American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

American national identity and grand strategy are essential to U.S. national

security, achievement of international goals and objectives, and to the many nations that

aligned with the United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Analyzing

national identity encourages reflection on the use of the four components of state power:

diplomacy, information, military, and the economy (DIME), to achieve national security

ends (Huntington, 2004). This research was conducted to examine how American

national identity influenced U.S. grand strategy and international activities during the

Clinton Administration. This research is important because President Clinton, as the first

American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security environment without great

power threats, with almost unlimited international political capital, and with undisputed

national power (Hyland, 1999). The grand strategy Clinton employed, and the national

identity he used to justify that strategy, helped explain America’s world purpose at a

pivotal moment in modern world and national history. American national identity

provided a salient and compelling element of national discourse as the president faced the

opportunity to redefine America’s purpose in a new world order.

Background of the Study

National identity uses a group’s “individuality and distinctiveness” to differentiate

them from others and unite them as a unit (Huntington, 2004, p. 21). Identity is

influenced by group experiences, shared history and values, and often shaped and

expressed through group leader articulation. By identifying the president as the “official”

articulator of American national identity, there is a reduced validity and influence of

competing narratives from other political sectors (Beasely, 2004; Brands, 2014; Kupchan,

2010; Metz, 2010). National identity is an important causal factor of American behavior,

especially as it relates to military action (Coles, 2002; Huntington, 2004; Lixin, 2010).

Additionally, national identity explanations are often revised and publicized in

preparation for military conflict because it can help stimulate public support by crafting

the collective consciousness to produce interpretive frameworks that support the intended

policy (Coles, 2002, p. 588).

Presidents have used national identity to justify grand strategy shifts for decades.

Grand strategy is the coordination of all national resources for a political goal (Liddell

Hart, 1991, p. 322). Grand strategy also helps prioritize national interests and allocate

resources to support policy choices. Grand strategy is essential to the projection of

national power because it helps ensure the whole of government coordination of national

resources for national security interests (Art, 2003). This coordination helps prevent

individual government agencies from inadvertently working at cross purposes with each

other on global issues while increasing the efficiency of collaborative actions.

American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the 20th Century

The onset of WWI provided President Woodrow Wilson the opportunity to revise

American national identity from that of premier republican example and global model of

democracy to defender-of-liberty and world leader (Lixin, 2010). The first phase of

Wilson’s national identity redefinition emphasized America’s military and economic

strength along with the growing perils in the European community. Relying on American

exceptionalism as an enduring component of American identity, Wilson explained the

importance of American involvement to secure and protect national values of freedom

and liberty for all: “We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for

the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of

mankind” (Wilson, 1917, para. 34). By using the power of the president’s national

influence, Wilson effectively revised American national identity and reoriented its grand

strategy to support that new identity infused with the moral obligation to spread

democracy (Mead, 2005).

National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Modern Era

President Woodrow Wilson declared American foreign policy based on morals,

strong ideals, and the spread of democracy (Department of State Historian, 2019). U.S.

involvement in World War II and sustained world leadership during the bipolar Cold War

era signaled a significant national identity shift from passive democracy icon to active

defender of and advocate for democracy (Boys, 2015, p. 8). This transition included the

grand strategy shift from quasi-isolationism for matters outside the Western hemisphere

to internationalism and interventionism, but only during the war era (Brands, 2016; J. L.

Gaddis, 2002). After World War I, Congress rejected Wilson’s national identity and

American participation in the League of Nations (Boys, 2015, p. 95). However, during

World War II, President Franklin Roosevelt revised American national identity to support

a new grand strategy that prepared the nation for a new world era, the Cold War

(Deudney & Ikenberry, 2012).

Franklin Roosevelt’s “fireside chats” transformed presidential speeches into

personal narratives from the president to the average Americans in their “living room”

(Biser, 2016). Narratives were an effective communication tool because they helped the

president’s message seem as though it was just one average American talking with

another about matters of State (Biser, 2016). The golden age of radio enabled the

president to connect with the average American efficiently and directly. President

Roosevelt used these narratives not only to inform the public, but also to influence public

opinion in support of his initiatives. Of specific note was his 14th fireside chat, held on

September 3, 1939, which informed Americans of the ongoing European war and

introduced his “national policy” of support for the Allied Powers. Specifically, he

explained the concept of collective security, binding American security with that of other

nations thousands of miles away (Roosevelt, 1939). Roosevelt also invoked American

Judeo-Christian values as core aspects of national identity and justification for not only

defense of the American homeland but the projection of American power to protect

victims of international aggression (Roosevelt, 1939). President Roosevelt did not

declare war in this narrative; however, he revived a national identity that prepared the

country for generations of American global leadership (Biser, 2016).

President Truman reemphasized Roosevelt’s American grand strategy and

national identity to continue America’s international leadership role. First, President

Truman asked Americans to unite behind him as he projected American values of

individual freedoms, human rights, civil liberties, and the expansion of representative

government (Truman, 1945). Second, he equated American national security concerns

with the extension of American values of freedom from coercion and subjugation in his

1947 speech advocating aid to Turkey and Greece in their fight against the growing

communist threat (Truman, 1947). The Truman Doctrine solidified American

international leadership in the new bipolar world, with materiel support for those

specifically countering communist insurgents (Truman, 1947). The Marshall Plan and

the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enshrined this strategy in

world history.

President Dwight Eisenhower codified American grand strategy through the

Solarium Project at the U.S. State Department. George Keenan and others on the U.S.

State Department’s policy planning staff produced what would be called the grand

strategy of Soviet “Containment.” While “containing” and limiting communist

expansion were the strategic “ends,” the “ways” or methods used to employ resources

varied across presidential administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). However, American

national identity of world leadership endured across both Republican and Democratic

administrations (Art, 2003).

Defining Cold War Grand Strategy

Cold War grand strategy was predicated on U.S. activism in the world

community, the product of a new American identity of leadership across multiple

paradigms of national power, militarily, informationally, diplomatically, and

economically. Emerging victorious from WWII, American identity of exceptionalism

fueled the international activist tendencies of Cold War leaders. This new identity

provided consistent geopolitical “ends” through all nine successive presidential

administrations (J. L. Gaddis, 2009). It is this national identity, at odds with isolationist

tendencies of early American international traditions, that provides recurring debates in

the current and future direction of American grand strategy.

American Cold War grand strategy was based on several key principles, at least

partially divergent from previous era grand strategies and earlier American national

identity (Art, 2003). Around the world, the United States relied on selected national and

regional leaders to support American initiatives and quell the spread of socialist

tendencies in local populations. Though the United States coordinated frequently with

Western and Western-oriented partners for military initiatives, diplomacy, and economic

sanctions, democracy promotion and the rule of law were consistent tenets of American

foreign policy. Table 1 offers a composite summary of Cold War national security

principles, accompanying policies, and examples of how the policy was executed.

Table 1

Cold War National Security Principle

National

Identity

Principle

Policy

Example

Exceptionalism

Democratic Republic icon

Aloof from European conflicts,

hegemonic

International

Activism

Interventionist activities

Led or participated in many major

Western military actions

Regional

Stability

Monroe Doctrine,

dominate western

hemisphere

Incursions into Mexico, Haiti,

Grenada, etc.

Multilateralism

Created and lead global

institutions, activities

United Nations, NATO, Operation

Desert Storm

Pluralism

Promote democracy and

anti-authoritarianism

Encouraged and supported national

democratic initiatives around the

world

Rule of Law,

Impartial

Justice

Adherence to international

agreements and established

norms

Sanctions on war criminals, foreign

aid provides judicial, law

enforcement development

Primacy and

Hegemony

Military superiority,

interventionism

Dominant defense budget, global

commons guarantor

Benevolence

Support human rights and

disaster relief in other

countries

Foreign aid, disaster relief,

sanctions to promote human rights

Note. From Art (2003).

The Problem Statement

The context for this problem is the assertion that United States did not have a

clearly defined national identity for a post-Cold War grand strategy (J. L. Gaddis, 2002;

Kissinger, 2001; Martel, 2012). Strategy must be based on a common understanding of

American identity (Armed Services Committee, 2008), but research has suggested that

the United States did not have a clearly articulated national identity to guide its

immediate post-Cold War grand strategy, which led to political confusion, resource

inefficiencies, and an absence of effective long-term planning and operations (Brands,

2016; Cheney, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). As the first post-Cold War president, Clinton

was unencumbered by the Soviet Union and the global struggle that entailed. The

problem this research attempted to resolve was understanding how Clinton identified and

explained America’s post-Cold War national identity as a justification for his chosen

grand strategy. There has not been significant and deliberate research on American

national identity and its influence on grand strategy in the post-Cold War era despite the

creation of several collegiate grand strategy programs.

The Problem is Current, Relevant, and Significant

An effective grand strategy reflects American national identity, national values,

protects national interests, and symbiotically organizes national resources to accomplish

international security goals efficiently (Metz, 2010). But according to research,

American grand strategy based on a clearly defined national identity had been absent

since the fall of the Soviet Empire through the end of the century (Art, 2003; Brands,

2016; Dueck, 2006, D. J. Gaddis, 2010; Kissinger, 2002). There were several dimensions

to this problem. First, while there were several layers of published U.S. government

security strategies, they were compartmentalized either by specific military service or the

Department of Defense as a whole. The issue, however, was that grand strategy

encompasses the whole of government approach, synchronizing all elements of national

power and influence: DIME. Therefore, searching for a published grand strategy from an

administration prior to 1986 was inconclusive. However, Section 603 of the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act required the President to

annually publish a national security strategy (NSS) and then listed elements of the

definition of grand strategy as required components of this publication. This requirement

dedicates at least a section of the president’s published NSS to grand strategy.

Second, democracies tend to require elected leaders justify their policies to curry

continuous public support. National identity provides useful components for this

justification: a historically-based interpretation of “who we are” as a nation, the explicit

cultural values that define Americans, the nation’s purpose in the international

community, and a basis for inclusion and exclusion of others from peers and allies. By

connecting grand strategy proposals to these national identity components, presidents

clarify and justify how and why their proposal supports America. Though the president

has been described as the author and guarantor of national identity (Abshire, 2013;

Beasely, 2004; Huntington, 2004), this research found only one document published by

the Clinton administration detailing the national identity components: the NSS.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine post-Cold War American national

identity and its impact on grand strategy. I examined historical documents, presidential

speeches, and other publications to ascertain how President Clinton designed and

projected his version of national identity as justification for his grand strategy choices.

These varied sources are important because presidents often use surrogates to advance

their messages. In terms of national security and international relations, there are few

issues more important than a nation’s ability to effectively and efficiently project its

national power as a reflection of itself (Art, 2003; Brands, 2014; J. L. Gaddis, 2002).

Who America is as a nation directly guides its priorities, its approach to international

opportunities and threats, including where and how to use various elements of national

power to project its image in the community of nations (Huntington, 2004).

Understanding that American grand strategy changes in response to a potential

evolution of national identity enables successive administration officials, foreign policy

elites, and national security scholars to assess and determine several important foreign

policy factors. For example, President Woodrow Wilson revised his grand strategy,

taking the United States into WWI with the Allied Powers, by describing American

national identity as the guarantor of democracy around the world (Wilson, 1917).

Understanding national identity’s influence on grand strategy can better enable officials

to comprehend how their identity messaging supports and reinforces foreign policy goals.

By determining American national identity after the elimination of its longtime Soviet

nemesis, social and political scientists may better chart the evolution of core American

international interests in the context of varying degrees of national security threats.

Research Questions

This research was based on one fundamental question, with a subsequent

question:

RQ1: How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national

identity?

RQ2: How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement

his grand strategy?

Theoretical Foundation

This study’s theoretical framework was based on constructivism to understand

and assess potential changes in American national identity. Constructivism is the

international relations theory that asserts nations are merely macrocosms of individuals

and, as such, are prone to the same social dynamics of individuals and small groups

(Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013). Constructivism also asserts that national

identity is not only a social construct but also a principle determinant of national activity

(Huntington, 2004; Wendt, 1992).

Constructivism framed the approach to understanding American national identity

and how that identity defined America’s role and purpose in the international arena. As

an international relations theory, constructivism stipulates that the principles of human

nature, along the lines of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, guide a state’s national strategy

(Chadwick, 2003; McLeod, 2014). For example, as people feel the need for social

inclusion in their community, states join regional and global coalitions and organizations

to reaffirm their national identity and satisfy their social needs. Similarly, to enforce

international norms, leaders of dominant states may organize with other states to impose

sanctions and possibly ostracize offending states from international organizations and

forums (Wendt, 1992). Further, Kantian and Hegelian assumptions of social psychology

assert that a group’s identity requires an alter-ego to justify critical elements of its social

identity (Lebow, 2008). For example, the Soviet Union’s demise essentially removed a

critical pillar of American national identity, creating the need for redefinition

(Huntington, 2004).

Grand strategy is also the product of national identity, which organizes how a

nation determines and prioritizes its interests and projects its national power resources

(DIME) in the international arena (Huntington, 2004). By observing potential changes in

American identity, it is possible to observe corresponding changes in U.S. grand strategy

(Metz, 2010). There is a basic assumption in grand strategy theory that asserts that every

nation, with rational leaders, follows some strategic model regardless of how eclectic,

erratic, or ambiguous their actions may seem, and regardless if that model was clearly

defined or codified (Brands 2012, p. 76). This assumption provided an important

foundation for this research—that America had at least some systematic approach to

using national power for achieving international objectives. Post-Cold War changes in

American grand strategy during the George W. Bush era were based on neo-realists’

perceptions of power between states and non-state actors and American identity as the

moral leader of the free world (Dueck, 2006). In a constructivist sense, the new

American grand strategy was reactive to changes in either national strategic culture

(identity) or the distribution of power in the international arena (Dueck, 2006, p. 14).

Definition of Terms

Chairman of the joint chiefs of staff: The highest-ranking military official, the

President’s personal military advisor (Hastedt, 2004).

DIME: Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of national

power. Political power and cultural influence are considered a part of informational

power (Art, 2003). Military and economic activities are considered “hard power,” and

diplomatic and informational are considered “soft power” (Nye, 2009).

Department of Defense: The Department of Defense comprises six subordinate

departments (Joint Chiefs, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard), and various

supporting agencies. The Department of Defense’s purpose is threat deterrence and

national defense through the projection of military power (Hastedt, 2004).

Department of State: The Department of State is the nation’s diplomatic corps,

charged with managing treaties and agreements across a spectrum of national interests,

executing public diplomacy and informational affairs (Hastedt, 2004).

Defense strategic guidance: Published by the secretary of defense, this document

explains the application of military force, along with defense-related agencies, as an

instrument of national power to accomplish NSS objectives. The defense strategic

guidance is written for consumption by agency leaders within the Department of Defense

(Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 60).

Executive office of the president: The Executive Office of the President is the

complex of departments that serve to organize and execute the President’s directives

(Kissinger, 2001).

Grand strategy: The doctrine that identifies a nation’s identity, purpose, and

position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities, and synchronizes

resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): A tri-lateral trade agreement

between Canada, Mexico, and the United States in 1994 (NAFTA, 2020).

National defense strategy: Annual report by secretary of defense to Congress

describing major military missions, their required force structure, and how the military

will support the president’s NSS (U.S. Congress, 1986, Sec. 104e).

National military strategy: Required publication by the chairman of the joint

chiefs of staff to explain the distribution and application of military power to achieve

NSS and Defense Strategic Guidance objectives. The national military strategy explains

the Joint Force (coordinated effort by all Department of Defense agencies), force

development (through training and equipment), and force employment on military

objectives (Department of Defense, 2019a, p. 152).

National security strategy (NSS): A congressionally mandated publication of

presidential NSS (The Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, Sec. 104(b)). A document

approved by the president of the United States for developing, applying, and coordinating

the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national

security. (Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019). Because Section

603 of The Goldwater-Nichols Act listed elements of grand strategy’s definition as

required components of the NSS, at least a section of the NSS should be considered an

explanation of current U.S. grand strategy.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I: Signed by American President Richard Nixon

and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in May 1972, this agreement limited the number

of nuclear launch sites and additional munitions restriction (Hastedt, 2004).

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II: Signed by American President George H.W.

Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3, 1993, this policy further reduced

both nuclear arsenals to roughly 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads, along with other

munitions limitations (Sherman, 2014).

Whole of government: The collaborative relationship between different

government branches on a program, policy, or event (Kissinger, 2001).

Assumptions

This research involved certain assumptions to enable the framework to function.

There is a pragmatic definition of grand strategy that can be correctly applied to national

activities in the international arena. A president’s grand strategy may not be succinctly

articulated or delineated yet may still exist (Brands, 2012). Presidents use rational

approaches to determine how and when to employ American national power to influence

international opportunities and challenges. These assumptions are necessary to ensure

the logical and predictable use of power. Additionally, presidents use their explanation

of national identity to justify their decisions on the international agenda. These narratives

serve to define the nation, national goals, and what the nation aspires to become (Abshire,

2013, p. 51). This research was predicated on the determination that national identity

tenets directly influence grand strategy priorities.

Limitations

In this case study, I examined examples where President Clinton and his

administration used national identity to justify and explain grand strategic choices and

activities. This study used a normative approach that required the interpretation of

speeches and proclamations. The interpretation was that the president tried to legitimize

grand strategy choices through rhetorical validation in the public sphere, most clearly

with his NSSs. Unpopular or perceivably unjustifiable choices tended not to be accepted

or pursued long term, and the U.S. Constitution provided the president with latitude in

foreign affairs (Krebs, 2015). The greatest limitations are associated with the fact that

not every instance of international coordination and conflict could be observed and

measured for this study. There were classified decisions and activities with parameters

unknown to the public that were made within the limits of President Clinton’s published

grand strategy.

Another possible limitation of this study was mentioned at a congressional

hearing on grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008). The Cold War’s grand

strategy of “containment” was devised in response to a known threat, identifiable, and

straightforwardly confronted (Brands, 2016; J. L. Gaddis, 1982). But Dr. Mitchell Reiss

(2008) explained to the 110th Congress that the post-Cold War era may be far too

complex a strategic environment for a single over-arching grand strategy to be designed

for (p. 27). His assumption was echoed by General Jack Keene, Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff (Armed Services Committee, 2008). However, this research was not

intended to determine how a grand strategy is created, or if one can be designed

considering the complications of the 21st century. Because Section 603 of the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Act required the inclusion of grand strategy tenets in the president’s

annually published NSS, this research asserts President Clinton did produce the requisite

grand strategy explanations in each of his published NSSs from 1994 through 2000. It is

President Clinton’s seven NSSs, published annually, that were observed for this research.

The literature review clarified this assertion with a broader understanding of grand

strategy and national identity.

Delimitations

There were several delimitations to this research. I analyzed communications of

senior administration officials that explained how and why they used national resources

to solve challenges in the international arena. Some activities and communications were

prioritized above others based on their proximity to the president. Activities and actions

placed further from the president’s sphere were valued less than others and excluded

from this study simply because the need to limit and use the most valuable data possible.

However, every effort was made to ensure the research questions were saturated with

relevant data.

Selecting the temporal limits for this research was an important delimitation, as

that automatically included and excluded some data sets. This research was bounded by

the Clinton administration terms in office (1993–2000) because his terms represented the

first new presidency after the fall of the Soviet Union, and it presented a finite amount of

data that could reasonably be accessed. Several authors specifically identified the

December 25th, 1991, resignation of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and the

dissolution of the Soviet Union as end of the Cold War and a turning point in the history

of U.S. foreign policy (Brands, 2014; Bremmer, 2015; Nojeim & Kilroy, 2011).

