In a 3-5 page (750-1250 words) essay, answer the following question:

C H

A P

TE R 2

-

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic G onflict

f he theories and approaches discussed in chapter 1 inform

our understand- I

ing of incernarional relarions, and srare behavior specificall¡ and offer a m

eans for understancling erhnic conflicc. Y et, how

can w e caP

ture all the relevant piayers in intrastate ethnic conflict? The ievels of analysis fram

ew ork that has

been a m ainstay in international relations scholarshipl allow

s us to take into accollnt those im

portant players, or actors) that m atter for understanding ethnic

conflict, both its causes and possible solutions. The levels of analysis approacl'r usually considers three levels, or "im

ages": incernational (balance of pow

er, anarchic international system ), dom

estic (fac- tors w

i¡hin states such as legislatures, bureaucracies, interest grouP s, m

ilitar¡ political parties), and individual (elites/leaders). In this chapter w

e exam ine the

three levels of anaiysis, w hich are then applied to each of the case studies of

erhnic conflicr ir-r chapters 3-7. A s w

ill becom e quite clear, though the levels are

in rnany w ays distinct, they also overlap in actual cases of ethnic conflict. In

order for scholars and practitioners alike to discern the factors that m atter in

determ ining the causes of and solurions to ethnic conflict, how

ever, the levels of analysis fram

ew ork is useful as a m

eans to categoùze ancl idendfy relevant factors.

IN D

IV ID

U A

L LE V

E L

A r rhe end of the da¡ clecisions about poiicies, w

hether dom estic or inter-

national, are m ade by individuals, the eiites in the governm

ent. S cholars have

focused on decision-m aking theories to account for the decisions of elites,

nam ely in che fields of social psychology and psycholo gy.z A

slerel R osati argues'

"In realit¡ countries do not act; people act. S tates (and organizations) are m

ade up of inctividuals w

ho act on their behalf. U ltim

atel¡ hum an cognition m

at- ters-in politics, foreign polic¡ ancl w

orld politics."3 Leaders m atler because they

are able to gec others ro follow , w

hether in term s of dom

estic or foreign policy, A

s M ichael B

row n notes, the decision of w

hether disputes lead to w ar or P

eace rests w

ith clom estic elites.4

3l

32 E thnic C

onflict

Y et, there are also lim

itations to the efficacy of action on rhe individual level. The quesrion arises*as to how

m uch individuals really m

atter given the structure of the international system

or dom estic level factors. individual leaders are con-

strained by dom estic forces, such as interest groups) political parties, and politi

cal institutions. \X /hether elites can get rhe m

asses to follow depends on their

ability to m obilize constituents (including ethnic constituents). Leaders are also

constrained by the structure of the system . For exam

ple, during the C old W

ar, U

.S . leaders w

ere influenced by the bipolar strlrcture in w hich the S

oviet U nion

w as the other m

ajor pow er in the system

. The E ast-W

est conflict dom inated the

relationship betw een the tw

o superpow ers, affecting their foreign policy actions

and decisions. U .S

. leaders m aintained a consistent containm

en[ policy tow ard

the S ovier U

nion. W

hile these lim itations are im

portant to recognize, it is useful to look at the role of political elites/leaders in exam

ining intrastate and interstate behavior. W e

begin this secrion w ith a brief discussion of the general theories and approaches

to understanding individual elite behavior. The seconcl section acldresses the role elites play in ethnic conflict, particularly how

ethnic elites are able to m anipulare

identity ancl convince the m asses to follow

, as w ell as how

elites engage in ethnic outbidding in order ro obtain and m

aintain pow er.

P olitical Leadership

In general, the study of political leadership concerns itself w ith each leader's indi-

vidual style of decision rnaking and the effect that it has on his or her sociery.s The literature on political leadership abounds. It runs the gam

ut from personal biog-

raphies and autobiographies, each detailing an individual's style, to classical political theories of leadership, to a m

ore general analysis of politicai leadership.6 C

lassifying leaders into different categories of sryle requires looking at rheir per- sonal characreristics, the instrum

ents that they use and have at their disposal, the obstacles that they face, the structure in w

hich rhey operate, ancl the choices that they m

ake given all of these other factors. The literature on successful and failecl political leadership offers three different explanations, according to Lew

is E dinger.

Leadership is affected by conrextual factors (such as organizational structures and dom

estic socioeconom ic conditions), individual attributes (personal characteris-

tics ofleaders), and "qualities attributed to other persons involved" (such as "atti- tudinal dispositions and cognitions of others").7

In the study ofpolitical leadership, scholars have utilized several approaches, including a focus on the "form

al-legai authority of individuals in key policym ak-

ing posirions," w hich is the institutionalized executive authority w

ithin a coun- try. O

thers have utilized the rational actor approach, focusing on the rational calculation (cost-benefit) of selÊ

inrerested leaders.8

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 33

H ow

ever, the rational actor m odel em

braced by realism and liberalism

m ay

not be the best w ay to understand w

hat states do, or do not do, both internaliy and externally. Instead of a rational actor m

odel, w hich looks at an indiviclual's

preferences and outcom es, som

e scholars have utilized cognitive approaches, focusing on the w

ays in w hich individuals' beliefs, im

ages, ancl attitucles influ- ence their behavior.9 C

ognitive approaches can be used to help us unclerstand foreign policy behavior,lO

though these approaches can also be applied to elites and leaders' behavior w

ithin states (including understanding ethnic conflict, as w

e w ill discuss later).

In brief scholars have found that individuals tend to seek consistency and avoid "cognitive dissonance." W

hen new inform

ation does not corresP ond w

ith rheir preexisting beließ, individuais w

ill cliscounr that new inform

ation. In addi- don, indivicluals are likely to use schem

as-"ntental constructs that represent

clifferent clum ps of know

ledge (or com prehension) about various facets of the

environm ent." W

ith an increasingly uncertain and com plex environm

ent, indi- viduals w

ill find them selves utilizing schem

as and other cognitive clevices that are "shortcuts in inForm

ation processing" so as to be able "to m ake sense of the

w orld and the situation at hand."11 For exam

ple, P resident G

eorge W . B

ush's

January 2002 S tate of the U

nion speecl-r labeled lran, Iraq, and N orth K

orea as the "A

xis of E vil." H

e asserted that "fsltates like tl-rese, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arm

ing to threaten the peace of the w orlcl. B

y seeking w

eapons of m ass destruction, these regim

es pose a grave and grow ing danger.

They could provide these arm s to terrorists, giving thern the m

eans to m atch

rheir hatred. They could attack our allies or attem pt to blackm

ail the U nitecl

S tates. In any ofthese cases, the price ofindifference w

ould be catastrophic." In linking the S

eptem ber LL,200l, terrorist attacks to stâte-sP

onsored terrorism , he

clairnecl that "[o]r-rr w ar on terror is w

ell begun, but is only begun."12 B y catego-

rizing perceived enem ies as supporters of terrorism

, his rhetoric of the A xis of

E vil served as a device to understand ancl sim

plify a w orld filled w

ith com plexity

and uncertainry. Im

portantl¡ as R osati observes, once such beliefs and im

ages are obtained by an individual, "the m

ind tends to close; the closure is reinforced by the organiza- tional, political, and social contexts in w

hich the indivicluals operate."i3 In this w

a¡ leaclers as w ell as orher inclividuals are often constrained in their abiliry ro

learn w hen they obtain new

inform ation, and thus are often unable to "adjust to

new situations and changes in their environm

ent."14 In processing inform

ation about the w orlcl, individuals classify and categonze

item s. The classification and sorting can result in the em

ergence of stereotypes.ls S

tereotyping others can lead to w hat are called m

irror im ages and enem

y im ages:

In a hostile relationship, individuals' im age of them

selves is positive, but the

34 E thnic C

onflict

im age of others is negative (enem

y im age).16 In the stucly of foreign polic¡ schol-

ars, such as N oel K

gplow itz, have nocecl that leaders' "percepfions of [enem

ies'] character, intent, pð*"r, strengths, w

eaknesses, trr-istw orthiness, ancl that w

hich che [enem

y] actor adm ires ancl dislikes" m

atter. These perceptions of the enem y

are the result of a leacler's "experiences w ith the enem

y" as w ell as "interpreta-

tions of enem y behavior," am

ong other factors. K aplow

itz contends tl'rat though "self-im

ages ancl perceptions of enenties" can change (due to "lraum atic and

catastrophic events" or after long periocls of tim e have passed), they tencl to be

"relatively stal¡Ie."17 S uch consistent self-im

ages and petceptions of the enem y

can lead ro m isperceptions. For exam

ple, w hen leaders exaggerare their country's

srrengrh relarive to rheir enem y, rhey rnay engage in aggressive behavior, incluct-

ing w ar.l8 In the end, because irnages and beliefs are difficuh to change, leaders

are constrained in their ability to contend w ith possible conflict.l9

This brief overview of the research on political leaclership and cognitive

approaches is m eant to illustrate how

ir-rdivicluals m atter for ¡he understanding

and evaluation of the policy decisiolls that elites rnake. Y et, even rhough cleci-

sions are m acle by elites, the irnplem

entation of policy rests on the w illingness

and abiliry of others.to clo so. S uch w

illingness ancl ability is an irnportant con- sideration in the case oFethnic conflict.

E lites and E

thnic C onflict

The overarching question in cases oF ethnic conflict is how the elires-

individuals-get the m asses to follow

to the extent ti-rat they can organize col- lectively and even go to w

ar. A re rhe follow

ers being duped by the elites into em

bracing "false beliefs" and engaging in "actions that the follow ers w

oulcl nor w

ant to take if they unclerstoocl w hat the leaders w

ere up to"?20 O r, as instru-

m entalist approaches to ethnic conflict w

ould argLle, are elites using "institu- tional rules and norm

s," including constitutional rules, to attain pow er in the

face of perceivecl security threats to che ethnic group?Zl A re elites able to ¡ake

advantage ofthe everyday social interactions that proctuce and reproduce social identities- the social construction of t dentity?z2

S cholars, such as S

tuart K aufm

an, have exam ined the role that belligerenr

elites play in encouraging and fostering m ass hostilit¡ and form

ing perceptions about others as the enem

y. Leaclers can stoke the hostility of the m asses and

rouse the security dilem m

a by virtue of the fact that leaders have access to gov- ernm

ent pow er and the m

edia. In this w a¡ leaders' behavior can lead to w

ar.23

W hen elires can m

obilize grolrps by responding to their dem ancls ancl grievances,

such m obilization can leacl to collective action) including engaging in conflict.Z4

M arc H

ow ard R

oss m aintains that groups and leaders sttlize cultural m

etaphors for organtzation and m

obilization.2s Tlris is so because culture provides the link

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 35

becw een indivicluals and collective identit¡ ancl w

hen such idenrity is perceived ro be threatened, leaders can m

obilize grouP s inro action, even violent action.26

H e further notes, "P

ow erful m

etaphors flinked to how the enem

y engages in a particular behavior, for exam

ple] help groLlP S

clefine the threats chey face."Z7 R

elatecll¡ m ytl-rs about one's ow

n ethnic group and other ethnic grouP s

provide elires w ith a m

echanism to enhance their ow

n pow er and can lead to

conflict. S tephen V

an E vera exam

ines three types of chauvinist m ythm

aking: self-glorifying m

yths, self-w hitew

ashing m yths, and other-rnaligning m

yths. S

eif-glorifying m yths are those that focus on a narion's "special virtue and com

- petence, and false claim

s of past beneficence tow ard others." S

elf-w hitew

ashing m

yrhs "incorporate false denial of past w rong-doing against others." O

ther- m

aligning m yths "can incorporate clainis of others' cultural inferiorit¡ false

blam e of others for past crim

es and tragedies, ancl false claim s that others now

harbor m align intentions against rhe nation." A

ll three types m ostly com

e from political elites, as a m

eans to enhance their ow n pow

er as w ell as the pow

er of the group or nation, provide legitim

acy for the elites and the regim e, enable

leaclers "to m otivate sacrifice by their citizens and to justify cruelries againsr

orhers," ancl divert blam e for dom

estic econom ic crisis to enem

ies.2S A

society w

ith a w eak or nonexistent free press or lack of tradition of free speech, as w

ell as lack of free universities that can challenge the nationalist m

ythm akers, is a

society in danger of chauvinist ancl m isleading m

ythm aking.2e

Jam es Fearon and D

avid Laitin fincl in their cases of ethnic violence that political com

perition betw een tl're ethnic m

oclerates ancl extrem ists w

ithin the ethnic group m

otivates leaders "to 'play rhe ethnic card."' P laying the ethnic

card can occur in tw o w

ays. E xtrem

ist leaders or grouP s engage in violence as a

w ^y to com

pel m oclerate leaders ancl groups to strengthen their backing for

m ore extrem

e (and violent) positions. A lternativel¡

a m oclerate leader, fearing a

threat to his or her pow er base, Lltilizes violence as a m

eans of securing supporr from

the extrem ists or the m

asses at large.30 In this w ay, they argue, leaders are

able to construct group identities as m ore hostile and thr-rs trigger "a spiral of

vengeance."31 A s D

avicl Lake ancl D onald R

othchild claim , political entrepre-

neurs, m otivarect by pow

er and political office rather than sLlP P

orting the extrem

ists' view s, "m

ay reflect the polarization of societies and, through their actions, propel this process further."32 M

oclerates find them selves in a vulnera-

ble position, w here tl.rey m

usr m ain¡ain or obtain pow

er at the expense of extrem

ists. These political entrepreneurs assert that conflict w

ith other ethnic groups is possible. In doing so, they focus on the enem

y im ages of other ethnic

grolrps, underm ine healthy public debate, and persuacle m

em bers of their ow

n ethnic group to support them

. The quintessential exam ple is S

lobodan M ilosevic

in Y ugoslavia.33

36 E thnic C

onflrct

E thnic outbidcling occurs w

hen elites, vying for pow er w

ith other elites w ithin

tl-reir ethnic group\appeal to ethnic iclentity as the m ost salient identity issue for

the m asses. D

aniel'B ym

an distinguishes betw een tw

o rypes of elites, political and cultural. P

olirical elites are those leaders w ho are m

ost concerned w ith access to

pow er and decision m

aking, and "m ay or m

ay not care about ethnic issues." C ul-

turai elites are concerned w ith ethnic issues. B

ym an further notes that w

hile there are difFerences betw

een ti-re tw o types of elites, both seek to "enhance their

position against e¡hnic rivals" and tl-rus are concerned w ith advancing rhe

group's status. Further, ethnic elites m ay be induced to encourage conflict, either

because they seek pow er over their rivals or they believe that their cause is just

ancl rigl-rt. D efending and enhancing the group's iclendry provides legitim

acy to rhe ethnic elires.34 A

s nored in chapter 1, social constructivists argue that identi- ties are m

alieable. G iven that, elites attem

pt ro m ake certain idenri¡ies m

ore salient than others, focusing on the iclentities that w

ill invariably strengthen the political position of rhe leaders.3s S

tuart K aufm

an furtl-rer contributes to the cliscussion of ethnic ourbidding by noting tl-rat "[flor outbidding to be possible, elites require political space-i.e., the freedorn to engage in outbidding." In order for outbidding to bc successful, the preconditions for m

ass hostility or the actual existence of m

ass hostility are needed for the m asses to respond to calls frorn

exrrem ists.36 K

aufm an caLrtions rhat belligerent elites and ethnic outbidding are

necessary btit r-rot sufficient conditions for m obilization of the m

asses and thus for ethnic conflict to em

erge: m ass hostiiity ancl the security dilem

m a m

ust also be present.3T S

uch belligerent elites can com e from

the dorninant group or from the suborclinate grollp. \X

/hen the belligerent elites com e from

the dom inant

group, they have the resources of the governm ent at their disposal, creating "eth-

nic hostility and a security dilem m

a." W 'hen the belligerent elites com

e from the

suborclinate grolrp, they "create rival governm ents aim

ed at seceding from or

taking over the state," tl-rereby also provoking ethnic hostility and the security dilem

m a. A

n exam ple of this w

ould be tl-re S erb leaders in C

roatia dem anding to

secede from C

roatia in the early 1990s.38 In the diversionary theor¡ or hypothesis, elites use dom

estic problem s to their

advantage-nanely by engaging in aggressive behavior against other states. B y

diverting attention from troubles at hom

e and tow ard an external actor, elites

can garner support. In their analyses of irredentist ethnic conflict, D avid C

ar- m

ent and P atrick Jam

es found that elires rnay seek to divert such dom estic clis-

cord tow arcl another state, thereby leading to conflict if the elites m

ake clairns on territory w

here the elites' "in-group is perceived to be oppressed."39 A s they fur-

ther contend, "nationalist identities, political sym bols, and ideologies" becom

e crucial tools for elites to influence m

ass feeling as they seek to achieve particular foreign policy goais.a0 Lake and R

othchild rem ark that m

obiiization frequently

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 37

inclucles an irredentist elem ent, w

ith ethnic elites calling for "the reunification of an often nrythical but nonetheless polidcally salient etLrnic hom

eland."41 C

arm enr and Jarnes fincl rhat significant com

petition betw een elites w

ithin the dom

inant ethnic group can lead elites to P ut forw

ard new issues as a m

eans

ro underm ine their rivais and m

aintain P ow

er. A s noted earlieq elites also

a¡tem pt to influence m

ass sentim ent. M

ass sentim ent can act as a constraint on

elires in their efforts to seek policies that are cooperative.42 A s a result of the

em ergence of new

political P arties pushing for a foreign policy that is m

ore antagonistic (inclucling irredentist claim

s on other states), ethnic elites engage in ethnic outbidding, opting fbr aggressive policies as a m

eans of disdnguishing rhem

selves from other m

oclerate elites.43 A

s rhis section clernonstrates, w heth'er through m

anipulating ctem ocratic

freeclom s,44 enclorsing and prom

oting m ythm

aking, or engaging ir-r ethnic out- bidcling, elites can ancl do initiare and supporr ethnic conflicr. A

t the sam e tim

e, elites can also foster cooperation and peace, and the resolution oferhnic conflict, w

hich w e exanrine in the next section.

E lites and R

esolving E thnic C

onflict

E iites can play a role in m

anaging and settling ethnic conflict. In the case oF pow

er-sharing political institutions (that is, consociationalisrn, federalism

), elites m

ust cooperate w ith elites from

other grouP s. In order to be successful at m

anag- ing ethnic tensions and conflicr (rather than m

anipulating dem ocratic freedom

s), such elites, according ro U

lrich S chneckener, m

ust be able to incluce rheir follow -

ers to support peacefurl solutions, contain spoilers and extrem ists (including para-

rnilitaries), ancl put together "form al ancl inform

al coalitior-rs w ith m

oderate forces of the other side." In acldition, elices m

ust abide by the term s of rhe status quo

agreem ent, as w

ell as gLrarantee that all the relevant groLtP S

are able to P articipate

in the negotiations. M anaging ethnic tensions so as to lead to an agreem

ent can also benefir everyone if elites can also look to "positive traditions of m

utual under- stancling from

the pâst."4s S chneckener provicles several exam

ples of successful elite cooperation that reducecl ethnic conflict, including N

orthern Ireland follow -

ing the 1998 G ood Friday A

greem ent (in com

parison to the failecl attem pts at

ending the conflict during the 1970s).a6 H e also adds the im

portance of elites on both sides of a conflict being able "to present them

selves vis-à-vis their follow ers

as'w inners.'

. . . [T]he term s of the agreem

ent m ust help to tLtrn a zero-sum

gam e,

rypical for ethnic conflicts, into a positive-sum gam

e (w in-øin situøtion)."47

O ne strategy involving the role of elites in m

anaging ancl resolving conflict is the co-opcarion of elites by the state. If the leaders of disgruntled ethnic grouP

s can be transform

ecl into supporters of the statLrs quo and peace, rather than a threat to the peace, ethnic conflict can be m

anaged. Through inducem ents

38 E thnic C

onflict

(bribes, jobs, status, pow er), governm

ents can satisfy ethnic elites anct buy them off in order to obtain their support. A

s B ym

an observes, "\X /hen co-optation is

successful, g.i"rr.rrå., such as securit¡ status) or hegem onic concerns m

ay be w

idespread, but the group cannot m obilize effectively because its leaders are

co-opted."48 In term s of concerns abour inter-elite com

petition w ithin ethnic

grolrps, co-optation serves to enhance tl're sranding and P ow

er of the m oderates

at the expense of the extrem ists. M

oclerates are able to gain the support of their com

m unity, w

l-rile extrem ists becom

e m arginalized.4g There is a lim

it to co-optation as a strategy: if the grievances of the ethnic com

m unity are sig-

nificanr enough or the co-optecl elites lose their sratus, co-optation w ill not

succeed in ending the violence.s0 In attem

pcing to end ethnic conflict, how ever, there are alw

ays individuals w

ho m ay not be sarisfied w

ith a peaceful resolution of rhe conflict. S tephenJohn

S tedm

an exam ines ¡he role of "spoilers" in peace negotiations. S

poilers fear that any peace "threatens their pow

er, w orlclvieq and interescs" ancl therefore pro-

m ote the continuecl use of violence in orcler to unclercut rl-re peace negotiations

and possibility for an end ro the conflict.S l S

tedm an's w

ork reveals the irnpor- tance of recognizing the role that spoilers can play in preventing peace from being acl-rieved. H

e provides a typology of spoilers that includes the position of the spoiler (a spoiler "inside" signs an agreem

ent but cloes not com ply w

ith the m

ajor term s of the agreem

ent; an "outsicle" spoiier is not involvecl in the peace negotiations ancl em

ploys violence in orcler to dam age the peace process) as w

ell as the num

ber of spoiiers (the greater the num ber the m

ore clifficulty in achiev- ing the peace process).s2 C

onsequently, m anaging tl-re spoiiers, particularly by

international actors, is needed in orcler to oversee the im plem

entation of peace agreem

ents. P ositive inclucem

ents (sucl-r as providing the m eans to deal w

ith the grievances claim

ed by the spoilers), socialization about the acceptable norm s of

behavior for those parties com m

irtecl to peace and the peace process, and coer- cion (threat or use of punishm

ent to deter spoilers, such as w ithdraw

al of inter- national involvem

ent in the negotiations) are m eans to m

anage spoilers anci prom

ote the peace.s3 Thus for peace negotiations to go forw

ard, both elites and m asses (follow

ers) m

ust bLry into the agreem ent. A

s Frederic P earson notes, "it w

ould appear thât a good balance of elite ancl com

rnunal involvem ent is likely to be necessary for

peace Form ulae to evolve into conflict resolution."54

D O

M E

S TIC

LE V

E L

The fielcl of com parative politics (as w

ell as m any international relations scholars)

exarnines the facrors w ithin states thât can tell us m

uch about particular state

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 39

policies, both inrernal and external. There are form al institutions w

itirin a state, bur also other dom

estic factors such as political parties, incerest groLlP S

, econom ic

sectors and factors, social m ovem

ents, political culture, and other com pering

forces w ithin a state that are useful to expiain stare behavior in general, but also

ethnic conflict w ithin and betw

een states. Thus, an exploration of the dom

estic level of analysis provides a useful tool for understanding ethnic conflict. There are m

any dom estic sources of ethnic

conflict. C onsequentlf, there are m

any dornestic actors and institutions that can am

eliora¡e or exacerbate ethnic conflict. In this section of the chapter w e address

d.om estic level theories to understand the interests, P

ow ers) and organization of

clom estic acrors rhrough a discussion of rational interesr/actor, institutionalist,

andorganizational theories. W e explore the com

plexity of the state and rhe m any

political actors w irhin it. \X

/e then tLLrn to an exam ination of the underlying fac-

tors rhar can lead ro ethnic conflict (that can also diffuse or escalate it). Finally, w

e consider tw o types of states (hegem

onic and neurral) and the clom esric level

responses to ethnic conflict-the oP tions availabie to the state to resolve or at

least m inim

ize ethnic conflict in the state, inch"rding coercive m eciranism

s and national institutional

resP onses, such as federalism

and consociationalism .

