political science research paper

SHOULD RAWLS BE A SOCIALIST? A COMPARISON OF HIS IDEAL CAPITALISM WITH WORKER-CONTROLLED SOCIALISM Author(s): David E. Schweickart Source: Social Theory and Practice , Fall 1978, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1978), pp. 1-27 Published by: Florida State University Department of Philosophy Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23557707 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Theory and Practice This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms SHOULD RAWLS BE A SOCIALIST? A COMPARISON OF HIS IDEAL CAPITALISM WITH WORKER-CONTROLLED SOCIALISM In section forty-three of A Theory of Justice John Rawls sketches institutional arrangement which would qualify, he says, as capitalism.1 He also comments on the possibility of a liber socialist regime satisfying his two principles of justice, a concludes that "the theory of justice does not by itself favor ei form of regime. As we have seen, the decision as to which syste best for a given people depends upon their circumstances, inst tions, and historical traditions."2 Rawls does not provide the details of his "liberal socia regime." Had he done so, his conclusion might not have bee neutral. For it is possible to construct a socialist model whic decidedly superior to Rawls' ideal capitalism, superior in terms the ethical commitments exhibited in A Theory of Justice. Such any rate is the contention of this paper. Our proof-strategy is to construct a model of democrat worker-controlled, modified-market socialism, to argue its nomic viability, and then to compare it with Rawls' capitalism will consider a series of objections to capitalism which can phrased in terms of Rawlsian value commitments, and argue th our socialist model is less vulnerable to them than the Ideal Capitalism model. We conclude by observing that two arguments commonly made against socialism are not cogent with respect to the version we advocate. The model we defend is important in its own right, apart from serving as a counterexample to a Rawlsian claim. "Worker participation" has attracted considerable attention in recent years in both Western and Eastern Europe, and to a lesser extent in the United States. Case studies are now available, and there has Copyright © Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 1978) 1 This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Social Theory and Practice developed a small but growing body of theoretical analysis. Though the conclusions of various researchers are by no means uniform, much is known now, empirically and theoretically, about the economics of worker-control.3 Political philosophers would do well to take note, for the implications are significant. The model we will present is of an ideal worker-controlled society to be compared with Rawls' Ideal Capitalism. It is not an idealization of any existing society. It most closely resembles Yugoslavian socialism — the most dramatic attempt to date at institutionalizing worker-control

— but it diverges from the Yugo slavian model in several crucial respects which will be noted as we proceed. Our model should not be regarded as a timeless "best of all possible worlds." The viability and desirability of a particular socio-economic arrangement is conditioned by both the concrete productive capacities of society and the prevailing psychological dispositions. Neither of these factors is immutable. The model proposed here is compatible with the technological capabilities of advanced industrial societies, and does not depend for its viability on a general consciousness too far removed from that which exists today in such societies. On the other hand, it seems likely to me that the system proposed here, if adopted, would lead to a gradual change in capabilities, needs, and desires. And that in turn would render non-optimal a basic feature of our model, namely, the market mechanism, that feature so objectionable to the classical socialist tradition. Why the market is important now, and how it might "wither away" will not be discussed here, however. Our intent for now is to demonstrate the superiority of a viable socialist model to Rawls' Ideal Capitalism. The Model The model we wish to defend is a democratic, worker-controlled, market socialism.4 We will concentrate on the economic organiza tion rather than on the political, and will attempt to demonstrate its economic coherence and social desirability. We assume that the political structure will be democratic, with representative bodies at the community, regional and national levels. How these bodies will be selected, what their respective authorities will be, and how they will interact will not be specified. We assume, following Rawls, "that the basic structure is regulated by a just constitution that secures the liberties of equal citizenship. . . . Liberty of conscience This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism and freedom of thought are taken for granted, and the fair value of political liberty is maintained. The political process is conducted, as far as circumstances permit, as a just procedure for choosing between governments and for enacting just legislation."5 The essential features of our model are these. Each productive enterprise is controlled democratically by its workers, who are responsible for the day-to-day operation of the facility. Thus they are responsible for the organization of the workplace, factory discipline, techniques of production, what and how much to produce, and the distribution of the net revenue. The state has three basic functions: to oversee (as will be specified below) the productive assets utilized by the enterprises, to control the bulk of new investments, and to provide the "free services" usually associated with governments (police and fire protection, health and welfare services, etc.).6 The economy as a whole functions as a market economy. Firms buy raw materials from other firms and sell their products to other productive enterprises or to consumers.7 A firm's net revenue is the difference between total sales and total costs (including taxes and depreciation but not wages). How this revenue is distributed among the workers of the firm is a matter for them to decide. They may opt for equality; they may decide to remunerate the less interesting or more onerous tasks more highly; they may decide to reward those possessing highly useful but scarce skills with special premiums to keep them from looking for work elsewhere. Such decisions are made democratically, one person, one vote.8 Since a worker's income is determined by the firm's "profit,"9 all have a material interest in organizing the workplace as efficiently as possible (commensurate with job-satisfaction), and in producing a product which will satisfy the wants and needs of consumers "Deadweight" inefficiency of the type disruptive of Pareto optimality should thus be avoided, at least with respect to product design and workplace organization.10 Though the workers control the workplace to a decisive degree, they do not own the means of production. These are owned collectively by society. This ownership expresses itself in the governmental authority to insist that the value of the capital stock be kept intact. Hence

depreciation reserves must be maintained, and workers are not permitted to allow the social assets in their trust to deteriorate (in value) or to sell off the productive assets for personal gain. If a productive enterprise gets into economic difficulty, its This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

