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References

Berggvist, L. (2014, July14). The ISPS-Code and maritime terrorism. Center for International Maritime Security. http://cimsec.org/isps-code-maritime-

terrorism

Bowen, C., Fidgeon, P., & Page, S. J. (2014). Maritime tourism and terrorism: Customer perceptions of the potential terrorist threat to cruise shipping.

Current Issues in Tourism. 1797, 610-639.

Culley, J. (2016, January 29). ISIS could target Brits on cruise liners next as they amass own �eet of war ships. Daily

Star: https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latestnews/490912/ISIS-Mediterranean-Sea-missile-attacks-on-Europe-terrorism

Department of State. (2021). Annual Tra�cking in Persons Report, 2021.

https://www.state.gov/wp[1]content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf.

Greenberg, M., Chalk, P., Willis, H., Khilko, I., & Ortiz, D. (2006). Maritime terrorism risk and liability. RAND.

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf

Hastings, J. (2012). Understanding maritime piracy syndicate operations. Security Studies, 21(4), 683-

721. http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/10.1080/09636412.2012.734234

International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). (2021, Nov). Piracy and armed robbery incidents at lowest level in decades, but IMB cautions against

complacency. https://iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/piracy-and-armed-robbery-incidents-at-lowest-level-in-decades-but-imb-cautions-

against-complacency/

International Maritime Bureau (2022) ICC International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 1 January – 31 December 2021.

http://iilss.net/piracy-map-of-the-world2019-2020-2021-2022/

International Maritime Organization. (2004). SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS code.

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Guide_to_Maritime_Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx

Langewiesche, W. (2003). Anarchy at sea. The Atlantic Monthly, 50-80.

Maritime Connector. (2016). Modern piracy. http://maritime-connector.com/wiki/pirac

Peter, C. (2021) Targeting cruise ships: A Study of Security. International Journal of Safety and Security in Tourism/Hospitality.

Sutton, H. (2020, Nov). Rare Electric Narco Submarine Seized in Colombia. https://news.usni.org/2020/11/16/rare-electric-narco-submarine-

seized-in-colombia

Shkolnikova, S. (2018, September 11). 17 years a�er 9/11 attacks, families still grieve at ground zero. USA Today.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nationnow/2018/09/11/september-11-families-gather-ground-zero-remember/1265653002

White House. (2021, Dec). THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-

content/uploads/2021/12/National-Action-Plan-to-Combat-Human-Tra�cking.pdf

APUS does not maintain or control third-party websites and is not responsible for the accuracy or accessibility of their content.

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Global Maritime Issues: Piracy/Cruise Ship Threats/Narcotics & Human Smuggling This week, we will dig a little deeper into worldwide maritime and port security issues, including a more expanded look at the International Maritime

Organization's International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code, the threat of piracy, and the threat to cruise ships. The amazing thing with this threat

vector is that based on 2021 reporting, piracy incidents are at their lowest level in years.

To begin this more international look at these issues, it is important to remember that The ISPS Code is a set of measures to enhance the security of

ships and port facilities worldwide.

The Code is divided into two sections, Part A and Part B. Part A is MANDATORY and outlines maritime and port security-related requirements which

SOLAS contracting governments, port authorities, and shipping companies must adhere to. If these are adhered to, then the country, vessel, and

company are considered "compliant." Additionally, Part B of the Code provides a series of recommended guidelines for the adoption of Part B.

Please skim it to get an over-arching understanding of the importance of this agreement.

In December 2002, the code was adopted at a Conference of Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea or

SOLAS. Typically, a rule of this size and complexity takes years to enforce. This was not the case with ISPS as a mere 18 months later, on July 1st, 2004,

the requirements came into being. The engagement was swi� for individual countries and the international merchant marine community. Over 50,000

ships were certi�ed, and hundreds of thousands of seafarers and support sta� were educated for their new roles as Ship Security O�cers (SSO) and

Company Security O�cers (CSO). An equally daunting task was that port facilities themselves needed to be updated, with new security issues

addressed.

According to the IMO (2004), the essential components of the ISPS are:

Even with the ISPS in place, some acts of terrorism were still conducted. Bergqvist (2014) highlighted two attacks that gained world attention. These

included:

"M. Star: In July 2010, the Japanese-owned very large crude oil carrier experienced an explosion transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Although no

cra� was sighted, the explosion made a large dent in the hull, parts of the accommodation were slightly damaged, and one crewmember was

injured. A�er two days, the terrorist group Brigades of Abdullah Azzam claimed responsibility.