D om

estic Level Theorles: /nterests, P ow

ers, and O rganization

A r rhe don-restic levei, tire range of possible actors from

pow erful indivicluals to

nrass popular participation is quite staggering. For exam ple, the term

dom estic

actors can inclucle politicians (elites at the individual level of analysis, discussed above), political parties, inceres¡ grouP

s, or m ass social m

ovem ents' Theories

about these actors take into account their diversity ir-r size and im pact. B

efore tak- ing a look ar som

e very specific factors considerecl to be causes of ethnic conflict, w

e presenr the general theories developed by scholars about political actors in general.

Ir is essenrial to note chat theories of dom estic actors tend ro highlight three

very im portant aspects: their interesrs, their pow

ers, and their organization. E ach

actor iras a set of interests, com m

only referred to as his or her distribution of preferences am

ong alternatives. In other w ords, w

hen presentecl w ith a choice

betw een tw

o or m ore separate alternatives (be they policies, candidates, actions,

or w hatever) actors have one that they prefer m

ore than the otirers, one that they like the leasr. A

ll orher possible alternatives are ranked som ew

here betw een the

m ost preferred and rhe leasr preferrecl.ss D

ifferent actors m ay have very different

interests. A s an exam

ple, the P rotestanf com

m unity in N

orthern Ireland gener- ally believes that rule by the B

ritish is preferable to rule by the R epublic of Ire-

land. The inreresrs of the C arholic com

m unity have typtcally been opposite that

of the P rotestant com

m llnit¡ preferring to unite w

ith the R epublic of lreland.

40 E

thnic C onflict

S om

etim es actors have sim

ilar or corlrlrron interesfs, as w hen tw

o or m ore

groups see benefits ir-r a single policy or action. This m ay occur w

hen nllm erolls

m inority groLlps allseek the sarne change in how

a governm enr operates. A

goocl exam

ple w ould be a num

ber of m inority groLÌps pressing for an expansion of civil

liberties to protect each of them from

the don-rinant group.s6 E

ach actor also has a set of pow ers, or in other w

ords, a clisrribution of resources that he or she can use to achieve his or her goals. G

roups vary grearly in their ow

nership of pow ers. The clisrribution of pow

ers is usually rhe proclucr of broad social processes. These processes rnay be long-rerm

societal cl-ranges (for exam

ple, m odernization or inclustrialization of the econorny) or short-term

upheavals (for exam ple, a political revolurion). P

ow ers are ofren not equally dis-

tributed am ong the actors, or even am

ong rhe clifferent aspecrs of the societ¡ w

ith som e actors having significanr econom

ic pow er but litrle m

ilitaryfviolent pow

er, political pow er, or alm

osr any possible com bina¡ion.sz A

n exam ple w

ould be the chinese in M

alaysia w ho possess a great cleal of rhe econom

ic w ealth of

rhe countr¡ w hile the M

alays rnain¡ain m osr of rhe political conrrol ancl occupy

the politicai offices. The third factor is. organizarion. G

roups organize in a w ay rhat besr suits their

interests ancl pow ers. The com

m on organrzational expression of the ethnic group is

the political party. P olirical parties exisr m

ainþ ro conresr elecrions, They do so by organizíng rhe opinions, values, ideologies, and policy desires of rhe cirizens inro a coherenr political organization.s8 P

olitical parties are organizarions rhat provide candidates to serve in governm

ent. In the case of dernocracies, political parries pres- ent the electorate w

ith a list of candiclates w ith party plarform

s. P olirical parries also

allow for political pow

er to alternate as leaders from different polirical parries run

for, and w in, election. This m

eans that political parties are crucial for dem ocracies

to w ork. \xzhile political parries play a particularly im

porranr role in dem ocracies,

political parties are also founcl in nondem ocracies as w

ell.s9 Im

portantl¡ parties that represent ethnic com m

uni¡ies translate ethnic dem

ands into the electoral arena. E lecrions are a defining m

om enr in all societ-

ies: in a developed society they signal the conrinuation of au.thoriry or its rransfer from

one group to another; in a cleveloping society rirey can signal progress tow

ard greater dem ocracy or a srep backw

ards.60 Thus, the role of erhnic polirical parties is the key to undersranding rhe w

ay erhnic conflict is m anaged in a soci-

ery. Tim othy S

isk srares rhar w hen elecroral instirurions prom

ore cencrisr, coop- erative politics am

ong com pering erhnic grolrps, the political parries w

ill w ork ro

reduce conflict. H e labels this "centriperalism

" because the iclea is ro ger parries to find. a coûìm

on center. Therefore, an interacrion exisrs betw een polidcal par-

ries, their actions, and electoral institutions.dl such interactions and cornplex relationships are exam

ined ar rhe dom esric level of analysis. \X

/e acldress rhe role

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 41

of institutions ir-r shaping rhe actions of dornestic actors in m ore cletail later in

rhe chaP ter.

In essence, the organízation of a political party seeks to w in elections ancl

control governm ent. H

ow ever, political P

arties are not the only organizational expression for ethnic groLtps. P

aram ilitary organizations (or guerilla arm

ies) also

exist. These grolrps operate outsicle tl-re acceptable dernocratic or constitlltional fram

ew ork. P

aram ilitaries pursue an arm

ed resistance against the dom inant efh-

nic group andf or the state. They use violent m eans (for exam

ple, assassination, terrorism

, bom bings) ro achieve their political goals. E

xam ples of param

ilitary grorlps include rhe Irish R

epublican A rm

y (IR A

) in N orrhern Ireland and the

Tam il Tigers in S

ri Lanka. Interest groups, "social or political groirps rhat represent the interests oftheir

constituents," can take part in the political P rocess and thereby influence the

political and econom ic arenas w

ithin a state.62 S ocial m

ovem ents are form

ed w

hen people do not believe ¡hat the stare or other clom estic actors (nam

ely inter- esr grollps or political parties) have at¡encled to their interests satisfactorily and r,rnclerrake collective action.63 E

xam ples of social m

ovem enrs include labor m

ove-

n-ìents, P eace m

ovem ents, w

om en's m

oventents, ancl, of course, ethnic grouP s

m obilized to prom

ote their interests. Interests) pow

ers, and organization of any clom estic actor are constrained by the

"rules of the gam e" in the relevant poliry. These rules are set by the constitution,

law s, contracts, treaties, andfor rhe courcs. The rules lim

it the range of possible actions and proscribe the punishm

ent for refusing to com ply. For exam

ple, the constitlltion of G

erm any forbicls anyone from

organizing a political party w ith a

fascist or com m

unist icleology. Thus, even if a clom es¡ic actor had an interest in

starting such a political parq\ ú1ey couid only do so by breaking rhe rules, and tl-ren w

ould be subject to punishm ent (w

hich in this instance is incarceration). \X

/hat rheories can accoltnt for how the interests) P

ow ers, and organization of

dom estic actors behave? This section exam

ines three theories (rational inrerest/ actor, institutionai, and organization theories) of the behavior and actions of political actors in general.

R ationat C

hoice/lnterest fheories. R ational choice theories of political participa-

tion are based on an econom ic m

odel. K enneth A

rrow began the rational choice

school of political thought w ith his sem

inal w ork exam

ining decision m aking and

the rules usecl ro arrive at a collective clecision. H is econon-ric m

odel em phasizes

rhe ability of indiviclual decision-m akers to w

eigl-r the alternatives and select the option having m

a-xirnum urtility.6a A

nthony D ow

ns goes one step further and clevelops an econom

ic m odel to explain a citizen's rationale for casting a vote in

an election. In short, a cttizen w oulcl becom

e a voter if the value of casting a vote

42 E

thnrc C onflict

exceeded the costs involved. Tl-re value w as the difference be¡w

een the favored candidate ancl other candidates rnr"rltiplied by the likelihood of that voce m

aking a difference ", ,o *to w

ins.65 B orh of ihese founding w

orks of the rarional choice school have a m

odel of a person as a rarional, selÊ interested calculator. In other

w ords, hum

ans pursue their best interests: they take actions that m axirrrize gains

and m inim

ize losses. M

ancur O lson builds on rational choice rheory ro exam

ine an em pirical para-

dox: coilective action. C ollective action is action by a group of m

an¡ w hich often

does not occur even though a clear rational interest exists for such action. \picaLIy this paradox occurs because the cost ofthe action is borne by each individual but the benefit of the action is shared collecrively. For exam

ple, supporrers of dem oc-

racy in an authoritarian state m ay w

ânt to change the system . B

ut ro do so they w

ould have to m arch, rall¡ ancl protesr w

hile being observed and possibly rerali- atecl against by the oppressive stare regim

e. D ernocracy is a collecrive good that

they w ould all share if it cam

e to exisr, but none w ould receive an individual, tan-

gible benefit. H ow

ever, on the parr of those proresters w ho are jalled, bearen, or

killed, a very individual cost is paid. In orher w orcls, "[r]hough all of rhe m

em bers

of the group . . . havp a com ûron interest in obtaining this collective benefir, they

have no com m

on interest in paying the cost of providing thar collecrive good."66 C

ollecdve action lies at the hearr of ethnic conflicr. E rhnicities rypically orga-

nize into grollps ofvarious sizes anct functions in w hich a com

lnon identiry links to com

m on interests. \X

/e also know from

l-ristory rhat ethnic groups do incleed P

ress their dem ancts and take collective action. O

lson challenges rhe rarional interest rheories to explain how

this collective action w oulcl occur. H

e arglles that srnall groups can approxim

ate rhe rational actor rroclel because a sm all portion

of tire group can collect enough benefits ro provide rhe com m

on benefir for the w

hole group. A typical exam

ple rnight be a sm all erhnic polirical parry rhar cam

- paigns For the larger political interesrs. The leaders of the parry w

ould obtain benefits from

holding office, such as building careers (as w oulcl be seen ar the

individr"ral level of analysis). B ur olson argues that large groups are less likely

than sm all grollps to act coherenrly in pursuing rheir interesrs.6T

Thus, explaining m ass erhnic group m

obiltzation and acrion appears nor ro be possible w

ith just rational interest theories. "selective incentives" can "coerce" inclividuals into w

orking for the inreresrs of rhe group. In particular, olson high- ligl-rts the role of social sancrions ancl social rew

ards. w irhin erhnic groups, social

status ancl social acceptance are im portanr qualities. H

e states that "[i]t is in the nature of social incentives thar they can distinguish am

ong individuals: rhe recal- citrant individual can be ostracized," and those w

ho cooperate can be rew ard-

ed.68 This occurs in m any insrances of ethnic group"acrion, and it is very rypical

of m ass m

obilization. For exam ple, the erhnic m

obilization in R w

anda and

Levels of A nalysis and Fthnic C

onflict 43

B urundi relied heavily on social acceptance. M

em bers of each ethnic com

tnunity joined the killing m

obs, nor necessarily out of blooct lust, but m ore so that they

w ould not be ostracizecl by their ow

n ethnic com m

unity. The m

ain contribution of O lson's w

ork is to show the lim

its of rational inter- esr ancl actor theories. Im

portantly for the study of ethnic conflicr, it points out that rhe social context shapes the behavior of individuals and groups. Thus, it forces us to think about factors other than interest, pow

er, andorganízation and how

chese other facrors m ight influence individual and collective action.

The /V ew

lnstitutional S choo/. The N

ew Institutional S

chool adds the concept of institutions as actors to the rational interest theories. Jam

es M arch and Johan

O lsen argue that political institutions plây an autonom

ous role ancl thus should be the subject of acaclernic stucly: "P

olicical dem ocracy clepends nor only on eco-

nom ic ancl social conditions buc also on the design of political institr-ttions. . .

.

They are political actors in their ow n righ¡."69 Institutions interact w

ith hum an

acrions and social contexts. M arch and O

lsen assert that "fi]nstitutions seem to

be neither neutral reflections ofexogenous environm ental forces nor neutral are-

nas for the perform ances of inclividuais."T0 Their argum

ent is that institutions orcler social and poiitical interaction: the "organization of political life m

akes a difference."Tr

Institutions, as actors) have the ability to veto the actions ofothers, and thus m

aintain the status quo. G eorge Tsebelis develops the idea of the "V

eto P layers,"

or rhe "certain num ber of individual or collective actors [w

llo] have to agree to the proposed change."72In other w

ords, these actors can check any possible agreem ent

or policy change. The irnpiication for ethnic conflict is that if one group secures all the veto player positions it can block any change to a m

ore open, dem ocratic

society. For exam ple, the ruling W

hite governm ent in S

outh A frica during A

part- heid controilecl all the governing institutions, including the executive, legislature, and judiciar¡ and thus colrld prevent the m

inoriry B lack population from

effect- ing any change. Tl-ris concept of the veto player helps us understancl the frustration of n-rinority groups w

ho com plain that their calls for justice and equiry go

unheeded ancl that change is im possible. It also highlighrs how

control over insri- tutions can be tantam

ount to control over policy. C ontrol over policy leads to

control over ethnic conflict m anagem

ent/resolution andf or the lack of it.

O rganizational Theories. S

tate institutions that form ulare and execute policies

include rhe execurive, legislative, and judicial institutions that exist in m ost states.

The executive m ay be headed by a president or prim

e m inis¡er, or a m

onarch. A state m

ay be a parliarnentary system or presidential system

. The legislature m ay

have separate bodies such as the H ouse of R

epresentatives and S enate in the U

.S .

44 E

thnic C onflict

C ongress, or the H

ouse oF Lorcls ancl H ouse oF C

om m

ons in P arliar-nenr in the

U nited K

ingclom . S

tates also have a courr sysrem , or jucliciar¡ as w

ell as an adm in-

istrative bureaucracj, ancl m ilitary. Im

portantþ given thar srare instirutions differ in lrow

they are organized, "these clifferences have a pow erful irnpacr on polidcal

and social lìfe."73 O

rganizational theories em phasize the role of interacrion berw

een the parrs of a dom

estic actor. In other w orcls, these theories look at sucl-r things as how

the governm

ental adm inistration operates, the type of bureaucraric proceclures that

are follow ed, the w

ay decisions are m acle, and w

ho parricipares in decisions. O

rganizational theories em phasize that governm

ental actors w ill pursue their

interests as best they can given their orgam zational strengths and w

eaknesses. For exam

ple, a dom estic police unit typrcally is charged w

irh dom estic security.

Its m ain tool to accom

plish tl-ris goal is violent force as legirim ized by rhe srare,

and it w ill rely on its stanclard operaring procedr-rres and rradirional form

s of force to achieve its encls.Ta

G overnm

ent agencies and organizations act in w ays unlike other organizecl,

dom estic interests. This difference is clue ro the role of governm

ent as m anager

of the state. G overnm

ent actors operate w ithin a fram

ew ork of three cornpering

interests: the interesrs of the inclividLlal actors w ithin the organization, rhe inter-

ests of the organization, and rhe interesrs of the state. \X /hen these interests

coincide, governm ental acrors can be surprisingly effective and efficient. H

ow -

ever, w hen these interests do not coincicle, governm

ental actors m ay not only be

inefficient, but m ay also w

ork at cross-purposes from other governrnental actors

w ho are supposediy attem

pting to w ork row

arcl a com m

oll purpose.T.s S

uch general theories of dom esric politics are useful in helping us ro under-

stand the role ancl im portance of dornestic level factors ro account for the behav-

ior and actions of actors w itl-rin the state. M

oreover, these theories provide valuable insights into the dom

escic level factors that conrribute ro rhe outbreak of conflict w

ithin states. It is to these factors thar w e now

turn.

D om

estic Level C auses of E

thnic C onflict: W

hy They Fight A

s steven Lobell and P hilip M

auceri srare, "B y rrearing rhe srare as a unirary acror

that pursues national interests and international relations as rhe interaction of sovereign states) m

any internationai relations theorists ignore the dom estic

political environm ents that characterize m

ost clividecl states."76 D om

estic factors m

atter in understanding ethnic relations w ithin stares that can contribure to

conFlict. M ilton E

sm an notes that ethr-ric pluralism

can leacl to ethnic confItct.TT O

nly w hen tw

o or m ore ethnic groups occupy rhe "sam

e political space" does the potential for conflict arise.78 C

onsequenrl¡ how cloes one determ

ine w hy and

w hen e¡hnic groups w

ill fight? S cirolars have encleavored to carego ríze the facrors,

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 45

,,ciassified as political, econom ic, ancl cultural," rhat account for ethnic conflict.T9

\X /eak political institutions,sO

polirical and econom ic stratification leading to

serious divisions w ithin a society, deteriorating econom

ic conditions,S l as w

ell as frustration From

unm et expectations8z can lead ethnic groups and states to

eîgage in aggressive behavior both internally and externally as a m eans to im

prove econom

ic ancl political circum stances.s3

In an assessm ent of the literature on internal conflict, M

ichael E . B

row n sets

our four key caregories of factors that indicate the predisposition for violence: structural factors; political factors; econom

ic/social factors; and cultural fpetcep'

tual factors."84 There are three structural factors that he notes scholars have addressecl: "w

eak states; intra-state security concerns [ethnic security dilem m

as]; and ethnic geography."ss

'

W eak state strLlctLrres often result from

governm ent corruption and inepti-

tude. W eakened state structures m

ake for a m ore perrnissive atm

osphere for conflict to em

erge betw een groups. Leaders m

ay be engaged in pow er struggles,

extensive hum an righrs abuses occur, fhere is less ability to control borders, ancl

ethnic groups begin to push for their dem ands and com

pete w ith each other for

fesoLlrces. C onsequentl¡ a w

eak state is r¡nable to respond effectively to rheir dem

ands, w ith conflict the likely resulr. O

ne can see this in the years follow ing

the S oviet w

ithdraw al from

A fghanistan in 1985 and the ernergence of internal

conflict betw een com

peting groups. The w eak central governm

ent could not effectiveiy respond and end the fighting.s6

In rerrns of intrastate security concerns, as long as the in-group view s the out-

group in negative term s (enem

y im age) and perceives a threat to its ow

n identic¡ tirere w

ill be a lack of trust betw een the groups. M

istrust reinforces the negative perceptions each group has of the other, especially tl-re perception of hostile intentions, and thus each group m

ay be inclined to threaten the otheq leading to counterthreats and a spiral oF escalation of the conflict. This cycle of m

istrust and perception oF hostiie intentions results in the security dilem

m a, a concept

found in rhe inrernarional relations iiterature w ichin political science. In essence,

w hen states ¡ake action to increase their ow

n securit¡ other states feel less secure ancl then take actions to increase their security in turn. In the end, all are less secure.87 The security clilem

m a can also apply to ethnic and nationalist groups,

as noted in chapter 1. W hen one grollp threatens another, tl-re com

petition fuels the m

utual m istrust that further aggravates the already tense relationship (this

becom es even m

ore of an issue w hen the state is w

eak ancl unable to m ediate

betw een ethnic groups). R

ather ti-ran backing dow n in the face of threats, the

other group m ay react w

ith counterthreats, thereby producing a spiral of con- flict. For exam

ple, in the few short years leading to the breakup of Y

ugoslavia, acrions by both S

erbs and C roats reinForcecl the m

istrust both sides had of the

46 E thnic C

onflict

other and threats to each other's identity. A s noted by B

arry P osen, policies

undertaken by the C roatian governm

ent fueled the threats perceived by the S erbs

living in the republìc. For exam ple, the C

roatian governm ent

askecl S erbs to take

an oath of loyalry, and replaced S erbian police w

ith C roats. The S

erb m inority's

perception of the likelihoocl of further threats in the future lecl them to consider

offensive actions againsr C roats.88

M oreover, the securiry dilem

m a and concom

itant m istrust can lead to group

conflict if one group is dom inant over another, as is the case in N

orthern Ireland, w

here the P rotesrants are rhe m

ajoriry ancl dom inate in the areas of the police

forces, professional services, governrnent services, nonm anual labor, ancl overall

em ploym

ent. The disproportional clom inance of P

rotesrants in these various areas has lecl to long-term

inequality ancl tensions w ith C

atholics. The out-group, or m

inoriry (in this case, Irish C atl-rolics), m

ay perceive itself as having no recoLlrse to address its com

plaints, furrhering the conflict betw een the groups.89

Trying to overcom e the security clilem

m a is crucial to resolving conflicts,

including nationalist and ethnic ones. R eclucing the securicy dilem

m a involves

establishing rrust, credible com m

itm ents, and a cl-rangecl im

age of the enem y. If

groups m aintain m

iqtrust resulting fron-r the security dilem m

a, they are unlikely to be able to reach agreem

ent in orcler ro resolve their clifferences. C onversel¡

m utual trust rnakes it possible For groups and sta¡es to negotiate agreem

enrs ancl increase cooperation. O

nly over tim e can a group establisl-r a repuration for being

trustw or¡hy, particularly by fr-rlfilling its obligatior-rs.e0

The last structural factor no¡ecl by B row

n is ethnic geography. H e asserrs that

"states w ith ethnic m

inorities are m ore prone to conflict than others, and certain

kincls of erhnic dem ographics are m

ore problernatic rhan orhers."91 E thnic

m inoriry groLlps are either interm

inglecl w ith each other or live in their ow

n regions w

ithin a state. In both cases, confiict can erLlpt (secessionist dem ands for

those living in their ow n regions, for exam

ple). S choiars repeatedly note the eth-

nic conflicts that em erged in the afterm

ath of the colonial period in A frica.