Additionally, the event was a critical junction in American national identity because the

Cold War structure significantly influenced states’ identities and roles based on their

position in the international system (Dueck, 2006; Huntington, 2006; Kissinger, 1996).

Therefore, the international structural change resulting from the end of the Cold War

could have produced a new American national identity. However, I did not include the

George H. W. Bush administration because they were steeped in Cold War traditions as

evidenced by Bush’s tenure in the Reagan administration and the Cheney/Wolfowitz

Strategic Planning Guidance (Tyler, 1992) that proposed an aggressively hegemonic

grand strategy. The Cheney/Wolfowitz strategy was rejected by President Bush and not

officially published.

Delimitation was evidenced by the choices of speeches and communications

included in this data. Though not every public pronouncement referred to national

security, as much as possible I selected communications that specifically addressed both

national identity and the use of national power. This choice helped ensure the data and

findings were relevant and consistent with the research topic. It is important to note that

limited oppositional narratives were considered as data. The relevance of various

narratives offered by political opponents was specifically addressed by Krebs (2015) and

helped focus data analysis.

Potential Sociopolitical Significance

This study offered the potential for significant contribution to the social and

political implications of determining American foreign policy in addition to grand

strategy implications. This research of American national identity evolution may

contribute evidence of how the nation develops its foreign policy without predetermined

ideological obligations. By conducting a case study of the first post-Cold War

presidential administration, I was able to ascertain how America defined itself and

determined its place in the immediate post-Cold War world without a global opponent.

This research is not only teleological but introspective of American world leadership as

well. Being scholarly in nature, this research produced results without the ideologically

prescriptive requirements many journalists and political pundits find themselves

obligated to produce.

The social implications for this research may be just as significant. Because this

research was politically introspective, the results can help ascertain the social, political,

and cultural implications of current and future generations determining America’s place

in the world through the construct of national identity. Just as the 21st century has seen

considerable changes in American domestic politics, those changes are bound to

influence American self-image, and by implications, its international obligations and the

strategies to achieve them. This research may demonstrate that as American domestic

culture evolves, so does its self-identity and corresponding national security assumptions.

Summary

I examined the activities and communications of the first post-Cold War

American president to determine if and how he defined American national identity as a

legitimating force for a chosen grand strategy. Grand strategy identifies the nation’s

identity, purpose, and position in the international arena, prioritizes goals and activities,

and synchronizes resources to meet national security objectives (J. L. Gaddis, 2009).

This chapter outlined the trajectory of American national identity, showing a nation

developing its place in regional then global affairs. America consolidated its identity as

the “leader of the free world” in World War II and the Cold War as the protagonist for

regional stability in Europe, international security, and democracy promotion with the

grand strategy that directly confronted the global Soviet threat. The Soviet Union imbued

U.S. foreign policy with a clearly defined adversary and a noble national identity.

The end of the Cold War provided America the opportunity to reconceptualize its

purpose, national identity, and position in the evolving global arena (Layne, 1998). This

research is determined to settle the debate by determining if and how President Clinton

redesigned America’s national identity, world purpose, and required grand strategy. A

thorough literature review helped clarify national identity as the ideational construct used

to justify grand strategy selection, which is discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The primary research question was “How did President Clinton define America’s

post-Cold War national identity?” The secondary question was “How did President

Clinton use national identity to justify and implement his grand strategy?” This literature

review was designed to explore research on post-Cold War American national identity

and its potential influence on grand strategy. A literature review helped review ideas

concerning post-Cold War American grand strategy. Noted authors provided

perspectives on important issues in American foreign policy and activity in the

international arena. Yet this was not just a discussion of events but the reasons, theories,

and decisions that created events in the immediate post-Cold War American era. The

conceptual framework for grand strategy provided the foundation for understanding both

the definitions and relationships of national identity and grand strategy.

Although Carl von Clausewitz (2015) developed the concept of a national grand

strategy, and Liddell B. H. Hart (1991) coined the term in modern international relations

following WWII, the term often invokes a variety of unclear definitions. Thus, clarifying

a standard definition was important to this study. It was also important to identify what

researchers found to be persistent tenets of American grand strategy because tracking

changes in those tenets from one president to the next (or within administrations) can

contribute to identifying types of grand strategy changes and points-in-time at which they

occur.

I also sought to identify the various research methodologies used by scholars.

Observing how other researchers and authors studied this topic presents various research

methodologies and strategies that inform and focus this research effort. Although many

prescriptive monographs did not identify a research methodology, a strategy could often

be gleaned from the authors’ presentation of facts and assertions, which I used to inform

this study. Identification of research tools, tactics, and techniques also informed this

study either by demonstrating which produced rigorous results or what did not. For

example, it became clear that I would need to include a timeline of events considered

vital to this research. I modified President Clinton’s critical events timeline from the

University of Virginia’s Miller Center on The Presidency, excluding domestic and non-

foreign affairs issues. See “National Power Projection Timeline” in Appendix C.

In addition, I sought other scholars’ characterizations of each president’s foreign

policy in the hopes that information could help identify or explain substantive differences

between administrations. Lastly, I looked for new questions that would emerge from the

literature to better guide and focus this research. Specifically, the issue of varying

national interests proved to be a helpful addition because that delineated and prioritized

the major threats each president perceived and used to guide his new or adherence to a

potentially preexisting grand strategy. The conclusion serves both to summarize critical

aspects of the literature review and discusses implications for this research on social

changes.

The Literature Search Strategy section provides an outline of the document search

techniques and determinants used to find the best literature on post-Cold War American

grand strategy. I organized the bulk of the literature reviewed chronologically because I

observed what I think are evolutionary changes in both tone and content of American

grand strategy as the nation traversed important periods of national development and

world history. Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire, several authors attempted to

ascertain what America’s next grand strategy would be (J. L. Gaddis, 1991; Mead, W. R.,

1993). For instance, the attacks on September 11, 2001 triggered what G. John Ikenberry

(2001) called a “fundamental reorientation of foreign policy” (p. 19). However, though

commentary on American grand strategy was plentiful, scholarly discourse analyzing

changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy was sparse.

The literature review then begins by exploring constructivism as a derivative of

neo-liberalist theory, which explained the dynamics of inter-state activity through the lens

of human cultural experience. I explore national identity as a pivotal determinant of

national interests, which could produce a national grand strategy. The sitting president

was identified as the official author of American national identity and grand strategy,

ostensibly through the publication of the NSSs.

Literature Search Strategy

The literature search for this research project began at the Walden Library website

in the policy and administration databases. I searched the following databases: The

Political Science Complete, Political Science Complete: A Sage Full-Text Collection,

International Security, Homeland Security Digital Library, and Academic Search

Complete. I also used Google Scholar for essays and books on American grand strategy.

However, not all databases were available or productive under specific headings, so I

began with political science, under which I added Academic Search Complete, e-book

collection, Military and Government Collection, Political Science Complete, and

International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center.

For all databases used, the search parameters included full text, scholarly (peer-

reviewed) journals, and the earliest publication dates were set for 1990 (after the fall of

the Berlin Wall, the unofficial beginning of the end of the Cold War). Signed during

November 1990, the Charter of Paris served as the official Soviet declaration of

noncompetition in the Cold War and their commitment to self-determination. I assumed

essays published prior to that year would not adequately address the post-Cold War era of

American grand strategy since, at the time, no one would know the Cold War was ending.

The search parameters were grand strategy, American grand strategy, U.S. grand

strategy, national security strategy, American national identity, and national identity in

the subject terms field. I also combined identity with grand strategy. National security

was too broad of a term and did not produce titles specifically focusing on grand strategy,

yet national security strategy was equated with grand strategy by the Department of

Defense doctrine. English was the selected language and all types of documents were

included. This yielded 140 results, although some were in other languages.

To broaden the scope of this literature review, I also searched several websites of

noted national security think tanks for publications by noted scholars. The Council on

Foreign Relations website and my subscription offered a few publications relevant to

American post-Cold War grand strategy. Considered one of the elite foreign policy

centers in America, the Council on Foreign Relations is composed of renowned

practitioners and scholars on American foreign policy. The Army War College (Strategic

Studies Institute) and the National Defense University (Institute for National Strategic

Studies) publications were valuable to this research because they added a military

perspective.

The search also included conference proceedings and video lectures. The issue of

American grand strategy has inspired significant academic and professional inquiries

since the beginning of the 21st century. Of note are the lectures by John Mearsheimer,

Joseph Nye, and John Lewis Gaddis. Several prominent universities have recently

developed entire programs devoted to the study of American grand strategy. The Brady-

Johnson Program at Yale, Duke University Grand Strategy Program, and Temple

University’s collaboration with the Foreign Policy Research Institute on the Hertog

Program in grand strategy. The value these programs offered was syllabi, as a few

publications common to two or more programs guided this research and are presented

here.

Several databases were more challenging to work with than others. For example,

EBSCO host database made it difficult to download adobe files. Consequently, other

databases contributed search results with abstracts that looked promising. In addition, the

search parameters were limited on several databases, SAGE Journals and Taylor Francis

Online, for example. I was unable to select “peer-reviewed” as one of the search criteria.

Further, this research used databases provided by the Walden University Library

and the Central Rappahannock Regional Library (librarypoint.org) in Northern Virginia.

I requested books with prefaces that looked promising from the Central Rappahannock

Regional Library, as they have an extensive book loan agreement with Mary Washington

University and George Mason University, both also located in Virginia. The only other

search engine used was Google Scholar, which linked to Walden University Library.

SAGE Research Methods Online was very helpful in finding research methodology

information. I used the following Walden databases: ABI/INFORM Complete,

Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (eBook collection), Homeland Security Digital

Library, International Security and Counter Terrorism Reference Center, Military and

Government Collection, Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Premier,

SAGE Research Methods Online, SoCINDEX with Full Text. I used the following

Central Rappahannock Regional Library databases: Congressional Quarterly Researcher

and JSTOR. C-SPAN was used for video conferences and speeches, The Clinton

Presidential Library (online), and several collegiate sources, including The Miller Center

at the University of Virginia, The National Defense University, and The American

Presidency Project at The University of California for speeches, transcripts, and

documents. I also used The National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs,

which is located on the Homeland Security Digital Library.

The primary search terms were American grand strategy, U.S. grand strategy,

post-Cold War grand strategy, grand strategy, American post-Cold War national

identity, and American national identity. However, after reading a few essays, it became

apparent that searching for the critical components of grand strategy might also yield

valuable tangential information on the subject. Adding American national interests, post-

Cold War national interests, American strategic interests, strategic narratives, and

presidential narratives produced useful results that provided insight into American

strategic history. Using these and other search terms was an iterative process.

Finding and Sorting the Literature for Review

Much of the literature rejected for this research offered little analytical depth or

historical value, including the authors’ preferences for grand strategy while criticizing the

president. Few essays or books were the product of a scholarly research effort to identify

and explain specific changes in post-Cold War American grand strategy. Much of the

literature reviewed for this research included scholarly assessments of individual

presidential foreign policy, such as British Professor John Dumbrell’s (2005) lecture on

the Bill Clinton foreign policy. Individual presidential assessments helped identify

distinct trends that may have been unique to one president or one specific period in recent

American international history.

As this was essentially a study of international relations, I specifically included

non-American authors whose contributions helped broaden the perspectives on American

grand strategy. Dumbrell (2005), wrote from the United Kingdom, Miller (2010), writing

from Israel, and others served that purpose well. In international affairs, national identity

is important, yet so is the perception from other sources in the international community.

Theoretical Foundation

Literature Review

The Nature of Constructivism

Constructivism is a state-based theory of international relationships grounded on

the principles of human social interaction (Dougherty & Phaltzgraff, 1997; Ghica, 2013;

Wendt, 1992). This social theory suggests an international application of Maslow’s

hierarchy of needs (survival, safety, belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualization;

Chadwick & May, 2003; McLeod, 2014). However, constructivism’s principle structure

is that states relate to other states and situations based on ideational, intersubjective, and

socially constructed and contextual understandings, the same as individuals and groups

(Wendt, 1992). Therefore, the society of states is a cognitive structure of shared

knowledge among nations and their leaders, which contributes to each state’s national

identity.

Constructivism stipulates that state identities are the product of both endogenous

and external interaction in that a nation’s domestic agenda shapes its international

character and the broader society of states projects characteristics onto each nation,

especially at the regional level (Wendt, 1992). How the community of nations perceive a

specific state therefore influences that state’s perception of itself and the national interests

that are a product of that state’s identity. This phenomenon is especially clear in

international forums such as regional associations and the United Nations.

Because the nature of American democracy stipulates that the national

government’s character is a derivative of the domestic citizens’ political character

measured by votes, significant American cultural changes should preclude national

adjustments in the international arena. In terms of American grand strategy, the social

context and state identity define national interests.

The power of constructivist influence. The power of constructivism is its

explanation that the society of nations resembles the group dynamics of humans; that

social order is an important, even pivotal causal factor of state behavior; that reality is

normatively constructed by group participants; and that identity shapes and explains state

behavior (Adler-Nissen, 2014, p. 143). Constructivism suggests that social pressures

such as shaming, public exaltation, and the stigmatization of sanctions force states to

adhere to shared international values and norms (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, the power to

design and reinforce international norms and laws is a component of constructivism. For

American grand strategy, this explanation bears two important implications: whether the

United States follows or deviates from international norms and if the United States has

the power and influence to impose domestic norms within other states (e.g., preventing

state-sponsored genocide), or whether the U.S. can design international norms and

influence other states to follow them. Constructivism’s assumptions about structure and

process are important precursors to this issue of creating and influencing domestic and

international norms.

Additionally, numerous researchers have used constructivism to examine and

explain international relations activities in various regions. For example, Yukawa (2017)

used constructivism to explain the unique characteristics evident among Asian States.

The “ASEAN Way” uses constructivism emphasis on ideational factors to validate the

peaceful approach states’ interactions (Yukawa, 2017). Yukawa focused on the norms

and identities that states created which emphasized individual state tolerance of other

regional actors’ domestic activities.

Structure and process. Structure in international relations refers to enduring

characteristics of the international system that do not change often, if at all, and infuse the

contextual nature of state activity (Wendt, 1992). Structures are institutions and norms

built by iterations of state interactions. For example, realism indicates that one structural

characteristic of the international system is its anarchic nature in that there is no world

authority to impose order on the participants (Morgenthau, 2006). Another realist

example, and one adopted by constructivists, is that security is the first goal of states in a

“self-help” system (Wendt, 1992). Process, on the other hand, is the interaction of states

in the international community and is concerned with how states interact (Wendt, 1992).

Constructivism suggests that states may change their behavior based on learning and

interacting with other states and institutions. Further, states do learn and change in

reaction to exogenous activity (Wendt, 1992). Accordingly, constructivism asserts both

processes and structures of the international system are inter-subjective. Therefore, the

loss of America’s international alter-ego should have produced a significant change in its

self-perception and corresponding theory of international activity.

The issues of structure and process are important to this research for several

reasons. The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War changed the structure

of the international system (Waltz, 1993, p. 45). The bipolar world then became a

unipolar world, with the United States as the sole hegemonic power (Layne, 2006, p. 5).

National interests are the state’s international priorities which, using grand strategy, drive

the allocation of resources and the priority of state activity (Brands, 2012). Realists

consider interests unchanging and uninfluenced by factors such as institutions (process)

and the redistribution of power (structural) in the international system (Wendt, 1992).

This prevents realists from acknowledging that national interests change over time, often

in response to exogenous stimuli (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). On the other hand,

constructivists assert national interests change based on intersubjective processes of

identity transformation. This point is critical to this study of grand strategy because it

allows the capture of American national interest changes in response to known changes in

structure (the end of the Cold War and the bipolar world) and process (the terrorist

attacks on 9/11/01).

Constructivist implications for grand strategy. Constructivism’s offered

significant implications for this research on grand strategy change in the post-Cold War

era. First, constructivism explained national interests as defined by national identities,

and that national identities are inter-subjective products of State-based relationships

(Wendt, 1992). By observing evolving identities, this research may observe changes in

national interests and inter-State relationships. Second, grand strategy is composed of

prioritized national interests and the allocation of national resources to achieve those

interests (Art, 2003). Therefore, as national interests change based on an evolving

identity the accompanying grand strategy should reflect those changes accordingly. For

this research, constructivism presented a paradigm to examine U.S. activities in the

international arena based on changing identities that influenced national power.

The society-of-States is a cognitive structure of shared knowledge among nations

that contribute to each State’s national identity and ensuing their national interests are

considered (Huntington, 2004). Constructivism, as used in this study, examined State-

based activity based on ideational and social characteristics (Wendt, 1992). Therefore,

national identity was an ideational construct of a social position and purpose in the

international arena.

Additionally, as grand strategy is the planned use of national power to achieve

national interests, the value of several power dimensions can be explained through

constructivist theory. Joseph Nye’s (2010) TED Talk posited that America’s “soft

power” is by far the more effective power dimension for a multi-polar world. Nye’s

assertion is predicated on the attraction of independent nations in a multi-polar world,

where there are competing centers of influence across different power dimensions. Nye

also posits that attracting nations to America’s banner through soft power issues like

common values, reduces the number of states who might compete with U.S. interests in

various regions. Attracting friends is much easier than defeating adversaries. Soft

power’s primacy reinforces the use of constructivism as a research paradigm.

Constructivism and American grand strategy. The ability to design and

reinforce global norms and laws is a critical component of constructivism. Since WWII,

America has significantly influenced the international agenda, norms, and laws; and, as

one of the bipolar hegemonic powers, assumed the role of global policeman by

reinforcing those norms and leading ad hoc coalitions to punish rogue actors. Wendt

(1992) stipulates social identities determine national interests and roles in the global

arena (p. 438). As the author of the modern international system, the U.S. was

exceptionally positioned to influence its evolution through its grand strategy.

Katzenstein (1996) edited a 13-essay book examining normative influences on

national security, including national identity. The authors examined how social science

tenets inform State activity. National identity was explained as the social construct of

national leaders, often using narratives to communicate and inspire popular support

(Huntington, 2006; Katzenstein, 1996; Krebs, 2015). While liberalism is a broad

normative approach to international relations, constructivism specifically focuses on

social constructs among nations, which include national identity’s influence on State

activity. Dueck (2006), Huntington (2006), Jervis (2010), and others, used constructivism

to explain American national identity and the influence of strategic culture on American

interests and national power use.

The use of constructivism in international relations. Constructivism is a

relatively new theory within the spectrum of international relations. According to

constructivism, the reward of inclusion and the consequence of exclusion are important

stimuli for States (Wendt, 1992). For example, although the “Group of Seven” (G7) was

formed from the most influential economic powers in the early 1970’s, Russia was not

“elevated” to the group until 1998, when their democratic transition was firmly

established and consequently rewarded. President Bill Clinton urged Russia’s inclusion

into the group, which both rewarded Russian democratic growth and reinforced American

leadership in the forum, making it the “G8” (Laub, 2014).

Conversely, to “punish” Russian aggression against Georgia in 2008, President

George W. Bush considered removing them from the G8 (Laub, 2014). Russia’s 2013

annexation of Crimea prompted the G8 to cancel the 2014 meeting of the group, slated to

be held in Russia, and actually “suspended” Russian membership (Acosta, 2014). This

converted the G8 back to the G7. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif

(2015) confirmed another powerful example of the constructivist assumptions about

inclusion during an interview with Charlie Rose. Zarif explained the reason Iranians

wanted to approve the pending nuclear deal with the P5+1 (U.K., U.S., Germany, France,

Russia, and China) was not because of sanctions pressure, but because Iranians wanted to

rejoin the community of nations without the stigma of sanctions.

