Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Biometrics in Trusted Traveler Programs

Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Biometrics in

Trusted Traveler Programs

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Through the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States and the world became

aware of the reality of terrorism. Governments around the world created counterterrorism

measures to aviation security, as aviation was the chosen method by terrorist

organizations to execute attacks due to its high media coverage. As a response to the

terrorist attacks, the United States federal government passed and approved the U.S.

Patriot Act of 2001 and the Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001 (ATSA)

enabling the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).

The ATSA established a new department that allowed for more

communication and information sharing among different government agencies (TSA,

2013). In March 2003, two years after the creation of the TSA, the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) was created to supervise the TSA and Customs and Border

Protection (CBP) which are the agencies entrusted with the implementation and

management of Trusted

Traveler programs (DHS, 2014).

Background of the Study

For a decade DHS and its agencies implemented a single model of screening for

incoming and outgoing travelers in the United States and its territories. Through time and

with congressional pressure, DHS sought innovative ways of conducting their operations

as a result of budgetary cuts (TSA, 2009). In 2009, DHS introduced a series of Trusted

Traveler programs that enable travelers to enroll in an expedited security screening

experience within the United States and its territories. The TSA introduced a similar

program in 2011 allowing frequent flyers the opportunity to pilot the program and set its

implementation in 2013 (TSA, 2013).

In 2013, DHS agencies had fully implemented the Trusted Traveler Programs

where enrollment is based on a traveler’s background history, biometric collection, and

acceptance of terms and conditions; with a renewal process at 5-year intervals (TSA,

2014). The DHS introduced biometrics into the expedited screening process for

outgoing and incoming travelers to ensure citizen safety and freedom of commerce

(9/11 Commission Report, 2004).

Trusted Traveler Programs are designed to target specific travelers and their

needs. Global Entry is for the U.S. business traveler who often travels internationally and

wants to speed through the lines upon entry into the United States and its territories

(CBP, 2014). NEXUS is for the traveler who often travels to Canada for business or

pleasure, SENTRI is for the traveler crossing between the United States and Mexico, and

FAST is for the movement of shipping goods, provided that the company and driver are

categorized as low risk (CBP, 2014).

These programs are administrated by CBP, which has agreements with other

national governments such as Canada, Mexico, South Korea, Netherlands, Australia, and

New Zealand to have enrolled travelers receive expedited security screening in those

countries. Pre-Check is administered by the TSA and offers expedited security screening

through commercial airports (TSA, 2013). The traveler has the option to enroll in any

CBP program and will automatically receive entry into the TSA Pre-Check program as

long as the traveler is flying with a participating airline carrier (CBP, 2014).

All of these Trusted Traveler programs include the capture of personal

identification information (PII) such as biometrics to be used in the enrollment process.

The collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of PII is protected under the Privacy

Act of 1974 and requires federal agencies to give public notice of their system of records

by publication in the Federal Register; therefore, prohibiting the disclosure of

information from a system of records without the written consent of the individual,

unless the disclosure is under the 12 statutory exceptions (Woodward, 2008, pp. 357-

379).

Statement of the Problem

To enforce the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report to enhance

security measures, DHS agencies need to be in compliance with the Privacy Act of

1974. The DHS has to address the concerns of privacy advocates who insist that the

government is infringing into the civil liberties of the individual (Nelson, 2004).

Therefore, DHS must be able to address these concerns related to privacy, before it is

able to implement the use of biometrics as a security measure for screening of incoming

and outgoing travelers (Nelson, 2004).

Besides remaining in compliance with the Privacy Act requirements and

addressing the concerns of privacy advocates, DHS agencies have to consider the

differences in individuals’ attitudes, and perspectives. The acceptance of the

technology has to be considered as the “end-user” will be affected by the collection, and

the use of biometrics to enhance security in the expedited screening procedures

(Moroson, 2012). The understanding of such individual beliefs can help DHS, TSA,

airport managers, and industry experts in making decisions about whether the

introduction of biometrics into the expedited security procedures would be met with

resistance or acceptance among the traveling public (Boo & Jones, 2009).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this mixed-method study was to investigate privacy concerns of

travelers regarding the use of biometrics in Trusted Traveler Programs. In this study, I

investigated whether ease to use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the adopted

biometric technology would influence its implementation into the expedited screening

procedures of commercial airports in the United States.

In the study, I explored the various trends in the acceptance of biometric

technologies in a commercial airport environment based on the Trusted Travelers given

perception of privacy and airport experience and examined the factors that may

contribute to the propensity of DHS agencies to adopt biometric technology into the

expedited screening process. The role of human behaviors plays a significant role in the

implementation of any public policy and must be considered in organizational operations.

It is important that human behaviors be explored as they may have the ability to impact

the adoption of new technologies and expedited security procedures (Chan, 2002).

Nature of the Study

The overall research design was to explore the relationship between privacy

concerns of the individual participating in a Trusted Traveler Program and the adoption

of biometric technologies into the identity verification process in commercial airports as

an expedited security procedure. I used a document review as a method of collecting data

from multiple sources of information. According to Creswell (2007), the document

review method is used when there is a need for the data to answer what and how

questions. The first phase of the data collection has been incorporated into the literature

review, and included supporting documents that covered the use of biometrics in Trusted

Traveler Programs (2011-2014). It also covered the theoretical foundation of the study

(Davis’ TAM model).

The second phase of the data (Chapter 4) collection process included primary and

secondary documents that covered the reaction of individuals enrolled into Trusted

Traveler Programs and their concerns about privacy, ease of use, and usefulness of the

biometric system. I examined archival documents to determine the government’s actions

to safeguard an enrollee’s privacy and the role of attitudes, organizational factors, and

social demographics in the process of the acceptance to the use of biometric technologies.

Further discussion of the methodology and the research design used is provided in

Chapter 3.

Research Questions

The following research questions guided the study:

Research Question 1: Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of

biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?

Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the

technology, and security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the

expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?

Theoretical Foundations

The theoretical framework is based upon Morosan (2012) research on feelings

generated on the use of biometric technology in various industries. It further focuses on

the technology acceptance model (TAM) by Davis (1989). Davis’ TAM discusses the

ease of use of the technology and theories between organizational, social, and technical

factors that Trusted Travelers experience within a commercial airport environment to

enhance security measures.

In this study, Davis’ TAM was reference as it takes into account an individual’s

perceived ease of use and the usefulness of the technology (Davis, 1989). Furthermore,

Davis’ (1989) model explains the two beliefs that determine the attitudes for

organizations to adopt new technologies. The model suggests that the attitude

towards adoption will likely be decided on the adopter’s positive or negative

experience (Grembergen & Haes, 2008).

Trusted Traveler Programs incorporate a change in society because it places the

traveling public into two categories, low-risk and high-risk changing air travel screening

procedures. When a traveler decides to participate in a program, he or she willingly gives

up personal information in order to obtain benefits that expedite security screening during

traveling.

Operational Definitions of Terms

Biometric: The digital representation of an individual’s distinct behavioral and

physical characteristics (NSTC, 2006a).

Biometric template: Is the information captured of a sample of a biometric that

becomes the electronic data based on the observation of the characteristics of an

individual (NSTC, 2006a).

Biometric system: Is the process of comparing sets of biometric data with an

existing set that was previously collected, it is used to assist human-driven comparisons

to help screening officers compare an image of an individual on an identification card or

on a storage device (NSTC, 2006a). This process collects a sample, converts that sample

into a template and compares the templates to those previously collected (GAO, 2002).

All biometric systems perform recognition to again know a person who has previously

enrolled into the system. These systems conduct a verification process by the

comparison of a new biometric with an existing one that has previously enrolled into the

system (Morosan, 2012).

Enrollment: The process that a biometric system is specifically set to identify a

person. The person must present an identifier that later is link to an acquisition device

producing a biometric template (GAO, 2002, p.3).

Verification: The process to confirm whether an individual is who they claim to

be and the transaction that connects the process governing the physical access to the

resources of an organization (NSTC, 2006a).

Identification: The process to confirm whether an individual is who they claim to

be except that no identifier is provided. A trial template is compared with the reference

templates of all those enrolled into the system (GAO, 2002, p.4).

False match rate: This occurs when a system incorrectly matches an identity

(GAO, 2002, p.5).

False non-match rate: This occurs when a system rejects a valid identity (GAO,

2002, p. 5).

Failure to enroll rate: This rate measures the probability that a person will be

unable to enroll into a biometric system (GAO, 2002, p.5.).

Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management: This subcommittee is

under the U.S Government National Science & Technology Council (NSTC). The

council developed a report on the examination of the implementation of biometrics into

the use of government services. The subcommittee examined the use of biometrics of

government services into data management, collection of biometrics, ease of use and

speed in verification, and an appeal process in the event that the technology fails to verify

the individual (NSTC, 2006a).

Privacy: The conceptual definition of privacy based on Warren and Brandeis

(1890) is the “claim that an individual’s interest arises as an assertion against other

individuals or organizations to prevent interference from an individual’s autonomy”

(Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Each individual has the desire for physical space where he

or she can be free from embarrassment, accountability, intrusion, or interruption, and the

attempt to control the disclosures of personal information about themselves (Warren &

Brandeis, 1890).

The Privacy Act of 1974: The law requires a set of fair information

principles governing how the government collects, use, and maintains the use of

personally identifiable information in databases and record systems (Nelson, 2004).

The Government Act of 2002: The law requires government agencies to

implement assessments of the use of information technology and the potential affects

it may bring on privacy (Nelson, 2004).

Trusted Traveler: Is a U.S. citizen or foreign national who has been approved

by CBP to participate in a Trusted Traveler Program and is eligible for expedited

security screening with TSA Pre-Check (CBP, 2014).

Trusted Traveler Program: Program that provides expedited security screening

travel for pre-approved, low risk travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks (CBP,

2014.)

Significance of the Study

The study is significant because it allows DHS agencies to explore various

options when planning to adopt biometrics into the expedited screening procedures

across commercial airports in the United States and its territories, as it relates to matters

of privacy. The study makes it contribution to the literature by specifically addressing

privacy in Trusted Traveler programs as it relates to expedited security screening and the

adoption of biometric technologies in commercial airports (Merlano, 2014, p. 1).

Assumptions

In this study, I assumed that travelers enrolled in Trusted Traveler programs under

DHS agencies enjoyed the benefits of having a faster security experience through the

checkpoints in the United States and its territories. However, some researchers have

raised questions about the effectiveness of biometric systems into security systems based

on the capture and verification rates of current technology developments (NSTC, 2006a).

The Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management under the NSTC reported in

2006 that the “effectiveness of a particular biometric technology is dependent on how

and where the technology is used” (p.5).

To avoid any bias about the benefits of Trusted Traveler programs, I explored the

arguments of privacy advocates and those organizations that state that an individual

should not give up their right to privacy, or release personal information to have a faster

security screening experience; to draw a broad picture about the adoption of biometrics

into the expedited screening process in a commercial airport environment.

I also assumed that the participants in the archival complaints submitted to the

DHS Privacy Office that were used in this study answered truthfully and provided

honest answers to the questions on the complaint forms. I tried to account for the effect

of this assumption by analyzing different privacy annual reports and GAO reports on

privacy assessments that revealed various points of view (data triangulation).

Another assumption was that the data collected from the complaints and archival

documents were comprehensive and gathered the relevant information needed to answer

the questions of the study. A data collection form was developed to summarize the data

that was collected from all the documents, which helped me to compile and analyzed the

findings.

The final assumption was that responses to the study questions truthfully reflected

the assessments of legal experts. The legal system has not yet included new advances in

technology into its legal interpretation; therefore, balancing an individual’s right to

privacy had not been addressed in this regard. I tried to reach a group of specialists

dealing with legal matters under the subject of national security. I did this in an attempt

to provide various points of view on effective and efficient security measures while

remaining compliant with laws pertaining to privacy and the traveling public.

Scope of the Study

The implementation of Trusted Traveler Programs was an initiative by the DHS

to free resources as a result of budget reductions. The programs created a risk-based

model in security screening where it classified travelers into categories in which the

government had known or little information of individuals. The scope of the study was to

extend an assessment of the effects of Trusted Traveler programs and the potential to

adopt biometric systems to be implemented into the expedited security screening of

travelers in a commercial airport environment. The study involved the views of

specialists from national and international organizations, as well as individual’s enrolled

into a Trusted Traveler Program that had knowledge about the enrollment process and the

benefits of the current programs as describe by the GAO and the DHS Privacy Office.

Limitations and Delimitations

This research was about the privacy concerns related to the use of biometric

technology in Trusted Traveler programs specifically applied to the commercial airport

environment. The overall research design was an explanatory case study that included a

document review analysis. The review of primary documents (number of enrollees,

institution’s reports, and agency data) was complemented with the selection of

secondary data (journal articles, newspaper articles, and social media reactions) to see

the extent of the use of Trusted Traveler programs in public policy.

The study results will be disseminated to countries looking to implement these

types of risk-based security programs. The purpose is to allow countries to consider when

possible, the results of the study in developing or implementing Trusted Traveler

programs to free up resources and develop security standards based on intelligence driven

data. Yet, the creation of a set of suggestions that may work for all countries is not within

the scope of this study because each country has specific set conditions, and what works

in the United States might not be applicable to other countries. Thus, in future studies,

this topic might be worthy of examination for other countries engaged in national

security policies.

Implications for Social Change

By placing this study within the body of the research on social and political

change, the results may be used to enhance the discussion for the U.S Supreme Court to

bring about a clear interpretation of the fourth amendment and the U.S. Patriot Act of

2001. This research contributes to the deficiency in the literature as it addresses the

privacy aspect through legal matters as it relates to advances in information technology.

This study may give authorities, scholars, and specialists the opportunity to determine

which actions should be implemented in their policies.

The implementation of Trusted Traveler programs in American civil society has

already impacted the traveling public and commerce in commercial airports (Neyland,

2009). The American people will have to make the decision to give up their personal

privacy in order to receive the benefits of expedited security during the screening process

or not participate in such programs and continue to get standard screening in commercial

airports. Yet, Trusted Traveler programs are not just limited to the airport environment,

but those of border crossings and marine time entry within the U.S for the import and

export of commerce.

The goal of such research was to make a contribution to the existing body of

knowledge on the subject, so that individuals and civil society in the U.S. could better

understand issues and problems; propose and arrive at solutions, and foster the

continuation of change-oriented debate in public policy.

The implementation of Trusted Traveler programs with the adoption of

biometric technologies into the expedited screening process may interest other countries

with similar characteristics to those of the U.S. to implement programs of the same

nature (Neyland, 2009). It is hoped that this research will provide a platform for other

researchers to build on and conduct further studies on the subject.

Chapter Summary

The main purpose of this research was to explore and explain the relationship

between the privacy concerns of travelers and the adoption of biometrics into the

expedited screening process of outgoing travelers in Trusted Traveler programs.

Furthermore, the relationship between privacy, the adoption and use of biometrics is to

include the role of different stakeholders, local, state, and national legislation, and

explore and explain whether the traveler is accepting of the technology that would be

incorporated as it relates to privacy. For this research, a mixed method approach design

was chosen. Two research questions guided the study. The questions were answered

through quantitative and qualitative methods to understand technology acceptance.

In Chapter 2, I presented a review of the literature about the concept of expedited

screening, the use of biometric technology as it relates to expedited screening and how

privacy provisions must be addressed for its implementations on political and social

change. I specifically focus on Davis’ (1989) model on technology acceptance as the

selected framework for the study. I reviewed recent studies to set the contextual

background for the possible use of biometrics into the expedited screening of passengers.

Details of the research design are presented in Chapter 3, including the data collection

and data analysis methods. In Chapter 4, I presented the results of the documents

reviewed to answer the research questions. Chapter 5 included the interpretation of the

findings, recommendations for the application of the findings, implications for social

change, and recommendations for further studies.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

In this literature review, I focused on the concept of privacy and its importance to

the adoption and use of biometric systems in Trusted Traveler programs administered by

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, I discussed Davis’ (1989) TAM

as a selected theoretical framework for the study based on the findings of Morosan

(2012). Additionally, I presented a critical evaluation of the TAM model and provided

examples of its application in various contexts.

Furthermore, the debate between an individual’s right to privacy and the

government’s responsibility to develop security programs for its national security needs

creates challenges to civil rights and liberties. I presented background information

regarding Trusted Traveler programs in an attempt to understand the existing literature

written related to an individual’s right to privacy and the use of biometric technologies

for expedited screening. I incorporated and highlighted the studies on social, political,

and economic change, as well as the approaches and theories used: and the limitations of

these studies.