W hen the arbitrary borders of the coionial entities w

ere establishecl, the new ly

independent states had to contend w ith the various ethnic clivisions w

ithin their territorial boundaries. S

ignificant num bers of ethnic groups live in the m

ajority of A

frican states. The problem is that m

any of rhese groups are long-rim e ene-

m ies, fueling the possibility of conflict.e2 The political factors that B

row n cleals w

ith inclucle "cliscrim inatory political

institutions; exclusionary national icleologies; inter-group politics; and elite politics."93 A

t the end of the da¡ political issues are about the control ancl starus of territory-and w

hich ethnic gror-rp has control of the srate insriturions.94 W

hen the political institutions of a state favor one group over anorher (rhrough restrictions on the abiliry to vote in elections or rlln for public office),9s in other

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflìct 47

w orcls a hegem

onic state,96 the out-group is likely to feel resentm ent and seek to

change rhe discrim inatory insritutions. The legitim

acy oFa state's institutions is inportant for reducing the chances of ethnic conflict erupting. S

econcl, in addi- rion to the effects of discrim

inatory policical institutions, w hen a state is defined

by ethnic nationalism , rather than civic nationalism

, ethnic conFlict is m ore

likely to occttr.97 W ith ethnic nationalism

, certain ethnic grouP s are included,

ancl others are excludec{. In civic narionalistn, all people are given the sam e rights

regardless of ethnic identity. O ne finds m

ost dem ocracies prom

oting civic nationalism

and thus lessening the potential for conflict betw een groups'98

The third political factor B row

n acldresses is intergroup politics: "C onflict is

especially likely if objectives are incornpatible, grouP s are strong and determ

ined, action is feasible, sLrccess is possible, ancl if inter-groLlP

com parisons lead to com

- perition, anxiety, and fears ofbeing clom

inatecl." C hanges in rhe balance of pow

er berw

een erhnic groups can leacl to instabilit¡ and increase the possibility of con- f1ict.99 The em

ergence of w ar in Y

ugoslavia resulted in m any w

ays from fears of

rhe shift in pow er from

Y ugoslavia's fecleral governm

ent, w hich w

as dom inated

by S erbs, to the various republics, such as S

lovenia and C roatia. The shift in

pow er m

eant a change in the echnic balance of pow er in the scate as a w

hole and eventually lecl to w

ar w hen S

lovenia ancl C roatia sought to sececle in orcler to

ensure their securiry and protect them selves from

S erb dom

ination.lO 0

The fourth polidcal fac¡or B row

n discusses is elite polirics-the im portance

of politicians w ho take aclvantage of the instability in a society by exploiting

erhnic sentim enrs.lO

l \X

/e aclclressecl elite politics, nam ely the elites them

selves, in the indiviclual level of analysis section, w

hich stresses the instrum entalist

explanation for ethnic conflict: elites use ethnicity as a m eans to m

aintain or gain pow

er. E

conom ic and social factors encom

pass "econom ic problem

s" (such as the transition to a m

arket econom y that m

any of the states of tl're form er S

oviet bloc have experienced), "discrim

inatory econom ic system

s," w hich can lead to resent-

m ent if one ethnic group is favored over another, and finall¡ "econom

ic develop- m

ent and m odernization"

(as discussecl in chapter 1 on m odernizatron theories)

in w hich econom

ic and political expectations increase, w hich the state is often

not able to m eet.102 D

isputes betw een ethnic groups revolve around access to jobs

in the governm ent. D

isputes m ay also result from

rights related to em ploym

ent in the private sector, rights "that m

ay be regulatecl by rules im posed by the

.¡",..>r103 These econom ic and social factors, in w

hicl-r inequities betw een ethnic

groups are prevalent, can lead to conflict. The inequality in access to econom ic

resources is one of the causes of the conflict in N orthern Ireland betw

een P rot-

estants and C atholics. P

rotestants rem ain dom

inant in higher paying jobs, em

ploym ent in the police forces, ancl so forth, relative to C

atholics.

48 E thnic C

onflict

Finall¡ cultural discrim ination against m

inoriry ethnic groups can serve as a trigger for conflict. For exam

ple, certain ethnic groups m ay be given preference

for educationai opportunities over another group.104 E thnic conflicts are often

the result of conflict over language and religion-w hich

language, w hich religion

is ¡l-re dom inant one in a society.los In essence, such conflicts arise due to the

"struggle over relative status and position in society."106 For exam ple, in C

anada there have been perioclic calls for Q

uebec to secede. In large part these tensions are rooted in the division betw

een E nglish-speakers and French-speakers. In

1969 these tensions lecl the federal governm ent to recognize both as tire official

languages of the country. Lnportantl¡ each province is also able to endorse lan-

guage policies w itl-r regard to issues thar fall under rhe aurhority of the provin-

cial governm ents. A

s a result, French is the official language of Q uebec, w

hile E

nglish is the official language in m ost of the other provinces.107

In acidition to cultural factors, B row

n aiso notes the im portance of perceptual

factors. B y this he m

eans the "group histories and group perceptions of them -

selves ancl others."l08 W hile there is definitely hisrorical evidence of certain

groups having legitim ate grievances about past treatm

ent (relatecl to ¡he "ancient iratreds" argum

ent),€youps also "w hitew

ash ancl gloriÇ their ow

n histories, and they often dem

onize their neighbors, rivals, and adversarl.r.r'109 A s noted by V

an E

vera, in the case of the Form er Y

ugoslavia, C roatian politicians w

hitew ashecl the

actions of the C roatian U

stashe, w ho had rnurclered significant num

bers of S erbs

cluring \X /orld \X

/ar II. These actions only reinforced S erbs' perception of insecu-

rity vis-à-vis the C roats, contributing to S

erb hostility that played a significant role in tl-re outbreak of the w

ar betw een S

erbia and C roatia rn 199l-1992.110 a¡t.

perceptions groups have of them selves (usually favorable) and oF others (enem

y im

ages) can be selÊ Fulfilling prophecies and lead to conflict.

These cultural and perceptr-ral factors are, in essence, about identity. \X /hile

resource issues are sources of conflict, scholars increasingly note the im portance

of intangible factors, such as iclentit¡ as sources of conflict. This does not m ean

that resource issues and idendry issues are m utually exciusive as causes of

conFlict-rather, "bargaining over those [resource] issues w ithout prior and

adequate attention first to iclentity issues has the effect of further polarizing the parties" to conflict.111

A s noted in chapter 1, social idenrity theory provides the link betw

een pri- m

ordial sentim ents and the social construction of identiry. O

riginared by H enri

Tajfel, social identity theory assercs that "hum ans define them

selves, as w

ell as others, largely in term

s of rhe social groups to w hich they belong." In iclentifying

w ith a grollp, individuals also distinguisl-r them

selves from those in otirer

groups. W eldon notes that the social groups to w

hich individuals belong endure because sr-rcl-r groups "are also the prim

ary vehicles for childhooci and cultural

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 49

socialization," m olding people's view

s of the w orld.112 S

ocial identity theory links to an individual's psychological need to belong to a group' M

oreover, belonging to a group (group idenriry) enhances an inclividual's selÊ

esteem , espe-

cially if people beiieve not only that their group is different but that those dif- ferences indicate that their group is better than the other groups.113 The collective self-esteem

that com es From

positive feelings about one's ow n group

necessitates the (negative) com parison to an out-group.114

Im portantl¡ in-group identity and social categorization can leacl to discrim

- ination against other groups. The lack of tolerance for m

inority groups (and discrim

ination against rhem ) results) as recent research show

s, from "strong

ingroup iclentities, low self-esteetn, and perceptions of threar."1ls N

egative per- cep¡ions of the enem

y (out-group) and'm utual distrust fuel tl-re P

erceP tion of

ti-rreat and can leacl to conflict betw een groups. Jeff S

pinner-H alev and E

liza- berh Theiss-M

orse observe that if an in-group believes that the natural hostility of the out-group is causing the conflict, rhe in-group m

ay steP up its aggres-

sive actions preem ptively as a m

eans to gain perceivecl control of the situarion ar hanci.116

E sm

an acldresses psychological (perceptual) factors that contribute to ethnic conflict. H

ow ever, he argues that rhe underlying causes of conflict are "disputes

over real issues such as relative pow er (politics), m

aterial resources (econom ics)'

or respect (culture)."117 W hat one often observes in cases of erhnic conflict is that

w hen the conflict is underw

a¡ concerns about security and status becom e con-

necred. S ecurity fears that com

e from real violence tend to bolster rhe fear of

culrural extinction of the group.118 Lake and R othchild declare that the m

ost com

m on cause of ethnic conflict is "collective fears of the future." There are tw

o rypes of fears oF the future. O

ne involves the fear oF "assim ilation into a dom

i- nant culture and heger-nonic state." The other involves the "fear for their physical safety and survival."ll9 G

roups experience physical insecurit¡ w hich is com

- pouncled by inforrnarion failures (inform

ation abour other groups' intentions and capabilities), problem

s of credible com m

itm ent by the governm

ent to pro- tect the groups, and the security dilen-rm

a (inducing one grouP to preem

P rively

use force against the threatening group). The inform ation fäilures, security

dilem m

a, and problem s of creclible com

m itm

ents by the governm ent w

eaken the state, and the stare is no longer able to m

ecliate betw een groLlP

s. A w

eakened state is even less able to "provicle creclible glrârantees of protection for groups." The [ear groups perceive (either real or im

agined) is exacerbatecl. In the end, Lake and R

othchild conclude, these three strategic dilem m

as lead to conflicc.120 In support of the argum

ent that tangible issues are sources of conFlict, a recent study by C

iayron P eoples found that the relationship betw

een political discrim i-

narion against m inorities and the likelihood of interethnic violence w

as quite

50 E thnic C

onflict

strong. W hile the relationship betw

een econom ic and cultural discrim

ination ancl

interethnic violence w as not statisfically significant, he argues that these other

rypes of discrim inition nonetheless m

ay have an effèct on interethnic violence because of exisring political discrim

ir-ration. G roups facing political discrim

ina- tion are unlikeiy to be able to overcom

e otl-rer types of discrim inatiotr.l2l

The above discussion of the clom estic level inclicates that the factors that

accollnt for the em ergence of ethnic conflict are variecl. W

'hat m atters is cleter-

m ining w

hich factors are relevant for a particular ethnic conFlict. From there, one

can determ ine w

hich responses to ethnic conflict m ay be m

ore successful, and w

hich are likely to fail. W e explore the clornestic level responses to ethnic violence

in the next section.

D om

estic Leve/ R esponses to V

iolence: The S tate and lnstitutions

Inherent in this discussion of dom estic level theories and factors that can leacl to

ethnic conflicr is how the sociopolitical context creates interescs, pow

er, and orga- nization of ethnic actors. The clifferent theories and factors point to different reasons for ethnic conflict, but all identify ethnic actors as agents of tl-re conflict. A

num ber of the abo¡e theories establish that once political actors are m

obilized, new

interests are created and new dem

ancls occur that m ay alter the unclerþng

distriburion of resources. Therefore, once ethnic conflict is initiatecl the acrors m

ay cteate the conditions necessary to perpetllate the conflict, w hether purpose-

fully or unintentionall¡ regarclless of tire original cause. This claim of agency,

m oreover, is an irnporrant one in the eventual resolurion of ethnic conflict, for

addressing the problem m

eans not only assessing the root cause but also m odify-

ing the ac¡ions of the actors. R esolving internal conflict is difficult. The political

and econom ic system

s are w eak or nonexistent. C

ivil society needs to be rebuilr. W

arring parties fincl ir difficult to give up their w eapons. Trust m

ust be estab- lished, w

hich is difficult w hen people have w

itnessed horrific acts of bloodshed andm

ay w ant revenge instead.122

G overnm

ents m ay respond to dom

estic ethnic tensions and conflicts by granting m

inority rights, territorial alltol1olny) and fecleralism as w

ell as by set- ting up consociational structures in w

hich ethnic groups are given representa- tion in the policy-m

aking arena. G overnm

ents m

ay also responcl by engaging in coercion ancl repression against ethnic groups.123 The governm

encal response to violence is predicated on w

hether the goal of tl-re governm ent is conflict m

an- agem

ent or conflict settlem ent. A

ccording to A dam

P rzew

orski, conflict m an-

agem ent is processing and reclucing the severity of ethnic conFlict. This is

usually a short-term approach to allow

for a change in conditions that m ay

m ake a lasting peace m

ore possible. A s such, the conllict m

anagem ent approach

recognizes thar ethnic conflict is inherent in m ulticultural societies and thar it

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 51

rf\ay not be possible to elim inate it. \X

/hen ethnic conflict occurs it is m ecliated

ancl a solution to the current problem is form

ulated ancl im plem

enred.r24 B

arbara H arff and Ted G

urr proffer three dornestic ievel principies ro m anage

erhnic conflict. First, the rights of m inorities should be recognized and prom

oted by both the state and civil sociery. The recognition and prom

otion of the rights of rrrinori¡ies m

eans that "groups should be free from discrim

ination based on race,

narional origin, language, or religion." M oreover, m

inoriry grouP s should aiso

have the righr "to organize and act politically." The ability to organize and act in rhe political sphere m

eans that groups can ensure their gror-rp interests.12s S ec-

ond, to protect m inoriry rights, instirutions should borh be clem

ocratic and involve pow

er sharing. D em

ocratic political system s enable organrzed m

inorities ro Lrse the party system

as w ell as interest grouP

s in order to influence the policy decisions that m

atter ro the grouP . In addition, in dem

ocratic system s rhe peace-

ful resolution of conflicrs is accepted and expected. Leaders of m inoriry groups

are expecred to espouse m oderate, rather than extrelne, political goals, ancl to use

nonviolence in achieving them .I26 Third, w

hen conflicts involve issues of selÊ determ

ination, "negotiations For autonom y w

ithin existing states," rather than secession and inclependence, provide the best solution. R

egional aLltonom y, or

federalism , provicles for protection of group rights and increasecl access to cleci-

sior-r m aking at the local and regional level, ar-rd even at the central governm

ent 1evel.r27 W

e exam ine rhese different responses in m

ore detail later in this section. C

onflict settlem ent goes further than conflict lrranagentent. S

tefan \X /olff

defines conflict sem lem

enr as aim ing at establishing an institutional structure

thar provides a venue for ethnic groups to have their grievances heard and addressed such rhat groups w

ill Find it in their interesr to P tlrsue com

prom ise

rather than violence as a m eans to achieve their goals'128 In the end, how

ever, as E

sm an cautions, ethnic-based differences afe vety rarely "settled or resolved"

w hen groups rem

ain "under the sam e poiitical roof." \X

/ithout seP aration, the

likelihood of new grievances em

erging is high. A s a result, at best the hope is that

the m anagem

ent and regulation of future grievances is possible and acceptable to the various groups involved. In this w

ay, the m aintenance of peace is ensured,

ancl ethnic differences can be m ínttnized.rzg

S tate R

esponses to E thnic C

onftict. A state's response to ethnic conflict depends

on w hether the state hopes to m

anage the situation to the degree that outright violence and conflict is unlikely-or to achieve a stable ancl long-lasting setclem

ent of rhe ethnic conflict. The clifficulty in regarcl to ethnic conflict is that govern- m

ental actors and their actions vaty gteatly. Ilan P eleg provides a useful distinc-

rion betw een rhe neutral state that seeks to regulate conflict w

ithin its sovereignry ancl the hegem

onic stare that prom otes tl-re interests of the don-rinant ethnic

52 tthnic C onflict

group. The role of governm ental actors is very different in chese tw

o types of states, although the actors are not.130 M

oreover, the responses to ethnic conflict by these tw

o types tf states differ. In a hegem

onic state, governm ental actors are not neutral; instead, they favor

and prom ote the rights of one ethnic group over the others. For exam

ple, during A

partheicl in S outh A

frica, the conrts enforcecl a num ber of law

s that w ere

intended to strip rights aw ay From

B lack S

outh A fricans. O

ne of these law s, the

N ative A

cts of 1956, rem ovecl the right of appeal from

B lacks w

ho w ere forced

from their lancls.l3l

O f course, w

hen thc lregem onic s¡ate is nondem

ocratic, ¡he role o[ govern- m

ental actors in ethnic conflicc is greatly increasecl. \)Tithou¡ a legitim ate check

on their use of force (since autl-rori¡arian leaders are not accountable to the elec- torate ancl cannot be voted out of office for r-rnpopular policies), governm

ental actors can effectively create aircfor exacerbate ethnic conflict. "D

eatl-r S quads"

are a particularly horrenclous exam ple. Typically com

prised of a srnall group of soldiers andf or police, cleath squacls com

m it killings, coercion, rorture, ancl

extortion against the enem ies of the state. The governm

ent clenies the exisrence of the cleath squacls w

hile tacitly condoning or, at the very least, com piicitly tr,rrn-

ing a blind eye to their behavior. D eath squacls in C

entral A rnerica operatecl in

the 1980s and 1990s to terrorize incligenous populations as w ell as the polirical

opposition.l32 Thus, a hegen-ronic state m

anages conFlicr by transform ing the state for use

by the clom inani ethnic grollp, ancl is thus exclusivisr in narure. A

s P eleg

points out, "l-raving been internalized, hegem onic ethnicity is perceived as

'natural,' m aking the use ancl abuse of state pow

er for exclusirre erhnic goals norm

al and non-controversial."l33 The state, in essence, engages in a form

of coercion, in w

hich tlre clom inant group prrrsrres policics rhat enstrre irs con-

trol over other groups.l3a Likew ise, rhe state institr-rtions w

ill be transform ed

to enshrine the hegem onic rule. Tl-rus, tl-re severity ancl cluration of ethnic

conflict is redr-rced ancl m anaged by tl-re prom

orion of rhe clom inanr group's

rights and the disregarcl for other groups' rigl-rts. It is clear thar such a stare is not dem

ocratic.l35 If the state is nom

inally or previously clem ocratic, it is likely ro becom

e illib- eral. P

eleg iclentifies tw o m

ajor variants of illiberal clem ocracies and. rheir

approacl-r to the m anagem

ent of echnic conflict: separatiollist and assim ilation-

isr. In the separationist variant the dom inant group "clesires to keep itself sepa-

rate and superìor vis-à-vis the clom inarecl group." S

ri Lanka ancl Israel provicle goocl exanrples of this type of hegem

onic stare (derailed in chaprers 6 andT).In both cases, the state (ancl its institutions) is identifiecl exch-rsively w

ith a parriclr- lar clom

inant group (S ri Lankans anclJew

s, respectively).136

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 53

In the assim ilationist vâriant, the clom

inant grollP rries to converl the m

inor-

ities into the clom inant culture. Turkey's âttem

P t to transform

the K urdish

rninority is one such exam ple.i3T A

ssim ilationist attem

pts by hegem onic

scates

canbe a cause of conflict w hen the suborclinate grollP

does not accept assim ila-

riol, perhaps rebelling against the clon-rinant ethnic groLlP .138 W

hen the French in A

lgeria (a French colony from the n-rid-nineteenth century uncil inclepenclence

in L962) invoked their m ission ciuilisatrice (civilizing m

ission), they w ere attem

P t-

ing ro assim ilate A

lgerians, to m ake thern into Frenchm

en/-w om

en. The French

believed that they had a right to rLlle over the A lgerians, and, m

ore im portant,

that A lgerians m

ust becom e French througl-r the clom

inance of the French lan- guage, law

s, and so forth, at the expense of the indigenous population's cul- rlrre.139 S

uch a policy evenrually failed,'and ethnic conflict w as the result, as

A lgerians rebelled against French colonial rule, eventualiy leacling to A

lgeria's indepenclence.

\ptcally, rhe dom inanr group in l-regem

onic states seeks to settle the conFlict rhrough tl-re expulsion or elim

inarion of the m inority group(s). The hegem

onic grollp tries co create a purely ethnic state. This process m

ay entail m ass expul-

sions and genocicle.laO In rhe breakup of Y

ugoslavia, the S erbian reliance on

"ethnic cleansing" of ¡he C roat ancl M

uslitr-r n-rinori¡ies is an exam ple of a hege-

m onic stare's "solution" to ethnic conFlicl. The m

ass genocidal behavior of rhe cirizens of R

w ancla and B

urundi also fit into ¡l-ris category, as does the treat- m

enr of rhe A frican m

inority in S udan by the Islam

ic governm ent that rules the

country. In the enct, in order "to keep the peace" once a conFlict has taken place, hege-

m onic states engage in control policies. In doing so, B

ym an argues, hegem

onic srates attem

pt to lessen tl-re security dilem m

a w hile also keeping in check the

subordinate ethnic groups) but at the sâm e tim

e assuring the clom inant grouP

s that rheir dom

inance is guaranteecl. C ontrol policies inclucie the use of brute

force ("use of force against ethnic group m em

bers regardless of echnic political activity," just because they are m

em bers of a group) and selective control (use of

force against those w ho m

ighr undertake "ethnic political actlity," in order to prevenr them

from doing so).141 \X

/hile such policies m ighr lessen the security

dilem m

a, these policies are inherently unstable because over tim e subordinate

grollps are likely to challenge the ctom inant grollp for access to the state institu-

tions and an encl to discrim inatory policies. A

s suborclinate groups m obilize,

both politically and sociail¡ tl-rey challenge the dom inant group's hegem

onic position, leacling to future conflict.142

In a neurtral state, the governm ental acfors do r-rot favor one ethnicity over

another; insteacl, they seek to regulate conflicf betw een the groups' For exam

- ple, in m

ost \X /estern societies w

ith institutionalized dem ocracy and social

54 E thnic C

onflict

rights, the courts clo not lim it the rights of individr"rals on che basis of erhnic-

ity. The role of the courts is to be "color-blind" and enforce the law s w

irhout any dim

inution ofta person's status due to his or her erhnic background.la3 Thus, a neutral state typically follow

s eirher conflict m anagem

enr or serrle- m

ent in a sim ilar w

ay: by im plem

enting a policy or ser of policies that recog- nize, prom

ote, and protect m inority rights. These policies m

ay range from antidiscrim

ination law s, constitutional prorecrions, and rights of polirical

association and organization to program s to com

pensate for and/or reverse patterns of historical prejudice and discrim

inarion.l44 S

uch srares, ofren called accom

m odationisc states) prom

ore rhe inciusive political participation of all m

em bers of society.las D

em ocratic institutions and legitim

ate represenrative bodies typicaliy help protect m

inority righrs. W illiam

R iker persuasively argues

that only through tl-re com petirion of interesrs in a liberal, plural, and dem

ocraric fram

ew ork are tiÌe rights of all, rhe rnajority and rhe m

inorities, prorected.146 Im

porrantl¡ according to P eleg, the liberal srare rakes a neurral position w

ith regard to etl-rnicity. E

thnicity is neirher prom orecl nor opposecl. M

oreover, prefer- ential treatm

ent of one erlÌniciry rarher than anorher is not exrended by rhe governm

ent.l4T .

