Business Ethics

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility: A Theoretical Exploration of the Interaction Mechanisms Between Individual and Corporate Moral Responsibility

Mihaela Constantinescu • Muel Kaptein

Received: 10 March 2014 / Accepted: 15 March 2014 / Published online: 3 April 2014

� Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Moral responsibility for outcomes in corporate

settings can be ascribed either to the individual members,

the corporation, or both. In the latter case, the relationship

between individual and corporate responsibility has been

approached as inversely proportional, such that an increase

in individual responsibility leads to a corresponding

decrease in corporate responsibility and vice versa. In this

article, we develop a non-proportionate approach, where,

under specific conditions, individual and corporate moral

responsibilities interact dynamically, leading to a mutual

enhancement of responsibility: the more the corporation is

responsible, the more the individuals become responsible

and vice versa. We develop this mutually enhancing

approach in terms of normative ascriptions of responsibil-

ity, while leaving aside empirical implications in terms of

mutual awareness of responsibility between individuals and

corporations. We explore conceptually the conditions and

mechanisms that generate this mutual enhancement and

also discuss the implications for research and practice.

Keywords Responsibility � Moral responsibility � Corporate responsibility � Individual responsibility � Interaction mechanisms

When a good or bad outcome results from corporate

activity, who is it that we praise or blame? In answering

this normative issue of moral responsibility ascriptions

within corporate settings, business ethics scholars have

offered two main possible approaches, framed by the

individualist–collectivist debate on moral agency. On the

one hand, ascriptions of moral responsibility are directed

only to the individual members of the corporation

(McMahon 1995; Velasquez 1983, 2003). We call this the

Individual Moral Responsibility approach. On the other

hand, ascriptions of moral responsibility are directed to the

corporation itself (French 1979; Werhane 1985). We call

this the Corporate Moral Responsibility approach.

An important corollary of the Corporate Moral

Responsibility approach is that it does not posit that only

the corporation bears responsibility, but that, depending on

the situation, responsibility could be ascribed to either the

individual(s) or the corporation or even both (Mellema

2006; Thompson 1986; Werhane 1989). The explicit or

implicit assumption usually made in this approach is that

when both the individuals and the corporation are respon-

sible, the level of responsibility is inversely proportionally

divided, meaning that an increase in one’s responsibility

for an outcome determines a corresponding decrease in the

other’s responsibility (Card 2005; Garrett 1989). We would

like to call this the Summative Corporate Moral Respon-

sibility approach.

But it is not always necessary that the level of respon-

sibility ascribed to the individual(s) and the corporation is

proportional. We will argue in this paper for a non-pro-

portionate approach, in which due to the dynamic inter-

action between the individual member(s) and the

corporation, the overall level of responsibility can actually

increase, such that it is even possible that both parties are

fully responsible. We will call this the Mutually Enhancing

Corporate Moral Responsibility approach. Put briefly, this

approach suggests that, under specific conditions which

M. Constantinescu

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Bucharest, Splaiul

Independentei 204, 060024 Bucharest, Romania

e-mail: mihaela.constantinescu@etica-aplicata.ro

M. Kaptein (&) Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University,

PO Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands

e-mail: mkaptein@rsm.nl

123

J Bus Ethics (2015) 129:325–339

DOI 10.1007/s10551-014-2161-4

determine the way individual members and corporations

interact in generating (un)ethical outcomes, the degree of

responsibility that each possesses may actually increase.

Some scholars, such as Bovens (1998), Isaacs (2011),

and Mathiesen (2006), have pointed out the possible exis-

tence of the interactive, non-proportionate relationship

between individuals and corporations, but so far there is no

account which explains the normative grounds for it. This

article therefore aims to conceptually explore the norma-

tive grounds behind this interaction, which may lead to a

mutual enhancement of moral responsibility in corporate

settings. We do this by first positioning our account within

the individualist–collectivist debate over attributions 1 of

moral responsibility, where we state why we follow the

collectivist approach and argue that this approach is cur-

rently mainly summative. We then introduce the mutually

enhancing approach by illustrating it through a hypotheti-

cal example, followed by the main grounds supporting it.

We continue with a conceptual analysis of the conditions,

factors, and mechanisms behind this mutually enhancing

interaction. We finish the paper by presenting the conclu-

sions and some implications for theory and practice.

From Individual to Corporate Moral Responsibility

We start with several remarks on the concept of moral

responsibility which delineate the specific sense in which

we use it. Among the various uses of ‘‘responsibility’’ (see

Bovens 1998; Velasquez 2003), we focus on the type of

responsibility for past actions or outcomes which,

depending on the circumstances, is further subject to moral

evaluations in terms of blameworthiness or praiseworthi-

ness (Zimmerman 1985a). When using responsibility in

this context, the problem we have in mind is ‘‘who bears

the responsibility for a given state of affairs’’ (Bovens

1998, p. 27), in the sense that ‘‘one is called to account

after the event and either held responsible or not’’ (idem).

We equate this to moral responsibility, which is alter-

natively termed as backward-looking responsibility (Gil-

bert 2006), passive responsibility (Bovens 1998), or

descriptive responsibility (De Leede et al. 1999). In our

account, an agent may be ascribed moral responsibility

related to a specific outcome provided several necessary

conditions are met, such as there being agent autonomy,

intentionality, contextual knowledge, or capacity for

deliberation, as well as a causal connection between the

agent and the outcome, be it direct or indirect (Arnold

2006; Bovens 1998; Corlett 2009; De George 1999; De

Leede et al. 1999; French 1995; Isaacs 2006; Pettit 2007;

Soares 2003; Zimmerman 1997). 2

As research in the field of business ethics goes deeper

into assessing the moral responsibility of corporations, it

sometimes tends to overlook an important practical issue:

Is there any point in discussing the morality of organiza-

tions when they are already regulated by law? This is a

fundamental question for our account as well, for a nega-

tive answer might render it superfluous altogether. Fortu-

nately, however, the question is to be answered positively.

As part of our social reality, corporations and their mem-

bers display (un)ethical behavior that is not fully captured

by legal regulations (Isaacs 2011), as the latter only set the

minimum level of acceptable behavior. The concept of

moral responsibility therefore becomes an important tenet

of the debate on the meaning of corporate responsibility,

highlighting the need for corporations to think beyond

mere ‘‘compliance.’’

Accepting Corporations as Moral Agents

Given the vast literature around the individualist–collec-

tivist debate on moral agency—for an overview see Phil-

lips (1995), Kaptein and Wempe (2002), and Hasnas

(2010)—we do not seek to give further arguments in favor

or against each position here. Business ethics scholars have

offered extensive point–counterpoint arguments concern-

ing, for example, ontological issues in favor (French 1979;

Pettit 2007) or against (Hasnas 2010; McKenna 2006;

Velasquez 1983) corporate moral agency, the possibility

(Corlett 1992; McMahon 1995; Velasquez 2003) or

impossibility (Graham 2000; Werhane 1985) of reducing

corporate responsibility to individual responsibility, as well

as the capacity (Arnold 2006; Donaldson 1982; French

1979; Goodpaster and Mathews 1982; Tuomela 1989) or

incapacity (Keely 1979; Ladd 1970; Velasquez 1983) of

corporations to satisfy the necessary conditions for moral

responsibility ascriptions.