4 Social Theory and Practice workers are free to reorganize, to produce things o had been producing, or, as individuals, to leave elsewhere. They are not free, however, to sell off p without replacing them with others of equal value. Social ownership is also reflected in the governme tax capital assets. Taxes are designed to encourage e scarce capital goods, insuring that market prices ref costs. This will equalize (to a degree) the per labo industries of varying capital intensities, and w planners in selecting new investments. With such a worker-controlled socialism should be reasonab organizing the workplace and in allocating the non-h production. The major difficulty with the system lies in th labor. This is not suiprising since it is with regard t model deviates most radically from capitalism. T character of labor-power is often attacked as o objectionable features of capitalism, but it is pre modity character that accounts for the degree of " labor-allocation attained under capitalism. When pr ing an increase in demand, the capitalist expands particular, he reacts by hiring additional laborer labor from where it was less efficiently employed more so.11 The same incentive-structure is not operational in our model. A rise in demand would be happily received by a worker-controlled firm, but it has little direct material incentive to expand production. It has some, since the addition of workers would increase the number who must bear the burden of the tax on the fixed assets; but there is the countervailing consideration that total profits must be shared among more people. Our model thus exhibits a structural difficulty which must be surmounted if it is to be economically viable, namely, the inelasticity of supply with respect to a rise in demand. Certain arrangements are necessary to deal with this problem. We assume, as does Rawls, that an ideal society has a commitment to full employment; we follow Rawls in allowing the government to oversee this commitment.12 One important governmental task in this regard is to make it clear to all that the refusal to employ people when demand is up not only conflicts with a societal commitment to full employment, but also leads to inefficiency in labor allocation. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism A price rise effected to curb a surge in demand ought to be interpreted by a socially responsible firm as a temporary compensa tion for the inconvenience of integrating new workers into the organization. There are several reasons for thinking that worker-controlled firms might internalize this imperative. First of all, the cost to an established worker caused by the addition of new members would not be great. He would not find himself worse off than before the price increase, though he would not be as well off as he would be if production were not increased. Secondly, considerable moral pressure would likely be brought to bear on successful firms to expand production, particularly if their good fortune was fortuitous. Since the community is charged with overseeing the operation of its firms, profit figures and salary structures are a matter of public record. The community at large, not to mention officials responsi ble for maintaining full employment, would certainly try to per suade the more successful ventures to employ more people. The political authorities are not empowered to force a collective to expand, but their moral authority might not be insignificant.

A stick lies behind the carrot of moral suasion. The government controls the bulk of new investments.13 Insofar as the profit/worker ratio in a given industry is substantially higher than average, there exists an incentive for investment in that area. This is not a punitive measure. It may well be the case that a firm has expanded to the reasonable limit of its physical or legal capacity.14 If profits remain high, there exists a prima facie case for the establishment of more firms in that area. Potential profitability will certainly be one (though not the only) criterion for new investment. It should be noted that the tendency of a worker-controlled firm to respond non-optimally to a demand increase is counter-balanced to a degree by its response to a decrease in demand. While the capitalist is quick to hire more laborers in response to the former (at least in theory), he is also quick to lay them off when demand declines. The human costs to the workers involved in this case are not insignificant. A worker-controlled firm, in contrast, is slow to lay off workers unless they can find work elsewhere. The democratic process within the factory can be presumed to generate a sense of solidarity; in addition, decision-makers are not faced with long-term wage contracts. Thus, if production has to be cut back due to a decline in demand, the burden in likely to translate into wage and work This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

6 Social Theory and Practice reduction for all.15 If the decline proves to be more th some members of the firm will presumably shift to m enterprises, thus allowing the work and wages of thos rise again. Objections to capitalism, especially from the Marxist tradition, fall mainly into two categories: those against the commodity character of labor-power, and those against the "anarchy" of production. Worker-control of individual firms removes labor power from the commodity category. State control of new invest ments is the feature of our system which addresses the second problem-source. Let us elaborate the investment mechanism, for it is a crucial feature of our model. The society we advocate is a democratic society. It is not desirable, however, for a worker- controlled society, no matter how democratic, to provide for a popular vote on every new investment project. The sheer number of projects might make such a procedure unworkable; but more importantly, such a procedure would negate a major benefit of socialized investment —the conscious adoption of coordinated, coherent investment plan.16 Instead, the procedure we propose would be as follows. A certain quantity of funds, collected via taxation, are available to a region to finance new investments. A general plan is drawn up by a planning board (whose members are either elected directly or appointed by elected officials) which indicates the general lines of development: X% of the budget should go to developing new energy sources, Y % to new housing, Z% to expanding the production of personal consumer goods, and so forth. People then come forward—individuals, collectives or represen tatives of existing firms—who want a share of the funds. They present specific proposals, each of which includes documentation of the economic feasibility of the project (e.g., market surveys, cost analyses, profit projections) and an explanation of its role in the comprehensive plan. These proposals are publicized, and public hearings are held to debate their merits. If certain projects are particularly controversial or involve the commitment of large quantities of resources, then a majority opinion will be ascertained, either by survey or by referendum. The planning committee than makes a final selection, and presents a coordinated plan to the legislative body, which either adopts it or sends it back for revision.