The literature for the review came from various scholarly sources in the Walden

University library. The following databases were searched: PROQUEST, EBSCO,

JSTOR, Naval Graduate Academy, and SAGE found in the Walden Library. The

databases were searched using the following keywords: Trusted Traveler Program,

registered traveler program, risk-based security, expedited screening, TSA Pre-Check,

Global Entry, privacy in trusted traveler programs, biometrics, biometric systems,

biometric technologies, low-risk passenger, aviation security, and privacy concerns.

Other keywords used included ease of use biometric technology and privacy

requirements based on the federal definitions in the Privacy Act of 1974 and how the

TAM model would provide an integrated model for the adoption of biometric

technology into the expedited screening of passengers.

The Concept of Expedited Screening

The TSA uses the term expedited screening as a screening process that is more

convenient and efficient to screen individuals that the agency has gathered sufficient

background information classifying them as low-risk, compared to those receiving

standardize screening as no information is known beforehand (TSA, 2014). Passengers

qualifying for expedited screening no longer have to remove their shoes, can keep

permitted small liquids, gels, and laptops inside of their carry-on bag; and are allowed to

keep on their jackets and belts while passing through the walk through metal detectors

through security screening checkpoints (TSA, 2014). If the passenger has an alarm, those

items must be removed for alarm resolution (TSA, 2014).

Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST are Trusted Traveler programs that

expedite the security screening of low-risk passengers and shipments across the border

through lanes and kiosks dedicated to Trusted Travelers at Ports of Entry (CBP, 2013).

TSA Pre-Check was implemented in October 2011 and is a Trusted Traveler Program

that allow Trusted Travelers to receive expedited screening at security checkpoints in

commercial airports (GAO, 2014a, p.4). Trusted Travelers registered under programs

with CBP are automatically eligible to received TSA Pre-Check at commercial airports

in the United States.

The purpose of Trusted Traveler programs is for participants to receive expedited travel

benefits through dedicated lanes and kiosks at checkpoints and ports of entry throughout

the United States. All Trusted Traveler programs rely on the vetting of travelers who

voluntarily applied for membership by providing personal information and paying a fee

to either CBP or TSA (GAO, 2014a, p.12). Those travelers are granted Trusted Traveler

status and are considered low-risk compared to others as a result of the vetting process

that CBP and TSA conduct during the enrollment process and afterwards (GAO, 2014a,

p.12).

Trusted Traveler Programs allow program participants to go through the same

screening procedures as regular travelers with the exception that Trusted Travelers have a

special identification card that is compliant with the Western Hemisphere Travel

Initiative (WHTI) and requires the submission of biometrics (GAO, 2014a, p.12). The

card automatically notifies CBP through its computer system at primary inspection

booths of an individual’s trusted status. If a Trusted Traveler is referred to secondary

inspection, he or she would be moved to the front of the line because of its Trusted

Traveler status (GAO, 2014a, p.12).

When lanes and kiosks dedicated to Trusted Travelers become long, CBP and

TSA implement a technique called active lane management to ensure that Trusted

Travelers’ wait times are lower compare to regular travelers at ports of entry and

screening checkpoints (GAO, 2014a, p.13). The CBP uses active lane management by

switching regular traffic lanes to Trusted Traveler lanes when wait times become too long

for Trusted Travelers (GAO, 2014a, p.13). If there are few Trusted Travelers in the

dedicated lanes, those lanes get converted to regular travelers to maintain low wait-times

and faster processing (GAO, 2014b. p.5).

The TSA employs a similar concept named Managed Inclusion for its Pre-Check

program at commercial airport checkpoints who have dedicated Pre-Check lanes that are

under use when wait-times are too long in the standard lane using a criterion based on

risk assessments and low-risk eligibility (GAO, 2014a, p.13). Managed Inclusion enables

the risk assessment of passengers in real-time to determine their risk-level through the

use of randomization procedures, behavior detection officers (BDOs), canine screening

teams, and explosive trace detection (ETD) devices (GAO, 2014b, p.5).

In November 2015, the TSA reduced the use of Managed Inclusion with the use

of BDOs and ETDs in commercial airports as a result of audits conducted by the

Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG). OIG stated that the agency had

not tested the effectiveness of the Managed Inclusion process (GAO, 2016, p.1). The

OIG report stated that TSA’s behavior detection and analysis program, had not

demonstrated that behavioral indicators can be used to effectively and reliably identify

passengers who many pose a threat to aviation security (Improve Oversight, 2016,

p.10). The presented form of Managed Inclusion implemented by the agency is with the

use of canine screening teams (GAO, 2016, p. 2).

Figure 1: How the TSA operates managed inclusion with ETD devices

The expedited travel benefits for Trusted Travelers through CBP allows those with

Trusted Traveler status to enter at point of entries, by just scanning their passports at

dedicated kiosks and progressing through primary inspection booth without meeting a

CBP officer (GAO, 2014b, p.10). At the kiosk, Trusted Travelers submit their passports,

answer a series of questions, have their picture taken, and submit their fingerprint to

verify their identity (CBP, 2013).

The kiosk notifies the traveler that they have been cleared to enter the country, or

are being referred to secondary inspection (GAO, 2014b, p.10). When cleared to enter the

country, the Trusted Traveler shows their passport and their receipt from the kiosk to

ensure the receipt is valid and matches the passenger (GAO, 2014b, p.10). If the receipt is

clear, the passenger is allowed into the country. If the receipt has a large X on it, the

passenger is referred to secondary inspection (CBP, 2013).

Figure 2: Trusted Traveler POEs by program.

In the case of TSA, its expedited airport screening is based on low-risk populations and

“Trusted Traveler or Known Traveler” status – those who have volunteered personal

information to TSA, so that the TSA can confirmed those “Trusted or Known

Travelers” are low risk (TSA, 2013). The TSA Pre-Check program allows for the

expedited screening of low- risk populations such as children 12 years and younger, 75

and older adults, known crew members, Trusted Traveler programs through CBP,

frequent flyers choosing to opt-in through their air carriers, and through TSA Pre-Check

membership (GAO, 2014b, pp.8-9).

Figure 3: TSA Pre- lists

In December 2015, TSA officials announced that the branches of the U.S. armed forces

including those on Reserve and National Guard personnel were eligible to participate

(GAO, 2016, p.5). In addition, members of the intelligence community, TSA employees,

Department of State (Top Secret Cleared) employees, and foreign citizens participating

in CBP Trusted Traveler Programs were eligible to participate (GAO, 2016, p.6).

TSA Pre-Check enables the participating air carriers to technologically send the

necessary passenger information to Secure Flight for vetting against federal government

watch lists and print the low-risk designation in the encrypted boarding pass bar code and

the TSA Pre-Check designation on the boarding pass (GAO, 2014a, p.13).

Figure 4: Examples of boarding passes with the TSA Pre- Designation

The process to apply for TSA Pre-Check membership includes visiting a enrollment

center, where individual’s must provide their biographic information such as name, date

of birth, address, citizenship documentation, a second source of identification, and

fingerprints to undergo a security threat assessment (TSA, 2013).

As a result of previous programs implemented by the TSA such as Transportation

Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), the agency was able to leverage existing

capabilities into their enrollment process and threat assessments from program

applicants (GAO, 2014, p.18). In order to be eligible to participate in TSA Pre-Check,

applicants must be a U.S. citizen, U.S. national or a lawful permanent resident and must

not have been convicted of certain crimes (GAO, 2014a, P.18).

The system of Secure Flight is used at commercial airports to automatically match

a traveler’s information that has been collected by the air carriers to screen against the

various watch lists (No Fly and Selectee Lists) 72 hours before a travelers’ scheduled

departure (GAO, 2010, p.3). Once the verification is completed through the watch lists,

Secure Flight indicates the air carriers to mark a traveler’s boarding pass for expedited

screening, enhance screening, standard screening or is prohibited from boarding the

aircraft (GAO, 2010, p.5). ).

The same system is used to identify travelers who are eligible for expedited screening

at commercial airports by utilizing the same information collected by the air carriers

and vetting that information through the low-risk lists (GAO, 2014a, p.29). Afterwards,

the TSA notifies the traveler of their eligibility by informing the air carriers to mark the

boarding pass with the TSA Pre-Check designation (GAO, 2014a, p.19).

Figure 5: TSA Secure Flight screening process

For some commercial airports, the TSA has dedicated TSA Pre-Check expedited

screening lanes for those travelers having the TSA Pre-Check designation on their

boarding pass (TSA, 2014). The participation into the program is completely voluntary

and a traveler who has been designated as eligible for TSA Pre-Check expedited

screening may elect not to use the dedicated lanes according to TSA officials (TSA,

2014). Not all commercial airports can afford to have dedicated TSA Pre-Check

expedited screening lanes due to space restrictions and low volume of passengers with

Pre-Check designation that do not warrant a dedicated lane (GAO, 2014a, p.19). In

those commercial airports where Pre-Check dedicated lanes are unavailable, travelers

with the TSA Pre-Check designation can still experience expedited screening of

“their person” (ex: does not remove shoes, belts, and light jackets) but must divest

their permitted liquids, and laptops from their carry-on baggage, since the screening

process used in standard lanes are different from those in expedited screening lanes

(GAO, 2014a, p.19).

The selection in which the TSA determines who is eligible for expedited screening is

based on three risk assessment methods. The first method is verifying an individual’s

name through the TSA Pre-Check List of known travelers (GAO, 2014, p.9). The second

method is the designation of a traveler’s identification as low-risk under the

TSA’s Risk Assessment Algorithm (GAO, 2014b, p.9). The third method is the real time

assessment of a traveler at the airport under the Managed Inclusion Process (GAO, 2014,

p.9).

The concept to use expedited screening through Trusted Traveler Programs was

proposed by Northwest CEO Richard Anderson in 2002. He stated “Trusted Traveler

Programs is one example of how industry, working with government, can quickly bring

to market programs that would relieve some of the burden on aviation security”

(Melnik,

2002).

Foundations for a Risk-Based Security System

The development of Trusted Traveler Programs came from the idea that not all

travelers present the same security threat level. This idea expanded in the creation of a

risk-based approach to aviation security. Countries such as Israel and the European Union

focus their security resources on identifying risky travelers enabling them to match their

resources to those risks, rather than screening everyone the same (GAO, 2002, p.3) The

risk-based model approach provides security officials the ability to direct more resources

and obtained better screening equipment for travelers exposing a higher risk to security.

Therefore, the model allows for the improvement in detection and increase deterrence

compared to the one-size fit all approach (GAO, 2002, p.8).

Trusted Traveler Programs serve as a risk management tool as it chooses the appropriate

level of screening for a traveler depending on a prior assessment of their personal

background and the individual’s threat to security. These programs decrease the

inconveniences and uncertainties of the amount of time and the level of security,

travelers would experience as they pass through a security checkpoint in a commercial

airport (GAO, 2002, p.3).

The President and CEO of the U.S. Travel Association Roger Dow stated “These

programs would encourage travelers, especially business travelers to fly more often,

therefore, improving the economic health of the United States” (U.S. Travel Association,

2010). Additionally, other related industries would also benefit from these programs such

as tourism, aviation-related manufacturers, transportation workers and commerce

creating a healthy economy (U.S. Travel Association, 2010).

Dow (2010) highlighted that Trusted Traveler programs should be the centerpiece

for an enhanced air travel security system by screening passengers for security risks prior

to entering the checkpoints (p.3). The programs pre-screens the individual before arriving

at the airport and this risk assessment reduces the line in the airport and allows security

resources to be used for individuals presenting a higher risk level (p.3).

Additionally, these programs have the ability to deter potential threats as they create an

effective and efficient approach to security that alleviates congestion at security

checkpoint, as a congestive atmosphere becomes attractive to potential terrorists (p.3).

Furthermore, according to Dow (2010) these programs protect the privacy and civil

liberties by eliminating physical security measures for those enrolled into the program by

strengthening public trust as the federal government works on balancing privacy, civil

liberties, efficiency and security, as those travelers are deem low-risk (Dow, 2010).

Based on the views and influence of various stakeholders in the aviation industry, the

TSA in 2002 introduced a pilot for a registered traveler type program for transportation

workers. The program called Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC)

provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential for maritime workers giving them

unescorted access to secure areas into port facilities, outer continental self-facilities, and

vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the U.S.

Coast Guard (TWIC, 2013).

The application process for the TWIC card requires for applicants to submit biographic

and biometric information to include fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph, and pass a

security threat assessment (TWIC, 2013). Once accepted into the program, the card

issued has a computer chip, known as an Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) storing the

holders’ biometric and personal information (TWIC, 2013).

Furthermore, stakeholders such as airport managers, airlines, and law enforcement

entities found that such programs could contribute to enhanced customer service,

expedited check-in at airports, track frequent flier miles, collect information obtained

during background checks to help identify individuals wanted by the police, or tracking

the movement of citizens who might pose criminal risks (GAO, 2002, p.8). Since Trusted

Traveler programs are voluntary, passengers choose to participate in these programs.

This model assumes that a background check would accept all members of the non-

terrorist public who apply and are granted Trusted Traveler status, while rejecting all

terrorists (Chan, Jackson, & Latourrette, 2012).

According to Chan et al. (2012) some fraction of the non-terrorist population will apply

and be rejected incorrectly, as some fraction of terrorists will be accepted incorrectly into

the program (p.3). However, CBP and TSA maintained that Trusted Traveler Programs

are voluntary and participants may have less possibility for an appeal, than they would in

a government entitlement program since participation is guaranteed by statue (GAO,

2002, p.6)

However, many stakeholders expressed that Trusted Traveler Programs need to provide

accurate data verification about travelers, function well in a commercial airport

environment, and safeguard information against fraud (Chan et al., 2012). The concept of

biometrics and its technologies is being used in Trusted Traveler Programs for those

under CBP, but TSA has not adopted the used of this technology in its commercial

airport security screening procedures.

The Concept of Biometrics and its Technologies

Government programs apply the concept of biometrics and its various technologies as

a means for identifying and verifying of a person’s identity by analyzing and measuring

an individual’s characteristics. The scientifically measurement of a person’s

physiological characteristics produces a unique data that enables a biometric to clearly

identify or verify an individual (NTSC, 2006a, p. 2).

The adoption of the use of biometrics for security and identification related

matters are not uncommon in the private sector. The tourism and banking industry use

this concept to control fraud and accessibility (Moroson, 2012). The U.S. government

continues to look into the adoption and use of this technology for its Trusted Traveler

Programs, but must be able to incorporate privacy provisions, as the law requires it

(NTSC, 2006a, p.2).

The use of biometric technologies to measure and analyze an individual’s

personal characteristics can come in various forms, measuring body parts such as the

eyes, hand, fingerprints, and face (GAO, 2010, p.3). Acquisition devices such as

recordings, cameras to take pictures, and scanning devices as known as biometric

identification systems; that recognize patterns that are extracted, encoded, stored, and

compared depending on the computer hardware and software capabilities (GAO, 2004,

p.3).

The process for biometric identification systems is usually automated and the

decision-making process is fast within seconds. Based on the format of the system and its

use, it can be for identification or verification purposes (GAO, 2002, p.3).

Enrollment

In the enrollment process, the biometric system is specifically set to identify the

identity of the person. For this to take place, the person must provide an identity card,

which will act as an identifier (GAO, 2010, p.3). Afterwards, the system links the

biometric to confirm the identity that is stored in the identification document. Later,

the individual places its unique biometric (ex: face, hand, fingerprints, or eye) in the

acquisition device for identification (GAO, 2010, p.3). Those distinctive features are

turned into samples which are taken, encrypted, and stored as future templates for

comparisons in the future (GAO, 2010, p.3). If the identification document does not

match a person’s real identity, the template that is used as a template will be connected

to a false identity (GAO, 2004, p.4).

Figure 6: CBP Trusted Traveler enrollment process

Depending on the technology, the biometric system extraction, encoding and storage

information inside the template is exclusive to the vendor’s proprietary algorithms

(GAO, 2010, p.3). The same considerations are given to template sizes as templates can

be stored remotely in a central database or inside a biometric reader device, such as smart

cards and tokens (GAO, 2002, p.4). Specific factors such as changes in position, distance,

pressure, and environment can change the template. Therefore, every time the biometric

of an individual is taken, it is a unique template (p.4).

During the enrollment process, an individual may be asked to provide several samples

of biometric data as part of the enrollment process, these samples are reference

templates that are captured and stored for future comparisons (NSTC, 2006, p.3). The

quality of the templates is important as it depends on the response of the biometric

systems in order for it to accurately perform (NSTC, 2006, p.3). Since an individual’s

biometric data over time can change, an individual will have to resubmit into the

enrollment process to update their reference template, unless the technology being use

updates itself during matching operations (GAO, 2004, p.4).