In view of further developing the concept of mutually

enhancing responsibility, suffice it to say that we reside

with the collectivists in accepting corporations into the

moral realm. We do this based on the concept of corporate

practices which, briefly put, form ‘‘the grounds upon which

a corporation can be regarded as a moral entity’’ (Kaptein

and Wempe 2002, pp. 146–149) and which serve as a

means of evaluating corporate morality. The corporate

practices include the tasks, responsibilities, and proce-

dures—the corporate structure or formal dimension—as

well as the expectations, norms, and values—the corporate 1 We use ‘‘attributions’’ and ‘‘ascriptions’’ of moral responsibility

interchangeably throughout the article; they both refer here to a

normative way of allocating moral responsibility in corporate settings,

except where otherwise indicated. 2 Which we do not aim to explore in this article.

326 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

culture or informal dimension—that ‘‘are actually expres-

sed in the actions of organizational members’’ (idem).

Corporations may be considered responsible for the out-

comes of their practices inasmuch as they have the capacity

to change these practices (Donaldson 1982; Fisse and

Braithwaite 1988).

When we accept the collectivist stance that corporations

qualify as moral agents, we open up the possibility that the

corporation and individual constituent members at the

same time bear moral responsibility for a specific state of

affairs (Mellema 2006). Individual and corporate levels of

responsibility do not exclude each other or cancel each

other out (Bovens 1998). This is because moral responsi-

bility sometimes ‘‘has to be attributed both to individuals

who create and carry out corporate policies and practices

and to the policies and practices themselves’’ (Werhane

1989, p. 822), as otherwise ‘‘these practices will continue

despite the punishment of individuals’’ (idem).

We now turn to exploring this conceptual possibility by

inquiring how responsibility can be ascribed to both the

individual and corporate agents for a corporate outcome.

To that end, we identify two normative lines of reasoning

which result from the Corporate Moral Responsibility

approach, namely the Summative and the Mutually

Enhancing Corporate Moral Responsibility approaches.

After a short overview of the former approach, we will

focus our efforts in further developing the latter in the

remaining part of this article.

The Summative Corporate Moral Responsibility

Approach

A good part of dual attribution accounts of moral respon-

sibility in corporate contexts tend to offer a summative

approach, be it explicit or implicit. These accounts seem to

perceive moral responsibility for a specific outcome as the

sum of individual plus corporate moral responsibility. The

individual agent(s) and the corporate agent are therefore

attributed a greater or lesser part of the moral responsibility

for a specific outcome.

On the one hand, scholars point to cases that require an

addition of corporate moral responsibility to individual

responsibility in order to fully account for a specific out-

come. For Garrett (1989, p. 536), summing up individual

responsibility does not exhaust the total moral responsi-

bility associated with a corporate outcome, as ‘‘there is still

some responsibility left – that of the corporation per se.’’

Pettit (2007) seems to also make such a point when arguing

that it is sometimes impossible to fully distribute the

responsibility of a corporate agent to the individual mem-

bers of that agent—we need to add corporate moral

responsibility to the individual moral responsibility in

order to completely capture a specific outcome in a cor-

porate context.

On the other hand, scholars point to degrees or parts of

responsibility that individual agents and the corporate

agent bear related to a specific outcome (Card 2005). This

stance points out the fact that individual action is framed

by rules of the corporate context, therefore, in addition to

the role of individuals, the organization ‘‘retains a modi-

cum of moral responsibility’’ (Card 2005, p. 402) since it

shapes the available alternatives through its policies and

protocols.

This approach to moral responsibility addressing both

the individual and the corporate moral responsibility for an

outcome seems to regard the two levels of responsibility in

a similar manner to cases of by-stander non-intervention,

where moral responsibility is to be distributed proportion-

ally among those who could have become involved but

failed to do so (Forsyth et al. 2002). This approach

addresses situations when we need to assign a degree of

responsibility to each of the individual and the corporate

level of moral agency, depending on each one’s specific

contribution, such that only their sum would exhaust

100 % of the moral responsibility for a specific corporate

outcome.

The two levels of moral responsibility build-up or add-

up like pieces of a puzzle in this summative approach:

individual responsibility adds to corporate responsibility to

account for situations resulting from the corporate context.

Moral responsibility seems here to be predicated about the

corporate outcome and then split between the individual

and the corporate agents contributing to that specific out-

come. It follows that the two levels of responsibility limit

one another: an increase in one instance of responsibility

leads to a corresponding decrease in the other instance, so

that the total responsibility does not exceed 100 %. But

does this summative approach address all situations of both

individual and corporate moral responsibility?

The Mutually Enhancing Corporate Moral

Responsibility Approach

We think that the summative approach is unable to cover

all situations of individual and corporate moral responsi-

bility and that there is yet another approach to be taken into

account, one that helps to explain the dynamic interplay

between individual and corporate moral responsibility for

an array of situations that cannot be fully captured by such

a zero-sum approach. We focus in this section on this other

approach, which we call the Mutually Enhancing Corporate

Moral Responsibility approach.

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 327

123

Illustrating the Mutually Enhancing Approach

We first illustrate the mutually enhancing approach to

individual and corporate responsibility by imagining a

practical situation that might arise in a corporate setting.

We advance two alternative scenarios pointing to hypo-

thetical blameworthy and praiseworthy evaluations, as

attributions of blame and praise are both normative eval-

uations that we make related to morally responsible agents

(Isaacs 2011), and they both display the same mechanisms

of attribution. Following these illustrative examples which

serve as a practical introduction, we continue with the core

of this article, namely, our normative interpretation of the

mutually enhancing approach.

Scenario A: Blame Evaluations

Suppose that an aircraft maintenance company is under

public scrutiny for an accident resulting from poor main-

tenance. As the investigation in progress reveals, the

accident was caused by a rather insignificant piece of air-

craft component which was over-used and eventually did

not stay in place, triggering other components to break. The

fictitious situation goes as follows. The investigation points

to several employees of the maintenance company who

seem to have caused the accident. First is Mr. Jones, the

aircraft mechanic, who should have replaced the compo-

nent during last inspection, according to the company’s

written procedures. Second come Mr. Andersen and Mr.

Thompson, the inspectors who were supposed to check and

double-check the maintenance operations—again, accord-

ing to company’s procedures regarding aircraft safety. And

so the causal chain goes on from one employee to another.

Up to this point it seems that the corporation is ‘‘covered’’

and all moral responsibility falls on employees.