Our society thus provides for (and indeed requires) a number of "socialist entrepreneurs," individuals or collectives willing to This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism innovate, to take risks, in hope of producing new goods or services, or old ones in new ways. Their socio-economic status, and their resulting psychological dispositions are significantly different, however, from their capitalist counterparts. First of all, the risks they take are quite different, for they risk, not their personal savings, but a portion of the social surplus. If a project fails, they do not pay back the government for their loss. Nevertheless, they do have a definite personal stake in the success of the venture. The self-esteem and prestige of the entrepreneurs will certainly suffer if the project fails, as will their income and that of the others they have persuaded to join with them.17 On the positive side the socialist entrepreneurs are variously motivated: the appeal of seeing one's "great idea" materialize, of providing a desirable commodity or service that is at present non existent or in short supply, of providing better employment—better paying or more enjoyable—for oneself and one's comrades. This motivational structure is quite different from that of the capitalist investors, who risk their own fortunes in hopes of great financial gain. The consequence of this difference will be among the matters investigated as we turn now to a normative comparison of the two systems. Capitalism vs. Socialism: The Anti-Capitalist Arguments Let us recall Rawls' sketch of a just capitalism. It is a free enterprise economy supervised by four branches of government. The Allocative Branch is charged with keeping the economy competitive and with using taxes and subsidies to compensate for cases where prices set by competition do not accurately measure social benefits and costs. That is, it attempts to correct deviations from Pareto-optimality caused by monopolies and by "externali ties." The Stabilization Branch works to maintain sufficient effective demand to insure reasonably full employment ("those who want work can find it"). These two branches are intended to insure an efficient market economy. The other two branches are more directly concerned with justice. The Transfer Branch sees to it that no individual or household has an income below a "social minimum." It guarantees a certain level of well-being and honors specific claims of need. The Distributive Branch imposes inheritance and gift taxes to encourage a wide dispersal of property and to prevent concentrations of wealth, the This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Social Theory and Practice power of which might be detrimental to the fair value of political liberty. It is also given general taxing powers to "raise the revenues that justice requires." Rawls favors a proportional expenditure tax to accomplish this end. These are the basic institutions of Rawls' Ideal Capitalism.18 To what extent do they mitigate the major objections to capitalism? Are there reasons for thinking that our model would be more effective than Rawls' in this respect? The arguments against capitalism as an economic system can be grouped (exhaustively, I think) under the following headings: (1) Capitalism promotes an unjust distribution of wealth. (2) It is incapable of resolving the problem of unemployment. (3) Through the sales effort, it generates a system of irrational wants and needs.19 (4) Capitalism dehumanizes workers at the workplace by arrang ing production, without workers' consent, so as to inhibit the exercise of imagination, creativity and control. (5) Capitalist growth channels workers and resources into areas which have little relation to social needs or preferences. (The kind of growth is non-optimal.)

(6) Capitalism is oriented toward growth for the sake of growth, even when growth has undesirable social consequences. (The rate of growth is non-optimal.) (7) It is an economic system which is inherently unstable, prone to recession and/or inflation in ways that socialism is not. We will not present these arguments in detail here. Most are relatively well-known and have been discussed elsewhere. We will simply sketch the arguments and consider how they would apply to Rawls' model and to our own. (1) According to Rawls, justice implies a prima facie commit ment to equality. Material inequalities are permissible only if they work to the advantage of the least-favored members of society.20 Inequalities are acceptable insofar as they provide incentives for achievement, the benefits of which accrue in part to the least advantaged class. Worker-controlled socialism is not a system of absolute equality, since incomes may vary from firm to firm as well as within a given firm. However, it differs from capitalism in one crucial respect; property income, the major source of inequality under capitalism, is absent. It is not possible for an individual to make money with his money. He cannot generate personal income by purchasing the This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 9 labor-power of others. He cannot even interest accruing to his savings, since savings, the latter not serving as a sourc model.21 If our model is indeed economica satisfying the material needs of th society (this is a crucial hypothesis sanction inequalities due to property would appear to be unjustifiable on R the Distributive Branch of the gover supposed to correct the inequalities w ples of justice, but the mechanisms at adequate. Inheritance and gift taxes ar problem . They allow inequalities to d do they attem pt to correct them . E effect, since wealth and the accom through the reinvesting of income, personal consum er goods. Incom e taxe but they fail to discriminate among so be to the advantage of the least adv incentives for the development and u talents, but an analogous justification derived from ownership of stocks, made, since investment funds (th rationale of property income) can be gen It seems inconsistent for a theory of commitmenttoequalityasisRawls'tor the choice of saving- investment mec large component of inequality that is It is perhaps worth noting, parenthe accumulate a large fortune in our mo billion dollar fortune during a fifty would have to save ten million a year. saving $20,000 a year for fifty years. much is not clear, since in our model th other than spend it on personal co property one cannot legally purcha productive wealth, nor can one avoid l to work." To the objection that widespread inequalities continue to exist in countries that have abolished private property—the Soviet Union This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

10 Social Theory and Practice being the most conspicuous example24—we respond talking about a democratic regime. The equalizing democracy is reflected even in a society such as our own fortunes do not contradict the prevailing ideology, and are commonly accepted as essential to good manageme this society the salaries of top public officials are far from to allow large-scale accumulation. Politicians do not be saving their salaries, but by dabbling, legally or othe free enterprise system.

