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“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE” *

By Dr. Victor G. Devinatz

Dr. Victor G. Devinatz is Distinguished Professor of Management in the Depart- ment of Management and Quantitative Methods at Illinois State University where he teaches courses in labor rela- tions and human resource management.

*The following article is a revised version of the Distinguished Professor Lecture given by Professor Devinatz at Illinois State University on April 26, 2012.

I. Introduction

US trade unionism is in crisis. Union density has been declining throughout the United States since 1955, the year of the American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL—CIO) merger. With union density peaking at more than 34 percent in 1954,1 increasing globalization over the last thirty years has led to the dramatic weakening of the industrial unions in the basic manufacturing sectors of the US economy such as auto, steel and rubber. The most current statis- tics published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) demonstrate the severity of this problem. Private sector union density in 2011 registered only 6.9 percent2 which is indicative of the hemorrhaging of millions of members in manufacturing combined with labor being unable to successfully create new bargaining units in both mature and newly emerging industries. While much smaller than the private sector, the public sector continues to be a relatively bright spot for US trade unionism early in the twenty-fi rst century’s second decade. With union density among federal, state and municipal government employees exceeding that found in the private sector by fi vefold, at 37.0 percent3, public sector unionism is relatively healthy. This might soon change, however, with the recent attacks by state governments commenc- ing in early 2011.

This plummeting of union density has weakened US labor’s collective bargaining power and all but ended utilizing the strike as an offensive and defensive weapon. Since the BLS began keeping records in 1947, US

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

strike activity has hit record lows in the past two years. In 2010, there were only 11 strikes and/or lockouts involving 1,000 or more workers for a total of 45,000 workers while in 2009, there were but fi ve work stoppages (with 13,000 workers) of that size.4 These fi gures represent a dramatic decline from an annual average of nearly 280 strikes (comprising more than 1.4 million em- ployees) from 1970 through 1980.5 Moreover, the continued erosion of private sector union density and the belief that dramatic steps had to be taken to reverse this dismal state of affairs was the primary motivation for dissident unions seceding from the AFL-CIO in the summer of 2005 and subsequently establishing the Change to Win Federation (CTW) that September.6

This crisis in US trade unionism fi rst became apparent shortly after Ronald Reagan’s election to the US presidency in November 1980. After fi ring the striking air traffi c controllers in August 1981 and breaking their union, things went rap- idly downhill for the US labor movement. In addition to declining union density, the 1980s were characterized by numerous lost strikes in- cluding the 1983 Greyhound bus drivers’ work stoppage, the 1985-1986 Local P-9 strike against Hormel7 and the 1988 United Paperworkers Local 14 walkout8 against International Paper. Throughout the 1990s, unions suffered major defeats in additional work stoppages including Staley, Caterpillar,9 and Detroit Newspapers10 al- though the victorious 1997 United Parcel Service strike conducted by the Teamsters11 remained anomalous in this bleak landscape.

In this paper, I will argue that the crisis of US trade unionism in the early 21st century is ultimately the crisis of business unionism which was embraced by labor from 1945 to 1975, the “golden age” of the US trade union movement. This approach remained viable circa 1945 to 1975 but sowed the seeds of US trade unionism’s destruction beginning in the late 1970s/early 1980s as business unionism and political action provided diminishing returns to a faltering US trade union movement.

US trade unionism’s serious troubles resulted in the election of John Sweeney as the AFL- CIO president in 1995. Serving in this position

through late summer 2009, as a union reformer, Sweeney sought to replace a sclerotic business unionism with a variant of social movement unionism (SMU), combined with the adoption of several innovative changes to the AFL-CIO’s political involvement in the electoral arena, in an attempt to revitalize US labor. While Sweeney’s implementation of a version of SMU was a small step in the right direction, I contend that for the US trade union movement to have a fi ght- ing chance in the 21st century, new approaches must transcend Sweeney’s preliminary reform efforts. Such a strategy must necessarily involve the utilization of the rank-and-fi le’s input and a reconceptualization of labor’s bargaining strate- gies which would also provide the opportunity to revitalize labor’s work in the political arena.

This paper will proceed in the following manner. The fi rst section will briefl y discuss the explosive growth of industrial unionism during the New Deal era before, in the second section, examining and analyzing the trade union move- ment’s use of business unionism and political action during labor’s “Golden Era” which covers the period from 1945 to 1975. The third section will detail the unraveling of business union- ism circa 1977 to 1995 while the fourth section will discuss the Sweeney administration’s and the CTW’s implementation of a type of social movement unionism in response to the failure of business unionism. The penultimate section will outline an alternative mode of trade union- ism which must be implemented to transcend the current form of social movement unionism in place if there is to be a chance at revitalizing the US trade union movement. The fi nal section will conclude the paper.

II. The New Deal Era and the Growth of Industrial Unionism, 1933-1945

The 1930s signaled a revival of the US trade union movement. In an effort to resuscitate a devastated economy, the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was implemented in 1933, which offered, among other provisions, legal protection both for union organizing and for

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collective bargaining among most private sector workers. Upon the declaration of the NIRA’s codes of fair competition being unconstitutional in 1935, the National Labor Relations Act’s (NLRA) passage later that same year expanded federal coverage for private-sector collective bar- gaining activities fi rst protected under the NIRA.

Several months after the NLRA’s passage, the AFL convention experienced confl ict over the federation’s organizing strategy. A number of union leaders, such as the United Mineworkers president, John L. Lewis, argued for the neces- sity of creating industrial unions – that is, all of a facility’s employees irrespective of occupation and skill level, would be organized into a single labor organization – in contradistinction to the craft unions organizing just the skilled workers at the work site. Upon walking out of the 1935 AFL convention, nine unions established the Com- mittee for Industrial Organization and breathed new life into industrial unionism in the United States. The schism within the AFL was solidifi ed in 1938 with the establishment of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO.)

The NLRA’s passage and the CIO’s forma- tion resulted in enormous union growth. With manufacturing industries dominating the econ- omy, both AFL and CIO unions targeted such workers in steel, automotive and rubber for or- ganizing, often vying against each other in union certifi cation elections. Reviving militant tactics such as the sit-down strike or plant occupation, fi rst initiated by the Industrial Workers of the World two decades earlier, the CIO’s industrial unions began to grow in size, as these workers poured into these energetic organizations upon the conclusion of victorious collective actions. The wave of sit-down strikes lasting from 1936 to 1938 spread beyond factories to many other industries and was particularly effective since employers were unable to replace strikers while subsequently experiencing losses in business and productivity.

It was in the immediate postwar period when the industrial unions of the CIO began to con- struct a nascent business unionism, defi ned as labor organizations functioning as “businesses” in which the unions provide workers with an

array of services including the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements (CBA) and contract administration in exchange for mem- bers’ union dues. Six decades earlier, the craft unions of the AFL had already implemented a full-blown business unionism at the time of the federation’s formation in 1886.