But let us imagine that the investigation also reveals that

while everyone in charge of maintenance was aware that

written safety procedures required that even the smallest

and seemingly insignificant aircraft component should be

immediately replaced at first sign of usage, hardly anyone

was strictly following the official procedures, thus creating

a pattern of late replacement of components. All employees

involved in maintenance operations were under time

pressure and under pressure to cut costs, as the unwritten

(but well-known) policy of the company was to engage as

little resources as possible, both in terms of personnel and

supplies, with a view to reducing costs and time as much as

possible. For the same reasons, when this corner-cutting

behavior took place it was hardly ever investigated and

therefore largely remained unpunished: on the one hand,

employees did not bother to signal it, as everyone was

aware that this was common practice; on the other hand,

the corporate culture was such that signs of wrongdoing

were not corrected because it was time consuming.

Whom do we consider to be morally responsible and

blameworthy under these hypothetical circumstances?

Scenario B: Praise Evaluations

Before answering the question above, let us look at the

same hypothetical example in a modified scenario. Suppose

the aircraft maintenance company is publicly appreciated

for preventing a flight accident. What are the details?

During an apparently normal flight, the pilot faces severe

weather conditions which force him to take an unusual

measure. This means that he has to rely on one specific

aircraft component which was not normally used and

therefore was not regarded as being very important.

Everything goes well and the plane is landed safely.

An investigation follows up to see if the plane is still in

good condition and reveals an interesting fact. That

seemingly unimportant aircraft component was actually

newly replaced, although according to the manual

instructions the older one could have continued to be used

for six more months. But due to the (unforeseen) pressure

put on it, if the older component had been in place, the

pilot’s maneuver could have resulted in an air disaster.

To whom do we attribute credit for this happy end? Who

is eligible for positive moral responsibility ascriptions, and

to be evaluated as praiseworthy? As the investigation

reveals, Mr. Jones, the aircraft mechanic, was the first to

decide to replace the older component a few months before

due date, even if there were no alarming signs of wear and

tear, just for the sake of flight safety. He carefully explains

his reasons to Mr. Andersen and Mr. Thompson, the

inspectors who were supposed to check and double-check

the maintenance operations. The two go along with him as

they also consider Mr. Jones to be right in being a little

extra-cautious, although the written procedures of the air-

craft maintenance company did not require any of them to

do so. The decision goes up the chain of hierarchy and is

approved several times. Had it not been for the decisions of

several employees of the aircraft maintenance company,

the plane may not have been safely landed.

Now, praise seems to be solely attributable to those

individuals involved in the decision to replace the aircraft

component. However, there is more to it: our aircraft

maintenance company has a corporate culture that requires

each employee to assume full responsibility for his own

actions, so that no one can hide behind less demanding

written procedures when the time comes to account for

their actions or decisions. The employees are strongly

supported in providing their own input on every little

action they take.

328 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

Whom do we consider to be morally responsible and

blameworthy under the hypothetical circumstances of this

second scenario? Are the mechanisms for attributions of

moral responsibility the same as in the first scenario?

Discussion

The two hypothetical scenarios 3

illustrate situations

involving both individual and corporate responsibility. On

the one hand, in scenario A it is not only the employees

who should be considered morally responsible for late

replacement of aircraft components or for not signaling

when others behaved unethically, but also the corporation

itself, through the corporate culture, for stimulating the

individual unethical behavior and facilitating its continua-

tion. On the other hand, in scenario B both the employees

deciding to pay extra attention and the corporation itself,

through the corporate culture that stimulated individual

ethical behavior, are to be considered morally responsible.

While in the first scenario the bearing of moral responsi-

bility results in attributions of blame, in the second sce-

nario we consider the agents to be praiseworthy.

In both fictitious scenarios, the corporate culture seems

to differ from the written procedures, either by con-

tradicting them and creating room for unethical employee

behavior (in the first scenario) or by being even more

ethically demanding of the employees (in the second sce-

nario). When, for instance, the employees perceived their

environment as stimulating unethical behavior, they were

far from discouraged from proceeding in wrongdoing by

the written procedures, so they simply followed the course

of action prompted by the corporate culture. In turn, when

employees perceived their organizational environment as

being ethically demanding, they were stimulated to act

even beyond simple compliance with written procedures.

In addition to this, our fictitious scenarios implied that,

once individual (un)ethical behavior occurred, its contin-

uation was facilitated by the corporate culture, thus making

it easier for other employees to follow a similar pattern of

(un)ethical behavior.

What is more, individual and corporate responsibility

are not only interconnected in these hypothetical scenarios,

but they also seem to enhance one another: the more the

individuals perceive the corporate culture as stimulating

(un)ethical behavior, the more they act in this (un)ethical

manner, which in turn facilitates the corporate culture in

stimulating even more (un)ethical behavior. As a result, the

moral responsibility of both individuals and the corporation

increases by being mutually reinforcing. As long as each of

the moral agents (individuals and the corporation) con-

tributes to stimulating (un)ethical behavior and does not

put a stop to it, each one facilitates the continuation of

(un)ethical behavior and should be evaluated as blame-/

praise-worthy in its own right, in a mutually enhancing

manner, without bearing an inversely proportional

responsibility as in the summative approach.

Individual and Corporate Responsibility Interact

in a Mutually Enhancing Manner

In discussing the hypothetical examples above, we argued

that the summative approach is not fit to explain respon-

sibility attributions, as it renders an additive account of

corporate and individual moral responsibility. This is why

we settle for developing the mutually enhancing approach

to moral responsibility, which not only acknowledges the

two levels of individual and corporate responsibility, but

also connects them in an inter-related manner. It makes

room for situations where individual and corporate moral

responsibilities increase due to their interaction and also

points to the mechanisms behind this interaction. We

continue this section by highlighting four grounds which

make the mutually enhancing approach suitable for dealing

with situations like the ones presented and at the same time

explain from a normative perspective the way individual

and corporate responsibility should be approached when

such corporate situations might occur.

Interactive Relationship

First, the mutually enhancing approach to moral responsi-

bility in corporate contexts is based on a dynamic, inter-

actional view of responsibility. As our examples showed, it

often happens that we cannot evaluate individual and cor-

porate responsibility related to an outcome as two discon-

nected levels of responsibility. Our mechanic and the two

supervisors were not only acting as they would in everyday

life, but also under the influence of the signals they per-

ceived in their working environment. As Bovens notes,

‘‘the actions of complex organizations are always bound up

with the actions of individuals’’ (1998, p. 73). Individual

and corporate responsibility interact ‘‘given the way col-

lective obligations shape the obligations of individual

3 When building the two scenarios, we imagined only two of the

dimensions of corporate culture which might influence ethical

behavior of employees (Kaptein 1998, 2011a, b), namely time

pressure (Treviño 1986; Kaptein 2011a, b) and reinforcement of

ethical behavior, with the latter referring to the ‘‘likelihood of

managers and employees being punished for behaving unethically and

rewarded for behaving ethically’’ (Kaptein 2011b, p. 851). Of course,

other situations might be imagined, where, for instance, the corporate

culture is such that the distinction between ethical and unethical

behavior is not clear (Kaptein 2011a, b), or it demotivates employees,

leading to poor commitment to behave ethically (Idem). It is not

within the scope of the article to explore all such possibilities, the aim

of the scenarios being only illustrative for our account of mutually

enhancing moral responsibility.

