Dependent variables were the amount of extremist
messages viewed and the impact of these messages. Participants were asked the following
questions:
1. What social media applications do you use?
2. Which social media applications do you use the most?
3. Which social media applications do you use on a daily basis?
4. On which applications have you viewed extremist language,
conversation, or videos?
5. Which social media applications do you use to communicate with
friends, family, and acquaintances?
6. Which social media applications do you use to communicate with
people you do not know personally?
7. Has anyone ever directed extremist language or messages toward you?
If so, on what application did this occur?
8. Has anyone ever attempted to recruit you toward any cause or
fundraising operation on social media?
9. Has anyone from an extremist group ever tried to encourage you to
learn more about their group or cause?
10. Have you ever felt pressured to join an extremist group via social
media?
Follow-up questions were administered accordingly.
I interviewed a diverse group of college students and recent college graduates to
determine how they are affected by extremist language and videos on social media. I felt
they were able to identify extremism on social media because of their backgrounds in
homeland security and law enforcement. My research was not intended to draw
conclusions about larger populations.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed via the Rev Voice and Call Recorder
app. The Microsoft Word transcription tool was used to identify key themes during the
coding process. I developed tables in Microsoft Word for my results.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Students, graduates, and experts in the fields of law enforcement and homeland
security participated in my study because they knew me. Responses were influenced by
their perception of the research topic and their relationships with me. None of the
participants were current or future students of mine. Regardless, participants were aware
that I was a professor who was investigating the extent to which college students are
affected by extremist groups on social media. It is possible that responses were impacted
by the desire of participants to answer questions in a manner which aligns with my
research.
Participants were briefed on the purpose of my research. I reminded the
participants that they could opt at any point. Further, their names would be kept
confidential. Participants were assured of confidentiality. I explained that data would be
secured in my password protected computer in my office on campus for 5 years.
I obtained IRB approval from Savannah State University and Walden University
to conduct research involving students from Savannah State University. The Institutional
Review Board approval number from Savannah State University was 20-1-744. The IRB
approval number from Walden University was 01-14-21-0560221.
Summary
I used a qualitative approach to determine the prevalence of extremism on social
media. Atran et al. (2017) urged researchers to include young people as participants in
counterterrorism studies, due to their vulnerability and awareness on social media. I
interviewed college students and recent graduates of Savannah State University to gain a
better understanding of how they are impacted by extremists on social media. I
implemented several safeguards throughout the process to protect the participants. I
obtained IRB approval from Savannah State University and Walden University. I was
mindful of ethical concerns throughout the process, and I worked judiciously to preserve
the integrity of my research.
Chapter 4 will describe the results of my research. It will provide a discussion of
data collection methods and analysis. Ethical procedures and issues of trustworthiness
will be included. Chapter 4 will display tables which indicate the results of my research.
Chapter 4: Results
In this chapter, I present the findings from my in-depth interviews with college
students, recent graduates, and experts in the fields of homeland security and law
enforcement regarding their usage of social media. The aim of my research was to
determine the extent to which college students are targeted by extremist groups via social
media. Khader et al. (2016) explained how social media offers a world of opportunities
for extremist groups and presents a host of problems for security and law enforcement. I
interviewed 17 individuals about their social media usage: focusing on how often they
use social media, what applications they use, who they interact with, how they interact
with others, and what they view on various platforms. The research question was: How
are extremist groups using social media to recruit college students?
Demographics
Thompson (2011) explained that national security supervisors and administrators
often lack knowledge and awareness of social media platforms. For this research,
respondents were divided into two groups. The first group consisted of five individuals
who were experts in homeland security or law enforcement and had a minimum of 10
years of experience in the field. All the experts were at least 35 years of age. The second
group consisted of 12 individuals who were students or recent graduates in fields related
to law enforcement and homeland security between 20 and 24 years of age. Participants
were college student and recent graduates who majored in fields related to homeland
security and law enforcement. None of the participants were students of mine. Experts
had 10+ years of experience in fields related to law enforcement and homeland security.
Students and experts were recruited to the study via word of mouth and by my colleagues.