Verification

After the enrollment process is verification. Verification is to verify that an individual

is who they claim to be (ex: enrollee in the system) (GAO, 2010, p.4). Once the

individual gives an identifier and the biometrics are collected, the biometric system

process the biometrics, which generates a trial template according to the vendor’s

algorithm (GAO, 2010, p.4). Afterwards, the system compares the trial biometrics with

the person’s reference template already stored in the system and determines, if the

individual’s trial and stored template match each other (GAO, 2002, p.8).

Biometric systems that perform verification functions contain databases that range from

dozens to millions of enrolled templates. There function is to always predict the matching

of an individual’s biometric against his or hers reference template (GAO, 2002,

p.8). Most verification systems render a match to no match result in less than a second

and require employees to confirm their identities to gain access to secured computers and

buildings (GAO, 2002, p.9).

Figure 7: The biometric verification process

Identification

An additional step after the enrollment process is identifying who the person is.

Identification systems are different as no identifier is needed to provide a match (GAO,

2010, p.8). In these systems, the captured biometric is compared with a stored template

alongside all of the individuals enrolled in the system with the anticipation that a match

will be provided based on the search (GAO, 2010, p.8).

In positive identification systems, access to secure buildings and computers are

conducted by cross-checking everyone in the database that all enrollees are enrolled in

(GAO, 2002, p.10). The purpose of these systems is to find whether a person seeking

access can be identified as being enrolled in the system (GAO, 2002, p.10). However,

in negative identification systems, a person’s biometric information is not stored inside

a database leading to a non-match result (GAO, 2002, p.10).

For example, the comparison of a person’s biometric information in a database of those

that have registered in a public program can verify that a person may be “double

dipping” with the use of fraudulent documents using multiple identities (GAO, 2002,

p.10). A watch list system is an example of a negative identification system as it is

designed to identify people who match the list and alert authorities for appropriate action.

The system will check for those individuals that are not on the list and allowed them to

travel (GAO, 2002, p. 10)

Figure 8: The biometric identification process

Individuals’ biometrics in the database of identification systems may have been

placed in the system involuntarily. For example, in systems of surveillance, biometrics

may be face captures from mug shots given by a law enforcement agency (GAO, 2013,

p.12). For verification and identification systems, a no match is perfect since each time a

biometric is taken; the template is different (GAO, 2013, p.12). As a result, biometric

systems can be formatted to make a match or no-match decision on a number that has

been preset and/or program threshold establishing a degree of acceptability between the

captured template and the stored templates of those enrolled (NSTC, 2006b, pp.12-13).

Once the comparison is conducted, a score will be produced with the degree of

acceptability and that score is than compared to the established threshold to make a

decision (GAO, 2002, p.13). Depending on the setting of the threshold, it can have

several reference templates be considered matches to the trial template; resulting in

better scores leading to better matches (GAO, 2002, p.13). The International Biometrics

Group

(IBG) considers four types of biometric identifiers to be effective for Trusted Traveler

Programs especially for aviation security. These identifiers include fingerprint

recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, and facial recognition.

Types of Biometric Technologies

Fingerprint Recognition

This is the most commonly used and best-known technologies, as it is the easily

acceptable among private industries. This technology extracts impressions made up of

specific ridges in the fingertips. Fingerprints may be collected by rolling the finger or by

placing it on a flat surface (Biometrics, 2010). A flat print collects the impression of the

central area of the fingertip and the rolling print collects the ridges of the finger from

both sides (Biometrics, 2010).

An image of the fingerprint is collected by a scanner, converted, and then enhanced, to

become a template. Scanner technologies may be ultrasound, silicon, or optical (GAO,

2002, p.47). Ultrasound is considered the most accurate, but optical scanners are the

ones commonly used. During enhancement procedures, “noise” is a result of things

such as scars, cuts, dirt, and creases, or worn fingerprints is reduced, making the ridges

of the fingers more visible (GAO, 2002, p.47). About 80% of vendors format their

proprietary algorithms on the collection of miniature points that relate to breaks in the

ridges of the fingerprints, while others extract ridge patterns (GAO, 2002, p.47).

Iris Recognition

This technology centers on the color ring surrounding the pupil of the eye. The iris that

is part of the eye is made of elastic connective tissue and is considered extremely rich in

biometric data (GAO, 2002, p.47). The iris has 266 distinctive characteristics to include

trabecular meshwork, rings, furrows, freckles and a corona allowing for extensive

biometric data (GAO, 2002, p.47). Iris recognition utilizes a small, high-quality camera

to collect a white and black, high-resolution picture of the iris and then selects the

boundaries establishing a coordinate system over the iris. Afterwards, the specific zones

are analyzed within that coordinate system (Biometrics, 2010). The iris tends to remain

stable over the lifetime of the individual except if an injury would occur (GAO, 200,

p.47).

Hand Geometry

Hand Geometry utilizes an optical scanner that emits light-diodes with reflectors and

mirrors capturing a three-dimensional image of the sides and back of the hand

(Biometrics, 2010). Its purpose is to measure the width, length of fingers, joints, distance,

between the joints, shapes of the knuckles, and height. These systems have been used for

more than 10 years for access control at facilities from day care centers to nuclear power

plants (Biometrics, 2010). This technology from its images can produce 96

measurements of extraction and as the shape of an individual’s hand remains the same

over time, natural and environmental factors can result in changes (GAO, 2002, p.47).

Facial Recognition

Facial Recognition compares a live facial picture with a reference template and can be

used to analyze static images as a digitized passport photos (Biometrics, 2010). This

technology identifies an individual by areas of the face – the upper outlines of the eyes,

cheekbones, and mouth. These types of systems can be used as identification and

verification purposes. Furthermore, since facial pictures can be captured from video

cameras, facial recognition is the only biometric technology that can be used for

surveillance purposes (Biometrics, 2010). Facial recognition depends on two

algorithms: the Local Feature Analysis (LFA) and the Eigen Face method. The LFA

breaks into pieces the face by the nose, eyes, mouth, and cheeks creating smaller size

templates (GAO, 2002.p. 46). The Eigen Face method looks at the entire face using it at

the set template (GAO, 2002, p. 46).

Table 1

Leading biometric technologies for aviation security

There are other biometric technologies that are commonly used, but are not applied to

aviation security such as:

Retina Recognition

Retina Recognition collects and analyzes the blood vessels patterns from the thin nerve

of the back of the eyeball from the light entering through the pupil (Biometrics, 2010).

Each eye has its unique pattern of blood vessels, each pattern stays stable throughout a

person’s lifetime, but such diseases such as glaucoma, diabetes, high blood pressure, and

autoimmune deficiency syndrome can affect it (Biometrics, 2010). In retina recognition,

the individual has to place the eye closely to the lens of the scanning device and remain

completely still while focusing on a revolving light while a small camera scans the retina

through the pupil, since the retina is small and can be difficult to measure, the collection

of its image makes it hard in relation to other biometric technologies (GAO, 2002, p.48).

This technology the most reliable and accurate of the technologies currently used, but

any slight movement can interfere with the collection process and restarting can cause

time during the enrollment and verification process. At the moment, government and

military environments use this technology for access control requiring very high security

levels such research sites and nuclear weapons locations levels (GAO, 2002, p.48).

However, as a result of the high degree of cooperation and effort required of its users, it

is also one of the least deployable technologies in terms of biometrics (GAO, 2002,

p.48).

Signature Recognition

Signature Recognition confirms the identity of the individual by the measurement of

signatures that are hand written. Then, the signature through a series of movements is

analyzed to reflect an individual’s rhythm, pressure flow, and acceleration (GAO, 2002,

p.48). Electronic signature captures the signature and treats it as a graphic image compare

to signature recognition in which measures how a signature is signed (GAO, 2002, p.48).

In signature recognition, the capture consists of the individual signing his or her signature

on a digitized personal assistant or graphic tablet. Then, the system will analyze the

signature based on the dynamics of stroke count, pressure, speed, and stroke order, as

well as, track an individual’s natural signature fluctuations over time (GAO, 2002, p.49).

Speaker Recognition

Speaker Recognition uses the individual’s sound of voice combine with differences

in physiological as in learned speaking habits and the shape of vocal tracts

(Biometrics, 2010). In the enrollment process, this technology captures samples of

individual’s speech by having him or her speak predetermined information into a

telephone number or a microphone several times to capture the template (Biometrics,

2010).

The predetermined information can be a name, birth month, birth city, a sequence of

numbers, or a favorite color. Afterwards, that information is change from analog to

digital format and the distinctive vocal characteristics such as cadence, tone, and pitch

are collected and a model of the speaker is composed (Biometrics, 2010). Then, a

template is developed and saved for future matching. This technology can be used to

verify and identify a person’s identity, however, the biometric identifier is through

telephone or call centers (GAO, 2002, p.49).

Table 2

Leading biometrics technologies and their template size

Emerging Biometric Technologies

New biometric technologies are under development to recognize behavioral and

physiological characteristics. Some of these technologies are commercially available

while others still have years from implementation (Biometrics, 2010). Each

technologies technique’s performance can change, depending on how it is used and the

environment where is being used (Biometrics, 2010).

Vein Scan

This biometric technology automatically identifies a person from the patterns of the

blood vessels in the back of the hand. It uses near-infrared light to detect vein vessel

patterns (GAO, 2002, p. 50). Vein patterns are different between twins and even between

a person’s right and left hand. This technology is highly stable and robust, and the vein

pattern only changes throughout a person’s lifetime in size. It is not intrusive and works

on the hand even if it is not clean (GAO, 2002, p. 50).

Facial Thermography

Facial Thermography detects patterns of heat created by the branching of blood vessels

emitted from the skin. The patterns name thermo grams are highly distinctive that

identical twins have different ones. Facial thermography works much like facial

recognition, except that infrared cameras are used to capture the images (GAO, 2002,

p.50).

This technology is not intrusive and no physical contact is required, as every person can

present a usable image that can be collected in an instant. In addition, infrared systems

work in dim light or in total darkness. The problem with this technology is that the

manufacturing costs of the system are extremely expensive (Biometrics, 2010).

DNA Matching

Is a biometric technology that uses physiological traits for personal identification, it is

considered the ultimate technology as it can produce a proof positive identification of a

person, except for identical twins (GAO, 2002, p.51). The difference between DNA

matching from standard biometrics is that it compares actual samples rather than

templates generated by samples.

In addition, DNA comparisons cannot be automated and so comparisons cannot be

made in real time. This technology is only use for identification in forensic

applications and it has many years for its implementation as its extremely intrusive

(GAO, 2002, p.51).

Odor Sensing

Odor sensing is the measuring of body odor. This technology would allow the use of

an odor-sensing instrument to capture the volatile chemicals that the skin pores all over

the body as it emits an individual’s smell (GAO, 2002, p.51). The development of this

type of technology is complex as odor can change based on an individual’s diet,

medications, perfumes, and deodorants (GAO, 2002, p.51).

Blood Pulse Measurement

Blood Pulse Measurement is the technology that measures the blood pulse on a finger

with infrared sensors. This technology is in its experimental stages and has a high false

match rate, which is impractical for personal identification purposes (Biometrics,

2010).

Skin Pattern Recognition

Skin Pattern Recognition measures the characteristic spectrum of an individual’s skin.

Each individual’s skin is different as it relates to thickness and the interfaces between

the layers that have various pigmentation, undulations, collagen fibers, and proteins

changes in the density beneath the skin (GAO, 2002, p. 51). This technology uses a

light sensor that lights up a small patch with a beam of visible and near-infrared light

and then measures with a spectroscope after being scattered by the skin (GAO, 2002,

p.51). Afterwards, the measurements are analyzed and an optical pattern is extracted

(GAO, 2002, p.51).

Nailbed Identification

Nailbed Identification is the identification of the distinct tongue-in-grove spatial

arrangement of the epidermal structure directly under the fingernail. An interferometer is

used to detect phase changes in back-scattered light shone on the fingernail and once the

distinctive dimensions are reconstructed, a map is generated (GAO, 2002, p. 51).

Gait Recognition

Gait recognition is based on the concept of recognizing individuals by their walk.

An individual’s gait may be difficult to hide since an individual’s musculature prevents

the variation of movement and needs contact with that individual. This technology would

capture a pattern of pictures to analyze the characteristics based on movement (GAO,

2002, p.52). Experimental results have confirmed that there is potential for this

technology and further testing is needed to determine advantages, limitations, and

performance (GAO, 2002, p.52).

Ear Shape Recognition

Ear Shape Recognition is currently under development and it is the concept of

measuring and analyzing the specific shape and size of each individual’s ears and its

structure is based on the cartilaginous part of the outer ear. There are no commercial

systems available for this presently (GAO, 2002, p.52).

Table 3

Emerging Biometric Technologies and Their Maturity

Accuracy of Biometric Technologies

The accuracy of biometric technologies is based on three key performance metrics the

False Match Rate (FMR), False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) and the Failure to Enroll Rate

(FTER) (GAO, 2004, p.11).

The false match rate happens when a biometric system matches incorrectly an identity,

and that the individuals have been wrongly matched (GAO, 2004, p.11). In positive

identification and verification system, unauthorized people may be granted access to

resources and facilities because of incorrect matches. In negative identification

systems, the result of a false match can be to deny access (GAO, 2004, p.11). For

example, an applicant may be denied access to benefits to a government benefits

program, if it is falsely matched to a person that has previously enrolled in the program

and is registered under a different identity (GAO, 2004, p.11).

The false non-match rate happens when a biometric system rejects a valid identity and is

the probability of valid individuals being wrongly not matched (GAO, 2004, p.11).

In positive identification and verification systems, people can be denied access to

resources and facilities as the system may fail to make a correct match (GAO, 2004,

p.11). In negative identification systems, a false non-match can grant access to resources

that should be denied to the individual. For example, if an applicant has enrolled in a

government benefits program under another identity and is not matched correctly, he or

she will gain access to benefits (GAO, 2004, p.11).

The high similarity between two individuals’ traits can produce false matches; while

having a low similarity between two individuals during enrollment can be affected by

various conditions is what causes false non-matches. It is important to consider that an

individual’s biometric data will change through time based on aging and sometimes

injuries (Biometrics, 2010). If both the error rates are zero, it would make the biometric

system perfect, but biometric systems cannot identify individuals by 100 percent

accuracy and therefore a trade-off has to exist within the two (GAO, 2004, p.11). False

non-match and false match are related as they must be assessed towards the levels of risk

that are acceptable. These risk levels must be balanced with the limitations of

inconvenience (GAO, 2004, p.11). For example, in access control environments, perfect

security would require denying access to everyone and granting access to everyone

would result in denying access to no one. Neither extreme is reasonable, and biometric

systems must operate somewhere between the two (GAO, 2004, p.11).

Figure 9: The relationship between FMR and FNMR

An additional metric is derived from false match rate and false non-match rates that

vendors used as the equal error rate to demonstrate the accuracy of their biometric

systems. The equal error rate is the point where the false match rate equals the false

nonmatch rate (GAO, 2004, p.15). When a biometric system is at a threshold that is at its

equal error rate; an individual that is falsely matched, is the same as an individual that is

falsely non-matched (GAO, 2004, p.15). However, this statistic explanation tends to over

simplify the balance between the false match rate and the false non-match rate because in

the real world, few applications the need for security is identical to the need for

convenience (GAO, 2004, p.15).

The failure to enroll rate measures the probability that an individual will be unable to

enroll. This may come from not having a unique biometric sample or the system design

makes it hard for an individual to give biometric data (GAO, 2004, p.15). For example,

the people who work manual labor extensively, their fingerprints are too worn to be

captured and in retina recognition systems a high number of individuals are unable to

enroll because of the precision it requires (Biometrics, 2010). Furthermore, people

who cannot speak are unable to use voice recognition systems and people without

fingers or hands from injuries, congenital disease, and surgery amputation cannot use

hand geometry and fingerprint systems (Biometrics, 2010). 1 and 3 percent of the

population cannot use any one biometric system as they do not have the required body

part needed; and so are not counted into the system’s failure to enroll rate (GAO, 2004,

p.15).

In order to meet performance requirements, vendors of biometrics systems are

incorporating two or more biometrics systems, as one biometric capture system may have

high failure to enroll rates (Biometrics, 2010). Depending on how the biometric system is

programmed, it can operate for either identification or identification purposes. Recent

studies have demonstrated through experimental results that the identities established by

systems that incorporate more than one biometric are more reliable, can be applied to

large target populations, and improve response times (Biometrics, 2010).

Criticisms of Biometrics

Besides the important benefits over security measures that biometric technologies may

provide, there are issues and concerns. Government agencies and organizations realize

the significant advantages that biometric technologies have in improving and monitoring

identity identification and verification, yet, a major concern is tracking and data

management (Bocozk, Buster, Fitzgerald et al, 2005). According to the International

Biometrics Group (2008) the most negative part of biometric identification systems is

their ability to locate and track people. Many surveillance systems seem to track and

locate people and biometric systems are used because of their high level of accuracy

(p.4).

