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Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence Gregory M. Reichberg a a Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) , Norway Published online: 20 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Gregory M. Reichberg (2010) Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence, Journal of Military Ethics, 9:3, 262-275, DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2010.510866

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Thomas Aquinas on Military Prudence

GREGORY M. REICHBERG Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway

ABSTRACT Virtually all historical treatments of just war recognize the importance of the account given by Thomas Aquinas in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 40, ‘De bello’, where he outlines three conditions ! legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention ! for a justifiable use of armed force. It is, however, less well known that within the same section of the work (q. 50, a. 4) Aquinas extended his reflection on just war into a theory of military prudence. By placing generalship under the category of ‘prudence’, rather than ‘art’ or ‘science’, he held that military command involves more than a morally neutral skill with victory as its sole aim. Building on the premise that service to the common good constitutes the overarching purpose of the military profession, Aquinas showed how the virtue of prudence provides an inner compass for decision- making amid the uncertainty and confusion of the battlefield.

KEY WORDS: Thomas Aquinas, prudence, just war, strategy, virtue, morality, military profession

Introduction

Aquinas’s short discussion of war in Summa theologiae II-II, q. 40, ‘De bello’ (On War), has become a locus classicus for the large body of literature that has grown up around the idea of just war in Western thought. The ‘De bello’ is anchored in the Secunda-secundae pars (‘the second part of the second part’, written ca 1272, and typically abbreviated as II-II1), a section of the Summa theologiae that is organized around a typology of the virtues. The place of just war within this typology is obscured by the precise angle

under which this topic is taken up for discussion in q. 40. The opening article ‘whether any war is licit’ deals with the permissibility of waging war, and it is here that Aquinas famously outlines the three conditions ! legitimate authority, just cause, and right intention ! for a justifiable use of armed force. But despite its positioning within the Secunda-secundae, Aquinas says little in q. 40 to instruct us about the relation of just war to the broader theme of virtue. Whether bellum iustum designates an act of virtue, is the name of a virtue, or represents a disposition that falls short of the full goodness implied by ‘virtue’, receives no response at this precise juncture. Taken in isolation,

Correspondence address: PRIO, P.O. Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]

1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/10/030262!14 # 2010 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/15027570.2010.510866

Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 3, 262!275, 2010

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question 40 resembles a piece of casuistry, and this is mainly how it was appropriated by Aquinas’s scholastic commentators and to an even greater degree continues to be read today. Aquinas, by contrast, took care to place his De bello within a systematic

treatment of the virtues. Hence, far from proposing a free standing decision- procedure by which to judge particular cases, his aim was rather to situate lethal force in relation to the virtues that render it an acceptable practice in human life, and inversely, to indicate what vices are especially to be avoided. The idea, in other words, was to examine what moral dispositions ought to be cultivated by persons engaged in war. In the whole of the Summa theologiae, two virtues alone are singled out as having a special connection with the exercise of just war. The first, military prudence (q. 50, a. 4), is a virtue for commanders; its function is to regulate decision-making in war. The second, courage (q. 123, a. 5), pertains especially to rank-and-file soldiers, who must be inwardly prepared to face the dangers of the battlefield. In what follows I examine only military prudence, having discussed courage (fortitudo) in another venue (Reichberg, 2010).

Two Preliminary Considerations

Before embarking on this analysis, two clarifications are in order.2 First of all, what are we to make of the fact that Aquinas’s discussion of military prudence in q. 50 is situated at a considerable distance from the treatment of just war in q. 40? Had Aquinas intended to fill out his account of the latter by reference to the former ! as I have contended ! why did he not position the one immediately after the other? In response, it can be noted that the Summa theologiae was not written according to a linear ordering of topics, after the fashion of an encyclopedia or a series of monographs. Rather, it was designed as an organic synthesis, in which the reader was expected to move backwards and forwards in the work in order to gain a comprehensive view of each topic. Perhaps the most striking example of this procedure is Aquinas’s account ! set within a sequence of questions on the sacraments ! of the virtue of penance in Summa theologiae, part III, q. 85. A form of commutative justice, penance is nonetheless taken up for discussion over 200 questions from the main analysis of this theme in part II-II, qq. 60!62. Another example of the same procedure is afforded by his analysis of private property. First addressed in casuistical terms in q. 66, a. 2 (‘whether it is licit for property to be privately possessed’), the relevant virtue does not receive treatment until much later, namely q. 134, on ‘magnificence’ (the right use of wealth). A second clarification is needed apropos of my contention that q. 40 ‘De

bello’ was meant by Aquinas to be read in light of his teaching on military prudence and courage. Since the last-named virtues are concerned with the concrete implementation of just war (ius in bello), they would appear to offer little in the way of avirtue-ethical framework for q. 40, a. 1, which prima facie is directed to the conditions under which a war may justly be initiated ! ius ad bellum. On this reasoning, the present article should have traced Aquinas’s thought on the prudence of political leadership (prudentia regnativa), rather

