US Politics-Voting

  1  

Week 3 Rational and Expressive Choice Rational Choice Theory and the Rational Voter Model (P = B > C; or

Participation or voter choice (P) = perceived benefits of participation or

choice (B) > perceived costs of participation or choice (C)) became popular

in the 1970s. Pursuant to this theory and model, voters decide whether to

vote and which candidate to vote for on some rational basis, usually on the

basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits. The model lends

itself more than others to predicting what effects changes in external

conditions will have on the vote. A major contribution of the model was to

emphasize the role of issues in voter choice.

The paradox of participation calls into question this theoretical

perspective. The paradox theorizes that the rational individual will not

waste resources by bearing the costs of taking part in the voting process but

will instead take a free ride on the efforts of others. This is known as the

free rider problem. The problem is especially acute when the individual

does not perceive their vote as being decisive to the election outcome.

Some have used rational choice theory to argue that those in a high

socio-economic class would be less active “because they have the education

and intellectual sophistication to comprehend the free-rider problem and

  2  

because their high salaries raise the opportunity cost of participation” (Verba

1995, 284). The facts however suggest this hypothesis is false. In fact,

strong empirical evidence demonstrates that those in a high socio-economic

class are actually the most likely to be active.

Other rational choice proponents, including Anthony Downs, have

argued that lower information and transaction costs for the well educated

imply that it is actually easier for them to participate in politics. Verba

(1995) notes “[t]his approach has the virtue of fitting the facts but seems

somewhat post hoc” (284).

Overall, rational choice theory must be praised for its theoretical

elegance. But, the theory has done a poor job of predicting political

participation. More specifically, the theory has failed to predict how much

political activity and who will take part.

Some have argued that expressive choice theory can provide a more

compelling explanation of voter behavior. According to Schuessler in A

Logic of Expressive Choice (2000), individuals do not necessarily participate

in collective action in order to produce outcomes but instead often do so in

order to express who they are by attaching themselves to such outcomes.

Because under Schuessler’s perspective the value of participation

emerges not from the outcome but from the process of participation itself,

  3  

the free-rider problem is no longer a concern. Participation therefore is not a

form of investment but rather a form of consumption. Schuessler wrote,

“Consumption benefits are inextricably tied to expression: the sports fan’s

expression of team support is required for him to enjoy his participation.

Similarly, participation in politics, under a consumption-benefit regime, is

inextricably tied to the expression of partnership, or the expression of

preference toward one of the candidates” (46) (emphasis in original). So

while participation was often seen as a cost under the rational choice

perspectives, expressive choice theorists see participation as a huge benefit

logically driving the individual voter when making voting choices.

Mobilization

Mobilization is the process by which candidates, parties, activists and

groups induce other people to participate. Two types of mobilization: (1)

Directly – leaders mobilize people directly when they contact citizens

personally and encourage them to take action and (2) Indirectly – leaders

mobilize people indirectly when they contact citizens through mutual

associates (family, friends, neighbors or colleagues).

Political leaders do not try to mobilize everyone, and not all the time.

For maximum effect, they target their efforts on particular people, and they

time them for particular occasions. When targeting, political leaders are (1)

  4  

more likely to mobilize people they already know; (2) more likely to

mobilize people who are centrally positioned in social networks; (3) more

likely to mobilize people whose actions are most effective at producing

political outcomes; and (4) more likely to mobilize people who are likely to

respond by participating. Thus, political leaders are more likely to mobilize

(1) people who are employed, especially in large workplaces; (2) people

who belong to associations; (3) leaders of organizations, businesses and

local government; and (4) the wealthy, educated and partisan. Timing

becomes critical when we consider that (1) people participate more when

salient issues top the agenda; (2) people participate more when other

concerns do not demand their attentions; (3) people participate more when

important decisions are pending; (4) people participate when outcomes hang

in the balance; and (5) people participate more when issues come before

legislatures rather than before bureaucracies and courts.

Social Capital

Social capital is the features of social life – networks, norms and trust

– that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared

objectives. Putnam (2000) in his famous work Bowling Alone advances a

theory of social capital that presumes that generally speaking the more we

connect with others the more we trust them. Social trust and civic

  5  

engagement are strongly correlated. Significantly, education is the strongest

correlate of civic engagement. However education has increased with time

but yet, civic engagement has declined.

Putnam (2000) examined a number of potential factors to explain the

decline in social capital, social trust and civic engagement. These factors

included pressure of time and money; mobilization and suburbanization; the

changing role of woman; marriage and family; the rise of the welfare state;

the race and civil rights revolutions; age; and television. Putnam concluded

that television and generational effects are the most likely culprits to explain

the decline.

Life-cycle effects are differences attributable to a stage of life. Period

effects affect all people who live in a given era. With generational effects

individuals do not change, but society does; like life cycle effects,

generational effects show up as disparities among age groups at a single

point in time, but like period effects they produce real social change.

Citizen Engagement

Scholars debate whether the general decline in civic participation

since the 1960s represents a disengagement from political activity, including

voting. Niemi et al. (2010) note that academics have become concerned

about the decline in voter turnout and other forms of political participation.

