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PAPER - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? Author: Rolf Mowatt-Larssen | January 2010

A Timeline of Terrorists' Efforts to Acquire WMD

Preface Rolf Mowatt-Larssen spent more than two dozen years in intelligence, both in the CIA and U.S. Department of Energy. After the Sept.

11 terrorist attacks, he led the U.S. government's e�orts to determine whether al Qaeda had WMD capabilities and to prevent a

nuclear terrorist attack on the United States. Mowatt-Larssen, now a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for

Science and International A�airs, has put together a detailed timeline illustrating terrorists' e�orts to acquire WMD.

 

INTRODUCTION (Mowatt-Larssen's timeline follows in the attachment below.)

Several terrorist groups have actively sought weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of one kind or another. In particular, the

Japanese cult group Aum Shinrikyo, al Qaeda and its associates -- notably the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jemaah Islamiya and

Lashkar al Tayyib -- �gure most prominently among the groups that have manifested some degree of intent,

experimentation, and programmatic e�orts to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. To date, however, al Qaeda

is the only group known to be pursuing a long-term, persistent and systematic approach to developing weapons to be used in

mass casualty attacks.

Osama bin Ladin's assertion in 1998 that it was his Islamic duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction ensured that the

ful�llment of this intent would become a top priority for his lieutenants in the ensuing years. In an e�ort to explain his

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thinking to his followers, and to help guide their e�orts, the al Qaeda leader has o�ered a number of statements that provide

a need and rationale for using weapons of mass destruction as a means of achieving the group's concrete and ambitious

goals. Most recently, he promised in a 2007 video release to "escalate the killing and �ghting against you (Americans)" --

on grounds of destroying an international conspiracy to control the world -- adding, "The capitalist system seeks to turn the

entire world into a �efdom of the major corporations under the label of globalization in order to protect democracy."

These statements should not be interpreted as empty rhetoric and idle threats: Osama bin Ladin has signaled a speci�c

purpose for using WMD in al Qaeda's quest to destroy the global status quo, and to create conditions more conducive to the

overthrow of apostate regimes throughout the Islamic world. His argument is essentially that even weapons of mass

destruction -- which are outlawed under Islam -- are a justi�able means of countering US hegemony. Osama bin Ladin's

morality-based argument on the nature of the struggle between militant Islamists and the US-led coalition of secular forces

focuses the group's planning on the acquisition of strategic weapons that can be used in mass casualty attacks, rather than

on the production of tactical, more readily available weapons such as "dirty bombs," chemical agents, crude toxins and

poisons.

In this light, it is not surprising that the group's top WMD priority has been to acquire nuclear and strategic biological

weapons. Considering the potential that such weapons hold in ful�lling al Qaeda's aspirations, their WMD procurement

e�orts have been managed at the most senior levels, under rules of strict compartmentalization from lower levels of the

organization, and with central control over possible targets and timing of prospective attacks. In this sense, their approach

has been "Muhammed Atta-like" -- similar to the modus operandi Khaled Sheikh Mohammed employed in making

preparations for the 9/11 attacks -- as opposed to resembling the signature characterizing most terrorist attacks to which

the world has become accustomed.

Al Qaeda's patient, decade-long e�ort to steal or construct an improvised nuclear device (IND) �ows from their perception

of the bene�ts of producing the image of a mushroom cloud rising over a US city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the

course of history. This lofty aim helps explains why al Qaeda has consistently sought a bomb capable of producing a nuclear

yield, as opposed to settling for the more expedient and realistic course of devising a "dirty bomb," or a radiological

dispersal device.

Another 9/11-scale operational plot managed by the al Qaeda core leadership was the development of anthrax for use in a

mass casualty attack in the United States. The sophisticated anthrax project was run personally by al Qaeda deputy chief

Ayman Zawahiri, in parallel to the group's e�orts to acquire a nuclear capability; anthrax was probably meant to serve as

another means to achieve the same e�ect as using a nuclear bomb, given doubts that a nuclear option could be successfully

procured. Notably, al Qaeda's e�orts to acquire a nuclear and biological weapons capability were concentrated in the years

preceding September 11, 2001. Based on the timing and nature of their WMD-related activity in the 1990's, al Qaeda probably

anticipated using these means of mass destruction against targets in the US homeland in the intensi�ed campaign they knew

would follow the 9/11 attack. There is no indication that the fundamental objectives that lie behind their WMD intent have

changed over time.

