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Managing unethical behavior in organizations: The need for a behavioral business ethics approach De Cremer, David; Vandekerckhove, Wim . Journal of Management and Organization ; Lyndfield 23.3

(May 2017): 437-455.

ProQuest document link

ABSTRACT  

Issues of morality and ethics have increasingly become more important in organizations and business settings.

Traditionally, these issues of ethics and social responsibility in business settings have been discussed and

commented on by prescriptive approaches that are grounded in philosophical traditions. Building on the idea that

we need to develop a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the value that people assign to ethics

and how it influences their actions and decisions, in the present article we discuss and review the importance and

relevance of adopting also a descriptive approach that is grounded in the behavioral sciences (referred to as

behavioral business ethics). This approach has the advantages to promote our insights into how people can show

both good and bad behavior and why this is the case. Behavioral business ethics therefore represents an

important research challenge for organizational researchers to pursue and engage more meaningfully with more

prescriptive approaches. FULL TEXT  

INTRODUCTION

It is by now clear to everyone that as a result of corporate failures in the moral domain, a critical challenge for

organizations is to gain a deeper understanding of why ethical standards are so easily violated and accepted.

Indeed, all too often, greed has turned out to be center-stage in our decisions, which was clearly illustrated when

many banks had no problem distributing millions in bonuses - even guaranteed ones without any commitment to

high performance - to those who eventually made decisions that drove the company and society at large into a

financial crisis. Highly featured court cases in which investment banks are involved for fraud and misrepresenting

information are no exception anymore.

All of these decisions bring pain and hurt to the interests of society at large and makes that trust in our economic

institutions and organizations are at an all-time low. Cases like the United Kingdom parliamentary expenses

scandal show that unethical behaviors and decisions can bring forward significant financial and reputational

damages to our society and organizations (Bennett &Robinson, 2000). Even more so, at the level of the company,

the downplaying of moral standards and lack of adherence to norms preventing unethical behavior and

wrongdoings burden the reliability and profitability of those same companies. For example, as pointed out by De

Cremer (2014), corporate ethical failures led the German company Siemens to agree to a $1.6 billion settlement to

remedy harmful consequences of their bribery actions in emerging markets and in a similar way the oil company

Royal Dutch Shell was required to pay $150 million because they misrepresented information about their oil

resources.

As De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, and van Dijke (2010: 1) note, all 'these observations make clear that ethical failures have

become an important reality for corporations, organizations, and societies at large and as a result there is a

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growing concern on how to manage and regulate such failures.' For this reason, it is essential that we develop a

better understanding why the morals and ethical actions of so many business people seem to go out of the

window as soon as self-interest can be served in the short term. To do this it is essential to also rely on evidence-

based approaches and take stock of the research that is available at present. In light of this ambition, we argue

that is necessary to take a look at how business ethics has been studied so far and how new approaches to this

topic may help us to take the existing knowledge even further. Schminke (2010) has previously written about the

difficulties with integrating descriptive and prescriptive approaches to business ethics. Alzola (2011) argued that

since both approaches have their specificity, an integration is not the best way forward. Instead, Alzola (2011: 32)

calls for a reconciliation, which he understands as a 'dialog without hybridization, a dialog that starts with the

premise of respecting the identity of those involved in the conversation.' The aim of the present paper is to recast

prescriptive and descriptive business ethics in light of one another. For that purpose the paper is structured as

follows. In the next section we first briefly sketch the business ethics theories within the most important

philosophical paradigms. We suggest that their theoretical developments are epistemologically driven, i.e., they are

human efforts to grapple with moral perplexity. The section after that reviews the field of behavioral research and

summarizes the implications from the relatively new behavioral business ethics research approach (Treviño,

Weaver, &Reynolds, 2006; De Cremer &Tenbrunsel, 2012; Moore &Gino, 2013). The importance of this descriptive

business ethics research lies in the empirical insights into situational factors of 'bounded ethicality.' We then

continue with a section discussing the challenges that these insights propose for the field of business ethics and

indicate possible dialogs between descriptive and prescriptive business ethics.

BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE NORMATIVE APPROACH

Until quite recently, business ethics as a field focused on how managers and employees should act to satisfy

generally accepted ethical standards (see Rest, 1986; Jones, 1991). This approach can be described as one where

the 'ocused' and 'should' are dominant in people's thinking about ethical behavior and is referred to as the

prescriptive approach (Trevican be described as one where the 'ocused' and 'should' are dominant in people's

thinking about ethical if people are told how they should act in terms of ethical standards, they consciously will

adjust their behavior accordingly. This perspective is based on ideas developed in philosophical traditions and

includes prescriptions about comportment toward self, others, and the environment, and also prescriptions about

decision making, both in substance as well as procedural. Prescriptive business ethics draws on theories about

the nature of what is 'good' (ontology) and how we can know what 'good' is in specific situations (epistemology).

Hence discussions between prescriptive business ethicists are most productive when they happen within a

specific paradigm. Utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics are the main paradigms within which prescriptive

business ethics is developed. Utilitarianism judges the ethicality of an act by looking at the consequences of that

act. It is based on the notion of cause-effect and the binary abstraction of human strivings for pleasure over pain.

The good is thus what causes more pleasure than pain for stakeholders. Deontology does not consider

consequences. Instead, the ethicality of an act is judged by whether or not the act itself is good. It is based on the

notion that humans can act on free will. This is not a whimsical will. Rather, free will is a will freed from 'the

passions' and directed by reason only. The good is thus an act which a free will is able to will as an act. The

deliberation of that ability consists of versions of Kant's three tests: universalizability, respect for humans as

willing beings, and conceptual tenability. Virtue ethics considers an act in order to pass judgment on the actor. The

good is a matter of living a 'good life,' i.e., acting as a virtuous person and being seen as such. It is based on the

notion of the human telos - the potential flourishing as human beings - which we can only achieve by acting as a

virtuous person would. Generally, a virtuous person achieves the right balance between too little and too much of a

virtue, e.g., confidence as the virtuous middle between anxiety and hubris.

