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Race & ethnic relations: American and global perspectives

Marger, M. N. (2015). Race and ethnic relations: American and global

perspectives (10th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.

CANADA CHAPTER I6 Ethnic Model of the Future?

If you were to ask Americans to name the capital of Russia, a society very distant from the United States, most would probably answer correctly. If asked to name the capital of Canada, a society bordering the United States for the entire length of the continent, most would be hard pressed. One reason Americans pay so little attention to and know so little about Canada is that its sociological features are assumed to be replicas of their own. In the American mind , Canada might easily pass for the fifty-first state.

Undeniably, the economic and cultural hegemony of the United States on the North American continent for two centuries has created great cross-border similari- ties. But the fact that Americans can easily feel at home in C-anada tends to disguise some fundamental differences. Common cultural preferences, consumer patterns, political alliances, and, for two -thirds of Canada, language do not make Canadian society simply a northern microcosm of the United States. These differences are nowhere more apparent than in the realm of ethnic relations.

ETHNIC DIMENSIONS OF CANADA ' Canada 's ethnic structure is today extremely diverse. Moreover, it displays some fea-

tures of the corporate pluralistic model described in Chapter 4. Essentially this soci- ety features three ethnic dimensions:

• the division between two founding groups, British and French, each of whose language and culture have been legally protected since the eighteenth century;

• a large and growing non-English, non-French pastiche of ethnic groups, whose national origins represent virtually every region of the world;

• indigenous groups, referred to as Aboriginal people.

DIMENSION I: THE ENGLISH-FRENCH SCHISM

M ost of Canada's French-speaking people (Francophones) live in the province of Quebec, creating for them, in addition to their linguistic and cultural distinction, a

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45 0 PA RT Ill ETH NIC RELATIONS IN COMPARA TI VE PERS PE CTIVE

territorial base. English-speaking Canadians (Anglophones), by contrast, are dis- persed throughout Canada and include groups of various national origins. Those of British origin, however, are recognized as the cofounding group and remain the largest segment of English Canada. The current language breakdown in Canada is shown in Figure 16.1.

In a sense, then, Canada is not one nation but two. As we saw in Chapter 1, when ethnic groups occupy a definable territory-like Francophones in Quebec- they also commonly maintain or aspire to some degree of political autonomy. Hence, they are "nations within nations." In a real sense the Canadian experiment in na- tional dualism is still in process, and the issues separating the English and French seg- ments have by no means been resolved. Indeed, in recent decades the historica l discord between these two major cultural groups has periodicallx intensified, making the union of Canada precarious.

The relations between English and French Canadians constitute the first and most important dimension of ethnicity in Canada, cutting across other lines of ethnic diversity. As such, English-French relations will occupy much of our attention in this chapter.

DIMENSION 2: NON- ENGLISH, NON- FRENCH GROUPS

The various ethnic groups whose origins are neither British nor French together com- prise more tpan one-third of the Canadian population. Canada is a society of virtu- ally dozens of distinct ethnic groups varying in national origin, culture, and racial features. Canada today is one of the world's leading immigrant destinations, and most of the newcomers are non-European, or what in Canada are referred to as visible minorities. South and East Asian groups are the largest, but the ethnic diver- sity of Canada's changing population is virtually unmatched by any contemporary

70

60

50

c 40 Q) 0

~ 30

20

10

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Engl ish only French only Non-offi cia l

FIGURE 16. r I MOTHER TONGUES OF CANADIANS Source: Statistics Canada (2011).

Multiple

CHAPTER r6 CA N ADA 45r

nation. It is the presence of these non-French, non-English ethnic groups that make Canada today a strong example of what was referred to in Chapter 4 as a corporate pluralistic or multicultural society. The important social issues pertaining to these ethnic groups involve the nature and extent of their cultural and structural integration.

DIMENSION 3: ABORIGINAL GROUPS

The third dimension of ethnicity in Canada involves the relations of native (Aborigi- nal) peoples with the rest of Canadian society. Canadian Indians, usually referred to as First Nations, and Inuit (Eskimos) are, along with their American counterparts, the original peoples of the continent. Today, they are a relatively tiny proportion of the Canadian population. Their official status, their cultural systems, and the nature of their relations with other groups, however, largely set them apart from the rest of the society. Hence, they must be looked at as a unique component of the Canadian ethnic configuration.

These three dimensions create a complex ethnic picture in which the different elements are interwoven in complicated and, to American eyes, often bewildering combinations. Moreover, this ethnic diversity, particularly in recent decades, has given rise to public policies regarding immigrants and ethnic groups generally that are markedly different from those of the United States. Whereas the United States has, for most of its history, been committed to an assimilationist approach, the Canadian philosophy has traditionally been more pluralistic, and thus more tolerant of the continued expression of cultural differences among diverse groups.

FORMATION OF THE CANADIAN ETHNIC MOSAIC

We can start to make sense of Canada's complex mosaic by looking initially at the historical process by which ethnic diversity in this society has taken shape. We begin with the first and most critical dimension of Canadian ethnic relations, the English- French division.

THE EVOLUTION OF Two NATIONS: THE ENGLISH-FRENCH DMSION

The confrontation of English and French groups consumed the affairs of state from the outset of Canada's history and continues to play the preeminent role in ethnic relations.

THE E NGLISH CONQUEST Both Britain and France established colonies in North America beginning in the early seventeenth century and vied for continental dominance for almost a century and a half. The victory in Quebec in 1759 of the British forces over the French marked the end of France's colonial ventures in North America, but it did not eliminate the presence of a French cultural group. New France (Que- bec) was now made politically part of the British colonial empire, but its French in- habitants were granted the right to certain cultural privileges, including the retention of French civil law, the use of the French language, and the practice of Catholicism. The price of this cultural autonomy, however, was that French Canada was placed in

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452 PART Ill ETH N IC RELA TI ONS IN COM PARATIVE PERSPECT IVE

the position of a permanent minority within an English milieu. From the moment o - British ascendancy in Quebec, French Canadians were consumed with avoiding as- similation into the English-speaking North America that surrounded them. And it i this objective of cultural survival that remains at the heart of today's English-French schism.

During and after the American Revolutionary War, thousands of English- speaking emigrants from the thirteen American colonies who had remained loyal to Britain entered Canada. Many of these United Empire Loyalists, as they were called. settled in Quebec. This gave the province for the first time a substantial English- speaking population, which quickly came into conflict with the French majority over economic and political issues. In an attempt to separate the two groups, Britain established an Upper and a Lower Canada, the former composed mostly of English- speaking people, the latter of French-speaking. These would later become the pro - vinces of Ontario and Quebec. The national duality was thus •firmly established with two peoples, differing essentially in language and culture, juxtaposed geograph- ically and socially.

Although the French in Quebec were not threatened in a numerical sense by the influx of English-speaking people, this period of English-French relations marked the establishment of English dominance of the Quebec economy. With the exit of the French commercial elite following the British conquest, business and financial activi- ties became the domain of the English, and the French Canadians remained mostly on the land as subsistence farmers . This ethnic division of labor became a fixed ar- rangement that lasted into the modern era, making the French a numerical majority but an econqmic minority in their own province.

The disparities in power, wealth, and social position between English and French in Lower Canada led to the emergence of a French nationalist political ele- ment that sought the colony's independence. An open rebellion ensued in 1837, after which Britain consolidated Upper and Lower Canada into a single union. The under- lying objective of this move was the eventual assimilation of the French into the English colonial society. To bring about this end, discriminatory measures were en- acted assuring Anglo dominance .

In addition, with the failure of the rebellion, the conservative forces of French Canada were now ascendant. The clergy, in particular, reinforced its influence in the life of the French-speaking people and extended the doctrine that the French- Canadian culture could be sustained only through loyalty to the Catholic faith and the French language. This traditional nationalism, combining a rural-oriented way of life with a staunch Catholicism, held sway among the French-Canadian masses until the mid-twentieth century. The clergy, then, assumed the dominant institutional role in Quebec, promoting detente with the English colonialists as a means of ensuring la survivance, the survival of the French culture. 1

C ONFED ERATION In 1867, the Canadian provinces were linked in a federal system. The effect of confederation was to further isolate Quebec from the rest of Canada and to heighten the minority status of French Canadians. Outside Quebec, Francophones

1 A classic description of this traditional Quebec culture is found in Miner (1939). Later essays are contained in Rioux and Martin (1978).

C HAPTER I 6 CANADA 45 3

found themselves defenseless against the Anglophone majority, which chose to ig- nore the need for French schools and other institutions. The powerlessness of French Canadians was driven home in numerous instances in which minority interests or wishes were swept aside by the dominance of English Canada.

For French Canadians perhaps the most humiliating aspect of the relationship with English Canada was the minority status to which they were relegated in their own province. English control of Quebec's commerce and finance produced an English-speaking business elite, assuring that higher-status positions would remain the reserve of Anglophones. Although the French and English languages were both protected by law, only in Quebec was the principle of bilingualism instituted, and there it was strictly one-sided- Francophones were forced to use English in dealings with the Anglo Quebecers.

The Catholic Church's control of education in the province also handicapped the upward mobility of the French-speaking masses. Expounding the philosophy of French-Canadian cultural survival through retreat to church and land, the clergy em- phasized the humanities, classics, and religion in schools and colleges- not the com- mercial and technical skills that were appropriate to an industrial system. Hence, few French Canadians were prepared for skilled positions in business and science. As French Canada increasingly industrialized, Francophones therefore occupied the least-skilled and lowest-ranking jobs.