On the other hand, the pursuit of crude toxins and poisons appears to have been of little interest to the al Qaeda leadership,

even though the production of such weapons is easier and thus might seem more attractive for potential use in attacks.

Although experimentation and training in crude chemical agents and pathogens was standard fare in al Qaeda's camps in

Afghanistan before 9/11, their use in attacks appears to have been left to the initiative of individual cells and planners outside

the direct supervision of the al Qaeda core leadership. Prominent examples of small-scale chemical- and biological- related

activity include Midhat al-Mursi's (aka Abu Khabab) basic training for operatives in the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan

before 9/11; the Abu Musab al Zarqawi network's plotting to use ricin and cyanide in multiple attacks planned in Europe in

late 2002-early 2003; and a Bahraini terrorist cell's plot to use a crude cyanide gas device called the "mobtaker" (an Arabic

word roughly meaning "invention") in an attack on the New York City subway in the same time frame.

In each of these cases, the evidence suggests that the al Qaeda senior leadership was not directly involved or apparently even

aware of attack preparations until late stages of planning. Moreover, there is no evidence that the al Qaeda leadership

regarded the use of crude toxins and poisons as being suitable for conducting what would amount to pin prick attacks on the

United States; on the contrary, Zawahiri canceled the planned attack on the New York City subway for "something better,"

suggesting that a relatively easy attack utilizing tactical weapons would not achieve the goals the al Qaeda leadership had set

for themselves.

So, why hasn't a terrorist WMD attack happened since 9/11?

There are many plausible explanations for why the world has not experienced an al Qaeda attack using chemical, biological,

radiological or nuclear weapons, but it would be foolish to discount the possibility that such an event will occur in the future.

To date, al Qaeda's WMD programs may have been disrupted. This is in fact one likely explanation, given a sustained and

ferocious counterterrorist response to 9/11 that largely destroyed al Qaeda as the organization that existed before the fateful

attack on the US. If so, terrorists must continue to be disrupted and denied a safe haven to reestablish the ability to launch a

major strike on the US homeland, or elsewhere in the world.

Or perhaps, al Qaeda operational planners have failed to acquire the kind of weapons they seek, because they are unwilling to

settle for anything other than a large scale attack in the US. It would surely be hard for al Qaeda to lower the bar they set on

9/11: what would constitute a worthy follow-up to 9/11, on their terms? What would they achieve through another attack?

There are few weapons that would meet their expectations in this regard. It is extremely di�cult to acquire a functioning

nuclear bomb, or to steal enough weapons usable material to build a bomb. And as al Qaeda probably learned in trying to

weaponize anthrax, biological pathogens may seem simple enough to produce, but such weapons are not easy to bottle up

and control. To complicate matters further, an attack on the scale of 9/11 is more di�cult to accomplish in an environment of

heightened security and vigilance in the US.

But if Osama bin Ladin and his lieutenants had been interested in employing crude chemical, biological and radiological

materials in small scale attacks, there is little doubt they could have done so by now. However, events have shown that the al

Qaeda leadership does not choose weapons based on how easy they are to acquire and use, be they conventional or

unconventional weapons. They choose them based on the best means of destroying the speci�c targets that they have in

mind. Al Qaeda's reasoning thus runs counter to analytic convention that equates the ease of acquisition of chemical,

biological or radiological weapons with an increasing likelihood of terrorist use -- i.e., a terrorist attack employing crude

weapons is therefore more likely than an attack using a nuclear or large scale biological weapon. In fact, it is the opposite: If

perpetrating a large- scale attack serves as al Qaeda's motivation for possessing WMD, not deterrence value, then the

greatest threat is posed by the most e�ective and simple means of mass destruction, whether these means consist of

nuclear, biological, or other forms of asymmetric weapons.