We find it important to note that each of these has its own historicity, meaning that these strands of ethical theory

were developed as an attempt to solve pressing societal problems of their time. Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart

Mill developed utilitarianism in the context of social reforms demanding government policies that would improve

the life of the poor instead of that of the aristocracy. Immanuel Kant developed his thinking in an attempt to give

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ethics a non-religious foundation in a time when Europe was ravaged by religious wars. Enlightenment thinkers

such as Kant-based science, politics and ethics on human reason. It would also be incorrect to state that these

people did not have an impact, or that those building further within these paradigms fail to have an impact today.

John Rawls' neo-Kantian seminal work Theory of Justice (1971) develops distributive prescriptions from a

hypothetical situation in which people decide on how to distribute goods and benefits within society, from behind

a 'veil of ignorance' where we have no knowledge of where on the social ladder we will live nor of our gender or

(dis)abilities. What Rawls (1971) wants to point out is that there is a rational way to organize society in a just way

but this rationality implies we can make abstraction of any concrete personal situation. Hence, to make a just

decision we must take the 'view from nowhere.'

Another neo-Kantian approach, procedural ethics, became popular through the work of Jürgen Habermas'

discourse ethics (Habermas, 1991). Instead of postulating the foundation of ethics in our individual human

reasoning abilities, Habermas sought to formulate such a foundation in the consensus people reach through

dialogue. Habermas' moral philosophy is thus an exploration of what constitutes a dialogue between humans

which can lead to an agreed decision. The answer is the 'domination-free dialogue' ( herrschaftsfreie Dialog) or the

ideal speech community. It is an ideal-typical situation where all those affected can speak without fear and while

being fully informed. Habermas thus formulates prescriptive statements with regard to how a decision must be

reached, because it is the procedure through which a decision is made that justifies the content of that decision.

The work of Habermas is also used to develop frameworks to understand business organizations as political

actors (Scherer &Palazzo, 2007).

For the purpose of this paper, the important aspect of the prescriptive approach is that it advocates a view point

that if people know how they should act, they will be consciously aware of these moral demands and hence display

behaviors in line with these 'oughts' and 'shoulds' (Rest, 1986; Reynolds, 2008). A prescriptive approach thus

implies that people are rational human beings, who make conscious decisions about how to act. As a result,

prescriptive approaches to business ethics assume that bad people do generally bad things and good people do

good things, because they are rational decision makers. Explaining situations whilst sticking to this rational way of

reasoning is attractive for a variety of reasons (De Cremer, 2009, De Cremer &Tenbrunsel, 2012): (a) it is a simple

assumption that promotes an economic way of thinking about moral violations, (b) allows to blame a few 'bad'

apples for the emerging violations, and (c) provides a justified ground to punish those regarded as rationally

responsible. However, many situations exist where good people do bad things - an observation that has received

considerable empirical support (Bersoff, 1999; Chugh, Bazerman &Banaji, 2005; Gino, Schweitzer, &Mead, 2011;

Shalvi, Dana, &Handgraaf, 2011; Umphress &Bingham, 2011). These observations challenge the accuracy of the

prescriptive approach in predicting the extent to which so-called rational human beings will display ethical

behavior. It seems to be the case that because of rather irrational, psychological tendencies humans do not always

recognize the moral dilemma at hand and engage in unethical behaviors without being aware of it.

To make sense of the fact that good people can do bad things an alternative view point is needed that accounts

for people's morally irrational behavior. We propose that this alternative view point is a descriptive approach that

examines more closely how people actually take decisions and why they sometimes do not act in line with the

moral principles that are universally endorsed. This approach is in line with Treviño, Weaver, and Reynolds (2006:

952) definition of behavioral ethics, which 'refers to individual behavior that is subject to or judged according to

generally accepted moral norms of behavior.' Important to realize is that such a behavioral approach includes the

assumption that people do not always deliberately cheat or engage in unethical actions because many of our

moral judgments and interpretations have to be considered as consequences of automatic and intuitive affective

reactions. Haidt (2001: 818), for instance, defined moral intuition as 'the sudden appearance in consciousness of a

moral judgment, including an affective valence (good-bad, like-dislike), without any conscious awareness of having

gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion.' Put simply, our moral evaluations

and decisions are not only guided by conscious rational thought processes but also by quick and affect-laden

processes (e.g., Ruedy, Moore, &Gino, 2013).

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Business ethics approaches thus have to take into account moral intuition to understand why managers,

employees and even organizations can so easily deviate from morally accepted standards in their actions and

decisions. A famous example of illustrating the role that intuitions and emotions play in making moral judgments

concerns the trolley problem as discussed by philosophers (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985; Otsuka, 2008) and

examined extensively recently by neuroscientists (Greene, 2013). The trolley dilemma introduces a problem where

there is an out-of-control trolley car about to strike a group of five people standing on the tracks ahead. Two

different versions of the dilemma exist. In the first version (referred to as the switch dilemma), people can divert

the trolley by using a switch onto another track where there is only one person standing. If they do this, only one

person will die and five will live. Studies show that the majority of people decide to divert the trolley to the other

track. This result initially was interpreted to favor a rational perspective on morality. That is, people simply count

the number of people that would die (1) versus survive (5). In the second version of the dilemma (referred to as the

footbridge dilemma) the trolley is also out of control, but this time there is no other track to divert the trolley on.

There is only one track and people are standing on a bridge across the track. Standing next to them is a large

stranger. This person is large enough to stop the trolley. The respondents themselves are not large enough to do

this. So, the question in this version of the dilemma is whether people will push the large stranger off the bridge to

derail the trolley. In this version, almost none of the respondents will do this. Although the philosophical tradition

of utilitarianism would dictate us to simply count in both versions of the dilemma, people do deviate from this

rational approach in the footbridge dilemma. The reason for this is that by pushing a person from the footbridge

people are asked to explicitly and directly harm someone and because of this association our emotions will come

into play and make us act less rational (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, &Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2007).

