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Modules/Module4/Mod4Background.html
Module 4 - Background
Management Integration and Implementation
Dube, L., Bernier, C., & Roy, V. (2007) Information Resource Management At Hydro-Quebec. International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 5(2):September. HEC023.
Dube, L., Bernier, C., & Roy, V. (2009) Taking on the Challenge of IT Management in a Global Business Context: The Alcan Case – Part A. International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 7(2):May. HEC020.
Dube, L., Bernier, C., & Roy, V. (2009) Taking on the Challenge of IT Management in a Global Business Context: The Alcan Case – Part B. International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 7(2):May. HEC021.
Bernier, C., Roy, V., & Brunelle, E. (2006) An ERP Story: Background (A). International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 4(1):March.
Bernier, C., Roy, V., & Brunelle, E. (2006) An ERP Story: Troubles Ahead (C). International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 4(1):March.
Bernier, C., Roy, V., & Brunelle, E. (2006) An ERP Story: Epilogue (D). International Journal of Case Studies in Management. 4(1):March.
Broderick, A. (2013, January). The Veterans Health Administration: Taking home Telehealth services to scale nationally. The Commonwealth Fund. Retrieved from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Case%20Study/2013/Jan/1657_Broderick_telehealth_adoption_VHA_case_study.pdf
Scacchi, W. (2003). Socio-Technical-Design. Institute for Software Research, Univ. of Wisconsin. Retrieved July 26, 2010 from http://www.ics.uci.edu/~wscacchi/Papers/SE-Encyc/Socio-Technical-Design.pdf
Sommerville, I. (2010). Socio-technical Systems Retrieved on July 26, 2010, from http://archive.cs.st-andrews.ac.uk/STSE-Handbook/Papers/SociotechnicalsystemsFromdesignmethodstosystemsengineering-BaxterSommerville.pdf
Torogoon, A., Jetton, P., Vlasic, A., & Spiller, J. (2004). Raise your glasses – the water's magic! Strategic IT at SA Water: a case study in alignment, outsourcing and governance. Journal of Information Technology. 19, 130–139.
Balloni, A. (2010). Challenges and Reflections on Knowledge Society and Sociotechnical Systems, The International Journal of Managing Information Technology (IJMIT) 2, 1, February 2010. Retrieved on July 26, 2010, from http://airccse.org/journal/ijmit/papers/0210ijmit3.pdf
University of Missouri - St. Louis. Why General Managers Need to Understand Information Systems. Working Paper. Retrieved November 27, 2013, from http://tralvex.com/pub/edu/ism/zip/whygm-is.pdf
Ricotta, F. J. (1993, July 19). The six immutable laws of information. Retrieved from http://seclists.org/interesting-people/1993/Jul/61
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© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 006 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 5 Issue 2
September 2007
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec1, 2
Case prepared by Professors Line DUBÉ, 3 Carmen BERNIER
4 and Vital ROY
5
January 3, 2006. The time is 6 p.m. and Karl Malenfant, Head of Development and
Implementation for Hydro-Québec Distribution’s Customer Information Systems (CIS) project,
enters his office. After more than five years of very hard work, the division is embarking on a
new phase of a $370-million project to implement a new information system using SAP’s IS/U
(Industry Solutions/Utilities) and CRM (Customer Relationship Management) solutions to
support HQD’s business processes. The three first project phases were successfully implemented,
as planned. He smiles, remembering all of the work accomplished by his team, as well as the
profound changes that implementing this system have wrought within Hydro-Québec. In his
mind, he recalls the first small steps of the project and takes stock of just how far they’ve come…
The Company
Hydro-Québec produces, transmits and distributes hydroelectricity. It also carries out innovative
research in the field. Its aim is to become a world leader in energy. 6 Hydro-Québec operates
Canada’s largest electricity generation, transmission and distribution network and is one of the
largest electricity producers in North America. Quebec law defines Hydro-Québec’s mission as
“to supply power and to pursue endeavours in energy-related research and promotion, energy
conversion and conservation, and any field connected with or related to power or energy”
(Article 22 of the Hydro-Québec Act).
1 Translation from French of “La gestion des ressources informationnelles à Hydro-Québec,” case deposited under number
9 65 2007 005. 2 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship. 3 Line Dubé is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. 4 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. 5 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. He is also Director of the
HEC Montréal Case Centre. 6 Mission aims and quantitative data used in this study were drawn from Hydro-Québec’s 2004 Annual Report and the Strategic
Plan 2002-2006: http://www.hydroquebec.com/publications/en/strategic_plan/pdf/plan-strategique-2002-2006.pdf.
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In 2004, Hydro-Québec had assets of $58 billion and generated revenue of close to $10.7 billion.
At the time, the approximately 22,000 employees working for Hydro-Québec served more than
3.5 million customers across the province. As Hydro-Québec relies, for the most part, on
hydraulic power to generate electricity, it has always been able to produce and market its
electricity at very competitive prices. In 2004, for example, electricity sold to customers in
Montreal was one-third the rate of that sold to customers in New York.
That year, given the large discrepancy in prices between Quebec and the United States, and given
occasional oversupply, Hydro-Québec made $384 million in net electricity exports through spot
trades on energy markets.
The Business Context
Following nationalization of all of Quebec’s electricity companies in 1963, the Quebec
government became Hydro-Québec’s sole shareholder. Hydro-Québec has always been
economically viable and an important contributor to Quebec’s coffers. Between 1998 and 2004,
Hydro-Québec paid the government of Quebec $5.3 billion. The government of Quebec, with its
limited resources (taxes were already considered to be quite high), substantial debt and growing
spending requirements, was grateful for the increasingly large dividends generated by Hydro-
Québec.
Electricity prices in Quebec are controlled by the Régie de l’énergie (Energy Board). 1 As such, a
good source of extra income was the sale of surplus electricity at higher prices on the U.S. market
in response to short-term needs. In 1997, however, when the U.S. electricity market was
deregulated, the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) established regulations
requiring reciprocity among companies wanting to sell electricity on the American market. That
meant that Hydro-Québec also had to open its market to American operators, thus ending its
monopoly over the production and distribution of electricity in Quebec.
Strategically speaking, senior management at Hydro-Québec saw this new business context as a
singular opportunity to highlight the significant energy assets and business expertise acquired in
Quebec over the years. Hydro-Québec created the TransÉnergie division in 1997 in order to bring
itself in line with the rules governing wholesale markets in North America. The Régie de
l’énergie supported TransÉnergie’s establishment following some changes to the Régie’s act. In
2002, Hydro-Québec decided to go a step further and changed its vertically integrated structure
by separating its production, transmission and distribution activities. Each division was given its
own mandate and responsibilities, thus better enabling them to define their own aims and
development strategies and to seize new business opportunities. This restructuring left Hydro-
Québec with six main divisions: Production, TransÉnergie, Distribution, Equipement, Pétrole et
gaz, and Technologie et développement industriel. 2
1 The Régie de l’énergie (Energy Board) is a provincial body whose “mission is to foster the conciliation of the public interest,
consumer protection and the fair treatment of the electricity carrier and distributors.” (Source: http://www.regie-energie.qc.ca/;
consulted September 20, 2005.) 2 A brief description of each division may be found in Appendix 1.
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Hydro-Québec retained its monopoly on electricity distribution in Quebec under this new model
through Hydro-Québec Distribution. Its other activities, however, were opened to competition, at
least in theory. Each division became autonomous, accountable, a profit centre in its own right
and responsible for meeting the profitability criteria established by the board and the government
of Quebec.