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than examining the form of prudence which he designated for military commanders. In response, it can be said that Aquinas’s inquiry on the permissibility of just

war combines elements that today would be classified both under ius ad bellum and ius in bello. Indeed, the ‘De bello’ text was written in an era when the one was still treated in seamless continuity with the other. The sharp distinction between ius ad bellum and ius in bello arose only much later, under the concept of ‘regular war’ (guerre reglée), a term popularized by Vattel in the eighteenth century. In the prior period, ‘[f]rom the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries (Aquinas to Grotius), concerns that now go under the heading of ius in bello were in fact treated largely as an extension of ius ad bellum’ (Reichberg 2008: 193). Thus, within q. 40, a. 1, the first two conditions outlined by Aquinas ! legitimate authority and just cause ! look principally to the inception of war (ius ad bellum), while the third, right intention, is mainly about the inner dispositions that should guide our conduct in war (ius in bello). This is how the text was read by his successors Vitoria and Suarez, who, in place of right intention, substituted the kindred expression debitus modus, ‘the right manner of waging war, the limit not to be exceeded.’ (Reichberg 2008: 199). As a consequence, we should not be surprised that when Aquinas himself sought to specify the virtues relevant to just war, his attention was turned, spontaneously as it were, to prudence and courage, two dispositions assuring upright conduct in bello: ‘Prosecuting warfare, pertains to fortitude,’ he wrote, ‘while its direction pertains to prudence, especially as this [virtue] is found in the general’ (ST II-II, q. 50, a. 4, ad 3). Had he so wished, Aquinas could have also detailed the virtues needed for sound political decision-making about war; but perhaps to economize, given the very wide thematic scope of the Summa theologiae, he refrained from any explicit mention of martial matters when he discussed regnative prudence in q. 50, a. 1, and the virtue of ‘judgment’ [the determination of a judge] in q. 60.3 Given the exegetical ambition of the present article, it is limited to a treatment of military prudence. But it must be recognized that a fuller account of Aquinas’s virtue-ethical approach to just war would require, in addition, an extension of his teaching on the political virtues to decision-making about resort to war.4

A Special Form of Prudence for Military Command

Military prudence is first mentioned in q. 48, a. 1, where it appears alongside three other types of prudence that similarly assure the sound leadership of a group: regnativa (governance of a polity), politica (citizens’ participation in such governance), and oeconomica (management of a family). Each receives separate treatment in q. 50 (a. 1!4). Technically, these are termed ‘subjective parts of prudence’, meaning each is a distinct species within the same genus of virtue. Also sharing the genus prudentia is the good governance of one’s individual self, a species so closely associated in ordinary speech with the genus that Aquinas names it ‘prudence’ with no qualification added. The designation of a special military mode of prudence cannot be found in

Aristotle.5 Nor was prudentia militaris a standard turn of phrase in the

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Roman military manuals that circulated widely in Latin Christendom during the thirteenth century. These texts employed the nomenclature of military art (ars) or science (scientia), rather than of military prudence. Thus, Frontinus, in the Strategematon (written ca. AD 90; cited by Aquinas in q. 40, a. 3), opens the work by telling the reader that he ‘alone of those interested in military science (militaris scientiam) have undertaken to reduce its rules to a system’ (Frontinus 1925: 2). Later, he notes that ‘devising stratagems depends on art (in arte)’ (Frontinus 1925: 6). At the same time, however, he emphasizes how the book will provide commanders with examples of good counsel (concilium), foresight (providentia), and shrewdness (sollertia), abilities that Aquinas would later associate with prudence (Frontinus 1925: 2). The other military work known to Aquinas, the Epitoma Rei Militaris by Vegetius (2004),6 (written ca. AD 400; cited by Aquinas in 40, a. 1, ad 47) likewise only mentions the art or science of war.8 The text makes no reference to military prudentia. Aquinas seems to have picked up the expression ‘prudentia militaris’ from

De affectibus (On the Emotions), a text that medieval scholarship had erroneously attributed to the Peripatetic philosopher Andronicus of Rhodes.9

The term appears in a list of different kinds of prudence, but without further elaboration. Since prudentia militaris represented an uncommon usage, it is understandable that Aquinas would have felt compelled to justify it by explaining, in response to the opening objection of q. 50, a. 4 ! ‘Whether military command should be deemed a species of prudence’ ! why precisely leadership in the ‘things of war’ ought to be categorized under the heading of prudence, not art.10