The expert group consisted of three White men, one African American man, and one
Native American woman. The student group consisted of three African
American men, two Hispanic men, two white males, and three African American women.
Data Collection
Data were gathered from college students, recent graduates, and experts about
what they view on social media applications. Interviews were conducted via phone and
WebEx. Questions focused on how different social media applications allow for the
formulation of new ideas, relationships, and other influences. Specifically, I sought to
determine how participants use social media to interact with friends, family, and
acquaintances and how this differs from how they meet new people and form new
relationships via social media.
Participants were asked about their social media usage and their views on how it is
used as a recruitment tool for extremist organizations. Data gathered helped identify
differences in how each group uses social media. Gaps were identified in how students
and experts use social media and the extremist messages they view.
Tables 1 and 2 below summarize key findings and questions posed to
interviewees. Both groups were asked the following questions:
1. What social media applications do you use?
2. Which social media applications do you use the most?
3. Which social media applications do you use on a daily basis?
4. On which applications have you viewed extremist language,
conversation, or videos?
5. Which social media applications do you use to communicate with
friends, family, and acquaintances?
6. Which social media applications do you use to communicate with
people you do not know personally?
7. Has anyone ever directed extremist language or messages toward you?
If so, on what application did this occur?
8. Has anyone ever attempted to recruit you toward any cause or
fundraising operation on social media?
9. Has anyone from an extremist group ever tried to encourage you to
learn more about their group or cause?
10. Have you ever felt pressured to join an extremist group via social
media?
Follow-up questions were administered accordingly.
In Table 1 and Table 2, the first column indicates the code name given to each
participant. The second column denotes which social media applications the respondent is
active on. The third column shows which applications they use at least once each day.
The fourth column shows designates what application they used the most. The fifth
column shows how many hours they spend on average each day on social media. The
sixth column denotes where they saw extremist material and what it consisted of. The
Participant Social media Apps used at App used Hours spent Apps with
Pressured to apps are you least once the most on social extremist
join an
in use per day media per language, extremist group day messages, or cause via
posts, or social media
videos
seventh column conveys the extent to which they felt pressured to join an extremist
group.
Data Analysis
Experts were interviewed to determine if their experiences were different from
those of the students. Results showed that there was a stark difference in how the two
groups used social media to interact with others. The results from the experts are
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Experts in the Field
NC (retired
officer)
FB, IG, YT FB FB 1-2 FB- QAnon
stuff
No but can see
how others
would be more
vulnerable
RD (officer) IG, Twit,
Reddit, Snap
Twit & Snap Twit 1-2 None online Nope just
derogatory stuff
about
everything
TC (educator) FB,
WhatsApp,
FB, IG,
WhatsApp
FB 2-3 Yes- FB (can
easily
stumble upon
stuff you
don’t intend
to)
Nope but can
see how others
can be
RW (officer) FB, IG, Twit FB FB 1-2 Yes- FB
(military,
religious,
LEO- anti
and pro right
wing)
No- but if
younger more
inexperienced
yes
PW
(communications
Officer)
FB, IG, Twit FB FB 1-2 Yes- FB Not really but
see how
students are
vulnerable
Note. FB= Facebook, IG=Instagram, YT= YouTube, Snap= Snapchat, Twit= Twitter,
HS= Homeland Security and LEO= Law enforcement officer
Students spent much more time on social media each day, and they were more
active on a wider range of apps than the experts. Student results are summarized in Table
2.
Table 2
College Students
Participant Social media Apps used at Apps used Hours spent Apps with
Pressured to join apps in use least once the most on social extremist
an extremist
per day media per language, group or cause
day messages, posts, via social media?