(2) Unemployment remains a perennial problem for As Keynes has demonstrated, laissez-faire capit mechanism for insuring full employment. An equilibri at any degree of unemployment. Rawls appears to accept the Keynesian argument t intervention provides the solution. Accordingly, his S Branch is charged with maintaining demand that is eno "reasonably full employment." But in light of the un inflation dilemma that the Keynesian principles seem the capability of the Stabilization Branch to fulfill it thrown into question. The problem is rooted in the f employment is not unequivocally in the interest of t class.25 Too little employment is not good, for it is ac decreased demand and political unrest. But neither employment. Full employment undercuts factoiy disci the capitalist's ability to expand production whenever encourages workers to press for higher wages. Such a s good for business, as business analysts frequently poin Unemployment remains too low for the workfo flexibility. Anytime the jobless total is less than 2 m common labor is scarce. Many employers tend to ho And certainly, the labor unions are in the driver's s negotiations. More workers can be had, to be su considerable cost. And they probably wouldn't be the desired. There's no assurance against inflation li genuine unemployment. That's a blunt, hard-headed but a fact.26 Under worker-controlled socialism there exists no class with a specific interest in maintaining unemployment. Unemployment cannot generate downward pressure on wages, for there are no wage This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Ra wis and Socialism 11 laborers. The material needs of unemp provided for out of the taxes paid by employ no interest whatsoever in maintaining Army." Indeed, it might at times be diff everyone, but not in the systematic, stru under capitalism.Given Rawls'commitme his "greater- likelihood" principle of ration the absence of countervailing considerati socialism to his Ideal Capitalism. (3) A worker-controlled firm, like its cap decided interest in maintaining demand fo motive for engaging in non-rational sales ence of this motive must be regarded n since Rawls defines the good life as on plan. "It is one of the plans that is consis of rational choice when these are applied t his situation, and . . . that plan among tho which would be chosen by him with f ity. . . . "29 To be sure, a person can live a choosing a plan with full deliberate ratio plan is the one he would have chosen had "goodness as rationality" would require attributed to institutions which make it diffi rationally concerning his needs and des rationality" is inconsistent with non-r particularly when the rational interest necessary connection to the rational inter Since both rely on the market mechanis and worker-controlled socialism are vulnerable to the abuse of non rational persuasion. However, the latter might be less so. To start with, limitations on the size of firms restrict the funds available for large-scale advertising campaigns. Secondly, if our model func tions according to design, a firm faced with a rise in demand hires more workers until incomes approximate their previous level. Hence a firm has little economic incentive to stimulate demand, for the individuals who run the firms cannot increase their long-range incomes by merely expanding the scale of their operation. They

have a definite interest in maintaining demand, but not so much in increasing it.30 Unlike capitalism, expansion of production in worker-controlled socialism under conditions of constant return to scale does not raise the income of anyone associated with the original firm. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

12 Social Theory and Practice (4) The tendency of capitalism to organize the work- work is devoid of dignity, skill, and intelligence was e Marx and re-emphasized by Braverman.31 When o decisions intending to minimize labor costs take into recalcitrance of a labor force which perceives its different from management, the result is a radical subd labor process and the replacement of skilled workers b A worker-controlled organization or reorganizati differently. Here the profit to be maximized is the t minus non-labor costs. Average workers have an preventing any class of specialists from becoming so that they can demand substantially higher than av shares. But they have, as well, a clear interest in raisin level of skill as much as possible, both to make th satisfying and to take away the force of the deman workers for preferential treatment. On the other hand interest whatsoever in turning workers into automato Rawls is well aware of the importance of skill devel component of human well-being. He holds his "A Principle" to be the basic principle of human motiv things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of capacities (their innate and or trained abilities), and th increases the more this capacity is realized, or th complexity."33 In view of the importance Rawls at principle it is curious that it does not enter into t Position" deliberation, and thus does not manifest itself in his principles of justice. Nor for that matter does it figure in the construction of the institutions of Ideal Capitalism. As the model stands there is no reason to think that work satisfaction would be any greater there than in contemporary America: There are, of course, the happy few who find savor in their daily job . . . [but] for the many there is hardly concealed discontent. The blue-collar blues is no more bitterly sung than the white collar moan. "I'm a machine," says the spot-welder. "I'm caged," says the bank teller, and echoes the hotel clerk. "I'm a mule," says the steelworker. "A monkey can do what I do," says the receptionist. "I'm less than a farm implement," says the migrant worker. "I'm an object," says the high-fashion model. Blue collar and white call upon the identical phrase: "I'm a robot."34 This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 13 The spirit of this critique might seem "Granted, Rawls has not addressed the but it does not follow that it is impos deal meaningfully with this problem. S cannot." A detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but a remark is in order. The empirical evidence that worker participation in decision making enhances work satisfaction is quite strong. Blumberg, surveying the literature, concludes: There is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or that other generally acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in workers' decision-making power. Such consistency of findings, I submit, is rare in social research.35 Our model of worker-control gives workers maximal decision making powers. Though a degree of worker-participation is not incompatible with capitalism, it seems unlikely that any capitalist system would allow as much participation as our model. The owners of means of production

have good reason to maintain their authority since their interests do not always coincide with those of their workers, for example, when there is a genuine conflict between speed and efficiency on the one hand and worker satisfaction on the other, or when workers begin to ask for a greater share of the company profits. Therefore it would seem that our model would be more likely to accord with Rawls' Aristotelian Principle than would any form of capitalism. Even if some efficiency were sacrificed for work-satisfaction, Rawls should prefer our model since he explicitly avows: It is a mistake to believe that a just society must wait upon a high material standard of life. What men want is meaningful work in free association with others, these associations regulating their relations to one another within a framework of just basic institutions. To achieve this state of things great wealth is not necessary.38 (5) The relationship between capitalism and growth is complex, and gives rise to many objections. If wealth is badly distributed, investment projects will be biased in favor of the wants and needs This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