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 329

123

members of collectives’’ (Isaacs 2011, p. 10). As employee

behavior and corporate practices are the output of indi-

vidual and corporate agencies, there are situations when we

need to take into account the interaction between the two

levels of responsibility in order to assign moral

responsibility.

Increase in Responsibility

Second, the fact that individual agency and corporate

agency are so tightly connected within corporate contexts

makes moral responsibility attributions to one party

enhance moral responsibility attributions to the other party.

As suggested in our imagined scenarios, the interaction

between individual and corporate responsibility evolves in

such a way that the level of responsibility assigned to each

is not constant—it increases in time: the more we blame or

praise the individuals (for behaving (un)ethically), the

more we blame or praise the corporation (for preventing or

not preventing (un)ethical behavior). This mutually

enhancing idea points to a bi-directional concept of moral

responsibility in corporate settings: it goes from the indi-

vidual to the corporate level and vice versa. Previous

accounts pointing to an increase in responsibility were

concerned with an increase in individual responsibility

when the individual agent is member of a corporation

(Isaacs 2011; Mathiesen 2006), but not to an increase in

corporate responsibility as well. The question raised by

mutually enhancing responsibility is not only what differ-

ence does it make to the moral responsibility of individuals

who are members of a corporation that is under moral

evaluation (the residual problem according to Graham

2006, pp. 258–259; see also Gilbert 2006), but also the

reverse: what difference does it make to the moral

responsibility of a corporation whose members are under

moral evaluation.

Multiplied Responsibility

Third, with the mutually enhancing approach the relation

between individual and corporate responsibility is not

straightforwardly one of addition (?), but rather involves

the multiplication (9) of responsibility pertaining to par-

ticipating agents. Put briefly, it renders the idea that

‘‘responsibility may be multiplied’’ (Zimmerman 1985a,

p. 355), meaning that sometimes, instead of picturing

agents as proportionally sharing responsibility for an out-

come, we may ascribe each of them more or even full

moral responsibility. Responsibility should not be pictured

‘‘as a substance of which there is a fixed amount, such that,

if the collective takes its share, then there is less for the

individuals’’ (Mathiesen 2006, p. 250), for corporate moral

responsibility does not necessarily exhaust all the respon-

sibility in a given case (Isaacs 2011, p. 18).

Agent-Related Evaluation

Fourth, the mutually enhancing approach is agent-focused

in assigning moral responsibility, leading to overall moral

responsibility attributions that exceed a fixed total of

100 % responsibility for an outcome. The summative

responsibility approach seems to be evaluating actions or

outcomes, and this is why individual and corporate

responsibility are seen as slices of 100 % of the total

responsibility attached to that outcome. With the mutually

enhancing approach, we look at agents as being the object

of evaluation—in this way moral responsibility attaches to

moral agents who are interacting in such a way that they

can each be considered fully responsible for a specific

outcome in a corporate context. Each moral agent in a

corporate setting has a different range of actions within his

power, each with full responsibility attached. 4 We there-

fore take it that it is not the degree or relevance of the

agent’s causal contribution, but the fact that the agent has

made a contribution in view of bringing about that out-

come, in order to be fully responsible for it (Miller 2006).

We have seen that the mutually enhancing approach

takes into account the interactive relationship between

individual and corporate agency, leading to an increase in

responsibility for both parties. It points to the possibility of

multiplying responsibility and is agent-focused when

evaluating responsibility ascriptions, such that it accom-

modates overall attributions that exceed a fixed total 100 %

responsibility for an outcome. This leads us to our first

proposition:

Proposition 1 The more the individuals and corporations

interact dynamically in generating (un)ethical outcomes,

the more their moral responsibility is mutually increased.

However, we are not claiming here that in any situation

of mutually enhancing moral responsibility it is always the

case that agents are to be seen as 100 % responsible. This

is a mere possibility, not a necessity. It might be that some

agents do not bear full responsibility due to excusing

conditions (Zimmerman 1985b): they may have acted

under coercion (contextual pressure), without intention or

without the possibly of knowing the particular circum-

stances of their action. In other words, an agent could be

attributed moral responsibility ranging anywhere from 0 to

100 %. This derives from the fact that moral responsibility

4 Even if we concede, for example, that corporate agents are ascribed

a more limited moral responsibility than individual agents (Wilmot

2001), they are still up to 100 % morally responsible for a specific

corporate outcome, given that they have participated in bringing it

about.

330 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

is a matter of degree (De George 1999), which is also the

case for collective agency (Corlett 2001) such as corporate

agency. It may well be that, when evaluating agents’

responsibility for an outcome, the corporation is seen as

70 % responsible while one individual agent is 80 %

responsible and other individual agent is 40 % responsi-

ble. 5 But this is not the same as holding that one agent’s

responsibility decreases as related to the other agent’s

responsibility, so that we would have a total sum of 100 %

responsibility after putting together each one’s share (as it

was the case with the summative approach). The mutually

enhancing approach does not require that responsibility is

divisible between multiple agents—we need not assume

that the total responsibility will remain fixed (May 1990).

Interaction Mechanisms for Mutually Enhancing

Responsibility

After setting the ground for the mutually enhancing

approach to moral responsibility in corporate settings, we

now turn to the question: what are the mechanisms that

trigger and foster the interaction of the two instances of

responsibility in such a way that the responsibility of one

increases the responsibility of the other and vice versa? In

this section, we explore these mechanisms, together with

the conditions and mediating factors that generate them. To

that end, we suggest that the mutually enhancing interac-

tion of individual and corporate responsibility is generated

by two types of mechanisms which are, in turn, based on

two conditions and one mediating factor as illustrated in

Fig. 1.

The Relations Between Corporate Practices

and Individual Behavior as Conditions for the Mutually

Enhancing Interaction

In order to speak of interaction mechanisms leading to

mutually enhancing moral responsibility, two necessary

conditions must be met.

First, we hold that there needs to be a disconnection

between the corporate formal and informal practices,

namely between the corporate structure and culture, in

order to speak of an interaction between the individual

agent(s) and the corporate agent leading to a mutual

enhancement of moral responsibility. As we have tried to

illustrate in the two scenarios built around the aircraft

maintenance company, we hold that the way the corporate

culture and structure are related has a strong influence on

the way we ascribe moral responsibility for corporate

outcomes. In both scenarios, the corporate culture differed

from the formal procedures: in scenario A, even though the

formal procedures supported ethical behavior, the corpo-

rate culture contradicted it, as it stimulated unethical action

and further facilitated its perpetuation among employees.