Establishment of the Shared Services Centre
When Hydro-Québec was broken up into six independent divisions, three executive vice-
president positions were created:
1. Executive Vice-President, Corporate Affairs and Secretary General;
2. Executive Vice-President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer;
3. Executive Vice-President, Human Resources and Shared Services.
In January 2003, the company’s organization chart included, for the first time, a Shared Services
Centre (SSC), which was placed under the responsibility of an executive vice-president. This
vice-president also oversaw the procurement and services unit as well as the IT unit. 1
The SSC brought together a broad spectrum of internal support services that it offered to all of
Hydro-Québec’s six new divisions. Shared services included, among others: IT, material
management, procurement, transportation services, document management and real estate
management (see full organization chart in Appendix 2). The SSC was divided into four units: IT
Solutions (Direction Solutions informatiques – DSI), IT Operations (Direction Exploitation des
TI – DETI), Telecommunications and Service Networks (Direction Télécommunications et
réseaux de services (DTRS) and Office Automation Systems (Direction Bureautique). These
units employed approximately 1,300 people who were responsible for all tasks directly related to
IT.
Although the move towards transition began in the early 2000s, the SSC’s launch marked a
formal and major turning point in Hydro-Québec’s customer relations. The shift was aimed at
developing business partnerships with the divisions in order to help them reach their objectives
and improve their financial performance. The SSC relied on best practices, the pooling of state-
of-the-art expertise and economies of scale to provide high-quality services to the divisions at the
best possible price.
Under the new organization, divisions retained full decision-making and budgetary powers on all
projects undertaken in partnership with the SSC, which they would “hire” as a service provider or
in-house consultant. For the time being at Hydro-Québec, divisions were not permitted to
outsource services that could be provided by the SSC. The SSC itself was not permitted to offer
its services to other companies.
1 Sources: Hydro-Québec: 2002 Annual Report. Hydro-Québec: Strategic Plan 2002-2006 (consulted on 26/09/05), available at:
http://www.hydroquebec.com/publications/en/strategic_plan/pdf/plan-strategique-2002-2006.pdf
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Reinventing IT Management
At the end of the 1990s, technology and business units’ efforts to better control returns on IT-
invested capital caused major changes in the way IT was organized in many companies. Hydro-
Québec was also part of that trend. In the past, Hydro-Québec had embraced a variety of IT
management movements, from centralization to decentralization. At the end of the 1990s, the
DDMA division (Direction Développement et maintenance des applications – Applications
Development and Maintenance), later renamed DSI (Direction Solutions informatiques – IT
Solutions), was responsible for carrying out all of Hydro-Québec’s technology-related projects,
establishing norms and processes and “acting as the custodian of such norms in all technology-
related activities.” Within this framework, the business units played quite a passive role of
“letting their needs be known” to DSI experts.
Deliberation and discussion among the IT divisions and business units made it possible to lay the
foundations of a new IT management model. In the early 2000s, Hydro-Québec decentralized
decisions relating to technological investments of any kind and handed decision-making over to
the business units. The same approach was applied to IT budgets shortly thereafter, as they were
also transferred to business units. The chief impact of the SSC’s establishment was to separate
governance from provision of services. Suppliers were no longer responsible for ensuring that
company guidelines (in terms of strategy, policy, framework, monitoring and audits) were
respected. The establishment of the SSC left decision-making in the hands of the business units,
which became fully accountable for their IT investments. The SSC, through its four IT units,
became an in-house consultant and supplier of IT projects to those business units.
Although the establishment of the SSC only made official changes that had already slowly been
taking place within the company, those changes nonetheless caused upheaval both within the
business units and the IT divisions. They now had to share the roles and responsibilities defined
by the new IT management model. The SSC was given a large number of quite critical
responsibilities. In a context marked by a growing shift toward software implementation, its
responsibilities were increasingly tied to technological infrastructure and, more specifically, to
technological architecture, security management, development of interfaces with existing
systems, development of new functions in existing software and performance enhancement. For
every project, the SSC now had to assess the technological impact of a given division’s new
needs, necessary resources (cost, time, expertise, equipment, software and infrastructure, for
example) and any links between a given project and Hydro-Québec’s other information systems
and existing infrastructure. The SSC was now also responsible for developing the necessary
technological platforms and technical competencies to provide continuous support for the
strategic applications of each division, to anticipate and respond to the technical support needs of
each division and to develop and enhance its in-house expertise. Last, the SSC was responsible
for developing and implementing all of the technological aspects of any given solution,
optimizing technological performance and maintaining and operating said solution.
These new responsibilities also brought new challenges for the SSC. The IT divisions now had to
negotiate all of their technological budgets with each division. They had to answer for every
dollar spent and were accountable for time and cost estimates. They had to offer one-stop service
to customers in order to make their internal organization transparent. They also needed to
continue to develop expertise and shared knowledge, in spite of overspecialization among IT
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec
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professionals and possible distancing in the customer/supplier relationship. The model was
implanted and gradually took shape through the relationship forged between the SSC and the
business units, and with Hydro-Québec Distribution in particular.
Hydro-Québec Distribution (HQD)
As a result of the structural changes implemented throughout the company, in early 1999, HQD
was made responsible for electricity distribution to over 3.5 million customers in Quebec. In
addition to offering a range of products and services, HQD also provided secure electricity supply
throughout the province. Customer service became a key factor in HQD’s development (as
illustrated by its 2002-2006 strategic plan) and the very nature of its activities (including, for
example, billing, collection, call centres and e-commerce) required significant technological
support. In December 1998, senior management appointed a new vice-president to head HQD
Sales and Customer Service, Ghislaine Larocque, who had vast experience in the energy industry,
and at Gaz Métropolitain, in particular.
A few months after her appointment, Ms. Larocque asked her management team a very important
question: “Where are our information systems leading us? What is our IT systems strategy?”
To her great surprise, her team was unable to answer her questions precisely. Although, each
year, HQD spent more than $50 million on more than 200 IT systems, it had no clear strategy and
no overall systems plan had been formally drawn up since its establishment.
The establishment of the six independent divisions transformed the organization’s outlook
entirely. HQD’s new decision-making unit was set up and tasked with managing customer
relations, as those customers were Hydro-Québec’s main source of revenue. The new division
now modelled itself on other North American electricity distributors and used distributor
benchmarks to measure its own achievements rather than modelling itself, as it previously had,
on electricity producers. HQ Distribution had given itself the means to become as efficient as a
private company.
To launch this major shift, in April 1999, Ms. Larocque created three teams as part of the
company’s 2000-2004 strategic planning exercise. The first team was responsible for defining
business strategy for business and commercial customers. The second team was to look after the
residential customer business strategy. And the third, coordinated by Mr. Malenfant, was tasked
with developing IT strategy to support the company’s two main market segments: “business and
commercial” and “residential.”
In addition to defining its IT strategy for the very first time, the new HQD division was now fully
responsible for its IT choices and investments. HQ Distribution now had to align “IT” with
“strategy”: IT strategic planning, assessment of short-, medium- and long-term needs as well as
their order of priority, business process reengineering and development, IT budget management,
IT project management and supervising IT implementation (including training and change
management).
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In September 1999, once the strategic planning exercise was complete, Ms. Larocque created a
new unit called “e-commerce and customer information systems” which was responsible for the
following:
1. To gather and manage the application software under the vice-president’s responsibility
(which included over 200 IT systems supporting all business processes);
2. To define the needs of the vice-president’s department, more generally speaking;
3. To prioritize projects to be implemented;
4. To provide strategies for modernizing customer application software for the 2000-2004
strategic plan;
5. To allocate SSC budgets.
Mr. Malenfant was appointed head of the new unit.
Several factors pushed the division to take IT matters into its own hands. The first was the
technological zeitgeist of the late 1990s. As the Internet expanded and the tech bubble grew, the
new technological world aroused interest and encouraged organizations to experiment with
innovation, and thus created new customer expectations. Second, huge IT investments were being
made at the time to replace legacy company systems that risked being compromised by the
millennium bug. The 1990s also marked the gradual development by Hydro-Québec of a more
comprehensive and process-oriented view of its work. All key distribution processes, particularly
those relating to customer service, relied on IT. As IT played an increasingly large role in HQD’s
business outlook, so HQD gradually took on the management of its own processes and IT.