14 Social Theory and Practice of those who have the wealth. If investments are not balanced growth, the most efficient utilization of unlikely. Growth is also plagued by "externality" situations in which the social costs of production and are not reflected in the market prices of goods. Let us consider only one argument relating to the kin generated by capitalism, one which focuses on a consumption externalities not amenable to ex post fact Rawls' Allocation Branch. The problem, I believe, is for capitalism and for certain forms of socialism, spec forms which allow investment initiative to remain in the hands of the firm (as in the case in Yugoslavia, for example) and/or to be governed solely by considerations of prospective profitability. One of the assumptions essential to the argument that the market mechanism yields an optimal allocation of resources is that an individual's consumption is a private matter, affecting only that individual. This, of course, is manifestly untrue in a large number of cases. The decision of my neighbor to buy beer in disposable bottles has consequences which affect me: a rise in litter, a decline in natural resources available to me and to those I care about, an eventual increase in the cost of municipal waste disposal. The private decisions of separate individuals to buy automobiles instead of horse carriages changed the physical and social structure of this country for those who purchased the automobiles and for those who did not. At issue here is something other than unforeseen consequences, a difficulty from which no social system can hope to be immune. Two points, really, are at issue. First, under capitalism the actual decision to allocate new investments in certain areas are made by people other than those directly affected. This is the case even under Rawls' Ideal Capitalism. Often we are not even aware of the decisions until after they have been committed to steel and concrete. Second, reliance on the market mechanism to confirm the viability of an investment decision is problematic even apart from the questions of advertising and wealth distribution. As Sen's "Isolation Paradox" demonstrates, the logic of a collective decision is quite unlike that of an individual one.37 Consider the following elaboration of the above example. When confronted as an individual consumer with the option of buying an eight-pack of beer in disposable bottles, I might well decide that the convenience is worth the bad consequences—the effect on the This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 15 environment of eight more bottles. Con decision in a political context, however, I any inconsistency, that the convenience of worth the consequences, for the option now such bottles. It follows that a society of quite rational people, all of whom prefer a litter free environment to the convenience of disposable bottles, could find themselves inundated with bottles anyway if they allow the market solution, the unplanned outcome of free individual choices, to work itself out. It is clear that the question, "Should X be produced?" might be answered differently depending on whether it is put before the collective for a vote or left to individuals to decide privately. The political solution allows for complete prohibition, while the market solution rarely does. Sen's Paradox adds the wrinkle that it might be the case that the market supplies X even when nobody, not even a tiny minority, preferred the production of X to a world without it. Clearly, then, the market solution to an investment problem is not always preferable to a political solution. It does not follow that it never is. In circumstances where personal consumption has little effect on non-consumers, the case for the market is much stronger. If I wish to grow com instead of wheat to satisfy a local demand, there would seem to be little reason for society to intervene. Putting the matter up for a vote should seem needlessly time-consuming. In addition, this procedure would risk the undesirable prohibition of com, simply because the majority prefer wheat. It is too often maintained that to choose socialism over capitalism is to choose majority rule over the market as the mechanism for resolving investment decisions. "Tyranny of the majority" is a common theme, especially among conservatives. However, in our model the problem is not posed in such terms. If there is a significant demand for a particular product, even if only by a small minority, then an investment proposal to meet that demand will appear economically attractive, and thus a good candidate for funding. Unless the proposal requires a very large commitment of resources, no regional vote is taken, although people who do object are provided with a forum—a public hearing—to make their case. But unless they can do so convincingly, the project will be funded. On the other hand, the political community does have a decisive vote in determining the direction of major economic change, since this comes about by and large through investments of considerable This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

16 Social Theory and Practice magnitude. In addition, the community exercises th the actual commitment of laborers and resources. Our model preserves the advantages of the market in certain respects. Small scale experimentation and the production of goods and services which affect only their consumers are likely to be funded primarily on the basis of projected profitability, the same criterion which determines capitalist investment. But large-scale expenditures—the expansion of a successful experiment or the channelling of social development in a specific direction—are likely to be scrutinized carefully for their social consequences. In this way, externalities can be identified and taken into account at the planning stage. In contrast to our model, Rawls' Ideal Capitalism is an unplanned economy that is vulnerable to the unplanned yet momentous consequences of private investment decisions. (6) Investment and growth in any society require a certain "sacrifice" of leisure or goods in hopes of having more at a later date. People and resources must be channelled into areas not immediately productive. Under capitalism this investment rate, a key determinant of the growth rate, is the unplanned outcome of the individual decisions of those who have something to invest. It is not the decison of the populace at large; in short, it is not a democratic decision.

Under worker-controlled socialism, on the other hand, investment funds come from taxes, and hence must be determined politically. Whether to invest more or less than last year will be a conscious political choice of the electorate. Reading Rawls on the level of savings, a topic to which he devotes considerable attention, one is struck by the fact that he writes as if the level of savings (and hence the quality of investment funds) was the result of a democratic procedure. Consideration of this issue, in fact, leads him to the problem of democracy itself and the issue of civil disobedience. "Supporting . . . that the informed collective judgment of the present generation [concerning the desired rate of savings] is known under requisite conditions, it may be thought that a democratic view of the state does not countenance the government's interfering for the sake of future generations even when the public judgment is manifestly mistaken."38 Rawls argues that this thinking is indeed correct. "[The government] is not authorized to nullify the views of the electorate as to how much savings is to be undertaken," though he insists that there is no reason why a democrat may not oppose the public will by suitable forms of civil disobedience.39 This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 17 What Rawls seems to have overlook ism has no mechanism whatsoever for express their opinion as to the desired institution relevant at all is the Trans authority to set the "social minimum" this too high, Rawls observes, might h ate saving cannot be made."40 But this least, extremely indirect. Lowering th greater inequalities to develop, and thu groups with increased opportunity determine how much of this increase w to imply, that the decision of the T appropriate social minimum is someh sion of the electorate as to the appropr misleading. Since Rawls considers the le question of social justice, and since h democratic decision procedure, though employed, he ought not maintain ne capitalism or socialism—not at any rat the latter, but not Ideal Capitalism, em (7) Let us consider two sources of Keynes has shown, "investor confide maintaining or upsetting stability. If tion, discouragement over falling pr investment outlets or some other econ (in sufficient numbers) exercise their " of reinvesting their profits, the spe decrease in the rate of investment mean and raw materials industries, which consumer demand, thus generating th The Keynesian analysis also suggests t action may stimulate lagging investor c its detrimental effects. This action i Stabilization Branch of Rawls' Ideal Cap not clear that the Stabilization Branch task. W hile few econom ists dispute th investor confidence is damaging to unanimity regarding the effectiveness This is especially so now in light of th the inflation-unemployment combinati To the extent that the Keynesian r This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