In scenario B, the corporate culture not only backed up

formal procedures which basically supported ethical

behavior, but went beyond them, by stimulating employees

to behave ethically and further fostering ethical behavior,

thus advocating more than simple compliance with written

procedures. The appropriate approach to responsibility

ascriptions is therefore dependent on the connection or

disconnection between the corporate formal and informal

practices.

When the corporate culture reflects the corporate

structure, being perfectly connected, the actions of indi-

viduals are easier to evaluate in relation to the corporate

practices. They either comply with or contradict the cor-

porate ethical or unethical practices, as the corporate cul-

ture and structure are both either ethical or unethical. In

such a case, the individual and corporate responsibility can

be interpreted in a summative approach. With the close

connection of corporate culture and structure, the role of

the corporation in generating ethical individual behavior is

clearly defined: individual responsibility starts where cor-

porate responsibility ends and vice versa, so that it can be

evaluated in terms of a zero-sum approach.

5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the manner in which a

specific degree of moral responsibibility (from 0 to 100 %) is to be

assigned to agents in a given case.

Fig. 1 Mechanisms for mutually enhancing moral responsibility

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 331

123

But when the formal and informal practices of a cor-

poration are disconnected, prompting different courses of

action, the individuals will have to either comply with the

corporate structure or adopt the corporate culture. While

this lack of perfect connection between the two corporate

dimensions does not influence the inclusion of corporations

in the moral realm (Kaptein and Wempe 2002), as we can

still evaluate corporate morality based on the outcomes of

corporate practices, it does influence the way we ascribe

overall moral responsibility to both individual and corpo-

rate agents. Namely, such disconnection means that: (1)

employees are given mixed signals concerning what type

of (un)ethical behavior to adopt in the workplace and (2)

the corporation does not completely display (un)ethical

lines of action. The way both the formal and informal

dimensions of corporations support ethical behavior

therefore has an important influence on the way moral

responsibility is to be ascribed. This brings us to our second

proposition:

Proposition 2 The more disconnected the corporate

culture and structure, the more individual and corporate

(un)ethical behavior are mutually reinforcing.

The second condition for mutually enhancing moral

responsibility stems from the first, namely that individuals

do indeed act according to the signals perceived from the

corporate culture. When they do, they conform to and

contribute to that corporate culture, at the same time. We

speak in this case of congruence between individual

behavior and corporate informal practices. If such con-

gruence is not met and individuals act according to the

corporate structure, then we are again in the summative

approach, where we only have to apply a zero-sum calculus

in order to evaluate individuals’ and corporations’ moral

responsibility. Namely, if in our scenario B individuals had

simply followed the written procedures and a tragic out-

come would have occurred, then they could have been

considered responsible for a proportionate part of the out-

come (because, for example, they conformed to written

procedures even though they considered these procedures

to be wrong) in a summative manner, together with the

corporation. Instead of praise, they would have received

moral blame.

With the vast literature commenting on the strong

influence of informal corporate practices on individuals’

behavior in the workplace, either in terms of climate

(Martin and Cullen 2006; Peterson 2002) or culture

(Kaptein 2011a, b; Treviño and Brown 2004), it is clear

that informal practices exert an important pressure on

individuals to conform to them, even when this means

going against the formal practices of the corporation. We

may state here that when the corporate culture is discon-

nected from the corporate structure, the likelihood of

individuals following the corporate culture increases.

While the formal dimension of corporations determines

what constitutes (un)ethical behavior (Victor and Cullen

1988), the informal dimension stimulates (un)ethical con-

duct (Treviño and Weaver 2003). This is why the con-

gruence between individual behavior and corporate

informal practices is the second condition which further

generates the interaction mechanisms leading to the mutual

enhancement of individual and corporate responsibility.

Our third proposition then reads as:

Proposition 3 The more congruent individual behavior

and corporate culture, the more individual and corporate

responsibility are mutually enhancing.

Corporate Functions as the Mediating Factor

Generating the Interaction Mechanisms

Having identified the conditions under which the interac-

tion mechanisms start to function, the next thing to do is to

determine and explain the mediating factor that acts as an

interaction facilitator between individual and corporate

responsibility. The role of such a mediating factor is to link

the two levels of responsibility and to make room for the

interaction mechanisms to occur. Without this mediating

factor together with the two conditions discussed above,

the mechanisms could not take place.

The mediating factor which we point to is therefore the

bond between corporate and individual moral agency. On

the one hand, corporate agency is to be evaluated in terms

of corporate practices, as it is by setting these practices,

either formal or informal, that corporations are to be

ascribed moral responsibility (Kaptein and Wempe 2002).

Through the organizational context and practices corpora-

tions become both moral agents and structures ‘‘that

enable, constrain and shape individual action’’ (Crawford

2007, pp. 196–197). On the other hand, individual agency

is to be evaluated in terms of individual behavior within the

corporate setting, which is linked to the obligations an

agent has with respect to some matter (Gilbert 2006), and

with what the agent should do as a result of his own status

or with his duties (the ‘‘deontic sense’’ of responsibility

according to Velasquez 2003, p. 532). Moral responsibility

ascribed to individual agents in corporate settings is

therefore strongly related to the contextual expectation to

act in a certain way (De Leede et al. 1999).

The connection between individual and corporate

agency, namely, between individual behavior and corpo-

rate practices is made through the mediating role of cor-

porate functions. Being performed by individuals within

corporations (Kaptein and Wempe 2002), these functions

are determined by the corporate practices, for it is the

corporate structure which ‘‘directs the tasks and

332 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

responsibilities that belong to various functions and

determines the relationships among these’’ (Idem, p. 148).

It is by pointing to the corporate functions that we are able

to speak of the interaction and increase in individual and

corporate moral responsibility corresponding to the mutu-

ally enhancing approach. When attributing moral respon-

sibility for generating a specific outcome, individual agents

are finally evaluated as blameworthy or praiseworthy

depending on their expected behavior as a result of the

functions they occupy (Grossi et al. 2007). The corporate

agent is in turn responsible for designing these functions

within the corporate structure and for embedding them in

the corporate culture so as to make them work in a coherent

manner.

In a corporation where (1) the culture differs from the

formal structure (by suggesting either less ethical or more

ethical behavior) and (2) individuals behave according to

the signals perceived from the corporate culture, the cor-

porate functions become the mediating factor between

individual and corporate agency. Even though they are

expressed in the formal structure of the corporation

(Kaptein and Wempe 2002), corporate functions cannot be

solely judged against the corporate structure. While indi-

vidual agents are expected to act in a certain way

according to the functions they occupy in the formal

structure, the way they act when occupying these functions

is the result of the signals prompted by the corporate

culture. This is why the corporate functions are the middle-

ground between corporate practices and individual

behavior and therefore create room for the interaction

mechanisms, which we aim to explore in the next section

of the article.