'W hen confror-rtecl w

ith violenr ethnic conflict, the neutral state uses govern- m

ental resources such as the m ilitary or police to corclon off violence and protect

noncom batants. O

nce the level of violence has decreased, tl-re governm ent turns

its attention row ard conflict settlem

ent, usually through institurional reform .148

A good exam

ple of this process is the resum ption of dem

ocracy in S pain follow

- ing tlre cleatl-r of the dictator Francisco Franco tn 1975. C

onfronred w irh nation-

alist calls for autonorny and the threar of violence from arm

ed param ilirary

groups, the governm ent established a new

quasi-federal disrriburion of aurhor- iry. A

num ber of A

utonom ous C

om m

uniries w ere established to prom

ote rhe rights of m

inorities ancl give rhem som

e regional aurhoriry. W hen param

ilitary groups such as the B

asque separarisrs E TA

(E uskacli Ta A

skatasuna) resum e rheir

violent cam paign against the S

panish srare, rhe governm enr uses rhe legal sysrem

to prosecute the com batants. Im

portantl¡ the S panish state rem

ains neurral as the courts treat the separatists as orclinary crim

inals and not as m em

bers of an underprivileged ethnic m

inority.l4e

D em

ocracy, D om

estic P ow

er-S hartng lnstítutions, and C

onfltct M anagem

ent: Liberaltsm

, C onsociationalism

, and Federalism . The insriturional approach

em phasizes tl-re role of rules and governing bodies in m

odifying rhe behavior of inclivictuals, eiites, and grollps. The srucly of "consrirr-rrional engineering" suggests that institutions cân play a pivotal role in pushing a sociery row

ard a m ore srable,

ancl, hopefull¡ a m ore dernocratic, structlrre.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 55

A s previously m

entioned, a m ajor difficulry in deeply divided societies is that

relationships betw een grouP

s, especially betw een the m

ore dom inant ethnic

group and the m inority groups, are often quite problem

atic. The dom ination of

tlre state andf or governm ent by one ethnic grouP

com P

licates the w orking of

clem ocracy. D

efining dem ocracy is difficult, and there are m

aîy definitions offered by prom

inent scholars. Larry D iam

ond, Juan Ltnz, and S eym

our Lipset scudy the w

orking of dem ocracy in divided societies, and thus their definition is

helpful in understanding how dem

ocracy perform s in divicled societies.150

I)iam ond, Linz,and Lipset see dem

ocracy as a system in w

hich rhree condi- rions are constant. First, com

petition betw een individuals ancl groups m

ust be m

eaningful. In other w ords, elections and all activities surrounding them

m ust

be fair and open ancl produce legicirnate results. S econcl, particiP

arion should be inclusive. Inclividuals and groups of all rypes should be able to contribute ro elecrions, politics, and policies. Tl-rird, there need to be freedom

s and liberties to ensure that participation, expression, and other righrs are exercised by all individuals.l's1

O f course, producing such a dem

ocratic m odel requires the establishm

ent of governm

ental instirudons. E xclusivist m

odels are designed to P rom

ote and enshrine the interes¡s of only the dom

inant group (for exam ple, as A

partheid did in S

ourh A frica), w

hile accom m

odationist m odels are inclusive. The set of instiru-

riol1s pÍonloted and created to establish a w

orking dem ocracy follow

ing the r¡odel of D

iam ond, Linz, and, Lipset is considered an "accom

Írì.odationist" m

ode1.1s2

There are tw o com

pering accom m

odationist clem ocratic m

ocleis: liberal and consociational. The liberal m

odel, oFten referrecl to as the A nglo-A

m erican

m odel, creates institutions that rem

ain neutral in regard to ethnicity. B ased on

the w ritings of John Locke, John S

tuart M ill, and others, the iil¡eral m

odel em

phasizes individual liberties and Freedom s. C

itizens are equal uncler the law ,

enjoy a set of protected rights, and live under a lim ited governm

ent. D onald

H orow

itz cites a theoretical basis for electoral engineering aim ed at accom

m o-

dation in deeply divided societies. H e argues that election rules thar do not

sim ply replicate existing ethnic grouP

S , but rather encourage cross-group coop-

erarion, can break dow n rhe salience of ethnic identities.ls3 S

isk classifies such an approach as "cenrripetal.'1s4

T'he engineered institutions attem P

t to pull the erhnic groups and political parties tow

ard a com m

on center. B enjam

in R eilly

produces evidence that such centriP etal instittttions can produce prom

ising results.155

Tl-rus, the liberal institutions do not recogntze any particular ethnicity as preÊ erenrial, as rhe insrirurions generally do not recognize echnicity at alll E

lectoral engineering favors the role of individual voters, inclividual candidates, ancl nego- tiation by non-etl-rnic groups in the legislature. This m

odel also relies heavily on

56 E thnic C

onflict

the pow er of constitutions

anct colrrts to regulate conflict w irhin the system

and deliver fair judgm

ents. Further, in a liberal clem ocrac¡ rhe stare is focused on

assim ilation and integration of the difFerenr ethnic groups.ls6

O ne of tl-re benefits of the liberal m

oclel is that it cle-em phasizes ethnicity as a

salienr trait for polirical action. In orcler to clo so, rhere is usually a need to super- sede clrrrent ethnic identities w

irh a com m

on) overlapping (superordinate) iden-

tity. S upporters of the liberal m

oclel point ro rhe U nited S

tates (am ong orher

countries) as a successful application of rhe liberal m oclel.lsT A

n "A m

erican" identity is developed and becom

es m ore salien¡ and clom

inanr rhan rhe m any

different, and fractured, ethnic iclenti¡ies. In essence, tl-re liberal n-rodel arrem prs

to m ove a divided society aw

ay from division and tow

ard consenslls in a dem obi-

Iization of ethnic appeals and erhnic conflicr, and the em ergence of a civic

nationalism . O

f course, critics argue that the civic-ethnic nationâlism divide "is

m ore a m

yth than a reaIity." A s S

pinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse note, in address- ing the critics of the civic-ethnic nationalism

clivision, "states are not m erely

containers of political practices; there is no such rhing as a culrurally neutral state. A

lm ost all states teach a certain kir-rcl of history to their citizens; celebrate

certain holidays, n-rar-ry w ith cultural ancl religious m

eanings; ancl use one or per- haps tw

o lang'-rages.'A ll of tl-rese are culturally-laden practi..r.rl58 Furtherm

ore, as E

sm an observes, com

piere inregration takes a long tirne and also risks the loss of cultural diversity if people integrate fully.lse

The consociational m odel cliffers sharply from

tl-re iiberal rnoclel. Far from ignoring ethnic differences ancl in clirecr opposition to rhe liberal rnodel, the consociational m

oclel recognizes the existence of clisdnct ethniciries (although the stace itself is neutral, w

irh no one erhnic group clom inanr as in the hege-

m onic state). Furtherm

ore, supporters of tl-re consociational m oclel contend that

the establishm enr of a srable and just sociery m

usr be based on rhe explicit par- ticipation of the ethnic groups. Institutions shoulcl be creared thar allow

ethnic groups to enter into agreem

ent ancl accom m

odarion. S uch ân agreem

ent pro- tects grollps' rights and interesrs.l60 A

rend Lgphart builr his consociational m

odel from his study of sm

all, continenral E uropean narions (thar is, B

elgium ,

the N etherlands, and S

w itzerland). H

e claim s that consociational insritucions

prodllcecl elite accom m

odation and the developrnent of stable, proctllcrive societ- ies w

hile still preserving ethnic and group identities.16l Lijphart argues that in order ro builcl a consociarional m

odel, rhe srare m usr

actively seek reconciliation betw een hostile ethnic constituencies. A

lso, rhe final agreem

ent m lrst be the product of negotiation betw

een pow er-sharir-rg elites, ancl

not the product of any inrernal or external coercion. E lite cooperation w

ould then am

eliorate the com m

unity conflicr. To arrive at this elire-driven com pro-

m ise, four institutions are necessary: propordonal representation, federalism

,

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 57

grancl coalition, ancl m titual veto. P

roportional representation for elections ensures that ethnic differences, ancl their representation

by political parties, are replicatecl in the legislature. This form

of election guarantees that ethnic groups l-rave a legitim

ate forum to voice their concerns and interests. Federalism

creates regional alltonom

y For ethnic grollps. M echanism

s to create a"grand coalition" governm

ent prom ote a sharec{ executive. The m

utual veto gives each significant erlrnic group the ability to halt legislation andf or executive clecisions.162

\K /hen ethnic groups are interm

ingled, consociational institutions offer a solu- tion because rrrinority groups are represented in the central governm

ent and thus have an opportr.rnity to engage in the act of governing.163 I. \X

zilliam Zartrnan

argLres that consociational institutions can create new ancl overlapping identities,

such as m ultiethnic or trans-ethnic coalitions rhat m

ove beyoncl singularly eth- nic parties and ethnic m

ajorities.l6a Incleecl, Lijphart argues that consociational institutions are responsible for the etl-rnic cooperation that has brought peace ancl harm

ony to cliviclecl B elgium

.l6s Federalism

offers a sol-rtion to ethnic conflict w hen ethnic grollps are territo-

rially (regionally) concentrated because tl're local political ir-rstitutions ancl com

- perition becom

e tl-re focal point for the tension and hostility that w ould otherw

ise be directed at the central governm

ent.166 Fecleralism can be successfi-rl if it raises

the costs of secessior-r. For exam ple, in certain tow

ns in K enya, such as N

airobi ancl M

om basa, the Luo occupy im

porrant positions "outside their regions." Therefore, for the Luo, secession is costly because ofthe loss ofsignificant oppor- tunities in other regions in K

enya w ere they to secede.167

S om

e scholars argLre that federalism is not necessal'y For pow

er sharing and vice versa. A

state couid give a region territorial âutonom y but not shared pow

er at the central governm

ent level.168 C

onsequently, m any scholars m

ake persuasive argum

ents that fecleralisrn provicles the best possible governm ent for a nation of

considerable ethnic and regional clisparity. E specially in territorial federations,

fecleralism is an institutional arrangem

ent that provides ethnic andf or regional com

m unities w

irh clue territorial recognition.169 Federalism m

ay also aid in the lnanagem

ent of conflict by provicling m any political centers, each of w

hich m ay

be the locus of resolving clisputes.17o Fecteralism . m

ay constrain central pow er,

thus allow ing for m

ore regional autonorry.l71 A lexancler M

r"rrphy posits that federal system

s provide incentives for groups to create separate policy w ithin

their territorial unit. W hile such policy variance m

ay be difficult for the state as a w

hole, it rnay elim inate, or at least am

eliorate, conflict betw een regional

units.172 M ore generall¡ S

harda R arh goes so far as to say that fecleralism

pro- m

otes peace, securit¡ strength, dem ocrac¡ libert¡ ancl iclentity.l73

Fecleralism is not w

ithout its critics. K . C

. \X /heare agrees that fecleralism

is one m

ethocl by w hich to solve ethnic conFlict. H

ow ever, W

heare arglles that

58 E thnic C

onflict

federalism m

ay produce a constitutional crisis in sorne instances. S uch a crisis

can occur because of the built-in clisequilibrium in federalisn-r: the struggle

betw een the im

position of cornm on values by the cenrral governm

ent and the jealous prorection of local pow

ers by regional units.174 Jonathan Lem co eluci-

dates a dozen prerequisites for federalism to be an effective m

ethod of scem m

ing of state dissolution in m

ultiethnic states.175 Federalism

also suffers from the problene that m

inority groups w ithin the

state rem ain a m

inority in positions ar the federal level.r76 For exam ple, in the

form er Y

ugoslavia, each fecleral republic becam e ethnically based.r77 The m

inor- iry groups w

ithin S erbian territory felt threatened by the increasingly ethnically

focused acrions of the S erbian governm

ent, and P resiclent S

lobodan M ilosevic in

particular. E ach group sought to further its interests, thereby contributing to the

ethnic securiry dilem m

a w ithin each republic. M

oreover, the Fear alw ays exists

that regional leaders w ill seek further alltonom

y ancl separation From the central

governm ent, leading to dem

ands for independence.lTs Thus, not everyone agrees that consociational and federal institurions are

necessarily benevolent or successful. C ritics m

ake several argum ents. First, one

line of thought sLrgg.ests that the direction of causation points the w rong w

ay. Institutional change does not leacl to social change. R

ather, the m oderation of

cleavages (social change) allow s the successful irnplem

entation of dem ocratic

institutions.lT9 C onflict reduction requires m

echanism s to disperse the ioci of

pow er, em

phasize intra-ethnic divisions, and provide incentives for eli¡e coopera- tion. S

econd, elite accom m

odation rnay leacl to political com prom

ise, but it does not leacl to a long-term

solution to the divided societ¡ w hich is often the sollrce

of the conflict. For exam ple, C

am eron R

oss argues rhat fecleralism allow

s allthor- itarianism

to flourish in m any of R

ussia's eighqr-nine regions and republics.18o R

elatedl¡ B arbara W

alter argues that w hile elites m

ighr buy into the consocia- tional structure, the m

asses m ay not, and thus the consociational agreernent is

undem ocratic.lsl Thircl, ethnic groups often do nor w

ant to cooperate w ith each

other, but cooperation is necessary for effective governrnent uncler a propor- tional representation system

as found in consociational structures. Fourth and finall¡ a consociational structure can solidify (ancl perhaps exacerbate) ethnic divisions by rnaking ethnicity m

ore salient. Institutions that separate groups into hierarchical/geographic political units (for exam

ple, fecleralism ) sharpen social

divisions.182 P olitical parties tend to reflect this salience by prom

oting tlìem -

selves as ethnically based.183 For exam ple, as Y

ugoslavia's breakup occurred, political parties clefined them

selves in erhnic terrns, and voting in elections held in 1990 reflected the nationalist/ethnic divisions w

ithin the republics. The use of the A

lternative V ote in B

osnia-H erzegovina led to elections that w

ere effectively an "ethnic census."184 O

ne of Lrjpl-rart's consociationalist m odel successes, B

eigium ,

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 59

has faced challenges from the tw

o clorninan¡ ethnic groups, Flem ish and W

al-

loons, in recent years. The w ealthier Flernish region has den-rancled greater

auronom y, w

hich is resistecl by the francophones living in W allonia, the poorer

region. The francophones in W allonia w

orry that any reform s w

ill lead to reduc- tions in funding. S

uch a reduction in funding to the region w ould im

pact the region's econom

y, already declining relative to that of the Flernish region. The Flernisl-r parties seek to split the bilingual electoral constituency, B

russels-H alle-

V ilvoorde (B

H V

). In cloing so, H alle ancl V

ilvoorde, the D utch-speaking colnP

o- nents, w

ould "becom e part of neighboring Flem

ish voting districts to the north." C

onstitutionaliy bilingual B russels w

ould becom e a discrete districr.lss

K anchan C

handra has also noted that w hen "linking the politicization oF

erhnic divisions w itl-r the destabilizatiofr of clem

ocracy" w hat often happens is

rhe "out-bidding effect." E thnic outbidding occurs w

hen ethnic divisions have becom

e politicized to rhe extent that politicai parties are defined ethnically. A s

C handra explains w

ith regarcl to theories of ethnic outbidding, "rhe em ergence

of even a single ethnic part\/ 'infects' the rest of the party system , ieading to a

spiral of extrem e ethnic bids that destroy col-nP

etitive politics altogether." The result can destabilize dem

ocratic states.186 C handra arglres, how

ever, chat ethnic parties can have a positive effect on dem

ocrac¡ but this depends on w hether the

institutions are able to encourage the overlapping elem ents of e¡hnic identity (for

exam pie, different ethnic groups that share the sam

e religion). 187 1¡" m

octera- rion of ethnic outbidding can occur through the insritutionalization of cross- cutting cleavages. C

handra provides the exam ple of India (w

here there are cross-cutting

cleavages in [erm s of religion and language that have been institu-

tionaiized in the constitution as w ell as in policy areas such as em

ploym ent and

education), in w hich m

arginal parties have engaged in ethnic outbidding, w ith

centrist political behavior occurring afterw ards.lss A

n exam ple of language law

s as indicators of institutionalized cross-cutting cleavages is presented by Finland. A

ccording to S pinner-H

avel and Theiss-M orse, "In Finland m

em bers of a linguis-

tic m inority (Finnish or S

w edish) that constitutes at least 8 percent of a m

unici- palicy have the right to speak w

ith governm ent officials in rheir native rongue;

once the 8 percent threshold is m et, this linguistic right can only be revoked if

tlre m inority speakers fall to 6 percent." In this w

ay, they argue, linguistic rights are given to groups, but the set-up also provides for the cl-range in group identities and the em

ergence oFcross-ethnic alliances.189 A

dditionall¡ if the proportionality of the allocarion is considered unalter- able, problem

s m ay arise w

hen the actual proportional distribution of groups changes.lgo For exam

ple, Lebanon's governm ent w

as strlrctlrred as a consocia- tional dem

ocracy from the tim

e of independence in 1943 until 1975, w hen civil

w ar erupted. The relative im

portance of the top governm ent positions reflected

60 E thnic C

onflict

the proportion oF the popr-rlation of each sect: a M aronite C

hristian president, a S

unni M uslim

prirne rninister, a S hiite M

uslim chair of the legislature, and a

G reek O

rthoclox deþuty chair and cleputy prim e m

inisrer. W hile this arrange-

m ent w

orkecl for three decades, it facecl the challenge of the changing propor- tionality of rhe population. The C

hrisrian sects had been a rnajority in the earlier censlls ancl thus w

ere allocated the position of presiclent. O ver tim

e, how ever,

the proportion of the M uslim

population overtook the C hrisrian popularion,

thereby leading to clem ands by the M

uslim secrs rhar the com

position of rhe governm

ent reflect the changed status. S oon, periodic clashes betw

eeir groups erupted into full-scale civil w

ar.191 There is yet another difficulty w

ith the consociational m odel: ir neglecrs the

international dim ension of ethnic conflict. C

onsociational agreem ents focus

exclusively on dom estic institutions. E

thnic conflict often has an international com

ponent) and institu¡ional clesign has to take this into account. International institutions (as noced in the section on the inrernarional level of analysis), particularly cross-border legislative or parliam

entary institutions, can prom ore

overlapping (superorclinate) idencities, such as people having both a E uropean

iclentity ancl national iclentity. C ross-cutting cleavages could encourage m

ore m

oclerate behavior and nonviolent conflict. C onsequentl¡ a m

echanism -nam

ely institutions-that

can prom ote overlapping ictentities m

ay afford rhe m eans ¡o

resolve, or at least reduce, conflict betw een opposing groups that results from

inequality. In a sim ilar fashion to the logic of the social consrrucrivist approach,

these overlapping iclentities m ay arneliorate conflict by creating forum

s for expression, opportr-rnities for cooperation, ancl clevelopm

ent of m utual inter-

ests.1e2 The problem is that w

hile identities are not fixecl (in contradiction of rhe prim

ordialist approach to ethnic iclenrity), they are hard to change. A s B

ym an

m aintains, if a person is a m

em ber of a group thar has experienced violence

directed at it by virtue of group identiry "that iclenciry becom es pow

erful and far m

ore salient than com peting ones."193

These critiques of consociationalism and federalism

dem onsrrare the lim

irs and rarir¡ of dem

ocratic participatory sysrem

s in ethnically divided states. In rhe end, attem

pting to transition to dem ocracy is difficuit w

hen groups harbor sig- nifican¡ distrust and fears of insecr-rrit¡ polidcal institutions are w

eak, rhere are fears that elections w

ill lead to undem ocraric ourcor¡es (cyranny of the m

ajoriry), and ethnic elites use their clem

ocraric freeclom s (freedom

of the press, erc.) to clissem

inate aggressive ideas and policies.lea A lrl-rough dem

ocracy m ay be diffi-

cult to attain, that cloes not firean that states should nor artem pt to establish

dem ocratic institutions. A

s B ym

an observes, given that dem ocracy has a proven

track record in keeping the peace w ithin societies, clem

ocracy as a soh-rtion m usr

be front and center in acldressing ethnic conflicr.l95

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 61

lnfact,in an analysis of cases of success and failure in term s of pow

er sharing i¡r ethnically diverse scares, S

chneckener proffers six structure-oriented and five actor-oriented factors that account for success. The six structure-oriented

fac-

lors are (1) relative equilibrium of the various ethnic groups so that no one

group is a clear m ajority in the state or region; (2) no considerable

socioeco-

nom ic clifferences betw

een the groups such that one group is at a significant disaclvantage relarive to the other groupi (3) territorial segm

entation (federal- isrn, or even segregation of cities w

irhin a region); (4) overarching, shared iden- riry to the region or state; (5) cross-cutring cleavages leading to overlapping idenrities and m

em berships; and (6) m

oderate pluralism such that ethnic grouP

s are represented by m

ore than one political parry thereby leading to a m oderate

m ultiparty political system

.196 The actor.oriented factors are (1) dom inant elites

(discussed in the individual level section); (2) respect for the existing status quo; (3) m

utual understancling and traditions of com prom

ise by the elites; (4) par- dcipation by all groups, such that they are reP

resented at any negotiations as

w ell as in the actual pow

er-sharing system (this inclucles incorporation of para-

m ílitary ancl exrrem

ist groups); and (5) a com prom

ise solution that is arrived at internally rarher than im

posed from the outside.i9T S

chneckener finds that the actor-oriented factors are m

ofe im portant than the structure-oriented

ones in term

s of successfui m anagem

ent of ethnic conflict.198 H e show

s that cabinet governm

ents (rather than presidential system s), flexible P

roP ortionâl rules, con-

ditional veto righrs, an institutional link betw een the selÊ

governing bodies and tl-re central pow

er-sharing body (thereby lim iting segm

ental autonom y to certain

issues), and political and judicial m echanism

s should be utilized for m ediating

and settling conflicts.lee Y

et, Jonathan H earn cautions that w

hile scholars analyze "general categories of ethnic conflict and political instabiliry" exam

ining particular cases m ay lead

to the recognition of specific solutions that m ight not be recom

m endedby "a

single set of general prescripcionr.r2oO 4t E

iki B erg and G

uy B en-P

orat argue, tackling the underþing cultural and structural causes of conflict and altering the relations betw

een conflicting grouP s are the m

eans to settle protracted con- flicts.2ol In m

any cases, these underlying roots of conflict are found at the clom

estic level of analysis, and thus their solutions m ay be found there as w

ell.

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L LE V

E L

K enneth N

. W altz's influential book M

an, the S tate, and W

ar used the levels of analysis to unclerstancl the outbreak of international w

ar. H e argued that the

international, or rhircl, im age, best captures w

hy w ars occur. The anarchic interna-

tional system , in w

hich no central authority (such as a w orld governm

ent) exists

62 E thnic C

onflict

over states, m eans chat scaces have to engâge in selÊ

help to ensure their securiry and survival. H

e asserts thac "there is a constant possibiliry of w ar in a w

orld in w

hich there "r. t*olo, m ore states each seeking to prom

ote aset of interests and having no agency above them

upon w hich they can rely for protection."2o2 The

other tw o levels (dom

estic and individual) can explain the im m

ediate causes of w

ar in the sense that a state's decision to go ro w ar depends on several factors,

such as pow er, interest, regim

e rype, histor¡ size, and location. A s he contends,

"S ¡ates are m

otivated to attack each other and to defencl them selves by the reason

andf or passion of the com paratrvely few

w ho m

ake policies for states and of the m

any m ore w

ho influence ¡he few ."203

H e claim

s that the international system explains the outbreak of w

ar betw een

states. H is is a realist explanation, in facr, a neorealist or structural realist expla-

nation, because he focuses on the structure of the international system . S

pecifi- call¡ the structural elem

ents of the balance of pow er and the anarchic

environm ent enable w

ar to occur: "w ars occur because there is nothing to prevent

,1't"^.>204 In this w ay, the international, or system

ic, level is "the m ost com

pre- hensive" level because it covers "the totaliry of interactions w

hich take place w

ithin the system aqd its environm

ent."205 A

s this section w ill dem

onstrate, analysis at the international level can be use- ful to explain ethnic conflict, both w

ithin and betw een staces. In essence, "inter-

national conditions can provide favorable or unfavorable opportunities for access to resources, legitim

acy and coalition partners."206 For exam pie, changes

in the balance of pow er in the international system

, such as the encl of the C olcl

W ar, m

ay lead to opportunities for ethnic groups to seek pow er. The case of the

form er Y

ugoslavia illustrates this w ell. W

hile it w as a com

m unist countr¡ its

leader,Josip B rozTiro, broke aw

ay from the S

oviet U nion in the late 1940s. Thus,

during the C old W

ar, Y ugoslavia played an im

portant strategic roie for the U

nited S rates as a buffer against the U

S S

R . \X

/hen the S oviet U

nion collapsecl, ending the C

old \X /ar, the U

nitecl S tates no longer had a need for Y

ugoslavia to serve as a buffer. This lack of interesr by the w

orld's only rem aining superpow

er, as w

ell as the deteriorating econom ic conditions w

ithin Y ugoslavia, led to a

struggle for pow er betw

een the three m ain ethnic groups (S

erbs, C roats, ancl

M uslim

s in B osnia), each seeking to gain territory and pow

er at the expense oF the others, leading to a conflict lasting m

ore than three years.207 A

dditionall¡ because there is no w orld governm

ent in the international sys- tem

, internal ethnic conflicts can becom e international conflicts if they spread

to other countries across international borders. M oreover, w

hen outside actors provide support to actors involved in the conflict, w

hether in the form of eco-

nom ic, diplom

atic, or m ilitary support, an internal conflict becom

es interna- tionalized. C

onsequentl¡ external involvem ent in internal ethnic conflicts from

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 63

diasporas, as w ell as outsicle states intervening for strategic reasons, can contrib-

ure ro the continuation of ethnic conflict.208 A t tl're sam

e tim e) recognizing the

inrernational dynam ic of ethnic conflicrs (for exam

ple, significant num ber of

refugees both w ithin and across borclers; m

eclclling of outsicle P ow

ers in internal conflicts, etc.), international actors (inclividual states, international institr-rtions, ¿_ncl nongovernm

ental organizations) can act to P revent, m

anage, or resolve such conflicts.209 This section discusses ¡he role that internationai actors can play in prom

oting, as w ell as m

anaging, ethnic conflict.

lnternattonal Level A ctors in E

thnic C onflict

A s notecl above, international level factors can contribute to the em

ergence and conrinuarion of ethnic conflict. R

elevant actors inclucle diasporas (and thus states w

ith erhnic ties ro groups w ithin other states experiencing ethnic conflict) ancl

srates intervening for their ow n self-interests (as realist theory w

ould explain).