18 Social Theory and Practice worker-control model might prove more stable sin confidence" takes a very different form here. Un controlled socialism there is no special class of people w option of "liquidity preference." The quantity of invest is determined democratically and collected via taxation. the case that there are too few applicants for these fun the government can either return the excess to the tax stimulating consumption), or use some of it to aid tho most dependent on new investment (construction, and This aid would only be temporary (for if investment fu used one year, it is likely that less will be appropriated year), but it would give the industries more time to con

A second problem with capitalist stability is its ex dynamic. In a capitalist climate, defensive and offensiv tions make growth imperative. The profit of a firm (at percentage of it) must be reinvested, for size means the aggressively against competitors and to resist their moves. On the other hand, reinvestment is scarcel necessity to the individual capitalist. Investment inc real wealth, and with it one's power and prestige. Consu its rewards, of course, but so does investment, all the m it does not foreclose consumption but merely postpone goes well). A very different incentive structure presents itself to of a worker-controlled society when they vote on investment tax. A vote to increase this rate is a vote t present consumption (since taxes will go up) in orde funds for projects which will enhance the quality of life as an individual (since some of the funds will go towar the quality and quantity of consumer goods) and as a me community (since some will go to the development of public goods). One's power and prestige vis-à-vis other the community will not be enhanced, although that of the as a whole will be. The competitive relation between fir enter systematically as a motivation in this case b collective decision to increase investment funds does n that the new funds will go to one's own firm. Some some might also go to one's competitors. However, i one's livelihood grievously threatened, since the wor provision and size limitations on firms block the t destruction of one firm by another.42 A vote to decrease investments is essentially a vote t This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 19 leisure, though at the cost of decreas which might provide goods or leisure is felt immediately in those sectors o the construction and research indu generated by new investm ents. These tion, and thus decrease the length of year, or whatever is democratically de in income is too severe to be compensa some workers will seek employment immediatelyaffected.Theworkersin have been recently increased by the t underpressure) to take on new worker per person will decline in these indus The dislocation and movement of workers described above is similar to what occurs when capitalists, for whatever reasons, decrease investment. The socialist response compares favorably on two counts. First, the decline is a democratic decision, well publicized, and therefore capable of being planned for by the firms to be affected. For example, they may choose not to replace retiring workers. Second, the usual response of a worker-controlled firm to a demand reduction would be to decrease the working hours for everyone, rather than, as the most frequent case in capitalism, to layoff part of the force. If our analysis of motivational forces is correct, then capitalism has a strong tendency to maintain a high rate of investment regardless of the needs or preferences of the populace, since the tendency is the result of competitive pressures and the desire to make money with one's money. Our socialist system is consider ably more flexible, especially since the option of increased leisure is more immediately available. Now, so long as a high rate of growth is genuinely desirable, capitalism's growth imperative is not a serious problem. But when the high growth rate becomes problematic—as is being asserted with increasing frequency today43—our evaluation must change. If steady growth is a threat to ecological stability and is rapidly depleting irreplaceable raw materials, then an economic system that is internally structured to promote growth becomes increasingly "non-ideal."

Capitalism vs. Socialism: The Anti-Socialist Arguments We have examined at length the arguments against capitalism and noted to what extent our model was also vulnerable. Let us now This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

20 Social Theory and Practice look at two standard anti-socialist arguments. We do sake of completeness, since Rawls does not invoke th First let us consider the claim that capitalism gives to free initiative. If we compare capitalism to our so we see that both allow "entrepreneurs" to appeal to in funds for new projects. Capitalism allows, in additio ment of one's own savings, but the significance of th not so clear. No conclusion can be drawn from this about the relative quantity of capital available, since the people in our socialist country can decide on any level of investment by taxing themselves accordingly. Nor does personal investment, unmediated by bureaucratic institutions, comprise a significant share of the total investment outlay under capitalism. Small entrepreneurs usually borrow from financial institutions; the internal financing of large coiporations is done via departmental interaction. It is not clear to what extent the bureaucracy involved in such transactions is less than that of a socialist planning board. The difference might be significant; still it would have to be sufficient to counterbalance one distinct advantage of the socialist arrangement: anyone with a good idea can come forward and request funds. One need not have personal savings or even collateral. This should encourage more initiative than its capitalist counterpart, which entails high risk for small- business undertakings. There is also far more room for individual initiative within a worker-controlled firm than within a capitalist one. With a direct and significant stake in the successful operation of the firm, and with a democratic forum to present their ideas, individual workers have both the incentive and the opportunity to initiate change. The capitalist defense to these observations must be modified to claim not maximality but optimality. It must be maintained that individual initiative under socialism would be too greatly stimu lated—too many people asking for funds will generate a bureaucratic quagmire, or too much democracy in the workplace will create inefficiency and chaos. This argument cannot be settled abstractly, nor is the empirical evidence conclusive. The Yugoslavian experi ence indicates that conflicts between democracy and efficiency sometimes arise,44 but it also seems to indicate that these difficul ties are not irresolvable. As to bureaucratic inefficiency due to the planning board, not much evidence is available because our proposal has not been implemented anywhere (to my knowledge) for an appreciable length of time.45 There might be difficulties here, This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Ra wis and Socialism 21 perhaps the most serious in our model that they would outweigh the advantag ically supervised investment. Second let us now consider the cla capitalism, articulated most forcefully Road to Serfdom: It is now often said that democracy w If "capitalism" means here a competit disposal over private property, it is fa that only within this system is dem becomes dominated by a collectivis inevitably destroy itself.46 According to Hayek, his argument depe (i) The various kinds of collectivism, differ among themselves in the natur they want to direct the efforts of societ liberalism and individualism in wantin society and all its resources for this unit recognize autonomous spheres in whi uals are supreme.47 (ii) To direct all activities according t

that every one of our needs is given it which must be complete enough to among all the different courses which It presupposes, in short, the existence in which all the different human values are allotted their due place.48 Neither of these premises happens to be true. Our model of worker controlled socialism does not entail "organizing the whole of society and all its resources for a unitary end." In our model, the government has control over new investments, but not over the economy as a whole. We have argued that the disposal of the eco nomic surplus ought to be decided democratically, since the man ner of its disposal can substantially affect the lives of everyone. But the great bulk of economic decisions remains in the hands of individual consumers (what and how much to buy) and in those of the individual firms (what, how much, and under what conditions This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