First identifi ed and named by labor theorist Sidney Lens in the 1950s, business unionism pos- sesses a number of characteristics distinctive to the ideology. The fi rst feature can be described as “a service model of unionism” where unionists passively consume various goods and services, including wages, benefi ts, a grievance procedure, etc. negotiated by the union and provided by union staff. In this capacity, union offi cials are viewed as “executives” who are responsible for administering the “business.” A second emphasis is union offi cers concentrating their time and energy on narrowly-defi ned issues appearing in the collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, union member complaints are only dealt with if they represent specifi c contractual violations. A third attribute would be the belief that labor and management share all of the same concerns and are partners in assuring the success of the business, even when management has no de- sire to work with the unions. Fourth, the labor organization is treated as a large bureaucracy headed by union leaders who are physically and ideologically separated from the rank-and-fi le workers through the presence of professional staff. In this setting, union leaders develop the organization’s policies while the members’ major role is to consume services provided by union offi cials and staff. Moreover, the members are not expected to regularly participate in union affairs unless specifi cally called upon to do so by union offi cers.12

From 1945 to 1975, business unionism suc- cessfully increased wages and benefi ts for the union membership through collective bargain- ing. These improvements obtained by the indus- trial unions were transferred to other unionized companies’ workers within the same industry through pattern bargaining. Industrial unions in auto and steel, for example, utilized pattern bargaining by targeting a particular employer to

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

obtain what the union considered to be a strong contract. Once that agreement was fi nalized, negotiations commenced with another major employer in the same industry, trying to attain a contract at least as good as the fi rst agreement. Pattern bargaining not only functioned within an industry, but also between industries, as ad- vancements achieved by one labor organization in an industry inspired unions in other industries to negotiate comparable agreements. From the late 1940s through the early 1980s, pattern bargaining was crucial in taking wages out of competition and in maintaining union power.

George Meany, the AFL-CIO’s fi rst president (1955-1979) and a former plumber, was the quintessential business unionist committed to craft privilege who had virtually no interest in organizing the unorganized even though a chief reason motivating the 1955 AFL-CIO merger was to encourage the unionization efforts of member unions. With union density dropping from its peak of 35 percent at the time of the AFL-CIO merger to 27.4 percent in 1971, Meany hardly appeared upset. When asked in 1972, why union density was falling, he hastily responded, “I don’t know, I don’t care.”13

Meany’s regime was best characterized for its venomous anti-Communism at home and abroad and for his resolute support for both US foreign policy and the nation’s involvement in the Vietnam War. Additionally, he unceasingly defended race privilege in the work place while offering feeble support for both civil rights and the integration of the essentially lily-white craft unions. Furthermore, he excoriated and often viciously attacked extremely liberal Democrats, peace demonstrators, environmentalists, femi- nists and gay activists. And as reported in his offi cial biography, Meany bragged that he never walked a picket line in his life.14

In an attempt to defend union gains that were being jeopardized by declines in union density, the AFL-CIO made ambitious, through unsuc- cessful, attempts to modify labor legislation. The federation’s fi rst defeat occurred in March 1977 when a bill to legalize “common situs” picketing, that is the union having the right to picket other contractors and subcontractors at a

construction site when its dispute involved only one subcontractor, lost on a narrow vote in the heavily Democratic 95th Congress. This result did not auger well for the AFL-CIO’s more important reform effort, the Labor Law Reform Bill, which attempted to put more teeth in the NLRA. Although the bill cruised through the House by a margin of 257 to 163 in October 1977, it fell two votes short of cloture in the Sen- ate on June 15, 1978.15

III. The Unraveling of US Business Unionism from the Late 1970’s to 1995

The two legislative losses in 1977 and 1978 were just the beginning of more serious problems for labor. Business unionism began to unravel by the early 1980s with the US trade union movement confronted by a host of economic and political changes. While business unionism possessed intrinsic weaknesses, these structural limitations had remained hidden for more than three decades. From 1945 through 1975, four factors had resulted in business unionism suc- cessfully raising union members’ living stan- dards. First, overall union density remained fairly healthy, in the range of 35 percent from 1945 to 1955 but falling to 25 percent in 1975, with the basic manufacturing industries com- prising the core of union strength and a public sector union membership rapidly expanding during the 1960s and the 1970s. Second, due to the United States dominating world markets in the postwar era and the country experiencing signifi cant economic growth, union infl uence fl ourished because of this favorable climate. Third, despite signifi cant legislative defeats with the implementation of the anti-labor Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffi n Acts in 1947 and 1959, as previously mentioned, a “New Deal Coalition” provided a relatively favorable political environ- ment for labor organizations. And lastly, major corporations in heavily unionized industries did not challenge the unions’ right to exist as long as they continued to devote their energies only to collective bargaining and contract administra- tion, essentially the goals of business unionism.16

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This economic situation, however, had changed by the early 1980s. With increases in worldwide competition, the slowing of econom- ic growth and the squeezing of profi t rates, the United States no longer dominated the world market as it had for the three post-World War II decades which had dire consequences for labor. Union density continued its downward trajectory with the traditionally unionized man- ufacturing industries closing factories and out- sourcing jobs combined with newly emerging industries, such as high-tech, virulently battling unionization through enlisting union-busting consultants.17 Additionally, an inhospitable po- litical environment represented by the termina- tion of 11,000 members of the Professional Air Traffi c Controllers Organization (PATCO) by then-President Reagan in August 198118 encour- aged capital to adopt similar tactics in dealing with its private sector unions. Combined with the unraveling of the New Deal Coalition, this did not bode well for labor. These forces lay bare the dynamics of business unionism which experienced problems in continuing to deliver the economic goods to the union membership. This became obvious during contract negotia- tions, in the early 1980s, when US unions en- gaged in concession bargaining.19 In exchange for accepting wage and benefi t concessions, unions received the implementation of labor- management cooperation programs.20

As business unionism was beginning to fray, the AFL-CIO presidency changed hands after nearly a quarter of a century. Although one could contend that Lane Kirkland (1979-1995) was slightly more progressive than Meany, in essence, the second AFL-CIO president, who can best be described as a “bureaucrat’s bureau- crat,”21 shared the same business unionist per- spective and Cold War politics as his predecessor and mentor. Upon the smashing of the PATCO strike in August 1981, Kirkland hesitantly sup- ported the Solidarity March held in response which assembled 250,000 trade unionists in the nation’s capital despite the interracial unions expressing a particularly enthusiastic reaction to this event. Instead of emboldening Kirkland, such zeal generated apprehension in the nation’s

top labor leader. As a substitute to organizing more events which would produce street heat, his alternative was to urge union members to continue to support Democratic candidates at the polls.22 While Solidarity Day failed to spur Kirkland towards taking additional actions, the rapid and accelerating deindustrialization of the US economy throughout the 1980s and early 1990s also failed to alarm the federation presi- dent. At the time, he proffered neither strategies for mounting any resistance whatsoever nor any innovative ideas for responding to this decline which battered both unionists and nonunion workers alike.

