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Terrorism and Political Violence

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Mapping Far-right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment

Daniel Koehler & Peter Popella

To cite this article: Daniel Koehler & Peter Popella (2020) Mapping Far-right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment, Terrorism and Political Violence, 32:8, 1666-1690, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1500365

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1500365

Published online: 15 Aug 2018.

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Mapping Far-right Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism Efforts in the West: Characteristics of Plots and Perpetrators for Future Threat Assessment Daniel Koehlera and Peter Popellab

aGerman Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies (GIRDS), Graal Müritz, Germany; bDepartment of Infection Biology, Interfaculty Institute of Microbiology and Infection Medicine (IMIT), Tübingen, Germany

ABSTRACT The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism is widely attributed to collective actors based on a religious ideology, e.g. globally operating Salafi-jihadist groups like al-Qaeda or ISIL. Only limited attention has been given to the CBRN threat of violent domestic extremists in general or far-right terrorists specifi- cally. Nevertheless, a number of incidents involving far-right activists and CBRN agents in Western countries are known to the public, even though these have had comparatively little impact on public threat perception. This study systematically collected public information about far-right CBRN incidents to identify their main characteristics. The authors were able to identify 31 incidents in Western countries since 1970, which display features contrary to generally assumed forms of CBRN terrorism. Far-right CBRN terrorism appears to be predominantly a lone-actor phenomenon oftentimes involving mid- dle-aged and comparatively well-educated male perpetrators, mostly motivated by non-religious forms of far-right ideology (i.e. neo- Nazism, non-religious white supremacism) and indiscriminately tar- geting victims. Overall, far-right actors attempting to weaponize CBRN agents have been few and generally technically inept. However, the characteristics of the plots pose potential challenges for effective counter-measures and intervention, should the number of actors or the technical sophistication of plots increase in the future.

KEYWORDS Chemical; biological; radiological; nuclear (CBRN) terrorism; far-right; countermeasures; characteristics; incident database

Introduction

Efforts must be made to employ precision WMDs when fighting the cultural Marxist/ multiculturalist regimes of Western Europe, especially explosive weapons. Other types of WMDs (Biological/Chemical) must be considered as a realistic option as well. Efforts must be made to obtain any of the following WMDs.

● Anders Behring Breivik, right-wing terrorist1

CONTACT Daniel Koehler [email protected] German Institute on Radicalization and De-Radicalization Studies (GIRDS), Strandstr. 4, Graal Müritz 18181, Germany.

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2020, VOL. 32, NO. 8, 1666–1690 https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1500365

© 2018 Taylor & Francis

In 1995, four members of the anti-government extremist militia Minnesota Patriots Council were the first to be tried and convicted in the United States under the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act (BWATA) of 1989 for mail-ordering castor beans. They successfully extracted about 0.7 grams of 5 percent pure ricin, and plotted to assassinate a deputy U.S. marshal, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents, and a local sheriff.2 In May 2010, a member of the neo-Nazi so-called Aryan StrikeForce named Ian Davison became the first Briton convicted of producing a biological weapon (ricin again), in an alleged plot to poison water supplies of Muslim households.3 Even though far-right extremists have been prosecuted under legislation countering chemi- cal, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism in some countries first and numerous times since, their involvement, as well as their strategic and tactical use of CBRN weapons, has rarely received attention among academics, policy makers, and the broader public.

Based on a new dataset of far-right CBRN incidents drawing on open-source material (press reports, governmental documents, academic publications), we demon- strate that far-right CBRN terrorism is a rare but existing form of far-right terrorism. With a total of 31 identified incidents, the main findings of this analysis challenge some commonly held conceptions in CBRN and WMD terrorism research (e.g., that CBRN terrorism is usually a tactic used by groups based on a religious ideology). First, lone actors are predominant in attempted acquisition and use of CBRN weapons in far-right CBRN incidents (67 percent or 14 incidents of 21, excluding hoaxes and protoplots) rather than groups (including pairs of two). Second, non-religious forms of far-right ideology (i.e., neo-Nazism and non-religious white supremacism) are the widest held ideological beliefs of far-right CBRN plotters (58 percent or 18 incidents from the overall sample of 31). Furthermore, strategies of indiscriminate attack are more common (61 percent or 19 incidents from the overall sample of 31) than either discriminate or unknown targeting. Lastly, it is striking that more incidents with information about far-right CBRN plotters’ profession and education involved more plotters with upper and lower white-collar backgrounds (32 percent or 14 persons) than blue-collar backgrounds (16 percent or six persons), when excluding hoaxes and protoplots from the sample (leaving 38 identified persons involved in the incidents). The average age of plotters is 47 years (excluding those with unknown age, hoaxes, and protoplots), meaning that as a consequence far-right CBRN terrorism tends to be a phenomenon of rather well-educated middle-aged men (only six female suspects out of the total sample of 66 persons were identified). Additional findings about agents, plot dynamics, and complexity are presented below and the implications for law enforcement and counter-measures are discussed.

Definitions and terms

This study employs some contentious terms and concepts. Hence, the working defini- tions used are briefly introduced in the following sections.

A first key concept essential for the following analysis is the “far-right” or the “extreme right-wing,” both of which are used interchangeably here. The definition is

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1667

based on the spectrum of actors included under the term “white supremacism,” defined by Simi et al. as an “overlapping web of movements that include various Ku Klux Klans, neo-Nazis, Christian Identity, racist neo-Pagan believers, white power skinheads, Posse Comitatus, and segments of the anti-government Militia, Patriot, and Sovereign Citizen Movements.”4 The unifying ideological element of these actors is essentially apocalyptic racism (i.e., the idea of being “part of an innately superior biogenetic race (i.e., ‘master race’) that is under attack by race-mixing and intercultural exchange”).5

This study, after careful consideration, also includes additional actors identified by their readiness to use firearms to “protect rights they see as threatened by the government and to restore what they see as the Founders’ perfect plan for America.”6 Those militias, patriot, and sovereign citizens, which are not part of the white supremacist concept by Simi et al., were included here within the “far-right” to represent organized anti-government and fundamentalist beliefs as well as nationalist opposition to the current democratic status quo combined with a readiness to use violence. It was also recognized that the militia spectrum is very heterogeneous, spanning from clearly white supremacist and Nazi-style groups (e.g., Vanguard America or Traditionalist Worker Party) to nationalist or patriotic anti-government groups. This was also done in order to allow the inclusion of non-American actors from the far-right spectrum in the analysis. Furthermore, religious extreme right-wing groups, such as the Christian Identity for example, have also been included in the analysis to allow for testing the importance of religious-versus non-religious-based forms of far-right ideologies regard- ing the use of CBRN agents. The concept of right-wing extremism can be broader to include many additional group styles and ideologies, for example Black Supremacists or militant anti-communist groups. However, we felt that including these forms would have created too much of an analytical blur. Nevertheless, while not looking at this wider spectrum in this analysis here, it could be promising to look at characteristics of CBRN terrorism using a much more diverse sample.