THE Two SouruDES Industrialization beginning in the early decades of the twentieth century set in motion social processes that would gradually spell the demise of the pastoral, clerical Quebec culture. Urbanization accompanied the growth of industry. Whereas Quebec had been 60 percent rural in 1900, by 1931 it was 63 percent urban (Legendre, 1980). The focus of this rural-urban movement was Montreal, which tripled in size from 1901 to 1921. Industrialization and urbanization con- flicted with the traditional Catholic nationalism, which continued to stress agrarian and ecclesiastical values. The customary culture of Quebec society was clearly no longer compatible with the forces of modernization.

The industrialization of Quebec, however, was not led by French-Canadians but by outsiders-specifically, English-Canadian, American, and British capitalists. Quebecers tlius found themselves in a colonial-like situation. The skilled and more desirable jobs naturally went to the Anglophones, and the French speakers, though a numerical majority, were given the unskilled, menial positions. By the 1960s French Canadians were the most poorly paid workers in Quebec, below even the newly arrived immigrants from Europe, and their standard of living was below that of the average Canadian (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969a).

The English of Quebec, with their own institutional structure-schools, busi- nesses, churches, and neighborhoods- as well as control of the most important commercial and financial institutions, could, by and large, ignore the French around them. They made little effort to learn the French language, for it was unnec- essary. On the contrary, because so many jobs were controlled by the Anglophone business class, all the pressure was on the Francophones to learn English. In his classic account of a French-Canadian community of the 1930s, Everett C. Hughes noted that not only was there no need for the English residents of the town to speak

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454 PART III ETHNIC REL ATIO NS IN COM PARATI VE PERSPE CT IVE

French but to do so in any case would have upset the subordinate-superordinate relationship:

In fact, the English do not have to learn French to keep their position in industry. The housewife does not have to learn French to keep her housemaid. If they were to speak French in these relationships-except in a joking or patronizing spirit, as is occasionalk done-they would be in some measure reversing roles. For they would then be making the greater effort, which generally falls to the subordinate; and they would speak French badly, whereas the subordinate generally speaks English pretty well. (1943:83)

It was a situation described by the novelist Hugh MacLennan (1945) as "two soli- tudes,'' French and English living side by side but essentially in different social worlds.

THE QUIET REVOLUTION The decade of the 1960s in Quebec is often referred to as the "Quiet Revolution,'' for it was then that the transformation of ~rench-Canadian so- ciety that had begun in the early part of the century culminated in the emergence of a powerful nationalist ideology espoused by Quebec leaders determined to make Fra n- cophones maitres chez nous-"masters in our own house." Though revolutionary only in a figurative sense, the changes brought about during this period basically re- defined both the role of government in Quebec and the identity and goals of French- Canadian society.

The Quebec provincial government traditionally had been a force in sustaining the status quo, but it now became the principal vehicle of change. Responsibility fo r health, welfare, and especially education became its concerns, whereas in the past these had been largely church-sponsored institutions. In the economic realm, the provincial g'overnment pursued the objective of improving the position of Franco- phones and ending Anglophone control of the important segments of the economy (McRoberts, 1988). In short, with the development of a dynamic state led by a new middle class, technologically skilled and ideologically committed to a strong and self-sufficient society, Quebec by 1970 was well on the way toward a social and political transformation.

THE RISE OF THE PART! Quf:sf:c o1s The new nationalism spawned strong sentiments fa- voring the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada and the formation of an independent French-speaking nation. In the late 1960s, elements of the Francophone leadership that had emerged from the Quiet Revolution began to promote the idea that there was no longer any middle ground between partnership within the Cana- dian confederation and full sovereignty for Quebec; the latter was the only realistic option if Quebecers were to fully control their destiny. To consolidate and advance the achievements of the Quiet Revolution, they felt that Quebec had to fully sever its ties with Canada (Posgate, 1978) . Led by Rene Levesque, an articulate and charis- matic spokesperson, they left the ruling Liberal Party (which, ironically, had initiated the radical changes of the Quiet Revolution) and formed the Parti Quebecois (PQ ), declaring as its objective the political liberation of the Francophone community.

SovEREIGNTY-AssoCIATION Recognizing the need to retain an economic link with the rest of Canada, however, Levesque created the notion of "sovereignty-association,''

CHAPTER 16 CANA DA 455

which proposed that a politically independent Quebec would retain close economic ties to Canada. Nothing short of the removal of Quebec from its historical place in the Canadian union, however, was the avowed aim of the PQ. In its view, the split with English Canada was absolute and irreversible. "First and foremost I am a Quebecois," declared Levesque, "and second- with a rather growing doubt-a Canadian" (Saywell, 1977:4).

By the early 1970s, the growing support among Quebecers for the new, radically nationalist PQ was evident and alarming to English Canada. Even more alarming ._ were the activities of a small extremist separatist group, the Front de liberation du Quebec (FLQ), whose violent tactics and revolutionary ideology provoked a crisis in 1970 prompting the federal prime minister, Pierre Trudeau, to briefly invoke the War Measures Act, giving the police sweeping powers to arrest and detain suspected people.

This was a wrenching experience for Quebec and all of Canada that forced the separatists to moderate their proposals for change. In response, Levesque stressed the democratic processes by which Quebec's independence was to be attained and emphasized the "economic association" aspect of the envisioned sovereignty- association relationship with Canada. The PQ declared that if it were elected to power, it would put the issue of sovereignty-association before the people of Quebec as a referendum, to accept or reject.

In 1976, only eight years after its formation, the PQ won election as the govern- ment of Quebec. Its stunning victory sent shock waves throughout English Canada. For the first time, the contemporary Quebec nationalist movement drew the serious attention of even the United States. What had been feared since 1970 had occurred- the election of a provincial government ideologically committed to the separation of Quebec from Canada, led by the charismatic Levesque. It now seemed that the divi- sion of Canada into two separate nations, in a real rather than symbolic sense, was possible. 2

THE FIRST DEFEAT OF SovEREJGNTY-Assoc1ATION In 1980, the referendum on sovereignty- association that Levesque had promised was held in Quebec. Levesque downplayed the independence aspects of the measure and emphasized that approval of sovereignty-association meant only that Quebec would enter into "a new partner- ship" with Ca;,_ada. Moreover, the referendum was worded so that approval was only a first step toward political independence. It would give the Quebec government merely a mandate to negotiate a new arrangement with Canada, approval of which in any case would be left to the people through another referendum. Most people, however, interpreted it more simply as a yes or no vote for Quebec sovereignty.

By a margin of three to two, Quebecers rejected the idea of sovereignty- association. Not unexpectedly, virtually all Anglophones voted no, but a slight ma- jority of Francophones did as well. For the moment, then, the intensity of the Quebec nationalist movement had been quelled. The fundamental issue of the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada, however, had not been resolved.

2 Often overlooked in accounts of this volatile period is the fact that much of the support for the Parti Quebecois was based not on its advocacy of separatism but on its promise to deliver "good government " and on public disaffection with the relationship between Quebec and the federal government (McRoberrs, 1988).

456 PART III ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

SEPARATION: THE RECURRENT IssuE Two failed attempts to have Quebec become a signa- tory to the new Canadian constitution of 1982 led to increased nationalist sentiment among Quebecers in the early 1990s and, when the PQ was elected once again as the Quebec provincial government, the stage was set for a new effort at separating Que- bec from Canada. The party leaders had made the sovereignty issue, as before, the core of their electoral program. As in the past, their message was familiar: Quebec would never be afforded the kind of unique place in the Canadian confederation that would allow it to protect and promote its language and culture; thus political independence was the only logical alternative. To temper the uncertainties of going it alone, however, Quebecers were promised that after separation the province would continue to interact closely with the rest of Canada in economic matters, sim- ilar to what had been proposed by Levesque in 1980.

In October 1995- fifteen years after the 1980 proposal had been defeated-a referendum on sovereignty was once again held in the province. As in 1980, the mea- sure failed, but this time by the barest of margins-50.6 percent to 49.4 percent. A closer analysis of the results revealed that Francophones in the province had sup- ported the separatist proposal by 60 percent to 40 percent, whereas Anglophones and Allophones (immigrants speaking neither French nor English) had roundly voted against the measure by over 90 percent.

THE CuRRENT POLITICAL CLIMATE The crux of the issue of Quebec separatism is a view of Canada-and thus Quebec's place within it- that is very different between Que- becers and English-speaking Canadians. The latter conceive of Canada as a natio n of individual citizens who are equal before the law, regardless of their ancestors' language or ethnic origin, and who live in a federation of provinces with equal constitutional status. Quebecers, in contrast, view Canada as a nation of collectiv- ities defined primarily by language, specifically English and French (Bercuson , 1995). Because they are a cofounding group in Canada and are heavily outnum- bered by English-speaking Canadians, most Quebecers feel that they are entitled to special status and should not be subject to the same institutions that are domi- nated by Anglophones. This is a position that most of the rest of Canada has re- fused to accept.

In the current political climate in Quebec, the fury and passion of hard-line se- paratists seems to have been quelled as a younger population, secure in its French language and no longer obsessed with sovereignty, has emerged. Quebec itself in the last two decades has become a more multiethnic province with the infusion of thousands of immigrants, most of whom have little knowledge of-or interest in- the issue of separation. A significant Francophone element, however, continues to harbor separatist sentiments and remains an important political force.

Most Quebecers seem to favor an arrangement in which Quebec would accept its place in Canada if a renewed federalism, recognizing the province's unique sta- tus, could be achieved (Seguin, 2005). But the Quebec sovereignty issue has proved to be subject to mercurial changes. It thus remains a perplexing- and perilous- issue for Canada that may resurface with great force at some point in the future. Indeed, the intransigence of an element of Quebec society to accept nothing short of political independence, as well as the low-level animosity that seems so often to define the relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada, promise to eventually

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push the issue forward again. As one observer has put it, the issue of Quebec sep- aration may simply remain "a recurrent component of the Canadian agenda" (Banting, 1992:161).

LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY: BASIC FEATURES OF THE DUAL NATION

Beyond the politics of Quebec sovereignty, language plays a more basic cultural role in Canada. From the outset of Canadian history, language has served as the most critical feature separating French and English communities; it continues to evoke strong emotions on both sides and thoroughly encompasses all facets of division be- tween Canada's two nations. It would not be overstating the case to assert that the question of language was at the core of all historical conflict between English and French Canada from the time of the British conquest. It is no less so today, and therefore warrants further examination.

LANGUAGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF QUEBEC CULTURE Language is the very foundation of any people's culture. Hence, it was long felt that assimilation into the dominant English-Canadian society would be inevitable for French-speaking Canadians if mea- sures were not taken to assure the preservation of the French language. Moreover, language for Quebecers, as for many ethnic collectivities in multiethnic societies, is the key symbolic marker setting them off from other groups. Quite simply, it is what defines the French nation in Canada. As Levesque put it, "Everything else de- pends on this one essential element and follows from it or leads us infallibly back to it" (1968:14).

In hopes of quelling once-and-for-all Quebec separatist sentiments, the federal government in the late 1960s, led by Prime Minister Truaeau, began to promote the notion of a truly bilingual Canada . Responding to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which had been charged with studying how a more equitable balance could be established between the two founding peoples, the government adopted and avidly supported a policy of official bilingualism. To Quebecers, however, this effort was seen as essentially meaningless: many were already bilingual-of necessity. 3 What was of greatest concern to Quebecers was the preservation of the French language and culture in Quebec, la survivance. ,

QUEBEC LANGUAGE Pouc1Es Following the Quiet Revolution, Francophone Quebecers faced two demographic trends that threatened the survival of their culture and lan- guage. The first of these trends was a lowered birthrate. Historically, Quebec had maintained the highest fertility rate in Canada. Thus, even though few immigrants from France were attracted to Quebec after the colonial period, the ratio of French to English in Canada had held relatively constant for two centuries. This was

3 Despite the fact that Canada is officially a bilingual country, less than 20 percent of the total population is able to converse in both English and French, and more than half of these bilinguals live in Quebec (Statistics Canada, 2012). Except for Quebec, only New Brunswick among Canada 's ten provinces has a la rge bilingual population.

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458 PART III ETH N IC RELATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

derisively referred to as the "revenge of the cradle," the implication being that the complete English conquest was foiled by the high French birthrate. Quebec's ex- traordinarily high birthrate, however, fell dramatically beginning in the 1960s, be- coming the lowest in all of Canada.

The second ominous trend was the influx of non-French-speaking immigrants to Quebec, specifically to the city of Montreal. Like Toronto, starting in the 1950s ir became an attractive destination for large numbers of European immigrants and, later, immigrants from other world regions as well. Most of these newcomers, hoK- ever, chose to adopt English as their new language, seeing it as a more practical op- tion in adapting to social and economic life in North America . So, in addition to the declining birthrate of French speakers, immigration now threatened to further dilure the Francophone population.

In response to these demographic threats, aggressive pro-French-language poli- cies were enacted by successive Quebec governments beginning in the 1970s. The basic objective was to bring about the primary use of French in all spheres of Que- bec's public life- including, most important, business and education.

The first move in the direction of French-language preeminence in Quebec came in 1974, when the provincial government declared French the official language of the province and made access to any but French-language schools difficult. This created strong opposition from Montreal's English business community as well as the city's large number of immigrants, who sought to maintain their right to choose the lan- guage of instructiOf! for their children. Ironically, the measure was unacceptable to the separatists as well, but for the opposite reason: they felt it did not go far enough in establishing the primacy of the French language. In 1977, therefore, Levesque 's PQ govern~ent enacted a more sweeping and radical language law, Bill 101, which mandated that French would be the prime, if not sole, language used not only in of- ficial matters but also in commerce and industry. Requiring the use of French in the workplace, it was felt, would attack the Anglophone domination of economic insti- tutions directly. No longer could managerial positions be denied Quebecers on the basis of language.

T he response of the English-dominated business world of Montreal was indigna- tion. Rather than acquiescing to the rigorous new language regulations, many large corporations chose to move their offices to T oronto and other Canadian cities or at least to limit their Montreal operations. This proved economically costly to the provmce.

Even more controversial was the effect of the language law on Quebec's educa- tional system. Bill 101 set more stringent restrictions on instruction in English, prompting a further out-migration of Anglophones. But the law's primary target, many believed, was the large immigrant population in Montreal whose mother ton- gue was neither French nor English (Arnopoulos and Clift, 1980; Levine, 1990 ). Most of these groups had ordinarily chosen English-language schools for their chil- dren, but under the new law, almost all were now required to send their children to French schools.

Over the years, Quebec's language laws have been modified and in many cases legally challenged. Because of its ethnic diversity, Montreal continues to be the foca l point of the language debate. But the context of the issue has been fundamentally changed. Despite periodic controversies, the primacy of the French language in

CHAPTER I 6 CANADA 459

Quebec is no longer disputed . French, today, is the first language of all major institu- tions, government, business, and education. Moreover, Francophone Quebecers, for the most part, no longer see their language under threat; most, in fact, believe it is important to be bilingual (Patriquin, 2013 ).

Qutstc01s ETHNIC IDENTITY French-speaking Canadians are not simply one more ethnic group within the Canadian mosaic. The French in Canada are a people with a lin- guistic and cultural autonomy formally recognized from the very founding of the so- ciety. Moreover, unlike other Canadian ethnic groups, Francophone Canadians maintain a territorial base. For Canada's French-speaking people who live outside the province of Quebec, the tendencies toward assimilation into the dominant English-speaking society have been evident for many decades (Joy, 1972). More im- portant, the contemporary nationalist movement in Quebec has jettisoned these French-speaking non-Quebecers. It is Quebec alone that has become, in the eyes of the separatists, the only meaningful base for a sovereign French-speaking society in North America.

Manifestations of ethnic identity among Quebecers also illustrate their uniqueness within the Canadian ethnic system. Unlike English Canadians, French Canadians- specifically, those in Quebec- are faced with a dual national identity. Whereas people in the rest of Canada think of themselves simply as "Canadians," those in Quebec are both Canadiens and Quebecois (Quebecers). 4 In recent decades, the latter identity has, for most, seemed to take precedence (Centre for Research and Information on Canada [CRIC], 2002). This dual identity demonstrates well the idea of a unique French- Canadian nation in which people's allegiance and consciousness of kind do not focus necessarily on the same national unit perceived by other Canadians (Brunet, 1969). One must keep in mind, of course, that there are different degrees of nationalism among Queqecers. Some are vehemently and radically nationalistic and are unrelent- ing advocates of separatism, whereas others see themselves more as part of a unified Canada. What characterizes all Francophone Quebecers, however, is an understand- ing that they are culturally different from other Canadians.

CANADA'S OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS: THE THIRD FORCE

Although the division between English and French Canada overshadows all other ethnic issues, Canada today is far more ethnically diverse than is reflected in this schism. In fact, Canada today comprises a population of more than two hundred dif- ferent ethnic origins, making it one of the most heterogeneous multiethnic societies in the world. And it is the groups that are neither English nor French in origin that stand out increasingly in the Canadian ethnic picture. They comprise more than one-third of the total Canadian population and thus play an enormous role in all as - pects of ethnic relations and policy. They constitute an ex tremely diverse spectrum, including groups from all parts of Europe, East and Southeast Asia , the Indian sub- continent, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa, and Latin America.

4 The inhabitants of the original French colony in Canada called themselves Canadiens. Only later was the term Canadian adopted by the English. Hence, Canadien connotes, in the French-Canadian view, the idea of the original or true Canadians (Brunet, 1969) .

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460 PART III ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COM PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

It is obvious that the size of these groups as well as their cultural variety haw basically altered Canada's ethnic composition. To speak any longer of "Engli Canada" or even of "French Canada" is a misnomer, as those whose ethnic origins are neither British nor French continue to comprise a greater and greater share oi Canada's population. Today, Canada is very much an immigrant society, particu- larly in its largest cities- Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver-and the bulk of those immigrants come with neither British nor French roots.

The shaping of Canada's ethnic diversity can be seen historically as a process en- compassing two major periods of immigration-the influx of peoples during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the post- World War II stream, which continues today. Each period differed in the origins of the major immigrant group and in the groups' settlement patterns.

THE PERIOD OF WESTERN SETTLEMENT Although non-British and non-faench groups had been present in Canada before the late nineteenth century, they were not sizable en- ough to make a significant impact on the society's ethnic composition. In 1871, of a total population of 3.7 million, the largest of these groups were the Germans, who numbered 200,000; others were considerably smaller (Hawkins, 1972). Througho ut the nineteenth century, the British- English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish-dominated im- migration and reinforced the Anglo-Canadian preeminence (exclusive of Quebec, of course) both numerically and culturally.

In the latter years of the nineteenth century, spurred by the promotion of wes t- ern settlement, large n umbers of European immigrants were attracted to the prairie provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta. Germans and, to a lesser ex- tent, Dutch were the major immigrant groups until the early 1900s, when peop le from central and eastern Europe, especially Ukrainians, entered in large numbers. Americans, eager to acquire lands that were no longer available after the closing of the U.S. frontier, were also a significant immigrant group during this time (Troper 1972).