As opposed to being consumed with seri- ous domestic issues, the AFL-CIO president appeared more concerned with his European travels where he promoted the construction of pro-American style business unions in the for- mer Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries23 upon Communism’s demise. Dissatisfaction with Kirkland’s attention to domestic trade union affairs contributed to the defeat of Thomas Do- nahue, Kirkland’s handpicked successor, and the election of John Sweeney and his “New Voice Slate” in 1995. These reformers were chosen to direct the AFL-CIO after more political defeats for labor including the North American Free Trade Agreement Act’s passage, the inability of then-President Clinton to implement health care reform and the Republicans retaking Congress in the 1994 midterm elections.

IV. The Sweeney Regime, the CTW and the Implementation of Social Movement Unionism, 1995-2009

Upon John Sweeney’s ascendancy to the AFL- CIO presidency after the fi rst contested election in the federation’s four-decade history, rank-and- fi le activists, progressive union staff members and other labor supporters expressed hope that signifi cant change was around the corner. Think- ing that the federation was open to countless new ideas and that the Cold War politics and the autocratic practices of the Meany and Kirkland regimes had been permanently shelved, many felt that labor could return to its halcyon days.

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

Creating high expectations for himself, Sweeney, who promised during his campaign to revitalize the US trade union movement through devoting massive resources to union organizing, remarked at a news conference shortly after taking offi ce that his AFL-CIO presidential tenure should largely be gauged on his success at reversing labor’s downward spiral.24 And early in the Sweeney administration, such opinions appeared more than reasonable with the regime deriving support even from Kim Moody and Michael Yates, two left-wing labor theoreticians highly critical of the AFL-CIO’s historical practice of business unionism. Moody pronounced the “New Voice” slate’s election to be “a welcome change”25 while Yates commented that the new regime was “a breath of fresh air.”26

In contrast to the business unionism of Meany and Kirkland, Sweeney offered something dif- ferent – specifi cally, a brand of social movement unionism (SMU) – to the battered AFL-CIO. SMU was fi rst introduced into the worldwide lexicon in the late 1980s by the British labor scholar Peter Waterman who used the term to de- scribe a new politically radical, militant unionism appearing in nations such as South Africa, Brazil and South Korea.27 The concept, however, only gained widespread currency in the United States after the publication of Kim Moody’s Workers in a Lean World.28 While SMU is an expansive term possessing multiple meanings, for the purposes of this paper, it will be used to describe a type of trade unionism where workers and their labor organizations construct coalitions with commu- nity groups in their quest for obtaining economic and social justice. As such, SMU goes beyond confi ning the union agenda to only handling workplace issues and attempting to maximize the members’ economics interests as negotiated in the contract. This brand of unionism, for ex- ample, is concerned with the devastating effects of growing economic inequality in the United States, the implementation of neoliberal policies and the war in Iraq. Moreover, in dealing with such issues, labor attempts to form coalitions with community organizations as well as im- migrant, racial minority, women and religious groups around a common agenda.29

Business unionism’s inherent weaknesses paved the way for the rise of SMU in the United States. According to SMU theoreticians, starting in the 1950s, the US trade union movement no longer served as a springboard for promoting social justice per se but evolved into a move- ment in which labor organizations developed into complex bureaucracies administered by union leaders and staff committed to delivering various sophisticated services for a demobilized and deactivated union membership.30

Despite the appearance of business union- ism’s extensive problems by the early 1980s, SMU was not placed on the historical agenda as an alternative methodology for attempting to resolve labor’s crisis until the end of that decade. In fact, SMU theorists have argued that the US trade union movement forfeited a key opportunity to revive itself when it failed to align with the social movements of the 1960s and the 1970s.31 SMU proponents contend that labor could have linked up with the anti- Vietnam War, the civil rights and the women’s movements in challenging the hegemony of corporate capital in US society. As previously mentioned, not only did the Meany administra- tion keep its distance from these movements but it often expressed open hostility to many of their stated objectives.

Although the AFL-CIO refused to form coali- tions with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the Alliance for Labor Action (ALA), es- tablished in July 1968 by the United Auto Work- ers Union (UAW) and the Teamsters Union, as a rival to the AFL-CIO attempted to create what I call a “premature” SMU by connecting with social movements as a strategy for reinvigorat- ing US trade unions. The newly-formed labor combination’s primary goal was to organize the millions of unorganized US workers and aimed to establish “community unions” to help the poor and the unemployed. Moreover, the ALA sought to implement a guaranteed income, national health insurance, and free education for all US citizens. In an attempt to realize the Alliance’s slogan “to fi nd answers to the urgent problems of our society,” the organization produced position papers on health care and national health insur-

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ance, the US housing crisis, pension reinsurance, tax reform and national security.32

While the ALA unionized slightly less than 10,000 workers in its pilot project, the Atlanta Union Organizing Offensive, from 1969 to 1971, the labor combination failed to devote adequate time and resources to bringing the community unions to fruition. Upon the Alliance’s fold- ing in 1972, SMU as an alternative to business unionism disappeared from the US trade union movement until the late 1980s when the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), under Sweeney, organized the “Justice for Janitors” campaigns. Utilizing the civil rights movement as a prototype, these organizing drives were conducted to provide collective bargaining rep- resentation for a work force composed primarily of immigrants and/or people of color employed in large offi ce buildings in metropolitan regions throughout the United States.33

Sweeney’s ideology excited both union re- formers and activists who felt that he would be more amenable than his forbears to aligning with liberal and left-wing social movements external to the AFL-CIO while encouraging the use of trade union militancy to achieve federation ob- jectives. As a former SEIU president, an impres- sive record of doubling the labor organization’s membership during the 1980s and early 1990s while many private sector unions were bleeding members,34 indicated that he was willing to intro- duce bold initiatives such as employing veterans of the 1960s-era civil rights and anti-Vietnam War movements as well as former Students for a Democratic Society and New Left organization activists.35 And at the start of his tenure, Sweeney hired political radicals in high-level staff posi- tions, such as Bill Fletcher, Jr. who fi rst became Sweeney’s assistant and subsequently the AFL- CIO Education Director, as well as encouraging presentations of liberal and leftist academics at AFL-CIO sponsored conferences.36

Through the cultivation of these ties to sym- pathetic intellectuals, the federation sponsored teach-ins throughout the United States with the fi rst held at Columbia University in New York City in 1996 which brought out thousands of par- ticipants. Two additional ones were organized at

UCLA in February 1997 and at the University of Pittsburgh the following September. These get- togethers resulted in labor-oriented academics formalizing their relationship to the federation through the establishment of the Scholars, Art- ists & Writers for Social Justice (SAWSJ). This group was largely responsible for articulating, developing and exchanging novel ideas and innovative proposals concerning the future of labor’s strategy with trade unionists in open, public forums.37

