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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Avatars of the Earth: Radical Environmentalism and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons

Zachary Kallenborn & Philipp C. Bleek

To cite this article: Zachary Kallenborn & Philipp C. Bleek (2020) Avatars of the Earth: Radical Environmentalism and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 43:5, 351-381, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1471972

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1471972

Published online: 30 May 2018.

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Avatars of the Earth: Radical Environmentalism and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Weapons

Zachary Kallenborn a and Philipp C. Bleek b

aThe Cadmus Group, Washington, DC, USA; bMiddlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, Monterey, CA, USA

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 25 November 2017 Accepted 21 March 2018

ABSTRACT Terrorists combining motivations and capabilities to conduct significant chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attacks are, logically and empirically, outliers. Certain characteristics of radical environmentalism heighten the risk of such outliers. The majority of even radical environmentalists embrace nonviolence. Those who turn violent mostly do so in limited ways due to a combination of motivations and capabilities. Fringe elements are motivated to commit large-scale—including CBRN—violence, but are mostly constrained by capability. Yet eco-radicalism also draws more capable adherents. If serious CBRN terrorism attacks occur—a risk about which analysts differ markedly—radical environmentalist fringe actors are plausible perpetrators.

On 17 January 1972, Allen Charles Schwander and Stephen J. Pera were arrested in Chicago, Illinois for attempting to release typhoid bacteria into Chicago’s water supply.1 Prior to their arrest, Schwander and Pera had successfully acquired cultures of several pathogenic bacteria, including Neisseria meningitidis (meningitis), Shigella sonnei (diphtheria), an unidentified species of Clostridium (Clostridium botulinum produces the deadly botulinum toxin), and Salmonella typhi (typhoid fever).2 Pera, the self-proclaimed microbiologist of the group— albeit largely self-taught with only limited formal training—also attempted to acquire cul- tures of Vibrio cholerae (cholera) and Yersinia pestis (plague) without success.3 Both Schwander and Pera were part of RISE, a radical environmental terrorist organization that hoped to kill large numbers of humans to save both the human race and the planet.4 Once the population had been drastically reduced, “enlightened” revolutionaries would repopulate the world with the understanding that the natural environment must be preserved.

RISE is not the only radical environmental organization to have sought or tried to use chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, although it had some of the most maximalist objectives. Past radical environmental CBRN usage falls on a spectrum encompassing both more symbolic actions and those actually intended to harm human beings. At the former end of the spectrum, and typical of eco-radical direct action tactics, in

CONTACT Zachary Kallenborn [email protected] The Cadmus Group, 3100 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, VA 22201; Philipp C. Bleek [email protected] Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 439 Pierce St, Monterey, CA, 93940. © 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1471972

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 2020, VOL. 43, NO. 5, 351–381

November 2013, radical animal rights groups claimed to have contaminated 263 jars of Kiwi Mink Oil with cyanic acid.5 Kiwi Mink Oil is intended to waterproof leather; however, the cyanic acid would destroy the leather and potentially cause minor burns. The claim led SC Johnson, the producer of the mink oil, to end production of the product, although it is unclear if the oil was actually contaminated.6 Somewhere in the middle, in November 2010 the Justice Department of UCLA (JD), an animal rights group, mailed razor blades allegedly contaminated with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to two researchers at UCLA.7

And on the violent end of the spectrum, in the early 2000s, the animal rights organization Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) sprayed Andrew Gay, the Huntingdon Life Scien- ces marketing director, in the face with an unidentified chemical spray, leaving him tempo- rarily blinded and writhing on the ground.8 There are many other similar examples, detailed in the Appendix.

In light of these and other examples, what is the actual threat of radical environmental- ists9 engaging in CBRN terrorism, ranging from unsophisticated and less consequential attacks (e.g., product contamination using off the shelf chemicals) to larger-scale, far more consequential attacks (e.g., releasing a contagious pathogen)?10 CBRN terrorism is widely perceived as a serious threat, although analysts differ on how seriously they view the threat and what forms they think it is most likely to take.11 Empirically and logically, most terro- rists lack motivation to pursue CBRN attacks and capabilities to carry out all but the most crude ones, so assessing the threat hinges on identifying potential outliers. This is especially true for eco-radicals, a majority of whom subscribe to strong norms of nonviolence. For example, a quantitative analysis of 1,069 eco-radical incidents found that the incidents “aimed overwhelmingly at property damage rather than causing injury or death to humans.”12 Further, a mass destructive attack risks significantly damaging the environment, dissuading at least some of the fringe elements who might otherwise be drawn to such attacks. However, the fringes of eco-radicalism include actors who possess maximalist objec- tives, and eco-radicalism more generally attracts some individuals who are more capable and better resourced. The authors have observed that the eco-radical milieu is frequently identified as a plausible source for an outlier CBRN attack in policy circles.13 Yet to date eco-radical CBRN threats have received only cursory attention as part of broader studies of either environmental extremist terrorism or CBRN terrorism.

Two previous studies have addressed the issue as a part of broader studies of eco-radical- ism: Gary A. Ackerman’s “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation Front”14 and Donald R. Liddick’s “Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements.”15 Ackerman discusses the eco-radical CBRN threat in the context of a broader assessment of the potential of eco-radical organizations to engage in violence that he includes alongside his more focused assessment of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF). In a response to Ackerman’s study, Bron Taylor argued that, inter alia, Ackerman failed to adequately separate the different currents of radical environmentalism, instead treating them as essentially equivalent.16 This is problematic because activists in different currents select different targets and tactics in pursuing different goals. In addition, since the publica- tion of Ackerman’s article, new radical environmental organizations have emerged (most notably the Deep Green Resistance [DGR] movement), while others have faded significantly (including the ELF that was Ackerman’s focus). Ackerman also does not distinguish between the types of CBRN weapons, which are not uniform in their appeal to potential attackers, acquisition difficulty, and damage potential. Nonetheless, Ackerman provides a useful

352 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

jumping off point for this analysis, especially his discussion of factors potentially motivating for and against large-scale violence.

Liddick also briefly discusses the potential for eco-radical CBRN usage as a part of a broader study of eco-radical terrorism, which surveys eco-radical tactics, organizations, and ideologies. However, Liddick does not consider the issue in depth, and, like Ackerman, does not distinguish between movement currents in his CBRN analysis. Liddick also does not consider historical examples of eco-radical CBRN usage.

This study builds on these previous analyses. It assesses that only a small subset of the broader movement are likely to seriously consider CBRN weapons and that subset will typi- cally lack the capabilities to engage in sophisticated, large-scale attacks warranting the label “weapon of mass destruction.”17 This is especially true owing to their leaderless resistance structure that limits coordinated, large-scale action. However, because some currents of radi- cal environmentalist ideology contain strong potential justifications for mass violence, and because the milieu attracts some who are more capable and better resourced, the emergence of organizations, and perhaps also individuals, capable of a larger-scale CBRN attack is diffi- cult to rule out.

For policy officials seeking to counter the potential threat, the focus should be on two worrying trends: (1) increasing rhetorical support for violence within the radical animal rights movement specifically and (2) the emergence of new green anarchist groups, which support violence. The first trend points toward potential future violence and potential larger scale CBRN usage. If paired with relevant capabilities this could pose a significant threat. The second trend is demonstrated by the emergence of the DGR movement, which has grown rapidly and accepts violent action as justifiable, even required, to bring down indus- trial civilization. The broad appeal of the movement, its hierarchical leadership structure, and its willingness to embrace violence suggest that DGR may possess both the motivations and the capabilities necessary to engage in significant CBRN attacks. It bears emphasizing that these groups represent only a small subset of both their narrower domains and broader radical environmentalism.

Because this analysis is fundamentally a threat assessment, it is necessarily somewhat speculative, informed by inductive reasoning based on limited empirics, deductive logic, and other published analyses. While some scholars have attempted to apply more formal meth- odologies to such threat assessments, they have also been criticized for applying a “social sci- ence veneer” to what is largely guesswork.18 This article proceeds from the notion that what one might characterize as “informed speculation” has scholarly value. This is particularly the case given how seriously an overwhelming majority of relevant policymakers take the CBRN terrorism threat and how substantially they have invested resources in combating it. For example, the most recent U.S. National Security Strategy, completed in 2015 under President Barack Obama, stated, “No threat poses as grave a danger to our security and well-being as the potential use of nuclear weapons and materials by irresponsible states or terrorists. … Vigilance is required to stop countries and non-state actors from developing or acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or the materials to build them.”19 Analysis of the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget found $4.5 billion in programs to combat civilian CBRN threats.20 If emerging disease and multihazard programs encompassing CBRN are included, total expenditures jump to $12.9 billion.21 Outside of the United States, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004, with its members endorsing the consen- sus that they were “Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State

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Actors … may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.”22

To examine the eco-radical CBRN threat, the article starts with a broad focus, then hones in on specifics. First, the article assesses the CBRN motivations and capabilities of the radical environ- mentalist milieu at large. Second, the core of the article breaks themovement down into three pri- mary currents, discussing the characteristics of each and assessing their implications for the risk of a spectrum of potential attacks ranging from small-scale up to catastrophic CBRN terrorism attacks. The article concludes by highlighting policy implications and areas for further research.

A Framework for Assessing CBRN Terrorism Threats: Motivations and Capabilities

Serious acts of CBRN terrorism are rare. Although a number of terrorist organizations and individuals have sought to develop such capabilities, only a few have succeeded and even they have done so in only limited ways. In part due to the rarity of CBRN terrorism events, determining which organizations and movements are most at risk of engaging in CBRN ter- rorism is difficult. But threat assessment is important because, although they are rare, both past experience and logic suggest that some CBRN terrorism events are likely to occur. Most of those are likely to have at most modest, albeit still potentially consequential, impacts.23

Outlier events with far more significant consequences remain plausible. Efforts to both pre- vent and respond to CBRN terrorism attacks hinge on threat assessments that identify the outliers who might combine both motivation and capabilities to carry out an attack.

The risk of an organization or individual engaging in CBRN terrorism is a function of capability and motivation; neither matters in the absence of the other.24 It does not matter how motivated a group might be if it has no capabilities, and it does not matter how capable a group might be if it lacks motivation. Although for the purpose of analysis the two catego- ries can usefully be treated as distinct, they may also interact with each other. The motivation to carry out attacks might lead actors to take steps to bolster their capabilities, and the exis- tence of capabilities might itself be a motivating factor.25 Moreover, while motivations and capabilities might both be present or be mutually reinforcing, the two categories might also push in opposite directions. For example, a desire for society to return to simpler social structures may serve as an ideological barrier to forming the type of complex organization needed for a sophisticated attack. Many, although not all, individuals and groups with the most grandiose ambitions are likely to be delusional in ways that undermine their capabili- ties; an extreme example is the Japanese apocalyptic millenarian cult Aum Shinrikyo, which unsuccessfully pursued sophisticated biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and even earth- quake-triggering machines, in the early to mid-1990s.26 And many capable actors will, for reasons often related to their capabilities, lack or have lesser motivation. For example, a large organization that might be in a position to capably manage a complex CBRN program might also have more opportunities for a subset of members with practical or moral qualms about such attacks to influence the group’s decisions.

A later section delves into the specific currents of eco-radicalism and their motivations and capabilities. But some generalizations about the broader milieu are possible.