or videos
BK FB, IG, Snap,
Twit
FB, IG, Snap Snap 5-6 FB- all over it FB was so bad I
deleted the app
LL FB, IG, Snap,
Twit
FB, IG,
Snap, Twit
Snap 6-8 FB and IG- go
back to your
country
remarks
Nope but racism
in comments and
replies
MF Twit, FB,
Snap
FB, Snap,
twitter
Twitter 6-7 Racism against
Hispanics on FB
and Twit
Nope but asked
about anti-LEO
stuff
GF IG, Snap, YT,
FB
IG, Snap, FB Snap 5-6 Extremist
language and
messages on
snap
Nope just lot of
discrimination
and hate
DB Snap IG FB
TikTok
Snap IG FB
TikTok
TikTok 8+ HT on FB Regular msg and
invites to group
for modeling
human trafficking
CF FB, IG, Twit,
Snap, TikTok
Snap, IG,
FB, TikTok
Snap 4-6 Yes- IG
someone
identifying as
Antifa
Little bit
BS IG FB
Twitter Snap
Parler
IG FB twit
snap Parler
Parler 6+ Lot of racist
stuff on Parler
Anti-govt/ far
right and racism
TM IG, Twit, FB,
Snap
IG, Twit,
FB, Snap
IG 7-8 FB- violence
groping of
women
No but constant
comments about
groping women
seemed to be ok
KE FB, Twit, IG,
Snap
FB, Twit,
IG, Snap
IG 6-8 FB- violence
against black
people/women
No- but
scary/intimidating
AH Twitter, Snap,
IG, FB
TikTok
Twitter,
Snap, IG, FB
TikTok
TikTok 8+ Twit, IG, and
TikTok had
terrible
comments
toward women
Not really but I’m
smart/aware
because of HS
background
KH Twit, Snap,
IG
Twit, Snap,
IG
IG 6-7 Twitter-not at
me personal but
just people
putting it out
there
Yes- DMing me
for HT- sexual
trafficking $$
(Sugar daddies)
GW FB IG
Twitter Snap
FB IG
Twitter Snap
Twitter 5-6 Twitter- anti
human
rights/religious
talk
Not at me but it’s
there. My
background
helps.
Each student spent at least 4 hours each day on social media, with some spending
8 or more. CF explained that he used social media much less than most of his peers. I
check it first thing in the morning, usually on the bus and during lunch. If I’m
bored in class or at the gym. Then maybe after dinner and when I get in bed. Lot
of my friends never get off it. They’re scrolling through or have it open all day.
CF still spent 4-5 hours a day total on social media.
Four of the five experts browsed Facebook every day. None of the experts
typically spent more than 3 hours per day on social media. A common theme among
experts was that they scheduled certain parts of their day to check social media, and they
rarely accessed applications outside of that time. Nearly all the students admitted to
checking social media out of boredom or habit. NC noted, “My wife and I check
Facebook at night when we get home. Gives us something to talk about. I don’t get on it
at work.”
Four of the five experts said Facebook was the social media app they used the
most. None of the students or recent graduates uses Facebook the most. Snapchat and
Twitter were the most popular among the student group. Instagram and Tik Tok were
mentioned as two applications most of the student group uses at least once a day. Parler
and Tik Tok were two applications used by the student group that none of the experts
mentioned in their interviews. Two of the students said TikTok was the app they use the
most, while none of the experts were active on the app.
Students spent more time on social media, used a wider range of social media
applications, and had different experiences than the group of experts. Four of the five
experts explained that they saw extremist speech on social media; all of it came on
Facebook. Students and recent graduates experienced extremist messages and posts on
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Parler, and TikTok. Students experienced hate speech and
extremist messages on social media applications that experts in the field never used.
None of the experts felt pressured by extremist groups or individuals via social media.
They said that their knowledge, experience, and training were the reasons for this. They
felt like students and those with less experience might be more vulnerable to being
attracted to an extremist organization or cause. The expert participants explained that
extremists target young people for a variety of reasons and young people are a vulnerable
group.
The results were mixed in the student group when it came to feeling pressured
from extremist groups or individuals. Two students admitted they were pressured by
extremist groups via social media. Others stated they did not feel pressured but
acknowledged how college students are especially vulnerable. Most of the students felt
that taking classes in their respective majors and being aware of online threats protected
them. Others felt students with different majors might be more vulnerable.
Student BK deleted Facebook because it was filled with extremist posts and
videos. He received several threatening messages and responses from people he did not
know personally. Multiple students encountered racist remarks across various platforms.
The group of experts acknowledged that political and religious extremist groups were a
problem on Facebook, but none of them had experiences with racism, threats, or pressure
from a group or individual.