Regarding the term “terrorism,” we opted for the “Revised Academic Consensus Definition” (RACD) understanding terrorism to be “on the one hand, a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness of a special form or tactic of fear-generating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, direct violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilians and non-combatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.”7 While the term “right-wing terror- ism” has also been contested,8 this study opts for the use or threat thereof of CBRN agents by far-right actors for the purpose of intimidating or killing ideologically defined enemies as a working definition of far-right CBRN terrorism.

Furthermore, as we look at “CBRN terrorism from the far-right,” it is necessary to clarify the specifics of what is counted as weaponized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents for terror purposes. Most research equates CBRN terrorism with the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but we agree with Ivanova and Sandler9 that the two concepts are inherently different. Therefore, their definition is applied here as well, including a CBRN incident in the sample “when CBRN substances are sought after, acquired, or used for a terrorist attack.”10 Incidents involving chemical agents with the

1668 D. KOEHLER AND P. POPELLA

purpose of manufacturing explosives are not included here, since their deadly effect is not the toxicity of the agent per se. In accordance with Ackerman and Pinson, we assume that CBRN agents “exert a stronger psychological impact on audiences—the essence of terror- ism—than the traditional gun and bomb.”11 It is arguably the specific psychological impact, for example inflicted through the victims’ fear of an excruciating and horrible death and secondary effects like the creation of uninhabitable spaces, which makes CBRN agents also a viable tool for assassinations or attacks with comparably low casualty rates. For the clarity of the following analysis, we chose to adapt Ackerman’s and Pinson’s typology of CBRN terror incidents.12 Those incidents in which an actor has merely discussed using or acquiring manuals to create CBRN agents without any further pre- paratory action are referred to as “protoplots.” Actual CBRN terror plots are differentiated into plots with “attempted acquisition” and those with “successful acquisition” of a CBRN agent. Additionally, there are categories for “threatened use” (when threats are combined with at least attempted acquisition, otherwise counted as “hoax”), as well as “actual use of the agent.” This study also counted “hoaxes,” i.e., the use of a non-lethal agent with the intent of simulating CBRN terrorism, because the psychological impact is still a major aim of the actor and the victim could easily see the “attack” as a warning and “test run” before the “real” agent is deployed.13

Methods and sources

This study is based on a recently collected dataset of extreme right-wing CBRN incidents. The complete dataset can be found in Annex 1. Existing databases (e.g., the Global Terrorism Database [GTD], the Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, Profiles of Incidents involving CBRN by Non-state actors Database [POICN]) are inadequate for two reasons. First, existing datasets are considerably incomplete when it comes to the far- right. The GTD, for example, only lists eight incidents with a CBRN agent (excluding those incidents with “chemical” agent listed but with the purpose of creating explosives) by right-wing actors and does not even include some of the most well-known far-right CBRN terror plots (e.g., the 2003 Tyler poison gas plot). A similar limitation was found in other datasets; the Monterey WMD Terrorism Database lists only 21 right-wing CBRN plots. In addition, some entries in both databases are listed without any verifying or supportive information or source. A second factor is that a large amount of data is not accessible openly and thereby not possible for researchers to validate. The Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, for example, is normally only accessible to U.S. law enforce- ment, intelligence, and active serving U.S. military personnel, even though access to researchers might be granted upon request and provided the justification for its use is deemed adequate by the database’s administrators. The POICN database, even while including far-right CBRN cases, is not accessible to the public either. As the main goal of this current study is to provide both a comprehensible and a publicly accessible collection of far-right CBRN incidents, the creation of a new dataset was the only alternative. For this purpose, we employed a systematic search within press databases such as LexisNexis and Factiva using a wide set of search terms focusing on actors (e.g.,

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1669

“white supremacist,” “neo-Nazi,” “white nationalist,” “racist”) and the most likely agents (e.g., “cyanide,” “ricin,” “anthrax”). Identified actors were searched by name again. “Blind” agent search terms (e.g., “chemical agent,” “biological weapon”) were used as well, to identify unknown or unlikely CBRN agents used by right-wing extremists. Those reports containing the search terms were collected and coded according to the available informa- tion (e.g., age of perpetrator, professional background, agent, status of plot, group back- ground, target group, specific ideology) and source quality (e.g., based on governmental statements, court observation, interviews with involved actors, secondary data). Furthermore, we used government sources (e.g., court documents, FBI archive) to either identify additional actors and incidents, or to complement press sources with more information and credibility. Furthermore, academic databases (e.g., Scopus, Web of Science) were used to identify existing research about the incidents and actors. In the final step, we compared that new dataset with the incidents listed in those databases which are openly available (GTD and partially Monterey) to check for potentially missing entries. When a missing entry was found but the authors were unable to identify any external supporting information or source, the case was not included in the analysis. Entries into the dataset for this analysis were only included when the incident involved a CBRN agent for terrorist purposes (as outlined in the RACD) according to the incident types presented above by a clearly identified member of the far-right either as indicated by their own statement or another kind of evidence (e.g., propaganda material found, witness state- ments, proven group membership) and when the incident is based on verifiable, openly accessible, high-quality information (e.g., at least two of the three sources: academic, governmental, press using primary sources such as interviews with suspects or court documents). If a case was found to be controversial regarding the ideological background of the suspect (e.g., Thomas Lavy), it was not included in the analysis. Even though the process did not include a systematic source evaluation as suggested by Ackerman and Pinson,14 we are confident that they have reached an adequate level of data validity and reliability through source triangulation, the focus on primary information cited, and the requirement of concurrence across different sources regarding ideological background, agent, and plot status.

Through this approach, we were able to gather a considerably larger number of incidents with more detailed information than currently available in previously existing databases. The entire analysis is based on openly accessible sources and thereby provides a dataset that is fully verifiable and usable to the research community. Finally, the article assesses for the first time the specific characteristics of far-right attempts to acquire and use CBRN agents.

Limitations

As the data collection process used English-language press, academic, and government sources only, cases from other countries that are not internationally known could not be included in the analysis. Since the overwhelming majority of cases are from the United States and United Kingdom, it is theoretically possible that cases from other contexts might display different

1670 D. KOEHLER AND P. POPELLA

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1672 D. KOEHLER AND P. POPELLA

characteristics. However, for the reasons of transparency and accessibility for international research, it was decided to limit the dataset to English-language sources. Furthermore, the collected sources, e.g., press and court documents, always present a certain institutional perspective on the case and cannot be considered primary-source data. With the given nature of the research topic, which is by definition a clandestine and criminal activity, the chosen approach seemed to be the best possible way to gather information without violating core academic standards and ethics. Finally, the historical record on far-right CBRN terrorism is scarce and it is not possible to draw robust generalized conclusions out of the small sample of cases accumulated for this analysis.