The new model developed by Hydro-Québec and its Distribution division to manage systems and
IT looked very good on paper, but now, at the dawn of the new millennium, it had to prove itself
in practice.
Evolution of IT Management through the CIS (Customer Information
Systems) Project
Modernization, a strategy
In an effort to modernize customer software applications, a special team was formed to develop a
strategy to allow IT to support the implementation of customer strategies.
The first finding of the planning exercise was that the company’s legacy systems, most of which
dated back to the late 1970s, required urgent updating. Those systems were first developed to
respond to the needs of a business context entirely unlike the one at the turn of the millennium.
For example, the company used addresses to anchor information: electricity was “delivered” to
addresses equipped with meters and the system would then send bills to those addresses.
Migrating from managing addresses to managing customers was almost impossible with an
address-based system. Today, a single customer may own several premises at several different
addresses and may, for example, wish to receive a single bill. Customer segmentation is also very
important. Yet notions of that kind were completely foreign to the legacy systems in use.
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That finding opened up a number of possible solutions to HQD. It could:
Develop the legacy systems;
Purchase a set of software packages from multiple vendors, choosing the best system in
each specific category, and have those systems communicate among themselves (the best-
of-breed approach);
Purchase the best integrated software package from a single vendor (the best-of-suite
approach).
Following an in-depth analysis of requirements (detailed review of business processes and
consideration of several distributors in the industry), senior management decided that developing
the old systems was impossible given the costs and risks involved.
In the fall of 2001, and with formal approval from Hydro-Québec’s board, a call for tender was
issued for a solution based on a set of products. Vendors of the best products and the best suites
were invited to bid. A second call for tender was issued for five professional services (functional
integration: processes and parameters, technological integration, change management, training
and project management) in order to find a consultancy that would become HQD’s sole partner in
the implementation of the chosen software package. HQD, supported by the SSC, was project
manager of this large-scale project. Up until that point, the SSC’s role had been to assist HQD in
its preliminary studies and as it prepared the calls for tender. The SSC was also responsible for
assessing the technical side of all bids made. HQD initially believed that a world-renowned
consultancy would add heft to the project in terms of credibility and confidence; it would also
make it possible to share risk with an outside partner by virtue of certain contractual agreements.
Insofar as choosing a software package was concerned, no “best of suite” vendor was able to
develop a competitive solution that satisfied HQD’s tender requirements. A consortium, which
included SAP, presented the best solution to bid requirements and was awarded the contract. The
solution was based on SAP’s IS/U and CRM applications and its R/3 suite. Moreover, as Hydro-
Québec was already using SAP’s R/3 suite of software applications, strategic partnership
agreements were negotiated for user licenses. Hydro-Québec became an “international model”
for the use of SAP products in the energy field.
Several consulting firms submitted proposals to become professional service providers, also
known as integrators. Cap Gemini submitted the best bid for four of the five services sought:
functional integration, change management, training and project management.
However, HQD was not satisfied with any of the submissions regarding technological
integration. Although HQD had originally hoped to have a single integrator for all five
components of the project, it became clear that this would not be possible. At that point, it also
became clear that the SSC, which had up to then provided support by assessing outside company
bids, could be considered by HQD as a possible delivery partner for the technological integration
side of the project. The SSC thus decided, with its own technological partners, to submit a bid in
response to the call for tender for the “technological integration” of professional services. The
SSC’s bid revealed a solid understanding of existing systems and excellent SAP expertise.
Indeed, as the SSC had been involved in four Hydro-Québec SAP R/3 software implementation
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projects, it had extensive technological expertise. One such project, at the end of the 1990s,
involved the IT groups in the Harmonie project, 1 which was a major project to implement R/3 for
the management of Hydro-Québec’s human, material and financial resources. The project was a
great success. The SSC’s bid was also satisfactory in terms of budget.
Upon the recommendation of the HQD management team, Hydro-Québec senior management
awarded the technological integration mandate (infrastructure, development, interface, etc.) to the
SSC and awarded to an outside company, Cap Gemini, the mandate to provide support for the
four other components of the project. All contracts were signed at the end of 2002. The Customer
Information Systems project was launched with a budget of $370 million, a start date of
January 3, 2003 and an end date of March 2007.
Project organization
Yves Legris, who was Director of the Collection Services Department at HQD at the time and
already had 15 years of experience at Hydro-Québec, was appointed head of the Customer
Information Systems project. His duties included overall project management and, more
specifically, financial management as well as management of the socio-political aspects of the
project, meaning the relationship with the rest of Hydro-Québec, its board and the outside
suppliers involved in the project. Karl Malenfant, who had up to that point held a number of IT
positions at HQD, was placed in charge of managing the operational aspects of the project, and
delivery, in particular. At the beginning of the project, HQD asked for a single point of contact
within the SSC for all issues. HQD also wanted all of its main SSC colleagues to be located in
premises downtown that had been leased for that purpose. Lorraine Mayer was appointed head of
IT on the CIS project (see Figure 1). She worked with more than a dozen SSC partners who
contributed to the project in one way or another, in addition to those colleagues who physically
moved downtown.
Figure 1
Customer Information Systems (CIS) Organization Chart
The three key players above were thus responsible for successfully leading this ambitious project
to modernize HQD’s principal business processes 2 and to implement the CIS solution. This major
1 Richard Landry and Suzanne Rivard, “Le projet Harmonie,” Gestion, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2001, p. 56-64. 2 All of the affected business processes are listed in Appendix 3.
Yves Legris Director
Karl Malenfant Head of Development and
Implementation
Lorraine Mayer Head of IT
Michel Gévry Cap Gemini Representative
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undertaking required that parameters be defined for 1,820 business functions within 47 units;
including general units such as Financial Accounting (FI), Control (CO), Human Resources
(HR), Sales & Distribution (SD), Customer Relations Management (CRM) and Business
Intelligence (BW). Also included were more specialized units such as Service Call Management
(SM), Billing Management (IS/U), Data Measurement Management (DM) and Energy Data
Management (EDM). A team of approximately 450 people worked on the project, two-thirds of
whom were from HQD and the SSC and one-third of whom were from Cap Gemini, the outside
supplier. Installation of the integrated software package was planned to take place over a period
of four years and in four distinct delivery phases:
1. March 2004: Updating of all infrastructure related to the printing and mailing of the
120,000 bills and inserts sent out each day;
2. March 2005: Implementation of all management processes regarding supply and
measuring equipment (meters, for example), including the management of customer
requests for assistance (new supplies or updating, for example) and just-in-time stock
management;
3. December 2005: Implementation of all business customer processes (350,000 clients);
4. December 2006: Implementation of all residential customer processes (approximately
3 million customers).
Some legacy systems were abandoned during each phase and, up until December 2006, bridges
had to be built between new incoming systems and the legacy systems that were not abandoned.
Implementing the new IT management model
The Customer Information System project helped shape the new IT management roles of HQD
and the SSC and had a major impact on all of the parties involved. Insofar as its general approach
to software was concerned, Hydro-Québec chose to no longer develop its own software, but
rather to purchase software package solutions. As the divisions were no longer “software
producers” and given the costs and risks associated with in-house development, it is clear why
the divisions chose to move towards turnkey solutions rather than risk custom software
development. Thus, as in the case of the CIS project, legacy systems were replaced one by one by
software packages purchased from external vendors. The result was that, to respond to customer
needs, the SSC’s IT expertise had to evolve. In this project, for example, traditional programmers
were increasingly less necessary. The same was true of the “functional” aspects of implementing
an information system like CIS, where such functional aspects migrated to the customer. This
became the responsibility of HQD. Thus, as Lorraine Mayer explained, IT Solutions’ (DSI)
gatekeeper role was now entrusted to the divisions themselves:
What the SSC brought that was new was that we no longer had to police things… The SSC was
customer-oriented above all else. Separating the governance role from the service role changed our
customer relationships for the better. The only services provided were those that customers wanted
and that they were prepared to pay for. A service culture prevailed: our job was to respond to
customers’ business needs. From that moment forward, it became possible to compare like with like
on the market.