Review of Identity Theory

Wendt (1992) explained identity theory as the perception of one’s place in the

society-of-States and the role-specific expectations that are the product of collective

understanding (p. 397). Consequently, social constructivist theory broadly assumes

people and States may have multiple identities in different social settings. For example, a

State may project a mentor identity with the role of revisionist in third world settings by

promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law through various aid programs.

That same state may project an elitist identity with a status-quo enforcing role in Eastern

Europe by defending existing State borders through the threat of force, sanctions, or the

organization of coalitions against the aggressor State. Therefore, the role the U.S. sees

itself assuming in the international system influences the decision-making system its

leaders employ to gauge national interests and the resources and actions to promote those

same interests.

Using constructivism, Huntington (1997) analyzed American national identity, its

national interest products, and explained historical identity changes that may influence

post-Cold War grand strategy. Huntington diagnosed trends during the 1990’s in the

international environment, such as the “clash of civilizations” and the resulting conflicts

within and between societies, a resurgence of power politics, and the conflicting global

pressures of fragmentation and convergence (p. 28). Huntington added the technological,

social, and demographic shifts in American society at the close of the Cold War and the

twentieth century forced a redefinition of American national identity. He identified the

“confused” nature of the various debates on U.S. national interests during this period, as

well as the unifying effect the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks had on national

identity and interests of the U.S. (p. 8).

Domestically, and speaking in cultural evolutionary terms, Huntington (1997)

noted early American identity as the product of primarily Protestant British and Northern

European traditions. These foundational principles of capitalism, limited government,

and the individual’s freedoms and role in society created the enduring core American

culture, and national and international identity. Huntington also reiterated Michael

Lind’s four phases of American cultural evolution: Anglo-American (1789-1861), Euro-

American (1875-1957), Multicultural America (1972-1996), and the fourth period

includes resolutions of various socio-economic divisions and power sharing conflicts in

21st century American society.

Huntington (1997) directly linked the American cultural evolution from the

colonial period to the end of the modern era to corresponding foreign policy changes

because dominant political demographics evolved and influenced the progression and

balance of isolationism and internationalism. However, Huntington also noted the

demise of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War deprived the American national

identity of its self-defining “national cause”, which galvanized national and international

support for the “Containment” grand strategy for nearly 50 years.

The Global War on Terror may have initially replaced the Cold War as America’s

raison d’être. Dueck (2006) explained the attacks on 9/11 may have primed America’s

strategic cultural identity to reinvigorate hegemonic tenets of American grand strategy

that were dormant and unprovoked during the 1990s. Dueck also confirmed the causal

relationship between cultural influences and foreign policy and validated the use of

constructivism as a paradigm for measuring potential changes in American grand strategy

(p. 14).

Additionally, Wendt (1992) posited that State identities promote national interests

(p. 399). While Wendt, and other liberal constructivists, normally disagree with the

structural influence argument of realists, here he suggests international institutions

provide a “structure” for perceiving State identities. The structures are the norms and

formal rules of the institution, and when a State joins the institution, it then adopts or

adheres to the institution’s rules. These structures (norms and institutions) then

contribute to both the State’s identity and a motivational force for determining State

activities.

In terms of this research, scholars assume America’s self-identity is defined or at

least influenced by participation in various international organizations. Indeed, applying

Wendt’s (1992) assumptions that a State’s identity is influenced by organizations it joins,

there is evidence the U.S. influences international organizations it helped create. When

the U.S. helped create the United Nations, significant elements of American identity were

written into the U.N. charter, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The

United Nations, 2020). Taking this one-step further, America sees itself not only as a

follower of U.N. norms, but also as a shaper of world norms by assuming a leading role

in creating several prominent international institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), among others.

To further support Wendt’s (1992) theory of identity, he inserts constructivist

theory into an example. Wendt’s assumption that two people, representing States without

endogenic power imperatives such as glory or conquest, meet for the first time and each

bases its actions on the other’s actions. While Wendt’s example further involved the

threat of violence through signaling, and the corresponding response of self-preservation,

he did not explain the initial threatening action. Readers were left to assume there is fear;

however, that was a missing component of the early scenario’s explanation (Wendt,

1992, p. 404). The other fault with constructivist theory is that it does not consider the

offensive nature of States to project their own values and images onto other States

(especially neighbors) as a matter of self-preservation.

American National Identity and grand strategy. Huntington (2004) provided

the lynch pin connecting national identity as a principal causal factor of grand strategy.

During the Cold War, political ideology and the “leader of the free world” national

identity served as the relevant impetuses for American grand strategy, with democracy

promotion as a defining national interest (Huntington, 2004, p. 257). However, the

Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War removed the “other” from American

national identity, causing national culture to replace ideological differences as the leading

American grand strategy characteristic. This was reinforced by President Clinton, and

other presidents, advocating the spread of American values around the world. Spreading

values as a component of American national identity in the post-Cold War era replaced

spreading democracy as the primary definition of American Cold War grand strategy

(Huntington, 2004).

Robert Jervis (2010) astutely identified the influence of national identity on

American grand strategy as expressed by presidential narratives. He explained national

identity as the set of group attributes, values, and practices which members think best

describe and differentiate their State from others (Jervis, 2010, p. 22). Jervis also

emphasized the importance of differentiation, as national identity critically used to

include States with similar attributes (allies) and exclude States that differ from us on

pivotal issues (adversaries), such as being a representative democracy. For this research,

Jervis (2010) and Huntington (2006) add important parameters for explaining national

identity: it explains “who we are” and what cultural characteristics describe America. An

important modern example was given in President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 state of the union

(SOTU) speech, when he explained “We must act in a way that is true to what we are…

the very heart of our identity as a nation is our firm commitment to human rights”

(Carter, 1978).

Eyre and Suchman (1996) used constructivism to explain conventional arms

proliferation among Third World nations. Leaders’ desire to improve their fledgling

nation’s “status” provoked regional arms races among impoverished and newly

independent countries during the post-Colonial era. Projecting Eyre and Suchman’s

(1996) use of constructivism to current situations on the Korean peninsula, the same

explanation could be made for North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s ongoing quest for

nuclear weapons and the prominence it could afford him as Asia’s second “nuclear

power”.

The social construction of Russia’s resurgence. “The Social Construction of

Russia’s Resurgence” (Clunan, 2009) uses social identity at the national level and

international relations theory to analyze how Russian elites used popular and historical

“national interests” to shape Russia’s 21st century identity. The sudden demise of the

Soviet Union and the rebirth of Russia offered international relations researchers as close

to a “natural” identity development experiment as one could expect (Clunan, 2009).

Russian political elites specifically crafted parts of the nation’s new identity to retain its

certain elements of the country’s historical prowess.

Russia’s Cold War identity existed in the collective and dominant characteristics

of its people because, even though the Soviet Union ceased to exist at the end of 1991,

the history and legacy of the Russian people proved an enduring national phenomenon.

However, Russian policy elites saw a unique opportunity to redefine the nation’s concept

of self and purpose as both a domestic vision and international aspirations. This is the

premise of my research, that American political leaders interpret and define national

identity as the determining factor for grand strategy.

Contextually, Russian resurgence occurred in the era of limited national economic

and military power, globalization, the birth of the internet, and the expansion of

international terrorism. Additionally, Russian leaders had to design their national identity

in terms of its relationship with the U.S. and Western Europe because these represented

the dominant powers in the international arena. A revanchist approach to Russian

identity would likely result in a new Cold War. Developing a Western-oriented identity

would likely lead to increased international collaboration, especially on security and

economic issues. Russia’s 2008 incursion into Georgia, and 2014 annexation of Crimea

(Simpson, 2014) can be considered evidence of the grand strategy born of the new

Russian identity.

Russia’s geopolitical history and economics almost guaranteed that whatever or

whoever the nation became it would significantly influence the global arena, especially in

terms of security and cooperation. The Russian domestic debate centered on two pivotal

questions: “What is Russia? and What does Russia do? (sic)” (Clunan, 2009, p. 2). In

fact, the processes demonstrated that Russian leaders debated limiting the influence of the

need for international grandeur redefining “Stateliness” for the 21st century. Clearly, the

identity question precedes and determines the question of national purpose. National

purpose determines national interests, the founding components of grand strategy.

Clunan (2009) directly States that national identity defines a nation’s foreign

policy directions. Clunan also introduces “aspirational” constructivism as a modified

approach to international relations that focuses on social psychology and social identity

theory as the origin of national identity. While my research uses the traditional

constructivist approach to international relations, it is noteworthy and encouraging to

observe the scientific study of international relations growing. Additionally, Clunan’s

work relies heavily on social psychology; my research focuses on the international

relations theory aspect of the equation, specifically grand strategy as the actualization of

national interests.

Review of Grand Strategy

This section introduced and defined the concept of grand strategy and its modern

use by the United States to organize national interests and guide the use of national

resources for strategic international objectives. The conceptual basis for this research

began with a discussion of grand strategy’s definition, its components, and the influence

of national identity on national interests.

First, grand strategy is about identifying and prioritizing national interests (Metz,

2010). Secondly, a grand strategy identifies, prioritizes, and allocates resources against

the principle threats to those national interests. The third function of grand strategy is to

provide subordinate leaders the broad guidance they need to execute their specific

national power paradigms (diplomatic, information, military, economic) to achieve

American foreign policy goals (Brands, 2014). Finally, published grand strategy (here,

through Clinton’s NSSs) is a national communication: proposed domestically to political

stakeholders, projected internationally to allies and adversaries. It informs allies of

national priorities and goals, and alerts adversaries to activities and national interests the

administration may challenge.

The architect of modern “grand strategy”, British strategist B. H. Liddell Hart

(1991), adopted Clausewitz’s explanation of strategy, while noting the administrative

discrepancy between “strategy” and “policy” (Hart B. H., 1991). Clausewitz defined

tactics as the movements to win battles, and that strategy was the vision that won

campaigns and wars (Mead W. R., Power, Terror, Peace, and War America's Grand

Strategy in a World at Risk, 2004, p. 13). Clausewitz identified grand strategy as the

province of kings and prime ministers because it determined which wars to fight and the

political goals those wars should achieve (Mead, 2004, p. 13). Hart also considered the

application of Clausewitz’s definition of strategy too narrow, focused only on wartime

activity for the dual purposes of military victory and the parameters of the ensuing peace.

Hart (1991) expanded Clausewitz’s philosophy of grand strategy to encompass

perennial State-based activity in the normal pursuit of various national goals in the

international arena, such as national security. Liddell Hart also identified grand strategy

as the highest form of Statecraft, using all the tools of national power to secure

international objectives (Hart, 1991, p. 322). In his book Strategy (1991), Hart not only

provided maxims for national strategy planning and execution, but also appeared to be

the earliest author to associate the phrase “ends and means” in explaining national

security objectives and the grand strategy to achieve them (p. 335). Hart’s vision of

grand strategy clearly incorporated national elements of power coordinated for political

ends. However, many authors do not converge on a single grand strategy definition,

which is why I address that issue below. For additional measures of national security

analysis, see Appendix C.

Defining grand strategy. From the very narrow perspectives and uses, to the

broadly theoretical and abstract, grand strategy is often characterized as a nebulous

concept (Committee, 2008). Several authors offered divergent definitions and purposes

for grand strategy. These views ranged from strictly military policy confined to wartime

operations, to the composite interests and goals of a nation in both peace and war. There

also seemed to be a discrepancy in the priority of grand strategy to foreign policy.

Considered by many to be the father of modern strategy, Prussian General Carl Von

Clausewitz identified State-based strategy as the woven strands of national power to

pursue political purpose and accomplish the highest national security objectives (Von

Clausewitz, 2015). That comprehensive perspective was supported by B. Liddell Hart

(1991).

Art (2003) agreed with the majority of authors that grand strategy identifies and

prioritizes a nation’s international goals, but stipulated the only national resource grand

strategy uses is military power. Art posited foreign policy was the broader phenomenon

that coordinated all the elements of national power: DIME (p. 2). Other authors also

favored the military perspective to define grand strategy. Brimley (2008) equated grand

strategy with the military phrase “commander’s intent”, where the leader identifies his

priorities, the contextual factors, and the mission’s goals, albeit at the national level for

international goals. Mearsheimer (2011) explained grand strategy as the process of

militarily securing regions of the world valuable to American economic security (Europe,

North East Asia, and the Persian Gulf).

Emphasizing the broader perspective, several authors offered more

comprehensive grand strategy definitions. Brands (2014), Layne (2006), Kennedy

(1991), Payne (2012), and others held the exact opposite view to Art (2003), that grand

strategy is “the highest form of Statecraft” (Brands, 2014, p. 1). Brands’ case study

delineated the ambiguous and “slippery” concept and defined grand strategy as the

“intellectual architecture” that provides organization and structure to a nation’s foreign

policy (p. 1). Kennedy (1991) also emphasized the broader use of grand strategy,

incorporating the hard elements of national power: the military, economic, and political.

Grand strategy, Kennedy proclaimed, provides the critical link between near term actions

and long-term national interests and goals, without the military emphasis. Notably,

Payne’s explanation offered no emphasis on military aspects of grand strategy.

The grand strategy authors. Gray (2011) identified the U.S. president as the

author of American grand strategy. This occurs primarily through the publication of the

NSS, with incremental adjustments and clarifications made through public speeches,

administration press releases, and official pronouncements that help to clarify emerging

national interests. While Gray’s perspective explains the president’s unique role in

designing the nation’s grand strategy, it presents a possible explanation for continuity in

the Cold War grand strategy of “Containment”. If each of the presidents held

synonymous views of the priority of international threats and courses of action to

alleviate those threats, that would explain how “Containment” was supported by

successive American presidents, even across four decades of oscillating political parties.

The erratic threat levels in the post-Cold War period may also have influenced

each president’s perception of the need for a particular and continuous grand strategy, or,

as Kissinger (2001) explained of Clinton, a president could decide there was no need for

a grand strategy at all. Gray’s (2011) explanation may also offer insight into how and

why American post-Cold War grand strategy may have changed in response to the

evolving international threat levels. Gray explained that erratic threat levels and types

prevented the U.S. from developing a mature grand strategy in the post-Cold War era.

He asserted the international threats changed significantly with the demise of the Soviet

Union under Bush I and the Clinton era saw a relatively benign, if evolving, threat

atmosphere, notwithstanding the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and African embassies.

However, hard and tumultuous attacks on September 11th under “Bush II” followed by a

lower level but persistent threat scenario under Obama produced an evolving approach

that was not yet fully developed into a mature and specific strategy.

The use of grand strategy by States is also a point of contention. A generous

reading of Thucydides’ (trans. 1956) account of the Peloponnesian War suggests he

thought grand strategies were available only to leaders of large and powerful city-States.

Thucydides asserted larger city-States could plan their expeditions (grand strategy), but

the smaller and weaker States’ leaders were often at the mercy of their dominating

neighbors and perpetually reactive (Thucydides, 1956, p. 29). Thucydides (1956)

suggested smaller States’ leaders’ grand strategy options were limited to collective

security through city-State coalitions in the hopes that their combined strength would

prevent more powerful States from attacking coalition members (p. 203).

Grand strategy tenets. A nation’s grand strategy is the guiding paradigm through

which it prioritizes national interests, allocates national resources against those interests,

and determines the intellectual architecture that guides its policies, actions, and reactions

to the myriad events and situations in the international arena (J. L. Gaddis, 2002).

Historically speaking, Paul Miller (2012) identified five perpetual tenets of American

grand strategy: homeland defense, promoting the democratic peace, maintaining a

favorable balance of power, the correction of rogue States, and the promotion of ally

capabilities and good governance around the world (p. 7). Ikenberry (2001) offered

similar but broader principles of American grand strategy since the nation’s founding.

Ikenberry suggested cooperative security and the promotion of liberalism and capitalism

around the world are what traditionally drive American grand strategy. Coincidentally,

cooperative security, the promotion of liberalism, and capitalist cooperation around the

world were products of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt’s Atlantic

Charter (1941). Professor Jonathan Monten (2005) agreed with Ikenberry on the

theoretical level, that liberalist tendencies have shaped American grand strategy. Ben

Miller, (2010) concurred with the liberalist tradition, and added the promotion of human

rights, democracy, and free trade. It appears 20th century American grand strategy and

the U.S.’s support for the 1948 publication of the United Nations Declarations of Human

Rights (UNDHR) influenced Miller’s assertions.

What was interesting was that each of these broad, theoretical, and specific tenets

of American grand strategy may be considered true and accurate descriptions albeit at

different intervals in American history. The U.S. has consistently promoted human rights

around the world since WWI, yet notably supported authoritarian regimes with

horrendous human rights records when it was politically expedient during the Cold War.

Although Ikenberry’s (2001) and Miller’s (2012) assumptions about American grand

strategy were not mutually exclusive, there appeared to be an oscillation in the emphasis

of evolving national interests that grand strategy is used to accomplish. This may

account for the variations in perception, characterization, and even the perceived lack of

grand strategy.

Defining national interests. One of the key components of grand strategy

research is the identification and prioritization of the national interests (Yetiv, 2008).

Although many politicians and pundits proclaim their description of American national

interests to be the purest, in terms of grand strategy, the sitting president is, in my

opinion, the primary author of those interests by virtue of his authority to determine

national security objectives and the allocation of national resources against those

objectives. I deduced this opinion based on the president’s authority outlined in Article II

of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, President Clinton’s national security strategies

published his national and international priorities, which in turn, guided U.S. policy

during his term. Because national interests are often defined in terms of both domestic

and international threats and opportunities, the identified national interests may change

between presidents and even during a presidential administration. In advocating for a

particular grand strategy, democratically elected presidents are compelled to publish their

assessments of American national interests in order to garner public support their

strategic goals.

Numerous authors proclaimed a few national interests as “foundational” for

modern American grand strategy. Liberalism is one of America’s most enduring national

interests, prevalent in the international preferences of America’s founding fathers

(Ikenberry, 2001; Miller, 2010; Monten, 2005). Walt (2005) stipulated the promotion of

peace and prosperity were cornerstones of the Great Republic since its founding. While

many early American presidents advocated liberalist tenets in their international policies,

supporting the growth of democratic governments around the world became an enduring

national interest after WWII.

The Department of Defense dictionary (2015) defined national interests as the

“foundation” for national security goals (p. 165). While it did not mention grand

strategy, the dictionary also defined NSS as the president’s publication that organized

instruments of national power to obtain national goals and contribute to national security

(p. 165). Metz (2010) and Wormley (2009) correlated American grand strategy with the

president’s published NSS. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act required sitting presidents

to annually submit their national security strategies to Congress. Wormley (2009)

analyzed the national security strategies from 1986 to 2006 to analyze continuity in their

“ends”, the president’s articulation of national interests. He identified four “enduring”

national interests: 1) physical security of the continental U.S., 2) protecting the global

economy, 3) promoting the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights, and

4) cooperative security through strategic alliances (Wormley, 2009, p. 2).

To many students of foreign policy, geopolitics was proven a cornerstone of

international relations. Toward that end, understanding specific regions of the world that

have proven themselves of concern to the U.S. helped further clarify national interests.

The regions where the U.S. consistently focused in the modern era were Western Europe,

the Middle East, and East Asia (Layne, 2006; Mearsheimer, 2001). These areas were

perpetually identified as vital to U.S. national interests for political and economic security

(Art, 1999; Brands, 2014; Miller, 2010). Conversely, Africa and Latin America have

only proven to be peripheral interests to American foreign policy and did not

significantly impact the development or implementation of American grand strategy

during President Clinton’s tenure.