354 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

Capabilities

Capabilities consist of access to information, infrastructure, and material inputs, along with the skills to use them effectively. Capabilities needed to carry out CBRN attacks fall on a spectrum. At the low end, crude chemical poisons and biologically derived toxins are rela- tively accessible, requiring little more than a trip to the local hardware store or some rudi- mentary processing.27 Higher up the spectrum, it is often said that we should be more concerned about biologists becoming terrorists than terrorists becoming biologists.28 This barrier is particularly acute in the biological domain, where much knowledge is tacit (can only be learned by doing), local (resides in particular groups operating in particular loca- tions), and collective (resides among teams rather than individuals).29 For example, a lack of tacit knowledge appears to have inhibited Aum Shinrikyo’s development of biological weap- ons.30 As discussed below, many of these barriers are falling over time, although the near- term implications of various scientific and technological developments are often exaggerated.

Most radical environmentalists have very low capabilities to engage in CBRN terrorism, especially owing to their leaderless resistance structure that limits coordinated, large-scale plots. But radical environmentalism attracts some adherents who are highly educated and well resourced, and therefore might plausibly carry out more sophisticated attacks with suffi- cient motivation.

Environmentalism as a whole tends to draw individuals who are both better educated and more affluent than many other milieus out of which radicalized individuals might emerge. This is consistent with the “post-materialist” scholarly explanation for the prevalence of environmentalism.31 The argument is that “once basic material needs are met such as access to enough food, clean water, health care and shelter,” individuals can turn toward “quality of life and aesthetic concerns—political priorities that go beyond basic needs. … According to a post-materialist explanation, pro-environmental attitudes are more common among the relatively affluent because they are more likely to prioritize the pursuit of a high-quality life and the preservation of outdoor recreational areas over basic security and social order, which they already enjoy.”32 According to research drawing on the World Values Survey, concern for the environment correlates robustly and positively with years of schooling.33

If environmentalists as a whole are better educated, and consequently also better resourced, it is plausible that those who are radicalized will, on average, also be. But the empirical basis for assessing that intuition is slim. Consistent with, but providing only mod- est support for, the hypothesis, in a dataset of “nearly 1,500 violent and nonviolent extrem- ists who adhere to far right, far left, Islamist, or single issue ideologies in the United States covering 1948–2013,” the 104 individuals categorized as “Animal rights/environmentalist” have distributions of education, employment, and social stratum consistent with the data- base as a whole, and, as one might expect, skew higher relative to, for example, a comparison set of the 443 individuals categorized as “White supremacist/KKK/Neo-Nazi.”34

Radical environmentalist organizations typically assume a “leaderless resistance”model of organization, wherein individuals or small groups self-select into the organization by under- taking actions that advance the causes of the movement and doing so under its banner.35

These activists are often disconnected from one another and may only know other activists by their noms-de-guerre in online postings.36 This separation is often encouraged by the idea of a “security culture”: underground members are strongly encouraged to never speak to one another and never acknowledge any involvement with the movement.37 If an

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individual hopes to “join” the organization, they are encouraged to create their own cell of fellow activists among friends and others who share their views.

While this cellular structure offers increased security against law enforcement penetra- tion, it also means that any potential plot will likely only draw on the resources of a small group of people, meaning low manpower and a limited available financial resources and knowledge base. This resource limitation makes all aspects of an operation more difficult. Individuals will be forced to assume multiple roles; for example, a single individual might be required to acquire equipment and material for the operation, conduct reconnaissance, and carry out the operation itself.38 This low level of capability will be strongly reflected in the types of actions that are attempted and, even more importantly, that are successfully carried out. Direct action campaigns typically take the form of highly unsophisticated attacks: slash- ing tires, vandalism, and sabotage.

Developing a robust CBRN capability is a complex process involving the acquisition of highly specialized equipment and knowledge. For example, for a large-scale biological weap- ons capability, a potential bio-terrorist would require extensive equipment including fer- menters, spray-dryers, protective equipment, and some method of delivery (although some basic methods are affordable, advanced spray-systems would be very costly). Besides equip- ment, the terrorist would need to have the knowledge and skills to successfully mass-pro- duce, weaponize, and disseminate the pathogen.39 Developing nerve or mustard agents poses similar challenges; however, basic chemical weapons such as chlorine would be much easier to acquire. Acquiring radioactive material for a radiological dispersal device would require an initial operation—assuming an attack was not simply carried out on a location where it was already present—and the organization would have to do so without drawing too much attention from law enforcement personnel.40 A radical environmentalist group acquiring a nuclear fission weapons capability, assuming that was desired, is difficult to imagine given the immense challenges that would need to be overcome. However, if any nonstate actor were capable of doing so, a hotly contested issue,41 it is difficult to definitively rule out radical environmentalists.

Radical environmental ideology is likely to hamper knowledge, expertise, material acqui- sition, and other threats insiders may pose.42 Because of radical environmentalism’s critiques of industrial society, those with radical environmental leanings are less likely to affiliate with, and more likely to end prior affiliations with, various industrial enterprises from which they might otherwise extract capabilities or which they might target. Prior to Ted Kaczynski’s bombing campaign, he resigned his position at the University of California to live in the for- est because he found “modern life absolutely unacceptable.”43 Similarly, radical environmen- talists may distrust insiders by default for supporting industrial society and environmental exploitation. This is likely to be a significant barrier to sophisticated attacks that require access to specialized material and equipment with little general availability, such as specific strains of bacteria or specialized machine tools.

Both rudimentary chemical and biological weapons offer the lowest cost and easiest method of CBRN attack, allowing their possible acquisition by individuals or small groups of activists. Instructions to produce the toxin ricin are widely available online and the ingre- dients are both accessible and affordable. Ricin could be deployed effectively to kill specific targets via ingestion; however, it would be far more difficult to deploy effectively on a large scale as an aerosol.

356 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

Recent and ongoing technological innovations are lowering some barriers to CBRN attacks, especially in the biological realm. First, while the Internet has offered much greater interconnectivity between cultures and societies, it may be exploited to acquire equipment, material, and knowledge related to biological weapons. Various online resources such as LabX offer new and second-hand advanced laboratory equipment that seemingly can be pur- chased with little scrutiny of the end-user.44 By posing as a representative of a hospital, clinic, or bio-industrial firm, an activist may be able to evade what scrutiny there is. Second, scientific and technological innovations are changing the character of the threat. Advance- ments in genetic engineering may enable the acquisition of pathogenic material at low cost. A World Health Organization Independent Advisory Group on Public Health recently found that “the creation of variola virus using information on DNA sequences will be easier and cheaper in the future and may be possible in small laboratories with inadequate bio- safety and biosecurity for handling variola virus.”45 Similarly, technologies such as Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) enable gene editing at lower cost and greater availability, and could potentially be used to provide vaccine or other resis- tances.46 Alternatively, genetic engineering could also be used to limit a pathogen’s transmis- sibility, perhaps to minimize the risk of spreading disease to animals or to otherwise support more limited, targeted attacks. Microfluidics, chip-scale chemistry, has implications for chemistry, biology, and chemistry involving nuclear materials; for example, ordering or 3D printing a “black box” microfluidics chip designed to carry out certain chemical processes would reduce the need for tacit knowledge and allow the efficient production of very high- purity chemical agents, although for now such technology is less accessible than the cruder chemical processes it might replace.47 Similarly, additive manufacturing or 3D printing may lower existing barriers to various CBRN attacks.48

Nonetheless, significant challenges remain, including acquiring the skill set necessary to transform an acquired pathogen into an effective weapon. Acquiring and effectively using a delivery system does not appear to be any easier. A potential bioterrorist would still need to account for weather effects, including wind conditions and humidity, and ensure appropriate particle sizes, among other issues. As the U.S. Department of Defense notes: “If disseminated properly, only a small amount of biological agent is needed to infect numerous people. Proper dissemination, however, is a non-trivial problem because the agent must be dispersed in 1 to 10 micron particles and be inhaled by the target population.”49

Motivations

Existing literature on CBRN terrorism shows that motivations, either for or against pursuing CBRN attacks, are a function of strategic and tactical calculations plus ideological impera- tives. CBRN terrorism may be seen as a method to facilitate tactical victories or contribute to broader strategic objectives.50 But CBRN might also backfire, achieving tactical successes at the cost of strategic setbacks because an attack might galvanize a government crackdown or loss of support from some key constituency.51

Actors might also be influenced or motivated partly or entirely by identity and related norms.52 Terrorists select means of attack based in part on whom they perceive themselves to be.53 For example, the Biblical overtones of unleashing an infectious biological agent might appeal to certain apocalyptic millenarian groups.54 Extreme elements of the radical environ- mental movement may be attracted by certain CBRN approaches because of how those

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consequences are achieved. A pathogen might be perceived as a “natural” way for “Mother Earth” to assert herself against her human oppressors, with the instigators of such a bioter- rorism attack serving as a vector. Similarly, previous attacks often used rat poison, perhaps in part because of the ideological appeal of threatening humans using a poison designed to kill animals. Conversely, many actors, even radicalized ones, would not countenance some forms of CBRN attack no matter how the cost–benefit calculus played out—that is not the kind of thing people like us do. Sophisticated, synthetic chemicals and radioactive substances are often closely associated with advanced industry and may be seen as further poisoning the Earth, and therefore anathema.

Most radical environmentalists have little motivation to engage in violent acts of terror- ism, much less violent CBRN terrorism. Most radical environmental organizations explicitly embrace nonviolence and historically violence has been rare, with modest impacts. However, radical environmental ideologies may require extreme action, including CBRN terrorism, to achieve expansive goals. Outlier motivations have and should be expected to continue to arise; the more challenging question is assessing how likely they are to be married with sig- nificant capabilities.

In the short term, potential radical environmental motivations for engaging in CBRN attacks are likely to be mitigated by the nonviolent tendency of the movement and its strong concern for public perception. The radical environmental movement makes extensive efforts to ensure their actions do not harm human life. In Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, the first principle of radical environmental direct action is that it is nonviolent.55 Similarly, the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) primer advises activists “to take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human, and non-human. … In over 20 years, and thousands of actions, nobody has ever been injured or killed in an ALF action.”56

The strong norm of nonviolence and explicit rejection of violence may even serve to con- strain those who reject that norm. Even those activists who embrace violence may restrict its scale to avoid becoming alienated from the rest of the movement. This dynamic may partly account for the limited casualties and rapid fading of organizations that embraced vio- lence—such as the Animal Rights Militia (ARM) and JD. However, because this indirect constraining is predicated on concern over isolation from the movement, the emergence of new organizations or sub-movements that support violence diminishes the strength of this barrier.

Further, radical environmentalists may believe natural and social forces may lead to desired outcomes without widespread violent action. Radical environmentalists may desire a reduction in the human population, but may believe the environmental impacts of human behavior will serve as nature’s own punishment.57 This is akin to the voluntary extinction movement, which advocates that humans choose to stop breeding to mitigate the human impact on the Earth.58

However, in the long term, radical environmental ideology is likely to provide increas- ingly strong justifications for terrorism. Many radical environmentalists adhere to the phi- losophy of Deep Ecology, which undergirds the views of Dave Foreman and the Earth First! (EF!) organization he co-founded.59 Deep Ecology rests on biocentrism: the idea that all human and nonhuman life has inherent value.60 Humans are only one species among many, sharing a “common relationship” to the planet.61 Further, humans and nonhumans share evolutionary origins and humans could not survive without nonhumans.62 Deep Ecology

358 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

extends biocentrism further to argue that human activity in the nonhuman world is exces- sive and “the flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human population.”63 This requires significant policy and ideological shifts to better emphasize the value of nonhuman life.64 Adherents of Deep Ecology have an obligation to help implement those shifts.65

Although Deep Ecology does not explicitly call for an active culling of the population, that would be a logical extension if normative constraints against violence are breached.