Yemen, level 3: In August 2013, due to a high level of activity by Al Qaeda-a�liated groups in Yemen, the Government of the United Kingdom

raised the ISPS security level to level 3 for British-�agged ships in Yemeni territorial waters. A serious situation indeed, since an elevation to level

3 was unprecedented since the ISPS Code was introduced in 2004"...

Berggvist (2014) also highlighted the attack on Cosco Asia: In September 2013, while on transit in the Suez Canal, the Chinese-owned container

vessel under the �ag of Panama was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. The ship sustained only minor damages, and there were no casualties. An

Islamist group named Al-Furqan claimed responsibility for the attack. Although a minor attack, it was of great concern for the Egyptian government

due to the economic importance of the Canal. To increase security, a protective wall along the Canal is in the process of being constructed.

But, there are still many holes and gaps in a "perfect" adoption of the ISPS Code. Two areas that need immediate consideration are:

establishment of an international framework that fosters cooperation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local

administrations, and the shipping and port industries in assessing and detecting potential security threats to ships or port facilities used for

international trade to implement preventive security measures against such threats;

•

determining the respective roles and responsibilities of all parties concerned with safeguarding maritime security in ports and on board ships

at the national, regional, and international levels;

•

to ensure that there is early and e�cient collation and exchange of maritime security-related information at national, regional, and international

levels;

•

to provide a methodology for ship and port security assessments, which facilitates the development of ship, company, and port facility security

plans and procedures, which must be utilized to respond to ships' or ports' varying security levels; and

•

to ensure that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are in place on board ships and in ports.•

There is a lack of agreed-upon national legislation/guidelines on ISPS code implementation.•

Growing need for an agreed upon risk assessment methodology/countries using their approach.•

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Narcotics & Human Smuggling

Narcotics smuggling is a serious threat vector. The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Richard Etheridge crew o�oaded approximately 1,700 kilograms of

seized cocaine at Coast Guard Base San Juan following the disruption of a go-fast vessel smuggling attempt by Coast Guard and British Virgin Islands

authorities near Anegada, British Virgin Islands. The seized cocaine has an estimated wholesale value of approximately 51 million dollars. This

disruption and seizure resulted from multi-agency e�orts involving the Caribbean Border Interagency Group and the Caribbean Corridor Strike Force.

O�en lost in the discussion of maritime threat vectors is narcotics is narcotics. Stopping this activity is as much of a border security mission as stopping

an attack on a cruise ship. The total amount of narcotics entering the country is estimated to be signi�cant by maritime means. The lead federal agency

addressing this threat vector is the U.S. Coast Guard.

Maritime smuggling ventures can take many forms. A small boat coming from Canada to the U.S. on the Great Lakes, a semi-submersible o� of the

West Coast, or a “go-fast” in the Caribbean.

H I Sutton Image. USNI (Nov 16, 2020 https://news.usni.org/2020/11/16/rare-electric-narco-submarine-seized-in-colombia

Narco submarines are just one more threat vector to consider, along with attacks on cruise ships and piracy.

In addition to narcotics smuggling, human tra�cking is a component of illegal maritime smuggling. In 2017, Executive Order 13773 was released. The

EO was entitled “Enforcing Federal Law Concerning Transnational Criminal Organizations and Preventing International Tra�cking.” Then, in 2020,

11,193 situations of human tra�cking were identi�ed through the United States National Human Tra�cking Hotline. Globally, an estimated 24.9

million people are subjected to human tra�cking, which generates an estimated $150 billion annually in illicit pro�ts.

In December 2021, the White House released the “National Action Plan to Combat Human Tra�cking.” Within this document, the pro�le of “human

tra�ckers” was presented. “More generally, human tra�ckers o�en operate a range of illicit enterprises both in the United States and abroad. For

example:

Transnational criminal organizations engage in human tra�cking, frequently in conjunction with other criminal activities.