Initiating and Fostering Mechanisms for Mutually

Enhancing Responsibility

We now turn to the actual mechanisms that trigger and

foster the process of dynamic interaction leading to a

mutual enhancement of individual and corporate respon-

sibility. We identify two such interaction mechanisms.

The first type of mechanism is one that determines the

interaction between individual and corporate moral

responsibility—this is what we call initializing mecha-

nisms. These initializing mechanisms stimulate unethical

or, by contrast, ethical behavior and culture and work bi-

directionally. On the one hand, we have the corporate agent

(through the corporate culture) stimulating (un)ethical

individual behavior. On the other hand, we have the indi-

vidual agents (through individual behavior) stimulating

(un)ethical corporate culture. The more the corporate cul-

ture stimulates the occurrence of (un)ethical behavior, the

more the individuals stimulate such (un)ethical culture to

occur by behaving (un)ethically, and vice versa.

Going back to our hypothetical example, we can see that

with the first scenario the corporate culture of the aircraft

maintenance company stimulated unethical individual

behavior, while individuals (mechanics, inspectors, etc.)

responded in the same manner, by further stimulating

unethical corporate culture. The same initializing mecha-

nisms are in place with our second scenario, but with a

slightly different connotation. Here the corporate culture of

the aircraft maintenance company stimulated ethical indi-

vidual behavior, while individuals (mechanics, inspectors,

etc.) responded in the same manner, by further stimulating

ethical culture.

The functioning of these initializing mechanisms may be

better captured by one insight emerging from a complexity

analysis of corporate identity, that is, ‘‘the identity of

corporate members and corporations are coterminous’’

(Woermann 2010, p. 168). This means that these identities

are formed and disappear altogether, as the identities of

corporate members ‘‘are not ontologically prior to the

identities of the corporation as a whole’’ (idem). But what

is the relevance of our corporate identity in connection with

our ethical or unethical corporate behavior? The fact is that

it has an important impact on the way we picture our

responsibilities in a corporate context. As Woermann puts

it: ‘‘our corporate responsibilities are not linked with some

a priori ethical scheme, but are, first and foremost, deter-

mined by our corporate practices, and, therefore, linked

with our corporate identities’’ (idem).

The second type of mechanism that we identify is a

supporting type, which causes the interaction between

individual and corporate moral responsibility to continue—

this is what we call fostering (or supporting) mechanisms.

They rest on the previous type of mechanisms and can

therefore only start once the initializing mechanisms are in

place. These fostering mechanisms facilitate ethical or

unethical behavior and culture to continue and also work

bi-directionally. On the one hand, we have the corporate

agent (through the corporate culture) facilitating (un)ethi-

cal individual behavior. On the other hand, we have the

individual agents (through individual behavior) facilitating

(un)ethical corporate culture. The more the corporate cul-

ture facilitates (un)ethical patterns of behavior, the more

the individuals facilitate such (un)ethical culture to con-

tinue by repeating (un)ethical behavior, and vice versa.

If we take our fictitious examples once again, we can see

that in the first scenario the corporate culture of the aircraft

maintenance company facilitated the continuation of

unethical individual behavior once it had started, while

individuals (mechanics, inspectors, etc.) responded in the

same manner, by further facilitating the spread of unethical

corporate culture. The same fostering mechanisms are in

place with our second scenario: the corporate practices of

the aircraft maintenance company facilitated ethical

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 333

123

individual behavior, while individuals (mechanics,

inspectors, etc.) responded in the same manner, by further

facilitating ethical corporate culture.

But how does this process of interaction between indi-

vidual and corporate agency lead to a mutual enhancement

of responsibility? As our hypothetical scenarios suggested,

(un)ethical behavior is first stimulated through individual

behavior and corporate culture, and then continued because

of the joint support given by individuals and the corpora-

tion alike. This fostering of (un)ethical behavior actually

increases the level of responsibility assigned to each of the

agents: none puts a stop to (un)ethical practices and both

continue to generate even more (un)ethical behavior. This

leads us to our fourth proposition:

Proposition 4 The more the individuals view the corpo-

rate culture as stimulating and facilitating (un)ethical

behavior, the more likely their own (un)ethical behavior,

and so the more the corporate culture appears to stimulate

and facilitate (un)ethical behavior.

For instance, if corporate practices (culture and struc-

ture) are such that they do not prevent unethical behavior

and further facilitate it by letting it multiply without

sanctioning it (Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008), the

degree of responsibility we assign to the corporate agent

increases over time. The reverse is true in case of indi-

viduals. While corporate agents are expected to possess

mechanisms which can identify, control and change

immoral practices (Donaldson 1982), individual agents

are expected to overcome, resist, or reject corporate

practices when the practices are immoral (De George

1999). As long as individuals carry on such unethical

behavior or do not signal when witnessing others behav-

ing unethically, they contribute to perpetuating unethical

behavior (Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008) by facil-

itating it and become increasingly responsible over time.

Agents cannot hide behind their roles or functions in

justifying their immoral acts: ‘‘role responsibilities are

always subordinate to general moral responsibility’’ (De

George 1999, p. 121).

These fostering mechanisms may be further explained

by appealing to a complex systems perspective, as related

to the process of identity formation. The moment the

components of the system interact, ‘‘they allow for conti-

nuity and transformation’’ (Woermann 2010, p. 170). In

their interaction, the components produce the system which

in turn produces the components that produce it (Morin

2008). In other words, the functioning of these fostering

mechanisms is similar to the recursive process involved in

corporate identity formation, whereby ‘‘the products and

the effects are at the same time causes and producers of

what produces them’’ (Morin 2008, p. 49). The more the

individuals behave (un)ethically, the more the corporate

culture generates (un)ethical patterns of action and vice

versa.

In describing both the initiating and the fostering

mechanisms behind the interaction of individual and cor-

porate agency leading to a mutually enhancing responsi-

bility, we have made use of terms with slightly different

connotations. We stated that we may speak, on the one

hand, of stimulating (un)ethical behavior and, on the other

hand, of facilitating (un)ethical behavior. The reason

behind this use of terms is that there needs to be a moderate

incentive for (un)ethical behavior (to occur and continue)

in order to speak of intertwined responsibility. If there were

a more active or compelling incentive, then it would not

have been the case that individual and corporate respon-

sibility were intertwined, but rather that they were partly or

proportionally responsible in a summative way (or, if the

individual unethical behavior was imposed by force, maybe

only corporate responsibility was involved).

The Upward Double-Helix of Mutually Enhancing

Individual and Corporate Responsibility

We find the upward double-helix to be most suitable for

interpreting the idea of mutually enhancing moral respon-

sibility. Like the two intertwined strands of an upward

double-helix, which are different yet complementary, the

individual and the corporate levels of responsibility interact

in a dynamic, self-reinforcing process that leads to a

mutual enhancement of responsibility in time. As we pre-

viously suggested in our hypothetical examples, when the

corporation does not sanction unethical individual behav-

ior, we hold it to be morally responsible together with the

individual agent(s). However, individual responsibility

does not decrease as a result of also holding the corporation

responsible, which leads to an overall responsibility that

goes beyond the 100 % logical sum that was implied by the

summative approach to responsibility. This point is to some

extent endorsed by Teigen and Brun (2011) in their study

showing that respondents tend to perceive and allocate

moral responsibility non-additively when they evaluate

groups of three or four individuals performing a joint task:

when put together, individual responsibilities exceed the

100 % logical sum in such cases.