Reformers were also encouraged by Sweeney and his “New Voice” administration’s commit- ment to spending increasing federation resources on campaigns to unionize millions of low-wage workers, many who were women, immigrants and racial minorities. As a starting point, in 1996, AFL-CIO leaders stated that $20 million would be devoted to the project with the amount increased to $30 million for 1997. Furthermore, unlike the negligible role it played during the Kirkland era, Sweeney determined that the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute would be in- strumental in these efforts.38

Redistributing federation resources was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for remaking a culture hospitable to union organiz- ing. Realizing this, Sweeney introduced various innovative programs including the creation of a Corporate Affairs Department for emboldening shareholder activism while, in 1996, he intro- duced “Union Summer,” modeled after the Civil Rights Movement’s “Freedom Summer,” so that hundreds of college students and young workers could acquire union organizing experience.39

Moreover, the AFL-CIO president estab- lished a “Union Cities” initiative to spur union organizing at the regional level which had been moribund prior to Sweeney’s election in 1995. Besides providing the necessary funding and staff support, the program was designed to “promote cross-fertilization” of ideas and to revivify the inactive Central Labor Councils. “Additionally, this effort strengthened the AFL-CIO’s politi- cal program while contributing to “expanded mutual support networks” which were crucial for organizing campaigns and the successful negotiation of labor contracts.40

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

Unlike his business unionist predecessors, Sweeney was highly visible as the AFL-CIO president in backing unionization drives among diverse groups of workers including California strawberry pickers, south Florida nursing-home employees, Las Vegas construction workers, airport employees in Los Angeles and San Francisco and south Louisiana maritime work- ers. Furthermore, he generated extensive trade union support for internationally and historically signifi cant rallies in Seattle and Miami while traveling throughout the United States speak- ing out in support of immigrant workers’ rights and in defense of laid-off Enron employees.41 Sweeney also was infl uential in directing and encouraging city federations, such as the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, to become active participants in local living wage move- ments which have led to the implementation of many living wage statutes in both large and small US cities.42

Lastly, Sweeney, was the lone voice at the AFL-CIO’s highest echelons in advocating for gay and lesbian rights as the SEIU president back in 198343 and was light years ahead of Mea- ny and Kirkland on social issues upon becoming federation president. Examples include, under Sweeney’s infl uence, the recognition of Pride at Work, representing gay and lesbian trade unionists, as a sanctioned constituency group. Furthermore, other constituency groups, such as the Asia Pacifi c American Labor Alliance, were provided more autonomy and freedom to pursue their own interests after Sweeney came to power.44

Although it should be clear up to this point in the discussion that meaningful differences existed between the Meany, Kirkland and Sweeney regimes, a glaring similarity between all three administrations was their heavy reli- ance on Washington-focused strategies albeit with a few elemental variations. Meany and Kirkland were clearly consumed and obsessed with foreign policy issues to the neglect of US trade unionists’ everyday concerns while Sweeney was much more focused on domestic affairs. For Sweeney, only if trade policy was the topic at hand did foreign policy reach his radar

screen. More importantly, however, Sweeney utilized a similar approach to instilling institu- tional change and at attempting to solve labor’s problems as his two predecessors, specifi cally taking an unquestionably bureaucratic approach in establishing a collection of institutes, policy centers, task forces and committees staffed by policy experts whose recommendations were then communicated through expensive media and marketing campaigns.45

Sweeney’s labor-management relations phi- losophy was also fraught with contradictions. While he actively sought out and built coalitions with various social movements as specifi ed ear- lier, and spoke of, and encouraged, the use of militant shop fl oor tactics, such as work-to-rule actions and strikes, for empowering unions, he also seemed committed to promoting labor- management partnerships in order to enhance the competitiveness of US business without unions getting anything concrete in return. For example, in his 1996 book, America Needs a Raise, Sweeney discusses in glowing terms the labor- management cooperation program between USX and the United Steelworkers Union where “(a) labor-management committee meets regularly to discuss how to solve shop-fl oor problems and improve the quality of the steel they’re producing. . . . . Meanwhile the union contract provides that the Steelworkers can recommend (my italicization - VGD) a candidate for the USX board of direc- tors who will represent the employees’ interests as stakeholders of the corporation.”46 In a second example, among several others appearing in the book, Sweeney applauds the Levi Strauss-UNITE relationship where “(at) the corporate level, union and management offi cials meet regularly to dis- cuss companywide issues and set strategies for competing on the world market.”47

Although union density continued to plummet under Sweeney, compared with the previous regimes of Meany and Kirkland, there were some positive developments made under the “New Voice” slate’s administration. For example, for the fi rst time in decades, Sweeney returned labor to the center of the American liberal co- alition, through the AFL-CIO’s involvement with various social movements including anti-

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globalization, anti-sweatshop, environmental, and immigrant groups.48 And while the current quantity of National Labor Relations Board certifi cation elections is less than a third of the more than 6,000 elections held annually in the early 1980s, the average victory rate while Sweeney headed the federation was 61 percent compared with 51 percent during the Kirkland years. Moreover, BLS union membership data indicated that the total number of union mem- bers increased by 2.7 percent while Sweeney was in offi ce compared with a 5.3 percent decline under Kirkland’s tenure. Granted that this union membership growth is miniscule and occurred during 2007 and 2008, it remains the fi rst time since the collection of annual membership data by the BLS commenced a quarter of a century ago that even a slight uptick in overall member- ship has been registered.49

In spite of these minor achievements, the strategy that the Sweeney regime adopted was fundamentally fl awed. This approach can be best described as being representative of a kind of social movement unionism from above; one that was initiated, controlled, and managed by the AFL- CIO’s bureaucracy as opposed to a unionism that was determined and guided by the direct involvement of the rank-and-fi le members them- selves. As an example, while Sweeney expressed commitment to dramatically increasing the num- ber of union members through the allocation of additional resources to union organizing, he attempted to accomplish this goal through utiliz- ing professional organizers rather than converting rank-and-fi le unionists into organizers them- selves through providing the necessary training and education. Sweeney remained attached to this strategy despite the results of an AFL-CIO leadership-commissioned study, which found that unions achieved victory in 73 percent of the certifi cation elections in which rank-and- fi le members served as organizers compared to winning only 27 percent of the time when only professional organizers were involved.50

A second crucial characteristic of this social movement unionism from above approach was Swee- ney’s reliance on Washington-based tactics, as already mentioned, which also lacked signifi cant

rank and fi le worker input in either their concep- tualization or execution. Undoubtedly, Sweeney felt more at home through using ostensible ex- perts connected with institutes and policy centers in proposing solutions for resolving labor’s woes and then publicizing them through clever and expensive media and marketing campaigns.51 Although these presentations were highly pro- fessional, they failed to generate creative energy among unionists themselves which is ultimately what is required to have a chance to revitalize the US trade union movement.

Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail the split of the Change to Win Federation (CTW) from the AFL-CIO in the summer of 2005, many labor commentators believe that no fundamental ideological and tactical differences exist between the two orga- nizations.52 It appears that in a manner similar to the Sweeney-led AFL-CIO, the CTW adopted a social movement unionism from above which was largely inspired by the CTW’s largest affi li- ate, the SEIU. For example, Freeman53 argues that the CTW’s advocacy of utilizing militancy in organizing campaigns to attain cooperation and partnership with management is not a new approach. Greer54 refers to these “contentious and cooperative” tactics utilized by both the AFL-CIO and the CTW as a “hybrid of business and social-movement unionism.”

One example representing the CTW’s social movement unionism from above approach is its views on union democracy. One reason why the CTW affi liates left the AFL-CIO is because the former labor organizations believed that there should be “an extreme centralization of power in unions and in the AFL-CIO.” Implement- ing this tactic in the CTW after the schism, the SEIU has taken this approach to an extreme in its own national union through combining its local unions into mega-locals which comprise tens of thousands of members spanning several states. Such an organizational structure is clearly a major obstacle to the promotion of union de- mocracy because it makes it increasingly diffi cult for the members to communicate with other union members, to attend local meetings and to run for union offi ce.55

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

In addition to centralizing power and creat- ing bureaucracies in their own unions and their new labor combination, the CTW leaders do not appear to believe that union democracy is either necessary or desirable to US trade unions. Arguing that taking “bold action” and having a “military-style” command are required for resuscitating labor, this group of union offi cials holds the position that “democracy is a luxury unions can’t afford” because as one SEIU staff member stated, “(U)nion democracy doesn’t work because workers can’t be trusted to make the right decisions.”56

V. What Needs to be Done: The Implementation of Social Movement Unionism From Below

Clearly, a social movement unionism from above as implemented by Sweeney and the CTW is preferable to an entrenched and sclerotic busi- ness unionism of the Meany and Kirkland years. But such an approach does not go far enough in laying the groundwork for what is needed to revive the US trade union movement in an era confronted by a hyper-globalization, inadequate legal protection and the recent attacks by state governments on public sector unions. Trade unionists desirous of reversing the existing state of affairs must transcend a social movement union- ism from above orientation if they hope to redirect the path of labor during the current Richard Trumka and any post-Trumka administrations.

Instead of Sweeney’s and the CTW’s ap- proach, I propose as an alternative a social movement unionism from below strategy. The de- fi ning feature of a social movement unionism from below is, undoubtedly, democracy. But what I mean by “democracy” in this case is not “union democracy” as is traditionally understood and defi ned by the “Union Member’s Bill of Rights” as contained in the 1959 Landrum-Griffi n Act. Such protections dating back more than half a century include the right to nominate candidates for union offi ce, to vote in union elections and/ or referendums, to attend and participate in union meetings, to provide criticisms of union offi cials, to express any perspective at union

meetings, to circulate literature outside the union meeting place and to conduct separate meetings without the involvement of union offi cers. In a social movement unionism from below, I believe “democracy” must extend beyond “union de- mocracy” to include working class democracy, where the union fi ghts for the interests of the working class as a whole and not just for the sectoral interests of its offi cial members. The impetus for such working class democracy must derive from the creative energy of all workers, union and non-union alike, as well as allies who have a stake in the future of a vibrant US trade union movement. Thus, at a minimum, what is required and desirable in the implementation of a social movement unionism from below is the active participation of rank-and-fi le workers in channeling their own creative energy, they can begin to generate initiatives and chart the course for a reengineered labor movement.

Although it is impossible to provide a blue- print of what a fully-developed social movement unionism from below would ultimately look like, I would like to discuss some recent examples from the US trade union movement that I believe are consistent with the beginnings of such an approach while sketching out a number of theoretical ideas that I believe need to be considered in order to successfully achieve the construction of such an orientation. In addition to creating a differ- ent relationship between rank-and-fi le trade unionists and union leaders as found in business unionism and social movement unionism from above, I also argue that a social movement unionism from below must reconfi gure the collective bargaining relationship between labor and management at the negotiation table.

An example of recent tactics consistent with this social movement unionism from below is the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union organizing success at Smithfi eld Foods after a multi-year struggle. Due primarily to a minority and immigrant workforce taking ownership of the unionization drive, rather than relying on the union’s professional staff to lead the cam- paign, the workers achieved in December 2008 a certifi cation election victory and employer recognition of the union. Some of the key events

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contributing to this tremendous success indicate the workers’ taking initiative and executing vari- ous strategies devised on their own. In 2003, for example, sanitation crew workers walked out to demonstrate their opposition to the plant’s poor wages and working conditions. Despite company goons’ threats, these workers achieved a number of concessions. Upon seeing this suc- cessful action, other workers halted production to force the company to deal with health and safety concerns throughout the plant.57

With the widespread occurrence of immi- grant rights protests throughout the nation in early 2006, on May Day, workers took the day off and shut down production at the Smithfi eld plant. In November 2006, when the company terminated 75 immigrant workers and made threats to fi re hundreds more because of al- leged Social Security number inconsistencies, a two-day strike that included black, white, and Latino workers resulted in the company rehiring all the fi red workers. Shortly thereafter, union supporters gathered 4,000 signatures on a peti- tion demanding that, beginning in 2007, Martin Luther King’s birthday be made a paid holiday for all employees. Upon management’s refusal to meet this demand, approximately 400 workers remained absent from work that day. This action undoubtedly caught management’s attention because, in 2008, for the fi rst time, Smithfi eld granted the holiday to workers at every one of its non-union facilities.58

A second example representative of this type of social movement unionism is the victorious plant occupation that United Electrical Workers (UE) Local 1110 members held against Republic Door and Window in Chicago in December 2008 where a primarily immigrant work force, in struggling to obtain the wages and severance pay that the company owed them, decided to take matters into their own hands after the fac- tory closed with only a two-day notice. Reminis- cent of the wave of sit-down strikes that swept the United States from 1936 to 1938 and was instrumental in building the nascent industrial unions of the CIO, 200 of the 240 factory work- ers occupied the plant on December 5, the day the factory closed. Lasting six days, the sit-down

strike ended when the union local negotiated a $1.75 million settlement with the company which included vacation time, severance pay and temporary health care benefi ts.59

Besides encouraging rank-and-file trade unionists to utilize their creative energies in devising their own strategies, I believe that the collective bargaining approach of a labor orga- nization adopting social movement unionism from below must go beyond merely trying to obtain the best labor contracts for union members per se. The vision of such a unionism’s collective bargaining strategy should become a mecha- nism for fi ghting for positive social change such as repairing problematic industries, providing economic opportunities, and modifying business practices that harm communities and destroy the environment. In order to accomplish this, com- munity representatives and nonunion workers must benefi t from unionism so that they have a direct interest in seeing workers organized into labor organizations. Thus, it is necessary to incorporate these two constituencies into the union’s negotiation committee.60