22 Social Theory and Practice to produce). New investments will be subject to co coordinated planning, but this does not presuppose "t of a complete ethical code in which all the different are allotted their due place." Major investment dec which have considerable impact on the community large amount of resources—would be subject to debat be decided democratically. Less important decisio made primarily on the basis of profitability. So distribution of wealth is equitable and the long-term of collective decisions are taken into account, profitab a reasonable index of social desirability. Projects must by the planning board, but their discretionary pow restricted effectively either by custom or by law. Curiously, our model suggests an evolution in quite direction from Hayek's "serfdom," toward somethi rather like the "withering away" of the state. Since th model, controls new investments, its power is det significant degree by the quantity of resources devote consumption." Now this might be quite high, par developing countries, but as a country completes its tion it is not unlikely that the rate of new investme democratically—will decline. If this happens, the econ the central government will likewise decline. In a sta where people are generally satisfied with the materia living, the government's role in the allocation of new might be quite insignificant. Concluding Remarks We have demonstrated, I believe, that worker-contro is more likely to accord with Rawlsian values than ca capitalism institutionally structured as Rawls himself It should be noted that we have not shown that c necessarily unjust. We have argued that a society stru the lines of Ideal Capitalism is less likely to satisf principles than one structured as we propose. Our cas controlled socialism has also appealed to values co Rawls to be distinct from justice— meaningful work, stability—but we have tried to document Rawls' own these values. These latter arguments have likewise greater-likelihood principle. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 23 If our analysis is correct, it follows t "the theory of justice does not by it regime" is highly problematic. It can b holds that an ethical theory cannot c unless injustice can be shown to inhere necessity. But if one holds, as Rawls ap justice includes a greater-likelihood prin neutral, especially when interpreted as institutions in addition to his two p should be a socialist. NOTES 1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), 274 ff. 2. Ibid., 280.

3. Jaroslav Vanek, ed., Self-Management: The Economic Liberation of Man (Baltimore, MD: Penguin, 1975) provides an excellent introduc tion to the literature. 4. We make no claim to decisive originality with our model, though certain details, particularly in the investment sector, are perhaps new. Economic models of worker-controlled socialism have been discussed with some frequency during the past twenty years. The first formal model was Benjamin Ward's, presented in his 1958 article, "Market Syndicalism," American Economic Review 48, 566-89. This model, sightly revised and considerably expanded, is one of the three major models discussed in Benjamin Ward, The Socialist Economy (New York, NY: The Philadelphia Book Company, 1967). The major American theoretician of the economics of worker-controlled socialism is Jaroslav Vanek, whose book, The General Theory of Labor Managed Economics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970) is an extensive technical analysis of a worker- control model in terms of the standard categories of neoclassical economics. A less technical treatment can be found in his companion piece, The Participatory Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971). In this presentation I will avoid the neoclassical categories (I do not find them helpful—a prejudice perhaps), and attempt a straight forward, commonsensical analysis. I will not make as many simplifi cations as Vanek and Ward, for I am not aiming at mathematical theorems. 5. Rawls, 275. Our model differs from Yugoslavia in its political structure. Yugoslavia permits only one political party; freedom of thought is not taken for granted. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

24 Social Theory and Practice 6. We will not analyze the free-service sector in detail, th doubt be an important section of the economy. This sect many of the features of the non-governmental sector. departments, for example, will be worker-controll degree. However, they differ in one decisive respect— to negotiate directly with a public authority for wages 7. Some price regulation might be in order if the indust exhibits a significant degree of monopoly power. Vane instrument important and appropriate in certain circu Jaroslav Vanek, "The Yugoslav Economy Viewed T Theory of Labor Management," in The Labor-Mana Essays by Jaroslav Vanek (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ 1977), 54. 8. Obviously not every decision need be made by the workers. A special council or general manager (or both) be empowered to make certain kinds of decisions. But are elected by the workers of the enterprise; they are n the state or appointed by the community at large. 9. "Profit" here should not be confused with a capitalist latter is the difference between total sales and total c labor costs. Socialist production does not view labor as is, as a factor of production formally indistinguishabl capital, and so forth. The economic organization r conceptual distinction. 10. Pareto-optimality is a situation wherein nobody can be without making someone worse off. Planning by phys notoriously non-optimal in this sense, often resulting in t of goods that nobody really wants. Cf. Ota Sik, Pla Under Socialism (Prague; M. E. Sharpe, 1967), 89, n 11. The notion of "efficiency" has little ethical import which the structure of demand reflects an unjust distribu But once the requisite background institutions have been socialist society, no less than a capitalist one, must conce the efficient allocation of labor. 12. Rawls, 276. 13. "New" investment is that financed by the tax on capi that paid for out of depreciation funds. Firms have com over the latter. (This feature of our model is a rather ar allowing individual forms some autonomous control ov decisions.)