The loss of privacy is another serious concern surrounding the use of biometrics

(Archarya, 2006; Baird, 2002; Cavoukian 1999; European Commission, 2005; Jain, Ross,

& Prabhkar, 2004). The global implementation of the use of biometric systems has

increased and the concern for privacy and an individual’s right to that privacy have

increased as well. “In the United States, the freedom of the individual is perceived to be

closely related to his or her ability to operate somewhat autonomously and anonymously

in the eyes of the states, as well as, other organizations that collect data from individuals

without permission” (Woodward, Webb, Newton, Bradley, & Rubenson, 2001, p.22).

According to Cavoukian (1999) privacy is what an individual does in their own

space and whom they choose to interact “with trust, sense of freedom and openness, or

with distrust, sense of insecurity and fear” (p.29). Furthermore, an individual’s interest

and autonomy usually will rise when the person feels like their privacy is threatened by

others (NSTC, 2006d). According to privacy rights advocates, biometric technology

will violate the individual’s right to privacy and invade confidentiality (Vollmer, 2006).

A biometric per say is not considered good or bad, it depends on how the biometric

system is designed, developed, and implemented (Pilgrim, 2007). The biometric

industry and organizations are apprehensive about privacy, as it a significant problem in

regards to the collection of personal information (ANSI, 2005).

The majority of apprehensions related to privacy are based on the rights of the

individual, data mining, and the managing of biometric data by an organization

(Allan, 2002). Discussions related to privacy concerns focused on individuals, as they

do not have power over the managing of their personal data that could easily be

misused and abused (Allan, 2002). The different forms of privacy by Tiresias (2008)

are:

•Privacy protective: Is a system used to limit access or protect personal

information providing a form for the individual can established a trusted identity.

•Privacy sympathetic: Is a system that limits the access and the usage of personal

data by making decision by design related towards the transmission and storage

of biometric data.

•Privacy neutral: Is a system where privacy is not an issue and its potential impact

to privacy is light. These systems are hard to misuse from a privacy point of view

as it does not protect personal privacy.

•Privacy invasive: Is a system that enables and facilitates the use of personal data

in an unstructured matter allowing for privacy principles acceptance (p.8).

Privacy rights advocates do not accept the use of biometrics and other forms of

verification for capturing information about individuals for the fear of having a

“surveillance society or police state” where private companies and governments collect

large quantities of personal information without justification (Archarya, 2005, p.8).

Therefore, the adoption of biometrics becomes an issue of physical privacy, creating

greater anxiety of state watching in the blanket term for national security (Archarya,

2005; ANSI, 2005; Rand, 2001; Woodward et al., 2001).

In addition, the elevation of the trepidation of physical privacy can lead to

stigmatization, hygiene, and actual harm (ANSI, 2005; Woodward et al., 2001).

Additionally, the disapproval of biometric technology is the function creep. The term

function creep refers to data collected for one reason and then is used for another

unintended purpose without justification and to take advantage of the authorization of

data subjects (Archarya, 2005). According to Tiresias (2008) function creeps are a

direct violation of privacy principles.

The use of the Social Security Number (SSN) is an example of the function creep

in the society of the United States. The original social security cards had the label “Not

for Identification”, then, by 1961, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began using social

security numbers for purposes of tax identification (Lease, 2005, p.57). In 2002,

employment, credit, insurance transactions, and state driver’s licenses require the social

security number, even though it is not needed to complete the transaction (Lease, 2005,

p.57). Furthermore, a controversial concern surrounding the use of biometrics is data

catalogued though the collection of personal information. Data catalogued is a reduction

of the individual unique identifiers in association with committed crimes (Watkins,

2007).

Biometric data is not easy to modify as once the digital identifier is

compromised, it cannot be used for identification and verification into the records of the

system’s database (Watkins, 2007). Under the use of this technology, automatic

recognition is controversial because its purpose is to have human errors prevented.

However, when the system does not respond properly, there is no one to correct those

mistakes and that becomes the cost for implementing such technology (Watkins, 2007).

Another concern for the resistance of biometric technology is health and hygiene.

Users of the technology may experience anxiety based on the cleanliness of the sensors

used to collect data from irises, fingerprints, and facial scans (Bocozk et al, 2005).

Presently, there are no studies demonstrating of any health concerns associated with the

use of biometrics. However, the idea may produce fear in users or discourage them from

enrolling or accepting the verification process of biometric technologies (Bocozk et al,

2005).

Those health concerns would have to be investigated by health professionals,

subject matter experts and vendors of biometric technologies. The religious concern

towards the use of biometric technology can come from societal emphasis and legal

opinions as respect to religious beliefs (Bocozk et al, 2005).

Besides all of the concerns regarding the use of biometric technologies, Lease

(2005) stated, “supporters of biometric authentication systems argued that properly

deployed and equipped with adequate best practice controls, biometric systems can

actually function to enhance and protect privacy” (p.57). Experts in biometric

technology stated that the potential for this technology is tremendous, but the need

for privacy principles and the ability to protect users from unauthorized intrusion is

important (Cavoukian, 1999).

As the government continues to adopt and implement this technology quickly, the right

to privacy of the individual is being threatened (Vollmer, 2006). The government must

implement safeguards that need to be incorporated into the technology, so that the

individual’s intrusion of privacy is minimal and public safety and protection are

maximized (Vollmer, 2006). The bottom line is that the system’s design, deployment,

personnel training, and use must have protections for personal privacy (Lease, 2005).

Privacy provisions are not subject to just government institutions, businesses need to

accept responsibility for protecting consumer data and their privacy. According to

Cavoukain (1999) the use of biometric information must balance effectively and

appropriately a customer’s right to privacy and must be for legitimate business purposes

as organizations should deployed and adopt requirements for the promotion of fair

information practices (p.44). The purpose of fair information requirements and practices

is to reduce and avoid unauthorized data collection that is unreasonable, unnecessary, and

unauthorized use, and disclosures (Cavoukian, 1999).

Biometric application through the privacy enhancing of privacy technologies

(PETs) is a solution offered by ANSI (2005). PETs are systems of information and

communication technology (ICT) measuring privacy protection through the reduction and

elimination of personal data and through the prevention of undesired processing without

losing the functionality of the data system (ANSI, 2005). Privacy watchdogs have already

protested the use of biometrics to verify and identify individuals, but it is important to

incorporate safeguards and privacy principles in the protection of an individual’s security

and to lessen the compromise of consumer data (ANSI, 2005). By implementing those

items, individuals have the peace of mind that their information is secured and controlled;

and not sold to third-party vendors (Nwatu, 2011). Organizations will be trusted more by

the public if their systems and data are viewed as protecting privacy and enhancing

security (Nwatu, 2011).

Technology Acceptance Model by Davis (1989)

The incorporation of any biometric system in any government program cannot

neglect the TAM model and its usage on how large populations may perceive the use of

recent technologies. Davis (1989) model provided a valid and reliable measure that

predicts the acceptance or adoption of new technologies by end-users and is used to

measure technology acceptance (King & He, 2006).

According to Liu and Silverman (2001) several factors affect the adoption and

acceptance of biometric systems to include accuracy, costs, user acceptance, error

incidence, required security level, and long-term stability affect in whether a biometric

system will be deployed or not. Additionally, Rajchel (2007) stated “that the lifestyle of

the system, invasiveness, hygiene and health, religion, culture and ethics would affect

implementation”. Table 4 illustrates the different factors impacting the adoption of

biometric technologies (Liu & Silverman, 2001). The TAM plays an important part in the

implementation toward the adoption of biometric systems and although, the authors of

the model may have various viewpoints, analyzing the need to make the decision to

adopt, is based on financial resources, the type of biometric technology to use and the

availability of experienced personnel.

Table 4

Comparison of Factors Influencing Biometrics Adoption

The TAM is the theoretical framework that allows for the understanding of how

perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness will influence an individual’s behavior

and attitudes towards the adoption of the use of the technology being implemented

(Klopping & McKinney, 2004; Nqugi, 2005; Wahid, 2007). When understanding the

various factors that will affect the implementation of technological systems, the model

enables the improvement of the system’s design, deployment and adoption strategies, and

user acceptance (Shen, Laffey, Lin & Huang, 2006). The literature related to this model

has been receptive and popular as it continues to be used to clarify the various influences

that can determine the acceptance of technology in organizational environments

(Mahinda & Whitworth, 2005).

The model uses the factors of perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use in

order to determine the possible technology adoption, acceptance, and usage (Shen,

Laffey, Lin, & Huang, 2006). The author of the model concluded that perceived

usefulness (PU) and perceived ease of use (PEOU) affected attitudes and behavioral

reactions toward the usage of technologies such as biometrics (Shen et al., 2006). For

example, individuals using the technology may believe that it will be useful, easy to use,

and reliable in identifying people and an enhancement to their personal security (Shen et

al., 2006).

These beliefs would generate attitude or behavioral reactions furthering an

interest in the use of the technology. Furthermore, if users believed that the system is

complex and does not have reliable performance, then the behaviors toward the system

will be negative impacting the adoption of the technology. External variables such as the

characteristics of the system’s design, available training, interest, awareness, and

documentation will heavily impact the usage of the technology (Wahid, 2007).

Biometric technology vendors find it hard to incorporate the model operationally as it

goes under the implementation level (Ngugi, 2005). As the model has been employed

to describe factors that will influence the adoption, the model becomes deficient in

reliability, flexibility, and extendibility (Mahinda &Whitworth, 2005). Furthermore,

the model is criticized for being incomplete as it does not include other variables that

impact the adoption such as privacy, security, and trust (Brydie, 2008; Josua & Koshy

2009, Shen et al., 2006).

In a study conducted by Joshua and Koshy (2009) it concluded that perceived

ease of use and security helped determine the attitudes toward the acceptance of

technological systems. Afterwards, Kim (2006) realized that physical security was a

variable that affected the acceptance of the system by hotel guests; and that reliability and

trust were also reasons for adoption (Brydie, 2008). The studies conducted that the

acknowledgment of these variables would affect the implementation of the technological

systems, by improving the design, deployment and adoption strategies to gain user

acceptance (Wahid, 2007).

The model in Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between ease of use,

usefulness, and external variables such as those of security, privacy, and trust

towards attitude formation toward the acceptance of biometric technologies (Joshua

& Koshy, 2009). According to Joshua & Koshy (2009), “the original model that

Davis (1989) developed did not include security as a variable. Over the years,

researchers argued that other factors would affect the attitudes and behavioral

reactions to use technology besides perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness”

(Cowen, 2009, Joshua & Koshy, 2009, Jahagir & Begum, 2008; Shen, Laffey, Lin &

Huang, 2006).

Ease of Use

Is the extent that an individual would accept at no cost using a method (Jahangir

& Begum, 2008; Joshua & Koshy, 2009). According to Jahangir and Begum (2008),

“perceived ease of use is the user’s awareness that the use of biometrics will be of

minimal effort, if an individual understands the technology, it leads to adoption and

this is important as it would generate positive attitudes towards acceptance of the

system” (p.34).

Perceived Usefulness

Refers to an individual’s perception of the outcome of the experience when using a new

piece of technology (Jahangir & Begum, 2008). If an individual believes that biometric

systems are helpful and effective to protect individual security, and privacy, they will

likely accept its use. However, if the individual does not realize the usefulness, it will

also affect the adoption (Jahangir & Begum, 2008; Joshua & Koshy, 2009).

Figure 10: Davis (1989) technology acceptance model

Security

Is the need for preventative measures and identity protection towards unnecessary risks

(Jahangir & Begum, 2008). When users perceived that there is reliability and security in

the use of the technology, their attitudes towards the technology would be positive

(Jahangir & Begum, 2008). Moreover, the sense of loss of safety and unreliability of the

system would increase attitudes towards the system to be negative.

Awareness

The level of awareness of the technology would impact its implementation as well as a

person’s age (Asfaw, 2006; Norris, 2001). Various factors would add an important

role in the adoption, implementation, and usability of biometric technologies.

•Awareness of the benefits and effects of the technology to incorporate identity

management and fight against identity fraud.

•Awareness of accessibility and availability, and

•Awareness of the daily use of biometrics as a part of life.

The issue of implementation is determined by various factors that could impact

the acceptance in the long-term as it could bring change in attitudes and behaviors.

High levels of awareness may not always impact the adoption and usability of

biometrics, but it is a factor that should be considered in its adoption and

implementation strategies

(Asfaw, 2006; Norris, 2001).

Attitude

According to Alrafi (2005) behaviors could be negative or positive and the way

an individual perceives that experience it what gives such attitude. Attitude is the

individual’s society, as he or she believes it to be. Behaviors determined an implicit

response that is:

1. Considered significant in the individual’s society,

2. Based on patterns learned through discrimination and generalization,

3. Self-cueing and drive-producing, and,

4. Anticipatory and mediating in reference to patterns of overt responses (p.4).

If an individual has a positive attitude towards the technology, it is most likely to

approve and accept it as a part of life. However, a disapproving feeling would lead to a

negative mindset towards any biometric system based on their perceived ease of use,

perceived usefulness, awareness, security, privacy, and level of interest of the individual

(Joshua & Koshy, 2009; Jahangir & Begum, 2008).

Past research suggested that individuals are not likely to perceive information

practices as invasive to privacy when (1) the information used or collected is related to a

transaction and (2) the information they believe would be used to draw reliable and

valid inferences about them (Baker, 1991; Clarke, 1988; Stone & Stone, 1990; Stone et

al., 1983; Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982). As privacy is considered to

be the most highly prized rights, it becomes secondary when it comes to threats of

physical harm and street crimes (Vidmar & Flaherty, 1985, as cited in Katz & Tassone,

1990). In the use of Davis (1989) TAM Model, biometrics is an information technology

tool that would have to incorporate cultural, gender and demographic differences, as

well as, social influence and attitudes towards technology; in order to see if the target

population would accept or reject the use of biometric devices (Malhotra & Galletta,

1999). Moreover, the current research points out that understanding specifically who

the user is can have an important influence on the technology’s acceptability to that

user, in this case, it would be the Trusted Traveler who voluntarily participates in the

program. Additionally, the effects of the change in behaviors and attitudes is described

in the Cognitive Dissonance Theory, where the use of a product may change one’s

perceptions, attitudes, and needs when the product has been used. For example, a

frequent flyer may experience various trip conditions such as the commute to the

airport, airline check-in, security screening, and gate boarding differently versus a non-

frequent flyer (Pranic, Roehl, &West, 2008). However, the introduction of a new

experience may change the common knowledge of the frequent flyer that could result in

altering the perceptions of the frequent flyer into accepting the new security procedures

(Pranic,

Roehl, &West, 2008).

The Concept of Privacy

According to Warren and Brandeis (1890) “Privacy” is the claim that an

individual interest usually arises as an assertion against other individuals or organizations

to prevent interference from the individual’s autonomy. It is the desire of each individual

for physical space, as he or she can be free of interruption, intrusion, embarrassment, and

accountability; it is the attempt to control the manner of disclosures of personal

information” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).

The birthplace of privacy in the United States comes from the article “The Right to

Privacy” by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis (1890) which provided the example of

the conceptual transition from physical place to information space. For instance, in the

last fifty years, the Supreme Court used the right to privacy to protect the right to

purchase and use contraceptives, the right to have an abortion, and the right to engage in

private and consensual homosexual activity (Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 644).

However, the main concern of Warren and Brandeis was with the media that was

interested in gossip and revealing personal things about individuals without their consent

(Chemerinsky, 2006, p.644). For example, Warren and Brandeis (1890) stated that

“photography is an information technology that enabled the collection of information

about an individual independent of his or her actual control; creating the capability to use

the collected information for any purpose without further involvement or agreement from

the individual” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).

As of current date, the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated or protected

the right to informational privacy. In his article in 1960, William Prosser described how

privacy came to be established in tort law and the various torts that fit within to include

torts for intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and placing a person in a false light

(Chemerinsky, 2006, p. 645). Privacy is about freedom from government intrusion into

an individual’s home or to an individual’s person.

Brandeis made an argument that the Fourth Amendment should apply because

people have a reasonable expectation of privacy for their conversations and the

unjustified intrusion by the government is a means of infringing on this expectation and

deem a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Privacy is used

in constitutional law to protect aspects of autonomy in which the person has the right to

make certain crucial personal decisions.

The present concern is on data aggregation, electronic surveillance, identity theft,

identity management, biometrics, warehousing and breaches. The Warren and Brandeis

(1890) concern led to specific questions in the field of privacy and to the legal aspects in

U.S. Society such as: (1) “What effect should privacy protection have on technology?”

(2) “What is the appropriate use of personal information?” and (3) “Should personal

information be collected and for what particular purpose or application?”