Variations of American grand strategy. Various authors addressed several

variations in American grand strategy, both during the Cold War and in the post-Cold

War period. Although J. L. Gaddis (1982) determined “Containment” to be America’s

Cold War grand strategy, he also observed strategic variations across administrations

within the broader “Containment” strategy. A few authors touched on the ideological

foundations of American grand strategy, instead favoring the strong influence of evolving

threats and opportunities within the strategic environment.

Boyle (2008) and Walt (2005) suggested the U.S. has long used a combination of

offshore balancing in the Middle East and Europe, and Selective Engagement elsewhere.

Brands (2014) asserted a more complex view. He said every State has a grand strategy

because leaders make decisions based on national priorities (p. 6). Brands, Ikenberry

(2001), Kissinger (2001), and Mearsheimer (2011) all characterized American grand

strategy under Clinton as unsynchronized, eclectic, or ad hoc. Under Bush II, Brands

observed an initial dovish approach to primacy that yielded quickly to the rise of a

hegemonic strategy after 9/11. Agreeing with Brands (2016), J. L. Gaddis (2009)

described a lack of strategic coherency in the Bush I and Clinton administrations. J. L.

Gaddis (2009) suggested national catastrophes and wars force States to actually choose a

grand strategy, resulting in the increased focus of the Bush II administration after the

attacks on September 11th and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Conversely, Layne (2006), and Mead (2004) found strands of grand strategy

continuity running from the end of WWII through their dates of publication. However,

Layne characterized American grand strategy as traditionally extra-regional hegemony.

Mead asserted American grand strategy was based on global hegemony, especially after

9/11. Schwenninger (2003) agreed with Mead but introduced a new term “muscular

dominance” for the post 9/11 period. Mearsheimer’s (2001) earlier work depicted

American grand strategy as offshore balancing, but not hegemonic (p. 261). Payne

(2012) found America did have a post-Cold War grand strategy, but identified it as

cooperative security without the hegemonic tone of the previous Cold War era.

Modern American ideological traditions. Miller’s essay “Explaining Changes

in U.S. Grand Strategy” (2010) asserted that regardless of the methods, American grand

strategy has consistently had the same liberalist objectives: the expansion of free trade

and the spread of democracy and human rights. Chris Layne (2006) also discussed the

liberalist traditions of American grand strategy, dating back to the nation’s founding, for

two reasons. Layne first asserted America’s best strategy for security was the creation of

like-minded capitalist democracies abroad (p. 118). Additionally, Layne stipulated that

American security and prosperity were based on the Open-Door policy of international

trade since the early days of the republic (p. 120).

Miller (2010) conjugated liberalism and realism into offensive and defensive

versions to explain long-term ideological trends in U.S. grand strategy. Using these four

created paradigms (offense or defensive liberalism, offensive or defensive realism),

Miller asserted U.S. grand strategy followed an offensive or defensive liberalist trend in

methods at least since President Woodrow Wilson and continues today (p. 562). For

example, Miller’s “offensive liberalism” explained President George W. Bush’s 2003

invasion of Iraq because he used force to democratize the country. This assertion ignores

the preliminary “weapons of mass destruction” reasons for the invasion, so the point is

not well-proven by his example. Miller’s offensive realism equates to Kissinger’s (2003)

neo-realism as they both advocate U.S. military hegemony as the ideational premise for

American security and world peace. Historically, Miller posited the end of the Cold War

allowed the U.S. to shift from a realist paradigm (due to the benign international

environment and the loss of great power challengers) to a liberalist-based grand strategy

(p. 27).

Layne (2006) contrasts Miller (2010) by focusing only on the offensive and

defensive realist patterns of American Cold War and post-Cold War grand strategy

traditions. Layne asserted that primacy-based or hegemonic grand strategies inevitably

lead to strategic over-commitment and are therefore inherently self-defeating. John

Mearsheimer (2001) explained the benefits of offensive realism by suggesting the

structural constraints of the international system lead great powers to choose regional

hegemony. Layne and Mearsheimer raised the importance of geography in States

selecting their grand strategies. Mearsheimer explained continental great powers are

prone to hegemonic grand strategies due to powerful neighbors and an insecure

environment. Layne accepted the U.S. did not have this concern during the post-Cold

War period (the 1990’s) and did not seek a hegemonic grand strategy based on offensive

realism. However, that assertion raises questions in light of the advance inter-State

communications caused by globalism in the post-9/11 world.

Layne (2006) asserted offensive and defensive realism could be used as structural

theories to gauge post-Cold War American grand strategy. This was validated by

Mearsheimer’s (1991) prediction the U.S. would pursue, and achieved, regional

hegemonic grand strategy. However, that does not provide a comprehensive

understanding of U.S. grand strategy prior to 9/11. In addition, Layne discounted

Mearsheimer’s successful assertion because, aided by two “vast moats”, the U.S. had

achieved hegemony in the Western hemisphere long before the end of the Cold War. In

addition, Layne asserted previous great powers failed to achieve regional hegemony in

Europe due to both the multi-polar atmosphere and the history of counterbalancing

against rising powers.

Although Miller (2010) does not offer the observation, Layne (2006) asserts and

Mearsheimer (1991) disagrees, that due to the Cold War’s swing between offensive and

defensive realism, the U.S. did employ an extra regional hegemonic grand strategy in

addition to “Containment”. This is proven by the continued presence of many American

military bases in both Europe and Asia. During the Cold War, the choice for liberalism

reigned when the international threats were low and the U.S. could promote other

nations’ pluralist transitions; the choice for realism reigned during periods of high

international threat levels, such as the Cold War (Miller, 2010).

Miller (2010) asserted the post-Cold War period saw the rise of American

defensive liberalism due primarily to the absence of a competing great power and the lack

of an international existential threat, which contributed to the lack of realist-based grand

strategies. America’s benign support for and promotion of democracy in Haiti and

Kosovo, respectively, signaled a defensive rather than offensive liberalist grand strategy

(Miller, 2010, p. 46). The liberalist strategy also explained America’s humanitarian

interventions under Presidents George H. W. Bush in Somalia (1992-93) and Bill Clinton

in Haiti (1994-99), Bosnia (with NATO, 1995), and Kosovo (with NATO, 1999)

(Frontline, 2014).

Miller (2010) explained the rise of offensive liberalism in the post-9/11 period,

under the President George W. Bush administration, as a defensive measure to eliminate

the existential threat posed by Saddam Hussein and replace it with a liberal democracy

(p. 45). Forcible regime change, according to Miller, is a perfect example of offensive

liberalism. He also cited the unilateralist proclamations in the 2002 National Security

Strategy as proof the U.S. was returning to its post-WWII hegemonic roots.

Strategic patterns in the modern American era. Layne (2006) contends WWII

was a pivot point in American grand strategy, producing an extra-regional primacy-

oriented grand strategy outside the Western hemisphere (p. 12). Layne identified only

Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia as regions of post-Cold War American

national interest (p. 3), primarily for political and economic interests and with a strong

concentration on the determinants of geo-politics. America has long held a symbiotic

relationship with Western Europe, at the time the Persian Gulf provided the world’s

necessary oil, and Asian trade has been a cornerstone of the U.S. Pacific strategy since

Roosevelt’s Open-Door Policy.

Layne’s thesis is an expansion of John Mearsheimer’s (2001) position that

American grand strategy has been only regional hegemony, for the Western hemisphere,

since the end of WWII. Mearsheimer supported this claim by asserting the U.S. serves

only as an offshore balancer for East Asia, competing with China and Russia, and in the

Western European theatre competing only with Russia.

In an earlier essay by Swarz and Layne (2002), they contend the U.S. post-Cold

War grand strategy saw no major change from the previous era. However, Swarz and

Layne clarified the continuation of Cold War strategy to be the acceptance of a

multipolarity field as long as the U.S. retains primacy (p. 36). Swarz and Layne assert

the U.S. is assertive in other regions just enough to confront competitors and regional

disruptors, but also enough to prevent allies from feeling so insecure they consider

growing their own military power. This military growth, Swarz and Layne assert, could

lead other States to reduce their U.S. dependency and become regional competitors.

Interestingly, they suggest that although the U.S. decries NATO and the EU’s strategic

dependence, that dependence ensures U.S. primacy because other States won’t feel

pressured to increase their own military capabilities.

Swarz and Layne’s (2002) argument is unfolding in Turkey during the Trump

administration. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. was Turkey’s primary

military supplier (Gabelnick, Hartung, & Washburn, 1999). However, Turkey’s 2019

purchase of Russian air defense systems signals military growth beyond America’s

control and created significant tension between Turkey, NATO, and the U.S. (Team,

2019).

Primary grand strategy options. Although other authors delineated a more

extensive grand strategy typology, Posen and Ross (1997) identified only four

“competing” grand strategies for American presidents to choose: Neo-Isolationist;

Selective Engagement; Cooperative Security; and Primacy (p. 4). The authors detailed

the theoretical foundations of the strategies and provided a table explaining the

application of each strategy to current or recent international challenges the U.S. has

faced (Posen and Ross, 1997, p. 4). However, there is a broader and more definitive

typology of American grand strategy choices. Art (2003) identified eight grand strategies

available to presidents:

• Selective Engagement-choose specific issues/causes to engage others on. This

includes long-standing U.S. national interests yet suggests limited

international activity. This grand strategy is primarily reactive in nature.

• Dominion/Primacy/Hegemony- “rule the world” strategy that requires

American superiority across all dimensions of national power and all the

regions of the world. This grand strategy is offensive and proactive,

suggesting the U.S. inject itself into every major international situation to

guarantee the outcome is favorable to U.S. interests.

• Global Collective Security- accepts American responsibility for global

peace. Politically unattainable, this strategy requires global consensus that is

nearly impossible to achieve, and collective action on major American

initiatives.

• Regional Collective Security- to keep the peace in selected regions around the

world (e.g. Persian Gulf, to maintain oil flow). Similar to Selective

Engagement, this grand strategy identifies world regions where the U.S.

would declare its national interests require considerable engagement on behalf

of allies and friends.

• Cooperative Security- reduces wars by limiting all States’ offensive military

capabilities, comparable to the U.S. Similar to global collective security, this

grand strategy invites multiple treaties and security agreements around the

world.

• Containment- efforts to limit the capabilities and growth of a declared

adversary, often through proxy and with direct confrontation. Containment

strategy may be considered a subsidiary of a comprehensive Selective

Engagement strategy because it allows the protagonist to select when and

where to engage to limit adversarial advancements.

• Isolationism- to avoid most wars, maintain freedom of action. This grand

strategy dictates that U.S. involvement in external affairs be strictly limited to

direct national security threats to its people or nation, and possibly its national

interests.

• Offshore Balancing- expanded isolationism that includes limiting rising

Eurasian great power rivals. This strategy requires the U.S. to accept a multi-

polar world so it may partner with allies to solve regional problems instead of

direct engagement in multiple locations at once.

American post-Cold War grand strategy publications. Analyzing the literature on

post-Cold War American grand strategy revealed a few interesting publication patterns.

Periods of heightened interest in and increased publications on American grand strategy

are noticeable around pivotal points in the era. For example, following the collapse of

the Soviet Union in December 1991, several authors explored the issue of America’s role

in the world, including future grand strategy speculations absent the Cold War nemesis of

the Soviet Union.

In addition, the early post-Cold War literature seemed to focus research efforts on

the comparison of State activity and proclamations by national leaders to determine and

validate a grand strategy designation. However, after President George W. Bush’s

publication of the 2002 National Security Strategy, the focus on grand strategy research

seemed to shift to the culture changes in both the group of presidential advisors (neo-

conservatives) (Colodny & Shachtman, 2009).

Similarly, President George W. Bush’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted a

resurgence of interest, essays, and analysis of American grand strategy. Clearly, many

authors found Bush’s declaration of unilateralism and preemptive military engagement,

as published in his 2002 National Security Strategy, to be the codification of American

grand strategy gone awry (Brands, 2014). While others found strands of strategic

continuity in Bush’s actions, but noted his “tactical failures” problematic, it appeared his

declaration of preemptive attack was considered controversial (Mead, 2005). The right of

preemption had a long-standing history in American foreign policy, Kennedy prepared to

use it during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Reagan used it to justify invading Granada in

1983.

Grand strategy assessments. Whether or not American had a post-Cold War

grand strategy, and what that strategy was during successive presidential terms proved

the strongest points of contention in the literature. Several noted authors declared

American post-Cold War presidents had “no grand strategy” (Brimley, 2008; Goldgeier,

2009; Kissinger, 2003; Suri, 2009). Many authors declared American post-Cold War

grand strategy alive and well, sometimes described as a “continuation” of Cold War

grand strategy (Brands, 2014; Layne, 2006; Miller, B., 2010; Miller, P., 2010; Monten,

2005; Payne, 2012). Still others decried an “oscillation” between several strategies

(Biddle, 2005, Metz, 2010). These authors tended to deride the sitting president for lack

of strategic continuity with America’s traditional national interests.

American grand strategy is continuous. Several authors identified continuous

national interests in American grand strategy. In Peace of Illusions (2006), Professor

Christopher Layne declared that America has a continuous grand strategy borne after

WWII (p. 25). Layne posited American grand strategy has been extra-regional hegemony

and primacy both throughout the Cold War and during the post-Cold War period as well.

Justifying this assertion in the post-Cold War period, Layne offered the Defense Planning

Guidance (1992), written by then-Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney and his policy

assistant Paul Wolfowitz. Layne focused on the document’s assertion that the U.S.

should “maintain” hegemony by preventing aspiring national competitors, such as China.

One could have considered Chaney’s document “The First Draft of a (New) Grand

Strategy” (Corporation for Public Broadcasting , 1992), however the document was

immediately discredited by then-President George H.W. Bush. However, Layne cited

successive NSSs by both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations that

stipulated the same premise of maintaining the American global leadership role and

eliminating rising rivals.

Miller (2012) also asserted the U.S. actually had a post-Cold War grand strategy

and, like Layne (2006), that strategy was continuous since at least the end of World War

II. While Miller identified ideological continuity in American grand strategy, he does not

name a specific grand strategy, rather national interests. His description of homeland

security, open door policy, economic growth, and democracy promotion as America’s

perpetual national interests are areas of grand strategy continuity. Miller suggested only

the manner of grand strategy application changed after the Cold War, in response to

changes in the threat environment. Losing the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union,

Miller explained, allowed the U.S. to adjust its national interests and pursue a less

“offensive” grand strategy style.

Interestingly, Miller (2012) identified specific grand strategies, such as balancing,

as “instruments” for the broader American grand strategy “toolbox” (p. 15). However,

Miller’s assertion that domestic politics and ideology do not influence a State’s grand

strategy (p. 19), specifically contradicts Clunan (2009), Dueck (2006), and Huntington’s

(2004) premise that changes in American cultural identity specifically influenced changes

in American grand strategy.

Dueck (2006) asserted “national interests”, a critical component of grand strategy,

are inherently cultural determinants, and therefore subject to national cultural transitions

(p. 14). While Dueck’s premise does not specifically eliminate external influences on

American strategic thought, his priority is clearly domestically driven and therefore more

reflective of national demographic and societal evolution. Dueck disagrees with

Mearsheimer’s (1990) and Waltz’s (Brown, 1995) premise that realist traditions decry

multipolar international systems. Dueck asserted the post-Cold War era would see the

rise of other, albeit “lesser”, powers such as Japan and Germany. American grand

strategy, Dueck noted, would have to evolve to maintain hegemony while

accommodating the rise of multipolarity in the international system. It is this primacy,

along with America’s exceptional responsibility to spread liberal democracy, which

Dueck notes as the continuous tenets of American grand strategy, even through the

Clinton and George W. Bush terms.

Strategic adjustment. This research revealed that several noted national security

authors documented American grand strategy oscillation in the post-Cold War period

(Dueck, 2006; Kupchan, 2002; Metz, 2010). Dr. Metz (2010) suggested that every

nation, including America, does have a grand strategy that strategy tends to shift over

time in response to the evolution of domestic pressures and external threats and

opportunities (1:52). Waltz (2002) explained that both George Bush (Gulf War) and

Clinton (Bosnian and Serbian Interventions) acted within the guidelines of long-standing

international security institutions, such as the U.N., used America military power

defensively and within the framework of multilateralism.

Strategic drift. Several authors identified America’s apparently eclectic national

interests and international activities as evidence of a lack of grand strategy. Brimley and.

Flournoy (2003) conducted a 21st century version of President Eisenhower’s 1953

Solarium Project to analyze and determine the best grand strategy options for America in

the post-9/11 era. They equated the absence of a 2003 Iraq invasion strategy with an

absence of the broader American grand strategy. Numerous other authors also noted the

apparent lack of an American grand strategy into which smaller actions, even wars, could

be explained (J. L. Gaddis, 2009; Suri, 2009).

Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), Suri (2009), and others, categorized several

examples of American “strategic drift”. They asserted the end of the Cold War and the

absence of an international threat contributed to popular ambivalence concerning foreign

policy, especially under Clinton. That resulted in a significant drop in foreign aid during

the 1990’s and allowed President Clinton to take an “ambivalent attitude” toward the

requirement of a grand strategy (Brands, 2014, p. 146). That inattentiveness led to

critical operational failures in grand strategy: ad hoc crisis management, opaque national

interests, a lack of interest prioritization, and the emergence of too many minor problems

without adequate attention or discipline focused on the important issues. Militarily, half

measures in Somalia and Haiti, delays in the decisions to intervene in Bosnian and

Kosovo, and undermining pro-Western Russian leaders by expanding NATO all

contributed to the perception among scholars that the Clinton ship of State was

strategically adrift (Biddle, 2012; Brands, 2014; Brimley, 2008; Suri, 2009; Walton,

2012; Yetiv, 2008).

Strategic cultural continuity and change. The political elites who plan and

conduct American foreign policy are critical elements of the strategy formulation and

execution process. In addition, people bring ideas and perceptions that may influence

group thought and national security culture. Jeremy Suri (2009) mentioned the

importance of having sophisticated strategists such as George Kennan, Henry Kissinger,

and Dean Acheson to organize and guide American strategic thought during the Cold

War. The “Wise Men” of the Cold War identified urgent threats, lucid national interests,

and designed policies to secure interests at reasonable national costs (Suri, 2009, p. 613).

That group preceded technocrats such Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, and Colin Powell.

These like-minded national security advisors of the late-Cold War period produced and

adhered to the flexible but rigorous policy guideline called “Containment”. However,

those generations of national security advisers, had largely receded from policy making

until the George W. Bush term. As scholars observe new generations of advisers rise,

scholars may also note new interpretations of American national identity and the grand

strategies that identity is likely to produce.

The “policy elites” theory (Drezner, 2011) of continuity and change in American

political leadership added a social dimension to the analysis of American national identity

and grand strategy. Corporate leaders such as Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul

Wolfowitz, tried to apply a strategic framework from their Cold War era to the post-Cold

War period in the 1994 Defense Planning Guidance (Burr, 2015). The Defense Planning

Guidance was intended to propose a grand strategy that would prevent the emergence of

an international rival and define the establishment of American international hegemony

for the post-Cold War era (Burr, 2015). Although President George H.W. Bush refuted

the proposed strategy before leaving office, the same team of “Vulcans” resurrected that

Cold War-era strategy under George W. Bush in 2002 National Security Strategy (Suri,

2009). This illustrated how the revolving door between corporate America and American

political elites can influence national security theory and planning from one period to the

next. However, as political parties change leadership roles in government with elections,

the party elites, their constituencies’ priorities, and corresponding policy preferences

could change as well. While J. L. Gaddis (1982, 2002) observed remarkable grand

strategy consistency during the Cold War, across varying political leaderships, the post-

Cold War did not offer the political stabilizing force of an international alter-ego like the

Soviet Union.