Distinguishing Military Prudence from Military Art

In his general treatment of prudentia, Aquinas emphasized how this virtue has a special status among the intellectual virtues. Insofar as it is directed to objects that are inherently contingent, prudence stands in contrast to the three dispositions of speculative knowing (understanding, science, and wisdom), all of which are directed to necessaria (see Reichberg 2002). In this respect military command clearly has an affinity with the domain of prudence: ‘war’, as Clausewitz would later put the point, ‘is the realm of uncertainty. . .. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth’ (Vom Kriege, bk. 1, ch. 3, cited in Reichberg et al. 2006: 557). But prudence is not alone among the intellectual virtues in cognizing the contingent, as art likewise has this privilege. How then do the two differ? Andwhy, more precisely, did Aquinas deem militaris a form of moral prudentia, rather than follow the standard usage whereby it had been considered an art (or science), namely a skill indifferent to the adoption of morallygood or bad ends? Or, another possibility to be considered, was it his intent simply to establish an analogy between military command and prudentia, rather than to identify the first as a full-fledged instantiation of the second? Art and prudence are generically alike, Thomas remarks (I-II, q. 57, a. 4, ad

2), with respect both to their seat in the soul and their subject matter. Habits of

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the practical intellect, these two virtues are concerned with contingent happenings, not of just any sort whatsoever, but only such as can issue from human initiative. Principles of concrete effectuation, the role of art and prudence consists not so much in apprehending these contingent happenings as it does in steering the very process by which they come into existence. Art, Thomas defines as ‘right reason about things to be made’ and prudence

as ‘right reason about things to be done’ (I-II, q. 57, a. 4).11 ‘Making’ (facere), he explains, designates an action that results in the production of things external to the agent, while ‘doing’ (agere) names an action that abides in the agent. Classic within Aristotelianism, this distinction between immanent and transitive action is not about spatiality; it points rather to a difference in finality. An operation is deemed ‘transitive’ when it is ordered to (for the sake of) the good of the work, even if the work in question should exist solely in the mind of its maker. Immanent operations, by contrast, are directed to the actuality or perfection of the agent. From his various comments on this topic, we can infer that when Thomas

identifies the acting that is the concern of prudence with immanent action, he thereby wishes to specify just one special sort of such action, namely, the action of the will. More precisely, it is choice ! the inner act by which the will selects among alternative goods ! that prudence is especially meant to guide. Once it is understood that prudence is directive of our actions under the

aspect of their voluntariness, the other key properties of this virtue become readily apparent. Summarizing these will enable us to perceive more clearly how prudence differs from art, allowing us subsequently to discern in what measure military command meets the conditions proper to prudentia. (1) Among the virtues, prudence has responsibility for coordinating each of

our individual choices with the ‘comprehensive end of human life’ (q. 47, a. 13). Art, by contrast, is ‘directed to a particular end’ (q. 47, a. 4, ad 2). Rather than looking to the well-being of the agent (finis operantis), it is occupied with producing a work (finis operis). Thus, to ask whether the thing made will benefit or harm its maker is a question rightly addressed to prudence, not to art. ‘The craftsman,’ Thomas concludes, ‘needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and maintain it in good condition: whereas prudence is necessary to man, in order that he may lead a good life’ (I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 1). (2) Prudence presupposes rectitude of the will (‘a relation to right appetite’ !

q. 47, a. 13, ad 2). This is because deeds are morally good only when they are appropriately directed to their due end. Hence among the intellectual virtues, prudence alone has the singular status of also being a moral virtue, i.e. a virtue assuring right volition. Art, by contrast, is independent of rectitude in the will. Since its perfecting

role is restricted solely to strengthening the intellect and other faculties of cognition, a skill for making ! as likewise any purely intellectual capacity such as mathematics ! is neutral vis-à-vis its good or bad moral use. A craftsman who employs his art for an evil end will be deemed no less skillful an artist.12

He will of course be condemnable on moral grounds, but this moral judgment does not bear precisely on his professional, artistic competence, but rather on

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his person, and specifically the condition of his will. By the same token, should a person make morally good use of her art, this will be an effect, not of the art itself, but of an upright will. This uprightness depends on principles extrinsic to the art (see Maritain 1972: 21!45). (3) Since rectitude of the will is guaranteed by the moral virtues, prudence

must ally itself with the full complement of these virtues if it is to judge well of its objects. This is a corollary of the Aristotelian thesis (Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1040b7-11) that our judgment of right and wrong depends on a correct perception of the ends of action. Since the moral virtues are dispositions by which we are well inclined to the comprehensive end of human life ! which subsumes into itself all subordinate ends ! prudential judgment presupposes a connectedness to the full array of these moral virtues.13