Although immigrants did settle in Canada's cities, the objectives of nineteenth- century immigration policy were mainly to attract people who would develop the agricultural potential of the vast western domain. This did not mean an open-door policy, however. British peoples, or at least those from northwestern Europe, were deemed most desirable. Ukrainians and others from eastern and central Europe, though technically not among these, were recruited nonetheless because their agri- cultural background was considered more critical than their national origin. What the west needed above all were farmers; therefore, even nonconforming religious sects like Hutterites , Mennonites, and Doukhobors were promised parcels of land to settle, often as entire communities. Expressly rejected, however, were non- Europeans.

THE CONTEMPORARY PERJOD OF IMMIGRATION After World War II, the next great phase of immigration began, considerably changing the Canadian ethnic composition. Their societies of origin as well as their Canadian destinations distinguished the new immi- grant groups from those of previous eras.

Whereas British, northwestern European, and, selectively, central and eastern European groups had been the major immigrants of the past, the first new arrivals

CHAPTER 16 CANADA 461

were mainly from southern and eastern European countries, in addition to the con- tinued large-scale entry of the British. The largest among the non-British groups were the Italians, almost a half million of whom had come by 1971 (Iacovetta, 1992).

The contemporary period of immigration also introduced an entirely new di- mension to Canada's ethnic mosaic because it included for the first time non- European peoples in significant numbers. Although not officially stated, Canada's immigration policy before 1962 had been, in effect, "white only" (Hawkins, 1989; Richmond, 1976), not unlike that of the United States pre-1965. Discriminatory measures favoring northwestern Europeans, particularly those from the British Isles, were now dropped, profoundly affecting the ethnic makeup of immigration.

Immigrants from Asia in the contemporary period have come from almost every country of that continent, with especially large numbers of Chinese (from the Chi- nese mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and East Indians. Other sizable Asian groups are Filipinos, Vietnamese, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Bangladeshis, Lebanese, and Iranians. Blacks have come mostly from the Caribbean- especially Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Haiti- and have settled mainly in Toronto and Montreal. Before this period, most of Canada's tiny black population was of Ameri- can origin. Most Canadian blacks during the colonial period had come with the American loyalists during the Revolutionary War or during the War of 1812, settling mainly in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick (Clairmont and Magill, 1974; Winks, 1971). Also, some American-origin blacks had come to Canada escaping slavery via the Underground Railroad.

Non-European groups (visible minorities) have dominated immigration to Canada during the past fifty years. Whereas blacks and Asians before 1967 had constituted fewer than 4 percent of immigrants, by 1973 they we;e approximately one-third, and by 1981, one-half. As shown in Figure 16.2, whereas European coun- tries were the major source of immigrants before 1961, today Asian countries are the leading sources. 5 Visible minorities make up nearly 20 percent of the total Canadian population, an increase that is due almost entirely to the immigration of people from non-European countries.

In addition to their diversity, the immigrants of the current era differ from those of previous eras in that their destinations have been almost entirely urban, specifi- cally, Canada's three major metropolises: Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. More than a third of all the new immigrants are destined for Toronto alone, making that city the core of Canada's new ethnic character (Lo, 2008; Reitz and Lum, 2006). What had been an overwhelmingly white, Christian, and relatively provincial British-dominated city has been transformed into a cultural and linguistic panorama whose ethnic diversity is virtually unmatched anywhere on the globe. Immigrants to - day account for almost half of metropolitan Toronto's population, a percentage un- surpassed by any urban area in North America. One of the notable features of the ethnic reconfiguration of large Canadian cities is the relatively conflict-free manner in which it has taken place. This is strikingly different from what has occurred in most European cities that have absorbed large numbers of immigrants in recent decades.

5 Compare Figure 16.2 with Figure 5.3 in Chapter 5 . Notice how similar the changing national origins are of immigrants to both Canada and the United States in the past several decades.

..

462 PA RT Ill ETH NIC RELATIONS IN C OMP ARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

c Ql (.)

Qj 0...

100

80

60

40

20

0 Before 1971 1971to1980 1981to1990 1991 to2000 2001 to2005 2006to201 1

Period of immigration

D United States 0Africa

~ Asia ( i~c l udi ng the Middle East)

D Caribbean , Central and South America D Europe D Ocean ia and other

FIGURE 16. 2 ' I R EG ION OF BIRTH OF IMMIGRANTS TO C AN ADA, BY PERIOD OF IMMIGRAT!o~ · Source: Statistics Canada (2012 ).

Along with the United States and Australia, Canada is today among the world 's primary immigrant-receiving societies. Indeed, its per capita rate of immigration is the highest in the world. Moreover, the contemporary wave of immigration has trans- formed Canada into a society rivaled in ethnic diversity only by the United States. Today, immigrants make up one in five people in Canada. This proportion is ex- ceeded only by Australia and is significantly higher than the proportion of immigrants that make up the U.S. population (Figure 16.3 ). As we will see, Canada's groups that are neither British nor French in origin have established themselves as an important political and social element, a so-called Third Force. Their growing numbers and di- versity more than anything else have contributed to the current philosophy and gov- ernment policy of multiculturalism, which is discussed later in this chapter.

ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

The third major element of the Canadian ethnic configuration is the native, or Ab- original, groups, who together make up about 4 percent of the total population . Among these peoples are Native Indians (or First Nations) , Inuit, and Meris, the last of mixed racial origins (Table 16.1) .

Canadian Indians are officially designated as "status" or "nonstatus." Status (or "registered") Indians have been classified as Indians under the Canadian Indian Act and are the direct responsibility of the federal government. About one-half live on

30

25

20 c ~ 15 Qj

0...

10

5

Italy France United Kingdom

United States

CHAPTER 16 CANADA 463

Germany Canada Australia

FIGURE 16.3 I FOREIGN -BORN POPULATION AS A PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION Source: Statistics Canada (2012).

reserves (the counterpart of reservations in the United States) established by the gov- ernment. Like American Indians, Canadian First Nations are ethnically diverse and have long seen themselves as distinct peoples. It is their common relationship with the federal government, however, that links them together (Gibbins, 1997).

The Metis are marginal to both white and Native Indian societies. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, fur traders, mostly French, often lived with or married Indian women. The offspring of these mixed unions developed a un- ique culture, partly European and partly Indian. (Metis is a French word similar in meaning to the Spanish mestizo.) In western Canada, where the intermixture oc- curred in a geographically and socially isolated environment, the Meris grew in num- ber and developed a distinct ethnic identity, even declaring themselves a nation. Following an abortive rebellion in 1885, however, they became a highly stigmatized group. The Meris were recognized officially as a distinct people until 1940, when the Canadian go,vernment reversed this position. Today, most Meris live in the Prairie provinces of Canada, and a majority live in urban areas (Statistics Canada, 2009b, 2012).

T ABLE 16.l I CAN ADIAN ABORIGINAL POPULATION

North American Indian (First Nations)

Meris

Inuit

Other Aboriginal or more than one Aboriginal identity

Total

Source: Sta tistics Ca nada (2013 ).

851,560

451,795

59,445

37,890

1,400,685

60.8%

32.3%

4.2%

2.7%

100%

..

464 PART III ET H NIC REL ATI ONS IN COMP ARATI VE PERSPE CT IVE

Canada's Inuit have remained relatively isolated geographically in the far Nor.::- and historically have not been subject to colonization to the extent that Natir~ Indians have. Thus, although they do qualify for special political status, technicall- they are not Indians.

NATIVES AND WHITES : E ARLY R ELATIONS Except for being markedly less violent, the his- torical relations between Canada's native peoples and white settlers have been, trag- ically, not essentially different from those that evolved in the United States. The technological superiority of the whites and their desire for land spawned policies and practices that led to deculturation, dependency, and impoverishment amon the Aboriginal populace.

Accommodation characterized the white attitude toward native peoples from the time of initial contact until 1867. The indigenous peoples were vital to the fur tra de. and as enterprises like the Hudson's Bay Company expanded their operations, In- dians and Inuit were engaged in trapping. As they were drawn into this trade, they became increasingly dependent on the same companies for their subsistence; in the process, their traditional cultures were basically overturned. During this period. however, whites had little direct intent to impose their cultural ways on the native peoples. Their prime concern was profit maximization. As Breton, Reitz, and Valen- tine have put it, "The traders and whalers wanted productive trappers and hunters, not North American versions of themselves" (1980:73) . White domination, then was real, although not necessarily deliberate.

With confederation and the western expansion, this general attitude of accom- modation changed to one of domination. The federal government entered into trea- ties with the native peoples for the acquisition of occupied lands, and Indians were increasingly relegated to reserves, isolated from the mainstream society. The government subsequently assumed the role of patron, regulating various aspects of Indian life. Moreover, the reserves were increasingly incapable of supporting hunting and fishing economies, forcing Indians into even greater dependence on the government.

Concurrent with government jurisdiction of reserve lands were efforts to assimi- late natives into either the English or French culture, resulting in the denigration of indigenous cultures. Aboriginal children were taken from their families and placed into missionary-run residential schools whose intent was to purge them of native ways . Thus, although they were increasingly isolated from white society, they were expected to assimilate into the white culture (Breton et al., 1980). Indeed, until the 1970s, the goal of assimilation, though largely unsuccessful, had been the foundation of government policies toward native peoples for more than a century (Gibbins, 1997).

C HANGING RELATIONS In recent years, the native peoples of Canada have developed a resurgent group consciousness and pride and have become more politically mobi- lized in movements that seem to parallel those among Indians in the United States, with whom they share generally common origins and cultures. Viewing themselves as a colonized minority in Canada, they have sought the renegotiation of land claims, and in recent years , policies have been instituted that have led to greater na- tive control over their reserves (Asch, 1984; Frideres, 1990; Ponting, 1997; Warry,

C H APTE R r 6 CANA D A 465

2007). In a sense, the political movement among Aboriginal peoples in Canada has displayed many basic similarities to the Quebec nationalist movement. Each has sought greater freedom from the control of the federal government, and each has es- poused an assertive and sometimes militant nationalism.