Multiple grand strategies. Yetiv (2008) indirectly offered an interesting

observation: that the U.S. may actually be employing multiple grand strategies

simultaneously (p. 11). This assertion assumed the U.S. could use different grand

strategies at different times, and in response to different regional or national interest

situations. Yetiv’s book specifically examined U.S. grand strategy in the Persian Gulf

from 1972 through 2005. However, the suggestion that U.S. presidents used a variety of

grand strategies in response to changing situations and national interests creates a third

option for this research: that the U.S. may have been alternating between grand strategies,

and therefore gave various observers the perception that no particular grand strategy was

prominent or adhered to during an observation period.

Grand strategies and presidential doctrines. Thinking about the evolution of the

grand strategy concept in America President Eisenhower should be credited for codifying

the process through rigorous analysis and comparison in the Solarium Project. It was

President Eisenhower’s military background that inspired him to essentially conduct

military decision-making protocols on U.S. government Statecraft. It seems simple and

intuitive for the national leader to test and validate his doctrine before publishing it, but in

terms of modern American grand strategy, President Eisenhower set the example

(Abshire, 2013).

President Obama’s grand strategy included adherence to a broad variation of the

Nixon Doctrine, in terms of providing military training and materiel to selected States.

President Nixon’s “Guam Speech” formally declared America as a “Pacific Power, and

that America would provide a nuclear shield to U.S. treaty nations while requiring the

native military (of South Vietnam) to be the primary fighting force for the conflict

(Woolley & Peters, 1969). However, President Obama chose to adjust U.S. adherence to

the unpublished Clinton Doctrine, which suggested the U.S. could and would get

involved in any nation or region it considered necessary for national security. The

Clinton Doctrine also proved the precursor to part of the Bush Doctrine by declaring

American interests were global in nature.

The Bush (2002) Doctrine’s preemptive strike declaration was a traditional

presumption of U.S. presidents. Reagan used it in Grenada, George H.W. Bush in

Somalia, Clinton in Haiti, and previous presidents in Mexico, Cuba, and the Dominican

Republic, among other regions. Therefore, the popular surprise at the Bush Doctrine’s

assertion of unilateralism was not actually all that surprising to students of American

political history.

Effectively managing the balance of power, vis-a-vis other allies and adversaries,

has been one of the five pillars of American grand strategy at least since the era of

President Theodore Roosevelt (Miller P. D., 2012, p. 7). Noted geopolitical analyst

Robert Kaplan explained the international center of gravity was moving away from

Europe and to the Asian-Pacific region (Gardels, 2014). While some thought balance of

power politics died with the rise of American unipolarity, President Obama recognized

the issue’s resurgence with China’s rising geopolitical and economic power. Obama’s

intended “pivot to Asia” highlights a reorientation of American grand strategy toward the

Pacific theater as the concentration of the 21st century’s political and economic wealth

(Campbell & Andrews, 2013).

Research Methodologies

Many of the essays included in this literature review presented research

methodologies and techniques that may inform the study of post-Cold War American

grand strategy. For example, Layne’s The Peace of Illusions (2006) identified four

empirical tests he used to assess changes in grand strategy across presidential

administrations. First, he looked at that president’s Stated aims or goals and

characterized that strategy according to a predetermined typology. This also included

ascertaining the consistency of policies during the administration. Second, Layne asked

if the president favored multipolarity or unilateral action. Third, Layne asked if the

military and broader DIME projection in the region appeared to support the broader

American grand strategy. Fourth, Layne asked if the grand strategy was consistent in

peacetime as it was during hostilities (p. 25).

Brands’ (2014) What Good is Grand Strategy? asserted grand strategy is not

required to be formally announced in a speech or policy letter (p. 6). However, Brands

also declared that because grand strategy making is an iterative process, it might be

analyzed by observing the way a State’s leaders manage a range of international problems

over a specific period. Brands’ enumerated definitions of seven grand strategy

components offer specific and observable points at which a presidential administration

might be gauged. Brands determined Clinton achieved some success with the modest

expansion of NATO and free markets but failed to provide an overarching strategy.

Similarly, he assessed George W. Bush was led by the “Hawkish Vulcans” (Cheney and

Wolfowitz) and used the military inefficiently because he (Bush) did not theoretically

link his activities to a higher international purpose.

The case study research strategy. Several authors who produced research results

used the case study research strategy. Walton (2012) explained that case study strategy

allowed him to categorize each president’s grand strategy for analysis and comparison.

Walton analyzed President George W. Bush’s 2002 NSS to determine if its goals were

clearly articulated and prioritized. He also compared Bush’s own 2002 NSS to his 2006

version, and declared the comparison demonstrated critical faults in both years’

documents which contributed to faults in national execution. The case study approach

allowed me to compartmentalize and analyze President Clinton’s policies to identify a

possible cohesive and consistent strategy.

The Gap in the Literature

This literature review exposed a potential gap in the published knowledge about

the relationship between America’s evolving national identity and its influence on post-

Cold War grand strategy. Congressional leaders and several authors expressed dismay at

America’s lack of grand strategy (Armed Services Committee, 2008). Understanding

American grand strategy in terms of national identity may explain previously unnoticed

points of strategic continuity.

While Huntington (2006) noted the importance of observing America’s search for

national identity in the post-Cold War era, his research did not examine the importance of

presidential influence on that identity or its causal influence on grand strategy. Specific

presidential narratives have not been examined to ascertain how they construct national

identity or use it to justify and validate grand strategy choices. American post-Cold War

national identity and grand strategy are yet not fully explored.

This study was needed to understand the connection between evolving national

identity and its impact on grand strategy. Additionally, by observing the president’s

strategic narratives, speeches, and publications, I was able to ascertain how American

national identity was constructed and presented to domestic and international audiences

as justification for grand strategy choices in the immediate post-Cold War era.

Additionally, because America stood with such prominence in world affairs during this

period, the U.S. electorate, foreign policy scholars, practitioners, and observers should

carefully consider the national identity proffered by political leaders, and the long-term

impact of its resulting grand strategy.

Summary

This literature review explained constructivism as the relevant international

relations theory for this research because of its reliance on ideational constructs of reality.

I explained the value of national identity as a primary causal factor for determining

national interests and grand strategy. This review also illuminated national identity as an

ideational construct proffered by national leaders. This review also clarified the president

as the author of American national identity, often through strategic narratives, and the

accompanying grand strategy. Additionally, the principle tenets of American grand

strategy, as specifically noted by Miller (2010), or ideologically explained by J. L.

Gaddis (2002) may lend themselves to specific characteristics and qualities of national

identity as explained by the President.

The qualitative case study approach emerged as the best research design for this

study. Constructivism’s explanation of national identity as the producer of national

interests and grand strategy ensures this design remains within logical and reproducible

guidelines. Clunan’s (2009) use of constructivism to delineate Russia’s resurgence

further confirms this research designs’ generalizability. Because the President’s

multidimensional authority enables him to determine both national identity and grand

strategy, the link is clearly established. However, his communication parameters require

a qualitative methodology to review normative data within the parameters of his tenure.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

This chapter reviews the research methodology for the examination and analysis

of national identity’s influence on post-Cold War American grand strategy during the

Clinton administration. I review research strategies, data acquisition and analysis

techniques, the researcher’s role, and other relevant methodological issues. Because the

research purpose guided critical decisions including research dimensions, the

methodology, strategy, and data management, the research questions influenced specific

research characteristics. The purpose of this research was to determine if and how

American national identity was modified and used to validate grand strategic changes in

the post-Cold War era.

Research Design and Rationale

This study was designed to clarify a post-Cold War grand strategy by observing

America’s evolving national identity and how it influenced America’s post-Cold War

grand strategy. Because I examined presidential and senior administration

communications in various formats, qualitative case methodology offered the most

appropriate normative research paradigm. The qualitative research methodology

provided a rich theoretical approach to understanding subjective human interaction at the

strategic national level. Further, because national identity is an ideationally constructed

social phenomenon, the qualitative case study using constructivism offered the best

approach to data acquisition and analysis. The case study design enabled me to

temporally bind this study to President Clinton’s two terms in office (January 20, 1993–

January 20, 2001) and provided a finite approach to the data acquisition process. The

case study design is also one of the public administration traditions that incorporates

important data types such as documents and speech analysis, which provided the bulk of

my research sources (McNabb, 2009). Additionally, case study research allows the

incorporation of relevant contextual information, which helped highlight the use of

instruments like venue and audience selection in the presentation of presidential

pronouncements (Yin, 2006).

There are three different types of case studies that were considered for this study:

naturalist, positivist, and constructivist (Given, 2008, p. 69). The primary goal of the

naturalist case study is to produce detailed and pragmatic information on the research

topic within the case parameters. But aspirational constructivism was pertinent to this

research as a strategy reliant on social psychology (Clunan, 2009). Additionally, the

positivist case study is focused on producing “law-like propositions” that are predictive in

nature (Given, 2008, p. 69), which allowed this research to suggest future connections

between national identity and grand strategy. Further, constructivists tend to view case

studies as a check on standing literature and a contribution to the intellectual discourse on

the research topic (Brands, 2014).

Other grand strategy researchers have also used the case study design. For

example, Layne (2006) examined the extra-regional hegemonic theory of American

grand strategy from 1940 to 2006, connecting variables with predicted outcomes to

ascertain whether policymakers’ actions and communications were consistent with the

extra regional hegemony theory. Similar to this study, Layne also examined the

publications and communications of U.S. policymakers to determine if they were

consistent with the nation’s stated grand strategy. In terms of data, Layne’s use of

published NSSs as the codification of each president’s grand strategy also identified a

valid normative data source for this research. Additionally, Brands (2014), Kennedy

(1991), and Miller (2010), among others, also used case studies to compartmentalize

American presidential administrations and examine their use of national power to

determine and compare respective grand strategies. Though Miller alone introduced

empirical variables to test deviations in political ideology, the others all used historical

analysis to understand each president’s national interests and national power use.

Research Questions

RQ1: How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national

identity?

RQ2: How did President Clinton use national identity to justify and implement

his grand strategy?

The Study’s Grounding Concept

This study’s grounding concept was that every nation uses some grand strategic

method to organize their national interests and determine how and when to use national

resources to achieve those interests (Brands, 2014). A state’s national identity is

historically influenced, determines its role in the international community, and

significantly influences its grand strategy because it informs national interests

(Huntington, 2004). By comparing President Clinton’s explanations of national identity

to the use of national power, I was able to determine a direct relationship between his

constructed national identity and his chosen grand strategy.

The Researcher’s Role

The researcher is an important data instrument for qualitative research (Huberman

& Miles, 2002). Miles and Huberman also suggest that in qualitative studies, the

researcher’s role in acquiring data can range from a simple, nonparticipant observer to a

participative questioner who fully engages the subject to extract as much information as

possible. For this study, I objectively collected, sorted, coded, and analyzed relevant

historical documents, speeches, videos, and publications related to post-Cold War

American grand strategy and national identity during President Clinton’s two terms in

office (January 1993 through January 2001). Initially, I looked for references to human

characteristics (e.g., “who we are as a nation”) as justification for a specific use of hard or

soft power components.

Another important researcher role is presenting the data and manuscript in an

easily readable format (McNabb, 2009). A solid research project logically organizes the

research questions and associated data and uses road maps or guiding paragraphs to

outline manuscript sections and major issues (Creswell, 2009, p. 83). For this study, I

produced a coherent and logical explanation of how President Clinton used his version of

national identity to justify specific actions within his grand strategy. I read all Clinton’s

NSSs first, looking for references to grand strategy and national identity. Specifically, I

looked for key words and phrases in the NSSs that referred to one or more of the

established eight possible grand strategies outlined in the literature review. I also looked

for human identifiers and character traits that Clinton might have used to construct his

version of American national identity. I focused on Clinton’s reliance on “American

values” as a consistent precursor to his national identity explanation.

Methodology

Data Management

The nature of the research influences all aspects of data management, including

what data types are acceptable and how they are acquired, stored, coded, and analyzed

(Patton, 2002). Because political science research often includes descriptive data types,

such as speeches, essays, and human interviews, I adhered to established data coding and

analysis techniques. Data were stored on my home computer, which uses several Internet

Security protocols. Additionally, no personal data were acquired or stored for this

research.

There were a few steps that I followed in the data collection and analysis process.

First, I gathered research documents, relevant essays, and speeches by policymakers and

foreign policy intellectuals (see Creswell, 2014). Second, case study data analysis steps

include (a) organizing the data; (b) generating categories, themes, and patterns; (c) coding

the data; (d) applying the ideas, themes, and categories to data; (e) searching for

alternative explanations; and (f) preparing and presenting the report of findings (McNabb,

2009, p. 367). Steps (a) through (d) are iterative, and I expected at least three to five

cycles of data analysis and organization, though I stopped counting after the ninth cycle.

Third, by ensuring the analysis and coding process was rigorous, logical, and iterative,

the research findings should withstand scrutiny and peer review.

I began the data search by looking for major international challenges during the

Clinton administration. I compared lists of international activities from different sources

such as the Clinton Presidential Library, the Miller Center at the University of Virginia,

and the Clintonwhitehouse5.gov website, which is no longer updated. From the

composite list, I looked for international incidents and choices that were publicly justified

by President Clinton’s explanation of national identity or national values. I checked the

Miller Center’s list of President Clinton’s speeches against the Clinton Presidential

Library’s list; however, I only researched speeches relevant to national security, and

foreign affairs.

President Clinton’s NSSs provided the bulk of the data for this research because

they clearly articulated justifications for his strategic preferences. I also compared the

NSS explanations to the actual strategic decisions made during his tenure. I read all the

NSSs from President Reagan’s (1987) first through President Clinton’s (2000) last. First,

I searched for specific national identity phrases such as “who we are,” “as a nation, we,”

“America’s role,” and “America is.” Because a president’s oratorical tool includes using

human characteristics to define his version of national identity (Huntington, 2004), I also

searched for descriptions of human values and characteristics attributed to the U.S. as a

nation by Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton.

Primarily in the NSSs I looked for examples of grand strategy components, of

which there were many, including descriptions of national interests and national goals,

explanations of when and how national power could be projected in support of goals, and

any references to the eight standing grand strategy descriptors listed in Chapter 2. To

ascertain any correlation between the results of the NSS observations and America’s use

of national power, I compared America’s role in significant international incidents with

the Stated policy.

Data Types

Qualitative case study research includes a wide variety of data types to saturate

the study topic within the specific case boundaries (Given, 2008). Consequently, this

project included a variety of written and spoken word data to identify how President

Clinton justified and explained grand strategy choices in terms of national identity.

Speeches and publications from President Clinton, senior administration policy makers,

national security practitioners, scholars, and think tank contributors were analyzed to

determine their explanations and analysis of the administration’s grand strategy and the

national identity used to justify that strategy.

Publications and speeches are data sources with a long history in national security

research. For example, the National Security Directive #75, issued by President Reagan

in 1983, identified specific goals for American policy toward the Soviet Union:

“Containment”, the retraction of Soviet international influence, and the promotion of

pluralist economic and political trends in Soviet elite spheres. Additionally, the directive

explained the diplomatic, political, military (usually through proxy), and economic means

to achieve stated ends as negotiations, costly consequences for belligerent actions, and

rewards for conforming to international standards (Reagan, 1983).

This research also included primary data sources such as the direct presidential or

senior staff pronouncements. Using primary sources reduced the transference of bias.

For example, instead of researching Sciolino’s (1996) article explaining why Clinton

changed course on intervening in Bosnia, I reviewed his 1995 Oval Office speech to the

nation when he invoked America’s “values and interests” as the key motivator for

international action (Clinton, 1995b).

This research also leaned on an extensive literature base, including historical,

modern policy, and academic-oriented documents. I prioritized the data sources, granting

more weight to the pronouncements from members of the National Security Council as

opposed to others in the political arena. The Congressional Research Service identified

the National Security Council as a major component in formulating and often

implementing American national security policy (Best, 2011). Although different

presidents reshape their National Security Council to suit personal preferences, the

statutory members identified by the national security directive (National Security Agency

1947) are the president, vice president, and the secretaries of defense and state.

Because qualitative research in international relations often struggles with

choosing relevant data, this research used data that directly supported the topic of grand

strategy and national identity. The primary data sets included are incidents and

pronouncements that involved the use or direction of America’s primary sources of

national power: DIME. For example, where and how the president employed military

resources to defend or promote American interests were included.

Data Collection

I examined presidential and senior administration speeches, pronouncements,

publications, and other communications using qualitative case study methodology. I used

C-Span, The National Defense University, The Clinton Presidential Library (online), The

Miller Center at the University of Virginia, and The American Presidency Project at The

University of California for presidential speeches, transcripts, documents, and The

National Security Strategy Archives for published NSSs. Additionally, it is important for

presidential narratives to use strict speech selection protocols. For example, televised

speeches that focus on foreign affairs or national security, especially when presented

before relevant audiences should be primary sources, which excludes the bulk of

published presidential communications (Krebs, 2015).

Further, is is important for the political science researcher to try to compare

similar items within the case study limits so the items reviewed have some semblance of

situational equality and relationship (McNabb, 2009). This highlights one of the inherent

limitations of qualitative research in international affairs; no two contexts are exactly the

same, so comparisons and analyses rely on the researcher’s adherence to established

practices and data saturation. Consequently, I focused on presidential goals, the “ends”

of American grand strategy. By focusing on the grand strategy ends, I reduced the

influence of the president’s personal tendency to use one national power source (e.g., the

military) over others, and I concentrated on enduring grand strategy aspects more likely

to survive presidential party shifts. No personal or confidential data were used for this

research. Only publicly available research was considered for data corpus.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

Understanding qualitative data is not always as simple as reading the texts of

speeches and drawing conclusions, especially when a researcher compares data across

situations within the same case limits (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). To appreciate

the value of the case study research strategy within the political science field, several key

factors were incorporated into the data analysis and interpretation regime. First, data

points were purposefully selected to provide significant contributions to the research and

accurately reflect the values of the case (presidential administration) it represented

(Creswell, 2014; McNabb, 2009). Toward that end, I endeavored to find situations where

the president explained the use of national power as a product of his interpretation of

national identity. This critical aspect binds the essential elements of this project (grand

strategy and national identity) in the constructivist research paradigm. Published

documents and speech transcripts were searched for reference to American national or

cultural identity as justification for national power projection. The type of national power

and context within which it was used were compared to the eight established grand

strategy types.

Additionally, qualitative data analysis is an iterative process, allowing data

inferences found later in the process to influence earlier data sets and inferences

(McNabb, 2009). There are six critical steps in qualitative data analysis that I followed

according to McNabb (2009):

1. Data were organized by creating folders labeled with preliminary codes based

on the nature of the research questions and on Huntington’s (2004)

explanation of national identity. I looked for human characteristics used to

explain national identity.

2. Categories, themes, and patterns were generated by reviewing and searching

the data for explanations of strategic choices, national characteristics

(especially those used to justify decisions), human values attributed to

national identity, and grand strategy explanations.