Art, however, ordered as it is to the achievement of some specialized task, has no need of the moral virtues, save insofar as these are necessary to regulate its ordination to the whole of human life. This ordination remains extrinsic to the art itself, as has already been noted. In a reduced sense, however, Aquinas does recognize that art cannot entirely bypass virtue within its own domain, as no one will advance very far in making a sculpture, designing a house, acquiring expertise in engineering, and so forth, without having a disposition to persevere in these activities. Moderation, likewise, will also be needed, as for instance when an architect is expected to keep within the financial restraints imposed by her assignment. It is clear, however, that this perseverance and moderation need not reach into all areas of her life, and in fact may be sorely lacking outside the sphere of her art. The appetitive dispositions thus required for the cultivation of an art or science, Aquinas refers to under the heading of ‘incomplete virtue’.14 Whereas the ‘complete’ virtue presupposed by prudence is applicable throughout life as a whole, with the result that each moral virtue stands interconnected with the others, the ‘incomplete’ moral virtue associated with art or science consists in an inclination to pursue goals of more limited scope. Since such limited goals are independent of each other, the various dispositions that conduce to their respective fulfillment can survive without being interconnected. (4) Extending as it does to the very execution of voluntary action ! no two

instances of which are strictly identical ! prudence can follow no fixed and settled rules of conduct. The matters about which it deliberates are open- ended; each constitutes a unique situation in which there is more than one way to obtain the desired end. Art, by contrast, requires adherence to pre- established rules, rules that must be mastered by the craftsman if he is to succeed in his work (see I-II, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3). The above review of Aquinas’s teaching on prudentia shows that when he

placed the things of war under this heading, he seems thereby to have committed himself to a thick moral conception of military command. Inversely, had he categorized this leadership under the heading of art, morality would have applied to it in an extrinsic manner only. A general who ordered the commission of atrocities, or who waged war for a manifestly evil purpose, could still be deemed a habile commander if he successfully led his troops to victory, even though, on moral grounds, he must be deemed a bad

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man. But to assert that military command is indeed an instance of prudence is for Aquinas equivalent to saying that morality is intrinsic to this practice, such that any willful misconduct ! by direct intention or negligence ! on the part of the general would evince a faulty command. In such a case not only is he to be rightly condemned qua man, but more to the point, his competence qua commander would be called into question. These two different perspectives on military command, the one maximally,

the other minimally moral, have been usefully contrasted by Nicholas Fotion (1986) in an essay on the ethics of military strategy.

[1] On the face of it, it would seem that in doing his work, a military tactician or strategist would be acting neither morally nor immorally but, rather nonmorally. Developing a strategy or some tactic is, after all, a form of planning. Unlike the strategy and tactics used for dealing with poverty and illness, it is true that the strategies and tactics of war tend to get many people killed and maimed. But strategical and tactical planning, it could be argued, are simply matters of gathering information, and using logic and imagination to decide what to do in the future, and insofar as they are so, they would seem to be nonmoral (Fotion 1986: 5). . . .When we praise someone as a good tactician, we can be praising him for being good at doing certain tasks conceived of very narrowly. Imagine here two excellent military tacticians. One is fighting on the side of the Allies in World War II and the other on the German side. Imagine the German is a dyed-in-the-wool Nazi. Is the latter less of a tactician because he has immoral views and is fighting for an immoral political ideology? The praise we give him and the Allied tactician can be for battle skills they possess quite apart from the morality of the overall positions they hold. Thus we can, if we know that the Nazi is a truly excellent tactician, learn much about tactics by reading his works and following his moves on the battlefield. To the extent we can do this sort of analysis, we can say that tactical moves, even when well done, are morally neutral (that is, they are nonmoral activities or virtues) (Fotion 1986: 6!7).

[2] Military strategists and tacticians and their activities are unavoidably assessable in the realm of ethics and morality. They can act well or badly, but, either way, given the consequences of the sorts of activity in which they are engaged, morality cannot be left out of our full understanding of their activity (Fotion 1986: 16). . . .[W]hat counts as ethical or moral is thought to be important to the well-being of people. That iswhygames of baseball are not absorbed into the ethical realm. The activityof playing the game itself (for example getting a hit) does not directly harm or help anyone. With military activity and planning it is otherwise. How these ‘games’ are played makes a tremendous difference, so they cannot help but belong within the realm of morality (Fotion 1986: 17).

By classifying military command under the moral virtue of prudence, Aquinas would seem thus to have opted squarely for the maximalist view described in [2] above. It must be said, nonetheless, that certain of his statements point toward the minimalism of [1]. We will begin by reviewing these before turning to his explicit treatment of this question in q. 50, a. 4, which, as we shall see, is aligned with the maximalism of [2].

A Minimalist View of Military Prudence?

A minimalist conception of the moral relevance of military prudence seems to be implied by a statement that figures toward the beginning of Aquinas’s general treatment of prudentia in q. 47:

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Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the comprehensive end of human life. This is the end that prudence aims at. As the philosopher [Aristotle] says [Nic. Eth. VI.5], he who reasons well in view of attaining a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not unqualifiedly (simpliciter) but in a particular genus, namely warfare (rebus bellicis), so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent unqualifiedly. ( Q. 47, a. 2, ad 1)