Two of the female students received multiple messages regarding private
modeling and being paid for dates with older, wealthy men. These participants explained
how they were pressured multiple times over the course of a few months, and they feared
these men were involved in human trafficking. Student KH explained, “I got a bunch of
messages about sugar babies/sugar daddies. Instagram was the worst for that. I got rid of
my old account, and it’s not bad on my new one.” Two other female respondents in the
student group were sent multiple videos and messages in which women were groped and
brutalized. One student, AH, said she felt pressured to join or participate in the activities,
but all four were contacted by multiple individuals over the course of a few months about
criminal activities. None of the law enforcement experts experienced anything similar.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Process for Credibility
I interviewed students, graduates, and experts in the field of homeland security
and law enforcement. During the coding process, other professors checked the data and
listened to voice recordings. I included quotations from the interviews as part of the
analysis to support findings.
Evidence of Transferability
I strictly adhered to procedures described in previous chapters. Open-ended
questions, such as the ones used in this study, should allow any researcher to gather rich
data from respondents regarding their social media usage. Being familiar with
respondents influenced responses, likely resulting in deeper conversations and answers.
For data to be credible and to contribute to the existing literature, they must be applied to
other contexts and studies.
Process for Dependability
I used the Rev iPhone app to record and transcribe all the interviews. This allowed
for successful coding of the data. University professors reviewed the data as well.
Participants were made aware that all the interviews were being recorded. Each
participant gave consent to being recorded.
Confirmability
To ensure confirmability, I took separate notes during the interviews, monitoring
specific themes as they appeared. As noted, the complete transcripts helped in the coding
process, but the brief notes I took with each interview allowed me to pay attention to
specific themes and common replies I heard from respondents. Some of the interviews
were conducted via WebEx, so I was able to monitor body language and other nonverbal
communication. Rich data resulted from the interview method of using the Rev app to
record and transcribe while taking brief notes by hand.
Results
The research question asked how extremist groups were using social media to
recruit college students. There was evidence that this occurred as three students were
contacted by various extremist groups via social media. Others stumbled upon extremist
videos and were exposed to extremist literature. There was evidence that at least one of
the students felt pressured to join a radical group. None of the experts were contacted by
extremist groups via social media.
Students received several threats from racist individuals and groups on various
social media platforms. One of the respondents felt like he was targeted specifically
because he was a Black student at a Black college. When asked about feeling pressured to
join an extremist group, BK responded,
No, it’s not like that. But when I used to have Facebook, people said racist stuff
all the time. When I’d comment on a post, I guess they clicked on my profile and
it said Savannah State, so they knew I was Black.
BK explained that the harassment and abuse got so bad that he deleted the app. Other
students complained of similar racist comments and abuse on various social media
applications.
The abuse that these students and recent graduates described was obviously
troubling. None of the experts experienced similar abuse or threats. TC, one of the
experts, acknowledged the existence of racism and other derogatory language on social
media, but he explained that there were ways to avoid it:
I use WhatsApp to speak to family and friends when I travel around the world.
I’m active on Facebook, but only connect with people I know. There’s definitely
hate speech and terrible stuff out there, but there are ways around it if you know
what you’re doing.
He felt that his training and expertise insulated him from threats and attacks.
As a group, experts agreed that extremist language existed on the platforms, but
for various reasons, they did not feel like they were targeted by real threats or abuse.
When asked if he had ever been pressured to join an extremist group, one of the experts,
NC responded, “I haven't felt pressured, but I could imagine that a lot of people that are
not solid in their own convictions and their own ethics and their own morals could feel
pressured to do so”. He acknowledged that many do feel this pressure for various reasons,
but he and others with training and experience in homeland security were not targets of
extremist groups.
Summary
My research was intended to determine the extent to which college students were
targeted by extremist groups online on social media. A diverse group of current students
and recent graduates with majors related to law enforcement and homeland security were
interviewed. I felt these students understood common terrorist recruitment strategies as
well as what constitutes extremist language and hate speech. Experts were interviewed to
determine if there was a difference in how they used and experienced social media
compared to the students and recent graduates. Further, if experts in the field used social
media less overall, were active on fewer applications, and were ignorant of new, popular
applications, was there a gap in understanding of how prominent extremism and
recruitment of young people were on social media applications?