An important event in 1999 moved Canada toward greater autonomy for Ab - original groups . The federal government entered into an agreement with Inuit lea- ders that provided for the creation of a new territory called Nunavut ("our land," in the Inuit language), to be carved out of the Northwest Territories. Inuit '- were given effective control of 135,000 square miles (one -fifth of Canada's land- mass) and the equivalent of about $1 billion over a fourteen-year period (Legare, 1997; Stout, 1997). Although the creation of Nunavut had no bearing on the movement for self-government among Native Indians of southern Canada, it none- theless marked an important step in giving back control of land to indigenous Canadians.

Two events occurred in the late 1990s that augur additional significant changes in the relations between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canada. First, the Cana- dian government in 1998 offered a historic apology to native peoples for 150 years of paternalistic and sometimes racist treatment. This represented an important sym- bolic gesture. More substantive, however, was an earlier Supreme Court ruling that validated Indian claims to land in British Columbia. The decision was based on oral histories presented by the Gitxsan tribe, not on written treaties, and therefore may have a profound effect on future treaty negotiations between First Nations and the federal and provincial governments (DePalma, 1998). c

ETHNIC STRATIFICATION

Canada's diverse population is arranged in a hierarchy, with some groups exhibiting greater wealth and power than others. But in comparison to the United States and other multiethnic societies, the relative gaps between the various groups on the eth- nic hierarchy are not as wide and, in terms of socioeconomic status, it is becoming increasingly difficult to speak of " dominant" and "minority" groups. This increas- ingly egalitarian ethnic system is a relatively recent development, however. It is in large measure ;t product of the changed status of Quebec in the Canadian confedera- tion as well as the rapid changes that have occurred in the society's ethnic composi- tion during the past several decades.

THE VERTICAL MOSAIC

In a study that has become a classic of Canadian sociology, John Porter (1965) de- scribed the system of ethnic stratification in mid-twentieth-century Canada as a "ver- tical mosaic." A strong relationship, he found, was evident between ethnicity and various measures of social class. The general pattern that emerged from his analysis was a three-part structure made up of British and French charter groups, the former at the top of the income and occupational hierarchies, followed by later-arriving European ethnic groups and, finally, native peoples. The notion of a vertical mosaic suggested that Canadian society was not only ethnically differentiated but ethnically stratified as well. As his work proceeded, Porter explained, "The hierarchical

466 PART lll ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COM PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

relationship between Canada's many cultural groups became a recurring theme ir. class and power" (1965:xiii).

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1969 reaffirme- Porter's basic findings regarding the hierarchy and revealed the concentration of par- ticular ethnic groups in certain occupational areas. British, Jewish, and Asian gro up- were overrepresented in the managerial, professional, and technical occupationJ. Ukrainian, Scandinavian, Dutch, German, and Russian groups were overrepresente among farmers (a reflection of these groups' significant presence in the agricultura, provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta). And Italians, French, Polish. and Hungarians were overrepresented among blue-collar workers (Porter, 19 85: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969b).

THE ENGLISH -FRENCH DIFFERENCE Perhaps the most glaring differenc;;e in class position. historically, was between the two charter groups- English and French. Whereas the English were traditionally at the top of the hierarchy, the French were no higher than most later-arriving ethnic groups and actually lower than some. As noted ear- lier, French Canadians traditionally occupied a lower collective economic position even in Quebec, where they were a numerical majority. Porter found that in Quebec "by and large the British run the industrial life" (1965:92}. As occupational status rose, he noted , so did the proportion of English personnel. The tendency for French Canadians to fill the lower-level working-class positions in the Quebec economy ha d been vividly demonstrated over two decades earlier by Everett Hughes in his study of a Quebec town. In the town's major industries, Hughes found, the English held "all positionS" of great authority and perform[ed] all functions requiring advanced technical training" (1943:46). The French, by contrast, predominated in the lower occupational ranks and eventually disappeared in number as the degree of authority rose. "French Canadians as a group," noted Hughes, "do not enjoy that full confi- dence of industrial directors and executives that would admit them easily to the in- ner and higher circles of the fraternity- and fraternity it is-of men who run industry" (1943:53 ). Hughes concluded that the same situation prevailed through- out the province generally. The English-French variance shown by Hughes and Porter was later corroborated by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1969a), which showed that those of French origin were dispropor- tionately in lower-status occupations and earned incomes considerably lower than those of English Canadians.

ETHNICITY AND CLASS IN CANADA TODAY

In the last four decades, the patterns described by Porter have changed dramatically. The requirements of a postindustrial economy have created a more ethnically varied workforce at all occupational levels. Thus, even though collective differences among the various ethnic groups remain evident, ethnic inequality in Canada has been steadily declining (Banting et al., 2007; Brym, 1989; Darroch, 1979; lsajiw et al. , 1993; Lautard and Guppy, 1990; Pineo and Porter, 1985). By the 1990s, one re- searcher had concluded, "The relationship between ethnic origin and class position is in flux, and no ethnic group unequivocally dominates the Canadian class struc- ture" (Nakhaie, 1995:187). Some, in fact, maintain that intergroup differences

CHA PTER I 6 CANA D A 467

among white ethnic groups are now virtually nonexistent (Breton, 1989). The large influx of non-British immigrants since World War II has provided further pressures to afford upward mobility and a greater share of power to minority Canadians .

As to the specific differences between Anglophones and Francophones, income inequality has declined markedly, as have occupational differences (Forcese, 1997) . Today, there is little meaningful variance in the degree of equality of opportunity enjoyed by the two linguistic groups or in their socioeconomic status in Quebec (Vaillancourt et al., 2007).

Even at the elite level, the dominance of Anglo-Canadians appears to be eroding with the advent of a more ethnically diverse institutional leadership. In the past, non- British groups had been severely underrepresented in the power elites of major Canadian institutions (Clement, 1975; Kelner, 1970; Lautard and Guppy, 1990; Newman, 1975, 1979; Presthus, 1973). Today, elites of government, the economy, education, and labor are increasingly ethnically varied (Ogmundson and Fatels, 1994; Ogmundson and McLaughlin, 1992). And, in Quebec, too, as French has be- come the primary language of business and commerce, a Francophone economic elite has emerged, making Anglophone dominance largely a phenomenon of the past (Forcese, 1997; Levine, 1990).

This increasingly egalitarian ethnic system, however, does not mean that an eth- nic hierarchy in Canada no longer exists. Some studies continue to show differences in income, employment, and poverty between whites and nonwhites, as well as diffi- culties that recent immigrants are experiencing in the labor market (Block, 2010) .

'

ABO RIGINAL G ROUPS IN THE C LASS SYSTEM Although their circumstances are much im- proved from earlier generations, Aboriginal groups co-ntinue to occupy the lowest rung on all dimensions of social class and consequently have the poorest life chances of all Canadians . They exhibit the highest unemployment rates in the country, have the lowest levels of income and education, and disproportionately occupy low-level jobs. In the realm of education, for example, one-third of Aboriginal adults have less than a high school diploma, compared to only 13 percent of non-Aboriginals. And, only 9 percent of Aboriginals have a university degree, compared to almost one-quarter of non-Aboriginals (Statistics Canada, 2009c, 2010d).

For First Nations, the standard of living on reserves is characterized by poor and overcrowded housing, low incomes, and low participation in the labor force (Gionet, 2009; Salee, 2006; Siggner and Costa, 2005). Among those who migrate to the cities, a social pattern has developed that is similar to that of American urban Indians- high rates of unemployment, criminality, and alcoholism.

The social consequences of these conditions are predictable. Life expectancy rates are considerably lower, and infant mortality rates, though declining, remain higher among Aboriginal groups than among the general Canadian populace. Stan- dards of housing, education, nutrition, and general health remain below the national averages (Banting et al., 2007; Gionet, 2009; Kendall, 2001; Paperny and Minogue, 2009; Picard, 2010; Statistics Canada, 2009b, 2010a). Moreover, Aboriginal people make up a highly disproportionate number of inmates in Canadian prisons (Brzozowski, 2006).

Despite these dismal facts, the life chances of native peoples in Canada have im- proved somewhat in recent years, particularly in income and education. Aboriginal

..

468 PART Ill ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

people who have moved to urban areas have exhibited especially noticeable rises in socioeconomic status (Siggner and Costa, 2005). But Aboriginal groups on reserve and in remote areas continue to represent a markedly deprived segment of the society and, in many ways, are divorced from mainstream institutions. This is a troublesome and pressing issue of Canadian ethnic relations that is acknowledged by the general public; a 2010 national survey indicated that a majority of Canadians believe that the quality of life for Aboriginals has not improved over the past two decades (Ipsos 2010a).

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

When comparing their own country with their American neighbor in the conduct and character of ethnic relations, Canadians usually see themselves in a favorable light. The prevalent view is that their treatment of and attitudes toward minority ethnic groups have been and remain more tolerant and equitable. This popular Canadian perspective is in some regards accurate. Though incidents of racial and ethnic violence are scattered throughout Canadian history, they have never reached the magnitude, frequency, or intensity of ethnic hostilities in the United States. More- over, as we will see in the next section, an ethnic ideology more pluralistic in content has traditionally been proclaimed in which the society's various cultural groups have not been forced into a monolithic "Canadian" mold.

Despite its more subdued character, however, ethnic conflict in Canada has been revealed in patterns that are in some ways parallel to those of the United States. Like most other Western societies, Canada does not lack a racist tradition, though it has been more muted in expression and less malignant in consequence. Historically, Canadian racism has been evidenced in its immigration policies and in its treatment, both official and unofficial, of nonwhites, especially Aboriginals.

