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Biosecurity & Bioterrorism: Containing and Preventing Biological Threats
Chapter 8
Biological Threat to Agriculture
Learning Objectives
Discuss the importance of agriculture and food supply to the nation.
Describe the different ways that biological threats may harm agriculture and the food supply.
Define agroterrorism.
Discuss the potential effects of agroterrorism.
Discuss the importance of biosecurity to the agricultural sector.
Describe the nation’s response to an outbreak of a foreign animal disease.
Key Terminology
Agroterrorism
Biosafety
Biosecurity
Critical infrastructure
Vector
Biosecurity & Agriculture
Agriculture and food systems are vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that occur naturally, are accidentally introduced, or are intentionally delivered through an act of terrorism.
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
The Importance of Agriculture
~13% of Gross Domestic Product
Employs ~17% of the labor force
World population is growing
Shift from rural to urban centers
In the next 50 years mankind will consume twice as much food as mankind has consumed since the beginning of agriculture 10,000 years ago
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
Other Facts
The farm sector is the largest positive contributor to the U.S. trade balance.
The U.S. produces nearly 50% of the world’s soybeans, over 40% of its corn, 20% of its cotton, 12% of its wheat, and over 16% of its meat.
America has more than 2 million farms totaling over 300 million acres.
In some states, agriculture accounts for over 10% of employment and gross state product.
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
Other facts (continued)
>2 million farms (310 million acres)
United States leads the world in food production. In 2005 and 2006 there was nearly $70B in agricultural exports per year
In 2006, grains and feed generated nearly $18.4 billion in sales, soybeans generated $6.3 billion, red meat products generated $4.9 billion, and poultry generated $2.4 billion
Critical Thinking
Originally, agriculture and food systems were not part of our nation’s critical infrastructure. How could this oversight occur? Or, could you argue that they do not belong or are inconsistent with the other elements of critical infrastructure?
Foreign Animal Diseases
Serious animal diseases that are not endemic to the country of concern
Office International des Epizooties/ Epizootics (OIE), of the World Organization for Animal Health, is an intergovernmental organization with 155 member countries responsible for animal disease information, surveillance, guidelines and policy
OIE List A and List B
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
OIE List A
Predominately viral diseases that are transmitted in different ways
Airborne Transmission Mode of Animal Diseases
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)
Exotic Newcastle Disease (END)
Direct Transmission Mode of Animal Diseases
rinderpest, vesicular stomatitis, hog cholera, and African swine fever
Vector Transmission Mode of Animal Diseases
OIE List A Diseases
African Horse Sickness
African Swine Fever
Bluetongue
Classical Swine Fever
Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia
Newcastle Disease
Foot and Mouth Disease
Goat pox and Sheep Pox
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
Lumpy Skin Disease
Newcastle Disease
Peste des Petits Ruminants
Rift Valley Fever
Rinderpest
Swine Vesicular Disease
Vesicular Stomatitis
OIE List B
Considered to be of socio-economic and/or public health importance within countries and that were significant in the international trade
List can be viewed at http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/the-world-animal-health-information-system/old-classification-of-diseases-notifiable-to-the-oie-list-b/
12 categories, dozens of diseases
OIE Consolidated Listing
As of January 2006, OIE officials combined Lists A and B into one consolidated listing that divided up the diseases of concern by host (e.g., multiple species, sheep and goats, cattle, equine, swine, bees, fish, mollusks, crustaceans, and rabbits).
Inclusion criteria now cover four considerations: potential for international spread; significant spread within naïve populations; zoonotic potential; and, emerging diseases.
NO
YES
Exclude
YES
NO
Exclude
YES
YES
INCLUDE
International Spread
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International Spread
Has international spread been proven
on three or more occasions?
OR
Are more than three countries with populations of susceptible animals free of the disease or facing impending freedom?
Significant Spread Within
Naïve Populations
Does the disease exhibit significant mortality at the level of a country or compartment?
AND/OR
Does the disease exhibit significant morbidity at the level of a country or compartment?
Emerging Diseases
(A newly recognized pathogen or known pathogen behaving differently)
Is there rapid spread and/or apparent zoonotic properties?
Zoonotic Potential
Has transmission to humans been proven? (with the exception of artificial circumstances)
AND
Is human infection associated with severe consequences? (death or prolonged illness)
Domestic Compliance with OIE
NAHMS
NSU
USDA APHIS
NAHRS
USAHA
AAVLD
NVSL
NPDN
Quite an acronym soup!
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
Crop Diseases
Karnal Bunt – fungal disease of wheat
Soy Bean Rust – fungus Phakopsora pachyrhizi
Rice Blast – fungus Magnaporthe grisea
Plum Pox Virus – PPV affects many stone fruit trees
Consider their potential:
What crops will these pathogens affect?
Example – The US provides the world with about 50% of all its soy beans. Multiple outbreaks of soy bean rust could rob the world of a significant % of its plant protein source & result in $M in losses of potential revenues.