Research showed that these experts, who all had more than 10 years of experience
in the field, were out of touch with how college students and recent graduates used social
media and what they saw on various applications. The experts claimed they were aware
of threats but were not as vulnerable because of their knowledge and experience in the
field. They rarely felt like they were targets or intimidated by extremist groups and
speech. Students thought they were less vulnerable due to their knowledge and education,
but they experienced far more threats, discrimination, recruitment, and illicit offers. Both
groups felt their training and schooling prepared them for threats and dangers on social
media, but it was apparent students and recent graduates were targeted far more
frequently and more intensely than the group of experts.
A handful of students discussed the power of hashtags in social media posts.
They explained how groups and individuals use hashtags to circulate messages, photos,
and videos to a larger audience. Also, hashtags allowed people to search and find more
posts related to a common subject, term, or phrase. Research showed that students were
familiar with dozens of popular hashtags across various social media applications. Most
of the experts knew what hashtags were, but none elaborated on how they were an
instrumental tool on social media. They were unfamiliar with some of the most common
hashtags on Instagram, TikTok, and Twitter. It was clear the experts used these
applications, along with Snapchat, much less frequently, but it was also apparent they
were unaware of much of the message in the posts they were viewing.
Research showed that students were far more susceptible to discrimination, leud
contact, and racism on social media. Both were diverse groups, but none of the experts
expressed concerns about being targets because of their race or gender. Racial insults and
discrimination were some of the most prevalent claims from the students. One student
deleted his Facebook account because of all the threats and intimidation he experienced
due to his race. Experts said nothing about trafficking or making sexual advances at
young women. Multiple female students were targets of leud and aggressive behavior
toward women. Two of them were solicited for sex, and one was intimidated by videos of
violent sexual attacks on women. These experiences were all unique to students. Results
showed that there were two, separate social media worlds for the two groups. Experts saw
extremist language, mainly on Facebook, and acknowledged how it could be readily
circulated. They felt many could stumble upon new, dangerous ideas even intentionally.
Further, others without their experience, education, and training were certainly more
vulnerable. They admitted that young people used social media more frequently in a way
in which they did not. In sum, they recognized the violent prospects of social media, but
personally they experienced very little of it.
Almost half of the students said that Facebook used to be more popular, but said it
was mainly for “old people” now. Many students experienced intimidation, threats, and
other issues on Facebook, but as a group, they expressed what they experienced on
Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter, and Tik Tok was much worse than Facebook by itself.
Female students were solicited for sex on Instagram and multiple students were victims
of racism on Tik Tok and Snapchat, platforms the experts never used. Research was clear
that a gap exists in how young people and their bosses, managers, superior officers, and
supervisors use social media and what they experience on various platforms. This
research identified a possible gap in understanding of how individuals use social media
and how their experiences influence their lives. College and recent graduates were more
vulnerable to threats, but they were more aware as well. They use social media more, and
they use it differently than their professors, supervisors, and superiors. What can be done
to address this gap that might impact positive social change? Dialogue between the
groups must be established. Perhaps entry level positions consisting of young people and
recent graduates should be given more consideration in homeland security and law
enforcement jobs related to social media and online security threats. The counterterrorism
community must continually adapt to new threats. College students are essential to
national security.
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
My research was intended to determine the extent to which college students are
targeted by extremist groups via social media. Prior research has shown that social media
is the main tool used by extremist groups to connect with young people (Archetti, 2015).
As a professor, I had access to students and recent graduates in the fields of homeland
security and law enforcement who recognized the threat of online extremist groups. I
interviewed 12 students and recent graduates about their experiences on social media.
Then, I interviewed five experts in the fields of homeland security and law enforcement
to determine what gaps, if any, existed between the two groups.
Weimann (2014) explained that college-age students were much more active on
social media than prior generations. The results of this research showed that students and
experts have different experiences on social media. Students and recent graduates were
more active across a wider range of social media applications than the group of experts.
There was evidence that extremist groups contacted students and sent them information
about radical causes. Students were also much more likely to be victims of racial and
sexual abuse via social media.