How would this type of unionism actually function in practice? As an example in the pri- vate sector we can examine the troubles in the domestic auto industry which was exacerbated by the Financial Crisis of 2008. Without posing any potential solutions of its own, the United Auto Workers (UAW) adopted a defensive posture and immediately accepted the Obama Administration Auto Task Force’s directive to reduce wages and benefi ts to the level of the non-union transplants (although the lower-tier in the two-tier wage system was $14 per hour which was far below that of the transplants.)61 The union’s strategy was clearly to try to pre- serve as many jobs as it could in a declining domestic auto industry that would continue to outsource jobs.62

But what if the UAW had some foresight and had begun to formulate a different strategy several years before the crisis hit? What if the union had begun to organize both unionized and non-union auto workers, environmentalists and community activists around an alternative program? For example, upon the crisis’ onset,

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

the union could have argued that it represented all auto workers as well as environmentalists in the communities where these groups reside. Instead of agreeing with the federal govern- ment to invest $100 billion in particular auto companies, the UAW could have called for this funding to be used to establish an Auto Recon- struction Agency which would have the power “to restructure and refi nance” the auto industry. As part of its proposal, the union could have in- tegrated all union and non-union auto workers, environmentalists, community activists, consum- ers, etc. around the union agreeing to reopen all auto industry contracts if and only if the UAW would be allowed to negotiate over a number of items with the auto companies, traditionally not found in collective bargaining agreements. Such negotiations could have included negoti- ating over the manufacturing of green cars, the actual kind of cars to be produced, the levels of executive pay, wages of workers who lost their jobs due to outsourcing as well as the allocation of taxpayer bailout funds. This approach would potentially lead to opportunities to expand the auto industry’s manufacturing base, to economi- cally benefi t communities where auto plants are currently located as well as to unionize many non-union workers in the auto sector.63

In an example dealing with public sector la- bor, there are current attempts to defund public schools and to create charter schools in their place because of the ostensible failure of many of these institutions to provide quality education for students. What about integrating representatives of parent groups and student organizations into the bargaining committees of the National Edu- cation Association and the American Federation of Teachers so that these constituent groups have infl uence in negotiations? Parents and students have a signifi cant stake in the outcome of nego- tiations between the teachers unions and local school boards. Such an arrangement would demonstrate to parents and teachers that unions are not counter posed to their interests but are interested in providing a quality education for students within the constraints provided by various societal political interests. Moreover, it would bolster public sector unions so that when

they are attacked by various anti-union forces, it would be more diffi cult to pit public sector employees against, for example, more numerous tax payers which certain politically conservative forces are attempting to invoke at this time.64

Representatives from parent groups and student organizations should be involved in collective bargaining negotiations because they have concerns involving class size, allocation of resources devoted to educational and extra- curricular programs, etc. Additionally, since there are inordinately high turnover rates in the teaching industry, parents and students have a vested interested in teachers’ wages, benefi ts and working conditions because these issues directly impact the students’ learning conditions.65

Additionally, such an expansive collective bargaining strategy could lead to stronger sup- port for unions as a whole if these constituencies come to believe that labor truly has their best interests at heart. Under such a situation, trade unions would no longer be seen as merely “job trusts” for their members.66 This could contrib- ute to wider and deeper support for the unions’ legislative programs and put more pressure on legislators to pass labor’s agenda if the citizenry as a whole actually possessed reasons to sup- port the unions’ political program. From Carter through Obama, labor used its political muscle to help elect these Democratic candidates to the US presidency although labor law reform never became a legislative priority because other bills, according to these Democratic presidents had to come fi rst. When it came time to placing labor’s bills on the table, these administrations’ political capital was spent so nothing signifi cant ever was accomplished.67 If the US trade union movement could derive more support for its legislative program through a supportive citi- zenry, there is a higher probability that labor would be successful.

VI. Conclusion: Can Labor’s Crisis Be Resolved?

Let me conclude with what I believe to be his- torical examples of this type of “working class democracy” that occurred during an economic

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climate not dramatically different from ours to- day to demonstrate that social movement unionism from below possesses the capacity to dramatically reshape the US trade union movement. During the height of the Great Depression, three strikes in 1934 led by small groups of political radicals sparked a militant, mass labor movement which paved the way for the nascent industrial unionism of the CIO to organize broad swaths of American workers neglected by the AFL craft unions. A small group of socialists affi liated to the American Workers Party, who had been organizing unem- ployed workers in Toledo for over a year, headed the victorious Toledo Auto-Lite strike which led to extensive unionization in Toledo. In Min- neapolis, a band of Trotskyists connected with Teamsters Local 574 led a successful strike against the city’s trucking companies which resulted in widespread unionization in Minneapolis. And in San Francisco, the Communist Party’s role in the 1934 West Coast Longshoremen’s Strike was instrumental in contributing to the unionization of all of the US West Coast ports.68 Not only did these strikes demonstrate that viable industrial unions could be built, but, also, according to some scholars, these events were the decisive factor contributing to the passage of the NLRA in June 1935. And although not directly related to unionization per se but a much more recent collective action representing the spirit and vi- brancy of the practice of social movement unionism from below, and concerned with many of the same

issues as the AFL-CIO and the CTW unions, is the “Occupy Wall Street” Movement, which gained tremendous support in the fall of 2011. This movement began with just 12 people far fewer than the numbers involved even initially in organizing the three 1934 strikes.

A bottom-up social movement unionism hardly guarantees that the events of 1934 will be repeated in the near future or that success will necessarily always occur. Moreover, such a democratic approach will neither be smooth nor linear and, at times, may even be messy, chaotic and problematic. Moreover, this type of union- ism also offers, unfortunately, no assurance that a defi nitive victory over capital is forthcoming or even will be attained in the far-off future. But what can be asserted undeniably is the follow- ing: by implementing this brand of unionism, rank-and-fi le unionists will unquestionably form a deeper and lasting commitment to trade unions as their own organizations which will enable labor to be effectively representing all workers’ inter- ests in resisting capital’s maneuverings. While the trade union movement’s defi nitive objec- tive should continue to be the emancipation of labor, the creation of a social movement unionism from below, if and when it occurs, in and of itself, would be a landmark event in US labor history. Given the dwindling options left and the im- mense challenges ahead, it does, perhaps, offer the best route for any type of true union move- ment revival in the United States. ■

ENDNOTES

1 Michael Goldfi eld, The Decline of Organized Labor in the United States (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1987), p. xiv.

2 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “News Release: Union Members – 2011” www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (Janu- ary 27, 2012) <Accessed on January 3, 2013>.

3 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “News Release: Union Members – 2011” www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (Janu- ary 27, 2012) <Accessed on January 3, 2013>.