  6  

Signs of disengagement appeared in the 1960s, and at a time when trust in

the American government lessened. Disengagement was also observed in

other nations (2010).

Moreover, political knowledge also appears to be declining. The

quality of news coverage has worsened. The development of many

specialized cable channels and web sites gives individuals the ability to

either fully pay attention to politics or avoid it entirely. It is expected that

these developments will widen the knowledge gaps between those who

regularly follow political news and those who merely use new technology

for entertainment (Niemi et al. 2010).

As noted above, Putnam concluded that the observed decline was

“generational in nature” (Niemi et al. 2010, 23). For example, it was

observed that the decline in participation and political knowledge is

especially acute in young people (2010).

Niemi et al. (2010) also acknowledge that other academics see

disengagement as a myth. These scholars agree that cable channels and the

internet are replacing network television as the primary news source. But,

they also argue a change in values has occurred, which young people were

eager to adopt. Prior to the 1960s, the World War II generation placed an

emphasis on civic duty. Later generations focused instead on engagement,

  7  

which emphasizes individual autonomy and non-electoral behavior such as

community service and directly helping others (2010). “These changes in

modes of communication, news dissemination, and values have naturally

caused changes in some kinds of political behavior” (2010, 30).

Niemi et al. (2010) also make an important point about the difference

in calculating voter turnout. Historically, the base was calculated using the

VAP (voting age population). Since the 1970s, however, many individuals

in the voting age population have become ineligible to vote, including large

numbers of legal or illegal non-citizens and felons or ex-felons who were

denied the voting franchise by state laws. A more accurate measure appears

to be the VEP (voting eligible population), which actually shows that after

1972, the decline in voting turnout was much smaller than previously

observed (2010). A challenge with using the VEP, however, is that each

state’s laws must be taken into account so as to capture the most accurate

picture of the voting eligible population.

Putnam (2000) acknowledged that it was too early to tell the true

impact of the internet on social capital and citizen engagement. Even if we

accepted the arguments from the academics that believe disengagement is a

myth, the quality of the experience is ultimately very important to political

participation. The time spent viewing cable channel news and web sites is

  8  

increasingly becoming an individual activity. This contemporary experience

contrasts with the pre-1960s experience of families listening to the radio

together and individuals enjoying face-to-face bridge games where they

would discuss the issues of the day collectively (2000). As Putnam (2000)

states, “More and more of our time and money are spent on goods and

services consumed individually, rather than those consumed collectively”

(245).

Civic engagement is subject to criticism. Some scholars have argued:

(1) the lack of involvement may signal widespread satisfaction with the

status quo rather than a crisis of democracy; (2) participation sparks feelings

of powerlessness and frustration; (3) citizen participation may encourage

unwise decisions (due to lack of expertise); and (4) highly engaged

majorities may repress minorities and produce other injustices. In response,

others have argued: (1) there has never been non-self-interested elites who

could be trusted to advance the common good; (2) those who are active do a

poor job of representing the interests of the inactive; (3) through institutional

design, it may be possible to reconcile tensions between just and good

government and enhanced participation; (4) civic debate is the best way to

discern the truth; and (5) higher turnouts produce electorates less dominated

by extremes.

  9  

Regardless of one’s position with respect to civic engagement, most

agree political participation in the United States is dangerously low. I do not

argue that extremely high rates of participation must be achieved, but when

government legitimacy is perceived as low and indifference to government

and collective life too common, then increased engagement is needed. We

must remember that the amount, quality and distribution of political and

civic engagement are mostly the product of our political choices.

Youth Participation

Regardless of whether youth participate as much as older individuals,

the nature of their participation is clearly different. Instead of traditional

political activity such as working for a campaign and voting, youth are

engaging in activities such as boycotting and protesting (Niemi et al. 2010).

However the quality of these political activities may not yield the same

benefit to the newer generations that more traditional political activity had

for previous generations.

Verba et al.’s work only deepens the concern. Verba et al. (1995)

argue that resources such as time, money and skills are required for political

participation. The origins of such resources were traced back to the

involvement of individuals in major social institutions such as the family,

school, workplace, voluntary associations and religious institutions (1995).

  10  

“Socially structured circumstances and the constrained choices affect the

stockpile of time, money and civic skills available for politics” (271). If

individuals choose to engage in activities either alone or in non-traditional

organizations and groups, then they may not have the same quality of access

to the resources that are necessary for effective political engagement.

Newer generations may prefer to engage in contemporary forms of

non-electoral political activity, choosing not to vote. But, evidence exists

that government rewards those who vote (Griffin and Newman 2005).

Elections can be “successful in refocusing public officials’ attention to the

electorate’s desires” (Bennett and Resnick 1990, 800).

If decline in voting continues, even prolonged slight declines using a

VEP measure, a shift in the voting model may be warranted so as to better fit

this important democratic activity to the non-traditional paradigm embraced

by newer generations. Compulsory voting or voting via a secure internet

platform or a platform provided by another technology may eventually be an

essential change (Niemi et al. 2010). Additional research on the quality of

contemporary participation may help inform our electoral policy options.