3. Data was coded by grouping human character descriptors, strategic choices,

explanations of national interests and national identity. I compared the nodes

to determine if there was any continuity in the strategic thinking and

explanation of strategic choices.

4. The report hopes to show the connections between human characteristics,

values, and national identity descriptors. I also tried to reduce the themes to

determine and validate the grand strategy theme that best fit the strategic

choices President Clinton made.

5. Alternative explanations were searched for national identity and grand

strategy by reviewing competing newspapers and publications relevant to the

significant strategic situations I followed.

Data categories were initially developed based on the events’ characteristics,

justifications for international activity, and the explanations and descriptions provided by

policymakers. Additionally, discourse analysis provides the important research strategy

for deciphering narrative data sets and speeches by policymakers (Krebs, 2015; Milliken,

1999).

Using Krebs’ (2015) explanation of discourse analysis, I identified dominant and

alternative political narratives on national identity as a potential causal factor of national

power usage. Krebs’ explanation of identifying, comparing, and analyzing narratives

provided an important strategy. Milliken’s (1999) explanation of discourse productivity

explains how dominant narrators produce what they consider logical explanations for

action and thereby exclude alternative narratives as illogical or inconsistent with

proposed identity (p. 229). These guidelines established thematic assessments that

created meaningful nodes, such as national identity, national characteristics,

explanations for national power use.

Data Software

I used the Nvivo-12 data management program which provided several

advantages. First, I was a little familiar with the program because I used it for several

research courses with Walden. In addition, the program offered excellent coding

features, including word search programs that analyzed uploaded documents for key

words and phrases. Since this study analyzed the text of documents and speech

transcripts of foreign policy makers and practitioners for key words and phrases that

explained national identity and the use of national power, the ability to scan those

documents for similarities saved time and increased coding accuracy. Some of these

phrases and key words or ideas populated codes. The initial codes used were: national

identity, human characteristics, strategic choices, national interests, national identity, hard

power and soft power, and grand strategy.

Data Coding

Pollock (2009) considered coding raw data as the “sweat equity phase” of original

research because it involves tedious attention to detail and the listing of important

research variables (p. 266). Coding strategies must be fully justified and followed if the

research is to maintain rigor and validity. Additionally, I used the eight established grand

strategies identified in the literature review as initial codes for the data (Art, 2003). The

presidential exercise of national power in the pursuit of national interest may fit into these

predetermined categories.

Effectively organizing the data is the first important requirement of managing

qualitative research (McNabb, 2009, p. 354). Because reducing qualitative data is

important in each of the six steps of data analysis, McNabb suggests establishing data

categories that allow me to organize and compartmentalize information (p. 367).

Therefore, I identify the president’s grand strategy by the characterizations associated

with it, the references that explain the strategy, and at least two examples of how that

grand strategy uses each type (hard or soft) of national power. More categories of data

may emerge as the research progresses. Secondly, developing thematic typologies for

data addressing national characteristics is another critical step in data management.

McNabb (2009) explains coding as the application of meaningful identifiers to the

data in order to extract relevant “concepts, categories, and characteristics” (p. 590).

Krebs (2015) coded presidential narratives according to emerging themes in the speeches.

While Krebs’ charts of word counts did not seem to influence his findings, Nvivo

software enabled me to develop and connect themes of national characteristics and

national power usage.

The first iteration of my coding included reading the NSSs for recurring themes

and dominant issues, of which there were many as the Clinton’s (1994c) first appeared to

be used as baseline for successive ones, with only marginal changes from 1994 through

1997. As themes of “democracy promotion”, national values, national identity, and the

projection of national power emerged, I further developed nodes that offered more

detailed descriptions of these and other themes. Additional iterations further refined the

original and subsequent nodes and the saturation of themes began to emerge.

Quality Standards

In qualitative research, the standards of quality refer to various dimensions within

the research paradigm. These dimensions helped ensure the selected data was directly

related to the research topic, which contributed to the validity of the results. In addition,

these quality standards helped ensure the research results accurately reflected both

research data sets and the analysis process. I discuss validity, bias, credibility, and other

dimensions of quality below.

Validity, Reliability, Bias, and Ethics

Underpinning the trustworthiness and authenticity of research findings were the

issues of validity, reliability, and bias (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). Creswell (2014)

explains content validity as the ability of the research questions to accurately measure the

research purpose, that is, does the research question tell you what you want to know? (p.

201). Internal validity refers to the research design’s ability to limit alternative

explanations. Scholars gauge a study’s validity by the reader’s ability to check and

confirm the accuracy of the research findings through the employment of specific and

standardized research procedures.

Validity. Because the social science I research intends to make rich, descriptive,

and causal deductions about the world; I sought to order this research with logical

conclusions that another researcher could reasonably be expected to find. This research

process relied on important factors for internal validity. First, by using publicly available

data within specified temporal limits, I ensured any subsequent research could also access

the same finite data population. Second, by using frequent citations connecting critical

data to their original sources, other researchers should be able to follow the research

pattern with some ease, and, if they reach alternate conclusions, then determine where

their research process deviated from mine. Third, by searching for alternate explanations

of national identity in public media, I was able to reduce the likelihood that other causal

factors (e.g. an alternate national identity) influenced or better explained the use of nation

power components during this period. Additionally, discourse analysis techniques

(McNabb, 2009, p. 473) enabled me to maintain experimental validity because I could

focus on Clinton’s narratives, linguistic themes, and rhetorical organization for answers

to the research questions.

Reliability. A research study’s reliability and dependability refer to the degree

other researchers can reach the same or similar findings, interpretations, and conclusions

given the same data and research processes (Creswell, 2014). Reporting and reconciling

their different explanations were also be important. Producing a rich and accurate

description of the research topic improved the validity of this research and will help

convince readers of the findings’ accuracy.

The validity and reliability strategies for this research study included triangulating

data by determining if a two or more data sets propose the same or similar explanations

for a specific American grand strategy. Here, I found significant similarities between all

of President Clinton’s seven NSSs along important dimensions. The national interests

expressed in the NSSs were consistent in their references to American international

engagement and leadership, the use of national values to determine national interests, the

use of Selected Engagement as the grand strategy and justifications for the use of national

power.

Another validity strategy I used was member checking, by reviewing the research

findings with some of the assertions other scholars have made about the same topic to see

if they reached comparable conclusions. Samuel Huntington (2006) is often cited here.

Another aspect of reliability involves using standard qualitative methodologies and

refraining from unique or improvised processes that cannot be recreated by other

researchers. Creswell (2009) recommends these techniques help minimize reliability and

validity concerns.

Bias. Marshall and Rossman (2011) identify bias as the influence of a

researcher’s personal values or individual identity on the research process (p. 96).

Because bias can interfere with research objectivity, Marshall and Rossman suggest the

researcher openly explain his views on the research topic so that readers may assess if or

how the researcher’s bias may have influenced results (p. 96). Creswell (2014) also

explained that good research often includes researchers’ comments and interpretations on

the subject that are shaped by his personal history, culture, gender, and other factors.

Personally, I may have had some professional bias toward this research because I

was a Soldier during this period and subject to President Clinton’s grand strategy choices.

I also observed friends who were sent to Bosnia to support America’s mission. While I

do not have a preference for any specific national identity or grand strategy, the topics are

particularly and personally interesting, but not just during this period. I have a personal

interest in the trajectory of American national identity and grand strategy as it may evolve

through various eras and strategic situations. I do not think my personal experiences

influenced this research as the volumes of data made it relatively easy to remain

objective.

For political science research, McNabb (2009) suggested managing bias and

validity fully exploring alternate explanations (p. 367). As I reach various conclusions,

especially grand strategy clarifications, I reconsidered alternate explanations for the same

data points. Had I found viable alternatives, I would have included or explained them in

my results. I did not. Additionally, by considering alternate possible findings, the

researcher then improves validity by ensuring logical explanations, other than the

research findings, are considered and weighed on their merits. The reader has the

opportunity to consider those alternatives and determine if they were given full

consideration by the researcher.

Transferability. Transferability refers to the applicability of this research study’s

methodology and findings to a wider variety of public policy situations without an

abundance of qualifiers (Creswell, 2009; Marshall and Rossman, 2011; McNabb, 2009).

Ensuring robust results descriptions helped maintain a high transferability level for this

study’s research findings because that showed details of the process-generated results.

Additionally, extensive descriptions enable other scholars, researchers, and policymakers

to analyze and understand post-Cold War influence of national identity on American

grand strategy. Toward that end, this study used standard public policy parameters for

defining and analyzing data, and adheres to standard qualitative case study procedures.

By using established qualitative research standards, I ensured a broader audience could

find generalizability in these research findings. Additionally, including a rich contextual

description of the data points established clear parameters for transferability of research

findings to similar contexts.

There may be other important elements of this study that could be generalized to

other case studies, with similar contextual parameters. For example, because democratic

societies require political leaders to compete for their positions through the voting

process, elected leaders are compelled to explain the logic behind their strategic decisions

in the hopes of swaying voters to at least understand if not support their decisions. If

those leaders’ explanations include descriptions of national identity characteristics,

especially involving historical references and widely shared beliefs, then these research

parameters may generate comparable results. Similarly, if the elected leaders are

compelled to produce their national security rationale for the strategic use of national

power, to the degree that document explains their proposed grand strategy, it could fit the

terms of this research as well.

Ethical Considerations and Protections

Creswell (2009) and McNabb (2009) both suggest ethical considerations in

scientific research refer to the researchers’ and participants’ adherence to the moral

standards of social and professional conduct in the planning, conduct, and reporting of

research findings. In dissertation research, the doctoral student is primarily responsible

for maintaining strong ethical standards. The doctoral committee and the institutional

review board assist the student by assessing the research process and findings to ensure

maintenance of scientific standards. I maintained regular contact with my dissertation

chair had any ethical questions arose, I would have sought his advice. No ethical issued

emerged.

Sample Size

Because this project used historical data to populate the case study, the number of

data points were uncertain at the outset, and based on several factors, such as the political

magnitude of the event or national power exercised by the president, the activity’s

international context, and other contextual information. However, I endeavored to

include at least two examples each of hard power and soft power use by the

administration in order to provide predictable data sets and a balanced understanding of

identity’s influence on grand strategy choices. The quantity or size of the power

projection activity considered, and the way the projection is explained by the policy

maker, influenced this data set. If the two data points had not represented clear identity

connections, I would have sought a third or fourth data point to better saturate the

research.

In Beasley’s (2004, p. 149) book on presidential rhetoric and American national

identity, she explained that her primary data sources were presidential inaugural

addresses and SOTU addresses because they afforded the presidents heightened public

image, formal and ritualistic atmosphere, and an unfettered political forum for discourse.

This research also closely reviewed these data sources; however, I found the NSSs more

productive because they specifically included grand strategy tenets and addressed the

strategic use of national power paradigms in context. Additionally, while the SOTU

messages ritualistically included an automatic rebuttal from the opposing political party,

The actual data sources for this research included the NSSs from 1987 through

2000, including the first ones published, by President Reagan, as prescribed by the 1986

Goldwater-Nichols Act. President Clinton’s speeches, especially SOTU addresses, were

a valuable source for this research. Numerous books and peer-reviewed essays on

American grand strategy, national identity, and the international relations of the Clinton

era were also very useful. The New York Times and Chicago Tribune were searched for

confirmation and contention of Clinton’s proposed national identity during this period.

Summary

This research study of America’s evolving national identity influence on post-

Cold War grand strategy used a constructivist case study strategy to ascertain how

President Clinton and his administration characterized and justified national power usage.

I have shown how the research question determined the qualitative methodology as the

most appropriate research framework, and how the case study design offers the best

parameters for this public policy research topic.

The case study design and research software enabled me to manage available data

sources, such as documents, speeches, and other sources to compare descriptions of

national identity to the use of specific forms of national power. In addition, the

qualitative methodology allows me as the researcher to become an integral data

acquisition tool through the selection of rich and accurate data points while discarding

fewer valuable data. I identified critical issues, such as validity, reliability, and bias,

among others, and mitigated and managed them effectively. I established data

management priorities according to their proximity to grand strategy design, operation,

and analysis. The results of this study may provide valuable information for U.S.

government policy makers to better assess and guide America’s use of its national power

in the international arena.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

In this study, I examined American post-Cold War national identity and its

influence on foreign policy. The research questions posed in this study were “How did

America’s evolving national identity influence its post-Cold War grand strategy? and

“How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national identity as a

justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American

values?” The data showed that President Clinton defined and pursued a national security

policy founded on the cultural values he defined as American national identity. That

identity determined American national interests, the selection of activities to engage, and

the national power resources to achieve strategic ends.

Data Management

Organizing data required creating and associating categories for information that

contributed to answering the research questions. I created themed categories, such as

hard power and soft power (Nye, 2009), for data that fit each description. For example,

hard power related to data that demonstrated Clinton’s use of either military or economic

resources to achieve a specific national security goal. Similarly, soft power related to

data that used diplomacy, information, and organizations to achieve results.

The presidential speeches, national security strategies, and other (declassified)

national security archives were uploaded to the NVivo-12 research program. Primary

nodes for hard power, soft power, cultural and national values, grand strategy

determinations, and national interests were created with secondary nodes for goals,

collective action, and national characteristics, among others, were used to further refine

the primary nodes. As significant words and phrases emerged (see the following

section), they were identified across several national security strategies and speeches,

helping establish continuity for the topics they described. For example, “values” was

regularly prefaced by “human,” “national,” and “American” in describing the importance

for international activity. This research uses direct quotes more than would ordinarily be

expected in post-graduate work because the speakers’ actual words significantly

contributed to the topic’s description, comparison, and the speakers’ intent.

Data Analysis

Word search strategies were focused on several standard qualitative processes:

word frequency, indigenous word sequences (specific to national security and

international relations), and key words-in-context (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias,

2008; Kellstedt & Whitten, 2009). Key search terms and phrases included who we are;

what we stand for, national identity, national interest, culture values, national security,

and ideals. Key words-in-context showed a frequent reference to “values” as American

values, democratic values, human or universal values. “Ideals” was frequently prefaced

by democratic, specifically associating individual freedoms, pluralist government, and

capitalism as component definitions. Principal national security goals were also routinely

grouped in the typical sequence of security, economic prosperity, and democracy

promotion. The primary national “assets” were explained as military strength, economic

prosperity, and strong national ideals of human and democratic rights and the

attractiveness of American culture (Art, 2003; J. L. Gaddis, 2002). Clinton used the word

values 231 times in seven NSSs, often in conjunction with American values, national

values, “our” values, common values, social values, shared values, or democratic values.

The frequency of this term was important because it was often used as explanation or

justification for Clinton’s proposed policy agenda without delineating any specific value

or characteristic. The key word frequency chart is at Appendix B.

In reviewing the Republican rebuttals to Clinton’s eight SOTU addresses, the

opportunity for the opposition party to offer alternative identity characteristics, I found

only common references to conservative values of fiscal discipline, individual freedom,

limited government, and strong security protocols. The University of Virginia Miller

Center’s “Clinton Key-events Timeline” was also used for tracking international

activities during this administration. Additionally, I used the dates of key and potentially

contentious events (plus 5 calendar days) to search for editorials in the New York Times

and Chicago Tribune on their support or dissent for Clinton’s narrative of American

identity.

Coding and themes. Numerous codes emerged through iterations of document

analysis. President Clinton’s speeches were organized by venue. The annual SOTU

speeches were useful in identifying Clinton’s long-term strategic goals but were

distinguished from the event or situation-oriented speeches. The NSSs were categorized

by publication year, including from the Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W.

Bush administrations, for comparison. Nodes for hard power and soft power were

created then subdivided into diplomatic or information and economic or military.

National interest nodes were created to capture descriptions of policy objectives.

National interests were subdivided into goals and opportunity, along with specific

country or region oriented, such as Bosnia or Haiti, for example. The national identity

node was divided into characteristics, producing 40 references in seven files, and values,

with 11 references in six files.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

I established trustworthiness primarily through publicly available data and

standard data analysis software. Credibility and dependability were supported by well-

established data sources. The University of Virginia’s Miller Center provided the bulk of

President Clinton’s speeches, and I found their chart of major national activities useful

for calculating the use of national power. The NSSs were drawn from the National

Security Archive, which is published by the executive branch of the U.S. government.

The NSS reports are published to provide comprehensive articulation of American

national interests, objectives, and goals. The National Security Strategy Archives is

managed by a nonpartisan national security consulting firm called The Taylor Group.

Credibility was also maintained by using documents from the Clinton Library, especially

declassified documents that explained background information on such topics as the

engagement in Rwanda, the Haitian crisis, and the Bosnian intervention. Because these

documents are publicly available, they enhance the transferability and credibility of this

research.

Results

The Use of Constructivism in Identity Politics

“The other” is sociopsychologically important in defining group membership at

the national level (Huntington, 2004). The exclusion component of identity, identifying

who is in the group and who is not, is also important to national identity (Huntington,

2004). President Clinton used the constructivist principles of social inclusion and

exclusion regularly because collectivism was a stated process of his grand strategy. For

example, Clinton used social characteristics to define the tenets of Americanism, which

were the democratic values of individualism and pluralism, the capitalist values of free

enterprise, private ownership, and economic competition, and the human values of self-

determination and freedom from oppressive and coercive governments (Clinton, 2000b).

Though Clinton’s first inaugural speech did not mention national identity or American

values, these two constructs soon became recurring elements of nearly all presidential

speeches and publications.

American national values. The essential aspects of national identity are the core

values that influence not only how Americans perceive and project themselves but also

what their strategic interests are (Huntington, 2004). National values were the founding

principles upon which President Clinton based his national security strategies, which

were identified as representative democracy, free-market economics, and human rights

(Clinton, 1994b). The important connection that emerged was Clinton’s association of

national ideals and values with the same level of influence as military and economic

interests. This reliance on constructivist precepts as the foundation for national strategy

produced consistent national interests throughout Clinton’s tenure.

National interests. Clinton’s NSSs consistently relied on his stated national

interests to define when, where, how, and what national power he might use for a specific

goal. Clinton’s national interests were divided into three categories. Vital national

interests directly affected the physical security of the American homeland, its allies,

citizens, and the informational and economic infrastructure that supports America’s way

of life (Clinton, 2000b, p. 8). Important interests were lesser threats that could disrupt or

destabilize vital interests in various regions, including inter-state conflicts and issues that

could indirectly impact U.S. economic prosperity (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9). Humanitarian

interests were the third category, comprising natural and man-made disasters and

democratic development (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9).

All of Clinton’s NSSs identified the protection of national interests as the priority

determining America’s involvement in international affairs (Clinton, 2000b, p. 9).

America’s core values of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and economic and

political freedoms guided both the selection of national interests and the national power

resource(s) used to achieve those goals. For example, Clinton (1995a) cited the core

value of human rights defense to justify the deployment of U.S. military air assets to

Bosnia after diplomatic efforts failed.

Projecting economic prosperity was also a national security interest for President

Clinton. Although the development of these organizations actually began years before he

became President, the creation of the NAFTA and the WTO (formerly the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), Clinton’s support and efforts significantly helped their

ratification by the U.S. Senate. A list of Clinton’s national power projection in the

international arena is included in Appendix A.