4 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “Economic News Release: Table 1. Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 or More Workers, 1947-2011” www.bls.gov/news.release /wkstp. t01.htm (February 8, 2012) <Accessed on Janu- ary 3, 2013>.

5 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “Economic News Release: Table 1. Work Stoppages Involving 1,000 or More Workers,

1947-2011” www.bls.gov/news.release /wkstp. t01.htm (February 8, 2012) <Accessed on Janu- ary 3, 2013>.

6 For articles providing varying perspectives, although sometimes with subtle differences, on the Change to Win Federation as the rival of the AFL-CIO, see Gary Chaison, “The AFL-CIO Split: Does It Really Matter? ” Journal of Labor Re- search, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 301-311; Richard W. Hurd, “U.S. Labor 2006: Strategic Developments Across the Divide,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 313-325; Jim McNeill, “Work in Progress: The State of the Unions Two Years after the AFL-CIO Split,” Dissent, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 71-76; Samuel Estreicher, “Disunity Within the House of Labor: Change to Win or to Stay the Course? ” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Fall 2006), pp. 505-511; Ian Greer, “Business Union vs. Business Union? Understanding the

Split in the US Labour Movement,” Capital & Class, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn 2006), pp. 1-6; and Marick Masters, Ray Gibney, and Tom Zagenczyk, “The AFL-CIO v. CTW: The Competing Visions, Strategies, and Structures,” Journal of Labor Re- search, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Fall 2006), pp. 473-504.”

7 For discussions of the Hormel strike, see Neala J. Schleuning, Women, Community, and the Hormel Strike of 1985-86 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), Peter Rachleff, Hard-Pressed in the Heartland: The Hormel Strike and the Future of the Labor Movement. (Boston: South End Press, 1993); Hardy Green, On Strike at Hormel: The Struggle for a Democratic Labor Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) and Dave Hage and Paul Klauda. No Retreat, No Surrender: Labor’s War at Hormel (New York: William Morrow, 1989).

8 An excellent book detailing the United Paper- workers strike is Julius Getman, The Betrayal of Local 14 (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1998).

“THE CRISIS OF US TRADE UNIONISM AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE”

9 For a book discussing the Staley lockout and the defeat of the Decatur (Illinois) local of the United Paper workers International Union, see Steven K. Ashby and C.J. Hawking, Staley: The Fight for a New American Labor Movement (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009). Details on the United Auto Workers’ defeat in their strikes against Caterpillar can be found in Stephen Franklin, Three Strikes: Labor’s Heartland Losses and What They Mean for Working Americans (New York: The Guilford Press, 2001); Isaac Cohen, “The Caterpillar Labor Dispute and the UAW, 1991-1998,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Winter 2002), pp. 77-99 and Victor G. Devinatz, “A Heroic Defeat: The Caterpillar Labor Dispute and the UAW, 1991-1998,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 1-18.

10 A book covering the 19-month strikes at the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press, and the subsequent defeat of the Newspaper Guild, is Chris Rhomberg, The Broken Table: The Detroit Newspaper Strike and the State of American Labor (New York: Russell Sage Foundation , 2012).

11 Two articles concerning the UPS Strike that conclude that unions can successfully confront the power of corporations even under the most diffi cult circumstances are Matt Witt and Rand Wilson, “The Teamsters’ UPS Strike of 1997: Building a New Labor Movement,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 58-72 and Matt Witt and Rand Wilson, Part-Time America Won’t Work: The Teamsters Fight for Good Jobs at UPS in Not Your Father’s Union Movement: Inside the AFL-CIO, Jo-Ann Mort (ed.), Verso, London, pp. 179-187, 1998. For an article that contends that even though the Teamsters emerged victorious in the UPS strike, it did not signal that the U.S. labor movement was on the cusp of a major turnaround as some commen- tators claimed at the time, see R. Rothstein, “Union Strength in the United States: Lessons from the UPS Strike,” International Labour Review 136 (1997), pp. 469-91.

12 Matt Noyes, “Business Unionism and Its Dis- contents: Reflections on “Social Movement Unionism” and the Union Leadership in the U.S.” Rolling Earth, Movement Education www. re.rollingearth.org/?q=book/export /html/147 (April 2009) <Accessed October 15, 2011>

13 Joseph C. Goulden, Meany: The Unchallenged Strong Man of American Labor. (New York: Ath- eneum Publishers, 1972), p. 466.

14 Id at p.25 15 Taylor E. Dark, The Unions and the Democrats: An

Enduring Alliance (Ithaca, N.Y.: ILR Press, 1999), pp. 107-114.

16 Bruce Nissen, “What Are Scholars Telling the U.S. Labor Movement to Do?” Labor History, Vol. 44, No. 2 (May 2003), p. 160.

17 Id. 18 Information on this important strike can be found

in Michael A. Round, Grounded: Reagan and the PATCO Crash (New York: Garland Publishers, 1999); Willis. J. Nordlund, Silent Skies: The Air Traffi c Controllers’ Strike (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998); Arthur B. Shostak and David Skocik, The Air Controllers’ Controversy: Lessons From the PATCO Strike (New York: Human Sci- ences Press, 1986); Richard W. Hurd, “Refl ec- tions on PATCO’s Legacy: Labor’s Strategic Challenges Persist,” Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 207-214; Arthur B. Shostak, “Finding Meaning

in Labor’s “Perfect Storm”: Lessons from the 1981 PATCO Strike,” Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol.18. No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 223-229; and Joseph A. McCartin, “A Historian’s Perspective on the PATCO Strike, Its Legacy, and Lessons,” Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2006), pp. 215-222.

19 With the advent of concession bargaining in the early 1980s the crisis of business unionism became apparent in the U.S. private sector. While this type of bargaining was typically found in the private sector, public-sector concession bargaining occurred during this time period as well. For pertinent articles on concession bargaining in the private sector, see Everett M. Kassalow, “Concession Bargaining: Towards New Roles for American Unions and Manag- ers,” International Labour Review, Vol. 127, No. 5 (1988), pp. 573-592; Brian E. Becker, “Conces- sion Bargaining: The Impact on Shareholders’ Equity,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 40, No. 2 ( January 1987), pp. 268-279; James A. Craft, Suhail Abboushi and Trudy Labovitz, “Concession Bargaining and Unions: Impacts and Implications,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring1985), pp. 167-180 ; Peter Cappelli, “Plant-Level Concession Bargaining,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 90-104 and David Bensman, “Concession Bargaining in Steel: A Weakened Union Faces Corporate Blackmail,” Dissent Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 1983), pp. 97- 102. Information on public-sector concession bargaining can be found in David Lewin, “Im- plications of Concession Bargaining: Lessons from the Public Sector,” Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 106, No. 3 (May 1983), pp. 33-35.