Of interest to this course, the Action Plan directly addresses Maritime human tra�cking and exploitation with the seafood supply chain in Priority

Action 4.4.5 speci�cally:

The United States Government cannot enforce provisions under Chapter 77 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code on non-United States �agged vessels outside

of the United States territorial sea. As such, the United States Government’s responses to suspected human tra�cking and the full spectrum of labor

exploitation on such vessels rely heavily on intergovernmental cooperation. Accordingly, the United States Coast Guard, NOAA, DOS, USAID, DOJ,

DOL, and other federal agencies will work to create frameworks to coordinate and cooperate with international partners to promote the identi�cation

and protection of victims of human tra�cking as well as the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators. These frameworks will address forced labor

and other forms of labor exploitation on vessels, as well as other potential risk areas throughout the seafood supply chain, such as shore-based

processing operations. Additionally, DOT will engage with international multilateral maritime fora to share best practices in combating human

tra�cking within the transportation sector and to foster the development of culturally-sensitive counter[1]tra�cking awareness materials (THE

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN TO COMBAT HUMAN TRAFFICKING).

The Zhao Wei drug tra�cking organization engages in human tra�cking to generate funds to further its other criminal activities.•

MS-13 engages in human tra�cking both domestically and transnationally

Mexican-origin transnational criminal organizations engage in sex tra�cking to facilitate other illicit activities.

•

Multiple European countries have documented transnational organized crime operations that exploit both European nationals and migrants in

sex and labor tra�cking, including forced criminality such as pickpocketing and the distribution of narcotics.

•

Terrorist organizations – including Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab30 – engage in human tra�cking crimes.•

State actors such as Afghanistan, Burma, Cuba, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Eritrea, Iran, the People’s Republic of China, Russia,

South Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan engage in state-sponsored forced labor or sex tra�cking”.

•

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Piracy

Between a series of "Pirates of the Caribbean" movies and a very popular ride at Walt Disney World, a very romantic and nonviolent view of modern

maritime piracy has been provided. Pirates, such as the lead --- Captain Jack Sparrow, are portrayed as fun-loving, impish, and a basic "good fellow."

Even the 2009 �lm starring legendary screen actor Tom Hanks entitled "Captain Phillips" did little to highlight the violent and desperate nature of

modern maritime piracy. The �lm highlighted the siege and eventual takeover of the M/V MARESK ALABAMA, concluding with a deliberate team by

U.S. Navy Special Forces.

The reality is that modern piracy is anything but romantic or non-violent. The bulk of the body of knowledge underscores this fact. Hastings (2012)

noted that the literature on maritime piracy has grown signi�cantly in the past decade. Much of this literature looks at the causes of marine piracy,

either in general or in speci�c parts of the world. In his magisterial overview of maritime piracy, Martin Murphy lists seven major factors that encourage

piracy: “legal and jurisdictional opportunities, favorable geography, con�ict and disorder, under-funded law enforcement/inadequate security,

permissive political environments, cultural acceptability/maritime tradition, reward.”

Perhaps the best source of information on piracy is provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The IMB (2004) de�ned piracy as “the act of

boarding any vessel with intent to commit the� or any other crime, and with an intent or capacity to use force in furtherance of that act.” In simple

words, "piracy is an act of robbery or criminal violence at sea through illegal use of force by non-state agents." In recent years, the problem of piracy

has emerged as a signi�cant threat to sea transportation in some parts of the world.

Credit

Just as their forefathers, such as Blackbeard, were violent and dangerous and prayed on other vessels and their passengers, modern pirates are very

much involved in hijacking ships for ransom. Still, their ways of operation have dramatically changed in the past ten years. Currently, pirates use fast-

moving vessels supported by night-vision goggles or NVGs and employ automatic weapons such as Russian-made AK-47s and other larger automatic

weapons such as machine guns. In addition, they use GPS to navigate and communicate through radio networks. According to Maritime Connector

(2016), "Somali pirates were found attacking ships with Russian-made 82mm mortars that can target a ship as far as 5 kilometers from shore. Modern

pirates today are part of organized crime gangs that target big and small cargo vessels, and even cruise ships and private yachts."

The ICC International Maritime Bureau’s annual Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report noted that they conducted an “analysis of 132 global

maritime piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB PRC from 1 January to 31 December 2021”(Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships

Report).

This is not a threat that is going away any time in the future. However, as mentioned in the introduction, the number of piracy attacks has decreased.