We therefore hold that, once the dynamic interaction is

triggered due to initializing mechanisms and as long as

each party carries on due to fostering mechanisms, the

level of moral responsibility assigned to each of them

actually increases. Individual unethical behavior might

further cause others to take a similar stance (Den Nieu-

wenboer and Kaptein 2008), thus enhancing the overall

responsibility related to a specific outcome. The more the

corporation facilitates unethical behavior, the more the

individuals will pursue such unethical behavior, while we

334 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

hold each party to be more and more blameworthy. As long

as the congruence condition is met, the process of mutual

enhancement of responsibility works just like an upward

double-helix, where we have a self-sustaining process. The

dynamic stops when one of the two parties involved adopts

a different course of action, for example when individual

behavior is sanctioned by corporate practices (usually in

terms of formal procedures). Corporate responsibility is

intertwined with individual responsibility and both enhance

one another as long as they both follow a similar pattern of

ethical or unethical action. This leads us to our fifth and

final proposition:

Proposition 5 The more the individuals and the corpo-

ration stimulate and facilitate the same pattern of

(un)ethical behavior, the more responsible they become in

time.

Finally, the idea of mutual enhancement works as a

component of responsibility assignment, that is, as part of

the object for which the agents is held responsible. On the

one hand, individual agents become more responsible

because their unethical behavior generates similar unethi-

cal behavior within the corporate setting. On the other

hand, the corporate agent becomes more responsible as the

lack of sanctioning of unethical behavior or the lack of

control over unethical practices perpetuates unethical

behavior. The parties continue to act in an (un)ethical

manner while at the same time generating an (un)ethical

response perpetuated over and over, such that both indi-

vidual and corporate moral responsibility increase over a

continuum.

Discussion and Conclusion

Throughout this article we have focused on answering the

question: How should we assign moral responsibility in

corporate contexts? The literature around the individualist–

collectivist debate has provided two main possible answers

by pointing, on the one hand, to the Individual Moral

Responsibility approach and, on the other hand, to the

Corporate Moral Responsibility approach. Based on this

latter approach, we have depicted two possible normative

lines of reasoning on assigning moral responsibility for

outcomes in corporate settings to both the individuals and

the corporation in either a summative manner or in a

mutually enhancing manner. As the summative approach

has already been fairly extensively developed by business

ethics scholars, we have focused our efforts on developing

the latter approach, namely Mutually Enhancing Corporate

Moral Responsibility.

To that end, the main contribution put forward in this

article was to discuss the way in which the interaction

between individual(s) and the corporation may lead to an

increase in the degree of responsibility they both possess

for actions in corporate settings. The paper subsequently

explored the mechanisms behind the interaction of indi-

vidual and corporate action leading to such mutually

enhancing moral responsibility, together with conditions

and mediating factors which prompt these mechanisms.

The idea that the mutually enhancing approach puts

forward is that individual members of a corporation and the

corporation itself could be simultaneously blameworthy or

praiseworthy in a mutually enhancing manner because of

the support that the former offer to the latter, and vice

versa. The interactive nature of the actions of individuals

and corporations can actually increase the degree of

responsibility that each possesses for ethical failings or

accomplishments.

Implications for Business Ethics Research

We consider our account concerning mutually enhancing

responsibility to generate several implications for norma-

tive research, as well as for empirical research in business

ethics.

From a theoretical point of view, our account puts for-

ward a new normative perspective concerning the way

moral responsibility should be attributed in corporate

contexts. In addition to the summative view previously

developed (Card 2005; Pettit 2007), our account captures

the mutually enhancing interaction between individual and

corporate action, together with conditions, mediating fac-

tors and mechanisms leading to an increase in the degree of

responsibility assigned to the individual and corporate

agents. A direction for further normative research relates to

investigating whether the two conditions leading to the

interaction mechanisms may be further specified.

While initial research on unethical behavior in the

workplace focused mainly on the ‘‘personal characteristics

of individual transgressors’’ (Kaptein 2011b, p. 844), the

latest research is more interested in ‘‘the characteristics of

the organizational context within which unethical behavior

occurs’’ (Idem). This shift from the ‘‘bad apples’’ to the

‘‘bad barrels’’ approach (Treviño and Youngblood 1990)

led to interpreting the corporate culture as a key component

of the organizational context directly linked to unethical

behavior (Casey et al. 2001; Sims and Brinkmann 2003).

Our research suggests finding a balance between the

importance we should place on corporate culture, on the

one hand, and on individual behavior, on the other hand.

With the idea of mutually enhancing moral responsibility,

we acknowledge that there is a bi-directional relation

between individual behavior and corporate culture, where

each side supports the other by stimulating and facilitating

(un)ethical individual and corporate behavior.

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 335

123

Moreover, in developing our account we stated that one

of the necessary conditions for mutually enhancing moral

responsibility was the disconnection between the organi-

zational structure and culture. This brings a new develop-

ment to the notion of corporate practices (Kaptein and

Wempe 2002), as previous accounts did not explore the

implications of the relation between the two types of cor-

porate practices on moral responsibility ascriptions in

corporate settings. While our account was grounded on the

idea that corporations may be ascribed moral responsibility

based on the practices they display (idem), we further

stated that the disconnection between the formal and

informal practices may lead to a mutual increase in the

responsibility of corporations and individual agents when

generating an outcome. In addition to this, when discussing

the disconnection between corporate culture and structure,

we treated the two types of practices as if the formal

dimension was coherent, but formal elements can also

contradict one another. The same applies to the informal

dimension. Research into business ethics may further

investigate whether such contradictions have implications

for the mutually enhancing approach.

The initializing and fostering mechanisms identified by

our research reiterate the role of one dimension of corpo-

rate culture advanced by the multidimensional model

developed by Kaptein (1998, 2011b) in ascribing moral

responsibility. Namely, the reinforcement of ethical

behavior, defined as the ‘‘likelihood of managers and

employees being punished for behaving unethically and

rewarded for behaving ethically’’ (Kaptein 2011b, p. 851)

is implicitly acknowledged by the interaction mechanisms

developed in our paper. As we have stated, when individual

and corporate agents do not put a stop to observed uneth-

ical behavior, they contribute to the perpetuation of such

behavior by facilitating others in taking a similar stance

(Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein 2008). Further research

could investigate what other dimensions of the Ethical

Virtues Model (Kaptein 1998, 2011b) are more likely to

influence mutually enhancing ascriptions of moral

responsibility in corporate settings.