D iasporas and E

thnic Ties across S tate B

orders. O ne can view

ethnic kin that live in a different state, or states, as porential internarional factors in ethnic conflict. These related yer foreign groups can provicle m

aterial ancl em otional support for

ethnic groups. Tl-re diaspora is thus an international actor, or external P arty, thar

can fuel ethnic conflicr. A ltetnatively,

by w ithholding suP

P ort, the diaspora com

- m

unity m akes ir m

ore difficult for ethnic conflict to erlrP t and continu..2lO

¡tt adclition, kin srare (hom

e counrry) relations w ith the diaspora can affect relations

w ith the host country ir-r w

hich the cliaspora resicles. C onsequentl¡ as noted by

Y ossi S

hain ancl A haron B

arth, "D iasporâs are am

ong the m ost prom

inent acrors that link international and clom

estic spheres of politics."2l1 D

iaspora is definecl as people w ho have m

igrated from one collnrry to

another. These Foreign m igrants, accorcling to E

sm an, establish their ow

n com -

m unities that provide a sense of connecteclness in an unfam

iliar ancl perhaps "less than friendly environrtent."2lz Though diaspora groups are able to accul- turate into the host countfy, they naintain their distinctiveness. Im

portantl¡ ethnic cliasporas m

ay act as â dom estic interest group w

ithin their host country to influence policies tow

ard their hom e collntry. A

ctors in the hom e country (the

governm ent or other political actors) m

ay Llrge rhe ethnic diaspora to provide sLlpport (econom

ic, diplornatic, and m ilitary).213

S tates m

ay give support to their ethnic kin residing in other states. These ethnic ties can serve as a m

eans for intervention in tl-re affairs of a country expe- riencing erl-rnic conflict betw

een the ethnic kin and other ethnic groups w ithin a

state. S erbia's interventioll to sLlpport S

erbs living in tl-re K rajina region of C

roa- tia cl-rring the B

alkan w ars in the early 1990s is one such exam

ple. S tates m

ay even go so far as to claim

territory in w hich their ethnic kin resicle (irredentism

).

D rovides an explanâtion for identity-based m

otivations for intrastate and irrrerstate behavior.222

N on-ethnic Ties and E

xternal lntervention as a C ontributing Factor of E

thnic

C O

nfliC t. A

s a result of nationai self-interest, external states m ay take actions

rhar supporr one ethnic grollP over another in an internal ethnic conflict' as

realism w

ould argue regarding state behavior. For exam ple, in the 1970s Inclia's

support for B engalis in E

ast P akistar-r contributed to the breakup of P

akistan,

ancl the creation of rhe new state of B

angiadesh. In supporting the B engali

lr4uslim s, India w

as able to w eaken P

akistan, its regional rival.223 S tates m

ay see

other sta¡es beset w ith internal conflicts as "easy targets," ancl rhus see the

opporrunity "for an eas¡ cheap victory" by engaging in belligerent behavior against the other state, thereby escalating an internal conflict into an interscate confltct.z24 A

n exam ple w

ould be the R ussian m

ilitary intervention in G eorgia

n 1.992 in support of the secessionist m

oveÍtent in S outh O

ssetia (w hich

w anted to join w

ith N orth O

ssetia, one of the republics in the R ussian Feclera-

tion). R ussia's goal w

as tw ofold: to persuade G

eorgia to join the C om

m onw

ealth of Indepenclent S

tates and to gain G eorgia's consent to having R

ussian m ilitary

forces based in G eorgía.zzs

E xrernal pow

ers play a role in the em ergence of ethnic conflict by virtue of

rhe resources they can provide to extrem ists. S

uch resources can enable them to

overthrow the governm

ent, etìgage ín w ar, or establish an opP

osition govern- fîeît.226 R

ussian support for R ussian-speaking secessionists in the D

niestr region of M

oldova served its strategic interests. In fact, according to S tuart

K aufm

an, R ussia helpecl the D

niestrians start-and w in-the w

ar w ith the

M oldovan gov er r'rnert.2z7 H

ow ever, as w

ith kin state behavior noted previousl¡ exrernal states inlerven- ing to support an ethnic grollp have m

any foreign policy objectives, only one of w

hich m ay be to support an ethnic group in conflict. The state rnay decide that

other foreign policy goals are lrrore im portant or pressing. In addition, dom

estic politics influence an external srate's decision w

he¡her to intervene and sllP P

oft one side of a conflict or another.228

lnternational Level Factors as a M eans to M

anage and S

ett/e E thnic C

onflicts In term

s of international actors that can attem pt to m

anage and settle ethnic conflicts, one can look at individuai states, international governm

ental organíza- tions, ancl nongovefnm

ental organizations. H arff and G

urr argue that interna- tional actors can play a significant role in the protection of m

inoriry rights and the settlem

ent of ethnic conflicts. In addition, international actors m ay need to

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 65

64 E thnic C

onflict

For exam ple, S

om alia claim

ecl territory in E thiopia as its ow

n, given that S om

alis residecl in E

tl-riopia.2la B

y supporting ohe sicie in a conflict, external states "can trigger rl-re secr-rrity dilernm

a by threacening groups' future securic¡" especially if the exrernal stare has a historic tie to a specific group. In one exam

ple, Iraq's S unni A

rab leadership perceivecl a threat from

Iran's S hi'a M

uslim radicalism

and rhe L979 Iranian revolurion. The Iraqi leadership feared that the S

hi'a in Iraq m ight fom

enr revo- lution w

ith support from Iran's S

hi'a. In response, the Iraqi leadership "cracked dow

n hard on Iraqi S hi'a," especially people w

ith connecrions ro lran.215 O

f course, there is no guarantee that having ethnic ties to groups in another state w

ill lead to foreign policies in support of the erhnic kin. In an anaþsis of transstate ethnicity in the new

counrries established after the collapse of the S

oviet U nion, C

hades K ing ancl N

eil M elvin found that ir is ofren difficult ro

m obilize around diaspora issues, as a result of several factors, including tl-re

clom estic politics w

ithin rhe kin state.2r6 If there are erhnic m inoriries in rhe kin

stare that are pow erful enough, they can act as a "constraint on the ability of

political elites to use cliaspora issues as a m ajor clom

esric polirical resource." For exam

ple, U kraine's ¡nultiethnic com

posirion m akes it ciiFficulr for dom

estic actors to appeal ro diaspora issues regarding U

krainians living in orher coun- tries.2r7 A

lso affecting cliaspora-kin state relations are "the institurional srrengrh and resources w

ithin diaspora com m

uni¡ies them selves." H

ow w

ell a diaspora com

m unity is organized politicall¡ as w

ell as w hether it has significant econornic

resollrces and w hether there is a cohesive com

m unir¡ affects diaspora poiitics.

K ing and M

elvin show thar the R

ussian, U krainian, and K

azakh diasporas resicl- ing in the form

er S ovier republics have quite w

eak ethnic identiry and com m

unal solidarity. A

s a result, the kin stare has nor been able ¡o develop exrensive rela- tions w

ith their co-ethnics.2lB A

dclitionall¡ w hether the kin srare w

ill engage w

ith the diaspora depencls in large part on rhe diaspora relations w irh erhnic

com m

unities w ithin the host state. S

uch relations affect w hether the cliaspora is

open to actions by the kin state.2r9 Further constraints arise from

the fact thar rhe kin state has m an¡ and com

- peting, foreign policy goals, only one of w

hich m ay involve relarions w

irh its ethnic diaspora. In o¡her w

ords, the inrernational system acts as a constraint on

foreign policy behavior of tl-re kin stare.220 Finall¡ K ing and M

elvin nore rhar kin state-cliaspora relations are also affected by the econom

ic resources of ¡he kin state. A

kin state w ith lim

ited econom ic resources w

ill find it m ore difficuk to

connect w ith its diaspora.22l

In the end, it m ust be recognized that kin stare-cliaspora relations do m

ar- ter in understanding ethnic conflict. The consrrucrion of ethnic identiry rein- forces the idea of a connection betw

een kin srates and the diaspora, ancl

66 E thnic C

onflict

use coercive m easures) such as m

ilitary intervention, in order to encl ethnic con- flicts, especially w

hen such conflicts involve rhe m ass killing of civilians.22e A

s B

ym an observes, hðw

ever, m ilitary intervention to end "the fighting and preserve

peace for a short period of tim e w

hile diplom ats forge a polirical serdem

enr and non-governm

ental organizations carry out hum anitarian w

ork" is problem atic.

A nger and hostility rem

ain even after a civil w ar encls. S

uch anger and hostility are obstacles to production of along-lasting political settlem

ent as w ell as to success

in hum anitarian

operations. A s a result, he argues that the states in the interna-

rional com m

unity neecl to reconsider how to intervene in civil w

ars.230 P osen

argues that in reconsiclering approaches to intervention that w ill decrease rhe

chances of conflict, external actors "m ust assess the local groups' strategic view

of their situation." In rnaking such an assessm ent, external actors should ask:

"W hich groups fear for their physical security ancl w

hy? \X /har m

ilitary oprions ar.e

available to them ?" P

osen notes that lessening the threat perceptions of groups as w

ell as clecreasing their w indow

s of opportunity ro acr aggressively m ay c{ecrease

the likelihoocl of conflict erupting.231 International cooperation, through inrernational institutions, as liberalism

w ould argue, is possjble. H

ow ever, as is evidenr in rhis chapter ancl the individual

case chapters, the w illingness of international institutions, such as the U

nited N

ations or E Lrropeân U

nion, to intervene clepends in large part on the selÊ interests of the m

em ber states.232 A

s P osen asserts, regional conflicts do not

threaten rhe security or m aterial interests of m

os¡ external actors. A s a result,

international institutions face a credil¡ility problem w

hen they rhrearen ro inrer- vene for hum

anitarian reasons to safeguard groups that w orry about their

future.233 Thus, w hile rhe international com

m unity can play a role in addressing

ethnic conflicts, there are lim its to w

hat the inrernational com m

uniry can, and is w

illing to, do. In this section w e exam

ine the responses international acrors car Lrtilize in orcler to prevent, m

anage) or resolve erhnic conflict: m ecliation,

coercive intervention and noncoercive intervention.234

Third-P arty M

ediation. Thircl-party m ecliators are exrernal ac¡ors w

ho arrem pr ro

resolve ethnic conflicrs through negotiation ancl cliplom acy.23s Third-parry nego-

tiations ancl cliplom acy can prom

ote confidence-bLrilding lneasures (such as elec-

tions, autonom y, pow

er sharing, and dem onsrrarions of respect) for the w

arring parties.236 Third parties can also persuacle w

arring parries ro accepr m ediation if

the third party can ac¡ as the glrarânror of an agreem ent.237 It is im

portant to recogníze, how

ever, tl'rat there are costs to the m ediators if m

ecliation is unsuccess- fr"rl, including costs to their reputations. They m

ay also experience econom ic cosrs

if the parties to the conflic¡ are tracling partners.z38'U ¡hile rhere are cosrs ro rhe

m ediator, there are also costs to the w

arring parties. A cceptance of m

ediation, as

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 67

J. M ichael G

rieg and P atrick R

egan assert, "can im ply w

eakness, betray a lack of resolve, or convey legitim

acy on a heretofore unrecognized adversaty."23g

In m any w

ays, it is easier for individual states to m ediate ethnic conflicts than

for international organizations to do so. International organizations (both regional ancl global) m

ust consider the positions of m em

ber states before acting. Individual states can ttilize "secret 'back channel' diplom

acy." S uch back chan-

nel diplom acy provicles rhe foundation for form

al negotiations to ¡ake place. In orcler to ensure that an agreem

enc by m oderates can be enforced, individual

srares are also m ore easily able to deploy m

ilitary forces against extrem ists w

ho m

ay be bent on thw arting che agreem

ent.24O For exam

ple, in 1995, concerned about the possibility of instability in the B

alkans, the U nited S

tates deployed forces to M

acedonia (a state that w as oirce a republic in the form

er Y ugoslavia)

in an affem pt to prevent an outbreak of violence betw

een the A lbanian m

inority ancl che S

lavic governfileît.24r In considering the im

pact of m ediation by intergovernm

ental organizations (IG

O s), such as the E

uropean U nion or the U

nited N ations, it is im

portant to recognize that the legitim

acy of an international m ediator is "one of the m

ost effective resources" needed to get the w

arring parties to agree to negotiate. The "sratlrs and respect" of heads of state and other high-level officials (foreign m

in- isters) confer legitim

acy to the m ediators, and m

ay lead the w arring parties to

m oclerate their positions and m

ake concessions.242 M oreover, as discussed in

chapter 1, international institutions can reduce the uncertainty that prevails in conFlicts betw

een parties w orried about their future security. International insti-

rutions can provide "objective inform ation about each side's capabilities, resolve,

and interests."243 Jacob B

ercovitch and A llison H

ouston argue rhar regional organizations (such as the A

frican U nion, O

rganization of A frican S

tates) "offer the best chances of successful outcom

es in international m ediation," w

hereas m ore global interna-

tional organizations (such as the U N

) "have a very poor record in the area of m

ediation." The difference in outcom es m

ay result from the fact that the m

em -

bers of regional organizations have "com

m on ideals, perspectives, and interests"

that m ay be found w

anting in larger international organrzatrons.244 \X

/hile it m ay be the case that regional organizations have a better chance of a

successful olltcom e, this does not m

ean that international organtzations do not m

atter in dealing w ith conflict. S

chrodr and G erner's analysis of third-parry

m ediation founcl that, in general, m

ediation "does low er the level of conflict

betw een the antagonirrr.1245

M oreover, international organizarions can prom

ote norm s of acceptable

behavior and condem n unacceptable behavior in addressing peace and securiry.

U N

S ecurity C

ouncil R esolution L325 is one such exam

ple. In O ctober 2000, for

68 E thnic C

onflict

the first tim e, the S

ecurity C ouncil passed a resoiution recognizing the effecr

of w ar (both inras.tate and interstate) on w

om en, particularly "as refugees and

internally displaced persons, fw ho] increasingly are rargered by com

baranrs and arm

ed elem ents, and recognizi,?g the consequent im

pact this has on durable peace and reconciliation." Further, the resolu¡ion "[u]rges M

em ber S

tates to ensure increased representation of w

om en at all decision-m

aking levels in narional, regional and international institutions and m

echanism s for the prevenricn, m

an- agem

ent, and resolution of conflict" as w ell as encourages the support of "local

w om

en's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and [those] that involve w

om en in all of the im

plem enrarion m

echanism s of rhe

peace agreem enrs" (em

phasis in original).246 The resolurion's call for rhe pardci- pation of w

om en at the negotiating table m

atters for successful and inclusive m

ediation effort.s. In June 2008 the U

N S

ecurity C ouncil w

enr furrher in its efforts ro highlighr the im

pact of w ar on w

om en, particularly in rhe area of gender-based violence.

R esolution 1820 called for the "im

m ediare and com

plete halt to acrs of sexual violence." The resolution further declared that "civilians account for the vast m

ajority of those adyersely affected by arm ed conflict; rhar w

om en and girls are

particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a racric of w ar ro

hum iliate, dom

inate, instiil fear in, disperse andf or forcibly relocare civilian m

em bers of a com

m uniq, or ethnic groøp; and rhat sexual violence perpetratecl in

this m anner m

ay in som e instances persist after the cessation of hostiiities"

(em phasis added). S

peaking for rhe U nited S

tates (w hich helcl the S

ecuriry C oun-

cil presidency that m onrh), S

ecretary of S tare C

ondoleezza fuce s¡ated rhar "w e

affirm that sexual violence profoundly affecrs nor only rhe health ancl safery of

w om

en) but the econom ic and social srability of their narions." A

s w irh R

esolu- tion 1325, R

esolution 1820 calls on the relevanr U N

agencies ro consult w irl-r

w om

en and w om

en's organizations, and include w om

en in decision-m aking pro-

cesses to deal w ith peace and the post-conflict restrucruring ofa country's social,

econom ic, and political institurions and sysrem

s.247 -¡6"t" rw o S

ecurity C ouncii

resolutions are exam ples of the evolution and application of an inrernarional

norm of acceptable behavior (and condem

narion of unacceprable behavior) pro- m

oted by an internationai organizarion in seeking ro m ediate conflicrs, by tak-

ing into account the im pact of conflicts on w

om en ancl rhe need ro include

w om

en at the peace negotiations ancl posr-confiict social, econom ic, ancl politi-

cal institutions. N

ongovernm enta"I

organizacions (N G

O s) are usually involved w

ith distribur- ing hum

anitarian supplies to civilian victim s of ethnic conflicts. B

ut in acldidon to this, in their efforts to resolve conflicrs, N

G O

s; through the provision of "good offices," can prom

ote dialogue betw een the w

arring parties.24g H ow

ever,

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 69

N G

O s are lim

ired in their effect because extrem ists often attem

pt to unclerm ine

agreelxents concludect by m oderates. In that case, coercive m

easures m ay be

neecled, anct N G

O s do not have these coercive resources at their disposal.2a9

In assessing the success of rnediation in internal conflicts, scholars have founcl that the record is m

ixed. M ichael B

row n and C

hantal cte Jonge O udraat

note several factors necessary for successful m ediation, including "a clear strat-

egy" of rhe m ecliators (clear political objectives, icleas of how

best to achieve those objecrives, inclucling how

to form an international consensus), preference of at

least one sicle to tl-re conflict for "talking ro fighting," and m ecliators that have

leverage over the w arring parties (both indr-rcem

ents and punishm ents).2s0 E

ven w

hen agreem ent is reachecl, there is alw

ays the problem of irnplem

entation and

enforcem enc of the agreernent. S

om etirnes w

arring parties are not really inter- ested in a settlem

ent) preferring to use the negotiation process as a m eans to buy

rirne for im proving their n-rilitary situation. D

ue to the significant clistrust that perm

eates the relationship betw een the disputants, there is also the possibiliry

that one or rnore parties to the agreem ent w

ill cheat (for exam ple, groups w

ill w

ithhold w eapons ir-r case they need them

if fighting resum es). A

clditionall¡ leaclers m

ay not be able to control the actions of their m ore extrem

ist follow ers,

w l-ro m

ay prefer to fight than to seek peace.Zsl Finall¡ m ediarion is often unsllc-

cessful because the international com m

unity is unw illing "to provide m

ediators w

irh the econom ic, logistical, police, and m

ilitary support needed to oversee the process of disarm

am ent, integration of the arm

ed forces, reparriation of refu- gees, ancl holding ofgeneral elections."252

N oncoercive lntervention. N

oncoercive incervention involves actions by interna- tional actors that inclucle positive and negative inducem

ents to get the P arlies in

conflict to end their fightir-rg. E m

phasizing interr-rational norm s of acceptable

behavior is neecled. International actors can ostracize states and actors that clo not follow

these international norm s.253 S

pecificall¡ the international com m

unity can provide intelligence inform

ation to parties to the conflict they suP P

ort, as w

ell as decline to provide diplom atic slrpport. Internarional actors can also clecide

not to give econornic assistance. 'fhe "clenial or threatenecl denial of recognition" of the parties to conFlict is another type of nor-rcoercive intervention.2s4

International actors can provicle inducem ents ro groups in conflict in order

to change their behavior to one of cooperation and peace. For exam ple, follow

ing the coilapse of the S

ovier U nion the new

ly inclependent states of E stonia and

Law ia both passecl citizenship law

s nraking it l-rarcl for R ussians living in those

countries to becom e citizens. B

ut w hen both E

stonia and Latvia w anted to join

the E uropean U

nion, they reversed their resrrictive citizenship law s so as not to

discrim inate against ti're ethnic R

ussians in their countries.255

70 E thnic C

onflict

International actors can offer foreign aid as a m eans to prevent and m

anage ethnic conflict. A

id can assist in developm ent projects, such as an irrigation sys-

tem as in the caselof S

ri Lanka, w hich had been enm

esl-red in ethnic conflict betw

een the S inhalese and Tam

ils. The S inhalese and Tan-ril farn-rers needed to

cooperate to fix the irrigation system . The fanners perceived that in cooperating

to repair the system , both sicles w

ould benefit equally. A s E

sm an notes, ethnic

conflicr m ay be prevented in cases w

here projects are considered to be m urually

beneficial and lead to interdependence am ong ethnic groups.2s6

Foreign aid's influence in preventing conflict, how ever, is lim

iteci as donors w

orry that providing such aid m ay draw

them into the politics of the country in

conflict. M oreover, foreign aicl often benefirs one group over another, so rather

than reducing conflict, foreign aid m ay actually increase conflict as groups per-

ceive that they are not benefiting at the sarne level as another and respond w ith

increased violence. For exarnple, the S ri Lankan governlnent w

as able to obtain foreign aid for their M

ahaw eli irrigation project, located in territory dom

inatecl by the Tam

ils. Insteacl of letting the project benefit the Tam ils, the governm

ent relocarecl S

ri Lankan settlers to the territory. The Tam ils perceived a threat from

the actions oF the gqvernm ent, and rebelled.zs7

In general, noncoercive intervention is lim ited in its effects on the w

arring parties. O

n the positive side, such inten'entions, according to R othchild and

Lake, increase the costs to ethnic leaders in playing on ethnic sentirnents as w

ell as present the e¡hnic leaders w ith reason for accepting international

norm s so that they can gain "recognition, acceptance, and inclusion in the

international com m

unity." B ut w

hen conflicts are particularly severe, noncoer- cive intervention is unlikely to be successful. "The m

ost that noncoercive in¡er- vention can do in such situations is to create a clim

ate in w hich ethnic appeals

and violer-rce are perceived by all as illegitim ate and, therefore, m

arginally less likely to 1r" ,tr.¿.r'258

C oerctve lntervention. C

oercive intervention to encl ethnic conflict includes peace- keeping operations, m

ilitary assistance, arm s em

bargoes, econom ic sanctions,

tribunals, and m ilitary force.259 A

s B yrnan notes, international actors "can fulfill

three roles: they can protect ancl succor the victim s of the oppressive governm

ent; they can help alter the balance of pow

er on the ground, enabling a group to defend itself (oFren as a prelude to or part of a partition plan); or they can heip change the governm

ent, putting in pow er a new

regim e that w

ill be m ore w

illing and able to create peace am

ong hosrile com rnunal groups."260 International

gov- ernm

ental organizations (IG O

s), both regional (that is, the E uropean U

nion, A

frican U nion) and global (that is, the U

nited N ations), can be perceived as m

ore politically legitim

ate, as w

ell as better able to deal w ith the problem

s arising from

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 7l

burclen sharing, in com parison to individual states. C

oncerns over the abiliry to build coalitions of states w

illing to act, over the need to obtain financing for peacekeeping operations, ancl over negative dom

estic public opinion are ever P res-

enr. Y et, as R

othchilcl and Lake acknow ledge, because intervention by clefinition

is a shared effort, resistance both at hom e and abroad rr'aybe dam

pened.26l In attem

pting to be peacem akers, outside P

ow ers often run into difficulties in

the long term . A

large num ber of forces are needed to P

revent the resum ption of

violence, and there are "burdensom e rules of engagem

enr." In aclclition, chere is no ciear tim

e cornm itm

ent as to how long the international forces w

ill be deployed. Interventions focused on peacetnaking do "little to foster a political serrlem

ent or nation-bLlr\ding."262 M oreover, such interventions do little to end

rhe vioience, as w arring parties can hicle their w

eapons. D isanning groups does

nor Ltsually increase their securit¡ but in fact can reduce their security ifthey lear the future. W

hen groups are disarm ed, the balance of pow

er can shift dram ati-

cally if even a sm ail num

ber of w eapons are sm

uggled in by one grouP to the

detrim ent of another.263 R

esertling people w ho w

ere ctisplaced during the con- flict, another goal of incervention, is challenging. H

aving experienced hostile intentiolls of other ethnic groups, how

can returnees feel safe and secure w hen

they go hom e? R

eturnees m ay face violence Ltpon their return, as w

as the case of rhose R

w andans w

ho irad lled to Zaire during the genocide. \X /hen they returned,

m any w

ere killed.26a A

s notecl above, coercive intervention includes actuai and threatened use of m

ilitary force to stop the fighting. G rieg and R

egan found that w arring P

arties w

ere highly likely to accept offers oF m ediation w

hen third parties threatened rnilitary intervention.265 E

xternal actors can provide m ilitary sLlpport co one side

for security and protection against another ethnic group, rhereby shifting the balance of pow

er betw een the w

arring parties. M ilitary suP

P ort that shifts rhe

balance of pow er (usually tow

ard the w eaker side) can lead both sides to the con-

flict to m oderate their positions.266 w

hen N A

TO inrervened on behalf of the

B osnian M

uslirns and C roats in 1"995, B

osnian S erbs m

oderated their dem ands

(though the C roats, now

em boldened by N

A TO

's suP P

ott, increased their dernands).267 E

nforcem ent of an agreem

ent can also com e about from

coercive intervention, as such intervention provides sorely needed credibility.26s