American national identity. To understand America’s national identity

evolution, it is important to recognize how President Clinton’s immediate predecessors

explained American identity and the Soviet Union, which served as “the other” against

which the United States defined itself. President Reagan labeled the Soviet Union the

“Evil Empire” while emphasizing American identity as both politically and morally

superior (Reagan, 1983). Reagan (1988a) described America as the “vigorous leader of

the free world” (para. 43) Reagan (1988b) also claimed America’s national values of

individual freedom and democracy made the United States the “moral leader” of the

world struggle for freedom. Similarly, citing Americans’ willingness to collaborate

despite racial, ethnic, tribal, and religious differences, Clinton (2000a) specifically

distinguished the United States from Bosnia, Burundi, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, and the

Middle East where these differences incited violent conflict. Clinton identified not only

racial, ethnic, and social tolerance as pillars of Americanism, but he also explained the

aversion to violent conflict as a solution for sociopolitical challenges.

Another important predecessor was President George H. W. Bush who at his 1993

Address at West Point also proclaimed American world leadership based on national

values. Bush (1993a) advised against assuming the role of “world’s policeman” because

of the risk of over-committing limited resources, a sentiment echoed by his successor,

Clinton. Bush declared America the “only remaining superpower,” with the moral and

material responsibility to lead the world toward a widespread democratic peace.

Following the previous presidents, President Clinton endeavored to use national

identity as justification for the use of national power. In his 1994 SOTU address, Clinton

identified the United States as the “world’s greatest power” and highlighted the

international responsibilities accompanying that position. Clinton (1994b, p. 5) coined

the term “indispensable” nation, referring to the necessity of American involvement in

the resolution of prominent global issues. Clinton’s address on Bosnia clearly explained

that “our values and interests as Americans require that we participate” in implementing

the Dayton Peace Agreement (Clinton, 1995a, para. 1). He noted that America was not

just a place but a nation that acted on the ideals of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of

happiness” for billions of people around the world (Clinton, 1995a, para. 3). American

identity required the nation to lead the expansion of these ideals by promoting peace and

spreading democracy and economic prosperity.

Strategy Publication and Support

The literature review explained the NSS as the codification of American grand

strategy. The seven NSSs produced by the Clinton administration articulate grand

strategy, including explanations of national security goals and preferred methods for

achieving designated outcomes. To achieve the broadly stated goal of global security, the

1994 NSS listed such methods as the peace initiatives in the Middle East, the creation and

expansion of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and denuclearization agreements with

Russia and Ukraine (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii). For the promotion of economic growth,

Clinton listed the passing of NAFTA, the creation of the WTO, and the granting of Most

Favored Nation trade status to China, along with the completion of over 80 trade

agreements (Clinton, 1995b, ii).

Major national security themes. Clinton routinely emphasized soft power

components of his national security agenda, including the use of international

organizations, collective security processes and alliances, and the penchant for diplomatic

engagement. All seven NSSs emphasized these components, especially the use of the

WTO, NATO in Europe, the UN, and other regional and global organizations for various

contingency operations prevalent during the 1990s. Clinton encouraged NATO to

develop a new post-Cold War purpose in 1995, supporting the Dayton Peace Accords

between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, providing regional security and

peacekeeping operations (NATO, 2019). Additionally, Clinton’s first NSS stated both

American interests and national values, emphasizing its reflection of cultural

underwriting of strategic interests (Clinton, 1994b, p. ii).

A critical observation emerged after reading this data. The NSSs appeared to be

published partially for public (domestic and international) consumption as a general

outline of national priorities, goals, and likely methods. Additionally, they appeared to

be written to inform and explain guidelines for senior policymakers and executioners who

applied the information to sectors under their control. However, the foreign policy

speeches given by presidents are often specifically designed to generate public support

for their international decisions (Dueck, 2006).

Additionally, after conducting a key word (and word derivates) search of

important documents, the research produced another observation of the NSSs. The

reference to “leader” more than doubled from 1994 to 2000. The use of the word

“values” went from five in 1994 to 46 in 2000, and references to “ideals” increased from

one to six in the same period. The term “selective” was used an average of four times in

each of the NSSs in this period. This illustrates Clinton’s increased reliance on cultural

references to explain and justify his grand strategy of primacy and selective engagement.

Global leadership. In 1994, Clinton declared that because of America’s

democratic values and unparalleled economic and military power, the United States was

indispensable to international peace and prosperity and therefore must use global

leadership to ensure world peace and stability (Clinton, 1994b, p. 5). Clinton also

identified America as the world’s only “superpower,” which brought both privileges of

influence and responsibilities of global leadership. He used that title to admonish

isolationists yet cautioned against strategic over-reach. This dichotomy was a recurring

struggle within Clinton’s calculus for international action (J. L. Gaddis, 2002; Kissinger,

2001).

Collective action. Clinton’s reliance on economic growth contributed to the

creation of major international institutions WTO and NAFTA. One of the pervasive

themes in Clinton’s NSSs is the proclivity for collective action on national security

issues. Additionally, collective security fully supports the social aspects of constructivist

theory. Collective security was used to justify and explain several important principles

common among his published strategies and speeches. Clinton’s support for the final

stages in the creation of both NAFTA and the WTO exemplified his use of international

organizations and their collectivist approach to international trade. Clinton was a

signatory on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, although the treaty has not

been ratified by the Senate (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

Preparatory Commission, 1996).

Assertive multilateralism. The U.N., NATO, the WTO, and others were useful to

the President facing multiple humanitarian and diplomatic crises concurrently. While

Cold War American presidents routinely supported the U.N., President Clinton’s decision

to align U.S. expeditionary ventures with U.N.-supported operations marked a distinction

for collaboration in the new era. The U.S. support for U.N. efforts to return Haitian

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide following a 1991 military coup d’état is an example of

Clinton’s reliance on international organizations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 reaffirmed nine previous

resolutions aimed at reestablishing the constitutionally elected president of Haiti, by

military force if necessary (U.N. Security Council, 1994). President Clinton increased his

predecessor’s soft power pressure with coercive diplomacy, and hard power efforts with

broader military and economic sanctions on Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras’ military

regime (Office of the Historian, 2000). U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright declared

this approach a break from Cold War-era norms and termed the policy “assertive

multilateralism” (Office of the Historian, 2000).

When Cedras failed to comply with the 1993 Governor’s Island Accord he signed

with Aristide, the U.S. led the U.N. imposing a naval blockade on the island nation and

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began planning a military intervention. Clinton hoped the threat of a U.S. invasion would

force Cedras to step down, but he used the U.N. mandate to recruit support from

Caribbean nations totaling a force of nearly 25,000, the vast majority from the U.S.

Clinton also sent former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and then-former Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell to negotiate with Cedras under threat of

military invasion. General Hugh Shelton commanded the invasion force but accepted

Cedras’ peaceful transition without the use of force (Office of the Historian, 2000).

Clinton’s foreign policy relied heavily on the use of institutions and organizations,

prompting the Presidential Decision Directive/ National Security Council -25 (1994) and

56 (1997), which outlined protocols for the U.S. to manage complex humanitarian and

contingency operations. Directive 25 declared multilateralism a “cost effective” method

for managing multiple operations around the world. The directive listed the increased

frequency of several crises unique to the post-Cold War era and declared the U.S. would

lead the U.N.S.C. to create multilateral forces to address the challenges when appropriate.

Values-driven engagement. Throughout modern history, American leaders

selectively supported various natural and man-made humanitarian crises. The end of the

Cold War and the decentralization of international powers enabled numerous

humanitarian conflicts to emerge, many of which were long suppressed by former

authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the 1990s saw an increased interest in international

humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict (Roberts, 1999). Two

significant changes of the U.N.’s humanitarian crises response procedures were supported

by both President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton: the increased U.N. support

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of non-combatants in humanitarian in spite of opposition from hostile authoritarian

regimes, and the introduction of military “Peace Keeper” forces to support this

engagement (Roberts, 1999).

President Clinton consistently determined national interests based on his

definition of national values, prominently focusing on international humanitarian crises,

with the notable decision not to push for stronger IC engagement during the 1994

Rwandan genocide. The National Security Archive at George Washington University

used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain evidence Clinton’s 1993 and 1994

President’s Daily Briefings included CIA warnings of the impending and ongoing

slaughter of Tutsis by the Hutu nationalists (National Security Archive, 2017).

Additionally, almost 300 recently declassified diplomatic cables detail numerous

warnings sent from the limited peace keeping force in Kigali to the U. N. Secretary

General between January 11, 1994 and the beginning of killings in April 1994 (National

Security Archive, 2017). Similar documents detail U.N.S.C. discussions about the

Rwandan situation from 1992 through 1994, demonstrating the leading world powers

were knowledgeable about and discussed the situation before and during the crisis, yet

decided not to engage. Four years after the Rwandan crisis, Clinton’s speech to the

people of Rwanda highlighted very important human characteristics shared by all

peoples, including Africans and Americans, and proposed future U.S. and IC engagement

to support recovery and prevent future crises (Clinton, 1998b).

U.N.S.C. Resolution 918 authorized increasing the U.N. Peacekeeping force to

5,500 personnel (Council, 1994). On July 22, 1994 President Clinton announced a

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multilateral operation called “Support Hope”, sending a large contingent of U.S. and IC

forces to Rwanda and neighboring Uganda (Cunitz, 1995). The first shipment of food

arrived in Uganda, the staging area, two days later. Within two weeks, the killings were

abated and humanitarian assistance began to reach areas deep in the country.

In 1996 the Clinton Administration launched the African Crisis Response

Initiative. The program’s purpose was to coordinate with IC partners and African nations

to plan and support both humanitarian and peacekeeping operations on the continent.

The program supported several of Clinton’s grand strategy goals. First, because the

program was limited to democratic nations, it supported Clinton’s “enlargement” goal of

growing democracies. Second, the program allowed Clinton to selectively determine

when and how to provide humanitarian assistance to other nations while still controlling

limited U.S. resources.

The Use of National Power (Hard and Soft)

Grand strategy requires the use of national power to achieve national security

aims (Kissinger, 1957). Clinton’s NSSs consistently identified two power methods for

promoting strategic success: economic prosperity underwrites national security, and

democracy promotion supports a safe international environment (Clinton, The NSS,

1994c, p. i). Clinton specifically favored certain types of national power, with unilateral

military activity as the lowest frequency. With his first three NSSs entitled “Engagement

and Enlargement” Clinton (1994c, 1995c, 1996c) identified hard power economics as his

guiding international strategy. However, diplomacy provided him with pivotal successes

in Western Europe (Good Friday Peace Accords, 1998), Eastern Europe (Dayton Peace

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Accords, 1995), the Middle East (four peace agreements between Israel and her

neighbors, 1993, 1994, 1998, and 2999), and the Caribbean (Haiti, 1994).

In Clinton’s (1999b) Kosovo speech, he implied America led the world with

intolerance for genocide or “ethnic cleansing” (p. 1). He also explained American

strategy was to first try soft power (diplomacy) before employing hard power tactics in

the promotion of democratic values. Clinton cautiously used military power unilaterally.

On June 26, 1993, Clinton launched 23 Tomahawk missiles into Iraqi intelligence

headquarters in downtown Bagdad in response to reports Saddam Hussein launched

efforts to assassinate President George H.W. Bush during his April 1993 visit to Kuwait

(The Miller Center, 2019). He also used economic power to lift the longstanding trade

embargo against Vietnam, renewed Most Favored Trade status for China, ushered

NAFTA and the WTO Center into existence. Clinton also used diplomatic power to

bring the Oslo Accords Peace Plan between Israel and the Palestine Liberation

Organization.

Grand Strategy Determination

Under President Clinton, grand strategy was predicated on America’s founding

national values and ideals (Clinton, 2000a, p. 5). Contextually, his NSSs highlighted the

political and economic interdependence globalization promoted between the U.S. and

other nations. Clinton’s NSSs also discussed advancing technology’s impact on

international communication, and problematic social and ethnic dynamics in Eastern

Europe, Africa, and South America, including transnational refugees. Upon taking

office, and reaffirmed at his second inaugural, Clinton identified his reliance on

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international organizations, especially NATO and the U.N., and the use of collective

security as essential pillars of American engagement (Clinton, 1997a).

Clinton’s 1994 NSS, among others, clearly identifies “Selective Engagement” as

the grand strategy guiding his use of national power, specifically military force (p. 10).

While the NSS explains the necessity to efficiently husband scarce national resources,

and it does not specify any specific scenarios for the deployment of U.S. forces, the

assertion that the decisions were made “selectively” clearly explained the grand strategy

scheme. Clinton (1994b) reaffirmed this choice by stating the U.S. would “engage”

national interests selectively (p. 5), “target” military threats selectively (p. 10), or

“employ” resources “selectively” (p. 13). Because each of Clinton’s seven NSSs were

nearly identical, with minor revisions, they all explain Selective Engagement at least five

times.

Robert Art (1999) delineated a typology of seven grand strategy choices for post-

Cold War America. Art’s explanations of American national interests (e.g. great power

peace, global economic freedom, and democratic expansion) support the Selective

Engagement strategy expressed in each of Clinton’s NSSs. Lastly, Art (1999) confirms

America’s “Selective Engagement” grand strategy through Clinton’s choices to act or

lead in a variety of international incidents, but not others, which are illustrated below.

Colin Dueck’s (2006) provided the third confirmation of “Selective Engagement”

as Clinton’s grand strategy. Dueck cited the nearly five decades of liberal globalism that

guided America’s Cold War foreign policy as the long-standing trend Clinton was

compelled to follow (p. 146). Additionally, Dueck noted America’s liberal cultural

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traditions provided the requisite domestic support for Clinton’s choices. Dueck went on

to systematically invalidate the grand strategy alternatives to “Selective Engagement”.

The three observations above provided the triangulation from different sources that

confirm Clinton’s grand strategy of “Selective Engagement”.

However, it became clear that President Clinton supported and promoted the

national identity of American exceptionalism, implementing a second grand strategy of

American Primacy. Clinton’s (1996e) speech on NATO specifically cited America as the

“indispensable nation”. Clinton predicated this identity on America’s post-Cold War

great power status, America’s special responsibility to support the growth of democracy,

and the nation’s broad and unique global interests and responsibilities (Clinton, 1996c).

Major strategic themes. The major themes of Clinton’s National Security

Strategies were consistently identified and explained throughout the series of seven

published strategies. The guiding principles were clearly Stated in each NSS publication:

a) enhancing security, b) improving economic prosperity, c) democracy promotion, d)

international engagement, e) the U.S. as the world’s “leader”, but not the world’s

“policeman”, and f) a reliance on multilateralism with close allies (Clinton, 1994b). In

fact, similar themes populated George H. W. Bush’s (1993b) NSS as Clinton (1994b)

listed many of the same threats his predecessor used: transnational threats included

international organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental security, terrorism, and the

proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction. Regional issues, such as varying

humanitarian crises in Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean were of noticeable importance

throughout his tenure. These threats produced similar goals: preventing regional

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destabilization due to violence and refugee flow, stopping genocide and humanitarian

crises, and the use of international organizations to address the issues (Clinton, The NSS,

1994c, p. 21).

Another regional issue was the protection of international trade, which supported

American economic prosperity. Protecting commerce routes in the Pacific and Atlantic

theaters were of paramount concern to President Clinton. Protecting world shipping

lanes and trade routes became the American Navy’s mantle since the end of WWII.

Clinton continued the tradition. While Clinton clearly preferred multilateralism, he did

use hard (military) power unilaterally several times during his tenure. Clinton attacked

Saddam Hussein’s military bases in retaliation for the ejection of international inspectors.

He launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998 to degrade Iraqi chemical weapons capability

(Department of Defense, 2019b).

National identity and grand strategy. This research showed that while President

Clinton (1993a) did not mention national identity or American values in his first

inaugural speech, he soon learned the importance of these references for explaining and

justifying his use of national power. President Clinton used the traditions of American

values and national history to inform his evolving narrative of American identity. Before

the Joint Session of Congress, President Clinton (1993b) cited “old” American values of

individual responsibility for family, faith, and community as founding principles for his

“new” course for the nation. By April of his first year, President Clinton (1993c) cited

national values of responsibility, opportunity, respect for each other, and community to

promote volunteerism and national service. Clinton’s 1996 and 1998 SOTU speeches

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specifically explained American national identity in the context of liberalism’s shared

historical identity, celebration of diversity, and national unity (see Appendix B). Nearly

all his successive speeches of international consequence cited American values as

justification for strategic policy.

President Clinton’s (1993d) address on the U.S. involvement in Somalia

explained his reliance on the idea of American exceptionalism by explaining that “only

the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of this time” (p. 1).

Clinton Stated America’s conscience and best tradition spurred national engagement to

stop the humanitarian crisis. These ideational constructs justified the use of American

military force in Somalia, and later in Bosnia (Clinton, 1995b), and were helpful in

swaying public support. By the end of his second year in office, President Clinton

(1994e) specifically Stated America’s foreign policies would reflect her values.

Additionally, in the 1996 presidential debate with Senator Robert Dole, President Clinton

further aligned the most important use of national power, military deployment, with

American values. Clinton (1996d) told the world that for him to deploy military forces

Americas vital national interests and values must be at stake.

Clinton used America’s Cold War tradition of international engagement, the idea

of national exceptionalism, and the cultural power of traditional American values to

justify U.S. foreign policy and the expenditure of national power. The only caveat to this

process was evident in Clinton’s NSSs, all of which routinely explained the variable of

American national power expenditure would be “selective engagement” in international

ventures that involved only the most vital national interests and the availability of

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national resources. This mind map portrays President Clinton’s use of national values

and American history to construct his vision of American national identity as

“exceptional”. Clinton used this identity to define his grand strategy of Primacy and

Selective Engagement, pivoting the deployment of national resources on the balance of

national interests and values at stake. The figure below illustrates the evolution of

President Clinton’s development of national identity and its influence on American grand

strategy.

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Figure 1. National identity and grand strategy.

N ’

I ’ Goals

(W ,

, wh )

/or

G /Regional

A ;

U /Coalition

N ’

and

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Alternate national identity definitions. Krebs (2015, p. 183) noted American

national identity influences strategic engagement and power choices for presidents.

Conversely, alternate identity definitions, often proposed by competing domestic political

interests, may complicate or undermine a president’s ability to define the strategic

situation in a manner supportive of his choices. Dominating the national political

narrative is essential for political leadership in democracies (Krebs, 2015, p. 31)

A review of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune editorials for up to five

days after a major international event did not yield contrasts or challenges to Clinton’s

definition of American national identity or his reliance on democratic values for strategic

decisions. All of the editorials reviewed for this research presented policy-centered

agreement, dissent, or advice on various international situations. For example, Clinton’s

nuclear negotiations with North Korea, South Korea and Japan spanned nearly his entire

tenure, with mixed results at best. The New York Times (1993) editorial advised Clinton

to continue the diplomatic approach as the best course of action.

During terms in office, Clinton faced strong opposition from the Republican Party

on a variety of issues. When the Republicans controlled the House of Representatives,

Speaker Newt Gingrich provided consistent political opposition to Clinton. While

Gingrich usually confined himself to domestic matters of political difference, he rarely

offered alternative views on matters of foreign policy. The New York Times (Sciolino,

1995), and Washington Post (Kovaleski, 1995) reported an incident where Newt Gingrich

publicly expressed an opinion that the U.S. should recognize Hong Kong as a State, in

direct contrast to the long-standing “One China” policy codified during the Nixon

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administration and adhered to by successive presidents, including President Clinton. As

the Speaker of the House, and third in line for the presidency, Gingrich’s comments

carried some weight in the political discourse of the time. However, after Dr. Henry

Kissinger called Gingrich from China, Gingrich later explained his comments as “a joke”

(Kovaleski, 1995; Sciolino, 1995). Gingrich made further comments specifically

removing himself from foreign policy conversations.