Worsening environmental conditions may also encourage more radical action, by strengthening radical environmentalists’ raison d’etre. Climate change in particular has the potential to energize the radical environmental movement, given its potentially catastrophic impacts to the environment and nonhuman life. For example, a 2004 study estimated that by 2050 15–37 percent of species in sampled regions would be “committed to extinction,” meaning they would be confined to such small areas that extinction was inevitable.66 Fur- ther, the belief that significant impacts could occur may motivate action, even if they do not. For example, the aforementioned study was widely misinterpreted in popular media to fore- cast that 15–37 percent of species would be extinct by 2050, as opposed to “committed to extinction.”67 These challenges may illustrate the immediacy of environmental concerns, jus- tifying action.

The environmental motivations leading to a radical environmental CBRN attack may also shape the type of attack that is pursued. Attacks perceived as harming the environment or innocent living creatures may be rejected even if otherwise consistent with desired goals. Conversely, certain modes of attack, especially pathogens and toxins, may have ideological appeal because they may represent Mother Nature’s revenge for perceived transgressions against her.

But to fully understand radical environmentalist CBRN threats, the movement needs to be broken down into its three currents: general radical environmentalism, green anarchy, and animal rights. General radical environmentalism comprises the core of the movement, focusing on a broad range of environmental issues. Green anarchy blends radical environ- mentalism with anarchist ideas. And the animal rights movement focuses narrowly on ani- mal rights issues.

The Currents of Radical Environmentalism and the CBRN Risks They Pose

The three currents of eco-radicalism pose different threats of CBRN terrorism. Groups within the currents have different ideological orientations, attract different individuals, and have different organizational structures; what may hold strongly for one may not hold for another. This is clearly illustrated in the historical relationship between radical environmen- talism and CBRN, because the vast majority of CBRN attacks or hoaxes originated with ani- mal rights activists. However, the most ambitious CBRN attempt came from a green anarchist organization, RISE.

This article examines the three currents with respect to four broad categories of possible CBRN attack: nonhuman, low-level, large-scale, and catastrophic. This categorization is not intended to establish a continuous scale of attack but rather to provide a general analytical framework. After all, the motivations that drive an actor to poison one person with ricin are likely to be very different than those that motivate another to try to infect an entire city with plague.

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The categorization scheme is also based on the intent in a given attack, informed by the current’s general capabilities. The organization’s goals and ideology are likely to play a strong role in the intended scope of a given attack. For example, organizations with relatively narrow or local goals are less likely to desire a massive attack. Similarly, organizations that embrace nonviolence are likely to prefer nonviolent methods of attack.

In practice, the results of an attack may vary, sometimes quite significantly, from what was intended. Often the damage inflicted will be less than intended, but in rare instances it might be more. Because of their less discriminate effects, CBRN weapons are particularly prone to such deviations. This is especially true of sophisticated biological weapons. For example, genetically modified microorganisms might vary from the attackers’ expectations in their infectiousness, contagiousness, or virulence. Sabotage of industrial facilities could cause unintended consequences. An extreme version is the Evan Mecham Eco-Terrorist International Conspiracy cutting of power lines to nuclear power plants, which together with other accidental and/or intentional acts might in some very unlikely circumstance cause a reactor meltdown and venting of radioactive materials.

Nonhuman attacks: Nonhuman attacks are attacks deliberately targeting nonhuman enti- ties, such as infrastructure sabotage. CBRN may be used to render material inoperable or cause additional damage beyond conventional means. CBRN may be used to disrupt the food supply by spreading animal diseases such as Aphthovirus (Foot and Mouth Disease), plant diseases such as Karnal bunt of wheat, or spraying plants or animals with chemicals. Of nonhuman CBRN attacks, a CBRN attack on agriculture seems to have the most potential to cause damage.

Low-level: A low-level CBRN attack is an attack that seeks a small number of casual- ties, in the single digits, or no casualties at all. These attacks are relatively discrimina- tory. A low-level CBRN attack may take the form of an attempt to injure, for example by splashing acid into someone’s face, or assassinate, for example by poisoning their food with ricin, a specific target. Included within this category of analysis are CBRN hoaxes, which typically cause only limited harm (of course hoaxes might also be tar- geted against nonhuman targets).68

Large-scale: A large-scale CBRN attack is an attack that seeks a large number of injuries or deaths (tens to hundreds). A large-scale attack might take the form of the widespread dis- semination of Bacillus anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax) or the spreading of an infec- tious disease over a limited area with the expectation that it will spread further. These attacks may be discriminatory depending on the method of attack, or may be indiscriminate over a limited area. An example of a large-scale attack outside of the eco-radical milieu is the 1984 Rajneeshee attack in which 751 people suffered food poisoning after the Rajneeshee cult con- taminated salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon.

Catastrophic: A catastrophic CBRN attack is an attack that seeks to cause upwards of 1,000 deaths or injuries. This category is most closely related to the concept of a WMD attack: it is likely to be indiscriminate, spread throughout the population, and cause massive casualties. An extreme case of a catastrophic CBRN attack would be nuclear fission terror- ism. A real example of a catastrophic CBRN attack is the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo Subway. The attack caused thousands to report to hospital emergency rooms, several hundred injuries, and thirteen deaths, and the perpetrators apparently hoped to inflict far more.69

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To analyze the currents themselves, this article will use the typology set out by Bron Taylor in “Threat Assessments and Radical Environmentalism.” Taylor discusses three dis- tinct currents of eco-radicalism: radical environmentalists; animal liberationists; and anar- chism and green anarchism.70 Although these currents feature some common people and ideas, Taylor writes, “the issues activists choose to prioritize, and the tactics they select in the struggle, signal which subcultural axiology and ideology has captured their primary alle- giance.”71 To be clear, extant and potential groups and individuals in the broader radical environmental milieu do not all fit neatly into Taylor’s three-part typology. But they fit well enough, and the typology highlights characteristics that are sufficiently fundamental to this analysis, that its use illuminates more than it obfuscates.

The broad radical environmentalist current, “general radical environmentalists,” consti- tutes the mainstream of the movement and includes the ELF. General radical environmen- talists target environmental despoilers writ large; individuals or cells may focus on specific issues such as genetically modified crops. Animal liberationists, such as the ALF, focus on perceived animal abusers, including large-scale factory farms and animal-testing organiza- tions. This group will be referred to here as Animal Rights. And anarchism and green anar- chism focuses on the perceived ills of industrial civilization, arguing that the technological system inevitably leads to environmental exploitation and other pernicious effects. This group will be referred to as green anarchism for the sake of brevity.

General Radical Environmentalism

General radical environmentalists target environmental exploiters, seeking to modify their behavior by altering their cost–benefit calculations. As exploiter behavior is built largely on the desire for profit, driving up costs by destroying propertymay stop the actions. Certain gov- ernment agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management, are also seen as legitimate targets for their perceived collusion with corporations.72 Critical for distinguishing general radical environmentalists from the green anarchist current is that general radical environmentalists seek only to alter these actors’ behaviors, but not alter the broader system that supports them.

The general radical environmentalist current incorporates a wide variety of organizations that do not necessarily focus on a specific environmental issue. The common thread among the different organizations is the belief that direct, radical action is necessary to stop human degradations of the environment. These individuals believe that corporate interests have caused significant damage to the environment and wildlife. Waste run-off from industry contaminates bodies of water and harms aquatic life; urban sprawl destroys wilderness and the homes of animals; and genetic engineering of plants undermines global biodiversity.73

To end these practices, mainstream environmental actions such as protests are perceived as inadequate.

The primary organizations within this current are the ELF and EF!. EF! was formed in 1979, and was influenced by the works of the environmentalist Edward Abbey. EF! believes that human action is disrupting the vital interconnectivity of the natural world, creating sig- nificant problems, and mainstream environmentalists are not doing enough to stop it.74 EF! concentrates on civil disobedience, organizing tree sits to prevent them being cut down, and tree spiking (driving metal spikes into trees to destroy logging equipment used to cut them down).75 Members of EF! formed ELF in 1992, under the belief that EF! did not go far enough.76 ELF drew from the strategies of the ALF to more aggressively target

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environmental despoilers. The so-called elves of the ELF expanded beyond tree spiking to arson, direct sabotage, and joint operations with the ALF to free animals. Perhaps the most well known of these attacks was the arson attack on the Vail, Colorado ski resort that caused upward of $12 million in damages.77

Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching heavily influenced radical environmental- ist strategies. It provides specific details on tactics used across all three currents, but espe- cially by the general radical environmentalist current. The field guide offers instruction on how to successfully spike trees, damaging lumber machinery if the trees are harvested. The field guide offers specific guidance on the height at which the spikes should be driven into the tree; the size of spikes; and what spikes work for what types of trees.78 Importantly, it also offers guidance on how to avoid directly harming people.

Actual acts of violence have only rarely emerged from this milieu. Although self-identified ELF spokespeople Craig Rosebraugh and Leslie James Pickering have advocated violence, their views do not appear to be shared broadly by ELF.79 Neither was involved in the ELF or the environmental movement to a significant degree before proclaiming themselves spokes- people.80 Today, major voices in the movement, such as the veteran activist Rod Coronado, explicitly reject violence, including arson.81 As a result, even minor acts of violence would be contrary to prevailing norms.

Because the general radical environmentalist current has rarely engaged in violence, a CBRN attack from this current is unlikely. Nonetheless, disillusioned splinter groups present some concern worth monitoring.

General Radical Environmentalism CBRN Risk Assessment

The general environmentalist movement has not engaged or attempted to engage in CBRN terrorism, despite being the best-resourced and most popular current. Their tactics focus on changing behavior as opposed to dismantling the system, so extreme actions such as CBRN are unnecessary and likely counterproductive. In addition, the strong nonviolent norm within the current makes violent action highly unlikely.

Nonhuman: Although general radical environmentalists have strong motivators for non- human attacks, especially against the agricultural system, the use of CBRN is unlikely as they have successfully inflicted extensive damage using conventional means. Spreading Kar- nal bunt of wheat or other plant-based diseases could cause millions of dollars in damage.82

However, activists have inflicted millions of dollars in damage against Monsanto and other agribusinesses in conventional direct action attacks.83 These attacks stem from concern over the effects of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) on both humans and the natural world. However, concern over GMOs appears to be a relatively minor issue in comparison to more pressing concerns such as climate change or general environmental degradation.

Low-level: The general environmentalist milieu is not known to have engaged in any low- level acts of CBRN terrorism. Although a low-level CBRN attack could offer added psycho- logical impact, low-level CBRN usage is contrary to ELF and EF! strategies.84 Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching argues that eco-radicals attacks should, inter alia, be (1) only directed against inanimate objects and never human beings; (2) carefully targeted; and (3) as simple as possible.85 Even a low-level CBRN attack violates all three precepts.

Large-scale: A large-scale attack is unlikely to emerge from the general radical environ- mentalist current. A large-scale attack could be justified under the belief that less aggressive

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actions have failed, demanding a stronger response. The damages of global climate change might be perceived as justifying this. However, there is little evidence to suggest this is hap- pening within the general radical environmentalist current, especially since neither the ELF nor EF! appear to have taken any significant actions since 2009. And as argued in the low- level section, a large-scale attack would also be contrary to the Ecodefense strategy.