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
Crop Diseases in U.S. BW program
Rice Blast (Mangaporthe grisea)
Wheat Stem Rust (Puccinia graminis f.sp.triciti)
Wheat Smut (Fusarium graminearum)
Image courtesy of US Army
Plant pathogens with weaponization potential
Wheat pathogens
Wheat Dwarf (geminivirus)
Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus (Pseudomonas fascovaginaei)
Corn pathogens:
Barley Yellow Dwarf Virus (Pseudomonas fascovaginaei)
Brown Stripe Mildew (Sclerophthora rayssiae)
Sugarcane Downy Mildew (Peronosclerospora sacchari)
Java Downy Mildew (P. maydis)
Soybean pathogens:
Soybean Dwarf Virus (Luteovirus)
Red Leaf Blotch (Pyrenochaeta glycines)
Images courtesy of USDA ARS
Agroterrorism
The intentional use of biological agents targeted against crop or animal agriculture
Centuries ago, food crops were vulnerable to attack by invaders
World War I, the Germans mounted a biological warfare campaign in the U.S. while the country was still neutral.
The targets were draft animals, horses, and mules purchased by Allies for use by their military forces in Europe. The Germans had devised a plan to infect the animals with glanders and anthrax
| Year(s) | Location | Act |
| 1915-1917 | Argentina, Mesopotamia, Norway, Romania, USA | The German secret service mounted a covert biological campaign during WWI, using glanders and anthrax to infect draft animals, horses and mules to be used by the Allies for the war effort in Europe. It also appears that the Germans attempted to use a wheat fungus. |
| 1943 | Isle of Wight, UK | Richard Ford, a prominent British naturalist, has made the accusation that Germany dropped Colorado Potato Beetles on the UK during WWII, accounting for their unusual appearance in parts of the UK. According to Ford the bombs were made of cardboard and contained fifty to a hundred beetles. |
| 1950 | East Germany | In a Ministry of Forestry report dated June 15, 1950, the East German government accused the United States of scattering Colorado Potato beetles over potato crops in May and June of 1950. |
| 1952 | Kenya | The Mau Mau, a nationalist liberation movement, poisoned 33 steers at a British mission station, using what is believed to be a local toxic plant known as "African milk bush." |
| 1962-1997 | Cuba | Cuba has accused the U.S. of attacking Cuban crops or livestock on as many as 21 different occasions. According to Raymond Zilinskas, of the few incidents for which information is available, agents include: Newcastle Disease (1962), African swine fever (1971, 1979-80), Tobacco Blue Mold Disease (1979-80), Sugarcane Rust Disease (1978), and Thrips insect infestation (1997). Only in the case of the Thrips did Cuba make a formal complaint. |
Examples of Agroterrorism
| 1982-1984 | Afghanistan | Ken Alibek, First Deputy Chief of Biopreparat, alleges he was informed by a senior Soviet military officer that the Soviet Union attacked the Afghan mujaheddin with glanders on at least one occasion. According to Alibek this would have the dual effect of sickening the mujaheddin and killing their horses, their main mode of transportation. |
| 1983-1987 | Sri Lanka | Tamil militant group threatened to use biological agents against Sinhalese and crops in Sri Lanka. The communiqué threatened to introduce foreign diseases into the local tea crop and to use Leaf Curl to infect rubber trees. |
| 1984 | Queensland, Australia | Queensland's State Premier received a letter threatening to infect wild pigs with foot-and-mouth disease, which was feared might spread to cattle and sheep, unless prison reforms were implemented within twelve weeks. Ultimately, this incident proved to be a hoax as the perpetrator turned out to be a 37-year old murderer serving a life sentence in a local jail. |
| 1996 | Florida, USA | A Florida university professor informed the CIA that a Florida citrus canker outbreak was the result of a Cuban biological weapons program. Although the CIA could not substantiate the claim, it did investigate the case. |
Examples (continued)
Source: W. Seth Carus, 1998. Bioterrorism and Biocrimes. The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900. August 1998. (February 2001 Revision). Center for Counter-proliferation Research National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Effects of Agroterrorism
Disrupt or cripple the economy of a nation
Destroy the livelihood of many people
Put food supply at risk, perhaps for a long time
Spread quickly before being detected, thereby reaching difficult-to-control levels
Cause high mortality and morbidity in target population
Cost billions to contain, cleanup and disinfect infected premises
What makes agroterrorism attractive to a terrorist?
Economic impact
Lower physical risk to the terrorist
Lesser chance of outrage or backlash
Similarity to natural or accidental outbreak – therefore, a plausible deniability
Lower technical barriers
Biosecurity - from Field to Fork
Must be applied from one end of the food chain to the other
Consider the entire food production scheme
Includes pre- to post-harvest, processing, packaging and distribution
Biosecurity on the farm is a management practice designed to prevent the spread of disease
Accomplished by maintaining a facility in such a way that there is minimal movement of biological organisms (pathogens and pests) across its borders.
Biosecurity is the cheapest, most effective means of disease control available.
Image courtesy of California Department of Agriculture
Identification of hazards
People, animals, vehicles, and equipment.
Contaminated feed and/or water.