W hether using coercive or noncoercive m

eans, international actors intervene w

ith the hopes of affecring rhe oLrtcom e of an internal conflict. O

tttcom es of a

conflict include the regim e type, the econom

ic system , as w

ell as the autonom y

or independence of an ethnic group.269 Internationai actors need to consider intervention so as to lessen the effecrs of such conflicts on neighboring states. E

conom ic instability and refugees m

ay incluce neighboring states to take aclvantage ofrhe conflict and take aggressive actions for their ow

n interests

72 E thnic C

onflict

(for exam ple, provicling assistance ro rebels, invading rl-re country). Inrervention

by international actors can clissuade such behavior by neighboring scares.27O Im

portantl¡ as B rôw

n ancl cte Jonge O uclraat argLre, internationai in¡ervention

should focus on cooperative (noncoercive) m eans first, given that coercive inter-

vention "is m ore expensive ancl riskier." They contencl that w

hen the conflict has led to crim

es against hum anity (for exam

ple, genocic{e or rargering of civilians) or vital interests are at stake, rhen coercive rreans shoulcl be used.z7l

G iven that internal conflicts resulr from

insecuriries of the m inoriry or sub-

ordinate, groups as a result of the governm ent's policies, K

auFm an argues rhat

external actors can ellcolrrage governm ents to institute policies that reassure the

suborclinate groups that they neecl not fear their extinction. P olicies of reassur-

ance include econom ic aid ro the group "conclitionecl on peacefr-rl m

anagem ent

of the ethnic dispute."z72 In cases in w hich one erhnic grolrp w

anrs dom inance

over the other groups, external actors can engage in deterrence, nam ely threaten-

ing to provicle support for the sltborclinare groups. In doing so, rhey can induce both groups to m

oclerate tl-ieir clem ancls, ancl thus reduce the m

lltLlal perception of threat.z73 \K

/hen dealing w ith belligerent elites, exrernal acrors can use both

inclucem ents and pr¡nishm

ents as m eans ro change elite behavior, especially if

such elites have engaged in ethnic outbiciclirrg. Inclncem enrs enable elires to

rem ain in pow

er (as instrum encalist approaches to ethnic conflict rrake clear,

elites ofren use ethnicity ancl nationalisrn as m eans to obtain and rem

ain in pow

er). The problem rernains, how

ever, if the belligerenr elire, having sroked m

ass resentm enf and anger, is unable to back dow

n. M oreover, external ac¡ors

m ay be disinclined to provicle inclucernents to ethnic extrernists out of concern

for rew arcling aggressive b eltavior.27 4

P artition as an lnternattonal R

esponse to D em

ands for self-determ ination. -Ihe

dom estic level section earlier in this chapter acldressed clom

estic insritr-rrional arrangem

ents that rnay be instituted in an effor¡ to m anage and settle ethnic con-

flicts. In m any w

ays, these arrangem ents are a function of the international com

- m

unity's bias in favor of m aintaining territorial bor-rnclaries of states.27s yet,

partition, in w hich the state's territorial boundaries are redraw

n, is an oprion available to deal w

ith ethnic confiict w hen groups seei< ro secede or m

ake irreden- tist claim

s on territory in w hich their erhnic kin reside. E

xam ples include tl're

partition of P alestine thar creared Israel in 1948 and rhe esrablishm

enr of a K urd-

ish safe haven in northern Iraq in rhe 1990s. B yrnan argues that parririon m

ay be better at reclucing, if not preventing, blooclshecl. A

s rnany scl-rolars note, the his- torical record on the slrccess of partition in ending violence is m

ixec1.276 A t rhe

sam e tim

e, studies on partition find that states resulting From successful parti-

tion are m ore likely to rrove row

arcl denocracy.z77

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 73

There are several argum enrs opposing P

artition. P artirion could lead to

an escalarion of the conflict, particularly if civil institutions are w eak and

erhnic m inorities are disenfranchised. P

artition could lead to additional self- determ

ir-ration and inclepenclence m ovem

ents as groLrP S

now in the new

state seek ro fonn their ow

n state. P artition w

eakens the possibility of dem ocracy as

rhe new ethnic m

ajori¡ies cliscrim inate against the m

inorities now residing in

rhe new state. P

opulation rransfers neecled to seP arate the groups are likely

ro be rraum atic. There is the question of w

hether the new state w

ill be politi- cally and econom

ically viable. Finall¡ an internal w ar now

becom es an interna-

rional w ar betw

een new countries as a result of P

artitton.z7g The argum

enrs in favor of partition include ending the issues that contributed ro conflict betw

een groups, as the grollps are now seP

arated. O ccasionall¡ other

oprions m ay not be possible, especially if the central governm

ent is severely w eak-

ened and unstable, ancl thus unable ¡o m aintain order. W

hile dom estic institu-

rions such as federalism and consociationalism

are possible (as discussed in che clom

estic level section), their actual im plem

entation is often quite problem atíc.279

\X /hen the iclentities of the population are incom

patible, conflict is likely to re- escalare ancl clem

ocratrzatior^ difficult to em erge.2S

o In an analysis com P

aring partition, alrtonom

y, and de facto separation of populations in conflicts from 1900 to 2002, Tl-rom

as C hapm

an and P hilip R

oeder found that the reduction of the incom

patibility of national identities w

as m ore likely to happen w

ith partition as opposecl to auconom

y or de facto separation. This is so because both autonom y

and cle facro separatior-r en-rbolclen "ethnopoliticians as national leaders w ithin

an alttonom ous hom

elancl or a de facto entity on one side of the ceasefire line" ancl allow

for the m ainrenance of separate (and hardened) identities.2sl U

nlike solutions rhat m

aintair-r existing territorial borders in w hich conflicting grouP

s m

ust m ake clecisions together on resources, political reP

resentation, P ositions in

the executive, etc., paftition cloes noc entail the neecl for joint decision m aking

betw een the parties now

that they no longer reside in the sam e terrítory.zgz

Furtherm ore, partition that separates the w

arring parties, according to C haim

K aufinann, decreases the m

otivations as w ell as the P

rosP ects for continued con-

flict. M oreover, separating the w

arring parties reduces the potential for ethnic cleansing.z83 A

s B ym

an contends, "Intervention to bolsrer such failed states is as im

m oral as it is hopeless. H

elping deconstruct these stares, on che other hand, m

ay be the m osr practical and hum

ane solution to recurring civil w ars."284

The international com m

unity can thus play a favorable role in P rom

oting P ar-

tition as an option w iren all other options are not possible in order to end the

fighting. Then, in aclclition to recognizing the new state, the international com

- m

uniry can assist in "population transfers, provide for border security, and P ress

for guaranrees of m inority rights" (as there are likely to be ethnic m

inorities in the

74 E thnic C

onflict

new ly partitioned scates).28s A

s C hapm

an and R oeder found in rheir stud¡ the

level of dem ocracy w

as m uch higher for parties to partition, and dem

ocracy m ea-

sures w ere higher iir the post-conflict stage reiative to the pre-conflict stage. They

observed that the new states established as a result of partition "w

ere rnore likely than other new

states to be born dem ocratic and ro enjoy m

ore years of posrinde- pendence dem

ocracy."286 In the end, of course, resolving the significant ethnic tensions m

ay not be possible; as C arter Johnson astutely rem

arks, "it is not clear w

hether this is in anyone's pow er." S

eparating the w arring parties does reduce the

security threat, and w ith the security threat recluced, m

oderare poliricians m ay

then have an opportunrty to act.287 Im portantl¡ asJohnson founcl in his study of

partitions Follow ing ethnic civil w

ars (1945-2004), only com plete parririons, in

w hich the w

arring parties are separated, are likely ro lead ro peace.288

Lim itations of lnternational R

esponses to E nd lnternal E

thnic C onflict

In attem pting to deal w

ith ethnic disputes, conflicring groups often have fears for their future securiry as they cannot be com

pletely sure rhar the other parry or parties to the conflict w

ill nor renege on rhe agreem enr and resum

e fighting. E

thnic conflicts beçom e quite costly because, according to Jam

es Fearon, rhe m

ajoríty ethnic group is unable "to m ake a credible com

m irm

enr ro the m inoriry"

ethnic group. For exam ple, during the disintegrarion of Y

ugoslavia, C roatia's gov-

ernm ent engaged in behavior that underm

ined the S erb m

inoriry's securiry (including the use of the fascist U

stashe sym bols by the new

C roatian governm

enr and constitutional reform

s rhar favored ¡he C roadan m

ajoriry). W hile the C

roa- tian president, Franjo Tudjm

an, m ade verbal assllrances ro the S

erb m inoriry the

actual behavior of rhe governm ent threatened the S

erbs' security.z89 In such a case, groups w

ill need a thircl parLy ro provide a credible com m

irm enr ro any

agreem ent reached.29O

A s R

othchild and Lake observe, only w hen the groups in

conflict are convinced that tire external actors are com m

itted and w illing to

enforce the ethnic contract that ensures fairness for all ethnic groups "into the indefinite future" w

ill an external guaranree succeed. The fear of rhe furure loom s

larye-if groups in conflict fear that rhe ethnic conrracr that prorects rhem w

ill not continue in the future, such groups w

ill have litrle incentive ro lay dow n their

arm s, and the conflict w

ill continue.291 The problem

, as Fearon sees it, is that "internarion al organtzatíons w ill rarely

be able to m ake such com

m icm

ents creclib\e."292 C otrntries w

ith strong and w eak

interests in addressing the conflict face challenges in providing rhose glraranrees. S

trong countries intervening nay be perceived as raking sides (as w as rhe case

w ith U

.S . support for the B

osnian M uslim

s in opposirion to rhe B osnian S

erbs); w

eak countries are likely to lack the "poliricai srarnina to enforce a new erhnic

contract in the future" (for exam ple, rhe A

frican U nion's efforts to rnediate w

ith

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 75

Íegard to the conflict in S udan in w

hich the A U

does not have the econom ic or

m tlirary capabilities ro clo so).293 H

ow ever, Fearon does note that if the m

inority group has ethnic kin in a neighboring state that is pow

erful enough (for exam -

ple, the R ussian m

inority in E stonia can look to R

ussians in R ussia, w

ith its pow

erful ethnic kin), the m ajority ethnic grouP

m ay be incluced to m

âke a cred-

ibl..om -itroent to an agreem

ent.Zg4 For peace ro endure, the international com

m unity m

ust be w illing to com

m it

for rhe long haul.zgs The difficulty arises, as B row

n and de Jonge O uclraat col1-

tend, because international actors are not m otivatecl to act "in the early stages of

incernal conflicts, w hen levels of violence are low

ar-rd w inclow

s of oppoltunity are open." International actors consider taking actiolì w

hen the violence esca- lates, but at this stage, cor-rflict m

anagerrient becoÍnes m ore elusive.296

The role that external actors play in conflict prevention (focus on underlying problem

s that are the root of conflict and prom ote long-term

soiutions), conflict m

anagem ent (prevent conflicts from

escalating),292 ancl prom otion of peace is

im portant. \X

/hile involvem ent by the international cornm

unity is w elcom

e, con- flict m

anagem ent and resolution w

ill neeci to be accom plished by local parties to

the conflict, as they are the ones w ho w

ill, in m ost câses) rem

ain w ithin existing

rerricorial borders w hen the figl'rting ends, to solve the root causes of the con-

ilict.298 E xternal intervention (rnediation, noncoercive and coercive), according

ro R othchild and Lake, cannot overcom

e the strategic dilernrnas tl-rat leacl to fear and violence am

ong ethnic groups. \V hile inrernational âctors can "facilitate

com m

unication," inform arion failures are still possible. A

nd security dilem m

as are hard to m

inim ize by external actors w

hen one side to the internal conflict is facecl w

ith the incentive to engage in the preem P

rive Llse of force against another

etlrnic group.299 6" K aufm

an astr-rtely observes, "Thircl P arties cannot change

etl-rnically definecl grievances, negative srereotyP es, sym

bolic disputes, threaten- ing dernographic

trencls, or histories of ethnic clom ination in foreign counlries,

ancl they cannot elim inate the fears of extinction w

hich m ay result."3o0

In rhe encl, clurable peace rests on clom estic institutions established after rhe

figlrting encls. In an analysis of 111 civil w ars (1944-1999), B

um ba M

ukherjee Founcl rhar w

hile third-party enforcem ent m

atters for encouraging "the lihelihood of peace in the short run," ir is dom

estic institutions such as dem ocracy ancl

proportional representation that play the m ore crucial role "for søstainingpeace

in the long run" (em pl-rasis in original).301

C O

N C

LU S

IO N

This chapter has exam ined the literature at the intersection of com

parative poli- tics ancl international relations in an attem

pt to understand the causes of and

76 E thnic C

onflict

solutions ro ethnic conflict. Looking at individual, clom estic, anct internarional

level factors dem onstrates the com

plexiry of ethnic conflicts (in facr, all conflicts). The levels of analyüis fram

ew ork is the founclation of tl-re rem

aining chapters of the book as w

e explore five cases of ethnic conflict. H ow

ever, one cavear the reacler should keep in m

ind is rhar som etim

es rhe distinctions betw een one analydcal

ievel and another m ay not neatly m

atch the factors in an ethnic conflicr. The divi- sion betw

een ¡hese rhree levels helps us understand a conflicr, but not everything w

ill fit nicely into this categorization. In fact, it is the inreraction of these levels that m

akes undersrancling ethnic conFlict so difficult. For exam

ple, K aufm

an's w ork dem

onstrates that factors at different levels are necessary for ethnic conflicr ro em

erge: m ass hosriliry (dom

esric), belligerent elires (indiviclual), ancl a securiry dilem

m a (clom

esric); he also recognizes the role played by foreign parrons-an inrernarional level facror.302 4r H

arff ancl G urr

note, "E thnic conflict is not solely or even m

ainly a consequence of clom estic

politics. The poter-rtial for erhnic conFlicr, the issues ar srake, and even rhe lines ofcleavage betw

een contending groups have been shaped ancl reshaped by inter- national ".¡o.r.>r303 D

aniel D ruckm

an astutely ciaim s rhar group loyalty and

collective action "[c¡oss] the boundaries betw een levels of analysis, from

indi- viduals and sm

all inreracting groups ro collectiviries and narions."304 E lites play

a role in rnobilizing rhe m asses ro engage in conflict (for exam

ple, rhrough the use of dom

estic level factors such as ethnic polidcal parties, socioeconom ic con-

ditions, appeals to social identity of rhe group), and rnem bers of the inrerna-

tional com m

unity (individual states or international organizarions) som erim

es act to prevent ethnic conflicr bur ac orher rin-res supporr ethnic groups in rheir w

ar aim s. Thus, w

har w e propose is a m

ulrilevel analysis of erhnic conflict.30.5 A s

w ill be dem

onstrated in the case study chaprers rhar Follow , all three levels are

necessary to exam ine in order to understand ethnic cor-rflicr.

N O

TE S

1. J. D avid S

inger, "Internarional C onfiict: Three Levels of A

nalysis," rfforld P

olitics L2, no. 3 (A pril 1960): 453-461; J. D

avid S inger, "The Level-oÊ

A nalysis P

roblem in Internarional R

eladons," 'W oild P

olitics 14, no.1 (O cro-

ber 1961): 77-92; K ennerh W

akz, M an, tbe S

tate, and 'W ar: A

Tbeoretical A

naþsß (N ew

Y ork: C

olum bia U

niversiry P ress, 1959).

2. O le R

. H olsd, "The P

olirical P sychology of International politics: M

ore than a Luxur¡" P

olitical P sjtchologt 10, no. 3 (1989): 495-500. S

ee also S inger,

"The Level-of-A nalysis P

roblem in Inrernarional R

elations," 88-89. 3. Jercl A

. R osati, "The P

ow er of H

um an C

ognition in the S tudy of W

orld P

olitics," International S tødies R

euiew 2, no. 3 (A

utum n 2000): 47.

4. M ichael E

. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onflict: A n O

vervisw ," i¡

N ationølism

and E thnic C

onflict, ed. M ichael E

. B row

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., S

ean M . Lynn-Jones, and S

teven E . M

iller, rev. ed. (C am

bridge, M ass.: M

IT P

ress, 2001), 1"7.

5. Jean B londel, P

olitical Leadersbip: Tocuards a G eneral A

naþsis (London: S age,

re87). 6. C

arhy G orrnley-H

eenan, P

olitical Leadership and tbe N orthern Ireland P

eace

P rocess: R

ole, C apacitlt, ønd E

ffect (N ew

Y ork: P

algtave' 2007). 7. Lew

is J. E dinger, 'A

pproaches ro rhe C om

pararive A nalysis of P

olitical Leadership," R

euiew of P

olitics 52, no.4 (A uturnn 1990):5I2-5I3.

8. E dinger,'A

pproaches ro rhe C om

parativeA nalysis of P

olitical Leadersi-rip," 513-514.

g. R osati, ,.The P

ow er of H

um an cognidon in the S

rudy of w orlcl P

olitics," 48-50. S

ee also E dinger, 'A

pproaches ro the C om

parative A nalysis of

P olitical Leadership," 509-523; M

ark S hafer, "Im

ages and P olicy P

refer-

ences," P olitical P

sjtcholog L8, no. a Q 997): 873-829.

10. M any scholars have sruclied leaders' im

pact on foreign policy decision m ak-

ing, recognizing the im portance of the individual level of analysis. Though

by no m eans an exhaustive list, eviclence of this bocly of w

ork can be founcl in a special issue of International S

títdies R euieø, w

hich publishecl six articles on leaders and foreign policyrnaking' "Leaders, G

roups, and C oalitions:

U nclerstanding the P

eople and P rocesses in Foreign P

olicym aking," Interna'-

tional S tudies R

euieø 3, no. 2 (S um

m er 2001): 5-250.

11. R osati,,,The P

ow er of H

um an cognirion in rhe study of w

orld P olitics,"

56-s7. 12. G

eorge W . B

ush, "P resident D

elivers S tate of the U

nion A ddress" (January

29, 2002), http: f I geor gew bush-w

hi tehous e' archives' gov/new

s/releases/ 20 02 I 0 I I 20020129 - 1.l.hrm

l. L3. R

osari, ,,The P ow

er of H um

an cognition in the study of w orld P

oli- tics," 66.

14. R osati, "The P

ow er of H

um an C

ognition in the S tudy of W

orld P oli-

ttcsr" 67. 15. R

osati, "The P ow

er of H um

an C ognition in the S

tudy of \V orld

P olitics," 59.

L6. R osati, ,,The P

ow er of H

um an cognition in rhe srudy of \[/orld P

olitics," 60. S

ee also fuchard K . H

errm ann and M

ichael P . Fischerkeller, "B

eyond the E

nem y Im

age and S piral M

odel: C ognitive-strategic

R esearch after the

C old W

ar," Internøtional O rgønization 49, no.3 (S

um m

er 1995): 415-450; D

aniel D ruckm

an, "N ationalism

, P atriotism

, and G roup Loyalqt A

S ocial

P sychological P

erspective," M ersbon International

S hl'dies R

euiew 38 (1994):

43-68.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 77

78 E thnic C

onflict

17. N oel K

aplow itz, "P

sychopolirical D im

ensions of Inrernarional R elarions:

Tlre R eciprocal E

ffeccs of C onflict S

raregies," Internøtional S tudies Q

uarteþ 28, no. 4 (D

eèernber I98$: 376,377. 18. D

ruckm an, "N

ationalism , P

atriotism , and G

roup Loyalt¡" 55. 19. S

hannon Lindsey B lanton, "Im

ages in C onflicr: The C

ase of R onalcl R

ea- gan ancl E

l S alvador," International S

trdies Q uarteþ a0 $99Q

: aI. 20. Jam

es D . Fearon ancl D

avid D . Lairin, "V

iolence and rhe S ocial C

onsrruc- tion of E

tl-rnic Idenrit¡" Internøtionøl O rganízation 54, no. 4 (A

urum n 2000):

853-854. S ee also M

iltonJ. E sm

an, A n Introrluction

to E tbnic C

onflict (M alden,

M ass.: P

olity P ress, 2004) 33-34.

21. Fearon ancl Lairin, "V iolence and the S

ocial C onstrucrion of E

thnic lden- tiry" 855. S

ee also A shurosh V

arshne¡ "N arionalism

, E rhnic C

onflicr, ancl R

ationalit¡" P erspectiues on P

olitics 1, no. 1 (M arch 2003): 87-88.

22. Fearcn and Laitin, "V iolence ancl the S

ocial C onsrrucrion of E

rhnic Iden- dry" 855-856.

23. S tuartJ. K

aufm an, "S

piraling ro E thnic \V

ar: E lites, M

asses, and M oscow

in M

oldova's C ivil W

ar," Interna.tiond.l S ecw

ritl 2L, no.2 (Fa,II L996): 109. 24. Ted R

obert G qrr, "\X

/hy M inorities R

ebel: A G

lobal A nalysis of C

om m

unal M

obilization and C onflict since 1945," International P

olitical S cience R

euiew 14, no.2 (A

pril 1993): 167. 25. M

arc H ow

arcl R oss, "The R

elevance of C ulture for rhe S

rudy of P olirical

P syclrology and E

thnic C onflict," P

olitical P slchologt 18, no. Z (L997):309.

26. R oss, "The R

elevance of C ulture for rhe S

tucly of P olirical P

sychology and E

thnic C onflict," 304-305. S

ee also G avan D

uffy ancl N icole Lindstrom

, "C

onFlicting Identities: S oliclary Incenrives in the S

erbo-C roatian \X

/ar," Journal of P

eace R esearcb 39, no. I (2002): 70.

27. R oss, "The R

elevance of C ulture for the S

tudy of P olirical P

sychology and E

thnic C onflict," 319.