Warfare is here put forward as an activity that is regulated after the fashion of art. Yet, given the wide margin of contingency that befalls the art of strategy (which Clausewitz later summed up by his famous expression ‘the fog of war’), and in light of the fact that it must consequently often proceed without fixed rules, Aquinas notes how this form of reasoning bears a similarity to prudential deliberation.15 But this similarity should not lull us into thinking that we are in the domain of prudence proper. Hence in his initial classification of the kinds of prudence (q. 48, a. 1), Aquinas places the military variant into a category all its own. Directed as it is to a multitude, the army, that has come together uniquely for a special purpose, namely fighting, military prudence stands apart from the other forms of prudence (regnativa, politica, and oeconomica) whereby we are governed in view of the ‘whole of life’. The implication would seem to be clear, yet admittedly it is not explicitly

drawn out by Thomas himself: prescinding as it does from the comprehensive end of human life, prudentia militaris would seem to be prudence, ‘not unqualifiedly, but in a particular genus only.’ An instance of ‘incomplete prudence’ (prudentia imperfecta), the effective command of actions within the restricted domain of war would seem not to require full virtue; hence in principle it can be possessed by the good and the wicked alike. By contrast, the other forms of prudence (personal, regnativa, politica, and oeconomica), being habits of correct deliberation about ‘life as a whole’, meet the conditions proper to ‘complete’ prudence.16 Thick moral virtues, they are possessed by the good alone.17

A Maximalist View of Military Prudence.

If we turn now to Thomas’s ex professo treatment of military prudence in q. 50, a. 4, there emerges a different picture. Recalling Aristotle’s distinction (Nicomachean Ethics I.1) between a subordinate and master art, Aquinas is able to conclude that when applied to the military setting, the former is rightly designated ars, while the latter is more properly named prudentia. Noting (obj. 1) how the things of war have traditionally been classed under the heading of art, Thomas explains (ad 1) that

Military Command (Militaris) may be deemed an art insofar as it involves definite rules for the suitable use of external things, for instance arms or horses, but insofar as it is directed to the common good, it pertains more to prudence.

In this passage militaris stands alone as a noun.18 It signifies the strategic judgment by which a general directs his army to a determinate goal. This becomes clear if one considers that militaris was the term used by William of

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Moerbeke to render strathgików in his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics.19 Thus, in the opening chapter of this work, after asserting that ‘the end of strategy is victory’, Aristotle explains that the general achieves this result by subordinating to his skill the whole set of other skills ! bridle- making and horsemanship are the two examples cited in the text ! that are found among the members of his army (1094a10-20). Upon similarly observing that an army includes a diversity of skills, Aquinas proceeds to introduce a discreet shift in vocabulary. Where Aristotle had spoken of victory, Aquinas refers instead to the common good as the specifying goal of the general’s art. This enables him to reach a novel conclusion. Ordered to an overarching end ! the well-being of the entire political community ! military command requires full-fledged prudence. Inversely, the lower military skills (horsemanship, archery, building fortifications, etc.) directed as they are to narrow, more limited goals, may adequately be described under the heading of art. Aquinas unfortunately offered no further comment on this conclusion.

His attention in the body of the article was drawn instead to a subordinate problem ! one that he had already discussed in the Sentences commentary ! namely to explain why military prudence should be distinguished in kind from regnativa, the prudence by which the prince maintains a just rule over the polity. We will return to this problem in a moment. But now we should pause for a moment to dwell on the implications of Aquinas’s claim that military command reaches perfection precisely as a form of moral prudence. As has been noted above, Aquinas showed some uncertainty whether

military command should be deemed a form of prudence. Standing against this attribution was the part played by technical competence in generalship; a competence that can be mastered by the perverse and upright alike. An avid reader of the Old Testament Book of Job,20 Aquinas was well aware that all manner of evil ! including defeat on the battlefield ! could befall the just man. Inversely, he did not deny that victory could sometimes be achieved by perfidious means. But this moral ambivalence does not remove generalship from the sphere of ethics, because on Aquinas’s understanding, victory is not the nec sum ultra of generalship. Beyond this particular result, he emphasized how generalship has an essential ordination to the common good (bonum commune). This ordination must take precedence over, and thereby subordi- nate to itself, the technical (‘artistic’ in Aquinas’s terminology) skills that the general will have acquired in the course of his military training. At this juncture it should be sufficient to affirm ! without entering into

detailed textual justification (see Keys 2006) ! how for Aquinas the bonum commune did not designate a set of material interests that might be possessed by a collectivity, as when today we speak of the ‘national interest’. Union around goods of this sort could certainly prescind from considerations of morality, or run directly counter to them. Witness in our own time the atrocities that have been committed for the preservation of one’s state, nation, ethnicity, or religion.21 By contrast, on Aquinas’s understanding, morality is inherent to the common good: it is a collective flourishing in the goods proper