Interpretation of the Findings
Amedie (2015) indicated that failing to effectively monitor extremist groups
online represents a threat to U.S. national security. Stevens and Neumann (2009)
acknowledged the cultural and generational gaps that existed between counterterrorism
experts and those typically recruited by online extremist groups. This research showed
several differences in how experts and young people use social media and interact with
others on various applications. Students and recent graduates spent more than twice as
much time each day on social media as experts did. Students and recent graduates were
active on applications experts were not familiar with.
Security officials face several challenges on social media. Klausen (2015)
explained the importance of security forces monitoring extremist groups on social media
while noting several challenges. Research showed that experts were unaware of the extent
to which students and recent graduates suffer abuse on social media. Experts felt they
were insulated from being targeted by extremist groups and other threats due to their
training, knowledge, and experience. Students and recent graduates felt they were less
vulnerable than their peers who had not taken classes in homeland security or criminal
justice, but they reported habitual racial and sexual abuse on various applications.
Students were contacted by extremist groups, and one student felt pressured to
join. GF explained,
I first heard about them on Facebook. Then I looked at some of their stuff on
Twitter and YouTube. Videos were cool. They kept wanting me to get in a text
group. After a few messages, I got out, but they kept tweeting me stuff and
tagging me in comments on YouTube. It went on for like a month.
They stopped contacting him after a month, but they connected with him across multiple
platforms.
Other students were approached by men claiming to work for modeling agencies.
Two female students stopped posting pictures on their accounts because of prior
messages they received from men who expressed an interest in being their sugar daddies.
Other students expressed similar concerns and explained they made private accounts with
a nickname to avoid additional abuse. Research showed a clear distinction in what
students and experts were subjected to on social media.
Limitations of the Study
I interviewed a group of students and recent graduates and a group of law
enforcement and homeland security experts, who I knew from conferences and
community events. Students and experts were willing to participate because they knew
me. BK explained,
I know you teach that Terrorism class, so I figured you could use some of what I
had to say about social media and stuff. I also know you can’t use my name or
anything because you teach.
I was able to recruit a diverse group of students and experts in the fields of homeland
security and law enforcement who were willing to answer personal questions about their
social media usage. This would be problematic for a researcher who was unfamiliar with
their participants.
Participants shared personal social media habits and experiences with me. I was
able to gather rich data, in part, because of my familiarity with the participants.
Numerous participants mentioned that their responses would be different if someone else
was asking the questions. KH stated, “I wouldn’t just tell anyone that. But I remember
you speaking at that trafficking group about how it happens all the time in the U.S.” She
said this after describing how multiple men solicited her on Instagram for modeling
auditions, which entailed sexual acts. Participants unfamiliar with a researcher would
likely be hesitant to provide such personal information.
My research was not intended to draw broader conclusions about a larger
population. Interviews were conducted to gather rich data from a diverse group of
students. Participants provided detailed explanations of their interactions and experiences
on social media. Quantitative research is recommended to generate knowledge and
insights about how my findings might extend to populations.
Most of the interviews were completed over the phone, while a few of the
interviews were conducted via WebEx. Not all participants had access to video calls, and
social distancing precautions due to the Covid-19 pandemic made it impossible to meet
face-to-face. WebEx interviews resulted in clearer communication. These conversations,
which allowed the participant and I to see each other, allowed me to interpret responses
based on facial expressions and body language. Future studies using face-to-face
interviews and video conferencing will likely improve data collection due to observing
facial expressions and body language.
Recommendations
As a professor, I had unique access to a group of students and experts in the field
of homeland security and law enforcement who were willing to answer questions about
their personal lives on social media. For future research, I suggest having a personal
connection to the participants. As mentioned, this helped recruit participants and likely
increased their willingness to share details about social media interactions and
experiences with racism, sexual harassment, and other issues.
Interviews were the sole data collection method for this research. I felt that
interviews allowed participants to share honest, personal social media experiences, and I
was able to collect rich data through this method. For future research, I suggest
conducting interviews and focus groups. Allowing students and experts to discuss their
experiences together might encourage more open, thoughtful discussion about what each
is subjected to on social media and perceptions of why this occurs. I recommend focus
groups that consist of only students, mixed groups of students and experts, and a group
exclusively made up of experts. This will allow for gaps in understanding to be observed
more thoroughly.