28. S tephen V

an E vera, "H

yporheses on N ationalism

and W ar," in N

ationalism and E

thnic C onflìct, ed. M

ichael E . B

row n, O

w en R

. C oreJr., S

ean M . Lynn-Jones,

and S teven E

. M iller, rev. ed. (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress, 2001), 48,53. 29. Y

an E vera, "H

ypotheses on N ationalism

and W ar," 53.

30. Fearon ancl Laitin, "V iolence and rhe S

ocial C onstruction of E

thnic Iden- tit¡" 864-865.

31. Fearon and Laitin, "V iolence and the S

ocial C onsrrucrion of E

rhnic lden- tit¡" 865.

32. D avid A

. Lake and D onald R

othchild, "spreacling Fear: The G enesis of

Transnational E thnic C

onflict," rnTbe Internøtional S pread of E

thnic C onflict:

Fea4 D iffusion, and E

scalation, ed. D avicl A

. Lake and D onald R

orhchild (P

rinceton: P rinceron U

niversiry P ress, 1998), 19.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 79

33. Lake ancl R othchild, "S

preadingFear," 2O .

34. D aníel L. B

yrnan, K eeping tbe P

eace: Lasting S oløtions to E

thnic C onflicts (B

alni' m

ore: Jol-rns H opkins U

niversity P ress, 2002) 35.

15. B ynran, K

eeping the P eace,38. S

ee also S tephen M

. S aidem

an, "E xplaining

rhe Inrernational R elations of S

ecessionist C onflicts: V

ulnerability versus E

thnic Tres," Internd'tional O rganization

51, no. 4 (A utum

n 1997):721-753' 36. K

aufrnan, "spiraling ro E thnic W

ar," L09. 37. K

al:'fir'an, "S piraling to E

thnic W ar," Il4.

38. K anfm

an, "spiraling to E thnic W

ar," II7-118. 39. D

avíd C arm

ent and P arrick Jam

es, "Internal C onstraints and Interstate

E thnic C

onflícq" Jou.rnal of C onflict R

esoløtion 39, no. 1 (M arch 1995): 87. S

ee

also Lake and R othchild for a discussion of elites' use of diversionary w

ars, "S

preacling Fear," 31. 40. C

arm ent anclJam

es, "Internal C onstraints and Interstate E

thnic C onflict,"

90. 41. Lake and R

othchild, "S preading Fear," 31.

42. C ar-;rrent andJam

es, "Internal C onstraints and Interstate E

thnic C onflict,"

91..

43. C arrnent anclJam

es, "Inrernal C onstraints and Interstate E

C hnic C

onflict," 93.

44. B ym

an, K eeping tbe P

eace, 129. 45. U

lrich S chneckener, "M

aking P ow

er-S haring W

ork: Lessons from S

uccesses

and Failures in E thnic C

onflict R egulation," Joørnal of P

eace R esearch 39,

r-ro. 2 (M arch 2002):224.

46. S chneckener, "M

aking P ow

er-S harrng W

ork," 224. 47. S

chneckener, "M aking P

ow er-S

haring W ork," 225.

48. B ym

an, K eeping the P

eace, 81. 49. B

yraan, K eeping the P

eace, 82. 50. B

ym an, K

eeping the P eace, 96-97.

51. S tephen John S

tedm arr, "spoiler P

roblem s in P

eace P rocesses," in N

ational' ism

and E thnic C

onflict, ed. M ichael E

. B row

n, O w

en R . C

oteJr', S ean M

. Lynn- Jones, and S

teven E . M

iller, rev. ed. (C am

bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress, 2001), 366. 52. S

tedm an also m

entions the tyP e of spoilers (lim

ited, greed¡ total) and "locus of che spoiler problem

" (spoiler as leader or follow er). S

tedm an,

"spoiler P roblem

s in P eace P

rocesses," 369-372. 53. S

tedm an, "spoiler P

roblem s in P

eace P rocesses," 374-375.

54. Frederic S . P

earson, "D im

ensions of C onflict R

esolution in E thnopolitical

D ispuces," /ou.rnal of P

eace R esearcb 38, no. 3 (2001): 28O

.

55. K enneth A

rrow , S

ocial C hoice and Indiuiduøl V

aløes (N ew

Y ork: !Ø

iley and S

ons,1951).

80 E

thnic C onflict

56. D onald L. H

orow itz, E

tbnic G roøps in C

onflict (B erkeley: U

niversiry of C ali-

fornia P ress, 1985) 653,657.

57. H orow

it z, E titnic G

roups in C onflict, 186-194.

58. A ndrew

R eynolds and Tim

orhy D . S

isk, "E lecrions and E

lectoral S ystem

s: Im

plications for C onflicr M

anagem ent," in E

lections and. C onflìct M

anage- m

ent in A fricø, ed. Tim

othy D . S

isk and A ndrew

R eynolds (\X

/ashington D

.C .: U

nited S rates Institure of P

eace, 1998), LI,36. 59. M

ichael J. S oclarno, C

om parøtiue P

olitics: A G

lobal Introdøction (B oston:

M cG

raw -H

ill, 2008), 274. 60. R

eynolds and S isk, "E

lecrions and E lectoral S

ysrem s: Im

plicarions for C on-

flict M anagem

enf.') 61. Tim

othy S isk, D

em ocrøtization in S

outh A frica: Tbe E

lusiue S ocial C

ontract (P

rinceton: P rinceton U

niversity P ress, 1995).

62. G at:riel A

. A lm

ond, R ussell J. D

alton, G . B

ingham P

ow ell Jr., and K

aare S

trom , "Interest A

rticulation," in C om

pørutiue P olitics Todajt: A

\X lodd V

iew , ed.

G abriel A

. A lm

ond, R ussell J. D

alron, G . B

ingham P

ow ell Jr., and K

aare S

trom , 8th ed. (N

ew Y

ork: P earson Longm

an, 2006),65. 63. S

odarno, C om

paratiue P olitics, 283.

64. A trow

, S ocial C

hoice and Indiuidøøl V alues.

65. A nthony D

ow ns, A

n E conom

ic Theorjt of D em

ocracl (N ew

Y ork: H

arper ancl R

ow , 1957).

66. M ancur O

lson, The Logic of C ollectiue A

ction: P øblic G

oods and the Theory of G

roups (C am

bridge, M ass.: H

arvard U niversiry P

ress, I97l),21.. 67. O

lson, Tbe Logic of C ollectiue A

ction. 68. O

lson, The Logic of C ollectiue A

ction,6L 69. Jam

es G . M

arch andJohan P . O

lsen, "The N ew

Insritutionalism :

O rgani-

zatronal Facrors in P olirical Lífe," A

m erican P

olitical S cience R

euiew 78

Q e8\:738.

70. M arch and O

lsen, "The N ew

Institutionalrsm ," 742.

71,. M arch and O

lsen, "The N ew

Institutionalrsm ," 747.

72. G eorge Tsebelis, V

eto P lalers: H

ow P

olitical Institøtions W ork (P

rrnceron: P rince-

ton U niversity P

ress, 2002), 2. 73. M

ark K esselm

an, Joel K rieger, and \X

/illiam A

. Joseph, "Inrroducing C om

- parative P

olitics," in Introdøction to C

om paratiue P

olitics, ecl. M ark K

esselm an,

Joel K rieger, and \[/illiam

A . Joseph, 3rd ed. (B

osron: H oughton M

ifflin, 2004),8.

74. Jam es M

arch and H erberr S

im on, O

rganizations (N ew

Y ork: W

iley and S ons,

1es8). 75. M

arch and S im

on, O rganizations

76. S teven E

. Lobell and P hilip M

auceri, "D iffusion and E

scalation of E rhnic

C onflict," ín E

thnic C onflict and International P

olitics: E xplaining D

ffision and,

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 8l

E scalation, ed. S

teven E . Lobell and P

hilip M auceri (N

ew Y

ork: P algrave,

2004), l. //.

E sm

an, A n lntrod.øction to E

tbnic C onflict, 3.

78. E sm

an, A n Introdøction

to E *tnic C

onflict, 3. 79. E

sm an, A

n Introduction to E thnic C

onflict,75. S tuart K

aufm an argues that

there are several necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for ethnic con- flict: "ethnically defined stereotypes, negative stereorypes, dem

ographic threats, histories of ethnic dom

ination, em otion-laden ethnic sym

bols, reciprocal fears of group extinction,

de facto political anarcI7y, and political space and m

ilitary m eans [o act." The three proxim

ate callses of ethnic w ar

are m ass hostiliry belligerent elites, and security dilem

m as. K

aufm an, "S

pi- raling to E

rhnic W ar," ll4.

80. Jack S nyder, 'A

verting A narchy in the N

ew E

urope," rn Tbe C old W

ar and A

fter, ed. S ean M

. Lynn-Jones (C am

bridge, M ass.: M

IT P ress, l99l), L24.

81. S tephen V

an E vera, "P

rim ed for P

eace: E urope after the C

oldW ar," inThe

C old W

ar and A fter, ed. S

ean M . Lynn-Jones (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress, L99r),2r4-2t5.

82. Ted R obert G

urr, "The R evolution-S

ocial-C hange

N exus: S

om e O

ld Theo- ries and N

ew H

ypotheses," C

om pøratiue P

olitics 5, no. 3 (A priI 1973): 359-

392;'Ied R obert G

urr, "W 'hy M

inorities R ebel: A

G lobal A

nalysis of C

om m

unal M obilization and C

onflicc S ince 1945," International P

oliticøl S

cience R euiew

14, no.2 (A pril 1993): 1,61,-20L.

83. S ee also John H

utchinson and A nthony D

. S m

ith, "Introduction," in E th-

niciry, ed.John H utchinson and A

nrhony D . S

m ith (O

xford: O xford U

niver- sity P

ress, 1996), 3-I4, 84. B

row n, "The C

auses of Internal C onflict," 5.

85. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onflict," 5. 86. B

row n, "The C

auses of Internal C onflict," 5-6.

87. B arry R

. P osen, "The S

ecurity D ilem

m a and E

thnic C onflict," S

øruiaal 35, no. 1 (S

pring 1993):28. 88. P

osen, "The S ecurity D

ilem m

a and E rhnic C

onflict," 38. S ee also B

ym an,

K eepingthe

P eace, 17-22; K

aufm an, "S

piraling to E thnic W

ar," L08-L38. 89. M

yron R othbart, "Intergroup P

erception and S ocial C

onflict," in C

onflict betøeen P eople and G

roøps: C a.øses, P

rocesses, and R esoløtions, ed.

S tephen W

orchel andJefîrey A . S

im pson (C

hicago: N elson-H

all ,1993), 93-L09.

90. D ean G

. P ruitt, "D

efinition of the S ituacion as a D

eterm inant of Inter-

national A ction," in International B

ehauior: A S

ocial-P slchological A

naþsi5 ed. H

erberc C . K

elm an (N

ew Y

ork: H olt, funehart and W

inston, L965), 393-432; D

eborah W . Larsen, "Trust and M

issed O pportunities in Inter-

national R elations," P

olitical P rycbolog l8 (L997): 72I. B

ym an argues that

82 E thnic C

onflict

the security dilem m

a is berrer understood "as an explanation for the co1Ìtinuation of conflict or for escalation of existing tension to violence rather than å, o.. for w

hy peaceful societies sucldenly becom e violenr,,

(K eeping the P

eace, 19). 91. B

row n, "The C

auses of Inrernal C onflíct," 6-7.

92. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onflict," 7. 93. B

row n, "The C

auses of Internal C onflicr," 8.

94. E sm

an, A n Introdøction

to E tbnic C

onflict. C layron P

eoples exam ines dara For

m ore than tw

o hundred grollps and one hundred countries, focusing on m

inoriry groups and types of cliscrim ination ar-rd their relarionship to

interethnic violence. S ee C

layron D . P

eoples, "H ow

D iscrim

inarory P

olicies Im

pact Interethnic V iolence: A

C ross-N

arional, G roup-Level A

nalysis,,, Internøtional Joørnal of S

ociolog 3 4, no. 1 (S

pring 2004): 7 I-9 6. 95. P

eoples, "H ow

D iscrirninatory

P olicies Lnpact Interethnic V

iolence," 73. 96. B

ym an, K

eepingtbe P eace,3I-32; Ilan P

eleg, D em

otøtizingtbe H egem

onic S tate:

P olitical Tiansform

ation in the A ge of Identitlt (C

am bridge: C

am bridge U

niver- siry P

ress, 2007). 97. B

row n, "The Ç

auses of Inrernal C onFlict," 8.

98. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onflict," 8-9. 99. B

row n, "The C

auses of Internal C onflict," 9.

100. K risten P

. \X /illiam

s, '(IÍìrernarionalizarion oF E

rhnic C onflicr in rhe B

al- kans: The B

reakup of Y ugoslavia," ín E

thnic C onflict ancl International P

olitics: E

xpløining D ffitsion and E

scalation, ed. S teven E

. Lobell and P hilip M

auceri (N

ew Y

ork: P algrave, 2004),76; LenardJ. C

ohen, B rohen B

onds: The D isinte-

gration of Y ugosløuia (B

oulder: 'W esw

iew P

ress, 1993), 266. 101. B

row n, "lfhe C

auses of In¡ernal C onflict."

102. B row

n, "The C auses oFlnternal C

onflicr," 10.12. S ee also P

eoples, ,,H ow

D iscrim

inatory P olicies Im

pact Interethnic V iolence," 73.

103. E sm

an, A n Introduction to E

thnic C onflict, 79.

104. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onflict," 12. S ee also peoples, "H

ow D

is- crim

inatory P olicies Im

pact Inrerethnic V iolence," 23.

105. E sm

an, A n Introduction to E

tbnic C onflict,82.

106. B ym

an, K eeping the P

eace, 22. 107. E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E tbnic C

onflict,83, 139. 108. B

row n, "The C

auses of Internal C onfltct," L2.

109. B row

n, "The C auses of Internal C

onFiict," 12. 110. V

an E vera, "H

yporheses on N ationalism

and \X /aq" 50-51.

llr. Jay R

othm an and M

arie L. olson, "From lnreresrs ro Idenrities: Tow

ards a N

ew E

m phasis in Inreractive conflicr R

esolurion," Jottrnal of peace R esearch

38, no. 3 (2001):291.

1L2. S teven A

. \X /elclon, "The Institu¡ional C

ontext oF Tolerance for E thnic

M inorities: A

C om

parative, M ultilevel A

nalysis of lV estern E

urope," A m

eri- can Journal of P

olitical S cience 50, no. 2 (A

pril 2006): 332. Í3. Jeff S

pinner-H alev ancl E

lizabeth Theiss-M orse, "N

ational Identiry and S

elÊ E

steem ,"

P erspectiues on P

olitics L, no. 3 (S eptem

ber 2003): 519.

114. S pinner-H

alev and Theiss-M orse, "N

ational Identity and S elÊ

E steem

," 521. S

ee also Jeffrey R . S

eul, "'O urs Is the \X

/ay of G od': R

eligion, Identit¡ and Intergroup C

onflict,"/ol.rrnd,l of P ea,ce R

esearch 36, no. 5 (1999): 553-569.

115. W eldon, "The Institutional C

ontext of Tolerance for E thnic M

inorities," 333. 1ff. S

pinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse, "N ational Idendry and S

elÊ E

steern," 522.

ll7. E sm

an, A n Introdw

ction to E thnic C

onlTict, 89. 118. B

ym an, K

eepingthe P eace,23.

L19. Lake and R othchilcl, "spreading Fear," 7-8. S

ee also B ym

an on hegem onic

arnbitions as a cause of ethnic conflict. H e argues that hegem

onic conflict is "the m

ost clifficult type of conflict to solve." This is so because the sub- ordinate groups are expected to rem

ain suborctinate to the hegem onic

ethnic group (both in term s of status ancl security). B

ym an, K

eeping the P

eace,29-34. L20. Lake and R

othcl-rild, "spreading Fear," 4, 8-10. S tuart K

aufm an argues that

an ethnic securiry dilem m

a goes beyond the neorealist notion of a security dilem

m a-rather than anarchy and possible security threats leading ro the

dilem m

a, "an erhnic security dilernm a [also] requires reciprocal fears of

group extinction." S

ee K aufm

an, "S piraling to E

thnic W ar," ll2.

121. P eoples, "H

ow D

iscrim inatory P

olicies Im pact Interethnic V

iolence," 89, 92-93.

I22. M ichael E

. B row

n and C hantal de Jonge O

udraat, "Internal C onflict and

International A ction: A

n O vervieq" in N

øtionalism and E

thnic C onflict, ed.

M ichael E

. B row

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., S ean M

. Lynn Jones, and S teven E

.

M iller (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress,2001), 188. 123. B

ym an, K

eepingtbe P eace; E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E thnic C

onflict. 124. A

dam P

rzew orski, D

em otacl and the M

arhet: P olitical and E

conom ic R

eþrm s in

E astern E

ørope and Latin A m

ericø (C am

bridge: C am

bridge U niversiry P

ress, 1ee1).

L25. B arbara H

arff ancl Ted R obert G

ttr, E thnic C

onflict in W orld P

olitics, 2nd ed. (B

oulder: W estview

P ress, 2004), 182.

1.26. lJ.arff and G urr, E

thnic C onJlict in W

oild P olitics, 184.

I27. IJa$f and G urr, E

thnic C onflict in W

oild P olitics, 186.

128. S tefan W

olff , E tbnic C

onJlict: A G

lobal P erspectiue (O

xford: O xford U

niversity P

ress, 2006), 1,34-135. 129. E

sm an, A

n Introdw ction to E

tbnic C onflict, L72.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 83

84 E

thnrc C onflict

130. Ilan P eleg, "Transform

ing E thnic O

rders to P luralist R

egim es: Theoretical,

C om

parative, and, H istorical A

nalysis," irt D elnocracl and E

thnic C onflict:

A dt,ancing P

ôace in D eepþ D

iuided S ocieties, ecl. A

clrian G uelke (N

ew Y

ork: P

algrave, 2004), 7 -25 .

13L. P eleg, "Transform

ing E rhnic O

rders to P luralist R

egirnes." O n exclusionary

clom ination, see also E

sm an, A

n Introdctction to E tbnic C

onflict. L32. P

eleg, "Transform ing E

thnic O rclers to P

luralist R egim

es." L33. P

eleg, "Transform ing E

thnic O rders to P

luralist R egim

es," 12-13; Ilan P eleg,

'Jew islr-P

alestir-rian R elations in Israel: From

H egem

ony to E qualíqt?" Inter'

nøtional Journal of P olitics, C

u'lht're and S ocietl 17, no. 3 (S

pring 2004): 426-427. 1.34. E

lizabech C righton anct M

artha A bele M

ac Iver, "The E volution of P

ro- tracted E

thnic C onflict: G

roup D om

inance and P olicical U

nclerdevelop- m

ent in N orthern lreland and Lebanon," C

om pøratiue P

olitics 23, no. 2 (January l99l):128.

135. P eleg, "Transform

ing E thnic O

rders to P luralist R

egim es," 14.P

elegdistin- gr-rishes betw

een tw o types of hegem

or-ric regim es: m

ajority and m inority.

A m

ajority hegernonic regim e is defined as a state in w

hich one ethnic group is the."core nation." This "core nation" is abie to use the state lo m

aintain hegem onic rule and exciucle all other groups. In the case of

m inority hegem

onic regim es, the m

inority ethnic group is clom inant,

"negating the m ost basic rights of the m

ajorir¡ including the right of par- ticipating" in politics. In l¡oth câses, lhe state is exclusivist-one ethnic group (w

hether m ajority or n-rinority) dom

inates tire state and political institutions af the expense of other ethnic grouP

s. S uch states are undem

- ocratic. S

ee P eleg,'Jew

isl-r-P alestinian R

elations in Israel," 429. L36. P

eleg, "Transform ing E

thnic O rders to P

luralist R egim

es," 14; P eleg,

'Jew ish-P

alestinian R elations in Israel," 430. S

am m

y S m

ooha and Theodor H

anf define an ethnic dem ocracy as a state in w

hich one ethnic group is dom

inant, dom inance that is institutionalized. Im

portantl¡ they claim that

such a clem ocracy is clifferent "from

other types of dernocracy in according a structured superior status to a particular segm

ent of tl-re population and in regarding the non-dom

inant groups as iraving a relatively lesser claim to

the state and also as being not fully loyal." They continue, "Its m ost out-

standing m anifescations are restrictions on certain indiviclual and collective

rights ancl on the full expression of the national iclentity of the non-clom i-

nant grolrps." The state is not neutral. S am

m y S

m ooha and Tl'reodor H

anf, "The D

iverse M ocles of C

onflict-R egulation in D

eeply D ivided S

ocieties," International Joørnal of C

om paratiue S

ociologt 33, nos. L-2 (1992): 32. I37. P

eleg, "Transform ing E

thnic O rders to P

luralist R egim

es," 14;P eleg,"Jew

' ish-P

alestinian R elations in Israel," 430; E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E thnic

C onflict, 125-127.

I evels or A nalysis ¿nd l- lhnic C

onllicl 85

138. B ym

an, K eeping tbe P

eace, 30-31. 139. B

ym an, K

eepingthe P eøce,33.

140. P eleg, "Jew

ish-P alestinian R

elations in Israel," 430. 141. B

yrnan, K eeping the P

eace, 44-49. 142. B

ym an, K

eeping tlte P eace, 45-46; C

righton ancl M ac lver, "The E

volution of P

rotracted E ¡irnic C

onflict," 128. 143. P

eleg, "Transforrning E thnic O

rclers to P luralist R

egim es."

144. W illiam

FI. R iker, Liberølism

. against P opølisn (P

rospect H eights, Ill.: \X

/ave- lancl P

ress, 1982). 145. P

eleg,'Jew ish-P

alesrinian R

elations in Israel," 426-427. 146. fuker, Liberalism

against P opølism

. S ee also P

eleg, 'Jew ish-P

alestinian R

ela- tions in lsrael," 427.

147. P eleg, 'Jew

isl-r-P alestinian lìelations in Israel," 427.

148. fuker, Liberalism against P

opølism .

149. Jolrn G ibbons, S

panisb P olitics Tbdal (M

anchester: M anchester U

niversity P

ress, 1999). 150. Larry D

iam ond, Juan Linz, ancl S

eym our Lipset, "Introcluction:

\X /hat

M akes for D

em ocracy?" tn P

olitics in D eueloping C

ountries: C ornpa.r¡ng E

xperï ences u,itb D

em .oaaclt, ed. Larry D

iam ond, Juan Linz, and S

eym our Lipser,

2ncl ed. (B oulcier: Lynne R

ienner, L995). 151. D

iarnortd,Ltrtz, and Lipset, "Introduction: W hat M

akes for D em

ocracy?" 152. D

iam ond,Linz, ancl Lipset, "Introduction: W

ha¡ M akes for D

em ocracy?"

153. H orow

irz, E thnic G

roups in C onJlict.

154. S isk, D

em .ocratization in S

outh A frica.

155. B enjam

in R eill¡ D

em ocracy in D

iuided S ocieties: E

lectoral E ngineeringfor C

on-

flict M anagem

ent (C anbridee: C

am bridge U

niversity P ress, 2001).

156. P eleg, "Transform

ing E chnic O

rders to P luralist R

egirnes"; S m

ooha and H

ar-rf, "'Ihe D iverse M

odes of C onflict-R

egulatior-r in D

eeply D ivicled S

oci- eties," 33; E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E thnic C

onlTict, 155-156. 152 P

eleg, "Transforrning E thnic O

rders ¡o P luralist R

egim es."

158. S pinner-H

alev and Theiss-M orse, "N

ational lclentity ancl S elÊ

E steenl^," 524.