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Within the framework of this project, the role of business architect (or functional analyst), as it
had existed before within IT Solutions (DSI), also changed, as it was integrated into Hydro-
Québec’s business units. Given the increasing complexity of the technological infrastructure and
the highly sophisticated software packages, the SSC required new competencies, which led to the
development of other fields of specialization, as Ms. Mayer explained:
The concept of functional architect no longer existed with regard to software packages. That job
disappeared in the software package world, making way for application specialists and organizational
process specialists. I specify “in the software package world,” here, because in other fields (for
example, on the web), functional architects, programmers and other more traditional IT professions
are required and are essential. […] As I was saying, assemblers of technical software tools,
technological integrators and architects are all high-level professions that require people who are able
to see the big picture and have a high level of understanding of the solution. But programming as a
profession must evolve. And that’s great! Although no one buys a software package in order to write
code, few packages are delivered without at least some new functions being developed. Older
programmers have to develop their competencies and become designer/developers who can interact
with business analysts. Finally, we also need people who are also interested in performance, service
levels, optimization… that’s where there’s work to be done!
Organizational and staff development plans were drawn up to ensure that such competencies
were acquired and developed. Resources also had to be made available to support legacy systems
until the end and to support the new systems. As Lorraine Mayer explained:
Our theme over the next few years is going to be the multi-skilling of our resources. If you aren’t
flexible, in IT, then all is lost. In the world of software, we now need technological resources
(integrators, architects, etc.) and resources that know software well and understand the customer’s
business.
For some SSC employees who were used to the traditional IT model, the new approach was a
huge change and a major professional challenge. Several employees, including “old school”
functional architects at the SSC, were even transferred into HQD to take part in the functional
aspects of the project and to develop the software package. One-off training sessions and
knowledge transfers from a variety of consultants made it possible for a number of them to adapt
to SSC’s new role in a world of software solutions. IT Solutions’ (DSI) other fields of
specialization remained the same in terms of the required competencies, aside from the fact that
employees now needed to be more aware of the customer’s “business” side.
Clearly, all of these changes were going to disrupt human resources management in a company
this size. Staff transfers, the creation and altering of positions, the development of new
competencies, unions, collective labour agreements and new working hours were all factors that
management had to adapt to new business realities. Union-management relations in the affected
units were generally quite friendly and collective labour agreements included a clause on
technological change. Employees were informed of the project’s progress and impact. Transition
occurred slowly and in a manner that was respectful to all.
The new model of shared responsibility also brought its share of challenges to HQD. Although
HQD had been gradually developing structures and management tools since the early 2000s to
align and strategically manage its technological investments, the CIS project was a huge
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec
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challenge for the whole company because of its breadth and the major changes to its structures
and paradigms. As Karl Malenfant, Head of Development and Implementation said:
At some point, somebody had to step up and say, “We’ll take on these responsibilities…,” because
HQD couldn’t just say “We’ll take responsibility for everything” either. We didn’t necessarily have
the right competencies… We had to get organized!
The implemented solution required both an extremely sophisticated IT system and a review of
business processes in line with HQD’s new direction. In order to succeed, users absolutely had to
step out of their passive role of simply expressing their needs. They now had to become much
more active in the software implementation process. The CIS project thus had to identify people
with an excellent grasp of the business processes affected. These individual human resources had
to be able to establish links between the various modules of the SAP solution. They needed to
become familiar with the applications toolkit and choose the best approach. In short, they became
the new “applications specialists,” replacing functional architects. An organizational development
plan had to be drawn up. Thanks to training and attentive coaching provided by the consultancy,
some users were able to make that leap, develop those new competencies and fully play their
part. Others, unfortunately, fell by the wayside.
HQD then had to consider training the next generation of users to use and develop the new system
initially developed by the integrator. This new reality disrupted job definitions, collective labour
agreements and the corporate culture, as noted by Karl Malenfant:
On the HQD side, we now needed people who understood the applications, who understood the
processes, who were able to decide on the best tool to manage the processes that interested us […]
That meant that there were now people around 24/7 who understood the business side. We’d never
had that before. As soon as you get users establishing system parameters, then they have to be the
ones to modify those parameters when the system rejects them […] There were HQD people with
pagers and computers at home acting as production support in the middle of the night.
By preserving leadership of the project and by relying on assistance from an outside company, HQD
was able to develop expertise that guaranteed the longevity of both the old and new systems. A
transition support centre was established with a mandate to manage the legacy systems until they
were taken offline in 2006. The centre also looked after new systems once they were stabilized,
meaning about three months after implementation. At the end of the project, in 2007, the transition
centre became HQD’s internal CIS centre of expertise (CESSIC). This local centre of expertise dealt,
of course, with DSI’s CIS centre of expertise. When business processes needed to evolve, this was the
team that planned and monitored projects, redefined processes, established software package
parameters and managed organizational change. In order to do so, it had to work with DSI’s centre of
expertise on everything related to the impact of these new functionalities on technological factors.
When Karl Malenfant looks back on all of this change, he is proud of the IT management path taken
by HQD. The CIS project is proving that the new division-based IT model and partnership with the
SSC work. He is aware, however, that there is still much to do. HQD and the SSC were successful in
organizing and implementing a major project, but now is the time to reflect on what will follow. How
does one ensure the leadership necessary to allow the system to continue to evolve? What structure
needs to be put into place, which competencies need to be acquired in order to develop and optimize
all of the system’s user and support aspects? How does one achieve the flexibility required given
existing paradigms and unions? How can the partnership with the SSC, as experienced during the CIS
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec
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project, be turned into a model? Through this project, HQD established significant technological
leadership and helped define a new kind of partnership with the SSC. How will Hydro-Québec’s
other divisions react to this new IT management model?
2010-06-21
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Appendix 1
Hydro-Québec’s six main divisions
Hydro-Québec is currently organized into six main divisions:
Hydro-Québec Production: Hydro-Québec Production generates electricity and sells it
to distributors through firm contracts or through trading on the spot market. Hydro-
Québec Production leases transmission capacity on high-voltage power lines from Hydro-
Québec TransÉnergie in order to ship electricity to distributors, be they Hydro-Québec
Distribution or foreign distributors.
Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie: Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie is responsible for operating
the electricity transmission system. Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie leases capacity on its
high-voltage lines to electricity producers, particularly Hydro-Québec Production.
Hydro-Québec Distribution: Hydro-Québec Distribution distributes electricity to
Quebec consumers. Hydro-Québec Distribution has a network of low- and medium-
voltage lines that supply Quebec’s residences, companies and industries with electricity.
HQD must purchase electricity from a producer (Hydro-Québec Production or a private
producer) and guarantee distribution in line with customer requirements. Hydro-Québec
Distribution also bills customers for electricity consumption.
Hydro-Québec Équipement: Hydro-Québec Équipement is responsible for the
construction and refurbishment of generating stations and transmission lines. Such
projects are generally very large and are carried out, for the most part, for Hydro-Québec
Production and TransÉnergie.
Hydro-Québec Pétrole et Gaz: Hydro-Québec Pétrole et Gaz is responsible for all
activities related to the pipeline transmission of gas and for developing Quebec’s oil and
gas potential.
Hydro-Québec Technologie et développement industriel: The mission of Hydro-
Québec Technologie et développement industriel is to lead the field in energy innovation.
Hydro-Québec Technologie et développement industriel is responsible for all activities
related to innovation: from research and its promotion to industrial development, by way
of venture capital investment.
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Appendix 2
SSC Organization Chart (June 8, 2005)
Shared Services Centre (SSC)
IT Operations (DETI)
Office Automation Systems
Telecommunications and Service Networks (DTRS)
Transportation Services
Accounting and Document Management
Material Management
Procurement
Eastern Territories1
Western Territories1
IT Solutions (DSI)
Real Estate Management
Note 1: The Eastern Territories and Western Territories units are
responsible for managing customer relations.