Contact with other animals
Biosecurity on the Farm
3 Major Components
Isolation
Traffic control
Sanitation
Mitigating Risk
Case Designations – tiered diagnostic system (TDS) – just as with human diseases
Image courtesy of USDA ARS
Case Designations
Suspect case — premises containing an animal that has clinical signs consistent with a highly contagious FAD or emerging disease incident (EDI).
Presumptive positive case — premises containing an animal that has clinical signs consistent with a highly contagious FAD/EDI and additional epidemiologic information indicative of a highly contagious case.
Confirmed positive case — an animal that has clinical signs consistent with a highly contagious FAD and from which the highly contagious disease agent was isolated and identified in a USDA laboratory or other laboratory designated by the Secretary of Agriculture.
Critical Thinking
There is no doubt that foreign animal diseases are a threat to a nation’s economy and food supply. What are the essential elements necessary to recognize an FAD? Apply RAIN to one such situation and discuss appropriate actions for Recognition, Avoidance, Isolation, and Notification.
Animal Disease Outbreak Response
HSPD-7
USDA APHIS
Veterinary Services
National Veterinary Response Teams – formerly known as VMATs
NAHEMS
National Response Plan/Framework
ESF #11
Each Outbreak is Unique!
Enhanced biosecurity
Movement restrictions
Implement Control Measures
Areas
Zones
Premise Designations
Control Measures
Control Area (CA)
Infected Zone (IZ)
Buffer-Surveillance Zone (BSZ)
Surveillance Zone (SZ)
Free Zone (FZ)
Classification of Premises
Infected Premises
Suspect Premises
Contact Premises
At-risk Premises
Free Premises
Animal Quarantine
Every state has laws relating to communicable diseases among livestock and other animals and legal tools, such as quarantines and health certificate requirements, to control those diseases
Usually the power to quarantine is given to a department of agriculture or to a livestock commission or board
Includes the power to go onto private land and buildings to inspect for diseased animals and, if necessary, to seize them
Image courtesy of USDA APHIS
Movement Controls
Practices related to the control of movement of people, animals, vehicles, and equipment are critical to the maintenance of biosecurity during a disease outbreak or other animal emergency
Examples of practices involving movement controls include maintaining a closed herd or flock, identifying animals, keeping accurate records, and protecting animals from contact with wildlife
Movement of people (including owner/family members, employees, and visitors) is also considered a major biosecurity risk
Routine movement for services such as feed and manure removal as well as equipment on/off the premises should all have biosecurity measures
Depopulation and Culling
Euthanasia of animals must be performed as rapidly and humanely as possible
Considerations must be given to owners, caretakers, and their families during this process
It is the responsibility of the responders to ensure that when performing euthanasia on an animal, it is done with the highest degree of respect and with emphasis on making the death as painless and stress free as possible
If an FAD is confirmed, depopulation (or culling) is likely to be ordered by the state veterinarian’s office
Depopulation (culling) protocols include plans for the infected premises, contact-exposed premises, and contiguous premises
Proper destruction of all exposed cadavers, litter, and animal products are required
Carcass Disposal
Should be done on site – don’t move the problem off the farm, if possible
Options are not easy, especially when dealing with large numbers of animals
Mass burial – environmental insult
Landfill – move animals off site
Incineration – not easy to do, presents an airborne hazard
Composting – labor and equipment intensive
Disinfection
Guided by EPA documents
Numerous ways to accomplish
Clear and clean facilities down to the bare concrete
Some solutions are expensive
Care needs to be taken to reduce the generation and dispersal of infective dust and aerosols
If items cannot be adequately cleaned and disinfected, they should be disposed of by burning, burial, or other appropriate means
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Involvement of Local Responders
Animal health professionals will be heavily burdened with surveillance activities and depopulation efforts
Expertise of local responders may be essential for effective and timely containment of an FAD
Roles and responsibilities that responders may be called upon to assist with include:
Establishing quarantine perimeters for infected animal populations
Movement control (of animals, people, equipment, and products)
Contact tracing of animals to identify potential exposures
Tracing of visitors to a producer’s facility for the past 7 to 10 days
Cleaning and decontamination of equipment, vehicles, personnel
Discussion Questions
How would you describe a specific form of terrorism against agriculture, often referred to as agroterrorism?
Why might a terrorist “prefer” biological agents against an enemy’s agricultural sector to other Weapons of Mass Destruction and critical infrastructure?
How does agroterrorism relate to plant biosecurity management?
Discuss the roles of various response disciplines within each of the zones.
Critical Thinking.
Just how plausible is an act of agroterrorism? In your opinion, is it realistic or just someone’s active imagination?
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Chapter Summary
Agriculture is vitally important to the health and welfare of developed nations
Outbreaks may occur due to natural, accidental or intentional causes
Biosecurity is immensely important to the agricultural sector
Known the components
Understand Control Measures
Local responders may be called upon to lend assistance – movement controls, quarantine, carcass disposal and disinfection procedures will require many hands to get the job done, especially true if outbreaks are widespread