An examination of the 9/11 attack sheds light on al Qaeda's reasoning behind the selection of speci�c weapons, and how that

may apply to the role WMD plays in their thinking. Al Qaeda opted to pursue a highly complex and artfully choreographed

plot to strike multiple targets requiring the simultaneous hijacking of several 747 jumbo passenger aircraft, because using

airplanes as weapons o�ered the best means of attacking the targets they intended to destroy. If conventional wisdom on

assessing WMD terrorism threats had been applied to considering the likelihood of the 9/11 plot, analysts may well have

concluded it never would have happened; at the time, it was simply hard to believe any terrorist group could pull o� such an

elaborate plot utilizing novel, unpredictable weapons that were so di�cult to acquire.

Yet, WMD terrorism skeptics abound, and for understandable reasons. There is widespread suspicion in America and abroad

that WMD terrorism is another phony threat being hyped for political purposes, and to stoke fears among the public. It is

di�cult to debunk this allegation, given the US government's lack of credibility in the case of Iraqi WMD. That said, WMD

terrorism is not Iraqi WMD. The case that the WMD terrorism threat is real bears no association with the Iraqi intelligence

failure whatsoever, in terms of the reliability of the sources of intelligence, the quality of the information that has been

collected, and the weight of the evidence that lies at the heart of our understanding of the threat. If anything, the biases in

WMD terrorism analysis tilt towards treating the absence of information as an absence of threat; this could become a

vulnerability in the defenses, considering the very real possibility that there may be a terrorist plot in motion that has not

been found.

On the other side of the spectrum, even for the most ardent believers in the threat posed by WMD terrorism, it must be

acknowledged that much of the rhetoric expressed by the top levels of the group might be just that: mere saber rattling in an

increasingly desperate bid to remain relevant, to frighten their enemies, and to rally their followers with promises of

powerful weapons that will reverse their losses on the battle�eld. It is also possible that al Qaeda may be engaging in a classic

deception ruse, hoping to misdirect their foe with fears of mass destruction, in order to preserve the element of surprise for

the ful�llment of their true intentions.

There may be kernels of truth in each of these reasons as to why the world has not yet witnessed a terrorist WMD attack,

which is at least a mild surprise, considering all that has come to pass since 2001. However, for purposes of making a clear-

headed assessment of the threat, it may be useful to separate al Qaeda's WMD activity into two streams, one consisting of the

strategic programs managed under the direct supervision and management of the al Qaeda core leadership, and the other

consisting of tactical chemical, biological and radiological weapons development that was decentralized and pursued

autonomously in various locations around the world as part of the "global jihad." On this basis, a more precise

determination can be made on the actual threat posted by al Qaeda, and other groups in each of these cases.

Fortunately, there is a body of historical information that provides a useful starting point for such an inquiry. Hopefully, an

examination of WMD-associated information that is pertinent, but no longer sensitive, can help bridge the gaps in

perceptions between the diehard believers and skeptics as to the true nature of the problem and the threat it may pose, not

just in an al Qaeda context today, but in the future as WMD terrorism takes on new forms involving new actors.

In June 2003, the US government issued a warning that there was a high probability of an al Qaeda WMD attack sometime in

the next two years. This report represented a high water mark in concerns related to al Qaeda's WMD planning going back to

the founding of the group. Why didn't an attack happen in the next two years? Was the threat hyped for political purposes?

Was the intelligence assessment wrong? Or, was the threat neutralized? Some perspective into why the report was issued can

be gleaned by examining some of the evidence that was available to US and international policymakers by the summer of

2003 concerning roughly �fteen years of al Qaeda's e�orts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Presenting this

chronology will hopefully allow the reader to develop a better feel for the threat posed by al Qaeda's interest in WMD at that

time, and use it as a basis to help determine whether the WMD terrorism threat is real.

To continue reading the paper and to view a timeline of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD, download the PDF below:

Downloads Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?

Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality? (Russian Translation)

For more information on this publication: Belfer Communications Office

For Academic Citation: Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?.” Paper, Belfer Center for Science

and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010.