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec
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Appendix 3
HQD Processes Affected by the CIS Project
Financial processes
Billing
Receipt
Collection
Technical processes
Readings
Monitoring
Supply
Customer processes
Customer service
Management of responsibilities
Claims and complaints management
Sales
Contract management
Shared processes
Delivery management
Correspondence management
Document management
Workload management
Information management
Information Resource Management at Hydro-Québec
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Annex
Acronyms
CESSIC Customer Information System Support Centre – both Hydro-Québec Distribution
and DSI each have their own CESSIC.
CRM Customer Relationship Management (customer relations management software)
SSC Shared Services Centre
DSI IT Solutions
HQD Hydro-Québec Distribution
IS/U Industry Solutions/Utilities
R/3 Name of the software purchased by Hydro-Québec Distribution and used for the
CIS project
SAP SAP is the company that developed the R/3 software purchased by Hydro-Québec
Distribution
CIS Customer Information System
IT Information Technology
Modules/Module2/The Alcan Case – Part A.pdf
© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 007 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 7 Issue 2
May 2009
Taking on the Challenge of IT Management in a Global Business
Context: The Alcan1 Case – Part A2, 3
Case prepared by Professors Line DUBÉ, 4 Carmen BERNIER
5 and Vital ROY
6, 7
Montreal, March 2006. Robert Ouellette, an IT consultant and engineer by training in his early
forties, has just accepted the position of Vice-President 8 of Corporate Information Technologies
(IT) at Alcan. His first mandate is to prepare a full report on IT management methods at Alcan.
The IT governance model has not been reviewed in several years, despite Alcan’s many
acquisitions and diversified worldwide activities.
Alcan: A Truly Global Enterprise
Alcan, 9 whose head office is in Montreal (the Maison Alcan is located on the corner of
Sherbrooke and Stanley streets), has 68,000 employees and operating facilities in 61 countries.
The enterprise has four major business groups (Primary Metal, Engineered Products, Packaging
and Bauxite & Alumina) that generated annual revenues of the order of US$23.6 billion in 2006.
The groups contribute fairly equally to revenues, 10
except for the Bauxite & Alumina group,
whose contribution is much greater (see Figure 1).
1 This case reflects the situation at Alcan in the summer of 2007. 2 Translation from French of “Relever le défi de la gestion des TI dans un contexte d’affaires mondial : Le cas d’Alcan –
Partie A,” case deposited under number 9 65 2009 004. 3 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship. 4 Line Dubé is a Full Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. 5 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. 6 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. He is also Director of the
HEC Montréal Case Centre. 7 The authors wish to thank Robert Ouellette for his generous availability and invaluable cooperation throughout the entire
preparation of this case. All quotes used here are translations of excerpts of interviews with Mr. Ouellette during the summer of
2007. We also thank HEC Montréal for its support through its Strategic case-writing workshop designed to encourage the
production of major case studies for teaching purposes. We are also grateful to all workshop participants, whose judicious input
helped us to prepare a better teaching resource tool. 8 Title used by Alcan 9 Data are taken from: Alcan (2007). Alcan Corporate Overview, www.alcan.com 10 Source: Alcan (2006). Annual Review, www.alcan.com
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
© HEC Montréal 2
Alcan creates and sells a wide variety of products, including bauxite, smelter-grade alumina,
sheet ingot, extrusion billet, wire ingot, forging stock, beverage can sheet, automobile iron,
aluminium recycling services, fabricated products such as wire and cable, and flexible and
speciality packaging, just to name a few. Like all major players in its sector (see Appendix 1).
Alcan is highly vertically integrated. The company owns eight mines and deposits, seven alumina
refineries and seven speciality alumina plants, a transport network that includes port and rail
facilities, 26 aluminium smelters, 12 electric power plants, 17 laminated product plants,
49 engineered product plants and 180 packaging material plants (see Appendix 2).
Figure 1
Income Distribution by Business Group
34%
30%
7%
29%
Primary Metal
Engineered Products
Packaging
Bauxite and Alumina
IT Management: The Current Situation
The position of Director – Corporate IT has been vacant for almost a year (since April 2005).
During that time, pressure has been mounting to improve corporate leadership in the area of IT
management and to participate in a significant cost-cutting exercise across the company’s support
functions. This situation has pushed Alcan’s senior management to give greater priority to
information technologies: the company has therefore decided to create the position of Vice-
President – Corporate IT reporting to Michael Hanley, Executive Vice-President and Chief
Financial Officer (see the organization chart in Appendix 3).
Thus it was that Robert Ouellette joined Alcan in January 2006 as Vice-President – Corporate IT.
He was no stranger to Alcan, as he had done various consulting jobs for the company as part of a
large international consulting firm. He knew he would be facing a serious challenge.
During the interview process, I realized that the role hadn’t really been clearly defined. I explained to
my future superior that I was less interested in the solely corporate aspect of IT, since the bulk of IT
activities were carried out within the business groups. I explained that I intended to get involved in all
the IT files I judged to be important, at both the business group and corporate levels. We agreed on
that right away. The way I see it, the IT function should be managed as a coordinated function across
the entire company.
In the past, based on a culture of decentralization, responsibility for IT at Alcan had always been
shared among the various business groups. Apart from certain basic services like networking and
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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message handling, Alcan’s IT management system was highly decentralized. Every business
group was completely independent, with its own strategic IT plan, infrastructure choices based on
its specific needs, and IT applications and services. Each group had its own IT organization that
pursued its objectives based on the group’s needs and orientation. Groups’ needs, like their
activities, were highly diversified. Over the years, this culture of autonomy had been reinforced
by mergers and acquisitions.
Our IT people have never been asked to agree or cooperate with each other: their mandate has always
been to meet the specific needs of their own business group.
Robert was fully aware that this context was not propitious to his vision of IT management and
the way he intended to carry out his new role, but he had the advantage of being on a first-name
basis with many of the people who managed IT services within each of the business groups.
The day I took the position, I called each of the IT managers in all of the business groups. Thanks to
my consulting work, I had become pretty good friends with some of them over the years. I knew
them all well, except for the IT leader of the Packaging group, who had just joined the team.
Administratively speaking, none of these IT resources reported to him. So, in the beginning, he
acted like an internal consultant, getting involved in all the important and/or problematic IT files.
He took advantage of the fact that his role wasn’t clearly defined to create one for himself and
take it from there.
If push came to shove, I knew that the CFO had a lot of credibility in the organization, and that I
could count on his support if drastic measures had to be taken.
So he got moving.
One of the first things Robert did was to analyze IT costs. He actually had already questioned his
boss, Michael Hanley, on the total amount invested in IT services at Alcan. Since IT activities
were so decentralized, he expected a very approximate figure; instead, he received a very precise
answer:
“Alcan spends $200 million on IT.” I was surprised that he could give me an answer so quickly, but I
told him that, unfortunately, that was impossible given the lack of a global cost overview. I was sure
that it was closer to somewhere between $275 and $300 million. After all those years of consulting
for Alcan, I knew that if costs really were in the order of $200 million, the system would have come
down around our ears long ago. The phone would have rung off the hook! Because of the
fragmentation of systems, infrastructure and resources, we would never have had sufficient capacity.
But when I told him that, he immediately said, “That’s impossible! There’s no way we spend
$300 million on IT.” So that’s when I said, “Look, I can’t prove it to you today, but I’m going to do a
detailed analysis.” I knew it was important that his perception of things be realigned before I could
move on to do what I wanted to do.