On Rwanda, the New York Times supported Clinton’s decision not to send troops

into the ongoing conflict because of concerns for troop safety and, as the editorial

specifically explained, Rwanda did not present a clear and vital interest for the U.S. (The

New York Times Editorial Board, 1994a). However, the Times did support sending

humanitarian aid, and eventually U.S. forces in support of the U.N. mandate as long as

the troops were not in direct conflict with hostile forces.

Conversely, the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune supported NATO’s

airstrikes on Bosnian Serbs as the aggressors against ethnic Muslims (The Chicago

Tribune Editorial, 1994; The New York Times Editorial Board, 1994b). The New York

Times editorial agreed with Clinton’s recommendations for NATO’s new post-Cold War

role: as unbiased peacekeepers in support of U.N.S.C. resolutions. However, the New

York Times disputed Clinton’s estimation of the proposed NATO benefits by raising

concerns Russia would view the process threateningly. The Chicago Tribune, normally

supportive of a conservative agenda, approved of Clinton’s 1993 unilateral Tomahawk

missile strike on Iraqi intelligence facilities in response to the reported assassination

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attempt on former President George H.W. Bush (The Chicago Tribune Editorial Board,

1993).

Republican rebuttals. In the Republican rebuttal to the 1993 SOTU address,

Illinois Congressman Robert Michel warned the incoming president that the as long as

his foreign policy adhered to “traditional” American values, they would support the

policy (Michel, 1993). However, Michel cautioned if Clinton’s explanation(s) for his

strategic activity was not based on supporting American values and national interests, the

Republicans would oppose the policy. This seemed like a warning to simply include

values references in each activity’s justification to preclude Republican opposition. The

Congressman’s rebuttal did not include a description or delineation of the values he

required the President to support.

The Republican’s 1994 SOTU rebuttal was the only instance of the party

challenging President Clinton on national security issues. Kansas Senator Robert Dole’s

rebuttal speech celebrated and promoted the issue of American leadership in world affairs

(Dole, 1994). Dole, a WWII veteran, specifically confronted Clinton’s proposed

budgetary “slashing” of defense spending, even though defense spending had steadily

declined annually since the beginning of President Reagan’s second term (Korb, Conley,

& Rothman, 2011). However, Dole’s push to expand American international leadership

internationally did not mention that it was predicated on cultural values. Dole explained

it was America’s post-World War II mission to provide international leadership.

The Republican’s 1996 SOTU rebuttal, again given by Senator Robert Dole,

directly challenged President Clinton on the subject of American values, specifically

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mentioning the characteristics of “self-reliance and family” (sic) (Dole, The American

Presidency Project, 1996). However, the public policies disputed by Senator Dole

included federal government budget deficits, growth of the welfare State, and the seating

of partisan (in this case, “liberal) judges to the federal bench. As Senator Dole’s recalled

conservative American traditions reduced taxes and limited government, his rebuttal was

focused only on domestic political issues without mention of international relations or

national security.

Mississippi Senator Trent Lott gave the Republican’s rebuttal to President

Clinton’s 1998 SOTU address. In keeping with the tradition of the era, Senator Lott

disputed Clinton’s policies on the federal deficit, limited government, “over-regulation”

and taxation, Medicare expansion, and the “liberalization” of public education (Lott,

1998). Senator Lott (1998) specifically cited traditional American values of “family,

faith, and freedom” as he proposed alternative domestic policies. However, directly

addressing then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Senator Lott unequivocally exclaimed

his support for President Clinton’s defense of American national interests abroad and

protection of the homeland.

Summarily, Republican rebuttals to the Clinton SOTU addresses were not used to

propose alternative national identities or foreign policies, save Dole’s push for greater

American leadership in the early days of the Clinton administration. This research

observed rare challenges to President Clinton on the issue of national identity and foreign

policy. Conversely, Republicans routinely challenges President Clinton’s domestic

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policies, citing characteristics favored by conservatives as “traditional” American values

juxtaposed to Clinton’s agenda.

Observations and Results

How did President Clinton define America’s post-Cold War national identity as a

justification for using the four components of grand strategy to project American

values?” Clinton’s (1994b) recurring expression of America as the “indispensable

nation” solidified American identity as the global leader and sole superpower. Clinton’s

“indispensable” label justified his grand strategy of Primacy, while his caution against

becoming the world’s policeman signaled his aversion to indiscriminate international

expeditions by being “selective” in choosing America’s missions abroad (Clinton,

1996c).

Continuity of national values as both the source and purpose of national power

projection and the mantle of international leadership continued under President Clinton,

transcending the last two Cold War presidents into the next period. Promotion of

democracy, human rights, and rule of law by hard and soft power means were decades-

long traditions of American Cold War strategy and cornerstones of Clinton’s (1994b)

grand strategy. Collective security and interventionism also continued, although

according to Clinton’s (1995c, p. 7) Selective Engagement calculations the U.S. would

not be the “world’s policeman”. Unilateral military actions were relatively rare under

Clinton.

How did America’s presidentially constructed national identity influence its post-

Cold War grand strategy? President Clinton’s national security strategies specifically

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identified long-standing American cultural values as the source and purpose of American

NSS (Clinton, 1994b). President Clinton’s use of both hard power and soft power to

achieve national security ends clearly validated his Selective Engagement grand strategy

because they showed his preference for diplomacy and aversion to international

expeditions. President Clinton declared on multiple occasions and through different

publications that he did not want to U.S. to become the world’s policeman, so he chose

which international activities fit within his description of national interests, abstaining

from those situations he did not consider important enough for the expenditure of limited

American power resources.

President Clinton’s use of national values, predicated on liberalism and

democracy, enabled him to leverage America’s soft power tools of diplomacy and

cultural affinity to forge difficult yet significant peace agreements in nearly every region

of the world. In North America, Clinton’s peaceful transition for Haiti was a significant

accomplishment. His completion of NAFTA and financial support of Mexico helped

stabilize the North American economic surge of the 1990s. In Asia, Clinton’s support for

China’s entrance in the WTO and granting most favored nation status enabled that

country to significantly improve its access to global markets. In Europe and the Middle

East Clinton encouraged or participated in peace agreements between Northern Ireland

and Britain, Bosnia, Croatia, Herzegovina, and Serbia; and the Russian nuclear reduction

agreement helped reduce stockpiles of unsecured fuel and reduce the number of nuclear

weapons (see Appendix A).

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Constructivism proved a valuable research tool because soft power was pivotal to

the vast majority of President Clinton’s international successes. Clinton’s use of

diplomacy secured peace agreements in various world regions, including the Caribbean

(Haiti), the Middle East (Israel and Palestine), and Europe (Northern Ireland and

England). Even Clinton’s rare use of national hard power (military) was coordinated

within the context of U.N. approval and conducted with the support of allies.

Summary

As the first post-Cold War President, Clinton defined American national values

consistent with his immediate predecessors and used those values to determine national

strategic interests. Clinton identified a multi-prong grand strategy of Primacy and

Selective Engagement to allow himself the freedom to restrain the U.S. from becoming

the world’s policeman, yet allow for international leadership on issues at the highest

levels of national interest. Clinton’s national security strategies, publications, and

speeches clearly delineated his view of American values as justification for the

expenditure of national resources for strategic ends.

The definition of national identity espoused by President Clinton went

unchallenged at a pivotal point in American history. This research showed that the

editorial boards of the New York Times, generally considered a liberal publication, and

the Chicago Tribune, considered a conservative publication, did not effectively challenge

Clinton’s justifications for international engagement based on national identity or

national values. Additionally, the Republican rebuttals to the annual SOTU addresses did

not offer any significant challenge to President Clinton’s description of national values,

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constructed national identity, defined national interests, or use of national power

resources. The lack of public discourse on national identity, especially when it’s used to

justify the use of national power, presents a very important opportunity for a renewed

debate on national identity and a thorough examination of the detailed, not generalized,

characterizations of national values.

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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

This study’s purpose was to examine the narration of national identity as a pillar

of grand strategy. Because a nation derives its purpose from its identity, determining the

root of that identity helps illuminate the common determinants for different national

security activities (Huntington, 2004). This research is important because President

Clinton, as the first American post-Cold War leader, inherited a national security

environment without great power threats, with nearly unlimited international political

capital, and with undisputed national power at his disposal (Hyland, 1999). Clinton’s

grand strategy, and the national identity he used to validate that strategy, explained

America’s character and purpose in cultural and strategic terms. In many of his NSSs,

Clinton explained that America’s tradition role of world leadership would continue,

promoting democratic values, human rights, and good governance, but that the United

States would not act as the world’s policeman, indiscriminately inserting itself into every

national and international crisis (Clinton, 1994b, 1996b, 1998b). Thus, President Clinton

continued many of the national characteristics and priorities of his immediate

predecessors while resisting the temptation to enter international affairs (Clinton, 1995c,

p. 7). This directly answered one of the research questions: How did President Clinton

define American national identity as a foundation for national security decisions?

The other research question asked, “How did President Clinton define America’s

post-Cold War national identity as a justification for selecting his grand strategy?”

Because constructivism explains national identity as a social construct, President

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Clinton’s narratives, including the SOTU and inaugural speeches, along with the annual

NSS, routinely cited traditional American values and Cold War leadership to continue

and reinforce the idea of American world leadership. President Clinton’s 1994, 1995,

and 1996 NSSs cited America’s hard power strength (military and economic) and

democratic values as the source of America being “indispensable” to peace and

prosperity in world affairs. Clinton’s SOTU narratives also routinely linked the

promotion of peace and security abroad with domestic peace, security, and prosperity.

Summary of the Study

I examined the description and use of American national identity to support grand

strategy. In 1994, President Clinton’s first NSS identified “engagement and

enlargement” as his foreign policy theme. Though Clinton continued his predecessors’

reliance on the support for human rights, democracy promotion, and good governance in

developing regions, he emphasized the hard power tools of economic engagement and

trade to attract nations to the democratic model. He used the WTO, NAFTA, and trade

agreements to enhance American influence in the region and around the world.

Clinton (1994b) also described American values of individual freedom, human

dignity, and equality as the impetus for national interests and NSS (p. ii). In many

speeches around the world, Clinton emphasized tolerance, fair treatment for minorities,

human dignity, and human rights as the cornerstone of successful democracies (Clinton,

1995b, 1998b, 1999a). Thus, Clinton’s narratives defined post-Cold War American

national identity as the “indispensable nation” that promoted democracy and free trade

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around the world but did not act as the world’s policeman, engaging indiscriminately in

every international dispute (p. 5).

Clinton (1994b, 1995c) NSSs also identified selective engagement as his chosen

grand strategy because it afforded the latitude to carefully differentiate national interests

from other situations of lesser importance to national security. This strategy allowed the

president to preserve finite national resources and prevent American over-commitment in

regional activities that were of lesser national concern. Further, Clinton relied on soft

power to promote important peace agreements in Europe (Bosnia, Northern Ireland) and

the Middle East (Israel), confirming the importance of U.S. influence in world affairs.

Along with the results on Clinton’s grand strategy related to national identity,

public debate on post-Cold War national identity was not evident in this research. For

instance, review of the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune editorials did not

uncover significant discussion of Clinton’s definition of America’s identity or role in

world affairs. Speaker Gingrich’s brief proposal about American foreign policy in Asia

also did not produce lasting public debate on the issue. Further, the republican rebuttals

to President Clinton’s SOTU addresses did not present alternative national identity

descriptions or significantly challenge him on national security.

Interpretation of the Findings

The research produced several conclusions. The assumption that President

Clinton did not adhere to any specific grand strategy but was strategically adrift (Biddle,

2012; Suri, 2009; Walton, 2012) was not supported by this research. Clinton’s NSSs

showed significant similarity across important dimensions, including references to

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American liberal culture and democratic values as the source and purpose of American

national security policy. President Clinton consistently cited his definition of American

national identity characteristics as justification for international engagement and national

security policy.

Results also showed that Clinton identified and used selective engagement as his

grand strategy, which disconfirmed several authors who either claimed that America did

not have a coherent post-Cold War grand strategy or that the strategy was something

other than selective engagement. For example, Biddle (2005), Brands (2014), and Suri

(2009) described what they perceived as Clinton’s their perceived lack of grand strategy

as strategic drift. Layne (2006) also incorrectly identified American grand strategy as

extra-regional hegemony.

Limitations of the Study

This study did not involve a longitudinal perspective of American national

identity. This absence shows President Clinton’s definition on national identity from a

singular perspective in time instead of as a point on a continuum of American foreign

policy across identifiable national or international periods. Observing and understanding

American national identity at important points in international epochs could explain the

trajectory of change and continuity since the nation’s founding. These observations

could then be compared to other significant international leaders, such as Greek-, Roman-

, French-, and British-dominated periods.

Additionally, understanding American national identity at the end of the Cold

War could allow political leaders, scholars, and national security practitioners to assess

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and compare how American identity evolves and how that evolution impacts the use of

national power in contemporary international situations. As each president proposes,

defines, and projects his or her version of national identity, national leaders, scholars, and

voters need to assess the degree to which that new definition comports with their

understanding of traditional or contemporary America.

Recommendations

Presidential description of national identity can be a critical national security tool

because it defines national purpose, national interests, and the sequence of acceptable

tools used to accomplish international goals. Because national identity is pivotal to

national security, it should be regularly analyzed and debated in the public sphere.

Leading news outlets should challenge, support, and offer viable alternatives to

presidential definitions when they are determined to be incongruent with America’s best

interests. Similarly, scholarly publications should examine presidential definitions of

identity to determine their historical continuity or divergence.

Implications for Positive Sociopolitical Impact

This research offers insight into the creation and narration of American national

identity at a critical junction in national and international history. Because that identity is

used as a grand strategy determinant and justification for national security activities, the

importance of identity should be deliberately debated in the public space to better ensure

long term strategic continuity with American historical identity.

Understanding the power national identity wields in influencing and justifying

national interests and strategic choices can be an invaluable tool for political and social

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leadership. As America’s world leadership evolves in the post-Cold War era, and other

nations create new power centers in various regions and in different national security

dimensions (i.e. political, cultural, economic) cultural affinity with international peers

may prove to be the ultimate soft power, and far more effective than hard power. When

presidents create national identities (such as the “leader of the free world”) that

international allies can associate with and aspire to, America increases its power through

attraction, collaboration, and influence, which leads to cooperation on major national

security initiatives (Krebs, 2015).

A rising China and a resurgent Russia have reignited and redefined great power

competition in the 21st century. The U.S. can ill-afford to support right-wing dictators

around the world, as it did during the Cold War, and both Russia and China currently

serve as “spoilers” by vetoing controversial United Nations resolutions they deem

unacceptable and militarily supporting authoritarian allies such as Kim Jong Il in North

Korea and Bashad al Assad in Syria. Therefore, the U.S. must use its traditional national

identity components (e.g., respect for human rights, multilateralism, support for

democracy) to attract partners to its banner, organize and energize them into effective

cohorts, emphasizing the significance of soft power to grow the alliance as President

Clinton (1994c) strategy of “engagement and enlargement” sought to do.

The Trans Pacific Partnership , President Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia in

response to an emergent China, would have given the U.S. cultural and economic

leadership in more than 40 percent of the global economy and the world’s largest free

trade zone (McBride & Chatzky, 2019). President Trump’s decision to withdraw from

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TPP eliminated that opportunity and a valuable international dimension to American

regional leverage. Building and maintaining alliances with nations that share similar

cultural tenets is important, but it is increasingly relevant to the security of America’s

future that the nation promote economic interdependence and liberal democratic values in

regions and among nations where illiberal democracy or authoritarianism is the trend

(Kupchan, 2007).

The potential impact of this research may be no less than influencing

consideration for the way the most powerful nation on earth organized its interactions

with other nations and used national power components in the immediate post-Cold War

era. This research may affect the way American leaders and the broader public view

national identity and its influence in determining national security objectives, tools, and

methods of using national power to shape the international environment. For example, as

President George W. Bush introduced “3-D National Security” (Defense, Diplomacy, and

Development) by elevating foreign aid and development to near-cabinet level status in his

2006 National Security Strategy, he enhanced America’s commitment to improve

struggling national governments’ capacities to function effectively and improve the their

citizens’ lives.

This research may also have the potential for international implications, assuming

an isomorphic approach to linguistic and discourse analysis. As national leaders around

the world seek to justify their national interests, they may rely on their own definitions of

cultural and national identity to guide and justify their strategic policies. Primary

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elements of the national identity will reassure their domestic stakeholders and buttresses

their national concept of “self” in the community of nations.

Conclusion

Understanding American national identity is critical to understanding “who we

are” as a nation, what identity-associated U.S. national security priorities are delineated

in American grand strategy, and what national power resources elected and appointed

national leaders should leverage to reach international goals. President Clinton

demonstrated the link between national identity and national interests by using his

explanation of national values as justification for strategic choices. However, Clinton

leveraged the grand strategy variable of Selective Engagement to enable America to

decline involvement in situations he deemed less vital to American interests (Clinton,

The NSS, 1995c). Selective Engagement enabled Clinton to prevent his administration

from becoming the “world’s policeman” and entangling itself in the numerous crises

around the globe as many long-smoldering societal and ethnic conflicts erupted in the

power vacuum of dissolving authoritarian regimes and unstable national power

structures.

American values, the justification for its grand strategy and international activity,

proved a cogent dimension of America’s soft power. In the 21st century, the rising

prevalence of soft power over hard power is due in large part to the diffusion of influence

within and among State and non-State actors on the international landscape. The

increasing perception among scholars and practitioners that, in a growing number of

situations, the value and influence of soft power supersedes that of hard power suggests

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America’s future influence rests less with her military capability than with her ability to

attract and coordinate with friends and followers (Nye, 2004). This fits well within

America’s longstanding strategies of cooperative security and multilateralism. Rising

powers, such as China, use their massive economic connections regionally and globally

to increase their hard power alliances, yet China has struggled to attract and influence

even regional allies largely because of its preference for hard power’s dominating posture

and abrasive tactics (Meade & Keeley, 2017).

Because this research observed an element of America’s soft power (identity), and

an important national power dynamic (grand strategy) using constructivist principles,

there is cause for concern that President Trump’s international machinations may be

costing America supremacy in an increasingly important national power metric (Meade

& Keeley, 2017). America’s long-standing alliances with five of the top seven most

powerful nations supports her sustained position as the world’s most important nation

(Meade & Keeley, 2017). While several global power rating organizations scored the

U.S. as “most” powerful, the prevailing matrix was heavily favored toward hard power

metrics of military capability and economic capacity. However, the Pew Research Center

(2018) found indications that America’s soft power is declining, due in large part to

President Trump’s international image of being untrustworthy to lead on global issues (p.

3).

If the U.S. wants to sustain or increase its international influence, it would need to

ensure the presidents it elects offer and adhere to the values and traditions compatible

with wielding the prolific tool of soft power. This research showed how President

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Clinton’s (1994c) preference for diplomatic leverage enabled him to build an important

alliance with a declining Russia, an emerging China, and craft pivotal peace initiatives in

some of the world’s fiercest conflicts. President Clinton’s constructed national identity

of primacy, coupled with strong diplomatic economic and peace initiatives provided the

international community with decisive and inclusive leadership. As a source of

international influence, America’s soft power is a potent resource for leaders who use

America’s liberal values to construct a welcoming national identity of inclusion and

fairness. With the 2020 elections on the horizon, American would do well to listen

carefully to the national identity vision each candidate offers, and, for those who value

America’s global leadership, consider well how each candidate’s proposed identity may

cost or contribute to American global leadership.

American National Identity and Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.

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