I asked each participant the same 10 questions. For future research, I suggest
asking 15-20 detailed questions. I had issues with short responses for questions that were
not open-ended. Participants often spent most of their time giving extended answers to
one or two of the questions. I suggest implementing time expectations for each question.
Implications
Social media is the primary tool for violent, extremist groups to recruit new
members (Eze, 2018). To produce positive societal change, security forces must
implement a multilayered plan, involving vertical and horizontal partners, to monitor and
disrupt extremist groups from targeting college students on social media. Law
enforcement officials at the local, state, and federal levels must communicate effectively,
sharing relevant information in an efficient manner. Educational institutions must
cooperate with government agencies and organizations, while companies and businesses
become involved in the process as well.
Research has shown that experts in the field of homeland security and law
enforcement failed to grasp the extent to which students and recent graduates are
threatened and abused on social media. Students were subjected to conduct and threats
that experts never experienced. Predatory individuals attempted to exploit female students
on applications that experts never used. Experts acknowledged the potential dangers of
social media, but they failed to understand the magnitude and proximity of the
threat.
Both groups of participants described instances of extremism on Facebook, a
social media application each group used regularly. Expert participants indicated they felt
one could insulate oneself from extremist language and abuse on the application. One
student, Bk, was harassed so badly on Facebook, that he deleted his account. He felt
compelled to do so after reporting more than 25 racist comments and posts aimed at him.
Research showed a clear difference in how students and experts were affected by the
threats of the online world, specifically on social media.
Failing to understand the extent to which college students are targeted by
extremist groups via social media is a serious impediment to national security. It
represents a threat to the mental health of college students, young professionals, and
others who experience similar threats and abuses on social media. If experts in the field of
homeland security and law enforcement are not well versed on perils of social media,
national security is compromised.
At a minimum, communication between young professionals and their supervisors
in the fields of homeland security and law enforcement must improve. Recent graduates,
who are likely to be more active and aware on social media, should be emboldened to
advise decision makers. These young graduates, who have superior knowledge and
understanding of social media, should be given discretion to monitor threats across
various applications. The counterterrorism strategy must continually adapt to growing
threats of the cyber world. Including young people and recent graduates in the
decisionmaking process is a vital step to effectively monitoring extremist groups on
social media.
Social media platforms displayed the ability to restrict disinformation during the
2020 United States Presidential Election. Applications such as Twitter and Facebook
further demonstrated this during the Covid-19 pandemic. At the federal level, the United
States government must do more to compel these companies to address issues of racism,
sexual exploitation, and other forms of abuse.
Conclusion
Huey (2015) illustrated the complex world of online extremism. The purpose of
this research was to determine the extent to which college students were impacted by
extremists on social media. Twelve students and recent graduates of Savannah State
University were interviewed to gain an understanding of what they typically experienced
on social media. They described an extensive list of threats and dangers on social media.
One student, GW, explained, “I don’t know if it happens everywhere, but everyone I
know here has heard it before. Some more than others but we’ve all seen it. It sucks, you
know, but who can stop it?” Further research is needed to determine if this is a typical
experience for college students in the United States. This study revealed the impact hate
speech, racism, sexual exploitation, and other abuse has on college students.
Research showed distinct differences in how college students and experts in the
field of homeland security and law enforcement used social media. As a professor at
Savannah State University, I had access to a group of diverse students who had been
historically underrepresented in similar studies. They shared details about what they
experienced on social media: recruitment by extremist groups, racism, physical threats,
attempted sexual exploitation, and other forms of abuse. Experts in the field of homeland
security and law enforcement acknowledged the dangers and risks associated with social
media, but they failed to comprehend the extent to which students and recent graduates
were impacted by various threats.
Monitoring extremist groups on social media is an important aspect of U.S.
national security. College students provide a window into the true perils and dangers that
exist on social media. They are integral factors in promoting positive social change;
opening our eyes to abuse and exploitation, while guiding us to a solution.