Shortly thereafter, Robert came back with the amount he had verified: about $295 million
annually! An in-depth analysis showed that IT costs were documented in several places at the
local level. Within a single business group, for example, since IT human resources did not all
report to the same IT unit, the result was a wide variety of methods of recording those costs. In
certain cases, Robert noticed that IT costs were included in the groups’ operating expenses, thus
ending up in cost of goods sold. These disparate practices were keeping head office from getting
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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a complete picture of the real IT expenses. The $200 million figure from the CFO was accurate…
in terms of what made its way to senior management. But there was another $100 million that
was flying under the radar. Robert and his boss agreed that “whether we like it not, that money’s
spent!”
Robert reflected on the issues underlying the current situation. Not only was it virtually
impossible to identify the actual amount the organization was investing in IT, it was equally
impossible for IT governance at head office to set and monitor priorities. His first task would be
to put IT management in order at every level across the entire organization.
A 360° diagnosis
Robert observed that the management and use of information technologies at Alcan was
excessively complex. Over the years – particularly the last five – the company’s multiple
acquisitions had created a diversified, fragmented IT environment that had had a negative effect
on the effectiveness and efficiency of business processes. For example, Alcan had to work with
over 1,000 information systems, over 400 of which handled financial data. “To tell you the truth,
we’re still counting!” In addition to the heroic manual effort required to produce financial and
management information, this technological mish-mash made the management and application of
government regulations (like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example) much more costly. Many
major IT initiatives were underway in the various business groups, including several projects to
implement the SAP integrated software package, without any apparent intergroup coordination.
When I arrived, we realized that there were three major SAP implementation projects going on in
various places throughout the organization. When you look at them separately, it doesn’t seem like a
big deal, but together they represented an investment of $500 million. Three mega-projects like that
put enormous pressure on resources. There’s a limit to SAP expertise, after all.
In addition, IT projects and initiatives that affected processes that were common to the four
business groups (finance and procurement, for example) were inadequately coordinated.
Evaluation of project risk, including planned transformations, seemed insufficient. And, finally,
internal expertise (including SAP, project management and management of service level
agreements) appeared inadequate, given the scope of the projects currently underway in the four
business groups and at head office.
The Corporate IT 1 function: an overview
At the time of Robert Ouellette’s hiring, about 900 people worked in IT at Alcan, both in the
business units and at head office. Since the company was also a major consumer of IT services,
however, about 80% of its total annual IT budget was spent on outside services from consulting
and outsourcing firms, as well as on equipment and software. In March 2006, the Corporate IT
function, in whose organization Robert was particularly interested, was made up of a total of
136 resources spread over 12 different sites (see Appendix 4).
The structure of this group (see Figure 2) was based on five sectors of responsibility: the groups
in charge of corporate applications (financial and other), the Architecture Planning group, the
1 Term used by Alcan.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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Information Systems Solution group, the Infrastructure Planning group and the Shared
Infrastructure Services group.
Figure 2
Organization Structure of the Corporate IT Function (Source: Corporate IT – 1
st Month Assessment, April 2006, acetate 21)
The groups concerned with the development and support of corporate applications
(financial and other) included 14 resources divided among Montreal, Paris, Singen and Zurich.
These resources were extremely disparate with no centralized management. According to
Robert’s analysis, this group showed no sign of any form of coordinated leadership for corporate
financial applications. Consequently, there existed no overall architecture for those applications.
Various supply strategies were used for project delivery and application management, and there
was no consolidated overview of needs and requests. Since the competencies of this group were
not aligned with current projects, there was no option but to resort to outside expertise.
The Architecture group consisted of three resources with highly technical skills (Web
technologies and middleware) that corresponded to those of the Infrastructure Planning and
Shared Infrastructure Services groups. This group was therefore not equipped to take full
responsibility for all the layers of architecture of applications and information management.
The Information Systems Solutions group was made up of 60 resources distributed among five
different cities: Voreppe, Paris, Warmley, Neuf Brisach and Issoire. Primarily SAP-oriented
(project delivery and application management), this group focused mainly on the needs of the
former Pechiney and the major SAP implementation project in the Engineered Products group.
VP Corporate IT R. Ouellette
Infrastr . Planning C. Fraser
IS Solutions K. Taylor
Other Corp S. Robert
FFinance - Zurich W. Thiers
Finance - Paris
- P. B
Infrastr . Shared .
M. Hanley
IT Controller Assistant M - F.
Architecture K. Taylor
Vice-President – Corporate IT
Infrastructure Planning
Information Systems Solutions
Other corporate applications
Financial Applications Zurich
Financial Applications Paris
Financial Applications Montreal
Infrastructure Shared Services
Executive Vice-President and
Chief Financial Officer
IT Controller Assistant
Architecture
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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The Infrastructure Planning group had 16 resources in six different sites: Montreal, Chicago,
Voreppe, Kingston, Warmley and Saguenay. This group was primarily involved in planning
improvements to the technological infrastructure and the technical architecture design for new
applications. This group’s skills corresponded to those of the Architecture and Shared
Infrastructure Services groups.
The Infrastructure Shared Services group had 40 resources located in six different sites:
Montreal, Chicago, Voreppe, Paris, Warmley and Singen. This group was responsible for the
operation of the common infrastructure components, such as global network, e-mail and data
processing centres. It also provided workstation support and collaboration tools.
This fairly convoluted structure clearly illustrated the challenges of IT management in a context
of multiple acquisitions and incomplete integrations over the previous decade. Following the
acquisition of Pechiney, for example, Alcan found itself with two infrastructure groups. Since the
groups had not been integrated at that time, the situation still existed. Because of their recognized
skill in operations, Pechiney resources were assigned to that area; Alcan resources were
redirected towards infrastructure planning. The result was that former Alcan people did the
planning and former Pechiney people put those plans into execution – which led to difficulties in
coordinating efforts, a lack of skill and knowledge (particularly in the area of planning), and a lot
of generalized frustration for IT management within each of the business groups. So Robert
decided to complete the integration process, letting five people go, some of whom had been with
Alcan for 20 years. This daring move provided convincing evidence that senior management was
fully committed to the new orientations of IT management, marking the beginning of the
definition of the new global organizational structure of IT management at Alcan.
First results
A few months after his arrival, Robert noticed the first signs of some promising developments.
The first was that IT services, as well as the institution of shared services, were now on senior
management’s list of priorities. Also, a few business groups were making efforts to reduce
system diversity: the Engineered Products and Packaging groups had adopted an SAP strategy.
Significant progress was also being made in standardizing and consolidating the IT infrastructure,
particularly with respect to global network and e-mail.
A more in-depth analysis of IT management processes revealed, however, that a major
transformation was called for. Despite Alcan’s many acquisitions, the IT governance model had
not been revised in several years, with the result that IT services were still being managed like
separate fiefs. For the same reason, the funds allocated to IT were systematically under-
evaluated, with little indication of their business value. How could an accurate picture of IT costs
within the organization be obtained? Without being able to track real costs, how could Alcan
know if it was getting a fair return on its IT investments? Moreover, since certain infrastructure
costs (premises, for example) were not charged to IT, how could an accurate idea of the costs of
services offered internally be obtained for the purposes of comparative analysis? This type of
under-evaluation was also preventing management from making informed, fair decisions on the
outsourcing of certain services.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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There also seemed to be a problem with respect to internally available skills, which were
sometimes insufficient and poorly aligned with needs. IT competencies were not identified,
evaluated or compensated in the same way by the various business groups, and competency
deficiencies were palliated by outside resources, consultants or contract workers. Robert also
noticed that, in the case of several projects, Alcan had abdicated its leadership responsibility –
and control – of its IT resources:
There were outside people who did it for us – to the point that when we wanted to understand what
was happening at Alcan, we were dependent on outside consultants to tell us. It didn’t make any
sense.
Finally, Robert’s evaluation showed that the management of IT projects lacked rigour. Several
projects had been delivered late or over budget.
In this context, what would be the ideal characteristics and advantages of a new IT organization
and governance model at Alcan?
2010-06-21
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
© HEC Montréal 8
Appendix 1
Some Background on the Aluminium Industry
In 1889, Charles Martin Hall had just discovered and patented a new, inexpensive procedure for
extracting aluminium from bauxite and alumina. With a group of industrialists, he founded the
Pittsburgh Reduction Company, which was renamed the Aluminum Company of America in
1907 (Alcoa, 2002). Alcoa’s operations took off during the Second World War, when the demand
for aluminium for aircraft skyrocketed. To support the war effort, the American government
constructed a series of aluminium smelters whose operation it entrusted to Alcoa. By the end of
the war, the company had a virtual monopoly, accounting for 60% of all the aluminium produced
in the United States.
Alcan appeared on the scene in 1902 as a Canadian subsidiary of the Pittsburgh Reduction
Company. Initially called the Aluminum Company of Canada (ACOC), it became a wholly
independent company in the early 1950s (Alcan, 2003). This transformation was the result of a
decision by Manhattan’s Federal Judge John C. Knox on a celebrated antitrust case that pitted
Alcoa against the U.S. Justice Department (Time Magazine, 1950). In the post-war period, the
sale of government-owned excess production capacities of aluminium sparked heated debate,
which led to the U.S. market being split among three major players: Alcoa (50.9% of total
production), Reynolds (30.9%) and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (18.2%). In his
judgement, satisfied with the level of competition, Judge Knox refused to allow Alcoa to be
broken up, but ordered it to dispose of its Canadian holdings in the sector, as its Canadian
subsidiary had become the second-largest company in the sector. Alcoa thus relinquished its title
of ownership to Aluminum Limited, which became the parent company of Alcan, the name it had
taken in 1944.
The years that followed saw strong growth in Alcan’s processing capacity as the company
pursued aggressive expansion in many countries, including Australia, Britain, Brazil and India.
During this period, Alcan targeted vertical integration by investing in bauxite mines and alumina
plants in Africa, Brazil and Australia. During the 1980s, Alcan merged with British Aluminium
and made a series of acquisitions, including the Alusuisse Group Ltd., and created Alcan Taihan
Aluminum Limited in Korea to serve the vigorously expanding Asian market. In 1987, Alcan
merged with its parent company and chief operating unit Aluminium Limited to become Alcan
Inc.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s had a disastrous effect on the global aluminium
market. To compensate for a perilous financial position, the annual production of the former
Soviet Union went from about 250,000 metric tonnes to 1.2 million tonnes. The market was
glutted, resulting in an enormous downward pressure on prices, which plummeted from $1.65 a
pound in 1988 to as low as 53¢ a pound in 1993 (Binet, Guiard and Jaclot, 2000). To make
matters worse, the global recession seriously depressed the entire aluminium industry.
In reaction to this major market decline, all of the industry’s major players were forced to revise
their growth strategies, which sparked a spate of consolidation and restructuring as each tried to
trim its operating costs and boost their plants’ energy production (Funding Universe, 2007). The
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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first major transaction was the absorption of the independent producer Alumax by Alcoa in 1998,
followed by buyout of Reynolds in 1999. At almost the same time, Alcan acquired Alusuisse,
VAW Flexible Packaging (FlexPac), Baltek and Uniwood/Fome Cor. In 2001, Alcan joined a
Chinese joint venture and acquired France’s Pechiney, thereby gaining access to an electrolytic
process reputed to be the best in the industry.
The aluminium sector is highly vertically integrated. This is primarily because, at a technical
level, the processing of bauxite (aluminium ore) and alumina is very sensitive to the chemical
properties of the raw material, requiring case-by-case adjustment. Since very high production
capacities are needed to reach a break-even point and electrolytic processes are extremely energy-
consuming, companies must have access to stable, abundant, inexpensive supplies of energy
(Binet, Guiard and Jaclot, 2000).
The beginning of the new millennium saw a major market recovery with rapid economic
expansion (and increased demand for aluminium), particularly in Asia and Western Europe.
Since then, global production of primary aluminium has risen steadily at an annual rate of 4.5%,
reaching 31.8 million tonnes in 2005, for a production increase of over 35% since 1999.
World consumption of aluminium exceeded 44 million metric tonnes in 2005, representing an
annual economic activity in the order of US$300 billion. Aluminium is lightweight, strong, heat
conducive, corrosion resistant and infinitely recyclable, making it indispensable to a wide range
of semi-finished goods – laminated, rolled, extruded, drawn, cast and forged products – that are
subsequently transformed into finished products (consumer goods) for such markets as
transportation, construction, packaging, electricity, engineering, machinery and equipment.
In this new business context, North America has to import close to 975,000 tonnes of aluminium
every year to satisfy domestic demand. Quebec aluminium smelters are highly competitive,
however: at $1,090/tonne, it is more economical to produce aluminium in Quebec than elsewhere
in the world, where the average cost is US$1,370. In August 2007, the global market price of
aluminium reached US$2,520 per tonne, its highest level in the previous ten years (Industry
Canada, 2005).
Bibliography
ALCAN (2003). “Jalons de l’histoire,” www.alcan.com.
ALCOA (2002). “It all starts with dirt: The making of aluminum at Alcoa,”
http://www.alcoa.com/global/en/about_alcoa/dirt/pdf/startswithdirt.pdf, ( Consulted
November 5, 2007).
BINET, E., R. GUIARD and E. JACLOT (2000). “Les fusions Alcan-Péchiney-Algroup et
Alcoa-Reynolds,” École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris.
FUNDING UNIVERSE (2007). “Alcan Aluminium Limited,”
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Alcan-Aluminium-Limited-
Company-History.html. Consulted November 5, 2007.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
© HEC Montréal 10
INDUSTRY CANADA (2005). “Canadian aluminum industry technology roadmap: The
Canadian aluminum industry,”
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/pm-mp.nsf/eng/mm01826.html, (Consulted November 5,
2007).
TIME MAGAZINE (June 12, 1950). “Victory for Alcoa.”
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
© HEC Montréal 11
Appendix 2
Alcan’s Global Activities (Adapted from presentation at the CIO Executive Summit – December 2006, acetate 6)
Legend
Bauxite & Alumina
Primary Metal
Laminated Products - America and Asia
Laminated Products - Europe
Engineered Products
Packaging
Head Office and other offices
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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Appendix 3
Alcan Organization Chart – 2007
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part A
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Appendix 4
Personnel by Location – Corporate IT function (Source of data: Corporate IT – 1
st Month Assessment, April 2006, acetate 22)
Location Management* Financial
applications (Montreal, Paris and
Zurich)
Other
corporate
applications
Archi-
tecture
IS
Solutions
Infrastructure
planning
Infrastructure
shared
services
Total
Montreal 3 3 6 9 6 27
Chicago 2 1 3
Voreppe,
France
3 23 2 21 49
Paris 1 30 4 35
Warmley,
England
1 1 7 9
Neuf
Brisach,
France
5 5
Issoire,
France
1 1
Kingston,
Ontario
1 1
Saguenay 1 1
Singen,
Germany
2 1 3
Zurich,
Switzerland
2 2
Grand total 3 6 8 3 60 16 40 136
*The Management group includes the Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer (Michael Hanley), the
Corporate Vice-President, IT (Robert Ouellette) and the IT Controller.
Modules/Module2/The Alcan Case – Part B.pdf
© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 008 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 7 Issue 2
May 2009
Taking on the Challenge of IT Management in a Global Business
Context: The Alcan1 Case – Part B2, 3
Case prepared by Professors Line DUBÉ, 4 Carmen BERNIER
5 and Vital ROY
6, 7
Montreal, January 2007 – After ten months as Vice-President of Corporate Information
Technologies (IT), 8 Robert Ouellette was appointed Chief Information Officer at Alcan. After he
assumed his new function in March 2006, he conducted a detailed analysis of the IT situation at
Alcan and proposed a major shift in the way the company managed its IT services. The current IT
governance model, which had not been revised for several years, was now totally outdated. IT
services were managed like separate fiefs: each business group had its own IT strategy and its
own model for financing initiatives.