Catastrophic: Not surprisingly in light of the above, catastrophic CBRN terrorism is much less likely to emerge from the general radical environmental movement compared to the other currents. The general radical environmental movement focuses on changing behavior. However, organizations seeking to destroy the system appear to have predominately attempted catastrophic CBRN attacks. Aum Shinrikyo sought to incite a global, apocalyptic war. RISE sought to decimate humanity to repopulate the Earth with environmentally con- scious revolutionaries. While general radical environmentalists are unlikely to attempt to engage in catastrophic CBRN terrorism, some ideas could influence more extreme elements to justify such actions, and splinter groups or individuals alienated from more moderate col- leagues might also be motivated to attempt such attacks. The green anarchist current that blends radical environmentalism with the tenets of anarchism, discussed below, represents this possibility.

Green Anarchism

Combining anarchist and environmentalist ideas, green anarchism targets the industrial sys- tem that enables—and justifies—environmental exploitation. While many radical environ- mentalists believe that structural reform is possible, green anarchists do not.86 The roots of environmental degradation are seen as far deeper than a few misguided policies or poorly incentivized corporations. Rather, environmental exploitation is an endemic feature of human society since the first trees were felled to make way for agriculture. The entire system must be dismantled. Although green anarchists disagree on the details of alternatives to industrial society, many advocate for a return to an idealized primitive society.

Primitivist theorists such as John Zerzan and Ted Kaczynski (the Unabomber) argue that human society needs to return once again to a hunter-gatherer state.87 The system of tech- nology, they believe, robs humans of fundamental individuality and leads to widespread psy- chological suffering.88 To exist, a technological society requires large numbers of people and machines working together.89 That requires collective decision making that curtails individ- ual autonomy. Thus, the system of technology must limit human behavior to only those behaviors that support the system. For primitivists, nature provides an alternative to the technological system, as it exists independent of human control.90 Nature provides the resources necessary for a basic life, including food and basic shelter.91

As a whole, individuals and organizations advocating such beliefs, and even more so tak- ing radical action to support them, have been rare. The most well known green anarchist is the Unabomber, who undertook an extended bombing campaign over several decades.92

Other green anarchists joined organizations not explicitly advocating a green anarchist ide- ology. For example, Chris McIntosh, a green anarchist, committed arson on behalf of both ALF and ELF.93 Recent years have seen the emergence of two new green anarchist organiza- tions: the Mexico-based Individualities Tending Towards Savagery (ITS) and DGR.94

ITS engaged in a minor bombing campaign since 2011, primarily targeting nanotechnol- ogy scientists. Most recently, a group claiming to be an offshoot of ITS in Brazil calling itself

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Sociedade Secreta Silvestre (“Secret Forest Society”) claimed responsibility for a pressure cooker bomb detonated in Brazil during the Rio Olympics.95 Like Kaczynski, ITS believes that technology robs the individual of fundamental freedoms. In a missive dated March 2014, ITS writes, “we deny a life imposed on us by the system that dictates that we must walk mindlessly, obligatorily obeying orders from large organizations…”96 Like Kaczynski, nature provides an alternative to the perceived authoritarianism of the technological system. Based on the infrequency of their activities, ITS appears to be small and lack widespread support.

The emergence of DGR represents the first large-scale organization advocating a green anarchist ideology. Founded by Derrick Jensen, Lierre Keith, and Aric McBay in 2011, DGR seeks to bring a rapid end to industrial civilization to minimize the damage that it has and will continue to inflict on both humankind and the Earth. Although the movement focuses on environmental issues, it also integrates elements of social justice, including the rights of indigenous peoples throughout the world and radical feminism.97

DGR is worrying for three reasons. First, DGR sets out a coherent, four-phase strategy, “decisive ecological warfare (DEW)” with clear objectives that progress methodically toward DGR’s end goal of inducing widespread industrial collapse.98 DEW begins in phase 1 with networking and mobilization to build awareness and grow the organization, before moving to sabotage in phase 2, systems disruption in phase 3, and finally dismantlement of infra- structure in phase 4. As DGR moves through the phases of DEW, their objectives, organiza- tion, and actions shift to support and make use of growing militancy. Given their apparent lack of direct action and relative newness as an organization, DGR appears to be in phase 1. Second, DGR has rapidly grown in a short period of time. DGR currently has thirty-five chapters in total with twenty-four in the United States and eleven international chapters in at least nine countries.99 Third, DGR explicitly accepts violent action as one part of a com- plex strategy to achieve the movement’s goals. Derrick Jensen writes on the DGR website that, “Those in power will come down on us if we resist. It doesn’t matter if that resistance is violent or nonviolent. It’s resistance that brings the risk and retaliation, and it’s resistance that our planet needs.”100 Although DGR is not known to have yet engaged in violence, their motivations to do so are likely to grow if DGR continues down its established trajectory.

As epitomized in DGR, ITS, and the Unabomber, the green anarchist current has tended toward greater violence, compared to the other two currents. This tendency toward violence, coupled with a maximalist ideology, suggests a real potential for engaging in CBRN terror- ism, especially if motivations are complemented by capabilities.

Green Anarchism CBRN Risk Assessment

Green anarchist ideologies could be consistent with any form of CBRN terrorism because of their maximalist demands that all of industrial civilization be brought down. Such maximal- ist aims may demand maximalist means.101 Although there are few examples of green anar- chists, they are often violent. Looking at each level of CBRN attack:

Nonhuman: Green anarchists have not engaged in nonhuman CBRN attacks; however, they have strong motivations to do so. The industrial system is the primary villain in the green anarchist worldview. The opening paragraph of the Unabomber’s manifesto makes this clear: “The Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race. They have greatly increased the life expectancy of those in ‘advanced’ countries,

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but they have destabilized society, have made life unfulfilling, have subjected human beings to indignities, have led to widespread psychological suffering (in the Third World to physical suffering as well) and have inflicted severe damage on the natural world. The continued development of technology will worsen the situation.”102

The agricultural sector is an important underpinning of industrial society and so may be seen as a desirable potential target. Besides being a major industrial practice, agriculture often incorporates high technology, such as GMOs. Additionally, industrial agriculture sup- ports the continual expansion of the human population, expanding the system of technol- ogy.103 For DGR, the collapse of industrial agriculture is expected to happen even without external intervention.104 This might militate against an attack, or an attack could be seen as hastening an inevitable process.

Low-Level: A low-level CBRN attack could allow a green anarchist to draw attention to the radical environmental cause without the more significant and potentially counterproduc- tive political backlash a large-scale or especially catastrophic attack would trigger. This dynamic is illustrated in the Unabomber episode, as Ted Kaczynski offered to halt his bomb- ing campaign if news outlets published his manifesto.105 Kaczynski succeeded in that regard, and several other radical environmental organizations, including ITS, cite his work.106 While the Unabomber used conventional means of attack, a CBRN attack may offer more appeal because of the potentially greater psychological impact. This added psychological impact might be especially appealing as society becomes increasingly habituated to conventional violence.107

Large-scale: The green anarchist movement could be motivated to engage in a large-scale CBRN attack under the belief that a low-level attack is insufficient to achieve broader goals. As the system of technology has been a mainstay of human society since the industrial revo- lution, an extreme attack may be seen as necessary. For example, DGR believes that as indus- trial society begins to collapse, both the powerful and many everyday people will cling to civilization.108 The fear of a CBRN attack may be seen as a way to counteract this dynamic.

Catastrophic: RISE, a green anarchist group, is the only radical environmental group to attempt an act of catastrophic CBRN terrorism. RISE sought to cause literally billions of casualties and to repopulate the Earth with enlightened revolutionaries.109 More generally, a catastrophic CBRN terrorism attack could be seen as catalyzing the destruction of the tech- nological system. By definition, a catastrophic CBRN attack seeks to cause massive casualties and, if successful, would likely have numerous second order effects through governmental, economic, and societal response. Perpetrators may calculate that extensive blame would be focused on the government and those failing to protect the populace, turning perceptions against the government.

Animal Rights

Motivated by the idea that all animals have inherent moral value beyond their utility to humankind, radical animal rights activists target perceived animal abusers. Animals should not only be treated with respect and without cruelty, but they also have their own right to life. Although human society extends these rights to “nonrational” human beings such as infants or the mentally infirm, they are not generally extended to animals.110 Thus, animal experimentation for scientific purposes, hunting animals for sport, and wearing animal skins

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and furs are violations of those rights, regardless of whether the animals are treated humanely.111

In the view of some activists, large-scale factory farms and fur farms are especially abhor- rent, constituting systematic genocide on a scale equivalent to the worst human genocides.112

For example, Gary Yourofsky, an ALF supporter and prominent lecturer on veganism and animal rights, frequently compares the work of the ALF to the allied nations in World War II who rescued the Jewish peoples from Nazi Germany.113 Activists perceive themselves as rebels and warriors fighting for the oppressed animals that are unable to fight back against guns and knives.

Radical animal rights groups adopt a “leaderless resistance” organizational structure. Activists self-select into the organization by adhering to the ideology and engaging in attacks. The most well-known radical animal rights organization is the ALF. For the ALF, these actions are posted on a near-weekly basis to websites affiliated with the movement, including the North American Animal Liberation Press Office (NAALPO) website.114 Other websites are used for specific operations, such as Operation Bite Back, which focuses on fur research facilities and feed suppliers. Common forms of direct action include releasing cap- tive animals, slashing the tires of mobile slaughterhouses, and smashing the windows of butcher shops. On occasion activists engage in arson.

Radical animal rights groups rarely cross the threshold of violence. The ALF requires all actions undertaken by activists to take all necessary precautions to ensure that no human lives are harmed. The front page of the website for the ALF’s Operation Bite Back states that, “Bite Back does not publish news of actions in which the intent is to physically harm some- one.”115 Nonetheless, there has been some rhetorical support for violence.

Gary Yourofsky advocates for violence on behalf of animals because of the defenselessness of animals and the scale on which they are killed. Yourofsky claims to have given 2,660 lec- tures around the United States and Israel.116 Yourofsky has also established activist bona fides, having been arrested thirteen times, including for releasing approximately 1,500 mink from a fur farm. The ALF inducted Yourofsky into its activist hall of fame, suggesting his ideas carry weight within the movement.117 Although Yourofsky’s support for violence is largely rhetori- cal, a small number of historical animal rights groups have engaged in violence.

The most extreme attacks were largely confined to the ARM and JD, both believed to be ALF splinter groups. Both organizations engaged in letter and parcel bombing campaigns throughout the United Kingdom during the 1980s and 1990s.118 However, these bombings resulted in very few injuries and do not appear to have led to any deaths.119

Two other animal rights organizations have targeted humans. SHAC sought to end ani- mal testing at Huntingdon Life Sciences, a U.K.-based pharmaceutical company. In their campaign, SHAC attacked employees of Huntingdon Life Sciences and threatened bomb attacks, among other actions.120 Another organization, Negotiation is Over! (NIO) used threats of violence in its campaign against the University of Florida and its use of animals in scientific research.121 NIO and the other violent animal rights organizations have largely been small and short-lived.122

Although violent actions have been rare, the widespread moral comparisons between vio- lence against animals and against humans provide fertile ground for more radicalized actors to justify violence.