Interestingly, this relationship between doing harm to others and intuition was also the main theme of the moral

philosophical work of Emmanuel Levinas (Levinas, 1969, 2003; Burggraeve, 1999). It is the encounter with another

person that lays a moral claim on me. Levinas terms this the face-to-face with the Other - he uses capital 'O' to

emphasize the radical otherness of the other, i.e., irreducible to the 'same as me.' For Levinas, moral claims entail

an endless responsibility toward the other. There exists no calculation and no principled reasoning that releases

me from my responsibilities to the other. In that sense, the work of Levinas is radically different from the rational

approaches in ethical theory we mentioned at the outset of this paper: utilitarianism, deontology, and justice.

Levinas' work provides us with a philosophical account of why ethical intuition persistently overrides rational

'solutions.' It is the physical presence of another person that makes us perceive a situation as quite different,

something rational ethical theories are not able to take account of. The work of Levinas is a reaction to the Nazi

atrocities of the Second World War, and in this sense can be seen as part of philosophical grapplings with how

organization and ideology blunts ethical reasoning. Arendt's (1963) work on the 'banality of evil' and Lyotard's

(1984) critique of grand narratives are other examples. These influenced Bauman's (1991) work on 'moral distance'

to which we turn further in this paper.

Taken together, the assumption that when people are confronted with moral dilemmas they are automatically

aware of what they should be doing and therefore are in control to do the good thing is limited in its predictive

value because of the fact that humans seem to deviate from what rational approaches predict. In this paper we

therefore make the point that conditions exist where our human rationality fails and we are to some extent blind to

our own ethical transgressions. For this reason, if we are serious about designing more effective interventions to

prevent the emergence of unethical behaviors we also need to increase our understanding of why and how rational

approaches to ethics fail and why there is an irrational element present in our ethical decision-making processes.

In our view prescriptive business ethics and behavioral business ethics are complementary in helping us to

understand such questions.

BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS: AN EMERGING NEW FIELD

Knowing that unethical behavior needs to be accounted for does not directly imply that people are able all the time

to control impulses that undermine our conscious control over our bad and good actions. Therefore, the bad

behaviors that we have seen committed by corporate leaders in the last two decades cannot simply be seen in

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light of their 'bad' and 'unethical' personal character. How can we explain this?

An interesting idea put forward by the behavioral business ethics approach is that many organizational ethical

failures are not only caused by the so-called bad apples. In fact, closer inspection may reveal that many ethical

failures are in fact committed by people generally considered to be good apples (Bazerman &Banaji, 2004), but

depending on the barrel they are in they may be derail from the ethical path (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, &Treviño,

2010). As such, it may well be that all of us may commit unethical behaviors, given the right circumstances and

therefore we need to zoom in more on how individuals process morality information and its flaws and how they do

this in the larger social setting. The role of behavioral ethics in addressing ethical failures is to introduce a

psychological-driven approach that examines the role of cognitive, affective and motivational processes to explain

the 'how,' 'when,' and 'why' of individual's engagement in unethical behavior. Noteworthy, this approach will allow

us to identify deviations from actions and decisions based on a rational type of predictions, explain why these

deviations occur, and design more effective preventions and interventions (De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, &van Dijke,

2010; De Cremer, van Dick, Tenbrunsel, Pillutla, &Murnighan, 2011).

In the following section, we discuss two topics that have received considerable attention the last few years by

behavioral ethics researchers. These two topics illustrate how psychological processes play a role in shaping

people's moral judgments and actions that are relevant to business and organizations: (a) the processes and

biases taking place during ethical decision making and (b) the impact of the social situation on how ethical

judgments and actions are framed and evaluated.

ETHICAL DECISION MAKING

Before an actual decision is made in the moral domain, people need to realize that their decision may reveal ethical

consequences to both themselves and interdependent others. Only then, decisions that are violating existing and

shared moral principles can be recognized early on in the decision-making process and hence be interrupted in a

timely fashion to prevent further ethical escalations. Or, as Jones (1991) puts it, 'for the moral decision-making

process to begin, a person must recognize the moral issue' (p. 380). As mentioned earlier, this key aspect in the

conscious decision-making process is only a given if humans only make rational decisions. However, the

behavioral ethics approach clearly postulates that we are not solely driven in our actions by reason and that often

emotions exert significant influence. As a result, our decisions with respect to moral dilemmas are bounded in

rationality, which led Banaji and colleagues (Banaji &Bhaskar, 2000; Banaji, Bazerman, &Chugh, 2003; Chugh,

Bazerman, &Banaji, 2005) to refer to this issue as 'bounded ethicality.' Bounded ethicality includes the workings of

our human psychological biases that facilitate the emergence of unethical behaviors that do not correspond to our

normative beliefs. Specifically, people develop or adhere to cognitions (biases, beliefs) that allow them to

legitimize doubtful, untrustworthy and unethical actions. Importantly, these cognitive biases operate outside our

own awareness and therefore in a way make us blind to the ethical failures we commit (Reynolds, Leavitt,

&DeCelles, 2010). In addition, this blindness is further rooted in the self-favoring belief that in comparison to the

average person one can be looked upon as fairer and more honest (e.g., Taylor, 1989; Epley &Dunning, 2000; Hilbig

&Hessler, 2013). These self-favoring interpretations of who they are in terms of morality, are used by humans in

implicit ways to infer that they will not act unethically, which as a result lowers their threshold of monitoring and

noticing actual violations of our ethical standards (Banaji, Bazerman, &Chugh, 2003).

The concept of bounded ethicality thus literally includes a blindness component, which can be seen as activating

an ethical fading process, which as Tenbrunsel (2005: 96) notes is 'a process that removes the difficult moral

issues from a given problem or situation, hence increasing unethical behavior.' Below, we briefly discuss a number

of psychological processes that influence people to show unethical behavior even if it contradicts their own

personal beliefs about ethics. These processes are: moral disengagement, framing, anchoring effects, escalation

effects, level construal, and should-want self.