The National Science & Technology Council (NSTC) broke down the

complex term of privacy to make it relevant to the technological advances to today’s

society. Decisional

Concerns related to a person’s authority to make life decisions that affect the

person’s life and body and those of the person’s family members in end of life issues

(NSTC, 2006d).

Spatial

Concerns related to physical spaces to include a person’s bedroom, home, car, etc.

These issues usually concentrate on the authority of the person to decide who may enter

or observe the items and activities that happen in that specific place (NSTC, 2006d).

Intentional

Concerns related to characteristics that are publicly visible or intimate

activities. These concerns concentrate on the authority that the person has to bar further

communication of an observable feature or event (NSTC, 2006d).Examples are claims

against conversations being repeated that happen in public and the publishing of

photographs without authorization and unintended nudity (NSTC, 2006d).

Informational

Concerns related to the use of information that pertains to the person. Issues

usually concentrate on the extent of the person’s authority to control how that

information is used (by whom and for what purpose) and the responsibility of the

corresponding individuals and organizations to include the person in the decision-

making process that would drive the subsequent use (NTSC, 2006d).

The concept of informational would apply to the adoption of biometrics into

Trusted Traveler programs as the main focus would be that government organizations

would use the biometric data and convert it into electronic data and then make a

decision for individuals to be able to access expedited screening. This is the reason why

privacy assessments must be made before adoption and implementation of biometric

systems

(Solove, Rotenburg & Schwartz, 2006).

The term “privacy” is not in the text of the United States Constitution, but the

living document does have provisions that incorporate privacy protection. Those

provisions are in the First Amendment, protecting against the disclosure of group

membership (National Archives, 2013). The Third Amendment protects an

individual’s home from government intrusion (National Archives, 2013). The Fourth

Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of personal spaces, possessions,

and body from the government (National Archives, 2013). Last, the Fifth Amendment

is the protection against forced disclosure of self-information (National Archives,

2013).

For instance, the Fourth Amendment main focus is on unreasonable search and

seizures, which includes a review of the expectation of privacy for the individual

(National Archives, 2013). The individual must have an actual expectation of privacy and

that expectation must be reasonable in the given circumstances (Solove, Rotenburg &

Schwartz, 2006). For example, biometric systems must considered and inform the

individual of the development, operation, and its implementation (Morosan, 2012).

Just like the privacy provisions in the U.S. Constitution, Privacy Torts are

additional sources of privacy protection. In civil law, torts are civil injuries that an

individual could be compensated. There is a possibility that an individual could file a

claim related to the use of biometric data, at which point the details of what does or does

not qualify, and the measure of the injury would become the focus (Prosser, 1960).

According to Prosser (1960), these privacy torts are categorized as “(1) Interfering with

an individual’s private affairs, (2) Sharing embarrassing information about the

individual, and (3) Using someone’s name or image for personal gain”(Richards &

Solove, 2010, p.9).

As the U.S. Constitution has privacy provisions, states laws have also been in

place to protect the individual’s right to privacy extending those of federal jurisdictions.

As a result, each biometric system that is use exists only within the legal jurisdiction of

the tribal, local, state, and federal laws (NSTC, 2006d). Therefore, the laws of each place

must be reviewed and incorporated into the strategy and design of the biometric system in

order to operate and be administrated in (NSTC, 2006d).

The legal jurisdiction to biometric systems does not just extend to those in the

United States, but also into international governments. International agreements with the

European Union (EU) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) created

frameworks in the sharing of fair privacy principles when dealing with personal

information (NSTC, 2006d). The framework encourages participation of the individual

granting them the right to know what is the personal information being collected, the

right to request a copy of the information, and the right to appeal the accuracy of the

data including the chance to have it erased (NSTC, 2006c.)

In the case of the adoption of biometrics into Trusted Traveler programs for the

use of expedited security screening, it would exist in multiple jurisdictions within the

United States and would cross international boundaries (NSTC, 2006c.) International

connections would exist through the physical equipment used by the system, the

information in the system, the individuals using the system, and the individuals’

information in the system (NSTC, 2006c)

The real concern relating to the privacy of information is its ability to connect to

the interest of the individual. This connection is personal information as any information

could be used to identify the individual in any way. Not all data may look like personal

information, but can be through its use (Commerce, 2000). For example, if data is use in

combination with other data and results in the identification of the individual either

intentional or unintentional the data becomes personal information and privacy issues

become a concern (NTSC, 2006d).

The privacy impact of combining data for the purpose of identifying

individuals’ reaches to the point; to the intent to identify is the reason biometric

information justifies as personal information through its content and its use (GAO,

2010, p. 21). Where there is the use of biometric information, there is personal

information involved and privacy concerns need to be addressed to determine the

impact of the use of the data, and how it relates to the individual’s privacy interests

(NSTC, 2006).

Legal Authority and Privacy Provisions

The law and the legitimate public policy that governs biometric systems must be

clearly articulated, previously disclosed, and related to its original purpose. The

collection and use of personal information is based on a legal authority through an

agreement or law. An individual decides to participate in a system or program based on

the individual understanding of what he or she is giving and what he or she is getting in

return (NTSC, 2006c).

According to Moroson (2012):

“The privacy assessment of a biometric system should explain the context and

authority to the user. It should further explain the original collection of biometric

information and illustrate that all system functions; including information

sharing, the grounds to its legal authority and the details are articulated and

available to the individual, before personal information is collected” (p.440 ).

The use of biometric systems could be modified through time and privacy

protections must be applied. The most important privacy consideration to keep is the

ongoing management of biometric systems on the bases of information privacy. Private

industries have different requirements for the use of biometric systems, in regards to

medical, financial, and minor children. However, government institutions have three laws

that must be incorporated in their protocols (Morosan, 2012).

The collection and use of personal information by the government is controlled

under (a) The Freedom of Information Act of 1966, which provides access to any

government record to anyone for any purpose with the exception to include the protection

of personal privacy, (b) The Privacy Act of 1974 that has a set of fair information

principles to govern the government’s collection, use, and maintenance of PII contained

in a system of records; and (c) The Government Act of 2002 which requires government

agencies to conduct assessments of the use of information technology and its potential

impact that use could have on privacy (Nelson, 2004).

It is essential to understand the individual’s concern towards privacy protection,

as it is threatened, especially when information used by the system is based on health,

financial status, or used by the government for other means that are clearly not disclosed

(Neyland, 2009, pp.135-136). The biometric system must be clear in its design and

implementation strategies to address the concerns of the individual and illustrate that the

information collected would be used only for such functions and nothing else, preventing

the function creep (NSTC, 2006a).

Privacy advocates argued that these national databases would operate on a

presumption of accuracy, but who would be responsible for those amendments, costs, and

the process it would involve. Furthermore, privacy advocates suggest that the national ID

scheme offers the chance for favored companies to win lucrative government contracts

expanding their self-interests (Neyland, 2009, pp. 145).

Nevertheless, misidentification, problems with confirming identification, and

others using or manipulating identity information, could lead to problems for a broader

constituency (Neyland, 2009, pp. 145). Therefore, the politics built into the technology

include inclusion boundaries (good to almost everyone) and exclusion boundaries (those

to be targeted), would be depended on the terms of “feasible” and “reasonable”

arguments that would depend on the ability to successfully manage these boundaries

(Neyland, 2009, pp. 145)

According to Neyland (2009), National ID policies such as those of the Real ID Act of

2005 involve claims regarding the advantages and disadvantages of large-scale databases,

connecting each other with regards to millions of people. The advantages in using

biometrics under National ID policies are (a) fights against illegal working by preventing

employers from employing staff without having the proper documentation, (b) prevent

immigration abuse by making the country less attractive for asylum seekers, (c) prevent

the use of false and multiple identities’ by terrorists and criminals, (d) ensures that free

public services are only used by those entitled to them, preventing the abuse of health

tourism, and (e) help to protect people from identity theft where victims have their

identities stolen by others who may use the identity for financial or some other gain

(Neyland, 2009, pp 15-16).

However, Neyland (2009) mentioned the disadvantages on posing set policies on the

use of biometrics based on organizations against National ID policies, as these National

IDs are unreasonable, unnecessary, and technology is not feasible. Those claims are

based on the following arguments: (a) terrorism is not based on issues of identity, but

tied to various political situations around the world, (b) benefit fraud is committed

through the under or lack of reporting of income (not identity) and, (c) identity theft may

increase through the ID card scheme with criminals, by registering their own biometrics

under another name and gaining access to computer records (Neyland, 2009, p.15-16).

Nevertheless, Neyland (2009) suggested that a series of privacy concerns are subject to

the flexibility of the interpretation of legislation. Therefore, depending on the

interpretation, governments would use the technology for (a) impose fines and

imprisonment for failure to enroll or obtain a national ID, (b) decide to share

information with third parties, (c) limit powers to protect the population, (d) not all

interpretation of legislation would fit international organization compliance

requirements, and (e) cards with chips would produce audit trails that are not clear for

what and who it would be useful (Neyland, 2009, p.16).

The Use of Biometrics for Aviation Security

The DHS and its agencies have been exploring the use of biometrics in aviation security

in these areas:

•The verification of the identity of airport employees to ensure that access

to secured areas are restricted to authorized personnel only;

•The protection of public areas surrounding airports with the use of

surveillance systems;

•Verification of passengers when boarding aircrafts; and

•Verification of flight crew before and during a flight (GAO, 2004, p.20).

Purchasing airline tickets to travel and border crossings are the focus for

expressing concerns regarding privacy and forms of surveillance in the

light of new technological developments. Airport managers have

expressed the use of biometric systems in their airports based on reducing

the speed of security checks in favor of increasing profit from the retail

properties inside of airports.

For example, the use of facial scans for more rapid security checks would save time on

the passenger, therefore, the passenger would spend extra time on shopping (Neyland,

2009, pp.136). Furthermore, the use of a chip in storage cards would allow airport

managers to know who was who and their location in the airport as a means to enhance

security by stopping access into prohibited areas, as well as, for passengers who had

check-in but did not made their flight (Neyland, 2009, pp.136).

According to Neyland (2009) airport managers expressed mass problems that a

biometric device might generate based on problematic identity claims and airports

might not want to diminish their security records (Neyland, 2009, p.151). In developing

the biometric technology for the use in airports, it has to be measured in an airport

environment and the views of stakeholders have to be considered. Vendors have to take

into account what those technologies might be able to do, which ones to build, and who

would be the beneficiaries of the technology.

Airport managers have to consider the potential for increased security, enhanced

information regarding passenger movement, and increased shopping revenue against

possible problems in identity confirmation and constant problems with security delays

and security lapses (Neyland, 2009, p.151).

Challenges and Issues to the Adoption of Biometrics Technologies

The limitation of technology has to be taken into account in the security process. For

example, exception-processing procedures must be planned carefully as not all people

can be enrolled in the biometric system. However, exception-processing that is not

appropriate when primary is biometric processing could be a vulnerability to security, as

it could be exploited and directly affect the performance of the technology (GAO, 2004,

p.18).

In a study conducted by the General Accountability Office (GAO) for border security, it

was concluded that recognition of the fingerprint is the most developed of all current

biometric technologies in the market (GAO, 2004, p.19). Fingerprint recognition is the

longest in used and with databases containing up to 40 million entries, enables it to be

constantly expanding (GAO, 2004, p.19). The issuing process of credentials must be

considered into the process in any form of identity management system (GAO, 2004,

p.19).

Biometrics help to ensure that people presenting themselves before the security

system is the same as the person enrolled in the system (GAO, 2003, p.10). The purpose

of the biometric is to identify and verify an identity, so to establish multiple identities

could be a very difficult task as the system is to have one true identity. Therefore,

biometrics cannot connect a person to his or her unique identity, if it was connected to a

false identity from the beginning (GAO, 2004, p.10).

The selection to incorporate the use of biometrics as a security solution must consider

the costs and benefits and its potential effects on privacy and convenience. The

investment into a biometric system and its benefits, as well as, costs needs to be assessed

and analyzed before its incorporation (GAO, 2003, p.20). An organization’s goals must

take into consideration the desired objectives of the system as to the matching of

identities on a watch list or the verification of identities as to verify that individual is who

he or she is. Particular performance requirements must be described, as the time it would

take to verify a person’s identity, and the maximum number that the system can hold

(GAO, 2003, p.20).

Once the system performance requirements are set, a cost analysis could be created. The

costs of the technology must be taken into consideration, as well as, the target population

that it would affect (GAO, 2003, p.10). Initial costs must include efforts in engineering of

the design, testing, system implementation; personnel training, network infrastructure,

hardware and software, and additional facilities for the enrollment of people in the

biometric system (GAO, 2004, p.15).

Recurring costs factors include software and hardware system maintenance, hardware

acquirement, training personnel, and program management (GAO, 2004, p.18).

Additionally, other costs include hiring personnel for the enrollment process of people in

the biometric system and purchasing identification documents for biometric storage.

The consequence of performance issues such as accuracy problems, and their effect on

the process, and people are important in selecting the right biometric solution (GAO,

2004, p.18).

Effects on Privacy and Convenience of Use

Federal agencies are limited on the disclosure of personal information as it relates

to collection, storage, and usage of biometric information of fingerprints and photographs

by the Privacy Act of 1974 (GAO, 2003, p.20). However, the act does include

exemptions for national security and law enforcement purposes; and representatives of

privacy and civil liberties groups have raised concerns related to (1) the adequate security

protections put in place to handled identify theft, data sharing, and uses for biometric

data, and (2) secondary uses also known as function creeps (GAO, 2004, p.20). Those

concerns are related under the current law, as the legal system in the United States has

not addressed the large-scale of data handling by a biometric system (GAO, 2010, p.10).

The broad exemption of the Privacy Act of 1974 does not provide guidance on its

appropriate use for biometric information as it relates to national security or law

enforcement purposes (GAO, 2004, p.20). Since there are no general consensuses, or

criteria on the appropriate use of data sharing on the usage of biometric technologies,

there must be a balance between matters of security and privacy as it pertains to

biometric system usage (GAO, 2004, p.21). Discussions on policy decisions are required

as the current legal system has a range of unresolved policies, suggesting that the use of

biometric technologies is based on management and technical policies (GAO, 2004,

p.21) Furthermore, consideration must be applied in the use of biometrics and its

convenience would impact the government’s ability to achieve its goals. Some

individuals could find the use of biometric technologies difficult and could resist it based

on the personal beliefs of being uncomfortable to use, offensive, or intrusive (GAO,

2004, p.21). A biometric system’s performance and adoption in commercial airports

could be affected by an individual’s lack of cooperation and resistance, as the

process could be lengthy or erroneous.

This could negatively affect the ability of the biometric system to operate and fulfill the

government’s mission (GAO, 2004, p.21). The concern to adopt and use biometric

technologies into the expedited screening of passengers in a commercial airport

environment is based on the speed it would take to process each passenger and the

accuracy of the verification rate that the technology would produce when deployed at

airports (GAO, 2006, p.24).

Cavoukian, Chibba, & Stoianov (2012) in their research focused on having encryption

into the biometric template of a person for the protection of privacy and use a numerical

sequence to verify the individual. The government through its research through the GAO

has not provided that solution in its biometric systems deployed in facilities and for

further use in other areas (GAO, 2010, p.26). Furthermore, security cannot be based on

technology alone, but through ATSA it did encouraged the adoption of biometric

technologies to enhance security systems. Additionally, presidential directives have been

signed to adopt biometric technologies, but agencies with a mission in national security

have yet to implement such systems into aviation security.

Even though, the use of biometric systems is not 100% accurate in security systems, it

does allow for some accuracy when it comes to the identification of an individual as

required by the 9/11 Commission Report. Additionally, the privacy rights of the

individual must be protect by federal law, but since Trusted Traveler programs are

voluntary, the individual provides consent to have its privacy rights waived in an

exchange for a faster security experience.

Summary of the Literature Review

The focus of the comprehensive literature review in this study was conducted to discuss

expedited screening in Trusted Traveler programs within the DHS agencies dealing

with aviation security, the adoption of biometric systems as a layer of security in

commercial airports and its privacy provisions. An example of the use of biometric

systems for identity verification was use to illustrate how the TSA uses the technology

for its TWIC program. A description of biometric systems and the different types was

used to provide examples of positive and negative outcomes of the various acquisition

devices.

Davis’ (1989) TAM was presented to illustrate how an individual perceived ease of use

and perceived usefulness affects the individual’s attitudes towards the acceptance of the

technology that would be adopted into commercial airports. A descriptive of the

accuracy of the various biometric technologies reflects the positive and negatives

outcomes when being integrated into the verification process of travelers in expedited

screening. Furthermore, the description of the concept of privacy by Warren and

Brandeis (1890) and by legal experts under tort laws illustrates a modern day approach

to what is considered a person’s individual right to privacy.