20 Most industrial relations scholars and practi- tioners have considered the introduction of labor-management cooperation programs to be a positive development because of the alleged gains afforded to unions and employers. For articles and books supportive of this position, see Michael J. Duane, The Grievance Process in Labor-Management Cooperation (Westport, Connecticut : Quorum Books, 1993); Elmer Chat ak , “A Unionist’s Perspective on the Future of American Unions,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1991), pp. 327-332; William Brock, III, “The Importance of Labor- Management Cooperation,” Journal of Labor Research, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 225-230 ; William N. Cooke, Labor-Management Cooperation: New Partnerships or Going in Circles (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1990); Edward Co- hen-Rosenthal and Cynthia E. Burton, Mutual Gains: A Guide to Union-Management Cooperation (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1984); Gary B. Han- sen, “Ford and the UAW Have a Better Idea: A Joint Labor-Management Approach to Plant Closings and Worker Retraining,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 475, No. 1 (1984), pp. 158-174; and Michael H. Schuster, Union-Management Cooperation : Struc ture , Process , and Impac t (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research,1984). There are, however, a number of articles and books au- thored from a pro-union perspective that are exceptionally critical of union involvement in such programs such as Mike Parker and Jane

Slaughter, Working Smart: A Union Guide to Participation Programs and Reengineering (De- troit : Labor Notes, 1994); Mike Parker and Jane Slaughter, Unions and the Team Concept (Boston: South End Press, 1988); Donald M. Wells, Empty Promises: Quality of Working Life Programs and the Labor Movement (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); and Mike Parker, Inside the Circle: A Union Guide to Quality of Work Life (Boston: South End Press, 1985).

21 Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: The New Press, 2010), p. 301.

22 Paul Buhle, Taking Care of Business: Samuel Gomp- ers, George Meany, Lane Kirkland, and the Tragedy of American Labor (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), pp. 223-224.

23 Id at 231 24 Harold Meyerson, “AFL-CIO Sweeney’s Real

Trium phs .” ht t p : / / w w w.w a shing t onpos t . com /w p - dyn / content / ar ticle / 20 0 9 / 0 9 /15 / AR2009091502982.html?wprss=rss_opinions (September 16, 2009) <Accessed on November 30, 2009>

25 Kim Moody, “American Labor: A Movement Again? ” Monthly Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 ( July- August 1997a), p. 63

26 Michael D. Yates, Why Unions Matter. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2009), p. 16.

27 Peter Waterman, “Adventures of Emancipatory Labour Strategy as the New Global Movement Challenges International Unionism,” Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 217-253.

28 Kim Moody, Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy (London: Verso, 1997).

29 Noyes. 30 Buhle. 31 Lowell Turner and Richard Hurd, Building Social

Movement Unionism: The Transformation of the American Labor Movement in Rekindling the Movement: Labor’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century, Lowell Turner, Harry C. Katz, and Richard W. Hurd (eds.), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, pp. 14-17, 2001.

32 Victor G. Devinatz, “To Find Answers to the Urgent Problems of Our Society”: The Alliance for Labor Action’s Atlanta Union Organizing Offensive, 1969-1971,” Labor Studies Journal, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 71, 73

33 45. Roger Waldinger, Christopher Erickson, Ruth Milkman, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Abel. Valen- zuela, Kent Wong and Maurice Zeitlin, Helots No More: A Case Study of the Justice for Jani- tors Campaign in Los Angeles, in Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies, ed. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Sheldon Friedman, Richard W. Hurd, Rudolph A. Oswald, and Ronlad L. Seeber (eds.), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, pp. 102-119, 1998; Catherine L. Fisk, Daniel J.B. Mitchell, and Christopher L. Erickson, Union Representation of Immigrant Janitors in South- ern California: Economic and Legal Challenges, in Organizing Immigrants: The Challenge for Unions in Contemporary California, Ruth Milkman (ed.), Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, pp. 169-198, 2000.

34 Harold Meyerson, “Rolling the Union On: John Sweeney’s Movement Four Years Later,” Dissent, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Winter 2000), p. 48.

35 Steve Early, Embedded with Organized Labor: Journalistic Refl ections on the Class War at Home (New York: Monthly Review Press; 2009), p. 131; Dark, p. 338.

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36 Michael D. Yates, “Does the U.S. Labor Move- ment Have a Future? ” Monthly Review, Vol. 48, No. 9 (February 1997), p. 13; Early, p. 131

37 Yates, 2009, p. 202; Kim Moody, “Up Against the Polyester Ceiling: The “New” AFL-CIO Orga- nizes – Itself! New Politics, Vol. 6 (new series) 1998: pp. 11-18.

38 Moody 1997a, pp. 63-64. 39 Greer at 3. 40 Hurd, at 315. 41 Greer at 3. 42 Meyerson, 2000, p. 52. 43 John J. Sweeney, “The Growing Alliance Between

Gay and Union Activists,” Social Text, Volume 17, No. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 31-38.

44 Moody. 45 Id. 46 John J. Sweeney, America Needs a Raise: Fight-

ing for Economic Securit y and Social Justice (Wilmington, MA: Houghton Miffl in Company, 1996), p. 149.

47 Id at 150. 48 Early, p. 128; Meyerson 2009.

49 Robert Bruno, “John Sweeney and the Next American Labor Movement,” The Labor and Working-Class History Association Newsletter, (Fall 2009), p. 6

50 Moody. 51 Id. 52 Joshua Freeman, “Symposium: Split to Win? Assess-

ing the State of the Labor Movement Dissent, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Winter 2006): pp. 54-56; Greer; Chaison.

53 Id at 55. 54 Greer at 6. 55 Noyes. 56 Id. 57 “Victory After 15-Year Battle: UFCW Orga-

nizes Smithfi eld Plant North Carolina,” Workers Vanguard, No. 927, January 2, 2009, http://www. icl-fi .org/print/english/wv/927/smithfi eld.html. <Accessed March 21, 2010>

58 “Victory After 15-Year Battle: UFCW Orga- nizes Smithfi eld Plant North Carolina,” Workers Vanguard, No. 927, January 2, 2009, http://www. icl-fi .org/print/english/wv/927/smithfi eld.html. <Accessed March 21, 2010>

59 Kari Lydersen, Revolt on Goose Island: The Chi- cago Factory Takeover, and What It Says About the Economic Crisis. (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2009).

60 Stephen Lerner, “An Injury to All: Going Beyond Collective Bargaining as We Have Known It,” New Labor Forum, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 46, 49.

61 Robert Fitch, “Card Check: Labor’s Charlie Brown Moment,” New Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2010) Whole No. 48 newpol.org/con- tent/card-check-labors-charlie-brown-moment <Accessed January 3, 2013>

62 Lerner at 48. 63 Id at 48-49. 64 Robert Fitch, “Card Check: Labor’s Charlie

Brown Moment,” New Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Winter 2010) Whole No. 48 newpol.org/con- tent/card-check-labors-charlie-brown-moment <Accessed January 3, 2013>

65 Fitch. 66 Id. 67 Id.

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