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Animal Rights CBRN Risk Assessment

Animal rights activists carried out the vast majority of historical radical environmental CBRN attacks. However, these attacks have all been either directed at nonhuman targets or at worst low-level, typically taking the form of contaminating animal products, damaging targeted facilities, or hoaxes.

Because of the movement’s focus on the lives of animals, activists that might engage in a CBRN attack are likely to take extensive care to ensure that the attack does not harm inno- cent animal life. Although this may present a challenge for all scales of CBRN attack, it is likely to be especially challenging for large-scale and catastrophic attacks due to their larger impact. An attacker is likely to be most drawn to controllable methods of attack, such as poi- sons or non-zoonotic pathogens that are unlikely to result in nonhuman collateral damage.

Nonhuman: Animals rights activists have and will likely continue to use CBRN to inflict physical damage in nonviolent attacks. For example, in 1991 ALF members spread acid in a laboratory in Washington State University, causing $100,000 in damage.123 The vast major- ity of animal rights activists are highly unlikely to engage in an agricultural CBRN attack. Although deliberately spreading Foot and Mouth Disease or Bovine Spongiform Encepha- lopathy (Mad Cow Disease) would greatly hurt the bottom-line of the oft-vilified agricultural industry, such an attack would strongly conflict with animal rights activists’ primary goals of preserving, not destroying, animal life. In fact, there was major debate within the movement over the morality of arson attacks because of the mice and spiders potentially killed by fires.124

Low-level: Radical animal rights activists have and will likely continue to engage in low- level CBRN attacks and hoaxes. At least thirteen low-level CBRN attacks are attributable to the radical animal rights movement. These attacks have primarily used chemical agents, including acids and poisons, and on rare occasions have used, or claimed to use, biological agents, such as razor blades allegedly infected with HIV. In the early 2000s, members of SHAC sprayed Andrew Gay, the marketing director for Huntingdon Life Sciences, in the eyes with an unknown chemical spray, reportedly leaving him temporarily blinded and writ- ing on the ground.125 These attacks have garnered media attention and inflicted added dam- age through product recalls.

The majority of low-level animal rights attacks appear to have been intended to cause at most limited harm. On 13 November 2014, a communiqu�e was posted on the NAALPO website claiming that 263 jars of Kiwi Mink Oil (an oil used to treat leather) were contami- nated with cyanic acid.126 Had contaminated jars been used, they would have both caused skin burns and damaged the products to which they were applied. However, the perpetrators publicized their claimed activities, leading SC Johnson to recall the oil and end all produc- tion without anyone being harmed.127

Large-scale: The most plausible scenario for an animal rights organization to attempt a large-scale CBRN attack is a shift from hoax to actual attack. Animal rights groups claimed several hoaxes that could have resulted in large-scale casualties if they had either been real or not reported to the news media. For example, on 17 November 1984, ALF members reported that Mars Bars throughout the United Kingdom had been injected with rat poi- son.128 An animal rights activist could see the results of such apparent hoaxes and wonder what the impact would have been if the attack had been real. A single large-scale attack would likely generate global press attention and cause very costly economic damages.

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Further, any future hoax would generate greater impact under a strengthened belief that the hoax was real.

Catastrophic: The animal rights movement has not engaged nor ever attempted to engage in acts of catastrophic CBRN terrorism. However, if taken to its logical extreme, the ideology of the radical animal rights movement has potentially strong motivators for such an attack. The radical animal rights ideology views humankind as engaged in a daily genocide of ani- mal life for consumption, pleasure, and minor convenience. Killing a few thousand humans may be perceived as worth it if their deaths save millions of animals through decreased con- sumption. Subsequent political change may amplify the effect. As the animal rights move- ment has strong normative constraints against harming all life, the broader movement would not support, and would be deeply opposed to, such an attack. Thus, even if an individ- ual thought along these lines, they would not likely find much support or assistance from other activists, although a group of individuals could become radicalized together, especially if they grew disillusioned with the broader movement.

Conclusion

The good news is that the vast majority of radical environmentalists appear highly unlikely to engage in CBRN terrorism. The bad news is that the emergence of motivated outliers appears likely, and the possibility that they may also be capable cannot be ruled out. If seri- ous CBRN attacks occur, environmental extremists are plausible perpetrators.

Based on the preceding analysis, we make several generalizations about the potential envi- ronmental extremist CBRN threat:

1. Most radical environmentalists embrace nonviolence; however, a subset is violent, but mostly constrained by limited motivations and capabilities. The radical environmental movement emphasizes nonviolence, deeply valuing the sacred nature of all life. While vio- lent attacks have occurred, they have been rare and caused only minimal casualties, mostly as a function of limited motivation, and in rare circumstances where motivation existed, as a function of limited capabilities. Nonetheless, radical environmental ideologies do advo- cate for drastic change, unlikely to be accomplished with minor efforts.

2. Fringe elements of the eco-radical milieu are genuinely motivated to commit large- scale violence, including the use of CBRN weapons, but mostly constrained by limited capabilities. The very actors likely to be motivated to conduct large-scale CBRN attacks are also likely to be less capable, because their CBRN motivations are likely to be rooted in grandiose, delusional worldviews. At the same time, outliers combining motivation for large-scale CBRN attacks with more significant capabilities cannot be ruled out.

3. Sporadic radical environmental CBRN usage is likely to continue, consisting largely of hoaxes, with intermittent low-level chemical or biological attacks. Meth- ods of attack have historically been, and are likely to continue to be, very crude, relying on readily available knowledge, technology, and materiel. The leaderless resistance model of radical environmentalists, emphasizing individual action, also undercuts the capabilities needed for a more sophisticated operation.

4. Increasing rhetorical support for violence within the animal rights movement could lead to more significant action, likely mostly limited by low capabilities. Members of the animal rights movement have engaged in acts of violence. But they have only done so infrequently and the organizations that carried out violent attacks

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in the past are mostly dormant. At the same time, prominent voices in the movement advocate for violence.

5. Among radical environmentalists, green anarchist groups are most plausibly moti- vated to attempt large-scale or catastrophic CBRN attacks, although most are likely to have only limited capabilities. Green anarchists have a stronger history of violence compared to the other currents and RISE, a green anarchist group, is the only eco-radi- cal group to attempt a catastrophic CBRN attack. Their core goal of destroying the technological systems they perceive as buttressing the worst aspects of modern society would require large-scale action. However, green anarchist organizations have histori- cally been both rare and not highly capable, so more substantial threats hinge on sig- nificant outliers. DGR may present such an outlier, although they do not appear to have engaged in violent acts—CBRN or otherwise—to date or, for now, to possess sig- nificant relevant capabilities.

For law enforcement and other officials seeking to prevent CBRN terrorism, this suggests that radical environmentalism, as a whole, today presents at most a modest CBRN threat. That said, to the extent that any terrorist actors present serious CBRN threats—itself a con- troversial topic—eco-radicals rank reasonably high on the list. They do so because, as argued above, fringe elements in the milieu plausibly combine motivations to commit large-scale violence, in some cases with a specific interest in chemical and biological attack modes, with potential access to the capabilities and resources needed to carry out such attacks.

Further, a nuanced approach is warranted, focusing on the groups and individuals who actively support violence and might marry those beliefs with actual capabilities. DGR, in par- ticular, warrants close monitoring, given the organization’s expressed support for violence and their maximalist aims. Their rapid growth across the United States, Europe, and other countries also bolsters their capabilities and increases the challenges of monitoring and act- ing to curtail threats DGR and potential splinter groups from it, may pose. The increasing support for violence within the animal rights movement also deserves monitoring. Here, the key issue is whether new organizations dedicated to violent direct action emerge, because to date support for violence within the milieu has been mostly rhetorical, albeit with worrisome increases in the virulence of that rhetoric.

External factors are likely to play a strong role in the evolution of radical environmental- ism. Worsening environmental conditions—especially connected to global climate change— are likely to strengthen radical environmentalists’ raison d’etre, especially if government and society are perceived as failing to act or acting insufficiently. A DGR advertisement for advanced direct action training notes this explicitly: “Recognizing that our tactics are failing and things keep getting worse, this training will focus on escalation and creative, advanced tactics to increase our effectiveness. This training is aimed at activists who are tired of inef- fective actions. Topics will include soft and hard blockades, hit and run tactics, police inter- actions, legal repercussions, operational security, terrain advantages, escalation, and more.”129 Politics broadly—and specifically, whether certain groups and individuals perceive themselves as having a voice—are another key external variable. And law enforcement actions that may lead particular groups or individuals to feel under siege may also contribute to motivations to engage in higher levels of violence, including CBRN attack modes.

Future scientific developments could create new justifications for—or against—violence. Expansion of human or animal genetic modification is likely to be abhorrent to radical environ- mentalists. Besides the ethical issues involved, radical environmentalists would likely be deeply

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concerned about the spread of those genetic modifications to broader populations. On the other hand, future scientific innovations that provide substitutes, or at least decrease the need, for ani- mal testing could remove some of the justifications for radical animal rights activity.

Comparing the CBRN threat eco-radicals pose to that posed by other terrorist milieus is challenging. Radical Islamist groups arguably pose the most significant threat, combining motivations to commit mass casualty “spectacular” attacks with considerable resources and logistical capabilities, the patience to see complex plots through to fruition, and, unlike radi- cal environmentalists, have historically engaged in significant and frequent violent actions. That said, both Al Qaeda and Daesh’s CBRN efforts have, at least to date, been strikingly crude, an arguably heartening datapoint about the severity of the broader CBRN terrorism threat. Apocalyptic millenarian cults are also plausible sources of motivation to conduct mass casualty CBRN attacks, although they are unlikely to have the requisite capabilities and may, given their belief systems, undermine the efficacy of even the capabilities they do have. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult in the 1990s is the most striking example, launching a delusional nuclear weapons program, completely failing in the biological weapons domain (although how close they were to achieving more significant biological threats remains dis- puted), and achieving only limited effects with chemical weapons, despite the cult members including a Ph.D. virologist, a masters in chemistry, and a physician, having access to extraordinary resources, and operating in a remarkably permissive environment. All that said, the emergence of future groups with similar motivations is likely, and one cannot rule out the possibility that one or more of them may be more capable and/or luckier in their CBRN efforts. Crude chemical and biological weapons—especially the toxin ricin—are pop- ular among domestic U.S. right-wing terrorists and they tend to more frequently engage in violent attacks, but there is little reason to think individuals or groups within this milieu would be capable of more sophisticated CBRN attacks. Eco-radicals fall somewhere in the middle of the threat spectrum populated by these and other groups and individuals, although it is difficult to rank these largely hypothetical threats definitively.

The threat of CBRN terrorism broadly, and of radical environmentalist attacks employing it specifically, is to date thankfully mostly hypothetical. Reasonable analysts can differ about how serious that threat is likely to be going forward. But even one or a few outliers that com- bine motivations with capabilities could be very consequential. And the eco-radical milieu is one plausible source for such outliers. Actors within the milieu can be expected to continue to engage in CBRN-based hoax, nonhuman, and low-level attacks, as well as to occasionally attempt but often fail to successfully execute larger-scale attacks. There is some basis for hoping that motivation and capability do not align to cause these avatars of the Earth to suc- cessfully carry out more consequential CBRN terrorism attacks.

Acknowledgments

The authors express their appreciation to Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey Bale, Dean Baratta, Richard Danzig, Gregory Koblentz, Daniel Lebowitz, Scott Sagan, Nathan Taylor, Herbie Tinsley, and Nicole Tishler for providing invaluable feedback. Philipp C. Bleek also thanks students in multiple iterations of his graduate seminar on CBRN terrorism, who reviewed earlier drafts of the article and helped him refine his thoughts on CBRN terrorism more generally. The authors are grateful for opportunities to present their research and receive feedback at panels at the 2016 and 2017 International Studies Association Annual Conventions and at invited talks in 2016 at the University of Maryland’s Center for the Study

370 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and in 2017 for the New Jersey Office of Home- land Security and Preparedness’ “Intelligence. Unclassified” podcast.

ORCID

Zachary Kallenborn http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4642-1658 Philipp C. Bleek http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2877-6225

Notes

1. Seth Carus, “R.I.S.E.” in Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2000), 56.

2. Ibid., 59–62. 3. Ibid., 57, 63. 4. The full meaning of the name RISE is not known, an informant told police it stood for Recon-

struction, Society, Extermination, although the source could not recall what the “I” stood for. Carus, “R.I.S.E.,” 58.

5. Anonymous, “Kiwi Mink Oil Contaminated in Stores Across United States,” North American Animal Liberation Press Office, 14 November 2013, https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/ NAALPO/2013/11/14/2539/ (accessed 2 March 2017).

6. Serena Ng and Christina Binkley, “S.C. Johnson Pulls Kiwi Mink Oil After Animal Rights Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ SB10001424052702303653004579214373428064280 (accessed 16 May 2018).

7. Michael Martinez, “Activist Group Claims to Send AIDS-Tainted Razors to Animal Research- ers,” CNN, 24 November 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/24/california.ucla.threat/.

8. Alan Cowell, “Company in Animal Rights Battle,” The New York Times, 22 January 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/22/business/worldbusiness/22ANIM.html?pagewantedDall (accessed 16 May 2018).

9. “Radical environmentalists” and, interchangeably, “eco-radicals,” refer to individuals or organi- zations that engage in or advocate for illicit direct action, especially terrorism, to achieve their environmentalism-related goals.

10. We use the term CBRN rather than weapons of mass destruction (WMD) because our analysis encompasses a range of attacks, many of which do not merit the label of mass destruction. On the distinction between CBRN and WMD terrorism, see Kate Ivanova and Todd Sandler, “CBRN Attack Perpetrators: an Empirical Study,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2007), 276.

11. Gregory D. Koblentz, “Predicting Peril or the Peril of Prediction? Assessing the Risk of CBRN Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23 (2011), 501–20; Rolf Mowatt-Larssen and Monica Duffy Toft, “Recommendations to the New President on Countering WMD and Terror- ism,” Just Security, 17 November 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/34603/recommendations- president-countering-wmd-terrorism/ (accessed 16 May 2018); John Mueller, “WMD Terrorism: The Prospects” in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, ed. Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 84–89.

12. Jennifer Varriale Carson, Gary LaFree, and Laura Dugan, “Terrorist and Non-Terrorism Crimi- nal Attacks by Radical Environmental and Animal Rights Group in the United States, 1970–2007,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24 (2012).

13. Both authors have observed that in both government and nongovernment policy discussions about terrorist actors who might plausibly pose CBRN terrorism threats, eco-radicals are fre- quently mentioned. At the same time, the authors have also observed that potential eco-radical CBRN terrorism threats go almost unmentioned in academic, think tank, and government publi- cations that address CBRN terrorism more broadly. The apparent disconnect between policy- makers’ and analysts’ apparent concern about possible eco-radical CBRN terrorism, and the paucity of writing exploring it, is what motivated the authors to research and write this article.

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 371

14. Gary A. Ackerman, “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation Front,” Ter- rorism and Political Violence 15 (2003).

15. Donald R. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006).

16. Bron Taylor, “Threat Assessments and Radical Environmentalism,” Terrorism and Political Vio- lence 4 (2003).

17. The term “weapons of mass destruction” is controversial, because it lumps together threats that are dissimilar in various respects, because many attempted attacks with weapons that receive that label cause few or no casualties, and because there is disagreement about what deserves to be included in the category. John P. Caves and W. Seth Carus, The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030, Occasional Paper No. 10 (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, June 2014); Christian Enemark, “Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction,” Con- temporary Security Policy, 32, no. 2 (2011).

18. Bron Taylor, “Threat Assessments and Radical Environmentalism,” Terrorism and Political Vio- lence 4 (2003).

19. Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015).

20. Crystal Boddie, Matthew Watson, and Tara Kirk Sell, “Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2017,” Health Security 14 (2016).

21. Ibid. 22. United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1540 (2004): Adopted by the Security Council at

its 4956th Meeting, on 28 April 2004,” (2004), http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1540 (accessed 11 November 11, 2017).

23. Dana A. Shea and Frank Gottron, “Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks Using Chemical and Biological Agents: An Assessment Framework and Preliminary Comparisons” (CRS Report for Congress RL32391) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004).

24. The capability and motivation framework is widely employed. Jeffrey Bale and Gary Ackerman, “Recommendations on the Development of Methodologies and Attributes for Assessing Terror- ist Threats of WMD Terrorism,” Report Prepared for Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004, http://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/csep590/05au/readings/Bale_Ackerman_FinalReport. pdf (accessed 8 June 2017).

25. Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 2005), 80.

26. Richard Danzig et al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chem- ical Weapons, 2nd ed. (December 2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/ CNAS_AumShinrikyo_SecondEdition_English.pdf (accessed 6 June 2017).

27. Ibid., 41–80. 28. Gerald Epstein, “The Challenges of Developing Synthetic Pathogens,” Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, 19 May 2008, http://thebulletin.org/challenges-developing-synthetic-pathogens. 29. Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Barriers to Bioweapons: the Challenges of Expertise and Organi-

zation for Weapons Development (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2014). The importance of tacit knowledge in bioterrorism is also highlighted in James Revill and Catherine Jefferson, “Tacit Knowledge and the Biological Weapons Regime,” Science and Public Policy 41, (2014), http://spp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/12/11/scipol.sct090.full (accessed 16 May 2018).

30. Danzig, Aum Shinrikyo. 31. Paul R. Abramson and Ronald F. Inglehart, Value Change in Global Perspective (Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press, 1995). 32. Katrina Running, “Examining Environmental Concern in Developed, Transitioning and Devel-

oping Countries: A Cross-Country Test of the Objective Problems and the Subjective Values Explanations,”World Values Research 5 (2012), 4–5.

33. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Global Education Moni- toring Report 2016: Education for People and Planet: Creating Sustainable Futures for All,”

372 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

(2016), 10, 78, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002457/245752e.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017).

34. Gary LaFree et al., “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, http://www.start.umd.edu/ pirus (accessed 2 March 2017).

35. “Leaderless Resistance” was originally conceived of by Ulius Louis Amoss and popularized by Louis Beam in Louis Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” The Seditionist 12 (1992), http://www.louis beam.com/leaderless.htm (accessed 16 May 2018). For leaderless resistance in radical environ- mentalism see: Paule Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: the Case of the Earth Liberation Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19 (2007).

36. Examples include the website for Operation Bite Back (directaction.info), the North American Animal Liberation Press Office (https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/NAALPO/), and the now defunct website for Negotiation is Over.

37. “Security Culture: A Handbook for Activists,” Animal Liberation Front, August 2000, http:// www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/ELF/sec-handbook.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017).

38. For further details on how secrecy can inhibit CBRN acquisition see Danzig, Aum Shinrikyo. 39. Reynolds Salerno et al., “A BW Risk Assessment: Historical and Technical Perspectives,” The

Nonproliferation Review (Fall–Winter 2004), 40. 40. Detlof von Winterfeldt and Heather Rosoff, “A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb

Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,” Risk Analysis 27 (2007), http://research.cre ate.usc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articleD1051&contextDpublished_papers (accessed 2 March 2017).

41. Whether any nonstate actor could plausibly acquire a nuclear weapon, either by stealing it from a state or by obtaining fissile material and constructing an improvised nuclear device, is a matter of widespread debate. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2004); Matthew Bunn, “A Mathematical Model of the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci- ence 607 (2006), 103–20; John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Graham Allison, “A Response to Nuclear Terrorism Skeptics” Brown Journal of World Affairs 16 (Fall/Winter 2009), 31–44.

42. “Insiders” refers to individuals working for, belonging to, or otherwise affiliated with an organi- zation that would provide access to specialized equipment, material, and/or knowledge that would aid in conducting a CBRN attack.

43. Ted Kaczynski, “Letter to a Turkish Anarchist,” The Anarchist Library, undated, https://thea narchistlibrary.org/library/ted-kaczynski-letter-to-a-turkish-anarchist.

44. Raymond Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger, “Biotechnology E-Commerce: A Disruptive Challenge to Biological Arms Control,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, CNS Occasional Paper No. 21, 2015, http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/biotech_e commerce.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017); “LabX: Auctions, Classifieds, & New Productions,” http://www.labx.com/.

45. Quote taken from “Smallpox Eradication: Destruction of Variola Virus Stocks, Report by the Secretariat,” World Health Organization, 22 April 2016, http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/ WHA69/A69_23-en.pdf; for the full advisory report see: “The Independent Advisory Group on Public Health Implications of Synthetic Biology Technology Related to Smallpox, a Report to the Director-General of WHO,” World Health Organization, June 2015, http://apps.who.int/iris/bit stream/10665/198357/1/WHO_HSE_PED_2015.1_eng.pdf?uaD1.

46. Arthur Caplan et al., “No Time to Waste—The Ethical Challenges Created by CRISPR,” EMBO Reports 16, No. 15, 2015, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.15252/embr.201541337/full. (accessed 16 May 2018)

47. Tuan Nguyen, “Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation: Confronting New Technological Chal- lenges.” Science Magazine, 4 March 2005; Katherine S. Elvira, Xavier Casadevall I Solvas, Robert C. R. Wootton, and Andrew J. Demello. “The Past, Present, and Potential for Microfluidic Reac- tor Technology in Chemical Synthesis,” Nature Chemistry 5, no. 11 (2013), 905–15. doi:10.1038/

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 373

nchem.1753; Amy E. Smithson, “Chemical Micro Process Devices,” in Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing The Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies, ed. Jonathan Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 235–248; Jonathan B. Tucker, “Combinatorial Chemistry and High-Throughput Screening,” in Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing The Risks of Emerging Biological and Chemical Technologies, ed. Jonathan Tucker (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 89–100.

48. Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe, “3D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge,” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015), 7-19; Evan Thompson, “Don’t Panic, No One is 3D Printing a Nuclear Bomb,” Ramen IR (22 December 2015), https://ramenir.com/ 2015/12/22/dont-panic-no-one-is-3d-printing-a-nuclear-bomb/. (accessed 16 May 2018)

49. “The Military Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons of Mass Destruction Technologies (ADA 330102), ‘Chemical Weapons Technology,’” Department of Defense, February 1998, II-3-7.

50. Gurr and Cole, “The New Face of Terrorism: Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 80–107.

51. Bruce Hoffman, “The First Non-State Use of a Chemical Weapon in Warfare: The Tamil Tigers’ Assault on East Kiran,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 3–4 (2009); Grant Wardlow quoted in Benja- min Cole, The Changing Faces of Terrorism: How Real is the Threat from Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons? (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2011), 8.

52. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 229. 53. C. J. M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political

Violence 10 (1998) demonstrates that ideology helps shape terrorist target selections. By implica- tion, ideology also influences attack method decisions, as attack methods may be more or less effective depending on the target.

54. Jerrold M. Post, “Appendix: Psychological and Motivational Factors in Terrorist Decision-Mak- ing: Implications for CBW Terrorism.” In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, ed. Jonathan B. Tucker (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and Interna- tional Affairs, 2000).

55. Dave Foreman, “Strategic Monkeywrenching” in Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, eds. Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood (1993), https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/various- authors-ecodefense-a-field-guide-to-monkeywrenching (accessed 2 March 2017).

56. “The ALF Primer: A Guide to Direct Action and the Animal Liberation Front,” Animal Libera- tion Front, 2002, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/ALFPrime.htm (accessed 5 February 2017).

57. Taylor, “Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 10 (1998), cited in Ackerman, “Beyond Arson?”

58. Voluntary Human Extinction Movement, “About the Movement,” http://www.vhemt.org/aboutv hemt.htm (accessed 2 March 2017).

59. Not all radical environmentalists adhere to Deep Ecology. Murray Bookchin’s Social Ecology heavily critiques and provides an alternative to Deep Ecology. Social Ecology advocates for non- hierarchical human societies and argues that humans do have a uniqueness beyond other species. Michael Bookchin, “Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement,” Green Perspectives: Newsletter of the Green Program Project 4–5, 25 June 1987, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/bookchin/socecovdeepeco.html (accessed 16 May 2018).

60. Arne Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects.” In Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston & London: Shambhala, 1995), 68.

61. Paul Taylor, “Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy); 25th Anniversary Edition with a New Forward by Dale Jamieson Edi- tion,” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 99–101.

62. Ibid., 101–16. 63. Naess, “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects.” 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Chris Thomas et al., “Extinction Risk from Climate Change,” Nature 427 (2004).

374 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

67. Richard Ladl et al., “Crying Wolf on Climate Change and Extinction,” Biodiversity Research Group, School of Geography and the Environment, Oxford University, UK, January 2004, http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/biodiversity/publications/crywolf.pdf (accessed 2 March 2017).

68. Despite their prevalence, there is little literature on terrorism hoaxing. One significant exception is Nicole A. Tishler, “Fake Terrorism: Examining terrorist groups’ resort to hoaxing as a mode of attack” (PhD dissertation, Carleton, 2017).

69. Danzig, Aum Shinrikyo 70. Taylor, “Threat Assessments and Radical Environmentalism.” 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid., 10–11. 73. Leslie James Pickering, The Earth Liberation Front: 1997–2002 (New York: Arissa Media Group,

2007), 9–15. 74. “About Earth First!,” Earth First!, http://earthfirstjournal.org/about/ (accessed 2 March 2017);

Bron Taylor, “Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front.” In Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron Taylor (London & New York: Continuum, 2005).

75. Nicholas Kristof, “Forest Sabotage is Urged by Some,” New York Times, 22 January 1986, http:// www.nytimes.com/1986/01/22/us/forest-sabotage-is-urged-by-some.html. (accessed 16 May 2018)

76. Taylor, “Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front.” 77. Natalie Pawelski, “Group Claiming Credit for Vail Fires Says the Aim Was to Help Lynx,” CNN,

22 October 1998, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/science/9810/22/vail.fire.02/ (accessed 16 May 2018).

78. Dave Foreman and Bill Haywood, eds., Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching, 1993, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/various-authors-ecodefense-a-field-guide-to-monkey wrenching (accessed 16 May 2018).

79. Pickering himself acknowledges that the decision to stop calling the ELF a nonviolent organiza- tion generated criticism from supporters of the ELF. Pickering, “The Earth Liberation Front: 1997–2002,” 4.

80. Taylor, “Threat Assessments and Radical Environmentalism,” 176–77. 81. Rod Coronado’s activist bona-fides include serving as a spokesman for ELF, member of the Sea

Shepherd Conservation Society, Earth First!, and ALF, and serving one year in prison. 82. Mark Wheelis, Rocco Casagrande, and Laurence V. Madden, “Biological Attack on Agriculture:

Low-Tech, High-Impact Bioterrorism,” Bioscience 52, 2002, http://bioscience.oxfordjournals. org/content/52/7/569.full (accessed 16 May 2018).

83. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 5. 84. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson, “Army-of-One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone

Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26, 2014, 228. 85. Foreman, “Strategic Monkeywrenching.” 86. Anonymous, “What is Green Anarchy?,” Green Anarchy: Back to Basics, https://theanarchistli

brary.org/library/anonymous-what-is-green-anarchy (accessed 16 May 2018). 87. Primitivist thinkers disagree about the nature of hunter-gatherer society, emphasizing different

aspects. While Zerzan argues that hunter-gather societies tend toward gender equality, Kaczyn- ski dismisses this, arguing there are no clear examples. Kaczynski also strongly opposes the influ- ence of leftist ideas about equality on the green anarchist movement. Theodore Kaczynski, Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczynski a.k.a. The Unabomber (Port Townsend: Feral House, 2008), 128–71.

88. Ibid., 38. 89. Ibid., 71. 90. Ibid., 97. 91. Ibid., 98. 92. There is some debate over the relationship between the Unabomber and the broader radical

environmental movement. This debate has two fronts: whether the Unabomber is meaningfully linked to EF! and whether he should be classified in the radical environmental movement. The

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 375

former issue is not relevant to this analysis because the taxonomy is based on issues prioritized and tactics selected, not organizational affiliation. Scholars (e.g., Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde) advance the latter issue, seeing Kaczynski’s criticisms of mainstream radical environmentalism as evidence of questionable linkages. Prosecutors also claimed the environmental concern was just a disingenuous story for justifying social isolation. However, Kaczynski’s criticism focuses on Leftist influences within the movement that undermine the environmental and anti-technol- ogy goals (Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 106). While those criticisms put him outside the mainstream radical environmentalists, the focus on environmentalism justifies his inclusion under the broad tent of radical environmentalism. Taylor (“Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism”) persuasively addresses the prosecution’s arguments, noting Kaczynski’s ideology “intersected with typical elements of the worldviews of radical environmentalists and green anarchists” and that his “hate-filled and, almost certainly, mentally ill and paranoid personality” does not pre- clude ideology from also playing a motivating role. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Cas Mudde, “‘Eco- Terrorism’: Terrorist Threat or Political Ploy?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 37 (2014).

93. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 89. 94. ITS refers to itself in Spanish as “Individualidades tendiendo a lo Salvaje,” which has been variously

translated as “Individualities Tending Towards Savagery,” “Individuals Tending Towards Savagery,” “Individualists Tending Towards the Wild,” and “Individuals Tending Towards the Savage.”

95. Secret Forest Society, “Eleventh Communique of the Individualists Tending Toward the Wild,” Anarchist News, 11 August 2016, http://anarchistnews.org/content/eleventh-communique-indi vidualists-tending-toward-wild (accessed 16 May 2018)

96. Individualities Tending Towards Savagery, “Communique Eight,” The Anarchist Library, March 2014, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/individualists-tending-toward-the-wild-communiques (accessed 16May 2018).

97. The blend of social justice and radical environmentalism has created tensions within the organi- zation. Aric McBay, one of the co-founders, left the organization soon after its founding owing to disagreements over transgender rights (see: Aric McBay, “DGR and Transphobia,” Aric McBay: Author, Farmer, Organizer, 14 May 2013, http://www.aricmcbay.org/2013/05/14/dgr- and-transphobia/ (accessed 2 March 2017).

98. “Decisive Ecological Warfare: The Four Phases of Decisive Ecological Warfare,” Deep Green Resistance, http://deepgreenresistance.org/en/deep-green-resistance-strategy/decisive-ecological- warfare#four-phases (accessed 28 February 2016).

99. One chapter is a regional Middle andNorth Africa (MENA) group that appears to be based in Leba- non. There is also a regional European/MENA chapter. “Find a Deep Green Resistance Chapter,” Deep Green Resistance, http://deepgreenresistance.org/en/get-involved/find-deep-green-resistance- chapter (accessed 28 February 2016).

100. Derrick Jensen, “Frequently Asked Questions of Deep Green Resistance: What Has Happened to Those Who Have Tried to Use Violence?,” Deep Green Resistance, http://deepgreenresistance. org/en/who-we-are/faqs/deep-green-resistance-faqs (accessed 28 February 2016).

101. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014), 228.

102. Kaczynski, “Technological Slavery,” 37. 103. Derrick Jensen, Aric McBay, and Lierre Keith, Deep Green Resistance: Strategy to Save the Planet

(New York: Seven Stories Press, 2011), 425. 104. Ibid., 427. 105. Because the Unabomber did not commit any CBRN attacks, his actions are only referenced for

their potential to inspire others. Howard Kurtz, “Unabomber Manuscript is Published: Public Safety Reasons Cited in Joint Decision by Post, N.Y. Times,” Washington Post, 19 September 1995, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/unabomber/manifesto.decsn. htm (accessed 16 May 2018).

106. Individualities Tending Towards Savagery, “Communique Two,” The Anarchist Library, 22 May 2011, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/individualists-tending-toward-the-wild-communiques (accessed 16May 2018).

376 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

107. Mark Murray, “Poll: 71% Say Shooting Violence Now Normal Part of American Life,” NBC News, 14 December 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/poll-71-say-shooting-vio lence-now-normal-part-american-life-n479601 (accessed 16 May 2018).

108. Deep Green Resistance, “Decisive Ecological Warfare.” 109. Carus, “R.I.S.E.,” 59. 110. Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights; Updated with a New Preface (Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, 2004); Rachel Feltman, “Chimps Given Human Rights by U.S. Court for the First Time (Sort Of)” Washington Post (22 April 2015), https://www.washington post.com/news/speaking-of-science/wp/2015/04/21/chimps-given-human-rights-by-u-s-court- for-the-first-time/?utm_termD.5ff1174d3859 (accessed 16 May 2018).

111. Stephen Best and Anthony Nocella II, The Animal Liberation Front: A Political and Philosophical Analysis (New York: Lantern Books, 2011).

112. Stephen Best, “Manifesto for Radical Abolitionism: By Any Means Necessary,” Animal Libera- tion Front, 13 November 2009, http://animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/Manifesto-TotalLib. htm (accessed 16 May 2018).

113. “Rape and Kill Humans? j Gary Yourofsky on Violence for Animal Liberation,” YouTube, 26 January 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?vD4En39iyK4DA&featureDyoutu.be&tD60 (accessed 2 March 2017).

114. “North American Animal Liberation Press Office,” https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/ NAALPO/ (accessed 16 May 2018).

115. “Bite Back,” Directaction.info (accessed 28 February, 2016). 116. “About Gary Yourofsky,” ADAPTT: Animals Deserve Absolute Protection Today and Tomorrow,

http://www.adaptt.org/bio.html (accessed 20 February 2016). 117. “Animal Liberation Hall of Fame,” Animal Liberation Front, http://animalliberationfront.com/

Saints/ARHallOfFame/ALHallFame.htm (accessed 28 February 2016). 118. Rachel Monaghan, “Terrorism in the Name of Animal Rights,” Terrorism and Political Violence

11 (1999). 119. “Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to

Terrorism (START), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (accessed 16 May 2018). 120. Paul Peachey, “Animal Rights Group Ends 15-Year Campaign Against Experiments at Huntingdon,”

The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/animal-rights-group-ends-15-year- campaign-against-experiments-at-huntingdon-9687843.html (accessed 23 August 2014).

121. Non-Humans First, “An Exclusive Interview with Camille Marino, Founder of Negotiation is Over and Eleventh Hour for Animals,” 7 July 2014, https://nonhumansfirst.com/2014/07/07/an- exclusive-interview-with-camille-marino-founder-of-negotiation-is-over-and-eleventh-hour- for-animals/; Leah Nelson, “Animal Rights Extremist Camille Marino Calls for Violence,” South- ern Poverty Law Center, 1 March 2012, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence- report/2012/animal-rights-extremist-camille-marino-calls-violence (accessed 16 May 2018).

122. SHAC reportedly ended their campaign in August 2014. See: Paul Peachey, “Animal Rights Group Ends 15-Year Campaign Against Experiments at Huntingdon,” The Independent, 23 August 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/animal-rights-group-ends-15-year-campaign-against- experiments-at-huntingdon-9687843.html. NIO appears to primarily be the work of Camille Marino. In February 2015 she was sentenced to six months in prison for violating a protective order filed by fellow animal rights advocate and professor, Steven Best. The judge appears to have ordered her to take down the NIO website and as of 12 February 2017 we can find no evidence of continuing NIO activities. Barry Friedman, “Support Camille Marino, Unjustly Incarcerated in a New Mexico Jail,” Barry Friedman University of North Georgia Faculty Page, 21 July 2015, 2017, http://faculty.ung.edu/ bfriedman/bfried/AnimalLab/SupportCamille.html (accessed 2 March 2016).

123. Liddick Eco-Terrorism, 43. 124. Eizbieta Posluszna, Environmental and Animal Rights Extremism, Terrorism, and National Secu-

rity (Waltham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2015), 94. 125. Cowell, “Company in Animal Rights Battle.” 126. Anonymous, “Kiwi Mink Oil Contaminated in Stores Across United States.” 127. Ng and Binkley, “S.C. Johnson Pulls Kiwi Mink Oil After Animal Rights Threat.”

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 377

128. “Poison Scare Triggers Candy Recall in Britain,” Reuters, published in the Chicago Tribune, 19 November 1984.

129. “News from Deep Green Resistance: Advanced Direction Action Training, April 21–23,” Deep Green Resistance, undated, http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?uD0d86f498912106c40fb1110ba &idDe69941ba71&eD7fddb6db3c (accessed 6 June 2017).

130. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 43. 131. “Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-State Actors (POICN) [data file],” National Con-

sortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), accessed via e-mail cor- respondence with START.

132. Anonymous, “Butyric Acid Attack on Pro-Vivisection Group,” Bite Back, 14 July 2014, http:// www.directaction.info/news_july15_14.htm (accessed 16 May 2018).

133. Anonymous, “Butyric Acid Attack at Peek & Cloppenburg,” Bite Back, 11 February 2015, http:// www.directaction.info/news_feb28_15.htm (accessed 16 May 2018).

134. Ronald G. Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Litera- ture, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1995, cited in Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid, A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear Attacks: 1950–2005, 7 July 2006.

135. “Poison Scare Triggers Candy Recall in Britain,” Reuters, published in the Chicago Tribune, 19 November 1984.

136. “Mars Bar Poison Scare Was a Hoax Extremists Say,” AP, published in the Montreal Gazette, 20 November 1984.

137. Ronald G. Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Litera- ture, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1995, cited in Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid, A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear Attacks: 1950–2005, 7 July 2006.

138. “Biological Warfare: Dark Harvest,” TIME, 9 November 1981, http://content.time.com/time/mag azine/article/0,9171,922652,00.html (accessed 16 May 2018).

139. START, “POICN [data file].” 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Ronald G. Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Litera-

ture, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, 1995, cited in Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid, A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, and Nuclear Attacks: 1950–2005, 7 July 2006.

144. START, “POICN [data file].” 145. “Vancouver Supermarkets Pull Turkeys after Poisoning Threat,” AP, 24 December 1994, http://

www.apnewsarchive.com/1994/Vancouver-Supermarkets-Pull-Turkeys-After-Poisoning-Threat/ id-32574d7928adf570994e23b413376a52 (accessed 16 May 2018).

146. “Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty Threatens Terrorist-Style Attack,” Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, 20 September 2002, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelli gence-report/2002/stop-huntingdon-animal-cruelty-threatens-terrorist-style-attack (accessed 16 May 2018).

147. START, “POICN [data file].” 148. Alan Cowell, “Company in Animal Rights Battle.” 149. Stefan Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,”

Terrorism and Political Violence 15 (2003). 150. START, “POICN [data file].” 151. Michael Martinez, “Activist Group Claims to Send AIDS-Tainted Razors to Animal Research-

ers,” CNN, 24 November 2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/11/24/california.ucla.threat/ (accessed 16 May 2018).

152. START, “POICN [data file].” 153. “FAI / IRF Threatens Coca Cola and Nestle with Product Sabotage,” To Vima (English), 24

December 2013, http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aidD551969 (accessed 16 May 2018)

378 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

154. Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (FAI/IRF), “SXEDIO ‘PPASINH NEMESIS’ (Plan ‘Green Nemesis’),” hosted by To Vima, http://www.tovima.gr/ files/1/2013/12/24/analipsi.pdf (accessed 16 May 2018)

155. Anonymous, “Kiwi Mink Oil Contaminated in Stores Across United States,” North American Animal Liberation Press Office, 14 November 2013, https://animalliberationpressoffice.org/ NAALPO/2013/11/14/2539/; Serena Ng and Christina Binkley, “S.C. Johnson Pulls Kiwi Mink Oil After Animal Rights Threat,” The Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2013, http://www.wsj. com/articles/SB10001424052702303653004579214373428064280 (accessed 16 May 2018).

156. Carmen Paun, “Food, Drinks Taken Off Shelves in Greece After Green Terrorist Group Threat,” Politico, 20 December 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/food-drinks-taken-off-shelves-in- greece-after-green-terrorist-group-threat/ (accessed 16 May 2018); “A Greek Anarchist Group Said it Injected Grocery Products in Athens with Chlorine and Hydrochloric Acid,” AP, pub- lished in Business Insider, 21 December 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-greek-anar chists-claim-acid-attack-on-supermarket-products-2016-12 (accessed 16 May 2018).

157. Sarah Souli, “Greek Anarchists Say They’re Injecting Groceries with Toxic Acid,” Vice News, 21 December 2017, https://munchies.vice.com/en_us/article/8xvgwp/greek-anarchists-say-theyre- injecting-groceries-with-toxic-acid (accessed 16 May 2018).

158. Ibid. 159. Gary Ackerman and Lauren Pinson, “An Army of One: Assessing CBRN Pursuit and Use by

Lone Wolves and Autonomous Cells,” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014), 229.

Appendix: Historical Eco-radical CBRN ATTACKS

Nonhuman CBRN attacks

12 August 1991, ALF members spread hydrochloric acid around a lab at Washington State University.130

4 May 2005, pellets of the toxic compound sodium monofluoroacetate (referred to as 1080) were discovered next to a water reservoir in Kaikoura, New Zealand that was graffitied with “1080 kills.” Officials stated that perpetrators did not seem to intend to poison the water and the water tested free of harmful toxins.131

14 July 2014, butyric acid spread over the carpet of a pro-vivisection company.132

11 February 2015, butyric acid spilled in Peek & Cloppenburg store in Berlin to protest the store’s sale of fur.133

Low-Level CBRN attacks and hoaxes

1984, UK ALF activists were charged with injecting a weed-killer containing mercury into a turkey.134

17 November 1984, ALF members reported to the news media that Mars Bars throughout the United Kingdom had been injected with rat poison.135 This led to a major recall and $4.5 million in damages. The ALF later acknowledged it was a hoax.136

12 March 1985, ARM members threatened to contaminate eggs with rat poison.137

1991, packages containing B. Anthracis contaminated dirt were sent to the United Kingdom’s chemical defense establishment by individuals allegedly affiliated with the Scot- tish National Liberation Army (they called themselves the Dark Harvest Commandos).138

14 November 1991, ALF members were arrested for planning to contaminate bottles of Lucozade, a soft drink.139

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 379

3 January 1992, ARM members claimed to have injected oven cleaner into “Cold Buster” chocolate bars to protest the manufacturer’s testing on animals.140

11 January 1992, ALF members claimed to have poisoned milk in Milan, Italy in protest of cattle slaughter.141

30 September 1992, ALF members contaminated milk cartons with red dye in Rome.142

July 1994, ALF in the United Kingdom sent a package containing capsaicin (a chemical that causes a burning sensation) to the secretary of the National Front, an extremist right- wing U.K. organization.143

28 October 1994, organization calling itself “David Organization” threatened in a letter to release poison in a courthouse.144

23 December 1994, ARM members claimed to have put rat poison in thousands of tur- keys in Vancouver, British Columbia.145

October 1996, the Justice Department of UCLA mailed razor blades laced with rat poison to researchers in Canada and the United States.146

10 December 1998, ALF members mailed panettone cake that tested positive for rat poi- son to news agencies in Florence and Bologna, Italy to protest Nestle’s use of genetic engi- neering in their panettone products. This led to a significant recall estimated at $30 million.147

Early 2000s, SHAC members sprayed chemicals into the eyes of Andrew Gay, HLS mar- keting director, temporarily blinding him.148

24 July 2000, unknown animal and environmental extremists left jars of a cyanide com- pound outside of locations in downtown Minneapolis.149

2 March 2008, members of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society threw bottles of butyric acid at a Japanese whaling vessel, injuring four people.150

16 November 2010, Justice Department of UCLA mailed razor blades allegedly contami- nated with HIV to two researchers at UCLA.151

29 November 2011, Animal Liberation of USA/Canada members threatened to spread rat poison and e. coli in Chinese markets and restaurants in Toronto Canada in protest of res- taurants’ opposition to a shark fin ban.152

In December 2013, a Greek anarchist group claimed they injected Nestle and Coca-Cola products with hydrochloric acid, then returned them to store shelves.153 The group called the attack the “green nemesis” operation, citing the dominance of money and the harm to nature and the natural world as justifications for their actions.154

13 November 2014, 263 jars of Kiwi Mink Oil were contaminated with cyanic acid (an acid that will destroy leathers and can cause minor burns), leading to SC Johnson no longer producing mink oil.155

19 December 2016, a group calling itself “Green Nemesis” claimed they injected salad dressing, tomato sauce, Coca-Cola, Nestle Ice Tea, and Delta milk with chlorine and hydro- chloric acid, then returned them to store shelves in Greece.156

19 December 2017, Black and Green Arsonists claimed to have injected hydrochloric acid into bottles of Coca-Cola and Coca-Cola Light; tubes of lunchmeat; and Delta whole milk, then returned them to store shelves in Athens and Thessaloniki, Greece.157 Their communiqu�e was entitled “Green Nemesis Act 3” suggesting the perpetrators were affiliated with the 2016 event and the attack was to protest consumerism and the harm inflicted on animals.158

380 Z. KALLENBORN AND P. C. BLEEK

Large-Scale CBRN attacks

August 1999, the Justice Department mailed over 100 razor blades laced with rat poison to individuals in the fur industry.159

Catastrophic CBRN attacks

1971, RISE attempted to develop a wide range of biological weapons including typhoid to bring down civilization. However, they appear to have made little progress, the culture sam- ples that they collected were destroyed, and the members arrested and charged.

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 381