Discursive Ethical Framework

In Search of Virtue: The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths in Ethical Decision Making

Mary Crossan • Daina Mazutis • Gerard Seijts

Received: 1 March 2012 / Accepted: 6 March 2013 / Published online: 9 April 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract We present a comprehensive model that inte-

grates virtues, values, character strengths and ethical

decision making (EDM). We describe how a largely con-

sequentialist ethical framework has dominated most EDM

scholarship to date. We suggest that reintroducing a virtue

ethical perspective to existing EDM theories can help to

illustrate deficiencies in existing decision-making models,

and suggest that character strengths and motivational val-

ues can serve as natural bridges that link a virtue frame-

work to EDM in organizations. In conjunction with the

more fully formulated extant research on situational

determinants, we present and discuss our model that

introduces a virtue based orientation to EDM.

Keywords Character strengths � Ethical decision making � Virtues � Values

Introduction

We seek to present a comprehensive model that integrates

values, virtues, character strengths and ethical decision

making (EDM). Our intent is to leverage the large body of

research in each domain to present a decision-making

model that in its totality delivers critical insights for both

research and practice. The importance of developing such a

model has been widely recognized (Tenbrunsel and Smith-

Crowe 2008), yet the obstacles to its development are

significant since each domain has a long history of debate

and fragmented theory development (Treviño et al. 2006;

Wright and Goodstein 2007). We do not intend to resolve

these debates, but rather build on core frameworks in each

domain to extract elements that enable us to develop an

integrative model. Although we reference widely, we draw

specifically on Rest’s (1986) model of EDM, Schwartz’s

(1996) model of values and Peterson and Seligman’s

(2004) work on virtues and character strengths.

Our motivation in developing this model has been to

understand the role of character in decision making. In a

research project that sought to uncover lessons for leadership

from the 2008–2009 financial crisis, the term character sur-

faced time and again amongst the participants—mainly indi-

viduals from the C-suite—in a series of leadership forums

across three continents (Gandz et al. 2010). For example, the

participants described how arrogance and ego impeded deci-

sion making, and in contrast, how courage and prudence

served others well in being able to withstand pressure to pursue

investments that were based on dubious collateral or over-

engineered financial instruments. Furthermore, they com-

mented that leaders exhibiting character strengths such as

humility and patience; listened to what their managers and

employees at lower-level positions were telling them; and

these leaders appreciated divergent perspectives.

M. Crossan (&) � G. Seijts Richard Ivey School of Business, Western University,

London, ON, Canada

e-mail: [email protected]

G. Seijts

e-mail: [email protected]

D. Mazutis

IMD, Chemin de Bellerive 23, P.O. Box 915, 1001 Lausanne,

Switzerland

e-mail: [email protected]

G. Seijts

Ian O. Ihnatowycz Institute for Leadership, Richard Ivey School

of Business, Western University, London, Canada

123

J Bus Ethics (2013) 113:567–581

DOI 10.1007/s10551-013-1680-8

The message we received was clear. There was strong

sentiment that character was critical in leadership and

decision making even though most had difficulties articu-

lating what it was. More importantly, the participants

expected business schools to take a leadership role in

helping them understand what character is, to identify what

impact it has on decision making, and how it can be

developed. As we sought to understand the role of char-

acter in decision making we concluded that focusing on

EDM would help to narrow the analysis and would serve to

illuminate its role. Values and virtues evolved as important

underpinnings to character and so the proposed model

seeks to integrate these elements.

It is not our intent to present a set of propositions as is

often customary in theory development, but rather to pro-

pose a model with clear underlying premises and

assumptions from which a multitude of propositions could

then be developed. We see this as a critical step in

‘‘establishing how the virtues work (literally) in practice’’

(Beadle and Moore 2006, p. 337). In doing so our paper

makes several unique contributions. First, it provides

bridge-building between the philosophical and psycholog-

ical literatures and hence our model integrates key concepts

that have largely remained disconnected, thereby helping

to inform both theory and practice. Second, it fills an

important niche in the EDM literature by highlighting the

normative side through our focus on virtue ethics. Third, it

helps to bridge the microperspective at the individual level

with the macroperspective where situational pressures in

the decision-making context often exist. Finally, our model

is particularly relevant in complex and ambiguous situa-

tions, where ethical codes outlining universal principles

and rules are ill-suited to provide guidance to the decision

maker (Nyberg 2007).

The paper is structured around the model depicted in

Fig. 1 as follows. First, using Rest’s (1986) four-com-

ponent model of EDM, we describe how a largely

consequentialist ethical framework has dominated most

EDM scholarship to date. We then suggest that rein-

troducing a virtue ethical perspective to existing EDM

theories can help to illustrate deficiencies in existing

models, and suggest that character strengths and moti-

vational values can serve as natural bridges that link a

virtue framework to EDM in organizations. In con-

junction with the more fully formulated research on

situational determinants of EDM, we then present and

discuss a model that introduces a virtue-based orienta-

tion (VBO) to an expanded view of EDM that is rooted

in a learning framework. We conclude with a discussion

about the model, individual and environmental barriers

to EDM and limitations. Avenues for future research are

also considered.

Ethical Decision Making and Ethical Frameworks

In the introduction we noted that our model applies to

decision making in general, but we focus on EDM to

provide a sharper distinction to the theoretical concepts of

interest. The difference between decisions in general and

ethical decisions is not as straightforward as most indi-

viduals would think. Given that an ethical decision is

defined as any decision that may benefit or harm others or

that exercises the rights of some while denying the rights of

others (Hosmer 2008) it is clear that many decisions may

not at first be perceived as ethical when taken, but have

clear ethical implications when closely examined. We

chose to focus on EDM to surface underlying decision-

making elements, such as awareness and judgment, which

serve to illuminate why many decisions are not perceived

to be ethical in nature when in fact they are. As such,

although behaviour is the result of both conscious and sub-

conscious processes, we begin with a focus specifically on

the conscious processes of EDM.

One of the most commonly invoked explanations of

EDM is Rest’s (1986) four-component psychological pro-

cess of EDM that begins with moral awareness and moral

judgement and concludes with moral intent and finally

moral behaviour (Jones 1991; Jones and Ryan 1997; Kish-

Gephart et al. 2010; Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and

Fig. 1 A value-based model (VBO) of ethical decision making EDM

568 M. Crossan et al.

123

Butterfield 2005; Treviño et al. 2006). 1

Rest’s model is

based on Kohlberg’s EDM research, which in turn, was

built on the work of Piaget (Biggs et al. 1997; Stephens and

Smith 2009). While Rest (1986) prefixes the four compo-

nents of the EDM framework as moral, the elements

(awareness, judgement, intent and behaviour) are actually

purely descriptive and stripped of normative content.

Hence we deliberately omit this qualifier—moral—from

our model. As well, the term moral moves beyond values

and virtues to incorporate societal norms about what ought

or should be done, or what is valuable. We tease out

societal norms as part of the situational forces that influ-

ence awareness, judgement, intent and behaviour.

A useful heuristic for the categorization of normative

ethics is into its three major ethical frameworks: conse-

quentialism, deontology and virtue ethics (Hursthouse

2007). The basic tenets of a consequentialist account of

normative ethics is that what is right or wrong, good or bad,

should be derived from a careful analysis of the perceived

costs and benefits of a given course of action. Deontolog-

ical frameworks, on the other hand, suggest that ethical

behaviour should align with a set of universal principles of

duty, rights and justice rather than seeking net social

benefits, which may still allow for the marginalization of

some groups or individuals. In comparison, rather than

focusing on outcomes, the virtue ethics framework

emphasizes the excellences of personal character to define

moral behaviour (Ferrell et al. 2009).

This broad tripartite typology has been used in previous

research to distinguish between ethical frameworks

(Whetstone 2001) and is not meant to imply that other

ethical frameworks do not exist. Rather, philosophers have

debated the merits and challenges of these and other per-

spectives for millennia and a resolution to the moral supe-

riority of one framework over the other is therefore

improbable. Ultimately, however, it can be said that, at a

minimum, each perspective serves to inform the other two

and that no one approach can be considered to be a complete

account of ethical behaviour on its own (Hosmer 2008).

Descriptive ethicists—including sociologists, psycholo-

gists and business scholars who look at individual and

group behaviour in organizations—largely avoid applying

any manner of normative content (what individuals should

do) even when discussing intrinsically normative questions

such as the processes of EDM (Tenbrunsel and Smith-

Crowe 2008). This is not entirely surprising, given that

business or management, as a discipline, has been accused

of sidelining the discussion of ethics and morality in its

quest for legitimacy within the sciences (Ghoshal 2005).

The scientific approach favoured in business research

emphasizes the discovery of laws and patterns in the uni-

verse, and has thus tended to exclude the role of human

intentionality or choice, freeing individuals from any sense

of moral responsibility in the process (Ghoshal 2005).

The content of descriptive ethics, particularly in business

and management scholarship, has been almost entirely

consequentialist, with a focus on promoting a cost–benefit

analysis and the often instrumental outcomes of ethical

decisions such as sustained competitive advantage (Paine

2003) and superior financial performance (Vogel 2005). It

has even been observed that the pervasive focus on share-

holder value maximization (a consequentialist framing) has

become in and of itself rule-like and duty-driven and hence

entered the realm of deontological inquiry. Renewed debates

about the role of business in society that have accompanied

recent ethical and financial crises have also contributed to the

increase of deontological content in EDM process models.

However, there has been almost no discussion of virtue

ethical frameworks in the analysis of decision making in

organizations (Caza et al. 2004; Nyberg 2007; Solomon

1992). There has been some foundational work focusing on

the philosophical underpinnings of the link between virtues

and organizations. For example, Weaver (2006) connected

individual virtue and identity pointing out that organiza-

tions set a context for compartmentalizing identities, giving

rise to situations in which individuals lose sight of who

they are. In the end, however, the absence of a virtue

ethical perspective in current models of EDM presents a

unique opportunity to integrate specific individual-level

determinants of ethical behaviour in organizations

(Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe 2008).

To illustrate, there is a clear absence of a virtue ethical

perspective in Rest’s (1986) model of EDM. In fact, Rest

goes so far as to emphasize that his four-component model

represents the processes involved in the production of

a moral act, not general traits of people. The four

components are not presented as four virtues that

make up the ideally moral person, but rather they are

the major units of analysis in tracing out how a par-

ticular course of action was produced in the context

of a particular situation (p. 5).

1 While the terms ethical and moral are often used interchangeably

(e.g., Jones 1991), we understand ethics to be a system of beliefs that

allows individuals to make decisions about difficult issues in order to

determine what is right and wrong, while morality, more broadly

construed, may encompass and support a particular ethical system, but

may also include personal, cultural and societal norms and standards

by which people judge the rightness or wrongness of behaviour

(Hosmer 2008, p. 99). For example, at one point in time, slavery was

considered morally acceptable behaviour. However, analyzing slavery

through ethical frameworks such as consequentialism, deontology or

virtue ethics, allows for a more methodological assessment of the

rightness/wrongness of this behaviour. As well, something could be

immoral individually yet moral organizationally as would be the case

with alcohol where it may be immoral for some individuals to

consume alcohol given religious beliefs, but still moral for organiza-

tions to serve alcohol at company events given company norms.

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 569

123

Other models of EDM in organizations are also similarly

devoid of virtue ethical considerations focused on the

individual—how a charitable, benevolent, wise, courageous

or temperate person may act when facing ethical dilemmas.

For example, Treviño’s (1986) person–situation interac-

tionist model of EDM sidesteps the possibility of virtue

ethical determinants of EDM. Individual-level factors are

limited to personality traits such as ego strength and locus of

control (Treviño 1986). Similarly, both Hunt and Vitell

(1986) and Jones and Ryan (1997) allow for consequen-

tialist and deontological considerations in the EDM process,

but they do not consider a virtue ethical foundation. In fact,

many scholars have added individual-level variables to

Rest’s (1986) four-component model of EDM, including

thinking style (Groves et al. 2008), moral intensity (Jones

1991) and authentic leadership development (May et al.

2003); but none have included virtue ethical evaluations.

Indeed, several recent reviews of the determinants of EDM

in organizations clearly demonstrate the lack of attention

given to the possible role of virtues, character strengths or

values in the EDM process (Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and

Butterfield 2005; Treviño et al. 2006).

As in all philosophical debates, however, a single

framework provides an unbalanced or insufficient expla-

nation of ethical behaviour (Hosmer 2008). In discussions

of EDM processes then, research rooted in consequentialist

and deontological frameworks have prioritized questions of

‘‘What should I do?’’ over equally important questions such

as ‘‘Who should I be?’’ and ‘‘How does who I am affect my

decisions and actions?’’ What is needed therefore, for all

the three normative approaches, is an additional principle

borrowed from one of the other frameworks—consequen-

tialists need universal principles to balance their exclusive

focus on cost–benefit equations, deontologists require some

type of cost–benefit analysis to prioritize between princi-

ples, and both can be informed by examining how ethical

decisions might be made by an individual that one would

consider to be virtuous. This is a rather controversial

approach since some scholars, notably MacIntyre (1991),

argued that these three perspectives are ‘‘rival versions of

moral enquiry.’’ However, in the end,

each ethical system expresses [only] a portion of the

truth. Each system has adherents and opponents. And

each, it is important to admit, is incomplete or inadequate

as a means of judging the true moral content of mana-

gerial decisions and actions (Hosmer 2008, p. 112).

Although we are in general agreement with Hosmer, we

qualify the statement by suggesting that individuals need

not be seeking ‘‘truth’’ in the quest for judging ‘‘ethical

content’’ but rather, they may seek to broaden their

perspective in the quest for decisions and actions that are

better informed.

The next section describes in more detail what is meant

by a virtue ethical perspective specifically, and how this

perspective can serve to inform existing models of EDM in

organizations.

A Return to Virtue Ethics

The virtue ethical framework begins with an examination

of the intrinsic qualities that make someone admirable,

excellent or virtuous. Virtues are ‘‘acquired human quali-

ties, the excellences of character, which enable a person to

achieve the good life’’ (Mintz 1996, p. 827). This branch of

normative ethics is based in ancient Greek philosophy, in

particular the teachings of Plato and Aristotle, who con-

sidered the goal of human existence to be the pursuit of

excellence or of virtue. This constant striving for excel-

lence of character was deemed a necessary activity by all

humans so that they could live in a ‘‘good society’’ as

defined in terms of happiness.

The virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, justice,

transcendence and humanity have been valued not only by

moral philosophers and religious thinkers across a broad

survey of historical texts and contexts, but they emerge as

almost universally accepted components of what might

broadly be considered good character (Peterson and

Seligman 2004). Aristotle conceived of virtues as desirable

mean states between vices of deficiency and vices of

excess. For example, courage is a virtue between coward-

liness (vice of deficiency) and recklessness (vice of excess)

(Nicomachean ethics 1106a26–1106b28). Similarly,

humility would be a virtue between the deficiency of

shyness and the excess of shamelessness. Virtues are thus

moral qualities attributable to the individual that can

nonetheless be destroyed by actions that are in some way

deficient or excessive. Core to this conceptualization is that

individuals make a deliberate, rational choice to act in a

manner that lies between these two extremes and is thus

considered virtuous (Mintz 1996). In fact, Aristotle

believed that good judgement held the greatest importance

in ethics, and the ability to carefully consider how a vir-

tuous person would act when facing an ethical dilemma,

key to developing a virtuous character (Cameron 2011;

Nyberg 2007; Solomon 1992).

Aristotle’s view of the virtuous mean has been largely

ignored in recent discussions. Cameron (2003) has sug-

gested that there can be no excess of virtue. Instead, vir-

tuousness is something that is positively deviant, with the

mean—or normal behaviour—being ethical behaviour and

the deficiency being unethical behaviour. We concur with

this point when virtue is understood to be the virtuous

mean. Wrapped up in this discussion of virtue and vice is

whether it is human nature to be virtuous or not. Many

570 M. Crossan et al.

123

current management theories in general (Ghoshal 2005)

and ethical models in particular (e.g., Donaldson and

Dunfee 1994) make the implicit assumption that individ-

uals only engage in ‘‘good’’ behaviour because of complex

social contracts and engage in virtuous behaviour out of

abnormality. However, the opposite assumption is also

plausible—that human beings are actually predisposed to

be virtuous (Sadler-Smith 2012) and are instead continu-

ously fighting temptations to transgress and thus remain

true to their virtuous selves. These two perspectives high-

light the key role that context plays in exerting pressure for

better or worse. Although we do not specifically examine

the role of situational determinants on EDM (for a recent

review see Alzola (2012) and O’Fallon and Butterfield

(2005)) we acknowledge its role and will examine its

implications in future sections.

While common sense suggests that virtue ethics is

clearly tied to EDM, it is interesting to note the absence of

a virtue ethical framework in existing EDM models.

Rather, large quantities of empirical studies have focused

on descriptive rather than normative individual-level

determinants of ethical behaviour including demographic

characteristics (e.g., age, gender, education level), person-

ality traits (e.g., locus of control, Machiavellianism) and

other attributes (e.g., religion, dispositions) (Kish-Gephart

et al. 2010; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). Virtues, how-

ever, differ from demographic characteristics or other

conceptualizations of personality traits, in that they

intrinsically carry value. Personality traits, on the other

hand, have largely been divorced from any moral value in

their descriptive use in sociology, psychology or business.

Nonetheless, there has been an increased call to include a

virtue ethical framework into the analysis of various

management topics including: executive leadership (Manz

et al. 2008), EDM in organizations (Arjoon 2007), the role

of business in society (Arjoon 2000), market economics

(Graafland 2009) and even the pedagogical approach to

teaching business ethics (Mintz 1996).

We propose that research into character strengths and

motivational values can serve as two natural bridges

between the descriptive ethics of psychological or man-

agement models of EDM and a virtue ethical account of

EDM in organizations.

The Role of Character Strengths

Character strengths are ‘‘the psychological ingredients—

processes or mechanisms—that define the virtues … they are distinguishable routes to displaying one or another of

the virtues’’ (Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 13). As such,

character strengths present themselves as objective and

observable analytical variables—actual behavioural dis-

positions—that can be assessed according to traditional

empirical methods (e.g., the use of behavioural observation

scales to measure the character strengths of creativity,

compassion or fairness). However, because they are rooted

in the virtues, they offer a link to the normative content of

what can universally be considered good character and thus

help fuse the two domains.

In their compendium of character strengths and virtues,

Peterson and Seligman (2004) identify six universal virtues

that are common across a broad sample of cultures, reli-

gions and moral philosophers: wisdom, courage, humanity,

justice, temperance, and transcendence. The authors have

identified numerous character strengths that exemplify

each of these virtues and that have passed a battery of

validity criteria.

What is less clear, however, is how these character

strengths influence EDM in organizations. Simply being

creative, kind or optimistic is unlikely to inform EDM

processes in organizations. As such, character strengths

alone are insufficient to explain EDM. Rather, what is

needed is a theory of individual-level motivation to act in a

manner that displays these character strengths. Aristotle

contends that goodness of character can be developed

through practice of the virtues, for as ‘‘virtue itself is a

disposition which has been developed out of a capacity by

the proper exercise of that capacity’’ (Copleston 1962,

p. 336). In other words, the only way to become virtuous is

by performing virtuous acts. For example, Mintz (1996)

articulated that ‘‘we become just by the practice of just

actions, courageous by performing acts of courage. [These]

characteristics develop from corresponding activities’’

(Mintz 1996, p. 829). However, this is not meant to imply

that a single act of courage renders an individual coura-

geous. Rather, virtues are developed over time and formed

through habitual practice of the virtues and regular repe-

tition of the right actions (Graafland 2009; Sadler-Smith

2012).

The Role of Values

What then motivates individuals to perform virtuous acts

must be some underlying belief in the intrinsic value of

repeatedly behaving in a way that reflects the pursuit of

excellence of character. Here we present our second pro-

posed bridge between descriptive and normative ethics—

the vast empirical work on motivational values that has

shown that values are determinants of individual behaviour

and choice (Agle and Caldwell 1999; Fritzsche and Oz

2007; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Schwartz 1996).

Values are desirable, trans-situational goals that serve as

guiding principles in people’s lives (Schwartz 1996) by

exerting internal pressure to behave in a certain way (Illies

and Reiter-Palmon 2008). Thus values are ‘‘what people

want or consider beneficial to their welfare, although the

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 571

123

ultimate evidence for what a person values lies in their

actions’’ (Rokeach 1973). Values motivate action and as

such, values can be prioritized in some hierarchical manner

and preference given to certain values over others; if not,

individuals would become paralyzed by conflict and unable

to act (Locke 1991).

Schwartz (1996) and his colleagues have established that

there are ten distinct and universally applicable motiva-

tional values that can be distinguished along two competing

dimensions: openness to change (stimulation, self-direc-

tion) versus conservation (tradition, conformity, security)

and self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism)

versus self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence).

These ten values and their uniqueness are supported by

cross-cultural research (Smith et al. 2008). Each of these 10

motivational values contains two or more different single

values which represent a motivational value (e.g., single

values such as forgiving and loyal are reflective of benev-

olence). Interestingly, research on values and EDM has

focused almost entirely on just two of these dimensions—

self-enhancement versus self-transcendence values. Not

surprisingly, self-transcendence values have been linked to

ethical and socially responsible behaviour while self-

enhancement values appear to be negatively related to

ethical behaviour (Crilly et al. 2008; Egri and Herman

2000). It seems evident that individuals who are motivated

by self-transcendence values such as universalism or

benevolence will select different courses of action than

individuals who are motivated by power, achievement or

hedonism (self-enhancement motives).

The universal motivational values established by Schwartz

and colleagues and validated by others (Bardi and Schwartz

2003) have been found to have a circular structure in that the

competing dimensions form polar opposites to each other.

This means that pursuing opposing values simultaneously is

unlikely given competing motivational cores (Locke 1991)—

for example, seeking success for oneself (pursuit of achieve-

ment values) is likely to circumvent actions aimed at

enhancing the welfare of others (pursuit of benevolence val-

ues) which lie on opposite poles of the structure (Schwartz

1996, p. 4). This does not mean, however, that these opposing

values have limited relationships with character strengths and

virtues. In examining the relationships between values (as

proposed by Schwartz) and virtues (as proposed by Peterson

and Seligman), one can see how virtues might fundamentally

underpin different character strengths, which can ultimately

be seen as different expressions of what one values. For

example, the virtue of wisdom can be displayed through the

character strengths of curiosity, creativity and independent

thought, which are also characteristics associated with indi-

viduals who are motivated by openness to change. However,

wisdom can also be displayed through ambition and the pur-

suit of intellect (self-enhancement values) or through deep

understanding, tolerance and appreciation (self-transcen-

dence values). The same could be said for courage, humanity,

justice, temperance and transcendence in that these virtues

may also manifest differently for individuals driven by dif-

ferent motivational values. Relegating the discussion of vir-

tues as the sole purview of individuals who are primarily

motivated by self-transcendence values is thus an incomplete

account of how virtues and character strengths can serve as

underlying mechanisms in models of EDM.

Returning to Rest’s (1986) model of EDM, it is quite

possible that individuals with the character strengths

associated with the same virtue but with different motiva-

tional values would have different awareness, judgement,

intent and behaviour as a result of the application of those

values to ethical decisions. For example, research has

shown that the character strength of compassion is asso-

ciated with greater levels of awareness in others’ suffering

(Dutton et al. 2006) which could impact the EDM process.

However, this impact may differ depending on one’s

motivational values—an individual motivated by conser-

vation versus openness to change values, for example, may

choose to display their compassion through philanthropic

donation rather than a more stimulating or self-directed

behaviour such as volunteering in the field. Similarly,

individuals with the same values but with different char-

acter strengths will yield different outcomes with respect to

EDM. Motivated by self-transcendence values, individuals

may display compassion or generosity, both of which are

character strengths associated with the virtue of humanity.

Hence virtues and character strengths alone are insufficient

in explaining EDM as are values alone and it is only by

integrating the three that we gain a more complete under-

standing of EDM.

In summary, we argue that virtue ethics should be con-

sidered alongside traditional consequentialist and deonto-

logical models of EDM in social scientific accounts of EDM

in organizations. As well, by examining virtues, character

strengths and values together, we have greater insight into

EDM. In the following section, we illustrate the importance

of this virtue ethical perspective in EDM by returning to

Aristotle’s doctrine of the virtuous mean. In so doing, we

highlight several premises that contribute to our overall

model and therefore understanding of EDM.

Virtues, Values, Character and EDM: The VBO Model

Having bridged virtues to EDM through character strengths

and values, we now present the key processes in our VBO

model of EDM in organizations, which includes three pri-

mary components: (1) the virtuous mean, (2) a VBO and (3)

the buffering role of a VBO. At the core of our model is the

virtuous mean or the excellences of character that defines an

572 M. Crossan et al.

123

individual. We then link the virtuous mean to EDM by

introducing the construct of a VBO. We also modify Rest’s

(1986) primarily linear model by highlighting the role of

self-reflection in developing a VBO. Lastly, we illustrate

how a VBO functions as a buffer against dysfunctional

behaviour in the face of strong situational pressures.

The Virtuous Mean

In contrast to consequentialist or deontological frameworks,

the heart of our model uses a virtue ethical perspective built

around Aristotle’s characterization of the virtuous mean. It

is important to note that by ‘‘mean’’ Aristotle does not imply

average or moderation, but rather that one’s disposition is to

display particular character strengths associated with the

virtuous mean (Nicomachean ethics 1109a20). It is also

important to note that only character strengths, not the

virtues themselves, can be observed in excess. Virtuousness

here ‘‘is what individuals aspire to be when they are at their

very best … that which represents the highest of the human condition’’ (Cameron 2006, p. 319). As discussed, these

character strengths are associated with both universal vir-

tues and motivational values.

However, prior research that has tried to integrate values

with EDM has not adequately distinguished between this

virtuous mean and its close corollaries, vices of excess or

deficiency. For example, while we have argued that the

virtue of courage when associated with the value of

openness to change could be observed in the character

strength of bravery, self-enhancement when coupled with

the excess of this character strength (recklessness), or the

deficiency of bravery (cowardice), would quite likely lead

to negative individual or societal outcomes.

This observation suggests that developing the capacity to

operate within the virtuous mean is crucial to deepening

character strengths. We suggest that this process can be

understood as two different trajectories—a deepening of

character strengths within the mean as opposed to adding to

(or taking from) the mean which leads to excess (or defi-

ciency) of that character strength. By deepening within the

mean, there is a strengthening of character rather than simply

an accumulation of experiences that may serve to shift the

character strength away from a virtue to a vice. In developing

the virtue of courage, therefore, one may develop habits or

routines that exhibit the character strengths of perseverance,

bravery or integrity, thus deepening within the mean, but

must simultaneously avoid being reckless, righteous, or a

zealot which would indicate a shift to an excess of these

character strengths and hence a vice. Table 1 summarizes the

difference between deepening character strengths within the

mean versus accumulating experiences that lead to excess or

deficiency of character strengths.

These two very different trajectories have been lost in

prior research and yet may have significant implications for

EDM. There are two primary points to consider in this

regard. The first is in the examination of how virtues and

their closely associated vices of excess and deficiency

affect EDM. The second is how EDM may enhance or

undermine the development of character within the virtu-

ous mean. For example, using Rest’s (1986) four-compo-

nent model of EDM, individuals may find a virtue shifting

to a vice when they take action for which there is little or

no concrete or specific feedback from their peers that sig-

nals the shift, as for example in the case of integrity that

eventually turns into becoming self-righteous. In contrast,

development within the virtuous mean would arise when

there is reinforcement for character strengths and in par-

ticular when there has been some stretch in the enactment

of the character strength as might occur, for example, when

someone forgives a significant other even though it is

painful to do so. The development within the mean is thus

an integral part of a VBO, a construct which we discuss in

the next section.

Virtue-Based Orientation (VBO)

To link the virtuous mean to EDM, we introduce the

construct of a VBO which we define as a capacity to

deepen character strengths along the mean through self-

reflection while avoiding the vices of excess or deficiency.

Because virtues are habituated, this process is iterative and

requires deep contemplation regarding one’s responses to

ethical dilemmas. As such, we introduce self-reflection as a

mediator to Rest’s (1986) EDM model and depict the

sequence as circular rather than linear to signify the con-

tinual learning that occurs when individuals reflect upon

one’s own, or other’s, ethical or unethical conduct (Hill and

Stewart 1999). Locke (1991, p. 289) also highlights the

importance of reflection in motivational models arguing

that ‘‘reason does not automatically tell people what is right

or wrong, it confronts people with the responsibility of

validating their knowledge. However, they can default on

their responsibility and not exert the effort that thinking

requires.’’ This suggests that choosing to think or to reflect

about ‘‘what values they should pursue and the validity of

the values other people have told them to pursue; whether

and how to apply their values to a specific situation’’

(Locke 1991, p. 297) is something determined by indi-

vidual volition. We concur with Yanow and Tsoukas

(2009) that reflection should be understood as reflection-in-

action not simply reflection on or after action. Reflection-

in-action leaves room for understanding reflection as

embedded in practice and embodied in action, not simply

as a cognitive function.

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 573

123

Without this step of self-reflection, Rest’s (1986) model

of EDM assumes that individuals confront each new ethical

issue as independent from previous experience with ethical

dilemmas. However, research does not support this

assumption; people can and do learn from previous ethical

decisions and can thus increase their capacity for moral

reasoning (Sadler-Smith 2012; Schmidt et al. 2009). As

such, existing models and empirical tests of EDM do not

adequately account for the correlated nature of one’s

response to new ethical decisions with one’s experience

with past ethical decisions. A VBO explicitly includes this

deliberate reflection about the kind of person one would

like to become, as part of the capacity to deepen character

strengths along the virtuous mean. Our view is consistent

with the work of Bandura (1986, 1991) whose extensive

research has demonstrated that behaviour is motivated and

regulated by the ongoing process of self-influence. Self-

monitoring of behaviour and associated outcomes is a

cornerstone of the self-regulation process.

Because we define a VBO as the capacity to deepen

character strengths along the virtuous mean through self-

reflection, we conceptualize a VBO as something that can

be developed. As such, we use orientation in the sense that

one is either more or less aligned with a VBO and that a

VBO can thus also be observed in terms of degree.

The VBO and capacity for self-reflection does not,

however, suggest that EDM is a purely rational process and

that individuals must engage in ‘‘deliberate and extensive

reasoning as a precursor for ethical behaviour’’ (Sonensh-

ein 2007, p. 1024). Rather, we argue that without a VBO

and self-reflection, individuals are more likely to fail to

learn from previous situations and hence are more likely to

shift unconsciously towards the vices of excess or defi-

ciency. As such, a VBO model is neither purely rational

nor purely intuitionist, but rather a combination of both.

Individual values which drive behaviour are largely

unconscious; however, individuals have the capacity to

reflect on these values and therefore to change their

behaviour. In this manner, a VBO to EDM can also serve

as a buffer against strong situational pressures to act

unethically.

The Buffering Role of a VBO

Given the results of several well-known experiments in

social psychology (e.g., Milgram’s obedience studies, the

good Samaritan lecture and intervention, Zimbardo’s

prison experiment, and the Robbers Cave experiment),

many researchers have suggested that ‘‘character doesn’t

matter’’ in questions of EDM. Because otherwise ‘‘good’’

individuals are willing to commit ‘‘bad’’ acts under par-

ticular circumstances, critics argue that character strengths

can not be understood as stable and consistent but rather

that they will bend to the particular demands of the

Table 1 Deepening within the mean versus beyond the mean

Virtue Deficiency Mean Excess Wisdom Unoriginality

Closed to experience Closed minded Apathy

Creativity Curiosity Open Mindedness Love of Learning

Impracticality Unfocused interest Lack of judgement Obsessive

Courage Cowardice Laziness Inauthenticity

Bravery Persistence Integrity

Recklessness Zealot Righteousness

Humanity Harsh/Cruel Unfeeling Stinginess Socially awkward

Kindness Compassion Generosity Social Intelligence

Obsequious Indulgent Profligacy Manipulative

Justice Treachery Unjust Lack of confidence

Citizenship Fairness Leadership

Blind obedience Undiscerning Dictatorship

Temperance Unmerciful Boastfulness Rash Sloth

Forgiveness Humility Prudence Self-regulation

Pushover Self-deprecation Overly cautious Inflexible

Transcendence Ungrateful Hopeless Spiritlessness

Gratitude Hope Spirituality

Suppliant Behaviour Foolishness Fundamentalism

574 M. Crossan et al.

123

situation. For example, despite being compassionate, kind

and caring, individuals still administered what they con-

sidered to be excruciating electrical shocks to innocent

participants if so instructed by a person of authority or

failed to help someone in need if they were personally late

for another appointment (Zimbardo 2008). In this manner,

situationalists suggest that relying on issues of character to

explain EDM is futile as it can not address why even vir-

tuous people might behave in an uncharacteristically un-

virtuous manner; strong character alone cannot prevent

unethical behaviour (Alzola 2012; Homiak 2007).

In response, ethicists have examined the degree of moral

intensity, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of

responsibility for deleterious behaviour, strength of orga-

nizational culture and other situational or issue specific

moderators to explain the deviation from otherwise virtu-

ous decisions. For example, Jones (1991) argued, and

research has supported (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005),

that specific characteristics of the moral issue itself (e.g.,

magnitude of consequences, degree of social consensus)

can affect the likelihood of ethical behaviour. Other situ-

ational determinants suggested to affect EDM include

cultural, industry and environmental factors (Hunt and

Vitell 1986), job context and organizational culture

(Treviño 1986) and perception of rewards and punishments

(Ashkanasy et al. 2006). In fact, a recent meta-analysis of

the individual, issue and organizational determinants of

EDM found that organizational climates that emphasize

self-interest promoted unethical behaviour while benevo-

lent, principled ethical climates and stronger ethical

cultures are inversely related to unethical choices

(Kish-Gephart et al. 2010).

However, individuals do vary in the degree to which

they are susceptible to these situational pressures (Treviño

1986) and previous experience and reflection on ethical

dilemmas appears to bolster one’s resolve. Comer and

Vega (2008, p. 129) introduce the idea of personal ethical

thresholds to describe

how vulnerable the individual is to situational factors

in his or her organization, i.e., how little or how much

in the way of these contingencies it takes for orga-

nizational members to cross their proverbial line,

acting in a way they consider unethical.

Not everyone in the Milgram studies, for example, was

completely compliant to authority—in fact, 35 % dis-

obeyed. In replication studies, this rate of disobedience has

ranged from 12 to 72 %, indicating significant variance in

individual response to situational pressures (Zimbardo

2008). Joseph Dimow, a participant in the original Milgram

studies, recently reflected on why he declined to obey the

‘‘teacher’s’’ orders to administer greater shocks to the

‘‘learner’’, attributing his dissent to a suspicion of authority

born out of early experiences in political and military

organizations (Dimow 2004). The circular nature of a VBO

to EDM that includes self-reflection on previous experi-

ences can thus serve as a buffer against the strong pressures

of external situations to act against one’s virtuous core.

We argue then that when a VBO model of EDM is fully

engaged, individuals are better equipped to cope with sit-

uational pressures and are thus better equipped to make

ethical decisions. We see a VBO as operating in degrees—

one can have more or less of it and it is through the cir-

cularity of the EDM model and self-reflection in particular

that one develops, or habituates, a greater VBO. The VBO

can therefore be seen as a coping response—a self-control

strategy that facilitates the maintenance of behaviours that

are deemed desirable (Marx 1982). In the case of low

VBO, external forces—situational pressures, business

norms and the moral intensity of the issue itself—will

overwhelm the EDM process. In contrast, a greater degree

of VBO suggests that virtues, character strengths and val-

ues work together to overcome situational pressures in the

EDM process. The capacity to accumulate experiences that

deepen character strengths along the virtuous mean while

avoiding the second trajectory of accumulating experiences

that go beyond the mean into the vices of excess or defi-

ciency plays a buffering or moderating role.

The idea that virtuousness can buffer individuals against

negative performance has been observed in studies of

positive psychological states such as ‘‘courage, optimism,

faith, integrity, forgiveness, and compassion [that] have

been found to protect against psychological distress,

addiction, and dysfunctional behaviour’’ (Caza et al. 2004,

p. 174). The growing body of literature in positive psy-

chology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi 2000), positive

organizational behaviour (Luthans 2002) and positive

organization scholarship (Cameron et al. 2003) suggests

that striving for the highest in human potential can enable

individuals and the organizations they work for to with-

stand detrimental individual, group and organizational

outcomes (Caza et al. 2004; Cameron 2006).

In summary, we propose that these three core ele-

ments—the virtuous mean, a VBO and the buffering role of

a VBO—serve as a model to augment existing conse-

quentialist and deontological accounts of EDM. While

evaluating the costs–benefits of a decision on all parties

(consequentialist framing) in light of universal principles

of duty and obligation (deontological framing) is critical to

EDM, a virtue ethical perspective allows one to also con-

sider the interplay between character strengths and values

as drivers of a VBO approach to ethical dilemmas. It also

highlights the critical, mediating role of self-reflection in a

continuous learning model of EDM.

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 575

123

Core Premises of the VBO Model

Having presented the major components of our model, we

now transition to a statement of claims or core premises

that underpin the model. They are intended to capture the

core ideas of the model and in some cases are established

points building on prior theory, and in others, more novel

insights that arise from our theorizing. In all cases, these

claims form the foundation of our theoretical model.

1. Character strengths are the positive behavioural

dispositions associated with a set of universal virtues.

2. Character strengths shift from the virtuous mean to

vice if manifest in either their excess or deficiency.

3. Character strengths are developed through experi-

ences that deepen the strength without depleting it

(deficiency) or embellishing it (excess).

4. Values provide the motivational force that influences

the disposition towards experiences that deepen char-

acter strengths and virtues.

5. Individuals choose to activate (or not) a VBO to

EDM by engaging in self-reflection on previous

experiences with ethical dilemmas. Self-knowledge

and feedback are a sine qua non for self-reflection

and hence learning to occur.

6. A VBO buffers or moderates the effects of situational

forces on EDM. Situational forces dominate EDM under

the consequentialist paradigm in the case of low VBO.

7. In the case of low VBO, where a deontological approach

anchored in shareholder value maximization reigns,

situational forces will be filtered through that lens alone.

8. The more complex and conflictual the forces, the

greater the need for a VBO.

9. Most decisions have an ethical component but are not

perceived as such. Character strengths provide a

means to bridge EDM to decision making in general

through the construct of VBO.

10. It is through the circularity of Rest’s EDM model and

through the mediating role of self-reflection that

individuals develop a VBO. The development of a

VBO is a conscious process that becomes habitual

and intuitive with experience.

Having outlined the principle components of the VBO

model as well as the underlying core premises that link

virtues, values, character strengths and EDM, we now turn

to a discussion about the implications of the model for

theory, teaching and practice.

Discussion

In the last several decades, research on virtues, values,

character strengths and EDM has been abundant. However,

most theories and empirical tests have focused on just a

fragment of the entire nomological network or just one or

two aspects of EDM processes without providing an inte-

grative framework (O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005). Fur-

thermore, most accounts of EDM within organizations

implicitly follow a consequentialist framework focused on

cost–benefit analysis and ethical outcomes. In contrast, we

have proposed herein an integrated model of EDM that

incorporates virtues, values and character strengths with

both rational and intuitionist models of EDM, delivering a

set of premises that provide the opportunity for further

theorizing around each of the components of the model. As

such, we contribute to theory building in several research

domains.

First, many existing models of EDM are implicitly lin-

ear, suggesting that individuals approach each new ethical

decision in isolation from previous experience. We argue

instead that EDM should be seen as circular, and that self-

reflection plays a crucial mediating role in the EDM pro-

cess. It is through self-reflection that individuals can

develop a VBO, or a commitment to deepen character

strengths along the virtuous mean while avoiding the vices

of excess and deficiency. This critical element has been

previously overlooked in (or explicitly left out of) existing

EDM models, despite increasing evidence regarding the

importance of self-reflection in moral development and

EDM (Schmidt et al. 2009).

Second, previous research into the role of values and

EDM has also implicitly privileged some values over

others (e.g. self-transcendence over self-interest) as moti-

vators of ethical behaviour (Agle and Caldwell 1999).

However, this may in fact mask how values and virtues

interact and are manifest in different underlying character

strengths and how these character strengths can either be

deepened along the virtuous mean or shift through expe-

riences towards vices of excess or deficiency. Under-

standing this variance within the character strengths

associated with the values and virtues may explain some of

the equivocal research findings around their relationship to

EDM.

Third, most extant studies that report correlations

between values and ethical behaviour are largely devoid of

any normative content (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Crowe

2008) thus leaving unexplained which processes drive the

significant relationship between values and behaviour (i.e.

the black-box phenomenon). In contrast, we propose that it

is precisely a virtue ethical perspective that is missing from

existing models of EDM. Given that it has been shown that

both consequentialist and deontological considerations

have an impact on EDM (e.g. Groves et al. 2008), we argue

that a virtue ethical perspective will also have an impact on

EDM, particularly through the deepening of character

strengths around the virtuous mean, the development of a

576 M. Crossan et al.

123

VBO and the buffering role of the VBO in guarding against

situational pressures.

Fourth, our model of EDM is not meant to imply that all

that is required to consistently make ethical decisions is a

VBO. Rather, it is meant to highlight that in the case of a

low VBO, both consequentialist and deontological frame-

works privilege a process of awareness, judgement, intent

and behaviour that is less resistant to situational pressures.

For example, a stakeholder theory of EDM, which is a

fundamentally consequentialist theory of decision making,

would define the right or ethical decision as that which

satisfies or balances the needs of the most salient firm

stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, customers, suppliers or

employees). The ‘‘good’’ CEO is then the one who is able

to balance all of these internal and external situational

demands in a manner that maximizes the net utility for all

stakeholders. The danger here, of course, is that the EDM

process gets overwhelmed by situational pressures that

dictate the right course of action and the CEO may be

accused of being inconsistent or lacking clear principles. A

virtue ethical perspective, on the other hand, such as the

VBO model proposed, would ask an entirely different set

of questions to ascertain what the right decision may be or

what the ‘‘good’’ CEO may decide to do.

Take for example the recent case of Maple Leaf Foods

and the 2008 listeria outbreak in Canada, in which more

than 20 people died and hundreds fell ill as a result of

consuming contaminated meat. The situation was highly

complex in that seemingly incompatible pressures

emerged—short term profit versus long term sustainability

and conflicting stakeholder perspectives, to mention a few.

A purely consequentialist framing, especially one focused

on shareholder wealth protection, may have suggested the

best course of action was to deny any responsibility, to

continue to defend this decision, and to try to lay blame for

deaths and illnesses elsewhere. Similarly, a purely deon-

tological framing may also have delayed response as one

debated the rights, responsibilities and duties of all inter-

mediaries involved in handling the contaminated meat

products. In contrast, building in a virtue-based approach

provides insight not solely on the response or the outcome

of the response, but to the nature of the individuals

involved in leading the response to the crisis. A VBO

allows us to ask—what would a courageous, temperate or

wise CEO do in such a situation?

Maple Leaf Foods launched an immediate recall of the

suspected contaminated products to mitigate the risk to

consumers and closed their processing plant within a day of

the listeria reports. The recalls and the collection and

destruction of the recalled products cost Maple Leaf Foods

tens of millions of dollars. The CEO, Michael McCain,

gave a press conference as soon as word of the outbreak

reached him, and publicly apologized to all Canadians,

expressing his sympathy for those affected. The CEO took

personal accountability for the problems and showed

compassion. As the crisis unfolded, television spots and

advertisements gave updates on what the company was

learning through its investigation. It provided specific plans

to correct the problem. Additional structures and processes

have been put in place since the crisis to help Maple Leaf

Foods become a global leader in food safety.

In dealing with the crisis, the CEO’s approach was

decisive and transparent, displaying character strengths of

leadership and fairness as associated with the virtue of

justice. Michael McCain acted with honesty and integrity

in dealing with all stakeholders, character strengths asso-

ciated with the virtue of courage. He behaved with open

mindedness and an unwavering commitment to social

responsibility, character strengths associated with the vir-

tues of wisdom. Throughout the days and weeks that fol-

lowed the outbreak, he showed a great sense of compassion

and kindness, character strengths that are a reflection of

humanity. Last but not least, he did so with great humility,

a character strength associated with the virtue of temper-

ance. No doubt there were deontological and consequen-

tialist elements to his decision making, however, the VBO

element was clear. As Nyberg (2007, p. 587) argued: ‘‘… traditional ethical theories (consequentialism and deontol-

ogy) are not suitable … since universal principles and rules leave little room for the ambiguity and everydayness of

situated work activities.’’ These theories have challenges

capturing complex organizational practices—situations

with information uncertainties and ambiguities; situations

that involve ethical leadership predicaments; and moral

dilemmas embedded in the decision-making context

(Beabout 2012). A VBO to EDM thus has the potential to

free individuals from purely consequentialist frameworks

without committing them to a purely shareholder duty

(deontological) perspective. It is essential in complex or

turbulent situations where there is no immediate or

straightforward plan of action.

Last, the three components of a VBO model—the vir-

tuous mean, the VBO, and the buffering role of a VBO—

can also be applied to decision making in general, not only

to EDM. Many strategic decision-making models are

similarly anchored in a problem identification, judgement

and selection sequence, which have been depicted as either

purely rational or bounded rational processes (Eisenhardt

and Zbaracki 1992). Models of bounded rationality suggest

that individuals are plagued by cognitive limitations and

thus rely heavily on established routines to make strategic

judgements (e.g. base rate fallacy, confirmation bias, or

bandwagon effect). We argue that this routinization of

decision making can easily incorporate a VBO in that the

habituation process that is inherent in cultivating the vir-

tues of character, just as inculcating routines around

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 577

123

shareholder value maximization, is something that occurs

with practice. Reflecting on the routines within the orga-

nization can therefore surface the underlying normative

framework that is being applied and hence improve deci-

sion-making over time.

The foregoing describes contributions to current

research, however the model also provides opportunity for

future research. We address these opportunities as they

relate to the various components of the model.

With respect to the character strengths and virtues, there

is opportunity to develop the model by delving more dee-

ply into the role of each of the virtues and their relationship

to EDM. We have not advocated any particular role for

each of the virtues and it remains to be seen how these

character strengths interact with each other and how they

support EDM. It is quite possible that some are more

important than others and that combinations of various

character strengths and virtues reveal themselves as

working together in unique ways. For example, research

has suggested that humility, a character strength associated

with the virtue of temperance, may also be associated with

openness to new ideas and a love of learning (Vera and

Rodriguez-Lopez 2004), which are traditionally character

strengths reflective of the virtue of wisdom. It could be

then that temperance and wisdom work together in the

development of a VBO to EDM in that individuals who are

disposed to a love of learning are more open to self-

reflection and when coupled with humility or self-regula-

tion are better equipped to engage in balanced processing

of both positive and negative feedback. More interestingly,

future research could also investigate if there are particular

virtues or character strengths that work against each other

to prevent the development of a VBO to EDM.

Although related to the former point, there is an addi-

tional opportunity to examine the relationship between

values, virtues and the components of EDM as described

by Rest (1986). For example, as discussed, the character

strength of compassion, associated with the virtue of

humanity, has been shown to increase the attention and

concern paid to other members of the organization who are

suffering (Dutton et al. 2006), thereby providing support

that this character strength may impact the first stage in the

EDM process—awareness. However, how does compas-

sion affect judgement, intent or behaviour? How does this

character strength relate to self-reflection? How does the

deficiency (unfeeling) or excess (indulgent) of compassion

affect EDM? While our model identifies the individual

components of EDM, it was beyond the scope of this paper

to develop hypotheses around the specific relationships. It

is quite possible that values and virtues play different roles

relative to the components we have identified.

Understanding the factors that enable individuals to

deepen character strengths within the virtuous mean as

opposed to those that lead to excess or deficiency in the

context of management education and in organizations is

an important avenue of inquiry. Claims have been made

suggesting that management education programs may fuel

the development of excess especially in terms of priori-

tizing self-enhancement values (Krishnan 2008) and fur-

thermore, that in doing so, they are part of the problem, not

the solution (Bennis and O’Toole 2005). These are very

serious claims. Our model is ideally suited to examine

these claims and examine the role of management educa-

tion programs in fostering a VBO (or not). The question is

both one of content and of process: To what degree does

the content mastered in business programs implicitly or

explicitly endorse a consequentialist or deontological eth-

ical framework over a virtue-based one? Does the process

of teaching organizational behaviour, leadership, strategy,

finance, accounting or marketing encourage and support

the development of a VBO? Similarly, organizations are

also not exempt from culpability in the factors that may

lead to either developing excess or deficiency in employee

character strengths. For example, compensation and other

reward systems may motivate behaviours that are incon-

sistent with the virtuous mean. As well, organizational

culture may be misaligned and in fact may be one of the

external pressures for which individuals need a strong VBO

to withstand. There are several examples where organiza-

tional culture steered individuals away from making good

decisions, including Enron, Lehman Brothers and NASA.

As such, understanding individual and structural determi-

nants of a VBO is a promising avenue for future research.

Although we have described our model at the individual

level, there is opportunity to take a multi-level view of the

phenomenon to understand how values, virtues and char-

acter strengths relate to EDM at the group, organization

and societal levels. In particular, we need to better under-

stand how an individual with a strong VBO can influence

EDM at the group level or even the organizational level.

Given the variance observed in individual responses to

situational pressures (Zimbardo 2008), we expect to find

variance in the degree of VBO of individual employees,

and that individuals are therefore at least partially inde-

pendent of group and organizational influences. However,

because a VBO is habituated through practice, group-level

variables (e.g. group identity, trust) may also have a direct

effect on individual character strength development.

Unpacking the cross-level effects of a VBO to EDM thus

holds considerable promise for future empirical testing. We

consider such research paramount since there are few

individuals, even those with a strong VBO, who will be

able to sustain virtuous behaviour amidst others in the

organization, or industry, who take actions inconsistent

with a VBO. Therefore, understanding the multi-level

interactions will be essential.

578 M. Crossan et al.

123

Finally, there is a tremendous need and also a wealth of

opportunity to examine the interplay between VBO and

external forces to better understand the situational deter-

minants that challenge a VBO. We have cited prior

research that presents sobering findings about the strength

of external forces in shaping individual behaviour, often for

the worse (Zimbardo 2008). However, such research has

not examined the possibility of developing a strong VBO to

withstand the adverse effect of these forces, or indeed how

individuals with a strong VBO can shape situational forces.

Rather, the need for heroism is suggested as the antidote to

enduring negative situational pressures (Zimbardo 2008).

In contrast, our model, which is based on the fundamental

quest for excellence, not heroism, provides a more useful

starting point to examine the role of virtues, values and

character strengths in EDM that may provide important

answers to these pressing issues.

Conclusion

While there has been a renewed call to re-examine the

role of character development in light of recent ethical

and financial crises, surprisingly little attention has been

given to articulating a virtue ethical framework of deci-

sion making. In fact, there has been a deliberate shift

away from character-based models with the prevalence of

social psychological research into situational determi-

nants of ethical behaviour. Yet, a return to the funda-

mentals of virtue ethics, including a deeper understanding

of the character strengths associated with virtues and the

values these reflect, has the potential to inform the EDM

processes now required not only of organizational leaders

but of managers at all levels given an increasingly global

environment.

Given the almost entirely descriptive nature of most

EDM research, it is not surprising that virtues, motivational

values and character strengths have been largely excluded

from recent reviews of the EDM field (Kish-Gephart et al.

2010; Loe et al. 2000; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005;

Treviño et al. 2006). Furthermore, where ethical frame-

works have been tested, these have focused primarily on

consequentialist versus deontological distinctions and have

not included a virtue ethical perspective (e.g. Brady and

Wheeler 1996; Fritzsche and Becker 1984; Groves et al.

2008). In taking a virtue ethical perspective, therefore, we

elevate the assessment of personal character (being) to the

same status afforded to the assessment of ethical or

unethical acts (doing). This answers the call to integrate a

more balanced approach to EDM which incorporates a

discussion of virtues and character strengths into a conse-

quence-based or duty-based evaluation of moral behaviour.

Further, it strives to answer a more general call with

regards to a renewed interest in the role of virtues, values

and character traits in broader leadership theories (Arjoon

2000; Manz et al. 2008; Solomon 1992).

Importantly, because the distinction between decisions

with and without ethical implications can be difficult to

discern, a VBO can be generalized to apply to all decision

making and does not need to be contained to the realm of

ethical discourse. The four components of EDM—aware-

ness, judgement, intent and behaviour—are germane to

many rational decision-making models (Eisenhardt and

Zbaracki 1992). A commitment to cultivating character

strengths along the mean while avoiding depleting or

embellishing these character strengths thus applies to

strategic decisions just as much as to more proximal ethical

dilemmas. The VBO model therefore can be used alongside

consequentialist and deontological assessments of alternate

courses of action.

We acknowledge that the VBO presents a somewhat

ideal type of EDM, where a commitment to the virtuous

mean and the development of a VBO can serve as a buffer

to strong situational pressures. However, we understand

that ‘‘realistically, a truly virtuous manager is an unreal-

izable ideal, but nevertheless represents a set of virtuous

character dispositions toward which a real—and necessar-

ily imperfect—manager can strive’’ (Whetstone 2001,

p. 107). The commitment to deepen character strengths

within the mean without shifting to the vices of deficiency

or excess requires practice, as Aristotle argued:

The virtues on the other hand we acquire by first

having actually practised them, just as we do the arts.

We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we

shall have to do when we have learnt it: for instance,

men become builders by building houses, harpers by

playing on the harp. Similarly we become just by

doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts,

brave by doing brave acts (Nicomachean ethics

1103a31–1103b1).

We thus argue that a VBO to EDM is an acquirable skill

(Crossan et al. 2013). Like Hartman (2006, p. 69), we

believe that education has a role to play in character

development and that training in ethics ‘‘can improve stu-

dents’ character by helping them think critically about their

values and realize them in practice.’’ Further, research in

this area has demonstrated that individuals can, in fact,

increase their level of moral reasoning which is a critical

component of character in that higher levels of moral

reasoning require virtuous character strengths such as jus-

tice, fairness, humanity and compassion (Schmidt et al.

2009). We are thus optimistic that re-introducing a VBO

model of EDM alongside consequentialist and deontolog-

ical frameworks can contribute to the habituation of rou-

tines anchored in the virtuous mean.

The Role of Virtues, Values and Character Strengths 579

123

Acknowledgments We gratefully acknowledge the financial sup- port of the Trudeau Foundation and the Ian O. Ihnatowycz Institute

for Leadership at Richard Ivey School of Business, the insightful

contributions of the practitioners in the ‘‘Leadership on Trial’’ study,

as well as the insights provided by Jeffrey Gandz, Corey Mulvihill,

Dusya Vera, editor Joan Fontrodona and the anonymous reviewers.

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