Risk-based security was the foundation for the Trusted Traveler programs and for DHS

agencies to apply their resources to become more efficient and effective as an

organization. Examples of how biometric systems and their positive and negative effects

were reflected on government assistance benefits programs to demonstrate the use of

biometrics as a government statue.

The legal authority was presented to illustrate how legal jurisdictions

subsequently affect the adoption and implementation of biometric systems and their

compliance with federal, state, local, and international agreements. Lastly, the challenges

and issues on the adoption of biometrics takes into account that biometric technology has

its limitations and not all members of the population could enroll in such programs.

Limitations such as congenital diseases, injuries, or the aging process, and the

performance of the technology, must be kept to be relevant through time.

Additionally, the effects on privacy and convenience were presented to describe the

trade-offs of personal privacy for modern day convenience of faster security checks.

The information provided in Chapter 3 described the methodology that was used to

conduct this study.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to investigate and explore if privacy concerns of

travelers would be a factor in the adoption of biometric technologies in expedited

screening procedures in commercial airports. In addition, does ease of use, usefulness,

awareness of the technology, and security contributed to the adoption of biometric

technologies in the expedited screening process at commercial airports as it related to

Trusted Traveler Programs.

Chapter 1 introduced the study and the problem statement and Chapter 2

illustrated the relevant literature on expedited screening, risked-based security,

biometric technologies, and the concept of privacy. It also addressed legal authorities,

and privacy provisions; and the use of the TAM that created the theoretical foundation

for this study. Chapter 3 explains the research approach that was utilized for this mixed-

method investigation.

Research Design and Approach

In this mixed-method research study, the research questions were the

foundation for the approaches that were used. The perception of privacy and the

experiences of travelers using biometric systems reported to the DHS Privacy Office

provided the attitudes and behaviors determining that the data would be of a qualitative

nature.

The case study approach was used as it involved developing an in-depth analysis

of multiple cases (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). The data collection for a case study

approach involves various sources that include quantitative data relevant to the overall

research design (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). This study used a purposive

sampling method as it selected a small sample of units because of the valuable

information to the research questions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.25). Contextual

(holistic) strategies were used to interpret data in the context of a whole to include

interconnections among all of the elements. The entire study was of a inductive-

deductive cycle as at some points it would move towards a grounded result (facts and

observations) as an inductive inference to a general inference (TAM) through the

deductive inference of similar predictions (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998, p.26).

Data Collection

The data collection consisted in a document review of previous peer reviewed

journals, articles, and studies conducted on the effectiveness of biometric technologies

and the attitudes and behaviors that could be generated if the technology would be

implemented. The evaluation of privacy had to be considered, but it could not be based

on the perception of an individual, as the federal government defines the concept of

privacy based on the Privacy Act of 1974. The DHS Privacy Office collected and

reported the privacy complaints of Trusted Travelers during the enrollment process or

while experiencing the use of biometric technologies at ports of entry. These privacy

reports are reported to Congress on a semiannual basis and are distributed without the

disclosure of PII.

The DHS Privacy Office collects privacy complaints base on a set criteria that the

federal government has categorized as violations based on the Privacy Act of 1974.

These complaints are formal and DHS must take action to resolve the issue within a

seven to ten day period (DHS Privacy Office, 2012). I went to the DHS Privacy Office

public website under archived annual privacy reports from (2011-2014) that provided the

data that would answer the first research question in regards to privacy.

Secondly, the TSA made available the numbers of Trusted Travelers processed through

expedited screening and those enrolled in TSA Pre-Check, public information through a

study conducted by the GAO. I used those numbers and features to confirm them

through the TSA databases, but could not disclose additional information as these

databases are sensitive security information (SSI). The quantitative features provided the

data as to demonstrate how expedited screening was deployed at commercial airports.

Additionally, I gathered public information through social media networks with the

#TSAprecheck, #GlobalEntry and #TrustedTraveler to get a higher sample size than

those obtained by the DHS Privacy Office (2011-2014). The information on social

media networks provided more detailed information into the reactions of the population

participating in Trusted Traveler programs and their experiences with biometric

technologies and expedited screening at airports.

Variables: Independent and Dependent Variables

In this study, the variables determine the findings and outcomes of the research

conducted. I decided to have multiple variables that would create various outcomes.

For example, a variable can take different values according to treatment, scenario, and

other factors. In this study, I referred to independent variables as what has determined

the outcome of a dependent variable (Creswell, 2007, P.152). For instance, in this study

privacy, ease of use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the technology are

independent variables that could affect the outcome, which is the dependent variable if

biometric technologies would be used and adopted into the expedited screening

procedures at commercial airports. I wanted to explore the relationship among the

variables and its effects on the possibility of biometric technologies be deployed as a

security measure, if the technology was to be expanded as other agencies had.

Figure 11. A graphic representation illustrating the independent variables and the

dependent variable.

Setting

The TSA is responsible for implementing security screening procedures in 450

airports in the United States and its territories for outgoing travelers through aviation

security. The CBP is responsible for the screening of incoming travelers into the United

States from aboard. Currently, 121 commercial airports have expedited screening through

the participation of Trusted Traveler Programs. These airports have on-site enrollment

centers for those wanting to enroll in the program after viewing the process through prior

security experiences. The archived data of this study was obtained from airports

providing expedited screening specifically to Trusted Traveler program participants.

Databases

Publicly available GAO and OIG vetted data (reviewed and redacted), was used

in this study. The information is based on actually Trusted Traveler program

participants reported into the Performance Measurement Information System (PMIS),

an application that assists authorized users throughout the TSA to report and track all of

the Trusted Travelers processed through security screening checkpoints on a daily basis.

The system keeps a running total of all of the Trusted Traveler participants processing

in all 450 airports, as other airports have expedited screening of the individual, but not

of their belongings.

In addition, the Performance Information Management System (PIMS) allows

those who have access the capability of generating a variety of reports for viewing based

on set parameters (e.g. date range, region, busiest time, etc.) when required. Reports

could be made to illustrate Trusted Traveler expedited screening by an airport, lane,

busiest time, and date. The information is based on Trusted Traveler processing by the

categorization of “LLLL” documented and reported into PMIS by all of the TSA airports.

The TSA offers expedited screening in seven categories (Appendix B) in the

PMIS database, and this research study only focused on expedited screening for travelers

enrolled in a Trusted Traveler Programs administrated by a DHS agency. Data was

collected from several audits and reports gathered from commercial airports and point of

entries implementing expedited screening by the GAO and OIG. Those reports illustrate

the process and security assessments of biometric technologies in border and aviation

security. The information contained within the assessments and those analyses are

considered public.

Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research Question 1: Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of

biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?

This question was answered by the analysis of the qualitative data that was obtained

from the formal complaints of the DHS privacy reports. The data was analyzed based

on a case study approach. The case study approach allowed me to conduct a qualitative

analysis based on a specific way of collecting, organizing, and analyzing the data based

on analyzing a process (Patton, 2002, p.447). This method allowed for a thematic

analysis that allowed for pattern recognition (Patton, 2002, p.452)

Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, and

security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening

procedures at commercial airports?

This question was answered through a deductive analysis based on TAM. Data

triangulation was used to conduct a content analysis from previous document reviews.

Data collected from social media sites was based on analytic induction to verify that the

analysis was similar to those of the TAM. Lastly, the quantitative data collected from the

GAO reports illustrated the airport capabilities and the number of passengers receiving

expedited screening at commercial airports. Afterwards, through the purpose of

descriptive statistics, I illustrated through pie charts the perceptions of Trusted Travelers

experiences using biometric technologies, and receiving expedited screening at

commercial airports (Trochim, 2008).

Data Analysis

The data analysis for this research is based on a content analysis. Content analysis refers

to the researching of recurring words and themes (Patton, 2002, p.452). In this study, I

analyzed documents from the GAO, privacy complaints, social media postings, and

studies for recurrent patterns. The first part of the study that pertain to privacy concerns

was based on an inductive analysis as the process was to discover patterns, themes, and

categories in the data.

The second part of the study that dealt with variables that could impact the

acceptance of biometric technologies in the expedited screening procedures was based on

a deductive analysis, as the data was analyzed to the existing theoretical framework of

Morosan (2012) and Davis’ (1989) TAM. A minimal sample of descriptive statistics was

used for the data interpretation of the attitudes and behaviors of Trusted Travelers and

commercial airports providing expedited screening and its capabilities.

Protection of Participant’s Rights

There are no participants or subjects used in this study. I requested permission

from the Committee on Ethical Standards in Research for the Institutional Review Board

(IRB) at Walden University. The entire data was collected and used as secondary data

within this study. The information provided from the GAO, OIG, and DHS Privacy

Office is publicly available online at each agency’s official websites. The audits and

surveys were vetted and redacted (reviewed and cleared) are considered public

information and did not require permission from the DHS and TSA Office of Public

Affairs for use. The use of public information reduces the possibility of disclosing

SSI and protects the security assessments of both DHS agencies.

I could not collect or use the data from the databases based on SSI procedures. I

only used the databases to confirm previously released information made to the public

through the GAO. As a covered employee under the TSA SSI Policies and Procedures

Handbook (SSI Program, 2012) guidance on usage, I could reviewed the data to support

the research based on the assessments conducted by the GAO (2014) regarding the usage

of biometrics into the expedited screening process in commercial airports.

According to the TSA SSI Handbook Section 6.0 (2012) records containing SSI are not

available for public inspection or copying and the TSA does not release records

containing SSI to covered or non-covered persons who do not have a need to know. As

written in the TSA SSI Handbook Section 6.1 (2012), a covered person is an individual

or entity that has transportation or transportation security-related responsibilities to

include, but not limited to, (a) anyone who is permanently or temporarily assigned,

detailed to, attached employed by, or under contract with DHS, (b) regulated parties such

as federal, state, local, and tribal government employees, contractors and grantees, as

well as TSA stakeholders and industry partners; (c) committees of Congress; (d) other

persons with a need to know as defined in Title 49 code of federal regulations (2012)

Section 1520.11; and (e) persons receiving SSI pursuant to other conditional

disclosures. Moreover, the specific data could not be approved for public disclosure as

it contains information that if released publicly would be detrimental to transportation

security. Furthermore, the use of PMIS and PIMS was solely used to support specific

assessments conducted by the GAO (2014) and OIG (2012) regarding the number of

Trusted Travelers receiving expedited screening at commercial airports.

Summary

The primary focus of the research method in this study was to provide an extensive

explanation of the process used to describe the research design and approach. The

research method described the purposive sample and setting which consisted of current

U.S. commercial airports providing expedited screening. The instruments and

materials within this research study were collected from past OIG, GAO, and DHS

Privacy Office Annual Reports to provide an overview of privacy concerns reported by

travelers, biometric technologies used and tested, DHS agencies process of expedited

screening at commercial airports, and its enrollment rates since the implementation of

Trusted Traveler programs. The data collection provided the methods on how the data

was collected. The research questions described how what methods were used to have

them answered.

The databases identify the system used for tracking Trusted Traveler expedited

screening at commercial airports administered by the TSA. The data analysis explained

the reason for the selection of specific methods of analysis to explore an in-depth

explanation of the two research questions. The protection of participants’ rights is

addressed within the study to safeguard that any information gathered from a group or

individual had been provided in advance and that full consent to use the information in

this study was granted. Ethical issues within this study were presented to receive approval

from the Committee on Ethical Standards in Research for the Institutional Review Board

(IRB) at Walden University prior to conducting research.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

In order for biometric technologies to be adopted into the expedited screening

procedures for the TSA Pre-Check Trusted Traveler program in commercial airports,

DHS must address privacy requirements based on the Privacy Act of 1974. DHS has to

consider the differences in individuals’ perspectives, attitudes, and acceptance of the

technology; as the “user” would be affected by the collection and use of the technology if

adopted into the expedited security procedures.

The results of this study would help the DHS and TSA understand the position of

multiple entities that have an interest in the incorporation of such technology for stronger

security measures. Entities include national governments, airport managers, airlines,

industry experts, and the traveling public. Chapter 4 describes the process used to answer

the two research questions that dominated the study.

The first question framing the research addressed what the United States federal

government classification of a formal privacy complaint under the Privacy Act of 1974.

The complaints filed with the DHS Privacy Office have to be addressed and reported to

Congress on a semi-annual basis.

The research questions were: 1) Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the

adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening procedures at

commercial airports? And 2) Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology,

and security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening

procedures at commercial airports?

The document review of the privacy complaints of travelers was analyzed for

content to determine what privacy concerns were reported as it related to the use of

biometric technologies. The reports reviewed were from 2009-2014. Although, Trusted

Traveler programs began in 2009 through Global Entry by CBP, DHS had used

biometric technologies under its program US-VISIT (United States Visitor and

Immigration Status Indicator Technology) to control foreign travelers entering the

United States. Under the US-VISIT program, DHS collects the ten fingerprints and

digital photographs of most non-U.S. citizens while obtaining the US Visa and entering

the United States (OBIM, 2015).

This process provides biometric identification services to state, local, and federal

government officials helping immigration officers to determine if a particular person is

eligible to receive a visa to enter the U.S (OBIM, 2015). The collection of biometrics is

used to prevent identity fraud that can occur with documents used for identification and

verification, unlike with biometrics as each is unique and impossible to forge (OBIM,

2015). The program helps the U.S. government prevent people from using fraudulent

documents to enter the country or have stayed after visa expiration (OBIM, 2015). In

March 2013, the name of the program was changed to the Office of Biometric Identity

Management (OBIM).

DHS did not have information regarding formal complaints regarding Trusted

Traveler Programs until 2013 with the official implementation of TSA Pre-Check in 121

airports, so I had to review and collect data from formal complaints under the program of

US-VISIT to determine the privacy concerns in regards to the use of biometric

technologies. Using a categorical strategy by breaking down the narrative of the data

after reviewing 20 pages of privacy complaints, I did a context analysis and used the

software of QSR International Nvivo 11 to code based on the three surrounding themes:

1. Privacy concerns based on biometric technology experience through port of entries.

2. Privacy concerns based on personal information inputted into databases.

3. Privacy concerns based on interactions with government officials.

The categorization into the three areas was done to show the accurate position of the

federal government to accept these complaints as valid based on the requirements of the

Privacy Act of 1974. Therefore, when someone from the traveling public would file a

formal complaint it had to belong to the following categories to have a resolution from a

government official from the DHS Privacy Office. This Chapter further includes

descriptive statistics to reflect the various factors to include the expansion of expedited

screening in airports based on Pre-Check enrollment, participating airlines, third party

vendors, and increase participation into other Trusted Traveler Programs run by CBP.

Data Collection

This mixed method design with an overall case study approach was based on the

quantitative data that was released by the GAO in regards to the number of travelers

receiving expedited screening from 2011 to 2014. This information was made public and

was reviewed during the literature review to show stakeholders’ role of participation in

Trusted Traveler Programs. Upon approval of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) with

number 06-17-0269550, the study met ethical considerations, as no participants were

used.

I received consent from the agency to be able to verify the accuracy of the

numbers released to the GAO regarding the number of travelers receiving expedited

screening in airports nationwide. I did not disclose SSI as the information did not

mentioned a location, time, and technologies that would create a security risk. Once the

numbers for expedited screening compared to the Trusted Traveler status eligible

passengers was confirmed through the databases was correct. The public information of

the quantitative data was placed into a Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet categorized by year

and compared to the Trusted Traveler’s enrollment compared to passengers receiving

expedited screening at commercial airports.

The purpose was to understand if privacy concerns were a factor in the adoption

of biometric technologies if it would be used for expedited screening in commercial

airports. The concept of privacy on a personal level was subjective and does not fit into

the criteria of those underlined by the Privacy Act of 1974. Therefore, interviewing

members of the traveling public would not have been a reliable source of data, as it

would produce inconsistencies and not subject to government review. I went to the DHS

Privacy Office and collected the reports that were presented to Congress regarding

privacy complaints from 2009 - 2014.

The reports provided the qualitative data that was used to analyze what exactly

were the privacy complaints that the government took into consideration in regards to

biometrics and Trusted Traveler Programs. Afterwards, the data was imported into Nivo

11 and through a content analysis was categorized into the three most important

categories previously stated to understand how the federal government determined

privacy violations. In addition, social media posts from Facebook between the years of

2011-2014 of a sample size of 325 with the #TSAprecheck and #globalentry were

gathered to determine the traveling public reactions regarding experiences using Trusted

Traveler Programs. The information obtained from social media sites was collected to

enhance and answer the second research question, as the information is considered public

and accessible to anyone.

Data Analysis

Research Question 1: Do privacy concerns of travelers affect the adoption of biometric

technology into the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports?

