INTL613Wk7

HSINT and Informa�on Sharing

We saw the devasta�ng effects of lack of informa�on sharing leading up to the 9/11 terrorist a�acks that we have discussed mul�ple �mes in this course. This is s�ll just as important today as the recent joint review of domes�c sharing of counterterrorism informa�on by the combined Inspectors General of the IC, DHS and Department of Jus�ce (DOJ) stated,

Fi�een years a�er the September 11, 2001, terrorist a�acks on the United States, the terrorist threat remains in the United States and abroad…The U.S.’s na�onal security depends on the ability to share the right informa�on with the right people at the right �me. This requires sustained and responsible collabora�on among federal, state, local, and tribal en��es, as well as the private sector and interna�onal partners (Joint Review of Domes�c Sharing of Counterterrorism Informa�on, 2017, p. i).

Reforms a�er 9/11 focused on reorganiza�on and transforma�on of the IC, as well as improving informa�on sharing both between federal agencies and with the cri�cally important state and local agencies. It is important to note, however, that those reforms did not remove all the barriers to informa�on sharing. Although the “wall” was removed between law enforcement and intelligence agencies, many challenges remain. The mentality of secrecy and organiza�onal cultures that emphasize ins�tu�onal equi�es are s�ll strong impediments to effec�ve sharing.

Obstacles and challenges hindering effec�ve informa�on and intelligence sharing include legal, procedural, technical and bureaucra�c impediments. For example, just the lack of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between agencies can keep officials from sharing what common sense would say should be shared. In fact, the 9/11 Commissioners called on government agencies to discard the mentality of over-classifying informa�on and sharing only with those who “need to know” to transform the culture into one where the emphasis is on sharing with all of those essen�al to securing the na�on.

The culture of agencies feeling they own the informa�on they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to share the informa�on – to repay the taxpayers' investment by making that informa�on available (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 417).

It is important to also address the recent unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence by WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden made many in the IC ques�on the benefits of extensive informa�on sharing. So these agencies must

balance dissemina�on and s�ll maintain safeguards on sensi�ve informa�on. Intelligence and informa�on sharing is a very complex issue with compe�ng requirements, and not a subject with simple solu�ons. The U.S. Government Accountability Office con�nues to rate terrorism informa�on sharing as a high risk func�on.

Following the terrorist a�acks of 2001, Congress and the execu�ve branch took numerous ac�ons aimed explicitly at establishing a range of new measures to strengthen the na�on’s ability to iden�fy, detect, and deter terrorism- related ac�vi�es. For example, the Informa�on Sharing Environment (ISE) was established in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven�on Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), as amended, to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related informa�on. While this demonstrates significant and important progress, sharing terrorism-related informa�on remains a constantly evolving area that requires con�nued effort and a�en�on from the Program Manager, departments, and agencies. Sharing terrorism-related informa�on remains an area with some risk and con�nues to be vitally important to homeland security. It requires ongoing oversight as well as con�nuous improvement to iden�fy and respond to changing threats and technology (GAO, n.d.).

As one scholar recently wrote, “Where intelligence agencies add value is by integra�ng the best open-source informa�on and integra�ng it with the secret nuggets they gather. All intelligence is informa�on. But not all informa�on is intelligence” (Zegart, 2017, para. 6). However, you cannot develop a full picture of threats if informa�on and intelligence are not shared with those who should receive intelligence or be able to access reports. It does need to be acknowledged that there have been many improvements in intelligence and informa�on sharing.

In this course, we have already discussed some interagency informa�on sharing frameworks that include organiza�ons like the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country, as well as the na�onal network of state and locally owned fusion centers. Other sharing mechanism include the DHS Homeland Security Informa�on Network (HSIN) as well as a DOJ funded Regional Informa�on Sharing System (RISS) and the FBI’s Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal or LEEP, just to name a few (ISE, n.d.). Some�mes par�cipa�ng in all these frameworks and accessing all these systems is overwhelming for state and local agencies, while some of the key pieces of threat repor�ng do not make it in �me. Intelligence and informa�on sharing to support the homeland security enterprise will also be a result of the agencies involved trying to balance the compe�ng obstacles and opportuni�es of effec�ve sharing.