14. Given our model's commitment to factory democracy, some sort of size limitation on firms seems reasonable. What that should be and how much "inefficiency" this might generate cannot be answered abstractly. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 25 15.Itmightwellbedesirabletohaveth That is, a worker should be protected fro dismissal because of financial exigency share the burden. Considerations of fai coincide here, for should workers try t by shrinking the workforce, an ineff result. (Cf. J. E. Meade, "The Theory o of Profit Sharing," in Self Managem argument.) 16. Actually, "investment plans" would be the more appropriate term, since we envision a hierarchy of plans, formulated by and dealing with specific areas—communities, regions, the nation as a whole. The central government would concern itself with those projects involving the nation as a whole, the regional government with regional matters, etc. 17. If this risk is too high to generate sufficient demand for investment funds, special provisions could be made: special training and technical programs for young people so included or (if really necessary), bonuses for successful ventures. 18. For further details, consult Rawls, 274-80. 19. This charge is variously articulated in terms of "false needs," "wants destructive of human fulfillment," and so forth. For a Rawlsian, who believes in "goodness as rationality" (395 ff.), the charge of irrationality is sufficiently condemnatory. 20. Rawls, 303. 21. It is well known that personal savings by all but the very wealthy is an insignifiant source of investment funds in modern capitalist societies. "According to all recent studies of the apportionment of income between consumption and savings, only the upper income groups save, the total savings of groups below the top decile are fairly close to zero," Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure (New York, NY: Norton, 1965), 263. Since investment funds are generated by taxation in our model, there is little point in paying interest on personal savings. 22. This difficulty is not amenable to simple reform. If a society relies on private individuals for its saving and investment—and that is the essence of capitalism—it must allow interest and profit to accrue to private individuals in order to insure economic rationality. It cannot offer property income as an incentive with one hand and tax it away with the other. 23. McDonald's hamburger entrepreneur Ray Kroc, ranked among the five richest men in America, is said to be worth over $600 million. Leading the list is Daniel Keith Ludwig (shipping and real estate) with $3 billion. Newsweek (August 2, 1976), 56 ff. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

26 Social Theory and Practice 24. For an interesting account of Soviet practice, see Hed "How the Soviet Elite Lives," The Atlantic Monthly 1975), 39-51. 25. Michael Kalecki, who developed what is now known as ian General Theory" independently of and simultaneo Keynes, foresaw this problem as early as 1943. Cf. hi Aspects of Full Employment," reprinted in A Critique of Theory, eds. E. K. Hunt and Jesse Schwartz (Baltimo Penguin, 1972), 420-30. 26. Business Week, May 17, 1952. Quoted by Paul Baran, Economy of Growth (New York, NY: Monthly Review Pr 102. 27. "Suppose the aims which may be achieved by two plans are roughly the same. Then it may happen that some objectives have a greater chance of being realized by one plan than by the

other, yet at the same time none of the remaining aims are less likely to be attained. ... A greater likelihood of success favors a plan just as the more inclusive end does." Rawls, 412. 28. By non-rational sales persuasion we understand those techniques which deviate from the ideal of providing a customer with full and complete information regarding the service or object in question so as to enable him to come to a rational decision as to its desirability. For a virtuoso display of such techniques, consider an evening or two of American commercial television. 29. Rawls, 408. 30. Even if the expansion incentives operate imperfectly, our firms might not have much reason to stimulate demand. Members of a worker controlled firm benefit from a demand increase provided it translates into a price increase. But ordinarily, the effect of advertising and other such practices is an increased volume of sales, rather than a price increase. It is not clear that an advertising strategy aimed at increasing prices but not sales volume could succeed very often. 31. Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1974). 32. Braverman documents the theory and practice of such developments during this century. Whether or not Ideal Capitalism must feature such a lowering of labor skills will be considered below. 33. Rawls, 426. 34. Studs Terkel, Working (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1972), xiv. 35. P. Blumberg, "Alienation and Participation: Conclusions," in Self Management, 234. 36. Rawls, 290. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Rawls and Socialism 27 37.A.K.Sen,"OnOptimizingtheRateo (Septem ber 1961): 479-95. 38. Rawls, 295. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 286. 41. Conservative economists have long been critical of Keynesian remedies. Cf. Milton Friedman's analysis in Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 75-84, which concludes, "Whether the views so widely accepted about the effects of fiscal policy be right or wrong, they are contradicted by at least one extensive body of evidence justifying them. They are part of the economic mythology, not the demonstrated conclusions of economic analysis or quantitative studies." 42. This is not entirely true. The funding of an automobile plant might destroy the buggy-whip industry. Provisions for the transformation of obsolete industries must be made by the planning board. Such adjustments might well be painful to some people, though they would seem to fare better under a system which attempts to foresee and cushion such adjustments than under one which does not. 43. "Club of Rome" members D. H. Meadows et al, present a highly controversial, apocalyptic scenario in The Limits of Growth (New York, NY: NAL, 1972). For a collection of essays from both sides, see The Economic Growth Controversy, Richard Aronson, Eli Schwartz, and Andrew Weintraub, eds. (White Plains, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1973). 44. Cf. the comments of enterprise "direktors" concerning their relations with the workers' councils recorded in Richard Farkas, Yugoslav Economic Development and Political Change: The Relationship Between Economic Managers and Policy-Making Elites (New York, NY: Praeger, 1975), 26-29. 45. Yugoslavia experimented with various investment-plan procedures between 1950-65, some resembling our proposal. All these plans were abandoned. The political and economic reasons

for this are complex, and do not permit an easy evaluation. Cf. Jan Vanek, The Economics of Worker's Management: A Yugoslav Case Study (Lon don: Allen and Unwin, 1972), 65 f. 46. Frederick A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 69-70. 47. Ibid., 56. 48. Ibid., 57. This content downloaded from 107.77.232.140 on Thu, 15 Apr 2021 19:11:11 UTC David Schweickart Department of Philosophy Loyola University of Chicago All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms