American Modern Civilization Short Paper

George Kennan Argues for Containment

George Kennan

Introduction

Source: X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566–78, 580–82.

…. We have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity,

and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution

for the sake of vain baubles of the future…. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or

the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior

force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the

necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever

it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled

every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable

barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main

thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired

goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any

given time….

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the

Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian

expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with

outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness.” While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means

unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by

tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this

might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human

psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never

a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness.

For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign

government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on

Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a

compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free

institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant

application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,

corresponding to the shifts and manœuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or

talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see

that already they have scored great successes….

[T]he future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-

delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin….

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political

intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a

partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no

abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy

coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure

toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still

by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well

contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential….

[I]n actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line

and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the

internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist

movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined…. It is… a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a

country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its

internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality

capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that

such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear

sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow’s supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin’s foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy….

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a

power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet

power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains

under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of

moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to

promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual

mellowing of Soviet power….

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-

American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United States as a nation

among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best

traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

The Nixon Doctrine

Richard Nixon

Source:Richard Nixon, “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970‘s,” February 18, 1970.

… When I took office, the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern

of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define

America’s goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human

dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible

without a major American role.

This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this

Administration’s statement of a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations.

A NEW ERA

THE postwar period in international relations has ended.

Then, we were the only great power whose society and economy had escaped World War II’s massive destruction. Today, the ravages of that war have been overcome. Western Europe and

Japan have recovered their economic strength, their political vitality, and their national self-

confidence. Once the recipients of American aid, they have now begun to share their growing

resources with the developing world. Once almost totally dependent on American military

power, our European allies now play a greater role in our common policies, commensurate with

their growing strength.

Then, new nations were being born, often in turmoil and uncertainty. Today, these nations have a

new spirit and a growing strength of independence. Once, many feared that they would become

simply a battleground of cold-war rivalry and fertile ground for Communist penetration. But this

fear misjudged their pride in their national identities and their determination to preserve their

newly won sovereignty.

Then, we were confronted by a monolithic Communist world. Today, the nature of that world

has changed–the power of individual Communist nations has grown, but international Communist unity has been shattered. Once a unified bloc, its solidarity has been broken by the

powerful forces of nationalism. The Soviet Union and Communist China, once bound by an

alliance of friendship, had become bitter adversaries by the mid-1960’s. The only times the

Soviet Union has used the Red Army since World War II have been against its own allies in East

Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Marxist dream of

international Communist unity has disintegrated.

Then, the United States had a monopoly or overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons.

Today, a revolution in the technology of war has altered the nature of the military balance of

power. New types of weapons present new dangers. Communist China has acquired

thermonuclear weapons. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the ability to

inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first. There can be no gain and

certainly no victory for the power that provokes a thermonuclear exchange. Thus, both sides

have recognized a vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms

race.

Then, the slogans formed in the past century were the ideological accessories of the intellectual

debate. Today, the “isms” have lost their vitality–indeed the restlessness of youth on both sides of the dividing line testifies to the need for a new idealism and deeper purposes,

This is the challenge and the opportunity before America as it enters the 1970’s …

1. Peace Through Partnership –The Nixon Doctrine

As I said in my address of November 3, “We Americans are a do-it-yourself people-an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has

been carried over into our foreign policy.”

The postwar era of American foreign policy began in this vein in 1947 with the proclamation of

the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, offering American economic and military assistance

to countries threatened by aggression. Our policy held that democracy and prosperity, buttressed

by American military strength and organized in a worldwide network of American-led alliances,

would insure stability and peace. In the formative years of the postwar period, this great effort of

international political and economic reconstruction was a triumph of American leadership and

imagination, especially in Europe.

For two decades after the end of the Second World War, our foreign policy was guided by such a

vision and inspired by its success. The vision was based on the fact that the United States was the

richest and most stable country, without whose initiative and resources little security or progress

was possible.

This impulse carried us through into the 1960’s. The United States conceived programs and ran them. We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies. We discerned dangers, and acted

directly to combat them.

The world has dramatically changed since the days of the Marshall Plan. We deal now with a

world of stronger allies, a community of independent developing nations, and a Communist

world still hostile but now divided.

Others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes which once might have

required our intervention. Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency of our

involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies. This is the approach

which will best encourage other nations to do their part, and will most genuinely enlist the

support of the American people.

This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam–the “Nixon Doctrine.” Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but

that America cannot–and will not–conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it

makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of

withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effective in

meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace.

A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means

a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to

require us to maintain our commitments–and we will. As I said at the United Nations, “It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies.” But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are

to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union Address, I affirmed that “to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility.” This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way– the only way–we can carry out our responsibilities.

It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments.

Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound

foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others’ interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world

because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests

must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

We will view new commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests

and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to

counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost.

“Misplaced Power” Dwight D. Eisenhower

Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People,” January 17, 1961.

[T]the conflict now engulfing the world ….commands our whole attention, absorbs our very beings. We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To

meet it successfully, there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of

crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without complaint

the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted course toward permanent peace and human

betterment.

Crises there will continue to be. In meeting them, whether foreign or domestic, great or small,

there is a recurring temptation to feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the

miraculous solution to all current difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defense;

development of unrealistic programs to cure every ill in agriculture; a dramatic expansion in

basic and applied research—these and many other possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the road we wish to travel.

But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader consideration: the need to maintain

balance in and among national programs—balance between the private and the public economy, balance between cost and hoped for advantage—balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable; balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties

imposed by the nation upon the individual; balance between actions of the moment and the

national welfare of the future. Good judgment seeks balance and progress; lack of it eventually

finds imbalance and frustration.

The record of many decades stands as proof that our people and their government have, in the

main, understood these truths and have responded to them well, in the face of stress and threat.

But threats, new in kind or degree, constantly arise. I mention two only.

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty,

ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own

destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in

peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American

makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no

longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a

permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men

and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military

security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the

American experience. The total influence-economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative

need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil,

resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,

whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous

rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.

We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the

proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful

methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has

been the technological revolution during recent decades.

In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and

costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal

government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of

scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically

the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the

conduct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes

virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds

of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded.

Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert

to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-

technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new

and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society ….

Disarmament, with mutual honor and confidence, is a continuing imperative. Together we must

learn how to compose differences, not with arms, but with intellect and decent purpose. Because

this need is so sharp and apparent I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this

field with a definite sense of disappointment. As one who has witnessed the horror and the

lingering sadness of war–as one who knows that another war could utterly destroy this civilization which has been so slowly and painfully built over thousands of years–I wish I could say tonight that a lasting peace is in sight.

Happily, I can say that war has been avoided. Steady progress toward our ultimate goal has been

made. But, so much remains to be done. As a private citizen, I shall never cease to do what little

I can to help the world advance along that road.

Excerpts from “Peace Without Conquest” Lyndon B. Johnson

Source: Lyndon B. Johnson. Address at Johns Hopkins University: “Peace Without Conquest.” April 7, 1965. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online].

Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web:

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26877.

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peking. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in

Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression

in Korea. It is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The

contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

WHY ARE WE IN VIET-NAM?

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has

offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we have helped

to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Viet-Nam

defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and to the terror

that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are

people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are

attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the

value of an American commitment and in the value of America’s word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment

that retreat from Viet-Nam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one

country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never

satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in

southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: “Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further.”

There are those who say that all our effort there will be futile—that China’s power is such that it is bound to dominate all southeast Asia. But there is no end to that argument until all of the

nations of Asia are swallowed up.

There are those who wonder why we have a responsibility there. Well, we have it there for the

same reason that we have a responsibility for the defense of Europe. World War II was fought in

both Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves with continued responsibility for

the defense of freedom.

OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIET-NAM

Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We want

nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way.

We will do everything necessary to reach that objective. And we will do only what is absolutely

necessary.

. . . .

I wish it were possible to convince others with words of what we now find it necessary to say

with guns and planes: Armed hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to any challenge.

Because we fight for values and we fight for principles, rather than territory or colonies, our

patience and our determination are unending.

. . . .

Such peace demands an independent South Viet-Nam—securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships to all others—free from outside interference—tied to no alliance—a military base for no other country.

These are the essentials of any final settlement.

. . . .

But we will always oppose the effort of one nation to conquer another nation.

We will do this because our own security is at stake.

But there is more to it than that. For our generation has a dream. It is a very old dream. But we

have the power and now we have the opportunity to make that dream come true.

For centuries nations have struggled among each other. But we dream of a world where disputes

are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so.

For most of history men have hated and killed one another in battle. But we dream of an end to

war. And we will try to make it so.

For all existence most men have lived in poverty, threatened by hunger. But we dream of a world

where all are fed and charged with hope. And we will help to make it so.

. . . .

I know this will not be easy. I know how difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and love to

master hate. The complexities of this world do not bow easily to pure and consistent answers.

But the simple truths are there just the same. We must all try to follow them as best we can.

. . . .

Every night before I turn out the lights to sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done

everything that I can do to unite this country? Have I done everything I can to help unite the

world, to try to bring peace and hope to all the peoples of the world? Have I done enough?

Address on Cuba

John F. Kennedy

Source: John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Television Report to the American People in the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: United States General Printing Office, 1963), 806–809.

Document

GOOD EVENING, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military

buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the

fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The

purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the

Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9

a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed

our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels

obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several

of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a

distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking

Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the

southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic

missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far

south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now

being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of

the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th

Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on

September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen,

both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original

defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles

on the territory of any other nation.…

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate

deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a

world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation’s security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles

are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their

deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have

deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo

which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our

own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a

cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history—unlike that has of the Soviets since the end of World War it. It demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or

impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to

living daily on the bull’s eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear

threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western

Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric

policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by

either friend or foe.…

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and

under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the revolution of the

Congress, I have directed that the following initial steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under

shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation

or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine

will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time,

however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of

1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military

buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6, rejected secrecy

on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus

increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed

Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people

and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will

be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba

against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United

States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated

today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a

standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the

Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke

articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter

allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been

alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting

of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat

to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all

offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can

be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine,

reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I

call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort

to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to

move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his government’s own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these

weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.…

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being

directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your

deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for

all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your

nationalist revolution was betrayed—and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and

agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors

in the Americas—and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war—the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-

being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to

impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by

those who deny your freedom.

Many times in the past, the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their

liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be

truly free—free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or

degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the

associations of this hemisphere.

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we

have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will

be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead—months in which both our patience and our will will be tested—months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are—but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world.

The cost of freedom is always high—but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right—not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world.

God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Thank you and good night.

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered to the Council on Foreign

Relations

Kwame Nkrumah

Introduction

Source: Source: Nkrumah Speech on the United States and the Third World at the Council on

Foreign Relations, New York, 1958. (in Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cold

War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2003), 354-356).

Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of Ghana, the first of the former British colonies in Africa to gain

its independence (1957), at first attempted to get support from the former colonial power and

from the United States. In the early 1960s Nkrumah increasingly turned to the Eastern Bloc for

assistance. Here is an excerpt from his speech at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, in

1958.

[Principles:] The first is our desire to see Africa free and independent. The second is our

determination to pursue foreign policies based upon non-alignment. The third is our urgent need

for economic development. There is no area in Africa today where these three points are not on

the agenda of politics. There is no need to underline for American readers the reason for Africa’s rejection of colonial status. We believe, as do Americans, that to be self-governing is one of the

inalienable rights of man. In Africa, if peoples are to be truly independent, their governments

must reflect the fact that, in all parts of Africa, the overwhelming majority of the population are

native-born Africans. Even in the countries of considerable European settlement, such as

Southern Rhodesia, 90% of the people are African. When, therefore, at our recent African

conference, we called for an end to colonialism, we were doing no more than stating our belief

that the fact of a vast African majority should be accepted as a basis of government in Africa

(…)

We asked for the fixing of the definite dates for early independence and called upon the

administering powers to take rapid steps to implement the provisions of the United Nations

Charter and the political aspirations of the people, namely self-determination and independence.

These steps should, in my view, include a greatly accelerated and enlarged programme of

education and technical training, the opening up systematically of new opportunities for Africans

in agriculture and industry and rapid growth of African participation in the country’s political life. Such timetables would restore what, we believe, is most lacking in Africa’s plural societies—and that is the element of confidence and hope on the part of the African majority (…)

Non-alignment can only be understood in the context of the present atomic arms race and the

atmosphere of the Cold War. There is a wise African proverb: ‘When the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled down.’ When we in Africa survey the industrial and military power

concentrated behind the two great powers in the Cold War, we know that no military or strategic

act of ours could make one jot of difference to this balance of power, while our involvement

might draw us into areas of conflict which so far have not spread below the Sahara. Our attitude,

I imagine, is very much that of American looking at the disputes of Europe in the 19th century.

We do not wish to be involved. In addition, we know that we cannot affect the outcome. Above

all, we believe the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by keeping one great

continent free from the strife and rivalry of military blocs and cold wars.

But this attitude of non-alignment does not imply indifference to the great issues of our day. It

does not imply isolationism. It is in no way anti-Western; nor is it anti-Eastern. The greatest

issue of our day is surely to see that there is a tomorrow. For Africans especially there is a

particular tragedy in the risk of thermo-nuclear destruction. One continent has come but lately to

the threshold of the modern world. The opportunities of health and education and a wider vision

which other nations take for granted are barely within the rich of our people. And now they wee

the risk that all this richness of opportunity may be snatched away by destructive war. In any

war, the strategic areas of the world would be destroyed or occupied by some great power. It is

simply a question of who gets there first—the Suez Canal, Afghanistan and Gulf of Aquaba are examples.

On this great issue, therefore, of war and peace, the people and government of Ghana put all their

weight behind the peaceful settlement of disputes and seek conditions in which disputes do not

become embittered to the point of violence. We are willing to accept every provision from the

United Nations Charter. We go further and favour every extension of an international police

force as an alternative to war. One of the most important roles of the smaller nations today is

surely to use their influence in season and out of season to substitute the peaceful settlement of

disputes and international policing of disturbed areas for the present disastrous dependence upon

arms and force. For this reason, at our African conference, we underlined our demands for

controlled disarmament, we deplored the use of the sale of arms as a means of influencing other

nations’ diplomacy and we urged that African states should be represented on all international bodies concerned with disarmament.

Thus it is not indifference that leads to a policy of non-alignment. It is our belief that

international blocs and rivalries exacerbate and do not solve disputes and that we must be free to

judge issues on their merits and to look for solutions that are just and peaceful, irrespective of the

powers involved. We do not wish to be in the position of condoning imperialism or aggression

from any quarter. Powers which pursuer policies of goodwill, co-operation and constructive

international action will always find us at their side. In fact, perhaps ‘non-alignment’ is a mis- statement of our attitude. We are firmly alignment with all the forces in the world that genuinely

make for peace (…)

The hopes and ambitions of the African people have been planted and brought to maturity by the

impact of the Western civilization. The West has set the pattern of our hopes, and by entering

Africa in strength, it has forced the patterns upon us. Now comes our response. We cannot tell

our peoples that material benefits and growth and modern progress are not for them. If we do,

they will throw us out and seek other leaders who promise more. And they will abandon us, too,

if we do not in reasonable measure respond to their hopes. Therefore we have no choice. Africa

has no choice. We have to modernise. Either we shall do so with your interest and support—or we shall be compelled to turn elsewhere. This is not a warning or a threat, but a straight

statement of political reality.

And I also affirm, for myself and I believe for most of my fellow leaders in Africa, that we want

close co-operation with our friends. We know you. History has brought us together. We still have

the opportunity to build up a future on the basis of free and equal co-operation. This is our aim.

This is our hope.