Literature review

CBRN terrorism in general

It is beyond the scope of this article to give a full overview of the abundant academic literature that exists about terrorists’ motives and potential to use WMD or CBRN agents. However, some important insights of that body of research are of high relevance for the main focus of this study. First, WMD or CBRN research is divided regarding the identification of those actors who are most likely to use these tactics. One group of scholars finds that religiously inspired terrorists are more likely to employ CBRN agents due to their potential defiance of the negative worldly consequences of their actions and their ideological orientation towards the afterlife15 as opposed to, for example, nationalist actors.16 Other researchers claim that the strategic logic of CBRN agent use outweighs ideological frames.17 The application of quantitative analytical tools by a third group of scholars has also led to inconclusive results; one study failed to find a significant relation- ship between CBRN pursuit and religious ideology,18 while another found that religious actors with a transnational agenda have a larger risk of pursuing CBRN than others.19

Based on the existing research, no consensus has been established on the most likely user of CBRN terrorism.

Second, studies focusing on the difference between group- and lone-actor-based CBRN terrorism show that single actors or autonomous cells are less likely to reach the necessary capability required for CBRN terrorism and therefore are more likely to engage “in cruder, smaller scale, and less frequent CBRN plots and attacks than their formal terrorist organization counterparts.”20 Such “organizations embedded in alliance structures and based in authoritarian countries with relatively strong connections to a globalized world are more likely to seek to develop or acquire CBRN weapons.”21

Third, one study finds that once the threshold for CBRN attacks has been crossed the risk of future use of these weapons increases by one and a half times for all perpetrators within the same ideological group.22

And fourth, a democratic, non-corrupt environment with a strong rule of law seems to increase the risk of CBRN terrorism.23 However, this claim is also disputed by other researchers, who find that terrorist organizations based in authoritarian countries are more likely to seek CBRN weapons.24

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1673

Extreme right-wing terrorism in general

Research on extreme right-wing terrorism has not received nearly as much academic attention as, for example, jihadist terrorism. In 2011, Alex Schmid found that out of 4,458 empirically based, peer-reviewed publications, only a mere 0.6 percent related to domestic terrorism, which of course includes several phenomena beyond right-wing terrorism as well.25 Most publications related to the extreme right either focus on party

Figure 1. Types of Incidents

Figure 2. Agents Used or Pursued

1674 D. KOEHLER AND P. POPELLA

politics and election results, subcultural manifestations (e.g., racist skinheads,26 Ku Klux Klan,27 neo-Nazis28), or mobilization strategies (e.g., white supremacist music,29

online activity,30 or clothing31). Only a handful of scholars have attempted to study right-wing terrorism as such, oftentimes looking at specific countries such as the United States,32 Germany,33 Scandinavian countries,34 or Russia.35 A key problem faced by right-wing terrorism research is of a definitional nature, as competing con- cepts, such as “hate crimes,” are widely used to describe extreme right-wing violence and militancy. This conceptual confusion has been criticized by experts pointing out the potential danger of applying inadequate terms to clandestine political violence or terrorism.36 Nevertheless, the “hate crime” vs. “terrorism” debate is still ongoing37 and

Figure 3. Ideology of Suspects

Figure 4. Scope of CBRN Incidents

TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1675

potentially creates a barrier to a more coherent and focused research on right-wing terrorism.38 Another peculiarity of right-wing terrorism in the few comprehensive studies that exist is the different relationship between the act of violence and commu- nication to the public by right-wing terrorists as compared to their jihadist or ethno- separatist counterparts. While there is a widespread agreement among scholars that terrorism is essentially a form of communication to reach a target audience,39 right- wing terrorists, at least from certain countries, rarely connect their attacks with a sophisticated communication strategy or any form of claiming.40 This points to the question of phenomenological differences between right-wing and other forms of terrorism. This aspect is further complicated by the different types of organized right-wing violence identified in the expert community.41 This typological debate was only taken up again very recently,42 and there is still a lack of clarity regarding definitions, types, and characteristics of right-wing violence.

Figure 5. Targets of CBRN Incidents

Figure 6. Professional Background of Suspects

1676 D. KOEHLER AND P. POPELLA

Nevertheless, research on right-wing terrorism has increased, and most recent works on the phenomenon have focused on biographical backgrounds of perpetrators and environ- mental context factors,43 mapping the organizational characteristics of right-wing terrorist actors,44 or the attempt to build a standardized database of right-wing terrorism to enable cross-country comparison and analysis45 (which has been common practice in other forms of terrorism for decades).

Extreme right-wing CBRN terrorism

In the aftermath of Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin attack in Tokyo 1995, some scholars attempted to probe Western right-wing extremist groups’ potential for the use of weapons of mass destruction. A comparison between Aum Shinrikyo and Christian fundamentalist parts of

Figure 7. Profession of Suspects (Excluding Hoaxes and Protoplots)

Figure 8. Incident Actor Size

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the far-right spectrum based on an assumed shared religious fanaticism led to diverging threat assessments. While de Armond found a substantial risk of WMD use by (religious) right-wing extremists,46 Stern found that the cost would outweigh the benefit for such actors.47 While undoubtedly intent to use CBRN weapons existed among so called “Christian Patriots,” they were also seen as lacking capability to design, acquire, or employ such a weapon.48

In the seminal mixed method comparative analysis of threat levels posed by various terrorist actors to use C&B weapons by Ackerman et al.,49 right-wing extremists (both groups and lone actors) rank significantly lower than jihadists. Qualitative ranking of chemical attack threats during an elicitation exercise that polled experts on their opinion

Figure 9. Incident Actor Size (Excluding Hoaxes and Protoplots)

Figure 10. Timeline of Incidents

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lists right-wing actors on rank 14 and does not mention them at all in the quantitative modelling, which was based on a set of statistical models to identify salient characteristics of past perpetrators utilizing, among others, the Chemical and Biological Non-State Actors Database (CABNAD) and the Big Allied and Dangerous 2 (BAAD2) Dataset.50 Biological attacks by right-wing extremists are ranked 12 (qualitative) and not included in the quantitative modelling.51 It is noteworthy that the elicitation of rankings from experts places the chemical weapons threat of right-wing extremists much higher (rank 5),52

which suggests an increased threat perception amongst subject matter experts. The reason for this is “presumably because these actors are not believed by experts to be likely to possess the greater technical expertise needed to acquire, produce or use biological weapons.”53

Beyond these works, a small number of case studies focusing on individual actors or incidents54 have been conducted. Even though it seems that relatively little research has been conducted on far-right CBRN terrorism, this reflects the historical scarcity of the phenomenon. As some additional cases have become known to the public in recent years, it seems warranted to verify and if necessary amend existing research regarding this form of political violence.

Summarizing the current state of the literature regarding far-right CBRN terrorism and keeping in mind that various aspects are contested, the most likely scenario appears to be religiously motivated right-wing extremist groups in Western countries engaging in CBRN attacks against ideologically defined enemies (e.g., immigrants, law enforcement, Jewish community). Based on the rare information about the biographical backgrounds of right- wing terrorists,55 it is expected that perpetrators are of comparatively young age, male, have predominantly blue-collar professions and rather troubled family and mental health histories. Far-right CBRN terrorism is generally considered very unlikely in the existing research literature.

Overview of the dataset

The dataset collected for this analysis consists of a total of 31 incidents which occurred between March 1970 and May 2017, mostly in the United States of America (28 incidents). Even before 1970, the right-wing California-based militia group Minutemen discussed the use of biological and chemical agents.56 However, the available information was too vague for inclusion in this analysis. Three incidents occurred in the United Kingdom and one in South Africa. Hoaxes (two) and protoplots (seven) make up about 29 percent of all incidents. In 23 percent of incidents (seven), perpetrators attempted but failed to acquire CBRN agents; in 32 percent of cases (10), they were successful in obtaining them. Threatened (two) and actual use (three) of the agent occurred in 16 percent of the incidents see Figure 1.

The most popular CBRN agent in far-right plots seems to be ricin, which accounts for about 33 percent (or 11 cases) of 33 counted agents across the 31 incidents (sometimes more than one agent was pursued or acquired), followed by cyanide (24 percent or eight cases) and radiological material (12 percent or four cases). Other agents that have been featured sporadically in far-right CBRN plots are anthrax, sarin, bubonic plague, and teargas see Figure 2.

Information about ideological affiliation is limited, but the majority of incidents were arguably driven by neo-Nazism (32 percent or 10 incidents) and non-religious white supremacism (26 percent or eight incidents). Sixteen percent of incidents (five) appeared

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to come from militia groups and another 16 percent (again five incidents) from anti- government extremists. Christian fundamentalism makes up for only six percent (i.e., two) of incidents see Figure 3.

Those CBRN incidents with adequate information about potential or actual attack design displayed a strong tendency to indiscriminately target the envisioned victims (61 percent or 19 incidents of the overall sample of 31). Those victims (total count of 32 cases as multiple targets could be stated), in the eyes of the suspects, were predominantly to come from the government (e.g., law enforcement, politicians) with about 31 percent (or 10 cases), or the general public with 28 percent (or nine cases) Figure 4 and 5.

Information regarding the professional and educational background of involved perpe- trators is particularly scarce (59 percent unknown or 39 persons out of the total sample of 66 persons involved in all incident types). The largest percentage of perpetrators with a known background are upper and lower white-collar (20 percent or 13 persons), followed by 14 percent blue-collar perpetrators (i.e., nine persons). The share of white-collar (upper and lower) backgrounds significantly increases to 32 percent (14 persons) when excluding hoaxes and protoplots from the sample (leaving 38 persons who actually pursued and succeeded in acquiring CBRN agents), as opposed to 16 percent (six persons) with a blue- collar background see Figure 6 and 7.

The number of actors involved in the incidents shows a strong majority of lone actors57

(60 percent or 18 incidents out of the total sample of 30, one incident with unknown number of involved suspects), which increases to 67 percent (or 14 incidents) when excluding hoaxes and protoplots (leaving 21 incidents) see Figure 8 and 9.

As the timeline of incidents indicates, there is a general upward trend of CBRN involvement in far-right terrorism since 1985, with a current peak in 1998 (four inci- dents). 2017 is the second highest year of extreme right-wing CBRN incidents (three) see Figure 10.

Discussion of findings

The dataset compiled for this analysis displays some striking contradictions to commonly held conceptions in some of the existing research literature as outlined above in the literature review. Although our sample is relatively small, we can nevertheless outline how extreme right-wing actors have increasingly sought to use CBRN agents in their terror plots and attacks in recent years, especially since 1998. Though the total number of 31 incidents appears to be minimal compared with attacks and plots involving firearms or explosives, and the plots generally were of low technical sophistication, the potential psychological impact of a successful CBRN attack should not be underestimated. The seemingly increasing interest in CBRN of far-right extremists, especially in radiological agents since 2008, warrants greater attention. Furthermore, this dataset appears to chal- lenge the main assumptions derived from some of the existing literature. Far-right lone actors, as opposed to groups (including pairs of two), are predominantly involved in attempting to acquire and use CBRN weapons (67 percent or 14 incidents). This is noteworthy, since the literature widely assumes lone actors and autonomous cells are much less likely than formal organizational counterparts to reach the necessary capability for CBRN terrorism.58 It may be the case that the higher education and professional background of perpetrators and plotters makes up for the potential capability loss by not

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being part of a full organization. Thirty-two percent (or 14 persons) of involved suspects of the dataset (excluding hoaxes and protoplots) had an upper or lower white-collar education and profession. High-level governmental or academic background may provide them with access to equipment, information, and critical infrastructure. Another con- nected aspect is the comparatively advanced age of involved persons. An overall average of 42 years and 47 years when excluding hoaxes and protoplots, means that plotters are more likely to have relevant life experience, personal skills and access to information, contacts and equipment, as well as the necessary ability to assess the difficulties and barriers for the plot than teenagers or young adults.

Even though only limited information was available on the ideological motivation and background of individuals involved in far-right CBRN terrorism, a strong indication emerged from the dataset that non-religious forms of far-right ideology, especially neo- Nazism and non-religious white supremacism, were the main driving forces behind the incidents (58 percent or 18 incidents of the dataset). Hence, it was not the notion of an “apocalyptic racism”59 that appears to have been an important goal of far-right CBRN incidents, but rather the attempt to create chaos and cause an uprising to topple the government; to force the authorities to declare martial law causing public unrest and helping far-right groups to take power; to directly weaken law enforcement and the government; or to destroy identified enemies. Widely held assumptions that the risk of political blowback for non-religious terrorists when associated with CBRN terrorism would act as a rational barrier against these tactics have not been confirmed in the case of far-right CBRN terrorism. This strongly supports studies arguing that the strategic or pragmatic logic behind the choice of weapon outweighs potential ideological repercussions.60 This finding is furthermore supported by the clear majority (also 61 percent or 19 cases) of incidents which involve an attack or weapon design indiscrimi- nately attacking prospective victims. This includes poisoning the water supply of large cities, detonating a “dirty bomb,” or pumping poisonous gas into ventilation systems of certain buildings. Even though in some cases the target group was delineated (e.g., Jewish community), the attack would not have made it possible to discriminate between indivi- duals or even small groups of people. Successful plans would have resulted in indiscrimi- nate casualties in the majority of cases. It is unknown whether the perpetrators saw a risk of political blowback, and a potential indication—the use of claiming and communication after the successful attack—is not available for most of the incidents, since they failed to come to fruition. It is known that right-wing terrorists rarely claim their attacks,61 and a popular strategy within the far-right calls for false flag attacks (the “strategy of tension”)62

to cause populations to rally behind right-wing extremist parties and movements for restoring law and order. Without assessing the communication behavior of perpetrators after an attack, we cannot be sure what the communication strategy of far-right CBRN actors might have been. Nevertheless, the fact that most attack plans were designed to target indiscriminately indicates that the persons involved either saw no ideological issue with that tactic or did not anticipate a significant negative backlash on their own group or movement.

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On the agents and complexity of plots

Multiple different agents of chemical, biological, or radiological origin were identified in the 31 incidents of the dataset for this article. However, for some incidents conflicting agents were listed in the analyzed sources, leaving only a vague idea of the agents intended for use. Nevertheless, the majority of incidents (11 out of 31) involved ricin, followed by cyanide compounds (8 out of 31). Both agents require only a low level of knowledge and equipment for their acquisition and can thus be rated as agents of low complexity. Cyanide compounds, such as sodium cyanide or potassium cyanide, are required for a variety of chemical synthesis reactions and can therefore be easily obtained.63 They are also ready for harmful application “out-of-the-box.” In contrast to these chemical com- pounds, ricin is a toxic protein of biological origin. Ricin can be isolated from the beans of the castor oil plant (Ricinus communis) using a small laboratory setup in a plain household kitchen with makeshift extraction equipment.64 The beans of the castor oil plant as well as the isolation manuals can be acquired via the internet. However, due to the mixed quality of source material and equipment used, the quality and purity of ricin isolated within a makeshift laboratory setup might be significantly low. Ricin must be taken up into the human body, e.g., by injection, oral application, or inhalation, to exert high-level toxicity.65 Since the production of ricin is laborious, it is unlikely that sufficient quantities can be easily obtained to affect large crowds, e.g., by aerosolization.66 Ricin is most likely to be used for targeted assassinations, e.g., of governmental personnel, or an attack on a confined space, such as a restaurant, e.g., by lacing bowls filled with food or sauces with ricin. Ricin is also the most prominent agent of biological origin identified in the incidents. Further toxins that are generally considered as potential agents in bioterror attacks, such as shigatoxin or staphylococcal enterotoxin,67were not identified in any incident. However, these agents are alsomore difficult to acquire, since theymust be isolated and purified from bacterial cultures, while ricin can be isolated in a simpler way from plain raw materials. Other biological agents (such as botulinum toxin) were included in only a few incidents. Additionally, bacterial strains were only considered as an active agent in a handful of incidents (5 out of 31). Anthrax, which has become synonymous with the spores of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis and the toxin produced by the bacteria,68 was only identified in three incidents. Anthrax is generally considered by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to be the agentmost likely to be used in a large-scale terror attack on theUnited States.69 It is therefore surprising that the incident numbers are low, since anthrax would be advantageous for several reasons.B. anthracis is anomnipresent soil dweller and can thus be obtained fromenvironmental samples by microbiological isolation procedures.70 Also, while growing B. anthracis in a make- shift laboratory setup is a hurdle for the unskilled person, any individual with microbiological training would potentially be able to set up an improvised production line for themanufacturing of a low- to medium-quality slurry of spores, infectious enough for application in a terror plot. Bacteria in general are more suitable for targeting large crowds, due to the spreading of spores and the contagious nature of most microbes. Additionally, secondary infections spreading from the primary victims would potentially broaden the impact of the attack, putting the public in danger and constituting a challenge to containment policy. However, this scenario is unlikely in the case of anthrax, since B. anthracis is not spread by person-to-person transmission. Viruses were not considered in any of the identified cases. While viral diseases, such as Lassa or Ebola, often result in high mortality rates, their confined appearance in countries of, e.g., West Africa, pose high hurdles for their acquisition. Additionally, culturing and propagation is dependent on

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eukaryotic host cells, which require sophisticated bioreactors, unlikely to be found outside of the pharmaceutical or biotechnological industry. High demands on sterile working and culturing conditions, to avoid contamination of the culture broth or for self-protection against the agent, further complicate the use of viruses.

Sophisticated agents of chemical warfare, such as mustard, sarin, and VX, were only identified in one incident. These agents are highly effective in targeting large groups of humans and have a long history of application in warfare because of their high toxicity, the ease of dispersal due to their volatile nature, and their frightening characteristics.71

However, they are also difficult for individuals or small groups to acquire or produce in a self-developed setup. This is especially visible in the case of Demetrius Crocker, the only far-right-aligned terrorist who tried to acquire a sophisticated agent of chemical warfare, the organophosphorus compound “sarin.” Crocker did not intend to manufacture the nerve agent himself, but attempted to buy it from a potential supplier who was in fact a federal undercover agent.72 The synthesis of sophisticated agents of chemical warfare not only requires chemical components of high purity and in-depth knowledge of the synth- esis process, but also places high demands on the safety and sophistication of the manufacturing equipment, location, and storage.73 These requirements are unlikely to be met by individuals or small groups with no access to industrial or academic labora- tories. This complicated procedure has so far only been accomplished by the highly organized Aum Shinrikyo cult, resulting in the 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, and the ISIL terrorist semi-state. More easily accessible are toxic industrial materials of the chemical industry, such as sulfur dioxide, hydrofluoric acid, or chlorine, which are transported in hazardous goods transports on road and railways. Chlorine, which reacts strongly with the water on the human mucosa and thus potentially results in airway injury (“dry-land drowning”),74 might be the chemical agent which can be acquired most easily by terrorists. Chlorine can be obtained from a variety of shops or, in even larger scale, from a wide variety of industrial applications.75 However, chlorine was identified in none of the analyzed incidents.

Similar to sophisticated weapons of chemical warfare, obtaining radioactive material constitutes a large barrier for its application in terrorist attacks. This is also visible in the low number of incidents which involved radiological agents. Only four out of the 31 analyzed incidents were found to include radioactive substances, and reliable data was accessible for only three. Additionally, we find no unifying characteristics in these incidents, with the incidents ranging from the scifi-esque construction of a technically unfeasible “death-ray,”76 to the harvesting of radioactive material from household smoke detectors. Americium and thorium, which were acquired by Brandon Russel, are alpha emitters, which possess only low penetration power, making radiological toxification by external application to the human skin unlikely. However, combining these elements with explosives, such as the hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD) found at the crime scene, might lead to intake of radioactive splinters after penetration of the skin, or inhalation of airborne particles into the human body after detonating the dispersal device. Either way, detonating a “dirty bomb” is a frightening thought to many.

In conclusion, the most frequently used agents in far-right-inspired CBRN terror incidents are those which can be easily obtained and require low technical knowledge for production, e.g., cyanide compounds or self-isolated ricin (21 out of 31 incidents). Agents which are more complex to obtain, e.g., requiring a microbiological production

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line, equipment for chemical synthesis, or the acquisition of radiological material, con- stitute the minority of the incidents (10 out of 31).

Implications for law enforcement, counter-measures, and future research

The analysis of the dataset outlined in this article presents potential challenges for law enforcement and preventative counter-measures, if the number of actors seeking to weaponize CBRN agents or their level of technical sophistication increase. Most of the advanced plots in the dataset were uncovered by chance, not by investigative work, or were never executed due to other circumstances (e.g., the plotter being murdered or arrested for different crimes). However, the clear majority of plots failed to materialize due to the perpetrators’ lack of capability in relation to the pursued agents’ complexity in manufacturing and weaponization. Furthermore, several plots were detected by other unrelated criminal activities of the perpetrators and what seems to be insufficient opera- tional security. Nevertheless, the growing availability of necessary chemical, biological, and radiological components as well as technical equipment, in combination with the will- ingness to plot indiscriminate attacks within parts of the far-right environment, give reasons for concern. As a consequence, law enforcement agencies such as the FBI rely on a “culture of security awareness” and a “well-informed” “citizenry”77 within the chemical and biological industries to identify potentially dangerous individuals or groups plotting CBRN attacks as early as possible. Building such a well-informed citizenry, however, would require a widespread net of training programs and providers specialized in various aspects of countering violent extremism (CVE), hand-tailored for different target groups. Education packages such as the “State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT)” for police officers should therefore be expanded and adapted for other target groups. Furthermore, dedicated counselling programs helping with the initial assessment of a potentially high-risk case have proven to be effective in other contexts of right-wing terrorism as well, as shown by a 2017 case of a disrupted mass-shooting plot against Muslims in Florida through concerned citizen reports.78

Future research should compare the specific characteristics of ideologically based CBRN plots and incidents. The data presented here poses challenges to some currently held assumptions regarding the most likely actors behind CBRN attacks. Far-right actors have been significantly under-researched in terrorism studies, even though the number and successful acquisition of CBRN agents in many of these plots over the last decades should have caused more interest from researchers and policy makers to better understand the risks and nature of the phenomenon in general. Finally, this article is based on open- access information (mostly derived from press reports and government documents), which of course harbors a not insignificant risk for bias and incomplete or false informa- tion. Much more verified and independent data collection on far-right (CBRN) terrorism is essential to increase knowledge and opportunities for comparative research on this form of political violence. Most of the plots in the dataset presented here have not been included in academic terrorism databases or have not been the subject of academic research so far. Compared with other forms, e.g., jihadist terrorism, the scrutiny and available data for right-wing terrorism in general is still concerningly weak.

Technically, the majority of far-right CBRN plots displayed a low complexity and sophis- tication and involved no likely mass casualty risk if they had been carried out successfully.

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Nevertheless, the potentially large psychological effects of such attack scenarios in combina- tion with an increased availability of agents and technical knowledge, might make CBRN plots more attractive for violent far-right (and other) extremist actors in the future.

Conclusion

Far-right CBRN terrorism is rare and small in scale, but a real threat toWestern countries. For decades, a small number of right-wing extremists have continuously attempted to and in many cases succeeded in acquiring CBRNmaterials, weaponizing, and plotting to use them in terror attacks. Even though the overall number of incidents appears small when compared to other forms of political violence, and the technical sophistication of the plots was very low, it must not be overlooked that even one successful CBRN attack with an indiscriminate target could have significant psychological or physical consequences. This first-ever descriptive quantitative study of the characteristics of far-right CBRN terrorism gives strong indications that this form of right-wing terrorism has characteristics which contradict some current widely held assumptions among academics and policy makers. Far-right CBRN terrorism appears to be predominantly a lone-actor phenomenon, oftentimes involving middle-aged and comparatively well-educated male perpetrators, mostly motivated by non-religious forms of far-right ideology and aiming for an indiscriminate targeting of victims. Based on that assessment, law enforcement faces potentially significant challenges in the case of a growing interest and sophistication of domestic far-right terrorists in CBRN terror tactics, and should be adequately trained and equipped to handle the potential threat. Nevertheless, this analysis also points directly to the need for a whole society approach to countering violent extremism and radicalization, as this might be the key point of intervention. Far-right CBRN terrorism is usually the result of long-term radicalization processes involving elaborate careers of political violence and action, based on the age and known biographies of the perpetrators in our sample. Finally, this article found that right-wing CBRN terrorism has to date been rare and mostly unsophisticated or entirely inept, which is an encouraging outcome. However, it became clear that some right-wing terrorists have been motivated to pursue CBRN materials in order to weaponize them. Future terrorists might be more capable, and even failed or crude attacks can have significant consequences.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Dr. Daniel Koehler is the founding Director of the German Institute on Radicalization and De- Radicalization Studies (GIRDS) and Editor in Chief of the JD Journal for Deradicalization. As a Fellow at George Washington University’s Program on Extremism and Editorial Board member of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague (ICCT) he specialized on right-wing terrorism and countering violent extremism. He is also the founding Editor of Routledge’s Series on Countering Violent Extremism and author of “Understanding Deradicalization. Methods, Tools and Programs for Countering Violent Extremism” and “Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century. The National Socialist Underground and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany”, which both were published by Routledge in 2016.

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Dr. Peter Popella is a scholar of microbiology and specialist for infectious bacteria and antibiotic resistances. After completing his bachelor thesis, he explored the biosynthesis of antibacterial peptides in staphylococci at the department of Microbial Genetics at the Eberhard Karls University Tuebingen, Germany. During his doctoral thesis in the laboratory of Prof. Friedrich Götz, he worked in the field of novel antiinfective compounds and contributed to new findings in regards to pathogenicity mechanisms of human-pathogenic staphylococci. His studies were pub- lished in journals as Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy, Infection and Immunity, Cell Reports, Scientific Reports and Angewandte Chemie.Combining his expertise in the life sciences with his interest for security studies and terrorism, Dr. Peter Popella contributes as an independent researcher to interdisciplinary research projects in the field of bacterial biological weapons and CBRN terrorism.

Notes 1. From his manifesto, 2038: A European Declaration of Independence, https://info.publicintelli

gence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf (accessed July 19, 2018). 2. Jason Pate and Jacqueline E. Miller, “Minnesota Patriots Council,” in Encyclopedia of

Bioterrorism Defense, eds. Rebecca Katz and Raymond A. Zilinskas (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons, 2011), 412.

3. Martin Wainwright, “Neo-Nazi Ian Davison Jailed for 10 Years for Making Chemical Weapon,” The Guardian, May 14, 2010.

4. Pete Simi, Steven Windisch, and Sporer Karyn, Recruitment and Radicalization among US Far- Right Terrorists (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism START, 2016), 6.

5. Ibid. 6. Sam Jackson, “Don’t Assume the Militias at the Charlottesville Rally Were White

Supremacists: This Is What They Believe Now,” The Washington Post, https://www.washing tonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/08/remember-those-militias-at-the-charlottes ville-unite-the-right-rally-heres-what-they-believe/?utm_term=.b2e5d590ffa0 (accessed December 12, 2017).

7. Ibid., 86. 8. See for example: Ehud Sprinzak, “Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The

Case of Split Deligitimization,” in Terror from the Extreme Right, ed. Tore Bjørgo (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 17; Kathleen Deloughery, Ryan D. King, and Victor Asal, “Close Cousins or Distant Relatives? The Relationship between Terrorism and Hate Crime,” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (2012): 663–688; Daniel Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century: The National Socialist Underground and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany, eds. Nigel Copsey and Graham Macklin, Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far- Right (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2016); Kathleen M. Blee, “Women and Organized Racial Terrorism in the United States,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 421–433; Pete Simi, “Why Study White Supremacist Terror? A Research Note,” Deviant Behavior 31, no. 3 (2010): 251–273; Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Right-Wing Terrorism,” in Root Causes of Terrorism, ed. Tore Bjørgo (New York: Routledge, 2005): 141–153; Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Thugs or Terrorists? A Typology of Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe,” JD Journal for Deradicalization Summer, no. 3 (2015): 1–38.

9. Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: An Empirical Study,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 4 (2007): 276.

10. Ibid. 11. Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use

by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, no. 1 (2014): 228.

12. Ibid., 233.

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13. For the phenomenon of hoaxes in terrorism see for example: Nicole Alexandra Tishler, “Fake Terrorism: Examining Terrorist Groups’ Resort to Hoaxing as a Mode of Attack” (Doctor of Philosophy in International Affairs, Carlton University, Ottawa, Ontario, 2017), https://curve. carleton.ca/42bfc43c-dce7-40f6-8830-3d94834dc3f4 (accessed June 18, 2018).

14. Gary A. Ackerman and Lauren E. Pinson, “Speaking Truth to Sources: Introducing a Method for the Quantitative Evaluation of Open Sources in Event Data,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 7–8 (2016): 617–640.

15. e.g., Bruce Hoffman, “‘Holy Terror’: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18, no. 4 (1995): 271–284; Nathan E. Busch and Daniel Joyner, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Arpad Palfy, “Weapon System Selection and Mass-Casualty Outcomes,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003): 81–95; Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychology of WMD Terrorism,” International Studies Review 7, no. 1 (2005): 148–151; Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs 77 (1998): 26–41; D. Gressang IV, “Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (2001): 83–106; Chris Dishman, “Understanding Perspectives on WMD and Why They Are Important,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 4 (2001): 303–313.

16. E.g., Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Thomas Copeland, “Is the ‘New Terrorism’ Really New? An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Studies 21, no. 2 (2001): 12–13; Nancy K. Hayden, Terrifying Landscapes: A Study of Scientific Research into Understanding Motivations of Non-State Actors to Acquire and/or Use Weapons of Mass Destruction (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2007).

17. E.g., James Dingley, “The Bombing of Omagh, 15 August 1998: The Bombers, Their Tactics, Strategy, and Purpose Behind the Incident,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 6 (2001): 451–465; Adam Dolnik and Anjali Bhattacharjee, “Hamas: Suicide Bombings, Rockets, or WMD?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 3 (2002): 109–128; Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, “Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17, no. 4 (2005): 573–598; Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005); Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It (London: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Zacharey Kallenborn and Philipp C. Bleek, “Avatars of the Earth: Radical Environmentalism and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2018): 1–31. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2018.1471972.

18. Victor H. Asal, Gary A. Ackerman, and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Connections Can Be Toxic: Terrorist Organizational Factors and the Pursuit of CBRN Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35, no. 3 (2012): 229–254.

19. Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Incidents: Political Regimes, Perpetrators, and Targets,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 3 (2006): 423–448; Ivanova and Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators” (see note 9).

20. Ackerman and Pinson (see note 11), 241. 21. Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer (see note 18), 229. 22. Ivanova and Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators” (see note 9). 23. Ivanova and Sandler, “CBRN Incidents” (see note 19). 24. Asal, Ackerman, and Rethemeyer (see note 18). 25. Schmid, Alex, “The Literature on Terrorism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism

Research, ed. Alex and Schmid (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 457–74. 26. E.g., Mark S. Hamm, American Skinheads: The Criminology and Control of Hate Crime,

Praeger Series in Criminology and Crime Control Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 27. E.g., Kathleen M. Blee, “Becoming a Racist: Women in Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and Neo-

Nazi Groups,” Gender and Society 10, no. 6 (1996): 680–702.

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28. E.g., Pete Simi and Robert Futrell, American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement’s Hidden Spaces of Hate (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

29. E.g., Timothy S. Brown, “Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and ‘Nazi Rock’ in England and Germany,” Journal of Social History 38, no. 1 (2004): 157–178.

30. E.g., Josh Adams and Vincent J. Roscigno, “White Supremacists, Oppositional Culture and the World Wide Web,” Social Forces 84, no. 2 (2005): 759–778.

31. E.g., Cynthia Miller-Idriss, The Extreme Gone Mainstream: Commercialization and Far Right Youth Culture in Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

32. E.g., Daniel Levitas, The Terrorist Next Door: The Militia Movement and the Radical Right, 1st ed. (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin’s Press, 2002); Arie Perliger, “Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right” (The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012); Max Taylor, Donald Holbrook, and Mark Currie, Extreme Right Wing Political Violence and Terrorism, New Directions in Terrorism Studies (New York: Continuum International Pub. Group, 2013); Simi, Windisch, and Karyn (see note 4).

33. E.g., Heitmeyer (see note 8); Daniel Koehler, “German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective: A First Quantitative Overview of the ‘Database on Terrorism in Germany (Right- Wing Extremism)—DTG RWX’ Project,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 5 (2014): 48–58; Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century (see note 8); Daniel Koehler, “Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Developments and Issues for the Future,” PRISM 6, no. 2 (2016).

34. E.g., Tore Bjørgo, Terror from the Extreme Right, Cass Series on Political Violence 1 (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1995).

35. E.g., Walter Laqueur, Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia, 1st ed. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993); Martin Laryš and Miroslav Mareš, “Right-Wing Extremist Violence in the Russian Federation,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, no. 1 (2011): 129–154.