According to the ICC International Maritime Bureau, incidents are at their lowest level since 1994, “IMB’s latest global piracy report recorded 97

incidents of piracy and armed robbery for the �rst nine months of 2021 – the lowest level of reported incidents since 1994. In 2021, IMB’s Piracy

Reporting Centre (PRC) reported 85 vessels boarded, nine attempted attacks, two vessels �red upon, and one vessel hijacked”.

However, the IMB also reported that “…incidents are down to their lowest level in decades, but violence against seafarers has continued with 51 crew

kidnapped, eight taken hostage, �ve threatened, three injured, two assaulted and one killed.” CMBC added, “Of the more than 7,100 piracy incidents

recorded over the last two decades, about 100 involved at least one death, according to data from the International Maritime Organization (Want to

talk like a pirate? Learn Indonesian).

The History Channel provided a superb three-minute video clip of pirates attacking a cruise ship.

The issue of cruise ship security is yet another important facet of looking at international maritime and port security threat issues.

Want to see the state of piracy today…with live reports? Look to the ICC Commercial Crime Services (CCS), which is the anti-crime arm of the

International Chamber of Commerce. Based in the UK, CCS' main task is to combat all forms of commercial crime. The ICC’s International Maritime

Bureau (IMB) is a key component of our discussion here. IMB's key focus is on the suppression of piracy. Concerned at the alarming growth in the

phenomenon, this led to the creation of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992. Based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the center maintains a 24-hour

watch on the MTS reports of pirate attacks. Here is the link to the piracy center

You can request the latest Piracy Report from the IMB

One bright spot is that 2022 has had the lowest number of piracy incidents on the high seas since 1994. Hopefully, the trend will continue, and this is

one threat vector that will not receive as much attention.

Credit

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Cruise Ships as a Target

Think about it. The idea of a cruise ship as a target for terrorism is hardly new. The attack on the Achille Laura is one example that resulted in the death

of a U.S. citizen in the 1980s. The RAND Corporation's 2006 publication entitled "Maritime Terrorism - Risk and Liability" is still as relevant today as it

was when it was published, especially regarding piracy. Please take a look at pages 73-91. Here is the link. This gives you a lot to think about as we

consider worldwide threats to maritime and port security. The other thing you need to keep in mind is that crime does occur onboard cruise ships. This

is a threat to passengers aboard. As John A. Shedd noted, “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships are built for” John A. Shedd (Peter)

Cruise ships are departing from new locations all over the United States. This allows even more opportunity for the vessel to be a target of opportunity

for bad actors.

Credit

Perhaps the most authoritative, in-depth, academically rigorous study of cruise ships as a target was authored by Cyril Peter in a study for the

International Journal of Safety and Security in Tourism/Hospitality. Entitled “Targeting cruise ships: A Study of Security perceptions around terrorism.

Peter wrote:

Bowen, Fidgeon, and Page (2014) state that 44% of the participants from a particular study conducted believe that terrorists attacking cruise

ships will occur sometime in the not-too-distant future. They think that a maritime attack will occur. They also state that despite this view, cruise

travelers do not feel that cruise operators will increase their security measures, and they also accept that safety and security are a part of travel in

this post-9/11 world. This security risk is associated with life going forward. “The sea is a domain increasingly beyond government control, vast

and wild, where laws of nations mean little and secretive ship owners do as they please and where the resilient pathogens of piracy and terrorism

�ourish” (Langewiesche, 2003). This statement by Langewiesche in ‘Anarchy at Sea’ is true, even today. There are a lot more security controls,

checks, and sophisticated defense mechanisms in place today, but terrorist groups are determined and have been sharpening their maritime

capabilities as well. They are ready to take on the challenge. (Peter, 2021)

Peter continued:

A maritime attack on a cruise ship carrying 8,000 people will be more devastating than the attacks on the World Trade Center (9/11).

Shkolnikova (2018) states that 2,983 people perished in the 9/11 attacks. That is close to 3,000 people, but a successful attack on a cruise ship

could end with a much higher toll, and terrorists are aware of this. Hence their interest in a maritime attack. Given the numbers involved,

governments and cruise operators need to ensure that there is no chance of a security breach. Culley (2016) describes how ISIS and al Qaeda

have been slowly assembling a ‘navy’ and that ISIS is looking to attack cruise ships and merchant ships. These are real possibilities, one that

governments and cruise ship operators must take seriously. These groups should not be underestimated. A design for a maritime attack has

been in the planning stage for some time now. (Peter, 2021)

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