The qualitative data from the 50 privacy complaints from the annual reports was

reviewed through a content analysis. I reviewed all 50 complaints for themes, patterns,

and words. Through inductive analysis, I discovered that privacy concerns were

reported based on the overall experience of the use of biometric technologies, errors

inputted into databases, and interactions with government officials. I used Nvivo 11 to

code the recurrent themes and was categorized into three categories:

1. Privacy concerns based on biometric technology experience through port of

entries,

2. Privacy concerns based on personal information inputted into databases, and

3. Privacy concerns based on interactions with government officials.

The coding of the data was done through a content analysis of the privacy

complaint. A sample of a privacy complaint and the agency’s disposition is in Appendix

G. The privacy data was analyzed under these categories as it was the best form to

answer the first research question. Under the complaints received by the DHS Privacy

Office, I wanted to know the submissions based on the type of privacy violations that

occurred and how it would impact the study.

The themes were based on reactions towards the use of biometric technologies at

ports of entry, these includes ports, airports, and border crossings. I also was interested

into the various complaints that the traveler would experience after submitting

themselves to the biometric technology process and errors were done at no fault of the

passenger, but of personal information captured incorrectly. The last category was

created as various complaints were having a repetitive theme that government officials

were the cause of the traveler’s dissatisfaction while undergoing security screening.

Using Nivo 11, I reviewed the privacy complaints and highlighted the complaint

into one of the three categories placing references through pattern recognition and

thematic analysis. From the 50 formal complaints received from the DHS Privacy Office

regarding to Trusted Traveler programs or individual’s having interactions with biometric

technologies the results are as follows:

The 5 (10%) complaints in the area of experience with biometric technologies

through ports of entry had nothing to do with biometric technology. The complaints were

done because the traveler did not understand why he or she was referred to secondary

screening as they had registered for a Trusted Traveler Program and had willing paid the

fee of $100 dollars. Therefore, the complaints were filed to receive clarification and vent

about the experience during secondary screening selection. In the area of privacy

concerns based on personal information inputted into databases 20 (40%) complaints

were regarding the errors during enrollment/or processing. Errors included placing

fingerprints with incorrect names, dates of births, fingerprint captures, and poor quality

of fingerprints taken.

The last area of privacy concerns was based on interactions with public officials

as the highest with 25 (50%) complaints. In this area, the common themes were

mistreatment of government officials based on tone of voice, comments, and procedures

not understood by the traveler. The passenger’s use of the term “violation of privacy”

was based on searches conducted during secondary screening when during primary

screening an alarmed had occurred that enabled government officials to conduct a more

thorough investigation. Additionally, these complaints expressed many sentiments of

the traveler while experiencing secondary screening such as “Feeling like a Criminal”

“Feeling Uncomfortable”, “Feeling Violated”, “Questions Were Personal and Intrusive”,

“Feeling Angry”, and “Treated Unprofessionally.”

Figure 12: Total percentage of privacy complaints from 2009- 2014

After the data was analyzed and coded under the numerical form, each number

was divided by 50 and then multiplied by 100 to obtain a percentage; afterwards, it was

placed into Microsoft Excel to create the detailed graph showed above illustrating the

results of the analysis.

The results of the analysis for the first research question demonstrated that

privacy concerns do not have an impact on the adoption of biometric technologies into

the expedited screening process. Based on the analysis, the traveler would not object to

submitting to biometric technologies as long as they are treated with respect and the

process of biometric capture is not intrusive and done correctly during the enrollment and

security screening process.

Research Question 2: Do ease of use, usefulness, awareness of the technology, and

security affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening

procedures at commercial airports?

This part of the research was based on a deductive analysis as the data was

analyzed based on the theoretical framework of the TAM and Morosan (2012) research.

The numerical data of expedited screening was collected by the TSA from October 2011

through January 2014 and was released to the GAO in 2015. The content analysis shows

in millions, the differences in the Secure Flight system producing TSA Pre-Check

designated boarding passes compared to the actual number of passengers receiving

expedited screening. The numbers beginning from October 2011 showing by each

month are small for Pre-Check designation as only four airports were piloting the

program. Delta Airlines was the first airline to provide the service to its frequent flyers,

but expedited screening at the airports was not implemented until January 2012.

Multiple airlines such as Alaska Airlines, U.S. Airways, American and United Airlines

joined TSA Pre-Check to have passengers eligible for expedited screening. TSA began

processing passengers through expedited screening in only 30 airports. In

November 2012, to increase expedited screening into Pre-Check designated lanes, the

TSA incorporated the Managed Inclusion program to allow passengers without PreCheck

designation and with the use of a randomizer, experience the benefits of expedited

screening without registration into the Pre-Check program. By October 2013, the TSA

expanded the Pre-Check program designated lanes in 121 airports nationwide and Virgin

America, Hawaiian Airlines, JetBlue Airways and Southwest Airlines were added to the

expedited screening numbers. The addition of those airlines expanded the generation of

Trusted Traveler designation into the Secure Flight program giving the boarding pass of

passengers the Pre-Check status.

Figure 13. Expansion of TSA expedited screening from October 2011- January 2014

Figure 14. Percentage of passengers screening by type from May 11, 2014 – May 18,

2014

The content analysis underlines the comparison of when Secure Flight designates

the boarding passes with the Pre-Check designation and when the TSA began

implementing expedited screening at commercial airports. The data shows that the

system would over-designate boarding passes with the Trusted Traveler status, but

commercial airports did not have the expedited screening capabilities to sustain the large

volume of Pre-Check designation the Secure Flight system was producing.

During the period of May 11, 2014, through May 18, 2014, the TSA implemented

the programs of Managed Inclusion, Known Crew Traveler, and its risk assessment

algorithms. 41% of the traveling public received expedited screening at the 121

participating commercial airports compared to the 59% received standard screening. The

long-term objective of the agency is to provide 100% expedited screening and a wait time

of fewer than 5 minutes for Pre-Check participants and to increase voluntary enrollment

(TSA, 2016).

However, the agency does not understand that the program may not be suitable

for all members of the traveling public because some may travel once a year. Hence, for

passengers traveling once a year would not a benefit in enrolling into a Trusted Traveler

program. Therefore, the data will always be evolving as the relationship between

expedited screening, and the airport resources and capabilities are changing based on the

agency’s senior leadership objectives, additional airline participation, and financial

budget.

Additionally, private companies such as CLEAR and IDENTOGO are providing

the service of enrollment with a fee for identity verification bypassing the travel

document checker personnel at selected airports. Customers can skip the line but Trusted

Traveler program enrollment is required to receive expedited screening at commercial

airports or sporting events. These third-party vendors have conducted the research and

dedicated resources in understanding that individual members of the traveling public

would pay any fee, and have their biometric information collected and verified to reap

the benefits of shorter and faster lines while traveling (INDENTOGO, 2016).

An analytic induction was conducted based on a content analysis with documents

from the literature review and previous studies. A sample of 325 social media posts were

analyzed to capture the attitudes, perceptions, and concerns of the traveling public

regarding their experiences with Trusted Traveler Programs, biometric technologies, and

expedited screening. The data obtained from the DHS Privacy Office was not sufficient

to make a generalization regarding the TAM and attitudes of Trusted Traveler

participants.

The TAM could not be applied in this study based that I did not have access to the

actual design of the biometric technologies being used by CBP at ports of entry. In

addition, I did not conduct actual interviews of those that did have experience with those

technologies as it would null the data of the privacy reports. However, the 325 social

media postings provided an indication of how ease of use and usefulness are influential in

the attitudes and behaviors towards biometric technologies (Shen et al., 2006).

Based on the content analysis, the traveler feels ease to use the biometric

technologies as it would provide an extended benefit, if it is non-intrusive and enhances

security (Josha & Koshy, 2009). In the area of usefulness, passengers would accept

submitting to biometric technologies as long as they are aware of its purpose.

Individuals who choose to enroll in a Trusted Traveler program are made aware of the

technologies being used and its purpose in the terms and conditions policies during the

enrollment process.

During the data analysis with the use of Nvivo 11, I created three categories and

coded the social media posts based on the recurrent themes of (a) Shorter/faster lines;

(b) Experience was enjoyable, easy, and pleasant, and (c) Frustration with the process

during airport screening. I read all of the 325 posts and coded them based on the

frequency of the themes experienced by travelers. The data was analyzed and coded

under a numerical form; each number was divided by 325 and then multiplied by 100 to

obtain a percentage. Then, it was placed in Microsoft Excel creating the detailed graph

illustrating the results.

Figure 15: Social media analysis based on attitudes, perceptions, and frustrations.

The analysis revealed the majority 147 (45.2%) of those experiencing Trusted

Traveler status favored the shorter and faster lines. Third-Party vendors have explored

the concept of shorter lines with the use of biometric technologies during screening for

identity verification with positive results. 134 (41.2%) enjoyed the experience of the

expedited screening process due to not removing shoes, electronics, liquids from carry-on

bags, and belts. 44 (13.5%) experience frustration with the Trusted Traveler Program.

Furthermore, I explored in-depth the themes causing frustration among travelers

experiencing expedited screening at airports and ports of entry. Using the same process

as previously with the 325 media posts, the number used to determine the frustrations of

travelers experiences with expedited screening at airports is 44. The data was analyzed

and coded under a numerical form; each number was divided by 44 and then multiplied

by 100 to obtain a percentage. Then, it was placed in Microsoft Excel creating the

detailed graph illustrating the results.

Out of the 44, 22 (50.0%) felt cheated about paying for the program because their

boarding pass was not designated the Trusted Traveler status, non-enrollees were being

placed into Trusted Traveler designated lines that did not know the divestiture process for

expedited screening. 13 (29.5%) stated that Trusted Traveler designated lanes are longer

than standard lanes. 9 (20.5%) were selected for additional or secondary screening while

having Trusted Traveler status.

Out of the 44, 22 (50.0%) felt cheated about paying for the program because their

boarding pass was not designated the Trusted Traveler status, non-enrollees were being

placed into Trusted Traveler designated lines that did not know the divestiture process

towards expedited screening, 13 (29.5%) stated that Trusted Traveler designated lanes

are longer than those at the standard lanes, and 9 (20.5%) were selected for additional or

secondary screening while having Trusted Traveler status.

Figure 16: Social media analysis based on frustration with Trusted Traveler Programs.

Therefore, the adoption of biometric technologies into the expedited screening

process at commercial airports would be affected based on the common theme of

wait time during the security screening process and not the technology. The analysis

concluded that the traveling public would prefer to have security be efficient and fast

without the process being intrusive to their person.

Summary

In Chapter 4, I presented the results of the data analysis from the document

review of the formal complaints obtained from the DHS Privacy Office from 2009-

2014. I explained by the TAM could not be tested based on the lack of accessibility to

the system design. The social media analysis provided additional content into the

behaviors and attitudes of travelers experiencing expedited screening in commercial

airports. The analysis was conducted based on the data released by the TSA to the

GAO and confirmed through its databases of PMIS and PIMS. The GAO and OIG

provided the information of Secure Flight and the amount of passengers that received

expedited screening at commercial airports. The data demonstrated that commercial

airports do not have the full capabilities to increase the volume of expedited screening

based on resources.

Therefore, consideration must be made that the amount of passengers receiving

expedited screening would constantly change as more commercial airports would add

Pre-Check lanes and resources to support program participants. However, Secure

Flight is over producing the Trusted Traveler designation on boarding passes, but

commercial airports do not have the capabilities to process the high amount through

expedited screening.

During the time frame of this research, only 121 airports out of the 450 offer

expedited screening for Trusted Traveler status designation. It does not account for

additional airports that have implemented expedited screening, additional airline

participation, and the removal of the Managed Inclusion program as it was used as a

waittime management tool. Therefore, the amount of passengers receiving expedited

screening is related to the airport having lanes designated for Pre-Check processing or

standard lanes being converted into expedited screening and the resources to maintain

them.

The analysis and interpretation of the data in this mixed-method case study

expressed that privacy was based on the definition provided by the Privacy Act of 1974

and would not influence the adoption and usability of biometric technology in regards to

expedited screening procedures in commercial airports. The attitudes and behaviors of

the traveler are towards wait times and shorter/faster security lines, and not the use of

biometric technologies for the identification and verification process as a security

measure for expedited screening. A discussion of the results is presented in Chapter 5

with its conclusions and recommendations for further study.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

This chapter begins with a summary of the study and discusses the findings based

on the theoretical frameworks by Morosan (2012) and Davis’ (1989) TAM. The focus

was whether did privacy concerns would affect the adoption of biometric technologies in

the expedited screening process at commercial airports. In addition, I explored other

variables such as those of ease to use, usefulness, security, and awareness of the

technology to understand their effects on the adoption of biometric technologies into the

expedited screening procedures as a security measure at commercial airports.

Furthermore, this chapter discusses the limitations of this study and provides

recommendations for future research and actions. The conclusion of this chapter

finalizes with the implications for positive social change and what methods were

implemented to date in regards to enhancing expedited screening in commercial airports.

Summary

The study focused on privacy as a variable into the adoption of biometric

technologies into the expedited screening process at commercial airports. Furthermore,

the study explored the attitudes, perceptions, and concerns regarding the ease of use,

usefulness, and awareness of the biometric technology, and how its adoption would be

affected as an enhancement of the expedited screening procedures at commercial airports.

The research questions all surrounded on the theoretical concept of the TAM and

provided new information to technology manufacturers of biometrics devices,

government agencies, businesses, scholars, and public policy decision makers to decide

on the adoption of biometric technology as a security measure for the identity and

verification process of those going through expedited screening at commercial airports.

Such data would help the government agencies with the mission of national security to

be able to reach a balance between the individual’s right to privacy and safeguarding the

country.

In this study, I applied a mixed methodology approach with a focus of case study

that involved a small about descriptive statistics (graphs) and a content analysis of

secondary data from both quantitative and qualitative sources. During the numerical data

sets, the data revealed that the internal system of Secure Flight was over producing the

Trusted Traveler status designation more than the airport’s capabilities and resources

allowed.

As a result, there are increased wait-times or enrollees not screened through

expedited screening procedures as required. The qualitative data through privacy

complaints and social media posts were used as secondary data to enhanced and

provided and in-depth view of the traveler’s experience with Trusted Traveler Programs

commercial airports and ports of entry.

Interpretation of the Findings

The use of biometric technologies has increased as a tool for identification,

authentication, authorization, and accountability purposes. The literature review

provided the information and the reasoning for the use of the technology as a security

measure for identity identification and verification. For government agencies, biometric

technology implementation in its programs is for national security interests and record

management into national databases. In the use of aviation security, many variables must

be taken into account before the adoption of biometric technology can be implemented,

such as airport size, personnel executing the program, databases maintenance, airline

participation, technology manufacturers, and airport managers. In this mixed

methodology study, I investigated the variables that would influence the adoption of

biometric technology for use as a security measure for the expedited screening

procedures at commercial airports in the United States.

Findings for Research Question 1

The data analysis demonstrated that privacy concerns do not have an impact on the

adoption of biometric technologies into the expedited screening procedures. The traveler

would consent to their right to privacy to receive a benefit, or for the convenience of

having a faster security line. Additionally, the biometric device capture has to be quick

and non-invasive. The travelers referred the majority of the privacy concerns (50%) were

based on the treatment of government officials during secondary security screening rather

than concerns regarding the collection of their personal information through biometric

technologies.

Findings for Research Question 2

The TAM could not be applied as I did not have access to the actual design of the

biometric technologies used by CBP at ports of entry. However, a 325 purpose sample

of posts on social media sites provided an indication of how ease of use and usefulness

influences the attitudes and behaviors towards biometric technologies. The analysis

revealed that the data provided by the TSA showed that the internal system of Secure

Flight had over produced the Trusted Traveler status designation, but not all 450

commercial airports were offering expedited screening procedures or had Pre-Check

designated lanes.

Therefore, the commercial airports do not have the capabilities to provide

expedited screening to the large volume of travelers having the Trusted Traveler status

produced by Secure Flight. In addition, to capture the attitudes, perceptions, and

behaviors of the traveling public, a purposeful sample of 325 was analyzed to determine

that 45.2% of the traveling public preferred Trusted Traveler designated status because of

the shorter and/or faster lanes.

41.2% enjoyed the experience of the expedited process as being easy and

pleasant, and 13.5% were frustrated with the Trusted Traveler Program experience. I

wanted to explore further the frustration of travelers regarding Trusted Traveler programs

as it related to biometric technology. The results illustrated that 50.0% of Trusted

Travelers felt cheated, as the status was not reflected on the boarding pass, or

nonenrollees were being placed in Trusted Traveler lanes without knowing the divesture

procedures. 29.5% of travelers stated that longer lines were in Trusted Traveler

designated lanes, and 20.5% were because of additional and/or secondary screening.