IMMIGRATION AND RACISM

Historian Howard Palmer has written that "the more one scratches the surface of the period up to 1920, the more difficult it becomes to differentiate between the immi- gration histories of Canada and the United States" (1976:499). Official government policies regarding who and how many would be admitted and what place they would take in the occupational structure, as well as nativist sentiments and attitudes toward immigration in general, were all basically similar.

One analogous aspect of the early history of immigration in the two societies was the decidedly racist character of the selection process. Like the dominant Anglo

., group in the United States, "English Canadians," notes Evelyn Kallen, "from the beginning, exercised control of federal immigration policies responsible for determin- ing which ethnic groups would be allowed into Canada, where they would settle, what jobs they could assume, and what ranking and social position would be accorded them within the existing system of ethnic stratification" (2003:97- 98). Those deemed most suitable for Canada were, not surprisingly, most like the English Canadians, culturally and physically.

After 1870, when large-scale immigration to Canada began, the preference for British, or at least northwestern European, immigrants was an outspoken national

CHAPTER r6 CANADA 469

policy. The pretext for this selectivity was the matter of assimilation. Those from Britain and culturally similar societies, it was asserted, were more easily absorbed into the mainstream Canadian society. Others were not culturally or, as some be- lieved, biologically fit. Italians, Jews, and other non-Anglo groups-especially those who immigrated to Canadian cities at the turn of the century-met with a brand of nativism very similar to the U.S. variety (Avery, 1979; Harney and Troper, 1977) .

But it was nonwhites, especially Asians, who were least welcome and against whom the most blatantly racist policies and actions were directed. As in the United States, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, discriminatory poli- cies were enacted to discourage the entry of Chinese and other Asian groups, and in 1923 an exclusionary act totally barred their immigration (Elliott, 1979). Other re- strictive measures severely limited entry into Canada of those deemed "unassimila- ble," understood to mean nonwhites. In 191 1, for example, blacks seeking to emigrate from the United States were rejected because they were presumably unable to adapt to Canada's harsh winters (Palmer, 1976).

Discriminatory immigration policies restricting Asians and other nonwhites were not basically changed until the 1960s. Indeed, as recently as 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated bluntly Canada' s intention to encourage population growth through selective immigration. Large-scale Asian immigration, he stated, "would change the fundamental composition of the Canadian population"; therefore, no changes in immigration regulations were to be made (Corbett, 1957:36).

Seeking to enhance its international image and to more realistic;: ally meet its need for human resources , Canada abolished its racially discriminatory immigration pol- icy in legislative acts of 1962 and 1967. The selection of i!Jlmigrants was no longer to be based on nationality or race but on a system of points that objectively evalu- ated each immigrant's potential economic and social contribution to Canadian society (Hawkins, 1989) . As in the United States after it discarded restrictive immi- gration quotas in 1965, the ethnic origins of immigrants entering Canada changed radically-most were now non-European (Figure 16.2) .

ETHNIC ATTITUDES

As we have se~n, Canada in the last four decades has become a society far more eth- nically diverse than at any time in its history, with visible minorities making up the majority of new immigrants. This has prompted prejudicial attitudes and discrimina- tory actions, but by American standards these have been less evident and milder in content.

In their national attitudinal study, Berry, Kalin, and Taylor (1977) found that respondents in general reacted very favorably to English and French Canadians but less favorably to non-British and non-French groups. Specifically, northwestern Europeans were judged most favorably, central and southern European groups next, and nonwhite groups least favorably , except for Japanese . This social dis - tance scale was later demonstrated by other studies as well (Mackie, 1980; Pineo, 1987) . It is interesting to observe its essential similarity to the ethnic scale that, as noted in Chapter 3, has been consistently reaffirmed in the United States, though the differences among groups are declining in both societies (Reitz and Breton, 1994) .

470 PART Ill ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COM PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Even with this clear acknowledgment among Canadians of an ethnic hierarchy, Berry and his colleagues found no evidence of extreme ethnic prejudice. Though the rank order of groups was very apparent, the differences among them were not great. Race (that is, physical differences among groups) was found to be an important di- mension of group perception among Canadians, but the researchers concluded that "Canadians reject explicit racism" (1977:206). Later studies reaffirmed this concl u- sion (Berry and Kalin, 2000; Kalin and Berry, 1994) . Surveys indicate increasing eth- nic tolerance on several measures, including intermarriage and perceptions of visible minorities. Acceptance of marriage between whites and blacks, for example, rose from 55 percent in the mid-1970s to 92 percent in 2007, a rate higher than in the United States (Bibby, 2007; Milan et al., 2010) . Today, more than half of all second- and third -generation visible minorities who are married or living-together couples are ethnically mixed.

Despite the lower level of prejudice among Canadians, some 'suggest that nega- tive views toward nonwhites may simply be more subtle and covert and may reveal themselves when carefully probed (Cannon, 1995; Frideres, 1976; Kallen, 2003). Also, ethnic attitudes and actions of Canadians at times parallel those expressed by Americans. The most obvious example in recent years has been the growing negative attitudes toward Muslims. National polls have shown that Muslims are viewed sig- nificantly more unfavorably than other ethnic and religious groups (Geddes, 2013; Jedwab and Al-Yassini, 2012). Anti-Muslim views have taken a far less virulent form, however, and h_ave not blossomed into the Islamophobic outbreaks that have characterized the United States and some western European countries (Geddes, 2009; Jedwab, 2006; Trudeau Foundation, 2006). In fact, a study of twenty-three Western coun'tries found that Canadians had the least bigoted attitudes toward Muslims (Borooah and Mangan, 2007).

DISCRIMINATORY ACTIONS

Although the overt suppression of minority peoples is generally lacking in Canadian history, there are nonetheless some parallels between Canada and the United States in the past treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly nonwhites. In Canada, these racial-ethnic groups have suffered various forms of discrimination including, at one time or another, restrictions in voting, employment, land ownership, housing, and public accommodations (Davis and Krauter, 1971; Kallen, 2003).

Arrant anti-Asian immigration measures were noted earlier. In addition to this official discrimination, violence against Chinese and Japanese workers in British Columbia was common in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The most blatant discriminatory action against Asians, however, occurred during World War IL As in the United States, those of Japanese origin were forcibly removed from their homes and businesses and placed in internment camps for the duration of the war (Adachi, 1976).

Serious racist actions in the past were also directed at people of East Indian ori- gin. Along with the Chinese and Japanese, East Indians were barred from entry into Canada early in the twentieth century, and those remaining were subjected to dis- crimination in almost all areas of social life. East Indians in the past were depicted as dirty, sinister, immoral, prone to overcrowding, and generally inferior to whites.

CH A PTER 16 CANAD A 471

Buchignani suggests that East Indians in Canada before World War II were "an al- most ideal type subordinate racial caste" (1980:129). They were denied entry into various occupational fields and could not vote or hold citizenship.

Blacks have never made up a significant element of Canada's ethnic population; today they are about 2.5 percent {Statistics Canada, 2010d). Although their circum- stances have in some ways conformed to those of African Americans, negative ac- tions and attitudes toward blacks in Canada have never equaled in scope and intensity U.S. patterns. Studies of urban housing, for example, reveal that blacks in '- Canadian cities do not experience levels of residential segregation similar to what is so common in the United States (Fong, 1996; Lo, 2008; Walks and Bourne, 2006). As with other ethnic minorities, of course, immigration restrictions and discrimina- tion in schools, housing, and public accommodations were once common features of the Canadian black experience (Walker, 1980). Today, however, the official and ob- trusive forms of discrimination of the past have given way to milder and more subtle forms that are not easily verified (Bolaria and Li, 1988; Henry, 1994; Henry et al., 1995; Thompson and Weinfeld, 1995).

A national survey of non-Aboriginal adults in 2003 indicated that, although ra- cial and ethnic discrimination are not absent, the level and frequency of such actions are relatively low. One-third of blacks and 20 percent of South Asians said that they had sometimes or often experienced discrimination in the previous five years, most commonly at work or when applying for a job. The vast majority of respondents, however, reported that they had not experienced discrimination because of their ethnic background {Statistics Canada, 2003 ). '

Whether there are fundamental differences between Canadian and American be- liefs and actions toward nonwhite peoples, however, remains a debated issue (Kallen, 2003 ; Reitz and Breton, 1994) . The treatment of Aboriginal people in par- ticular prompts consternation among those who have viewed Canadian ethnic rela- tions as basically different from those in the United States. Also, in recent years, police relations with minorities, particularly blacks, have been a source of some ten- sion in Toronto and Montreal, each with growing black populations.

In sum, Canada, in the past, exhibited actions and attitudes not basically unlike those of other multiethnic societies. In the modern era, however, as the country has become extraordinarily diverse, levels of prejudice and discrimination are compara- tively low, and as Berry and Kalin have concluded, "Canadians are generally well- disposed toward the existence of ethnic and racial diversity in their society " (2000:185). Those outside of Canada seem to think the same. A 2010 international survey indicated that eight in ten global citizens described those living in Canada as being "tolerant of people from different racial and cultural backgrounds"- equal to the proportion of Canadians themselves who said this (lpsos, 2010b).

STABILITY AND CHANGE

Canada addresses ethnic issues differently than does the United States in large mea- sure because it is more pluralistic in its ethnic ideology. The ethnic end product envi- sioned by Canadians is not a duplicate of that envisioned by Americans. Whereas the United States can be categorized as basically assimilationist in orientation, Canada displays many elements of a corporate pluralistic society.