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to virtue. This he made clear in his treatment of legal justice ! like regnative prudence a virtue possessed chiefly by rulers ! which, in his words, ‘directs all the acts of all the virtues to the common good’ (q. 58, a. 5). The special link of generalship with the common good ! and a fortiori with

morality ! is reinforced by a point made in response to the second objection in q. 50, a. 4. Many activities in the city ! trading for a profit and craftsmanship are the two examples given in the objection ! fall under the regulation of political rule, but this subordination does not entail that each should be guided by its own specific form of prudence. To the contrary, directed as they are to the attainment of limited private goods, these can readily be delineated under the pattern of art, such that a virtuous ordination to the good of the polity, and thus a regulation by prudentia regnativa, remains extrinsic to what they are. An enterprising businessman who amassed a great fortune might still be counted a success even though he fostered divisive inequity within the political community. Not so the general who ordered acts wholly inconsistent with bedrock norms of war,22 for the resulting victory would be morally pyrrhic, having undermined the collective life of virtue that it was his duty to defend. ‘While other affairs in the polity are directed to private utility,’ writes Aquinas, ‘those military are directed to the protection of the entire common good’ (q. 50, a. 4, ad 2). Aquinas’s argumentation would accordingly exclude strategies which in our

own time go under the name of ‘political realism’ or ‘dirty hands’. Whether morality is thought to be inoperative in the domain of war, or the good of the nation is taken to require conduct inconsistent with the demands of morality, neither option could be acceptable within an account of military prudence that posits love of justice as the chief moral affect underlying this cognitive virtue. And in conformity with the doctrine of the unity of the virtues Aquinas had inherited from Aristotle, the military commander also stands in need of the full complement of other ‘complete’ virtues, in addition to justice, if he is to exercise his office rightly.23 Thus, on his understanding, military professionals ! exemplified in his discourse by the figure of the general ! are expected to be comprehensively good people. This is entailed by the essential link which exists between their professional role and service to the common good. This service requires that they be more than skilled technicians of their craft. Or, to put the same point differently, the very end of the military calling demands that technical skills be ordained to a good higher than victory. The coordination of these technical skills with the more comprehensive end of human society is the central task of prudence. And to carry out this coordination, prudence in turn depends on the full complement of moral virtues ! for the egregious lack of any one virtue would conduce to choices harmful to the common good.24

Conclusion: Aquinas’s Moral Realism

Finally, the very fact that he posits military command as a form of prudentia is evidence that Aquinas aimed to steer clear of what today would be called ‘moralism’.25 A quick look at the parts of prudence enumerated by Aquinas

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in q. 49 ! foresight, circumspection, and so forth ! shows how he understands that judgments of right and wrong must be embodied within a realistic appreciation of consequences and circumstances, empirical limitations, and the overall feasibility of actions. Moreover, by designating it a virtue both moral and intellectual, Aquinas emphasized how upright character is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for prudentia; in addition, possession of the relevant cognitive skills is also requisite. And the more complex the domain, the more demanding and specialized are the skills needed for morally successful action. This differentiation of skills, from one sector of human life to another, is what led Aquinas to follow Aristotle’s lead in distinguishing five authentic (‘complete’) instantiations of prudentia. It was Aquinas’s sensitivity to the special characteristics of military action !

a domain with which he had some acquaintance by virtue of having grown up in a family of knights (see Synan 1988) ! that led him to distinguish military from regnative prudentia. Despite their close structural similarity ! both are virtues conferring sound leadership of the common good ! the respective exigencies of war and peace are such that the cognitive skills required of the one are not purely identical with the other. This contrast he drew by analogy with the distinction, central to his moral psychology, between concupiscible and irascible appetite. Just as nature has provided animals with desires, by which they are drawn to what is conducive to their well-being, likewise it has given them an instinct of aggression by which they withstand external threats. In human beings, accordingly, who are animals moved by reason, there is need not only for political prudence, by which we are suitably disposed to actions that enhance the common good, but also for military prudence, by which the attacks of enemies are repelled (see q. 50, a. 4, in corp.). Some commentators have found this analogy less than convincing

(Labourdette 1959!1960: 44!46). In my opinion however, the intuition which motivated this elucidation remains sound. Exercising virtuous judgment in the heat of battle is qualitatively of a different order than governing a polity in peacetime.26 To maintain a moral posture amid the fear, confusion, and uncertainty of the battlefield, military professionals must learn how to conjoin reasoned judgment, technical skill, and the appropriate emotional dispositions. It was this distinctive set of abilities that Aquinas sought to capture when he described military command in terms of prudence, not art. In so doing he identified a number of key concerns that today are central to ethics training in the military.

Notes 1 Unless indicated otherwise, all citations from Aquinas are taken from the Summa theologiae; similarly, it

can be assumed that these citations are drawn from the Secunda-secundae part (II-II), unless reference is expressly made to another part of the Summa. Passages are quoted according to the standard textual divisions of part (e.g. ‘II-II’ ! omitted when reference is made to the Secunda-secundae), question (‘q.’), article (‘a.’), objection (‘obj.’) and response to objection (‘ad’). References are to the Latin version of the Summa theologiae (Aquinas 1941!1945); translations are the author’s own. For a translation of the entire work, see Aquinas (1948).

2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing these two considerations to my attention.