A related point concerns the idea that the overall

individual and corporate responsibility increases in time,

as long as the conditions for mutually enhancing inter-

action are met. When the corporate culture first stimu-

lates and then facilitates continuation of (un)ethical

individual behavior, the corporation becomes increas-

ingly responsible over time. Things work in the same

manner with individuals who contribute to stimulating

and then facilitating continuation of (un)ethical corpo-

rate practices, generating even more individual respon-

sibility (either in terms of moral blame or praise). Our

research suggests that the overall moral responsibility

ascriptions related to a specific outcome increase in time

in an upward double-helix model, where the support that

the individuals offer to the corporation and vice versa

determine a continuous perpetuation of (un)ethical

action. Further research might explore in more detail the

way responsibility increases in time given the mutually

enhancing approach, and inquire whether such an

increase evolves gradually in time.

In addition to this, empirical research could test the

validity of the upward double-helix model proposed for the

mutually enhancing approach to moral responsibility and

see to what extent the initializing and fostering mecha-

nisms we identified and developed do indeed lead to an

increase in individual and corporate moral responsibility

ascriptions. Do the initializing mechanisms stimulate

(un)ethical individual and corporate behavior? Do they

automatically trigger the fostering mechanisms which

facilitate the continuation of (un)ethical individual and

corporate behavior?

Another suggestion for future empirical research is to

identify actual cases illustrating the mutually enhancing

approach to moral responsibility and to discuss the way

corporate and individual responsibilities interact in prac-

tice. This is an interesting task because, although it may be

easy to find instances of such an interaction leading to

unethical outcomes, it would be difficult to identify

instances where individuals and corporations support each

other in generating ethical outcomes, as they are usually

not reported. However, deeper research into corporate

activity might bring such cases to the surface. The

boundary conditions and interaction mechanisms identified

in our research could then be tested empirically on the one

hand, and used to explain real corporate situations in

greater detail on the other.

Limitations and More Suggestions for Further Research

Our account inevitably faces several potential limitations.

Three of them will be discussed here.

First, by dealing with attributions of moral responsibility

within corporate settings, our paper takes into account

morality displayed by corporations and individuals com-

posing them. There are, of course, other spheres of morality

to which both individuals and corporations belong and

which affect them. Above the individual and the corporate

levels of responsibility there is, for example, a stakeholder

level, a sector level, and overall a societal level of

responsibility, in extra-organizational spheres of morality,

as well as a team level or department level of responsi-

bility, in intra-organizational spheres of morality. It was

not our aim to address all these levels of morality and the

responsibility they bring with them, together with the way

they influence the corporate and individual levels of

responsibility. However, this is a suggestion for future

336 M. Constantinescu, M. Kaptein

123

research in which the mutually enhancing approach can be

used.

Second, when developing the conditions for mutually

enhancing responsibility, we posited that there needs to be a

disconnection between the formal and informal dimensions

of the corporate practices, such that the corporate culture

does not perfectly reflect the structure. The culture may

either contradict the structure by stimulating and facilitating

unethical behavior, or it may go beyond the structure by

stimulating and facilitating ethical behavior that goes

beyond compliance. However, our research did not take into

account the possible degrees of such disconnection and the

way it may influence moral responsibility ascriptions. This

limitation creates room for further developments.

Third, the paper only discusses the mutually enhancing

approach as generating an increase in the degree of

responsibility ascribed to individual members and the

corporation itself, so that the overall responsibility exceeds

100 %. A suggestion for future conceptual research would

be to explore whether and how we can speak of a mutually

decreasing approach, which could lead to an overall

responsibility less than 100 %. Further normative research

could also delineate the way different degrees of respon-

sibility are attributed to individuals and the corporation,

such that one is, for example, considered 70 % responsible

and the other 60 % responsible for an ethical failure or

accomplishment.

Practical Implications

Three main practical implications result from the norma-

tive construction of the mutually enhancing approach to

moral responsibility ascriptions in corporate settings.

First, as long as we think that the more someone or some-

thing is responsible the less someone or something else is

responsible, we end up with the situation in which individuals

and corporations will either endlessly try to pass on the

responsibility for specific unethical behaviors to each other

(because this implies that they themselves will be less

responsible), or try to claim their responsibility and, conse-

quently, credit for specific ethical behaviors, to the detriment

of other party. Ignoring the mutually enhancing approach

therefore results in looking at the prevention of unethical

behavior as a competition between the individual and the

corporation (because the more the individual does in pre-

venting unethical behavior, the more the corporation is

responsible for unethical behavior that still takes place, and

vice versa), and not as a mutual responsibility—which, for

example, undermines the effectiveness of ethics and compli-

ance programs.

Second, the mutually enhancing approach helps man-

agers to avoid two shortcomings of other approaches

concerning moral responsibility ascriptions—blaming the

innocent (Corlett 1992; Hasnas 2010; Lewis 1972; Nar-

veson 2002; Velasquez 2003) and letting the guilty off the

hook (Lewis 1972; Mathiesen 2006; Mellema 1997; Ve-

lasquez 2003)—by assigning up to full responsibility to

moral agents in corporate settings.

Another practical implication of our research is to

consider what types of organizations are likely to meet

the conditions for mutually enhancing moral responsibil-

ity that would finally lead to an increase in the respon-

sibility that we ascribe to both the corporate and

individual agents for a joint outcome. Since the discon-

nection between the corporate culture and structure is the

very first condition for the interaction mechanisms to take

place, together with the congruence between employee

behavior and corporate culture, organizations with highly

formalized structures and a negative role model function

of managers seem to be suitable candidates for mutually

enhancing ascriptions of responsibility. In corporate set-

tings with rules, procedures and policies that are too

numerous and too strict, where managers promote an

unethical model (Kaptein 1998, 2011a, b), employees

tend to escape overregulation through less strict individual

behavior, contributing to or complying with an unethical

corporate culture. This is a hypothesis which further

empirical research could test.

In Conclusion

To conclude, by developing the mutually enhancing

approach we have drawn attention to the intertwined inter-

action between individual and corporate moral responsibility

and the mechanisms behind it. Moreover, when discussing

the conditions under which the interaction mechanisms start

to work, we have highlighted the importance of the relation

between the formal and informal dimensions of corporate

practices in supporting ethical behavior. As we find these

points relevant not only from a reactive, but also from a

proactive organizational perspective concerning moral

responsibility attributions, we hope that our research will

find an echo in the way corporations and their individual

members work together to improve their ethics and realize

ethical outcomes. As long as they realize the importance of

their interaction for each party’s responsibility toward cor-

porate outcomes, research findings in this article could

actually make a contribution in generating more ethical

corporate settings, for which both individual members and

corporations can then receive praise.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank our colleagues from Erasmus University and University of Bucharest, especially Ben

Wempe, Valentin Muresan and Emilian Mihailov for their useful

comments on earlier drafts of the paper. Part of the research was

funded by the University of Bucharest.

Mutually Enhancing Responsibility 337

123

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