Limitations of the Study

This study had no limitations. The investigation was based on how privacy

concerns would affect the adoption of biometric technology into the expedited screening

process at commercial airports. Additionally, I also explored if awareness, ease of use,

security, and usefulness of the technology would affect the adoption of biometric

technology into the expedited screening procedures. If the study had included actual

interviews of participants regarding their sentiments about privacy, the answers to the

research questions would have been different and results would not be those reflected in

the study.

The results based on the content analysis from the information obtained from the

DHS Privacy Office illustrated that not many people filed privacy complaints or that the

government discard them as it did not met the federal government’s definition of privacy.

Therefore, government agencies are required to abide by the law, and are not subjective

as individuals and corporations could. The Privacy Act of 1974 only applies to

government programs and private companies are regulated through their own terms of

service.

The small sample size of 50 privacy complaints obtained by the DHS Privacy

Office (2009-2014) demonstrated that the agency had not collected enough data or it

collected enough to meet the required minimum reporting requirements. The small

sample size collected over the years was used to make general assumptions of privacy

complaints in all of the United States and its territories, and not a specific region, state, or

city.

Additionally, the information obtained from the privacy complaints that was

analyzed was not enough and other secondary sources were needed. I was able to get a

wider perspective of the feelings of travelers through social media sites as they shared

their experiences with Trusted Traveler Programs and expedited screening at

commercial airports.

Additionally, I was not allowed to disclose information that was not made public

by the TSA previously. Under its SSI program, I was only allowed to verify information,

but could not disclose other information that would have had major contributions to this

study, if accessible. Therefore, the initial plan to compare and categorize commercial

airports based on their enplanements, personnel resources, technology, and wait-times

based on expedited screening was not possible. The non-disclosure of information

created a limitation because the research questions had to be answered through the

limited data that the agency had already released two years prior.

Discussion

According to TSA records, biometric security measures are being piloted to

include retinal scans that enable identification of passengers based on a unique set of

identifiers such as iris scans and fingerprints (TSA, 2012). Aviation security experts

suggested that security should be categorized into three parts: Items (Threats),

Identity (Passengers/Travelers), and Intent (Purpose). The TSA has made

improvements in the area of implementing the IATA version of the checkpoint of the

future, but has concentrated in the area of fraudulent boarding passes, instead of

identifying and verifying the traveler’s true identity (TSA, 2012).

Jackson, Chan, & Latourette (2011) argued about the consequences a Trusted

Traveler Program presents to the advantages of terrorists wanting to evade security

measures. First, a terrorist could apply for and be granted Trusted Traveler status,

providing them “authorized access” to that particular line (Jackson et al., 2011, p.3).

Second, terrorist could identify members of the public who are Trusted Travelers and

force them into carrying weapons through the Trusted Traveler line (Jackson et al., 2011,

p.3). Lastly, members of the public that are Trusted Travelers could become terrorists

(either by recruitment or by self-radicalization) and stage an attack before their

changed risk level was discovered and their Trusted Traveler status was revoked

(Jackson et al.

2011, p.3).

Furthermore, Jackson et al. (2011) stated that the reasoning for the limited

expansion of Trusted Traveler Programs in the United States is because if terrorists can

gain access based on the three forms stated previously, it would reduce the benefits of

such programs. They suggested that some fraction of the terrorists will apply, and some

may be accepted as Trusted Travelers depending on the nature of their background check

and the rates of false positives (incorrectly flagging an innocent person as a threat) or a

false negative (misidentifying a terrorist as a nonthreat) (Jackson et al. 2011, p.5).

However, the baseline probability of detection is the most important factor in aviation

security standards as all passengers, regardless of status would be receiving x-ray

screening of their property and a walk through metal detector of their person (Jackson et

al. 2011, p.5).

The quality of the background checks also plays a significant role in the

acceptance and implementation into the Trusted Traveler Program by reducing the rates

of false positives and false negatives, allowing for security to be more efficient and

using its resources for travelers where information is limited or unknown (Jackson et al.

2011,

p.15). However, terrorists could already use population that receives expedited screening

as a condition of their employment to gain access through security checkpoints, such as

pilots, airline crew, airport employees, and bribing security officials under existing

security models (Jackson et al. 2011, p.15).

Jackson et al. (2011) made the correlation between the baseline of security

performance and a terrorist ability to be able to gain Trusted Traveler status based on the

quality of the background checks; making the programs a tool for terrorist to circumvent

security screening. However, the RAND Corporation report (2011) stated that the TSA

when it was created in 2001, provided the head of the agency the ability to establish a

registered traveler program with the requirements that fliers must provide personal

information, including biometrics, and submit to a background to verify, whether they

present a threat to commercial aviation or not (RAND, 2011). Trusted Travelers would

receive expedited security screening and a more convenient and comfortable travel

experience, but security screeners would still reserve the right to increase the intensity of

the screening, if the Trusted Traveler were suspicious or chosen randomly for secondary

screening (RAND, 2011).

Airports managers and stakeholders argued that technology must be efficient,

precise, and time-saving as too much time being spent in the security process could

become a deterrent for those wanting to travel for either business or pleasure. However,

since Trusted Traveler Programs are voluntary those choosing to enroll received the

benefits of being pre-screened by the integration of biometrics; and can received a faster

security experience as they are granted low-risk status allowing for more time to be spent

on other things in the airport such a shopping and dining; while waiting for their flight

increasing commerce and revenue for all stakeholders involved.

The introduction of biometric technology into the expedited security screening

in commercial airports would create the balance in its desire to deter terrorist from

applying into the program, while at the same time delivering clear benefits to innocent

travelers who take the time to apply and pay the registration fee (RAND, 2011).

Furthermore, the primary variable based on the report is how effective the background

check would be. The reasoning behind it is what makes the program desirable to the

flying public also makes it attractive to a terrorist (RAND, 2011).

In regards to matters of privacy, privacy advocates have identified privacy

concerns with the use of facial recognition technology for its ability to recognize

individuals in public environments without their consent, and collect their information,

and then share their personal data (Facial, 2015, p. 13). One of the concerns is the

reduction of anonymity that affects the privacy of a person when in a public environment,

if choosing to be in public (Facial, 2015, p.13). However, the Center for Democracy &

Technology stated: when most individuals are in public, there is an expectation that some

business and people would recognize their faces, but only a few would make the

connection between the name of the face especially in matters of internet behaviors and

travel patterns (Facial, 2015, p.13).

Furthermore, privacy advocates stated: since being recognized in public

settings becomes more common, some individual may not be comfortable shopping in

specific establishments, gathering in public for a supporting cause, or visiting certain

places (Facial, 2015, p.14). The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) stated

that individuals lose control over their identity, if they do not have the option to want

to remain anonymous in public settings. Facial technology adds additional privacy

concerns as its use is not only to identify the individual, but also those they are with

(Facial, 2015, p.14).

The World Privacy Forum stated that the majority of individuals may find it

invasive to their privacy, if security cameras were used in the tracking of their

movements for marketing strategies (Facial, 2015, p.14). An additional privacy concern

is the identification or verification of the individual without its consent or knowledge.

Unlike those of other biometric technologies, facial recognition can be utilized to capture

the face at a distance with the individual knowing, and as the technology grows the

option of opting out may be less feasible for the utilization of the technology (Facial,

2015, p.15).

The biggest privacy issues with the use of facial recognition are:

•Individual control over personal information: The matter that personal data is

associated and collected with facial recognition could be shared, used, and sold

without the person’s consent (Facial, 2015, p.16).

•Data security: The data collected by the facial recognition technology can be

subject to data breaches that could be exposed to unauthorized entities (Facial,

2015, p.16). The risk of theft of data could increase the possibilities of stalking,

identity theft, and harassment (Facial, 2015, p.17). Industry experts believe that

security concerns are mitigated, as present facial print algorithms are tailored to

the vendor and, there is little use, if received through a breach (Facial, 2015,

p.17).

•Misidentification: The matching of someone’s image is captured and

misidentified with the incorrect identification of an individual leading to

longterm consequences without the knowledge of the individual (Facial, 2015,

p.17).

•Disparate treatment: Individuals who may not have consented to facial

recognition could be denied access to particular services and products.

Therefore, the use of patterns of behavior and personal characteristics could be

used to make generalization leading a person be discriminated based on certain

groups (Facial, 2015, P.17).

Stakeholders have expressed that the technology does not present unusual privacy

risks that already exist and could be reduced as the benefits would be weighed towards

what the technology offers (Facial, 2015, p.17). They argued that:

•Individuals should not expect complete anonymity in public: It is contended that

privacy and anonymity are not the same and that losing complete anonymity is

not a surrender of privacy. The capturing of a facial image of a face print in

public is not the same as removing a person’s anonymity, as it does not reveal

any personal information (Facial, 2015, p.18).

•Surveillance is already part of our daily life: Public places already have security

cameras and facial recognition does not increase their use (Facial, 2015, p.18).

•Individuals have demonstrated a willingness to give up privacy for the benefits

technology: Individuals have demonstrated their willingness to share personal

information in public, by posting on social networking sites. Therefore, the

trade-

offs between losing some privacy and the benefits of new technologies offer

businesses opportunities for economic development (Facial, 2015, p.18).

•The need for consent should be based on the context: The need for individual

consent should rely on the framework under which facial recognition technology

is utilized. In matters of security, there may not be a requirement to ask for

permission when using the technology compared to social networking sites

which have repositories of facial images to identify individual on a boarder scale

(Facial, 2015, p.19).

Privacy advocates expressed that the technology should have “privacy by design”

which are the building of privacy protections at every stage of development. For

example, manufacturers of biometric technologies could design into their systems that the

data collected, be used for specified purposes, and then, erasing the data after used

ensuring that repurposing of the data is disabled (Facial, 2015, p.25).

Conclusions

The current research makes the suggestion that travelers are willing to waive their

privacy concerns regarding the use of biometric technology, if the process is short on

time and that the security process is fast. The biometric technology that is used to

implement CBP Trusted Traveler programs utilizes a multi-model of fingerprint and

facial recognition for incoming passengers in port of entries in the United States and its

territories. Therefore, if the TSA would incorporate the same model, it could also address

the issue of wait times as the traveler would have already verified their identity through

dedicated kiosks minimizing the wait time in security lines. This concept has already

been introduced in the private sector with the CLEAR Program.

The industry has added the product of Trust Traveler status to avoid the long

security lines at commercial airports and sporting events. The CLEAR program has an

annual enrollment cost of $179 and supports the argument that individuals are willing to

pay such a fee for shorter lines (Crowley & Ross, 2009). However, CLEAR is not subject

to the Privacy Act of 1974, but it is regulated by its own terms of service. CLEAR is

available at 11 airports in the United States and works by passing through two steps:

identity verification and security screening.

Travelers who enrolled in CLEAR have their separate lane for the first step,

where they can utilize biometric authentication (Fingerprint or Iris Scan) at a kiosk rather

than wait for a TSA agent to inspect their ID and scribble something on the boarding pass

(Steele, 2015). After the identity has been verified, a CLEAR representative will escort

the traveler to the actual security screening, bypassing everyone waiting in line (Steele,

2015).

CLEAR is utilized by passengers who have first enroll online, and then visit an

airport location where their identity is verified, and biometrics are collected and recorded

into the vendor’s system (Steele, 2015). The enrollment in CLEAR can be done at any

CLEAR location with no appointment, and the card is shipped within 5 to 7 business

days

(Steele, 2015). However, enrolling in CLEAR does not mean that the traveler has Trusted

Traveler status; it is just a program that allows individuals to skip the line and the identity

verification of the TSA personnel (Steele, 2015).

Those who have enrolled in CLEAR must also enroll into a federal managed

Trusted Traveler Program to receive its benefits for expedited screening as CLEAR only

bypasses the identity verification portion of the screening as it is conducted by CLEAR

Kiosks (Steele, 2015). Furthermore, the federal government must balance the individual’s

right to privacy under the Privacy Act of 1974 and those of national security.

The U.S Patriot Act of 2001 made it that the federal government does not have to

follow restrictions of the Privacy Act of 1974 as issues of national security would take

priority. In addition, national security interests are one of the twelve exceptions that the

federal government has as a means to implement national security programs.

However, the Privacy Act of 1974 is the law that controls the federal government

into having privacy impact assessments and offices at every department to safeguard

itself from litigation. The U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 enables for multiple governmental

agencies to share information and programs in the process to combat terrorism based on

the attacks of September 11, 2001 (EPIC, 2016).

However, the balance between the interpretation of an individual’s right to

privacy and national security interests relies on the judicial system and which supreme

justice would favor the federal government’s position in fighting terrorism or the

individual’s right to privacy. The laws in the justice system have not been kept up

with advances in technology in the digital age.

Implications for Social Change

The results of this study within the body of research on social and political change

may be used to enhance the discussion for the U.S. Supreme Court to bring a clear

interpretation of the fourth amendment and the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001. The study

contributes to the deficiency in the literature as it addressed the privacy aspect of Trusted

Traveler Programs and the purpose biometric technologies could serve in the

enhancement of expedited screening procedures at commercial airports as a national

security objective. This study could provide scholars, authorities, and industry experts’

opportunities in deciding which actions should be implemented in their policies as it

relates to Trusted Traveler Programs.

The study revealed that the traveling public is more concern with wait times and

shorter or faster lines, and are willing to undergo any screening process that allows them

to have a reduction in their time during security screening at commercial airports. The

study illustrated that the traveling public is willing to consent to their right to privacy

for the convenience of shorter and faster lines, as they can spend less time during

security screening at commercial airports.

The objective of this research was to make a contribution to the existing body of

knowledge to foster a continuation of a change-oriented debate in matters of public

policy. The adoption of biometric technologies in Trusted Traveler Programs

specifically for the TSA Pre-Check Program in the expedited screening process may

interest other countries around the world with similar legal systems as those of the

United States, into implementing biometric technologies in programs of the same nature

(Neyland, 2009).

Recommendations

The DHS should combine all of its Trusted Traveler Programs into one database and in

the same format for all of its components. The incorporation of having one database

would reduce double efforts into creating different databases, maintenance, security

patches, equipment, facilities, and training of personnel. The purpose of Trusted Traveler

Programs is the same; regardless of the government agency that is overseeing its

implementation. The overall focus is the continuation of a security model based on

intelligence and risk assessments by allocating resources to individuals that are

categorized at a higher risk.

As the TSA implements its Trusted Traveler Program through Secure Flight and

its designation into the passenger’s boarding pass, CBP employs radio frequency

identification technology to allow pre-screened travelers expedited processing at

designated port of entries (OIG, 2014, p.1). Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a

form of automatic identification and data capture technology that uses radio frequencies

to transmit information (OIG, 2014, p. 1). CBP attaches a RFID tag in each Trusted

Traveler Program card and travelers who choose to participate in the program,

voluntary submit PII through a web-based application system that CBP uses to handle

the enrollment and vetting process (OIG, 2014, p.3).

Furthermore, CBP stores applicants’ data (biographic data, facial photographs,

and background investigation results) in a database. At ports of entry, RFID readers scan

the Trusted Traveler cards and use the unique number embedded in each card to retrieve

the passenger’s data through an encrypted network (OIG, 2014, p. 3). The CBP Officer

uses the passenger’s information shown on the monitor to authenticate the traveler’s

identity (OIG, 2014, p.3).

The CBP uses the RFID technology for registered travelers for expedited border

crossings and airports enrolled in their Trusted Traveler Programs. CBP maintains the

integrity of these programs through a stringent screening process that includes automated

searches against multiple law enforcement databases, 24-hour system checks to verify the

status of enrolled travelers, and random selections of registered travelers for secondary

inspection (OIG, 2014, p.4).

Additionally, CBP implemented a program to apply security patches to the

servers and databases that support these programs and has created testing environments

to see the effects of security patches before deploying its production systems (OIG, 2014,

p.5). CBP does not store any PII on the Trusted Traveler Program cards, and only the

unique identification number is present, this is done in the event that an attacker obtains

the information to produce a duplicate card, CBP officers can mitigate the threat by

verifying the travelers’ PII and picture presented on their terminal (OIG, 2014, p.6).

The TSA should incorporate the same system of assigning cards and kiosks for

those enrolled in Trusted Traveler Programs for the identity verification of the traveler

using the same technologies and databases, instead of creating a different system as both

agencies are under the DHS umbrella. The CLEAR program makes the concept workable

and is deployed at 11 commercial airports and CBP has also deployed the technology for

over two years and has had much success with the traveling public participating in

Trusted Traveler Programs. Therefore, by combining resources and placing all Trusted

Traveler Programs into one system, the concept would be easier to manage and would

reduce operating expenses compared to having two agencies manage separate programs.

Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Biometrics in Trusted Traveler Programs

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