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3 In Aquinas’s early treatise On the Government of Princes ! De regimine principum (English translation in Aquinas 2002) ! ‘preservation of the commonwealth. . . against external enemies’ (bk. 1, ch. 15, p. 28) figures as one of the chief duties of the highest temporal authority, but the point is not discussed by

reference to a specific virtue. Earlier in the same work (ch. 9) the types of prudence are listed as three in

kind (personal, familial, and political). No mention is made of military prudence, which suggests that

the text was written before he had read the De affectibus (see below). 4 For an indication of how this reflection might proceed, see my brief comments in Reichberg (2007: 11!

12). 5 Thus it is unsurprising that there is no mention of this virtue in the section of Aquinas’s commentary on

the Nicomachean Ethics (Sententia Libri Ethicorum, VI.7) where he discusses the classification of

prudence into different kinds (Aquinas 1969: 355!359). 6 The editor, M. D. Reeve, notes that ‘this was among those secular works of Antiquity that medieval

readers most often copied, excerpted and translated’ (Vegetius 2004: v). 7 Aquinas’s reference is actually to a text in which St. Jerome discusses Vegetius’ treatment of military

exercises in 1.9-28 and 2.23. A direct reference to De re militaris may, however, be found in q. 123, a. 1,

ad 2 (on courage), where Aquinas cites Vegetius (bk. 1) to the effect that ‘no man fears to do what he is

confident of having learned to do well.’ Speaking in the same reply about the science or art possessed

by soldiers, Aquinas notes how ‘through skill and practice in the in the use of arms, they think little of

the dangers of battle.’ No mention is made here of prudentia. 8 For instance in 3.9.11 (Vegetius 2004: 86), he speaks of those ‘skilled in the art of war, ! scientes artem

bellicam’ and then in 1.10.3 (Vegetius 2004: 15), he writes that ‘the Romans were trained in the whole

art of warfare ! omnem rei militaris erudiverant artem’. 9 The De affectibus is cited in q. 48, a.1, obj. 1, where the ‘parts of prudence’, are listed as ‘eubulia, solertia,

providentia, regnativa, militaris, politica, oeconomica, dialectica, rhetorica, physica’. The list is also

discussed in Aquinas’s commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard ! III, dist. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, ulterius (Aquinas 1933: 1072, § 267). The attempt to demonstrate a coherent rationale behind this

disparate collection of terms, all purportedly relating to the same virtue of practical wisdom, may have

been what led Aquinas to distinguish between the ‘integral’, ‘subjective’, and ‘potential’ parts of a

virtue. This classification is first mentioned within the Secunda secundae discussion of prudence (the

prologue to q. 48), and is applied subsequently, but does not appear in the earlier questions on faith,

hope, and charity. 10 Q. 50, a. 4, ad 1. In the earlier Sentences commentary, III, dist. 33, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 4, solutio 4, ad 4

(Aquinas 1933: 1079, § 301) it is merely assumed that militaris is a species of prudence, based on the

typology of the De affectibus. No attempt is made to justify this classification vis-à-vis the more

common placement of militaris under art. Rather than debate the suitability of its designation as a

kind of prudentia, Aquinas sought instead to explain why military command embodies a distinctive

mode of leadership prudence, in contrast to tradesmanship and other such skills necessary for the

maintenance of society, which are subsumed under prudentia regnativa. 11 ‘Recta ratio factabilium’ and ‘recta ratio agibilium’. 12 ‘It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of

art,’ Thomas writes, ‘as it does when we judge of the end which is a principle in moral matters: in the

former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the

appetite, as prudence does’ (I-II, q. 58, art 5, ad 2). In this sense, Aquinas’s concept of art is akin to

what Kant, in his Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals (§415), termed a ‘a general imperative of

skill’: ‘Here there is no question at all whether the end is reasonable or good, but there is only a

question as to what might be done to attain it. The prescriptions needed by a doctor in order to make

his patient thoroughly healthy and by a poisoner in order to make sure of killing his victim are of equal

value so far as each serves to bring about its purpose perfectly’ (Kant 1981: 25). 13 Summing this up, Aquinas writes (I-II, q. 65, a. 2) that ‘prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues,

since these dispose us appropriately toward certain ends, namely those from which prudential

reasoning proceeds.’ He likewise emphasizes how prudence also requires a link with the theological

virtues, charity especially, as by it a human being is well disposed to his ultimate end. See also

Aquinas’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VI, 1140 b21 (Aquinas 1969: 347) where he notes how

‘the moral virtues preserve the principles of prudence.’

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14 The contrast between incomplete (imperfecta) and complete (perfecta) moral virtue is drawn by Aquinas in I-II, q. 65, a. 1. There he explains how by the first we have an inclination to the production of a specific good work, while by the second we are inclined to perform a good deed well.

15 ‘By a kind of comparison a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art,’ Aquinas writes, since ‘in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine or navigation’ (q. 47, a. 4, ad 2).