Moral disengagement

One important psychological process that biases people's moral awareness concerns the concept of moral

disengagement (Bandura, 1999). Moral disengagement is the 'an individual's propensity to evoke cognitions which

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restructure one's actions to appear less harmful, minimize one's understanding of responsibility for one's actions,

or attenuate the perception of the distress one causes others' (Moore, 2008: 129). Moral disengagement can thus

be seen as a buffer that allows people to free themselves from feeling guilty and uneasy with the idea that they

may have violated accepted ethical standards. Having morally disengaged thoughts makes unethical behavior

more likely to emerge. Moreover, moral disengagement is particularly successful to reduce feelings of dissonance

that would normally occur if an individual has strong moral awareness when harming the interests of others.

These processes have more recently also been studied in organizational settings. Beu and Buckley (2004)

illustrated that certain leadership types (transactional, personalized charismatic leaders) have an influence on how

subordinates can morally justify own bad behavior. Research on organizational corruption also focuses on the

disengagement processes that help to rationalize how 'corrupt individuals tend not to view themselves as corrupt'

(Ashforth &Anand, 2003: 15-25).

Framing

Depending on how a situation is cognitively represented has an effect on how we approach moral dilemmas and

take decisions (Kahneman &Tversky, 2000). One of the types of frames most studied is whether a decision

involves a loss or a gain. Insights building upon the concept of loss aversion (the notion that people perceive

losses as more negative than they regard gains of an equal magnitude as positive, see Kahneman &Tversky, 1979;

Tversky &Kahneman, 1981) suggest that self-interest looms larger when people are faced with loss. Indeed, losses

are considered more unpleasant than gains are considered pleasurable and hence invite more risk-taking to avoid

the unpleasant situation. Thus, risk-taking often leads to behavior violating ethical standards. Findings in line with

this notion suggest that losses indeed can enhance people's concern for their self-interest, and thus give rise to

selfish (Brewer &Kramer, 1986; Sondak, Neale, &Pinkley, 1995; Poppe &Valkenberg, 2003) and unethical intentions

(e.g., Kern &Chugh, 2009) and behavior (Reinders Folmer &De Cremer, 2012). In a business context risky behavior

to preserve one's self-interest thus quickly takes the form of corruption and fraud. Recent surveys reported in the

media support this idea: employees expect more corruption in the future, and are themselves not wholly reluctant

to use unethical means to achieve their goals (see De Cremer, 2010b).

Anchoring effects

An important side-effect of framing effects - as discussed above - is the anchoring effect (Tversky &Kahneman,

1981; Strack &Mussweiler, 1997). This effect holds that our judgments and decisions are strongly influenced by

the information that is available and accessible. Importantly, this information can be very arbitrary or even

irrelevant to the decision and judgments one is making. This idea is illustrated in a famous early study by Tversky

and Kahneman (1974) who spun a wheel of fortune with numbers that ranged from 0 to 100 and asked participants

whether the fraction of African nations in the United Nations was greater than or less than that number.

Participants were then required to estimate the actual figure. Interestingly, estimates were significantly related to

the number spun on the wheel (the anchor), even though subjects could clearly see that the number had been

generated by a purely chance procedure. The 'anchoring' effect is clear in a sense that participants used the

number shown on the wheel and then used that number as an anchor - that they insufficiently adjusted away from

- to arrive at an estimate. In a similar vein, it follows logically that arbitrary information can thus also set the stage

for unfair and irrational decision making. This implies that it is more likely for price increases to be based on the

initial suggestions of the market itself than on the amount the consumer wants to pay.

Escalation effects

One important observation concerns the fact that those showing bad behavior never arrive immediately at the

stage of doing bad. Rather, it seems like bad behavior emerges slowly and gradually as can be inferred from

remarks like 'I never thought I would show this kind of behavior.' In the literature this effect is referred to as the

escalation effect or the slippery slope effect. The famous social psychology experiment by Milgram (1974)

illustrates this principle. His results showed that a high proportion of individuals subjected fellow participants to

excruciating electric shocks under the instruction of an experimenter. In addition to showing the powerful effect of

obedience, these results were also important because they illustrated that participants were only able to deliver

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these electric shocks - and morally accept them - because participants started off with delivering small shocks,

gradually increasing their intensity. If the experimenter would have asked immediately to deliver the highest shock

voltage possible (440 V) then most participants most likely would have denied delivering the shock. The idea

behind this escalation effect is that 'each step is so small as to be essentially continuous with previous ones; after

each step, the individual is positioned to take the next one. The individual's morality follows rather than leads

(Darley, 1992: 208).

Thus, many unethical decisions and actions grow slowly into existence and this escalation process itself is not

noticed consciously. Indeed, the literature on cognition and perception has shown that we have difficulties

noticing changes in our environment that emerge gradually (Levin 2002). A similar process is at play when it

comes down to the emergence of corruption, fraud and issuing false statements (Gino &Bazerman, 2009; Moore,

2009). For example, research by Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (2005) described how auditors are often blind to

clients' internal changes in accounting practices, but only if the changes appear gradually.

Level construal

One noteworthy observation is that people's decisions and judgments are more colored by self-interest in the

short-term relative to the long-term. As Moore and Loewenstein (2004), argue, self-interest is automatic and is thus

easily activated when there is time pressure and immediate actions are required. When decisions are delayed

people seem to apply more easily moral standards and even construct more harsh moral judgments. Recent

research by Eyal, Liberman, and Trope (2008) actually showed that people judge immoral acts as more offensive

and moral acts as more virtuous when the acts are more distant in time rather than close. Level construal theory

can explain this (Trope &Liberman, 2003; Liberman, Trope, &Stephan, 2007). According to this theory, acts that are

in the distant future cannot be experienced directly and therefore are hypothetical. Hypothetical situations bring

their own mental constructions with it and a consequence of this process is that more distant events (e.g., events

on the long-term) are represented with it less concrete details. Under such circumstances, people adhere more

easily to moral standards as guide lines for their decisions and judgments. In contrast, events that are closer in

time are represented in less abstract and more concrete ways. Under those circumstances people will rely more on

concrete details and relevant contextual information to make decisions and judgments. Then, egocentric

tendencies will more easily influence the actions one will take.

Forecasting errors

One necessary challenge that organizations, managers and leaders are confronted with is to constantly predict the

future. The affective and behavioral forecasting literature (for reviews see Wilson &Gilbert, 2003, 2005), however,

shows that individuals are quite limited in predicting the level of distress they will experience following emotional

events (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, &Wheatley, 1998). Participants consistently overestimated their future

emotional reactions to both positive and negative events (Gilbert et al., 1998; Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert,

&Axsom, 2000). With respect to what people expect they will do, literature on behavioral forecasting shows that

people overestimate their tendency to engage in socially desirable behaviors like being generous or cooperative

(Epley &Dunning, 2000), and underestimate their tendencies toward deviant and cruel behavior like providing

electric shocks (Milgram, 1974). Moreover, people also overestimate their willingness to forgive moral

transgressions by overvaluing restorative tactics such as offering apologies (De Cremer, Pillutla, &Reinders Folmer,

2011). In a similar vein, it also follows that people are biased in their predictions in such a way that they will predict

to behave more ethically than they actually will do in the end.

Should-want Selves

Related to the issue of forecasting errors is the distinction between the 'want' self and the 'should' self. This

distinction was introduced by Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, and Wade-Benzoni (1998) and is used to describe

intrapersonal conflicts that exist within the human mind; notably conflicts between what we morally should be

doing and what in reality we want to do. As we know now, people predict that they will act more morally in

situations than they actually do when being confronted with these situations. These faulty perceptions and

estimates can be explained by the distinction between should and want selves. The 'want' self is a reflection of

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people's emotions and affective impulses. Basically, the want self is characterized more as 'hot headed.' The

'should' self, in contrast, is characterized as rational and cognitive, and can thus be looked upon as 'cool headed.'

Applying this distinction to our forecasting problem, it follows that the 'should' self is more active when making

decisions on the long-term, whereas the 'want' self is doing more of the talking when it concerns short-term

decisions. Morality and ethics as standards to live by are thus more accessible and guiding when making

predictions towards the future.

THE IMPACT OF THE SITUATION

The above makes clear that psychological processes significantly influence people's perceptions, interpretations

and ultimately their behaviors. At the same time, these studies and the fact that scholars find them salient, show

that people are aware of what would constitute ethical behavior, or at least people are still trying to be rational or

give reasons for how they behave, but are unaware of the extent in which they fail to be rational. Hence,

prescriptive ethics is not a cognitive fantasy of moral philosophers. This observation therefore strongly suggests

that behavioral ethics researchers need to devote attention to the automatic and egocentric biases or heuristics

that influences individual's behavior. Of course, such a focus is only concerned with the cognitive, motivational

and affective processes that take place within the individual (i.e., an intra-individual approach). As we know from

social psychology (Snyder &Cantor, 1998), human behavior, however, is not only influenced by what one feels,

thinks and wants, but also by the situation one is interacting in (see also Treviño, 1986). This is an important point

to make because people underestimate the impact of the situation; a tendency referred to as the fundamental

attribution error (Ross, 1977). This bias describes the tendency to over-value dispositional or personality-based

explanations for the observed behaviors of others while under-valuing situational explanations for those behaviors.

In social psychology several famous studies have been conducted to illustrate the impact of social context on

people's behavior, and show relevance to the emergence of evil and bad behavior (Asch, 1955; Milgram, 1974;

Zimbardo, 2007).

The Asch (1955) experiments on social influence and conformity illustrated in a persuasive manner that social

conditions exists that make individuals comply with group pressures considering what a correct response is even

when the opinion of the group is clearly contrary to fact. To test this idea Asch put a group of eight individuals (one

participant and seven confederates) together in a room and verbally stated which of three unequal lines matched a

given line. The participant was seated so that he made his judgment last. Results showed evidence for the

'majority effect' in such a way that participants deviated from their own personal judgment (which was correct) if

the majority of the group opted for another response. These findings suggest that people can easily deviate from

what is considered good behavior if enough others show bad behavior.

The famous experiments by Milgram (1974) into obedience to authority have had a significant impact on how

social influence can shape bad behavior. As discussed earlier in the present paper, his findings were important as

they demonstrated that people can be easily pressured into complying with evil requests from their supervisors.

Despite the fact that most participants blamed the experimenter to avoid personal responsibility, the findings are

clear in showing that people do not stand up to authorities that easily and thus are subject to normative and social

influences more than they would predict themselves.

Finally, in 1971 Zimbardo (2007) conducted an impressive experiment at the Stanford University campus in which

participants assumed the roles of 'prisoner' or 'guard' within an experimentally devised mock prison setting. After a

while it was clear that many of the participants classified as 'prisoners' were in serious distress and many of the

ones classified as 'guards' were behaving in ways which brutalized and degraded their fellow participants.

Participants were so merged into the prisoner's setting that they took up their roles too seriously, leading to

behavior that was considered inappropriate and unethical at times. In a similar vein, De Cremer and colleagues (De

Cremer, 2003; De Cremer &van Dijk, 2005, 2008; Stouten, De Cremer, &Van Dijk, 2005; Van Dijk &De Cremer, 2006)

demonstrated in a series of experimental studies that providing people with the label of leader makes them more

self-serving in a way that they allocate more tangible resources to themselves. In addition, this self-serving

behavior goes together with a belief that leader labels make people feel that they are actually entitled to more

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rewards than when they are provided the label of follower. This is precisely the bias the Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance'

we mentioned earlier aims at avoiding.

The social context in which we make ethical-related decisions can exert a significant influence and derail us from

the good behavior we are expected to show. This idea of context being a powerful determinant for people to act in

bad and unethical ways towards others has been central in the work of Bauman on 'moral distance' (Bauman,

1991). The notion of moral distance holds the idea that people will have only ethical concerns about others that

are near to them. If the distance increases, it becomes easier to behave in unethical ways. Interestingly, the work

of Bauman was heavily influenced by the earlier mentioned study of Milgram (1974) on obedience to authority. One

could say that in the Milgram study the fact that the participants were sitting in a different room and did not see

the confederate who was supposedly receiving the electro shocks made it easier for them to increase the level of

shocks to a deadly level.

If context is essential in activating the effects associated with the notion of moral distance, a specific question to

address is how we can understand how specific organizational settings influence people's decisions to show good

behavior or not. In light of this question, Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, and Umphress's (2003) approach to study the

impact of the situation on people's unethical behavior and decision making by looking at organizational elements

is promising. These authors put forward the idea that organizational settings carry so many specific features with

it and each of these features may frame the organizational setting in ways that either prevent or facilitate

unethical behavior and decision making (De Cremer, 2010a).

A first organizational feature is the kind of industry people may work in. For example, the LIBOR scandal where

traders manipulated the interest rate known as Libor illustrates that a context defined in terms of finance actually

encouraged dishonest behavior. Indeed, when ex-trader Tom Hayes was sentenced to 14 years in prison for his

taking part in the Libor scandal, he noted in his voluntarily testimony that the practices he engaged in were

widespread and blatant in the industry. This claim has been backed up by recent behavioral ethics research

showing that mere exposure to money - an organizational feature much present in the financial sector - leads to

more unethical behavior (Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, &Sousa, 2013). The reason for this causal relationship is

that the mere exposure to money makes people adopt a business decision frame in which decisions are more

calculative. In addition, other recent research has further demonstrated that people with a calculative mind set act

in more selfish and unethical ways (Wang, Zhong, &Murnighan, 2014).

Another organizational feature is the structure of the organization that creates more versus less distance toward

others, which can influence the degree of unethical behaviors. Two types of organizational structures that are

relevant to this issue are mechanistic and organic structures (Slevin &Covin, 1997). Mechanistic structures in

organizations represent rigid and bureaucratic decision-making structures that foster more hierarchical and

distant relationships and communications. Organic structures, on the other hand, represent organizations that are

flexible and use more decentralized structures in which it is easier to communicate and relationships are

experienced as more close (Lawrence &Lorsch, 1967; Khandwalla, 1977). Based on the idea of Bauman (1991: 26)

that bureaucracy functions as a 'moral sleeping pill,' it stands to reason that mechanistic organization structures

introduce more distance and hence allow for more unethical behaviors to emerge.

A final important organizational element that influences significantly the level of compliance among its employees

is the perceived degree of fairness in which procedures are used to allocated organizational resources, or, also

referred to as procedural justice (Thibaut &Walker, 1975; Lind &Tyler, 1988). When the decision-making authorities,

acting as representatives of the organization, make use of fair procedures it makes that organizational members

perceive the organization is a neutral and ethical collective. Tyler, Dienhart, and Thomas (2008), in fact, provided

evidence that if organizational leaders enact fair procedures (e.g., giving voice, being accurate and unbiased in

processing information, etc.; Leventhal, 1980) employees infer the idea that the organization considers the value of

morality as an important one. This perception of a moral organization is essential to attract the right kind of

employees pursuing the same moral standards and promotes the emergence of moral congruence between the

organization and its employees, which furthers ethical and prosocial behavior (Tyler &De Cremer, 2009).

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Importantly, however, is that procedural justice not only builds ethical climates that are shared and supported by

all organizational members, but it also helps to integrate punishment systems into those ethical climates. The

reason for this is that the enactment of fair procedures promotes perceptions of legitimacy and trustworthiness

(Tyler, 1997), and as a result punishment and control systems will be endorsed and complied with as means to

promote and uphold the shared moral standards (De Cremer &van Knippenberg, 2003; De Cremer, Hoogervorst,

&Desmet, 2012).

This focus on organizational elements that significantly impact the emergence of ethical versus unethical

behaviors indicates that an important task for organizations is to devote attention to the design of the moral

nature of their work climates. One step toward doing this is thus to create procedurally just climates (Tenbrunsel,

Smith-Crowe, &Umphress, 2003). Another way of doing this is to ensure the presence of a more general

organizational ethical climate. Victor and Cullen (1987: 51), define ethical climate as 'the shared perception of what

is correct behavior and how ethical situations should be handled in an organization.' In such a climate, it is clear

for employees which values the organization appreciates and actively pursues and which kind of behaviors will not

be tolerated and thus corrected. A focus on designing and shaping the ethical infrastructure of the organizational

climate is therefore an important responsibility of leaders at different levels within the organization (Tenbrunsel,

Smith-Crowe, &Umphress, 2003; Arnaud &Schminke, 2012). For example, ethical climates can lead to the validity

and legitimacy of law and professional codes (Erondu, Sharland, &Okpara, 2004). Furthermore, ethical climates

also promote ethics related individual outcome variables such as the development of ethical judgments,

expressions of ethical intentions and fair and moral decision making (Barnett &Vaicys, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000;

Buchan, 2005).

THE FUTURE OF BEHAVIORAL ETHICS: WHAT TO DO NEXT?

In the present article, we described the usefulness and importance of a behavioral approach when studying issues

relevant to understanding the workings of business ethics in organizations. It is vital for organizations and

business to perform well and evidence is mounting that this can go hand in hand with good and moral behavior.

So, in a way 'good' companies can also do well at the performance level and as such can contribute to the

sustainability of the organization. A behavioral approach helps us to understand why people act the way they do

and why they do it. We hasten to say, however, that it is of course also important to stress that as a new field

behavioral business ethics still faces many challenges. These challenges are, in our view, situated in four areas

that are important with respect to (a) understanding further the psychological underpinnings of ethical judgments

and decision making, (b) creating a better understanding of the means on how to shape more ethical behavior

when such behavioral constraints are available, (c) deepening our insights into how to remedy unethical failures,

particularly in light of the idea that all of us can fail at any given moment, and (d) critically analyzing and

discussing the further development of the field of business ethics.

Below, we will discuss these challenges by pointing out the (1) importance of the ratio-emotion distinction (related

to challenge (a)), (2) role of leadership in shaping ethical work climates and motivations (related to challenge (b)),

(3) way we need to respond to build trust again after unethical failures (related to challenge (c)), and (4) relevance

of integrating the descriptive and prescriptive approaches (related to challenge (d)).

The first challenge deals with examining further the psychological antecedents of human decision making and

ethics. Specifically, it is important that in addition to looking at cognitive factors that we also focus more closely

on the role of emotions and motivations. However, we also agree with Reynolds and Ceranic's (2007)

recommendation that 'while we may have perhaps overrelied on cognition in the past, we did so for good reason.

As the field moves towards other areas ... it is wise to integrate into those new areas what research based on the

cognitive perspective has already established' (p. 1622).

On a related note, future research would do well to elaborate further on the distinction between affect-intuition and

ratio. Although we sometimes know how to judge consciously an event in moral terms, it often is the case that we

know intuitively what is right and wrong without too much cognitive processing. The use of dual-process models

(Chaiken &Trope, 1999) is therefore a necessity in the development of the field of behavioral business ethics. The

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introduction of such a model is arguably not new as concerns about the complex relation between reason,

emotion, and intuition goes way back to the Stoics and is prominent in Spinoza's ethics as well as the writings of

early Enlightenment thinkers such as Hume (1777/1969), who suggested that emotions guide moral cognitions,

and Kant (1785/1959), who considered reason the primary determinant of moral judgments. Therefore, we do not

only need to develop a research agenda in which both ratio and emotion/intuition have their place, but also focus

on when exactly which process is dominating, and, maybe even more importantly, how ratio and intuition interact

in arriving at morality judgments.

The second challenge concerns the development of the concept ethical leadership. Particularly in the wake of the

financial crisis, the demand for leaders leading with integrity and morality is at its peak (Stouten, Van Dijke, Mayer,

De Cremer, &Eeuwema, 2013). Brown, Treviño, and Harrison (2005) define ethical leadership as 'the demonstration

of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of

such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making' (p. 120). Ethical

leadership is thus believed to reveal more trustworthy, fair and cooperative working environments and intrinsically

motivate employees to do what is morally justified for both the company and society at large (Mayer, Kuenzi,

Greenbaum, Bardes, &Salvador, 2009; Walumbwa &Schaubroeck, 2009). Although the existing research paints a

positive image of the effects that ethical leadership reveal, in our opinion, several shortcomings concerning the

concept still need to be taken care of.

First, both the definition and operationalization of the ethical leadership concept entails a variety of leader

behaviors that make up for the complete leader, but that fail to clarify accurately what makes this complete leader

ethical. Specifically, ethical leaders are considered, fair, trustworthy, able to punish or reward, to show integrity and

respect, to motivate and be the example to follow, making that so many components are involved that it is hard to

see how research on ethical leadership is different from other established research themes in the organizational

field. Therefore, it is necessary that an integration is pursued between those different research themes and that

more insights are provided about which components matter more versus less in promoting the perceived morality

of the leader.

Second, the definition of ethical leadership solely focuses on how the leader him/herself can set the example to be

a moral employee, whereas it is also argued that ethical leaders should transmit ethical norms and standards

across different layers within the organization (Schaubroeck et al., 2012). In this view, leadership is simply

restricted to the one leading. More recent leadership studies and reviews have argued to adopt a follower-centered

approach of leadership as the congruency in values, attitudes and motives between leaders and followers

ultimately leads to an increase in leader effectiveness (Boas, Pillai, Bligh, &Uhl-Bien, 2006). For example, across a

series of experimental and field studies, De Cremer, Mayer, Van Dijke, Schouten, and Bardes (2009) showed that

self-sacrificial leadership (an ethical leadership style focused on promoting the interest of the collective even at

the expense of the leader's own interests) is most effective in promoting prosocial behaviors among followers who

are motivated to pursue safety and maintenance of the social welfare. Thus, how congruent the leader behavior

and identity is with the followers' values significantly influences how effective ethical leaders can be (cf. Mayer,

Aquino, Greenbaum, &Kuenzi, 2012).

The third challenge deals with how people respond once unethical events have emerged. Although many

organizations attempt to prevent the emergence of unethical decisions and actions, it is clear that these events

will nevertheless occur. Hence there is a need to study the extent to which self-interest versus morality plays a role

in addressing unethical outcomes. That is, unethical events can happen to one personally or one may observe how

another person is treated badly. An important question is whether people will do something about the unethical

event out of self-interested or moral concerns (cf. Turrillo et al., 2002). This question is an important one from the

perspective of organizations. As many tasks are conducted within teams and groups we need to know whether

people will report wrongdoing when others are the victim of irresponsible and unethical acts. If this is the case

then it is easier to build moral communities within organizations that are intrinsically motivated to maintain high

moral standards at the work floor.

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There is also a need to study how to remedy ethical failures. How to deal with violations of morally accepted rules

and standards in a way that trust (and by consequence ethical beliefs) is maintained? Indeed, when accepted

moral standards are violated, trust will suffer. Trust is defined as a psychological state in which people have

confidence that others will act out of goodwill and take the interests of others into account (Mayer, Davis,

&Schoorman, 1995; De Cremer, Snyder, &Dewitte, 2001). Unfortunately, to date, very little attention has been

devoted to this issue of restoring trust after ethical failures. This is regretful because when ethical failures emerge,

it is communicated that integrity is suffering and that acting out of goodwill is a problem. For this reason, a lack of

ethics may erode trust (De Cremer, 2010c; De Cremer, van Dijk, &Pillutla, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer, &van Dijk,

2011). Hence, in circumstances of ethical failures the stakes are high because trust is an important antecedent of

organizational performance (De Cremer, Snyder &Dewitte, 2001). Companies that manage ethical failures well tend

to preserve or even promote a trustworthy reputation (Pillutla, Murnighan, &De Cremer, 2009). The fourth challenge

concerns the suggestion that, although the present article advocates the use of a descriptive approach in studying

issues of ethics and morality in organizations and business, we do not wish to make the claim that we have to

leave prescriptive approaches behind or consider it as a field with limited value. Contrary, we wish to point out that

to further our understanding with respect to the why and how of (un)ethical behavior requires an integration

between the prescriptive and descriptive approaches. As Warren and Smith-Crowe (2008) wrote: 'while behavioral

ethics is descriptive rather than prescriptive, good social science requires a thorough understanding and definition

of one's construct - researchers only want to predict and describe ethical behavior, but in doing so, they must

define what is ethical, and, therefore, they must be in some sense prescriptive' (p. 84). Brief (2012) notes that too

little consideration to what constitutes right and wrong has left the field of descriptive business ethics occupied

with the obviously wrong. By drawing on the prescriptive ethics literature behavioral business ethics can move

beyond the extremes of scandal and explore a hinterland of ethically more complex phenomena. An example can

be found in Harbour and Kisfalvi (2014) who build on virtue ethics literature to examine empirically what

constitutes courage in an organizational context. The work of moral philosophers is used to develop conceptual

boundaries of the courage construct, rather than mere references in passing. Indeed we need to be able to define

what an ethical decision implies in terms of its meaning and content, or else behavioral business ethics runs the

risk of talking about anything and nothing at the same time (De Cremer &Tenbrunsel, 2012) and become a 'field

without meaning' (Tenbrunsel &Smith-Crowe, 2008: 551). On the one hand, the descriptive approach needs the

prescriptive one to give it a sense of direction. For example, we discussed the importance of ethical climates in

organizations. The descriptive work on organizational justice shows that people are not only concerned about

justice being done to them but also to others. Hence, an important task for organizations is to create procedurally

just climates that affect employees' perceptions and expectations that others in the organization act in moral and

ethical ways (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe &Umphress, 2003; De Cremer, van Dijke, &Mayer, 2010). A prescriptive

approach such as Habermas' dialogue ethics can be informative as to how to start building exactly such just

procedures (Unerman &Bennett, 2004).

On the other hand, the prescriptive approach needs the descriptive one. It is the latter that is the content of the

former. All ethical theories stem from an attempt to theorize ethical 'intuition': what is it about a situation that

makes it (un)ethical, how can we know what is ethical. For example, Kant developed his theory in an attempt to

circumvent a religious foundation for the human knowledge of what is good because he was disgusted with

religious wars that had caused so much suffering in Europe. Rawls sought to defend the notion that the state

would secure its citizens' well-being without imposing on those citizens how they should define their well-being. An

example closer to the business ethics field can be found in the prescriptive literature on whistleblowing. In the

1990s Miceli, Near and Dworkin conducted extensive descriptive research on whistleblowers (for an overview see

Miceli, Near, &Dworkin, 2008). This work has caused a huge shift in how prescriptive business ethics discusses

whistleblowing. For example, Vandekerckhove and Commers (2004) use the descriptive research to argue how the

debate around loyalty was a mistaken one. Also, descriptive ethics research is used to provide complexity to

normative prima facie positions on whether whistleblowing is a right or a duty, and what the implications are for

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implementing such policies (Tsahuridu &Vandekerckhove, 2008; Vandekerckhove &Tsahuridu, 2010). Over a time

span of only two decades, descriptive ethics research has shifted normative discussions around whistleblowing

from a focus on the whistleblower to a focus on the recipient of whistleblowing (Brown, Vandekerckhove, &Dreyfus,

2014; Vandekerckhove, Brown, &Tsahuridu, 2014).

IN CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to recast prescriptive and descriptive business ethics in light of one another. Although

much progress has been made in understanding why people care about ethics and morality and the resulting use

of moral values and codes of conduct in creating ethical climates in organizations, the present paper argued that

in addition to more prescriptive approaches we also need descriptive approaches that zoom in on the

psychological underpinnings of why good people can do bad things. Improving our insights into why people show

good and bad behavior will enable us to prevent or (if prevention is not possible) manage ethical failures and

promote towards the future. We hope that this message will motivate organizational researchers to take up the

challenge to develop more comprehensive theoretical models of (un)ethical behavior that are both informed by

moral philosophy as well as have clear practical implications to improve organizational functioning and

sustainability.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their comments on previous versions of this

paper.

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AuthorAffiliation

*

Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

**

University of Greenwich Business School, Greenwich, UK DETAILS

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Subject: Studies; Management; Ethics; Organizational behavior

Publication title: Journal of Management and Organization; Lyndfield

Volume: 23

Issue: 3

Pages: 437-455

Number of pages: 19

Publication year: 2017

Publication date: May 2017

Publisher: Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management (ANZAM)

Place of publication: Lyndfield

Country of publication: Australia

Publication subject: Business And Economics--Management

ISSN: 18333672

Source type: Scholarly Journals

Language of publication: English

Document type: Feature

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2016.4

ProQuest document ID: 1884656661

Document URL: https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.co

m/docview/1884656661?accountid=33337

Copyright: Copyright © Cambridge University Press and Australian and New Zealand Academy

of Management 2016

Last updated: 2017-04-27

Database: ABI/INFORM Collection

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Bibliography Citation style: APA 6th - American Psychological Association, 6th Edition

Cremer, D. D., & Vandekerckhove, W. (2017). Managing unethical behavior in organizations: The need for a

behavioral business ethics approach. Journal of Management and Organization, 23(3), 437-455.

doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2016.4

Copyright  2017 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. Terms and Conditions Contact ProQuest

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