O n chis point see aiso Jonathan H

earn, R ethinhing N

øtionalism : A

C riticøl

Inn'oduction (N ew

Y ork: P

algrave M acm

ilian, 2006). H e states that "m

ore civic or liberal form

s of nationalism are hardly a-cultural but, in Fact, have

evolved out of a particlrlar culture-history and generally prom ote that

culture" (p 9O )

159. E srnan, A

n lntroduction to E tbnic C

onflict, 169 170. 160. A

rend Lrlpharr, D em

ocracl in P løral S

ocieties (N ew

H aven: Y

ale U niversiry

P ress, L977); S

m ooha and H

anf, "f'he D iverse M

odes of C onflict-R

egulation in D

eeply D ividecl S

ocieties," 32-33. 161. Lijphart, D

em ocracl in P

lørøl S ocieties.

86 E thnic C

onflict

162. Lijphart, D enxocrdc)) in P

lural S ocieties.

163. A licia Levine, "P

olitical A ccom

m odation and the P

revention of S ecessionist

,,. :l-,

V iolence," iri The International D

im ensions of Internal C

onflict, ed. M ichael E

. B

row n (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress, 1996), 3Il-340; E sm

an, A n Introd.uc-

tion to E thnic C

onflict, t4L-I42. L64. I. W

illiam Zarrm

an, "P urting H

um pry-D

um pty Together A

gain," in The International S

pread of E thnic C

onflict: Fea4 D ifføsion, and E

scøløtion, ed. D avid

A . Lake ancl D

onalcl R othchild (P

rinceton: P rinceton U

niversity P ress,

1998),3t7-336. 165. A

rend Lijphart, C onflict and C

oexistence in B elgiu.m

: The D lnam

ics of ø C øbør-

øþ D iuid.ed S

ociery (B erkeley: U

niversity of C alifornia P

ress, 1981). 1,66. Levine, "P

olitical A ccom

m odarion and rhe P

revention of S ecessionisr

V iolence," 33L.

167. H orow

itz, E tbnic G

roups in C onflict, 626.

168. S chneckener, "M

aking P ow

er-S l-raring W

ork," 204. 169. G

raham S

m ith, "M

apping the Fecleral C onclition: Ideolog¡ P

olitical P rac-

rice and S ociai Justice," in Federølism

: The M øbietbnic C

høllenge, ed. G rahan-t

S m

ith (Londgn: Longm an, 1995); H

orow itz, E

thnic G roøps in C

onflict. 170. D

avtd C . N

ice, Federalism .: tbe P

oLitics of Intergouernm ental R

eLatioøs (N ew

Y ork:

S r. M

artin's P ress, 1987).

17L. S m

ith, "M apping the Federal C

onclition." 172. A

lexander B . M

urph¡ "B elgium

's R egional D

ivergence: A long rhe R

oacl ¡o Federation," ín Federalism

: The M u.biethnic C

høllenge, ed. G raham

S m

itl-r (Lon- don: Longm

an, 1995). 173. S

lrarda R ath, FederaLism

Today A pproaches,

Issues and Trends (N ew

D ehli: S

ter- ling P

ublishers P rivate, 1984).

I74. K . C

. W heare, Federøl G

ouernm .ent,4th ed. (London: O

xford U niversity P

ress, 1963). S

ee also E sm

an, A n Introdu,ction to E

tbnic C onflict, L4l.

175. Jonathan Lem co, P

olitical S tabilitl in Federal G

ouernm ents (N

ew Y

ork: P raeger,

reer). 176. B

rendan O 'Leary and John M

cG arr¡ "R

eguiating N ations and E

thnic C

om m

unities," in N ationalism

and R ationaLilt, ecl. A

lbert B reton, G

ianluigi G

aleotti, P ierre S

alm on, ancl R

onald \X /introbe (C

am bridge: C

am bridge

U niversiry P

ress, 1995), 245-289. I77. G

eorge S chopflin, "The fuse and Fall of Y

ugoslavia," inTbe P olitics of E

tbnic C

onflict R egølation, ed. John M

cG arry and B

renclan O 'Leary (London: R

out- leclge, 1993), 172-203.

178. Levine, "P olitical A

ccom m

odation and the P revention of S

ecessionist V io-

lence," 33O ,332.

179. }{orow itz, E

tbnic G roups in C

onflict.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 87

180. C am

eron R oss, "Federalism

and D em

ocratízatiott in R ussia," C

om m

ønist and P

ost-C ornm

u,nist S tudies 33 (2000): 403-420.

181. B arbara F. lV

alter, "D esigning Transitions from

C ivil W

ar: D em

obilization, D

em ocratization, and C

om m

itm ents to P

eace," in N ationalisnt and E

thnic C

onflict, ed. M ichael E

. B row

n, O w

en R . C

ote Jr., S ean M

. Lynn-Jones, and S

teven E . M

iller, rev. ecl. (C am

briclge, M ass.: M

IT P ress, 2001), 430.

I82. E ric A

. N ordlinger, C

onflict R egølation in D

it,ided S ocieties (C

am bridge, M

ass.: C

enter for International A ffairs, H

arvard U niversiry, 1972);Levrne, "P

oliti- cal A

ccom m

odarion and the P revention of S

ecessionist V iolence," 335.

1,83. Levine, "P olitical A

ccom m

odation and the P revention of S

ecessionist V iolence."

184. R eill¡ D

em ocrøcy in D

iuided S ocieties, 1.43-1.44.

185. "B elgium

's P itiful P

olicies," Tbe E conom

ist, July 16,2008, w w

w econom

ist .com

/clisplayS tory.cfm

?st ory _id: lI7 39 59 4. 186. K

ancl-ran C handra, "E

thnic P arties ancl D

em ocratic S

tabilit¡" P erspectiues

on P olitics 3, no. 2 (June 2005): 235. O

n ethnic ourbidcling see Jam

es D .

Fearon and D avici D

. Laitin, "V iolence and the S

ocial C onstrLlction of E

th- nic Identit¡" International O

rganizøtion 54, no. 4 (A ucum

n 2000): 864-865. 187. C

hanclra, "E thnic P

arties and D em

ocratic S tabiliry" 236.

188. C l-randra, "E

thnic P arties ancl D

em ocratic S

tability," 239. 189. S

pinner-H alev and Theiss-M

orse, "N ational Idenriry and S

elÊ E

steem ," 525.

190. Levine, "P olitical A

ccom m

oclation and the P revention of S

ecessionis¡ V

iolence," 335. 191. Lijphart, D

em ocracy in P

lural S ocieties, 147-I57.

192. N eal G

. Jesse and K risten P

. W illiam

s, Identi4t and Institøtions: C onflict R

edøc- tion in D

iuided S ocieties (A

lbany: S U

N Y

P ress, 2005). S

ee also N ina C

asperson, "G

ood Fences M ake G

ood N eighbours? A

C om

parison of C onflict-

R egulation S

trategies in P ostw

ar B osnìa," Journal of P

eace R esearcb 4L, no. 5

Q 00a): s69-s88.

193. B yraan, K

eeping the P eace, I02.

I94. B yrnan, K

eeping the P eace, L26-L29.

195. B ym

an, K eeping the P

eace, 1.52. 1 9 6. S

chneckener, "M aking P

ow er-S

haring \X /'ork," 2ll -214.

197. S chneckener, "M

aking P ow

er-S haring W

ork," 214-217. 198. S

chneckener, "M aking P

ow er-S

haring W ork," 218.

199. S clrneckener, "M

aking P ow

er-S h arrng W

ork," 224. 200. H

earn, R ethinkingN

ationalßm , 237.

201. E iki B

erg ancl G uy B

en-P orat, "Introduction: P

artition vs. P ow

er-S haring?"

N ations and N

ationalism . 14, no. 1 (2008): 31.

202. W altz, M

an, tbe S tate, and W

a4 227. 203. W

alcz, M an, tbe S

tate, and \Y a1 232.

88 E thnic C

onflict

204. W altz, M

an, the S tate, and.W

ar, 232. 205. S

inger, "The Level-of-A nalysis P

roblem in International R

elations," 80.

206. Lobell and M auceri, "D

iffusion and E scalation of E

thnic C onfli.ct," 2.

207. W tlIíam

s, "Internationalization of E thnic C

onflict in the B alkans," 75-94.

208. E sm

an, A n Introduction to E

tbnic C onflict, 102-103.

209. E sm

an, A n Introdøction to E

tbnic C onflict, 1.L9.

210. Y ossi S

hain and A haron B

arth, "D iasporas and International R

elations Theor¡" International O

rgønization 57, no.3 (S um

m er 2003): 449-479.

211. S hain and B

artl-r, "D iasporas ancl International R

elations Theor¡" 451. 212. E

sm an, A

n lntrodu.ction to E tbnic C

onflict, 104. 213. E

sm an, A

n Introduction to E thnic C

onflict, 105-106. 214. D

avid C arm

ent and P atrick Jam

es, "E xplaining Third-party Intervention

in E thnic C

onflict: Theory and E vidence," N

ations and N ationalism

6, no.2 (2000): I9a.

215. B ym

an, K eeping the P

eace, 4O .

216. C hades K

ing and N eil J. M

elvin, "D iaspora P

olitics: E thnic Linkages, For-

eign P olic¡ and S

ecurity in E urasia," Internationøl S

ecw riryt 24, no.3 (\V

inter I9e9l2ooo): t\0.

2I7. K rng and M

elvin, "D iaspora P

olitics," 131. 218. K

ing ancl M elvin, "D

iaspora P olitics," 132.

219. K ing ancl M

elvin, "D iaspora P

olitics," 132. 22O

. K rng and M

elvin, "D iaspora P

olitics," 133-734. 221. K

ing and M elvin, "D

iaspora P olitics," L34.

222. S hain and B

arth, "D iasporas ancl International R

elations Theor¡" 451, 458. S

ee also S tephen M

. S aiclem

an, "D iscrim

ination in International R ela-

tions: A nalyzing E

xterna"l S upport for E

thnic G roups," Journal of P

eøce

R esearcb 39, no. I (2002):27-50.

223. E sm

an, A n Introdøction to E

thnic C onflict, lO

7. 224. Lake and R

othchilcl, "S preacling Fear," 31.

225. M atthew

E vangelisca, "H

istorical Legacies and the P olitics of Incervention

in the Form er S

oviet U nion," tn Tbe International D

im ensions of Internal C

on-

flict, ed. M ichael E

. B row

n (C am

briclge, M ass.: M

IT P ress, 1996), I2I-1,22.

226. K asfm

an, "S piraling to E

ti-rnic \X /ar," 110, 118.

227. K attfm

an, "S piraling to E

thnic W ar," 110.

228. H orow

itz, E thnic G

roups in C onflict, 273.

229. l{arff and G urr, E

thnic C onflict in W

orld P olitics, 188-190.

230. B ym

an , K eeping the P

eace, I79. 231. P

osen, "The S ecuriry D

ilem m

a and E thnic C

onflict," 43. 232. D

onald R othchild and D

avid A . Lake, "C

ontaining Fear: The M anagem

ent of Transnational E

thnic C onflicr," in Tbe International S

pread of E thnic

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 89

C onflict: Fear, D

ffision, and E scalation, ed. D

avid A . Lake and D

onald R oth-

child (P rinceton: P

rinceton U niversity P

ress, L998), 221.

233. P osen, "The S

ecurity D ilem

m a and E

thnic C onflict," 43-44.

234. R othchild and Lake, "C

ontaining Fear," 203-226. 235. K

asfm an, "S

piraling to E thnic W

ar," L33. 236. E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E thnic C

onflict, 109; R othchild and Lake, "C

ontain- ing Fear," 205-2L1.

237. J. M ichael G

rieg and P atrick M

. R egan, "W

hen D o They S

ay Y es? A

n A naly-

sis of the W iilingness to O

ffer and A ccept M

ecliation," International S tudies

Q uarteþ 52 (20O

8):769. 238. G

rieg and R egan, "W

hen D o They S

ay Y es?" 762-763.

239. G rregand R

egan, "W hen D

o They S ayY

es?" 762. 240. E

sm an, A

n Introduction to E thnic C

onflict, 109-110. 24I. E

srnan, A n Introdøction

to E thnic C

onflict, ll0. 242. Jacob B

ercovitch and A llison H

ouston, "The S tudy of International M

edia- tion: Theoretical Issues ancl E

m pirical E

vidence," in R esoluing International

C onflicts: The Tbeorl and P

ractice of M ediation, ed. Jacob B

ercovitch (B oulder:

Lynne R ienner, 1996), 26.

243. S ara M

claughlin M itchell and P

aul R . H

ensel, "International Insti¡utions and C

om pliance w

ith A greem

ents," A m

ericA n Joørnal of P

olitical S cience 5L,

no. 4 (O ctober 2007):724.

244. B ercovitch and H

ouston, "The S tudy ollnternational M

ediation," 27. 245. P

hilip A . S

chroclt and D eborahJ. G

erner, "A n E

vent D ata A

nalysis of Third- P

arty M ediation in the M

idclle E ast ancl B

alkans," Joørnøl of C onflict R

esolø- tion 48, no. 3 (June 200a):322.

246. U m

red N ations S

ecurity C ouncil R

esolution 1325 (O ctober 31, 2000).

247. U nired N

ations, "security C ouncil D

em ands Im

m ediate ancl C

om plete

H alt to A

cts of S exual V

iolence against C ivilians in C

onflict Zones, U nani-

m ously A

dopting R esolution 1820 (2008)," S

ecurity C ouncil S

C /9364,

D epartm

ent of P ublic Inform

ation (June 19, 2008), w w

w .un.org/N

ew s/

P ress/docs/2 008 I sc9 3 6 4.doc.htm

. 248. E

sm an, A

n Introdøction to E

thnic C onflict, lL4.

249. E sm

an, A n Introduction to E

tbnic C onflict, L15.

250. B row

n and de Jonge O udraat, "Internal C

onflict ancl International A

ction," 168. 251. B

row n and deJonge O

udraat, "Internal C onflict and International A

ction," 168. S

ee also R othchilcl and Lake, "C

ontaining Fear," 223-224. 252. R

othchild and Lake, "C onraíntngFear," 224.

253. R othchild and Lake, "C

ontaining Fear," 215. 254. R

othchild and Lake, "C ontaining Fear," 216.

90 E thnic O

onflict

255. S pinner-H

alev ancl Theiss-M orse, "N

ational Iclendry and S elf-E

steern," 524. 256. E

sm an, A

n Introduction to E tbnic C

onflict, L18. 257. E

sm an, A

n innod.uction to E tbnic C

onflict, 116-117. 258. R

othchilcl and Lake, "C ontaining Fear," 2L6-2I7.

259. B row

n and deJonge O udraat, "Internal C

onflict and Internatiorral A ction,"

163-t92. 260. B

ym an, K

eeping the P eace, 178.

261. R othchilcl ancl Lake, "C

ontainingFear," 221.. 262. B

ym an, K

eeping the P eøce, 183.

263. B ym

an, K eeping the P

eace, 184-185. 264. B

ynan, K eeping the P

eace, 185 186. 265. G

ríegand R egan, "W

hen D o They S

ayY es?" 777.

266. P osen, "The S

ecurity D ilem

m a ancl E

tirnic C onflict," 44; S

tephen E . G

ent, "G

oing in W hen It C

ounts: M ilitary Inrervention ancl rhe O

u¡com e of C

ivil C

onflicts," International S tØ

dies Q uarteþ 52 (2008): 713-714; R

othchild ancl Lake, "C

ontaíntng F ear," 2I7.

267. R othcl-rild and Lake, "C

ontaining Fear," 217-18. 268. R

othchild ançl Lake, "C ontaining Fear," 218.

269. G ent, "G

oing in V 7hen it C

ounts," 715. 270. B

row rt and de Jonge O

udraat, "Internal C onflict and International

A ction," 185.

271. B row

n and cle Jonge O uclraat, "Internal C

onflict and International A

ction," 188. 272. K

asfm an, "S

piraling to E thnic W

ar," I34. 273. K

aufm an, "S

piraling to E thnic lV

ar," 135. 274. K

aufm an, "S

piraling to E thrric W

ar," 136-137. 275. B

ym an, K

eeping the P eace, I74.

276. B ym

an, K eepingthe P

eace, 155-169. 277. B

ym an, K

eeping tbe P eøce, l7l.

278. 'Ihom as C

hapm an and P

hilip G . R

oeder, "P artition as a S

olution to W ars

of N ationalism

: The Im portance of Institutions," A

m erican P

oliticaL S cience

R euieø 101, no. 4 (N

ovem ber 2007): 677; C

arterJohnson, "P artitioning ro

P eace: S

overeignt¡ D em

ograph¡ ancl E chnic C

ivil W ars," International S

ecø-

riryt 32, r-ro. 4 (S pring 2008): 151; C

haim K

aufm ann, "P

ossible and Im pos-

sible S olutions to E

thnic C ivil W

ars," tn N ationalism

and E thnic C

onJlict, ed. M

ichael E . B

row n, O

w en R

. C ote Jr., S

ean M . Lynn-Jor-res, and S

teven E .

M iller, rev. ed. (C

am bridge, M

ass.: M IT P

ress 2001), 478-482. 279 . B

ynan, K eeping the P

eace, I72-I73; Jol'tnson, "P artitioning to P

eace," 151. 280. C

hapm an ancl R

oeder, "P artition as a S

olution to V Ø

ars of N ationalism

," 679.

Levels of A nalysis and E

thnic C onflict 91

)81. C hapnan and R

oecler, "P arririon as a S

olution to W ars of N

ationalism ,"

679-680. )82. C

hapm an ancl R

oecler, "P artition as a S

olurion to W ars of N

ation- alism

," 681. 283. K

aufm ann, "P

ossible ancl hnpossible S olutions to E

thnic C ivil W

ars," 445. 284. B

ym an, K

eepingtbe P

eace, 176.

285. B ym

an, K eepingthe P

eace, 175;Johnson, "P artitioning to P

eace," 151.

286. C hapm

an and R oecler, "P

artition as a S olution to W

ars of N ationalism

," 689.

282 Johnson, "P artitiouing co P

eace," L51. 288. Johnson, "P

artitioning to P eace," 161.

289. Jam es D

. Fearon, "C om

m itm

ent P roblem

s and the S pread of E

thnic C on-

flict," in The International S pread of E

tbnic C onJlict: F'ear, D

iffusion, and E scalø-

tion, ed. D avid A

. Lake ancl D onald R

otirchild (P rinceton: P

rinceton U

niversity P ress, 1998), II8-I20. O

n the need to design credible guarantees see also B

arbara W alter, "D

esigning Transitions from C

ivil W ar: D

em obiliza-

tion, D em

octatizatior\ and C om

m itm

ents to P eace," in N

ationalism and

E thnic C

onflic6 ecl. M ichael E

. B row

n, O w

en R . C

oteJr., S ean M

. Lynn-Jones, and S

teven E . M

iller', rev. ed. (C am

briclge, M ass.: M

IT P ress, 200L), 415 443.

290. Fearon, "C om

m itm

ent P roblem

s and the S pread of E

thnic C onflict,"

107 -126. 291. R

othclrild and Lake, "C ontainíngFear,"

219. 292. Fearon, "C

ornm itm

ent P roblem

s and the S preacl of E

thnic C onflíct," I23.

293. R othchild and Lake, "C

ontainingFear," 2'1.9.

294. Fearon, "C om

nritm ent P

roblem s ancl the S

pread of E thnic C

onflict," 123. 295. B

row n and deJonge O

udraat, "Internal C onllict ancl International A

ction," t9I.

296. IJrow ¡, and deJonge O

uclraat, "Internal C onflict and International A

ction," 184.

297. B row

n ancl cleJonge O uclraat, "Internal C

onflict and International A ction,"

180-181,184. 298. Iìothchild ancl Lake, "C

ontaining Fear," 221-222. 299. R

orhcl'rild ancl Lake, "C ontainìngFear,"

225. 300. K

ar-ifm an, "S

piraling ro E thnic W

ar," I33. 301. B

um ba M

ukherjee, "D oes Third-P

arty E nforcem

ent or D om

estic Institu- tions P

rom ote E

ncluring P eace after C

ivil W ars? P

olicy Lessons from an

E rnpirical -Iesr," Foreign P

olicl A naþsß 2 (2006): a28.

302. K aufm

an, "S piraling to E

thnic W ar," 109.

303. H arff and G

urr, E thnic C

onflict in W orld P

olitics, 5,

92 E thnic C

onflict

304. D ruckm

an, "N acionalism

, P atriotism

, and G roup Loyalty," 54. S

ee also P

earson, "D im

ensions of C onflict R

esolution in E thnopolitical D

isputes," 275-287. I

305. Though focusing in large part on the individual level of analysis (providing a critique of the system

ic level), D eborah \V

elch Larson Llses a m ultilevel

approach ro explain U .S

. policy in the C old W

ar. D eborah W

elch Larson, The O

rigins of C ontøinm

ent: A P

sjtchological E

xplanatioø (P rinceton: P

rinceton U

niversity P ress, 1985).

C H

A P

TE R3

N orthern lreland: P

rotestants, G atholics, and

"The Troubles"

¡ff n M

arch 16,2006, a joint hearing of tw o U

nited S tates congressional sub-

llfcom lnit¡ees observed a m

om ent of silence and prayer before the m

eeting began. The joint hearing w

as entitled "The N orthern Ireland P

eace P rocess: P

olic- ing A

dvances and R em

aining C hallenges." It w

as com prised of the S

ubcom m

it- ree on A

frica, G lobal H

um an fughts, and Inrernational O

perations and the S

ubcom m

ittee on E urope anci E

rnerging Threats, both of w hich w

ere part of the C

om m

ittee on International R elations in the U

niced S tates H

ouse of R epresenta-

rives. A t 2:58 p.rr¡. in room

2172,R ayburn H

ouse O ffice B

uilding, the H onorable

C hristopher H

. S m

ith oF N ew

Jersey presided over the m om

ent of silence for a brave defense attorney from

N orthern Ireland.l

R osem

ary N elson w

as killed alm ost six and a half years earlier by a car bom

b as she clrove m

ere blocks aw ay from

her hom e. E

xacdy seven years before to the clay of the 2006 hearing, this brave attorney from

N orthern Ireland gave tesri-

m ony to a sim

ilar congressional com m

ittee. S

he described how her job represent-

ing C atholic defendants, som

e of w hom

w ere accusecl of terrorist crim

es, had led to her life being threatened by the R

oyal U lster C

onstabulatory (R U

C ), w

hich w as

the police force of N orthern Ireland at the tim

e. S he said that they had threat-

ened her m any tim

es, both directly and through her clients. \X zithin m

om ents of

her death, allegations of collusion by public servants circulated, pointing at the R

U C

, the N orthern Ireland O

ffice of the B ritish governm

ent, the B ritish A

rm ¡

and other B ritish state agencies. These allegations continue to this day.2

O n N

ovem ber 16,2004, rhe B

ritish secretary of srate for N orthern Ireland,

the R r. H

onorable P aul M

urph¡ M P

, announced a public inquiry into the death of R

osem ary N

elson. The inquiry (know n as the R

osem ary N

elson Inquiry) w as

established uncler section 44 of the P olice (N

orthern lreland) A ct of 1998. This

act to reform policing in N

orthern Ireland w as passed by the B

ritish H ouse

of C om

m ons after the conclusion of the 1998 G

ood Friclay A greem

ent in B

elfast, w hich w

as agreed to by m ost m

ajor parties in N orthern lreland, repre-

senring the m ajority of both C

atholic and P rotestant citizens. Tl-re public

inquiry w as called after a retirecl C

anadian S uprem

e C ourt judge, P

eter C or¡

93