472 PART III ETH NIC RELATIO NS IN COMPARATIVE PERSP ECTIVE

MELTING POT VERSUS MOSAIC

It has often been noted that one of the key factors differentiating the Canadian an d American ethnic systems is how the two regard relations among diverse groups and the path of absorption of those groups into the larger society. Canada has commonly been observed as a society in which there is a greater tolerance of ethnic differences. The popular phrases of comparison are melting pot, supposedly characteristic of the United States, and mosaic, supposedly characteristic of Canada.

THE MELTING PoT In the United States, as we saw in Chapter 5, the idea of the melting pot- the fusing of many immigrant groups into an American hybrid culture- became popular beginning in the early 1900s. Never, however, was it translated into public policy to any serious extent. In reality, the Anglo-conformity model pre- dominated; that is, the expectation was always that immigrants would conform to the dominant Anglo-Protestant culture. Even in recent years, the assumption that new groups will quickly learn English and generally adopt dominant norms and va - lues has continued to guide social thinking despite increased multicultural rhetoric.

THE MosAIC The Canadian ideology, in contrast, has historically favored a more plu- ralistic outcome of the massing of various ethnic groups. There have been and re- main greater awareness and tolerance of ethnic separateness. A simplified view is "unity in diversity." Canada, in this ideal model, is a mosaic, the various pieces fit- ting together within a common political and economic framework.

In 1971, the mosaic idea was made a basic part of Canada's face to the world when Prime' Minister Trudeau announced the policy of "multiculturalism within a bi- lingual framework." This was in response to the realization that the population was becoming more ethnically diverse as well as to the concerns of non-English, non- French groups that they were being ignored in an officially bicultural Canada. An even stronger commitment to the policy was made in 1988 when Canada became the world's first country to enact a national multiculturalism law. Multiculturalism- recognizing and supporting the retention of different ethnic cultures within the larger society- was firmly established as an official doctrine, and public policies were adopted accordingly (Fleras and Elliott, 2002; Hawkins, 1989; Kymlicka, 2007).

EXPLAINING CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM

What accounts for this multicultural ideology, markedly different from the American ethnic ideology, and how strongly is it validated in light of the reality of Canadian ethnic relations?

Two NATIONS IN ONE The dual national character of Canada has made the application of assimilationist ideas impractical in any case. Given the historical fact of two founding groups, neither the melting pot nor the Anglo-conformity model could have the same meaning in the Canadian context as in the American. The idea of "Canadianizing" people becomes an empty notion when there are, in fact, two dom- inant cultural groups and no uniform "Canadian way of life" to serve as a societal reference point.

CHA PTER 16 CANADA 473

Although it is also true that one would be hard put to clearly define an "Ameri- can way of life," there is nonetheless no essential ambiguity with regard to language and other major elements of American culture. In Canada, however, the presence of two founding peoples with distinctly different cultural systems has allowed ethnic gro ups that entered the society after the British and French to parlay this basic schism into significant freedom to retain their culture and group structure. As Hiller writes, "If one group had dominated, there would have been more accord about the specific nature of the dominant culture; but since the British and French were in con- flict themselves, the society had a greater built-in tolerance for the perpetuation of ethnic identities" (1976:107- 8) .

PARTICULARISM Some have suggested that one explanation for Canada's greater toler- ance of ethnic pluralism lies in the fact that historically Canada retained a British Tory tradition that made for a more particularistic social system, in contrast to the equalitarian and universalistic system of the United States (Clark, 1950; Lipset, 1968, 1990). A traditionally greater emphasis on hierarchy and status restrained pressures to melt down group differences. The necessity for ethnic groups in the United States to "become like others" therefore did not find a strong counterpart in Canada. Moreover, Canada developed as a nation firmly tied to Britain and did not emerge from revolution, like the United States. Thus a unique "Canadian" national identity to which all could relate never materialized. As James Laxer writes, "[T]he consequence has been a nation of multiple identities and two main languages" (2 003:36).

THE I MPACT OF IMMIGRATI ON The impact of immigration on Canadian society has in a way been even more profound than in the United States, creating a greater incentive to adopt a more pluralistic approach to ethnic diversity. Though not as numerous in an absolute sense, immigrants in Canada have been a considerably higher percentage of the population than immigrants in the United States. In the early years of this cen- tury, the foreign-born in some Canadian provinces outnumbered the native-born by two to one (McKenna, 1969). As noted earlier, today, the foreign-born continue to make up a much greater percentage of the total population in Canada than in the United States~

Murncu LTURALISM : MYTH VERSUS REALITY In comparing the ethnic ideologies of Canada and the United States, it is important to recognize that just as the American melting pot has been more myth than reality, so, too, the Canadian ethnic mosaic is not a true reflection of public attitude and policy toward ethnic differences . For both soci- eties, the reality of ethnic relations lies somewhere between these two ideals. As Porter points out, "In practice neither [ideal] has been practicable and neither has been particularly valued by the respective societies despite the rhetoric in prose and poetry that has been devoted to it" (1979:144). Just as Anglo-conformity was the dominant public policy with respect to ethnic groups in the United States after its emergence as a heterogeneous society in the late nineteenth century, so, too, in Canada the first period of heavy immigration at the turn of the century produced an ethnic policy that encouraged assimilation into the dominant Anglo-Canadian group. This basic policy did not change for the next three decades (Burnet, 1976, 1981;

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474 PART Ill ETHNIC RELATIONS IN COM PARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Palmer, 1976). Although immigrants entered a society in which assimilation could not be enforced as strongly as it was in the United States, there was never any questi on that Anglo -conformity was, except in Quebec, the guiding force of government policy toward the newcomers.

In a comparison of ethnicity in the two societies, Reitz and Breton (1994) sug- gest that the differences between Canada and the United States regarding assimila- tion, at least as it pertains to European-origin groups, are not as great as has been commonly assumed. "The fact is," they note, "in both Canada and the United States, the public discourse on immigration reflects both a tolerance for diversity and a bias toward assimilation" (1994:10). Moreover, their analysis suggests there is no evi- dence to support the notion that ethnic minorities in Canada retain their ethnic iden- tity and culture longer or more strongly than American ethnic minorities. In Canada, as in the United States, ethnicity declines in significance with ea~h passing genera- tion, taking on a largely symbolic function.

Whether succeeding generations of minority ethnic groups in Canada can or will want to resist the forces of assimilation into the dominant Anglo (or in Que- bec, French) culture seems doubtful. It is most commonly the case that immigrants and their children are determined to take advantage of the opportunities of their new society rather than preserve the same kind of life they left in their socie- ties of origin. For them, as Freda Hawkins has claimed, "the preservation of cul- tural heritage is a lesser concern and .. . the whole concept of multiculturalism can be confusing" (1989:217). Here, the experience of most ethnic groups in the United States may serve as a valid comparison. Although at times tortuous, a high level of assimilation, both cultural and structural, has been the fate of most groups by the third generation. This seems to be the pattern followed as well by Canadian groups.

Further evidence that multiculturalism in Canada is in large part symbolic lies in the undeniable limits that are imposed on the cultural freedoms that ethnic groups are permitted at the point where cultural practices challenge basic societal values and beliefs. Female circumcision or polygamy, for example, are acceptable and con- doned in the origin cultures of many immigrant Canadians, but these practices are clear violations of core Canadian values. In such cases, writes demographer Daniel Stoffman, "there is no room for compromise" (2009:A15). And in this, Canada is little different from its southern neighbor. Stoffman further explains that multicultur- alism is not the same as diversity. That Canada, like the United States, is increasingly diverse is obvious; but that should not be confused with official policies that encour- age diversity. A variety of ethnic differences arise not because of any government support or encouragement but as a result of simple demographics and societal values that are open to cultural changes, always, however, within limits.

CONFLICTING VIEWS OF MULTICULTURALISM The policy and ideology of multiculturalism, though now solidly part of the Canadian ethos, remains a debatable issue. Some see it as merely part of a political strategy designed to gain the support of ethnic minori- ties. There also is concern that it is moving Canada away from its traditional open, individualistic political system toward one in which, as one observer has described it, "the cake has to be sliced very carefully among powerful and competing groups"

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(Hawkins, 1989:216). Moreover, in recent years, Quebec, in light of its growing di- verse ethnic population, has adopted its own policy of multiculturalism, recognizing the unique needs of these ethnic subcultures while trying to integrate them into Que- bec (that is, French-speaking) institutions.

Some view multiculturalism as divisive in effect and stultifying as well for minor- ity ethnic groups (Porter, 1975, 1979). Sustaining and enhancing ethnic pluralism, they maintain, can only hinder the movement of these groups into mainstream insti- tutions, thus perpetuating the system of ethnic stratification. Moreover, as writer .. Neil Bissoondath (2002) has pointed out, rather than instilling cultural understand- ing among ethnic groups, the policy of multiculturalism may actually have the oppo- site effect by reinforcing and perpetuating stereotypes.

MU LTI CULTURA LISM AND PuBLI C OPIN ION Despite such concerns and despite the realities of ethnic assimilation, Canadians today overwhelmingly favor the official multicultural policy and view multiculturalism as fundamental to the country's national identity (Adams, 2007; Bloemraad, 2010). "Tolerance towards diversity and the acceptance of pluralism," notes political commentator Richard Gwyn, "have become the defin- ing characteristic of the country and its citizens" (1995:203). National surveys con- sistently indicate a strong public understanding and acceptance of the principles of cultural pluralism. More than two-thirds disagree with the proposition that "a coun- try in which everyone speaks the same language and has similar ethnic and religious backgrounds is preferable to a country in which people speak different languages and have different ethnic and religious backgrounds" (CRIC, 20b4) . Similar public attitudes toward ethnic diversity have been consistently evident in national polls (Nanos, 2010; Trudeau Foundation, 2006).