16 For instance, in q. 50, a. 3, ad 2, Aquinas notes that household prudence, directed as it is to the good life in general (totum bene vivere) for a family, will be possessed only by those who lead a virtuous life (requiritur vita virtuousa).

17 For the distinction between ‘complete’ (perfecta) and incomplete (imperfecta) prudence, see q. 47, a. 13. (This obviously runs parallel to the distinction made earlier ! I-II, q. 65, a. 1 ! between complete and incomplete virtue.) As examples of ‘incomplete prudence’, Aquinas mentions business acumen, and skill in navigating ships. The article likewise contrasts the two forms of ‘true’ prudence ! ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ ! to the ‘false prudence’ (prudentia falsa) of thieves and other such malefactors who successfully employ their minds for the promotion of evil ends.

18 This is overlooked in the standard English translation of the Summa (Aquinas 1948: 1402) which takes militaris to be an adjective, thereby requiring the translator to identify a suitable noun when none is given in the text. By selecting ‘prudence’ for this task, this translation commits the redundancy of asking ‘whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence.’

19 The text of Nicomachean Ethics 1094a 1!20 is cited in Aquinas (1969: 3). 20 Aquinas wrote a detailed commentary on this biblical text (Aquinas 1989). 21 In this connection, see the recent testimony of As’ad Shaftari, a former intelligence officer in a Lebanese

Christian militia, who admits (and now deeply regrets) having tortured and killed Palestinians, to defend ‘what I thought was Christianity in Lebanon’ (Worth 2010).

22 For an indication of what norms of war were operative in Aquinas’s own day, see Keen (1965). Aquinas mentioned at least two of these norms: the prohibition against lying to enemy belligerents (as opposed to ambushes and other forms of deception, that he deemed licit), or against breaking promises (both prohibitions are mentioned in q. 40, a. 3). See also Aquinas’s very emphatic statement in q. 64, a. 6 ‘it is in no way (nullo modo) permitted to slay the innocent’, which would appear to exclude (although he does not himself draw out this implication) the intentional killing of enemy non-combatants.

23 For a good survey of on the virtues relevant to the exercise just war, see the article by Ryan Gorman in this issue of Journal of Military Ethics (Gorman 2010).

24 It should be noted, however, that the moral virtues need not be possessed with equal firmness and consistency, nor will a weakening of each and every one of them have the same deleterious effect on military prudence as would a deficiency of justice (a virtue consisting in a ‘perpetual and constant will to render each man his due’ [q. 58. a. 1]).

25 On ‘moralism’, understood as a stance opposed to the exigencies of moral prudence, see Maritain (1952), where the French philosopher argues that Thomistic prudentia, as applied to the political sphere, seeks the mean between a purely artistic conception of politics on the one hand, and the undue application of personal ethical norms (‘ultramoralism’), on the other. For a recent workup of this theme, including a useful typology of different types of moralism, see Coady (2008).

26 On the special qualities of mind needed for militarycommand, see Clausewitz’s treatment of coup d’oeil and courage d’esprit in Vom Kriege, bk. 1, chap. 3 (passages reproduced in Reichberg et al. 2006: 557!559).

References

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Benzinger Brothers). Aquinas, T. (1969) Sententia Libri Ethicorum (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae). Aquinas, T. (1989) The Literal Exposition on Job, trans. A. Damico, ed. M. D. Yaffe (Atlanta: Scholars

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52 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Coady, C. A. J. (2008) Messy Moralism: The Challenge of Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

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Gorman, R. (2010) War and the Virtues in Aquinas’s Ethical Thought, Journal of Military Ethics 9(3), pp. Kant, I. (1981) Grounding for a Metaphysics of Morals, trans. J. W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett

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31 August 2010, available at: http://www2.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/range11.htm; Internet. Maritain, J. (1972) Responsibility of the Artist (New York: Gordian Press). Reichberg, G. M. (2002) The Intellectual Virtues (Ia IIae, qq. 57!58), in: S. J. Pope (Ed.), The Ethics of

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(Oxford: Blackwell). Synan, E. A. (1988) St. Thomas Aquinas and the Profession of Arms, Medieval Studies 50, pp. 404!437. Vegetius (2004) Epitoma Rei Militaris, ed. M. D. Reeve (Clarendon Press: Oxford). Worth, R. (2010) A Lonely Apology Rises from War’s Ashes, New York Times, 17 April sect. A, p. 4.

Biography

Gregory M. Reichberg (PhD, Emory University) is a Research Professor and former Leader of the Ethics, Norms and Identities research program at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). He currently serves as Director of the PRIO Cyprus Centre in Nicosia. He has written and published widely within the ethics of war. He is the co-editor (with Henrik Syse and Endre Begby) of The Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), (with Henrik Syse) Ethics, Nationalism, and Just War (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), and (with Vesselin Popovski and Nicholas Turner), World Religions and Norms of War (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009).

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