36. Simi (see note 8). 37. See for example: Deloughery, King, and Asal (see note 8); Colleen E. Mills, Joshua D. Freilich,

and Steven M. Chermak, “Extreme Hatred: Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives,’” Crime & Delinquency 63, no. 10(2015): 1191–1223.

38. Perliger (see note 32), 85. 39. Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International

Terrorism (New York: Longman, 1994); Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media: From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the World Trade Center Bombing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Schmid, Alex, “The Definition of Terrorism,” in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, ed. Alex and Schmid (Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 39–98.

40. Koehler, “German Right-Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective” (see note 33); Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century (see note 8).

41. Most notably by Sprinzak (see note 8). 42. Ravndal (see note 8). 43. E.g. Simi, Windisch, and Karyn (see note 4); Perliger (see note 32); James A. Piazza, “The

Determinants of Domestic Right-Wing Terrorism in the USA: Economic Grievance, Societal Change and Political Resentment,” Conflict Management and Peace Science no. 34 (2015).

44. Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century (see note 8). 45. Jacob Aasland Ravndal, “Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence in Western Europe: Introducing

the RTV Dataset,” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 3 (2016): 2–15; Koehler, “German Right- Wing Terrorism in Historical Perspective” (see note 33).

46. Paul de Armond, “Right Wing Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Motives, Strategies and Movements,” (1999), NCJ Report No.194399, URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/ App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=194399 (accessed July 19, 2018).

47. Jessica Stern, “The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4 (1999): 517.

48. Paul Brister and Nina A. Kollars, “Pass Em’ Right: Assessing the Threat of WMD Terrorism from America’s Christian Patriots,” Perspectives on Terrorism 5, no. 2 (2011): 50–68.

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49. Gary A. Ackerman et al., “Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries Identifying the Adversary: Report Prepared for the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC)” (College Park, MD: Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014).

50. Ibid., 214. 51. Ibid., 215. 52. Ibid., 214. 53. Ibid., 208. 54. E.g., Jessica Eve Stern, “Larry Wayne Harris (1998),” in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of

Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 227–46; Raymond A. Zilinskas, “North American Militia,” in Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, eds. Rebecca Katz and Raymond A. Zilinskas (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 481; Lauren Harrison, “Larry Wayne Harris,” ibid. (2011), 383–85; Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Republic of Texas,” ibid, 536–37.; Pate and Miller, “Minnesota Patriots Council” (see note 2), 412; Jennifer L. O. Sheer, “Minutemen: A Case Study,” ibid, 413–14.; Jeffrey M. Bale, “Christian Identity,” ibid. (Wiley & Sons), 170–72; Daniel Koehler and Peter Popella, “Beware of CBRN Terrorism – From the Far Right,” Small Wars Journal September 19 (2017), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/beware-of-cbrn-terrorism-from-the-far-right (accessed July 19, 2018).

55. Simi, Windisch, and Karyn (see note 4); Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century (see note 8).

56. Sheer (see note 54). 57. For a discussion regarding the definition of “lone actor” see: Paul Gill, Lone-Actor Terrorists: A

Behavioural Analysis, Political Violence (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge, 2015), 11–15. 58. Ackerman and Pinson (see note 11), 241. 59. Simi, Windisch, and Karyn (see note 4), 6. 60. E.g., Dingley (see note 17); Dolnik and Bhattacharjee (see note 17); Pape (see note 17); Pape

and Feldman (see note 17). 61. Koehler, Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century (see note 8); Koehler, “Right-Wing

Extremism and Terrorism in Europe” (see note 33). 62. See for example: Philip Jenkins, “Strategy of Tension: The Belgian Terrorist Crisis 1982–1986,”

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 13, no. 4–5 (1990); Jeffrey McKenzie Bale, “The ‘Black’ Terrorist International: Neo-Fascist Paramilitary Networks and the ‘Strategy of Tension’ in Italy, 1968-1974” (University of California, Berkeley, 1994).

63. K. Ganesan, S. K. Raza, and R. Vijayaraghavan, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” Journal of Pharmacy and Bioallied Sciences 2, no. 3 (2010).

64. J. Audi et al., “Ricin Poisoning: A Comprehensive Review,” JAMA 294, no. 18 (2005); Dana Shea and Frank Gottron, “Ricin: Technical Background and Potential Role in Terrorism,” (2004): 2342–2351.

65. Audi et al. (see note 64). 66. Steven M. Presley, Ronald J. Kendall, and Seshadri S. Ramkumar, New Developments in

Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016). 67. D. Anderson Peter, “Bioterrorism: Toxins as Weapons,” Journal of Pharmacy Practice 25, no. 2

(2012). 68. R. Pita and A. Romero, “Toxins as Weapons: A Historical Review,” Forensic Science Review 26,

no. 2 (2014). 69. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Anthrax—the Threat,” https://www.cdc.gov/

anthrax/bioterrorism/threat.html (accessed December 12, 2017). 70. Niall A. Logan, Hoffmaster, A. R., Shadomy, S. V., & Stauffer, K. E. “Bacillus and Other

Aerobic Endospore-Forming Bacteria,” in Manual of Clinical Microbiology, 10th ed, edited by J. Versalovic, K. Carroll, G. Funke, J. Jorgensen, M. Landry, and D. Warnock (Washington DC: American Society of Microbiology, 2011), 381–02.

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71. Demetrius Evison, David Hinsley, and Paul Rice, “Chemical Weapons,” BMJ: British Medical Journal 324, no. 7333 (2002); L. Szinicz, “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents,” Toxicology 214, no. 3 (2005).

72. FBI, “Domestic Terrorism Tips Lead to Sting, Prison for Plotter,” https://archives.fbi.gov/ archives/news/stories/2006/november/terror_112906 (accessed December 12, 2017).

73. Dana A. Shea, High-Threat Chemical Agents: Characteristics, Effects, and Policy Implications, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7709/ (accessed July 19, 2018).

74. K. Kuca and M. Pohanka, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” EXS 100 (2010). 75. Ganesan, Raza, and Vijayaraghavan (see note 63). 76. Citing Peter Caracappa, faculty of the nuclear engineering program at Rensselaer Polytechnic

Institute, “Feds: Men Conspired to Build Mobile X-Ray Weapon. | Is That Possible?,” http:// alloveralbany.com/archive/2013/06/19/feds-men-conspired-to-build-to-mobile-x-ray-weapon (accessed December 12, 2017).

77. Kristina Hummel, “A View from the CT Foxhole: Edward You, FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, Biological Countermeasures Unit,” CTC Sentinel 10, no. 7 (2017): 11.

78. Kelly Weill and Emilie Plesset, “FBI: Florida Man Planned to Shoot Muslims from Mosque Tower,” The Daily Beast, April 12, 2017.

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