Further proof of the commitment to multiculturalism is found in the compara- tively more favorable Canadian attitude toward immigration itself. When measured against Americans (as well as citizens of other immigrant-receiving countries), a greater percentage of Canadians are inclined to see immigration as having a positive effect on the society. National polls repeatedly indicate that a strong majority of Canadians perceive immigration as a fundamental feature of their society and believe that immigrants are vital to economic and social progress (Angus-Reid, 2009; Horowitz, 2()'10; Nanos, 2010; Trudeau Foundation, 2006).

At the same time that Canadians are solidly committed to cultural pluralism, the expectation that immigrants will assimilate to the society's core values also seems clearly part of the public view. In 1975, 85 percent of Canadians agreed with the statement that "immigrants to Canada have an obligation to learn Canadian ways." Twenty years later the percentage agreeing was 88. Furthermore, this view was no less evident among those who had come to Canada since the 1960s- that is, immigrants themselves (Bibby, 1995). The 2006 poll referred to earlier again con- firmed Canadians' acceptance of multiculturalism but also reported the general view that immigrants should abide by mainstream values, particularly as they pertain to gender equality (Trudeau Foundation, 2006). The strong desire for immigrants to in- tegrate into the larger society, however, does not parallel the American belief that immigrants should assimilate as quickly as possible. Nor does it translate into a de- sire for ethnic groups to remain separate and isolated communities. Rather, the

476 PART III ETH N IC REL ATIO NS IN C O M PARATIVE PE RS PE CTIVE

Canadian approach to immigrant adaptation is something of a middle course, wha - sociologist Irene Bloemraad calls "multicultural integration" (2010:10).

LOOKING AHEAD

Canada is a North American experiment in ethnic pluralism, exhibiting many of the characteristics of what was described in Chapter 4 as a corporate pluralistic, or mul- ticultural, society. In this, it stands in contrast to its southern neighbor. In consider- ing the future course of ethnic relations in Canada, we might return to the theme of the three ethnic dimensions denoted at this chapter's outset.

The overriding ethnic issue of Canadian society remains the French-English schism. This is the most encompassing dimension of ethnicity in Canada and con- tinues to present the most vexing problems of intergroup relations. Whether Quebec will retain its place in the Canadian union or eventually go the way of independence

' is a question that in the early twenty-first century remains unresolved. More tha n any other, this ethnic conflict will dominate internal politics in Canada in the coming years and, in a real sense, will define the future of Canada as a nation-state. Whether a politically and economically centralized society can sustain what are in essence two nations is a question that has been addressed in other corporate pluralistic societies made up of territorially based ethnic groups divided along the lines of language and culture. Judging from those cases, a continuing separatist movement of some scope can be expected as long as Francophone Quebec remains part of Canada. Whatever the nature of its resolution, however, it is not likely to degenerate into warfare or to erupt periodically in violence. The democratic context of Canada makes ethnic con- flict amenable' to political solution.

A second ethnic issue that will absorb the attention of Canadians in the coming years involves the racial and ethnic characteristics of its new immigrants-mostly non-European and nonwhite. Current studies have indicated that many immigrants have not kept pace with the rest of the workforce in income and jobs. Moreover, problems of discrimination are perceived by some (Banting et al., 2007; Samuel and Basavarajappa, 2006). Will these groups be fully integrated into- or perhaps even eventually dominate-Canadian society?

Although their future status will continue to be of major concern, it is now clear that these groups already have fundamentally altered the ethnic composition and fla- vor of Canada. As journalist Peter Newman has written, the members of Canada's two founding groups are no longer in the ascendancy, which means that "a new and radically different country has been created" (1995:34). Nothing could better il- lustrate this than the fact that two of the three most recent occupants of the office of governor general-the highest symbolic political position of the federal government- have been visible minority women, both born outside Canada.

Finally, the place of Aboriginal peoples remains unclear. Whether they will par- ticipate with other Canadians as equals in all aspects of citizenship or whether they will exhibit greater autonomy is still an unfolding issue. Also, the continuing socio- economic gap between Aboriginal peoples and the rest of Canadian society remains a troubling reality.

Factors irrespective of ethnicity have in the past impeded the development of a definitive Canadian national identity. Great regional differences as well as the

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constant specter of the United States, with its enormous economic and cultural influ- ences, have created divergent visions of the country's destiny. But today, it is its ap- proach to issues of ethnic diversity that defines Canada's place among the world's nations and provides its strongest source of national identity. It has accommodated ethnic diversity more successfully than almost any other contemporary multiethnic society, and, should it continue to succeed, will serve as an exemplar for others. 6

Canada will hold the attention of students of ethnic relations in the coming decades, for it may provide an answer to the question of how much diversity can be tolerated by a society that remains a centralized nation-state.

SUMMARY

• Canada is geographically and culturally close to the United States, but its ethnic structure is decidedly different in several respects.

• In its ethnic makeup, Canada is a dual-nation society, French and English, within which additional ethnic groups have taken their place.

• There are three dimensions of ethnicity in Canada: the French-English bifurca- tion; other ethnic groups, neither French nor English in origin; and Aboriginal peoples.

• The overriding issue of ethnic relations is the relentless conflict between French and English Canadians. The division between the two derives from the French colonial defeat by the British in the eighteenth century. Conflict has revolved around the efforts of French Canadians to retain their language and culture within the context of a surrounding English majority. The rupture intensified in the 1970s with the emergence of a separatist movement in Quebec, where most French-speaking Canadians live, and remains wide today.

• A large and varied cluster of non-British, non-French ethnic groups from virtu- ally all nations of the world immigrated to Canada beginning in the late 1950s, changing the very ethnic character of the society. Today, these groups make up more than one-third of the Canadian population and continue to grow in size as Canada has become one of the world's leading countries of immigration.

• Aboriginal peoples-Indians, Inuit, and Metis-are the third element in Canada's ethnic composition and are a numerically small part of the society. In socioecpnomic status, these groups are at the bottom of the Canadian ethnic hierarchy.

• Ethnic stratification in Canada was, in the past, a vertical mosaic in which those of British origin disproportionately occupied the higher occupations and the most important decision-making positions of major institutions. Today French Canadians and, increasingly, those of neither British nor French origin have narrowed those discrepancies considerably and are playing a more prominent role in Canadian economic and political affairs.

6 Michael Ignatieff has explained that "Spaniards avidly follow Canadian politics, because it is full of lessons for meeting the challenge of Basque and Catalan nationalism. Canada matters to Spain and every society in the world seeking to share a political community among peoples of different languages, religion, traditions and cultures" (2005:Al9).

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478 PART IIJ ETH N IC RELA TIO NS l\I C O M PA RATI VE PER SP EC TIV E

• Prejudice and discrimination in Canada today are milder in form and substance than those of the United States, but resembled U.S. forms in the past in immi- gration policies and in the treatment of nonwhite peoples.

• Canada has maintained a greater tolerance toward ethnic diversity than has the United States and can be categorized as a corporate pluralistic society.

• Canada historically has advanced a mosaic ethnic ideal, embodied today in the official policy of multiculturalism, according to which ethnic minorities are not compelled to fully adopt the cultural ways of the dominant group.

COMPARING C ANADA AND THE U NITED STATES

Points of Similarity • The ethnic development of both societies began with a process of migrant superordi-

nation, in which an indigenous population was overcome by a colonizing force. Following conquest, native populations in both societies were reduced to a state of dependence on the dominant group.

• Both societies were populated by successive immigrant waves and current immigration in both is comparable in its societal impact. Both societies today are among the major destinations of global immigration, and most immigrants are non-European.

• Both societies are today among the most ethnically diverse in the world.

Points of Difference • Canada is a two-nation society, with two distinct cultural groups having charter-

group status, In effect, there are two dominant ethnic groups in Canada . • Canada has adopted a more pluralist approach to the absorption of various ethnic

groups into its population, though in fact progressive assimilation of ethnic groups has generally paralleled U.S. patterns.

• Canada did not abide institutionalized slavery and thus did not experience the travails of integrating a former slave population into its mainstream.

• Race and ethnic relations in Canada have historically been more benign and ethnic tolerance higher than in the United States.

CRITICAL THINKIN G

1. As we have seen in Part II, immigration to the United States during the past four decades has created a demographic shift to a population that continues to be- come less European in origin. The same has been occurring in Canada, but the contentiousness of immigration and the issues that accompany it have not seemed to arise as strongly as in the United States. What may account for that difference?

2 . Can it be argued that Canadian-style multiculturalism, which supports the re- tention of ethnic cultures, impedes the integration of immigrants into the larger society by confining them to a particular ethnic slot? Reversing the issue, might Canadian-style multiculturalism actually ease the movement of immigrants of different ethnic origin into the larger society?

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3. Despite sharing the North American continent, Canada and the United States have followed different paths in their approaches to issues of race and ethnicity. What factors, both historical and contemporary, might account for this divergence?

4. Why would newly emergent multiethnic societies, such as those of Western Europe, be more likely to consider Canada as a potential model for dealing with issues of interethnic relations, rather than the United States?

PERSONAUPRACTICAL APPLICATION

1. How would you respond to a Canadian who asserts that ethnic prejudice and discrimination are much stronger in the United States? Would you agree or would you argue that different social and political histories and different popu- lations make such comparisons questionable?

2. Canada, as we have seen, is officially a bilingual society. This means that all government services are provided in both English and French and all consumer goods sold nationally must be packaged to accommodate speakers of both lan- guages . What would you think of an officially bilingual United States? Consider that there is already a kind of de facto bilingualism (English and Spanish) in some cities, like Miami and Los Angeles.

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