IT Management in a Global Business Context: A Plan for Alcan
“We need to move from a culture of decentralization to a culture of distributed collaboration.”
As Vice-President, Corporate IT, Robert Ouellette had begun outlining the future of IT
management at Alcan. His priority was to build a solid, competent team that could give him the
support he needed. In the absence of clear direction and a specific mandate, the IT management
team was floundering. He identified the key people within the organization, and then added some
new collaborators from very different backgrounds. Of the eight people on his IT management
1 This case reflects the situation at Alcan in the summer of 2007. 2 Translation from French of “Relever le défi de la gestion des TI dans un contexte d’affaires mondial : Le cas d’Alcan –
Partie B,” case deposited under number 9 65 2009 005.
3 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship.
4 Line Dubé is a Full Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
5 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
6 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal. He is also Director of the
HEC Montréal Case Centre.
7 The authors wish to thank Robert Ouellette for his generous availability and invaluable cooperation throughout the entire
preparation of this case. All quotes used here are translations of excerpts of interviews with Mr. Ouellette during the summer of
2007. We also thank HEC Montréal for its support through its Strategic case-writing workshop designed to encourage the
production of major case studies for teaching purposes. We are also grateful to all workshop participants, whose judicious input
helped us to prepare a better teaching resource tool. 8 Term used by Alcan.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
© HEC Montréal 2
team, four were new recruits to Alcan. The team’s first challenge was to build cohesion, develop
a common vision and find effective ways of working together. This groundwork was needed to
set up a solid management team that would be able to provide support for the major projects that
would transform the organization.
Robert decided that the next step would be to identify and formulate the main management
principles that would guide the entire reorganization of the IT function at Alcan (see Figure 1).
The management team established principles based on value added (business value), the
importance of human resource development, reduced diversity in the technological park,
economies of scale, reuse, purchase of software packages, and infrastructure management. These
principles were integrated into strategic planning and coloured all decisions and actions taken.
Figure 1
Alcan IT Principles (Source: Alcan IT Strategic Plan 2008-2010, v1.1b, June 11, 2007, acetates 39-40)
The IT management team then prepared a blueprint for the new orientations in IT management.
This first strategic general IT plan was focused on a tight alignment between IT and the business
strategy and the creation of a shared service centre. This plan, which was submitted in the spring
of 2007 and developed in cooperation with all business groups, including the IT group at head
office, established and communicated a common vision of IT management enterprise-wide.
Equally important, this new plan laid the foundations for applying the shared-services philosophy
that was endorsed by Alcan but never fully implemented. According to this new method, the
management of services that were common to all business groups would be done by a central
organizational unit supported by internal billing mechanisms. In the case of IT services, as well
as financial services and human resources, this centralization of shared services would promote
economies of scale, shared competencies, consolidation, standardization, reuse and low-cost
access to expertise. Before such services could be set up, the activities to be integrated first had to
be determined and the roles and responsibilities of the various stakeholders (the central IT
function, the shared service centre and the business groups) in managing IT services redefined.
In addition to creating shared service centres, the new strategic plan demonstrated IT senior
management’s desire to better integrate IT services with corporate strategies. The plan proposed
to set up a governance structure that would clearly identify the stakeholders’ role in IT
1. We are innovative and proactive in the use of technology to enable, deliver and
sustain business value.
2. We continually develop our people, our skills and our competencies.
3. We reduce diversity, complexity and leverage economies of scale.
4. We make information reusable, shared, protected, consistent and compliant.
5. We reuse before we buy; we buy and integrate before we build.
6. We manage infrastructure like a utility: secure, reliable, standard, available and
at best cost.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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management, reduce technological diversity and complexity, develop preferred partnerships with
global service suppliers, and continuously improve information security. In concrete terms, it
would define and develop an effective corporate architecture and technological infrastructure
capable of meeting the changing needs of each of the business groups while continuing to support
legacy systems. The strategic IT plan formalized Alcan’s desire to repatriate the management of
its IT services and obtain the necessary tools to manage them on a global basis.
Alcan senior management, satisfied with the proposed IT orientations and the results obtained in
such a short period of time, recognized the need to coordinate the activities of the various
stakeholders affected by the implementation of shared services (IT, finances and human
resources). It was for that reason that, in January 2007, the new Vice-President IT was appointed
Alcan’s Chief Information Officer, making him responsible for global IT management and the
coordination of shared-service activities.
The governance model for IT management and implementation
The new distributed collaboration model that Alcan wanted to implement would put an end to the
unchallenged autonomy of the business groups and require a new governance structure (see
Figure 2). This new structure clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder, in
particular, the role of the central IT group and of the business groups in achieving the objective of
global IT management.
In this model, the CIO was directly responsible for his management team (at the top of the
organization chart in Figure 2) and shared services (at the bottom). Senior IT management thus
consisted of the CIO and his four main associates: the Enterprise Architecture Director, Chief
Information Security Officer Director, Performance Management Director, and Strategic IT
Programs Director. The Corporate IT Director reported directly to the new CIO. At the bottom of
the chart are the two shared service centres (one for Infrastructure and the other, for Application)
that also reported directly to senior IT management.
In the centre are the IT Directors of the various business groups. Under Alcan’s usual
decentralization policy, each group had its own IT director/VP (the titles varied depending on the
group) who was responsible for IT management within his group and accountable solely to his
group’s head management. Under the new governance model, the four IT directors/VPs report to
the head management of their group (75%) and also to the CIO (25%). This change alone
constituted a veritable revolution in IT management at Alcan. It meant that, in addition to the
mandate of their business group, IT directors were now responsible for achieving the company’s
global objectives. IT directors/VPs retained control of local IT management, but used shared
services for delivery of common services. The shared service centres now acted as outsourcers or
internal consultants for the business groups.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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Figure 2
New IT Governance Structure (Source: IT Shared Services Overview, September 19, 2007, acetate 3)
In addition to establishing internal functioning, it was also necessary to redefine the authority
structure that connected the various groups within the IT function as well as outside of it in order
to create greater cohesion between Alcan’s business objectives and the strategic technological
objectives (See Figure 3).
Chief Information Officer
Corporate
IT Director
Bauxite & Alumina and Global IT –
Pacific Region IT Director
Directeur TI
Primary Metal
IT Director
Engineered Products
IT Director
Packaging
IT Vice- President
Enterprise Architecture
Director
Performance Management
Director
Strategic IT Investment
Programs Director
Chief Information Security Officer
Director
Infrastructure Shared Services
Application Shared Competency Centre
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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Figure 3
New Governance Structure for IT Management at Alcan – Decision-Making Bodies (Source: Adapted from Alcan IT, The Power of Partnership, IT Governance, v1.2, August 13, 2007, slide 20)
Members Frequency
E x
ec u
ti v
e C
o m
m it
te e
President and Chief Executive Officer of Alcan
Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer
Executive Vice-President – Corporate Development and Chief Legal
Officer
Senior Vice-President – Human Resources
Senior Vice-President – Investor and Corporate Relations
President and Chief Operating Officer – Engineered Products
President and Chief Operating Officer – Primary Metal
President and Chief Operating Officer – Packaging
President and Chief Operating Officer – Bauxite & Alumina
Annually
A u
d it
C o
m m
it te
e
Made up of a number of members of the Board of Directors
Semi-
annually
IT C
o u
n c il
(I T
C )
President and Chief Operating Officer – Engineered Products
Executive Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer
Chief Information Officer
Quarterly
IT L
ea d
er sh
ip
C o
m m
it te
e (
IT L
C )
Chief Information Officer
Director – Infrastructure Shared Services
Director – Application Shared Competency Centre
IT Director – Bauxite & Alumina
IT Director – Primary Metal
IT Vice-President - Packaging
IT Vice-President – Engineered Products
IT Director – Corporate
Bi-monthly
The CIO is ultimately accountable to the CFO. At least once a year, the CIO met with the Alcan
Executive Committee to report on his operations. To support him at the senior management level,
an IT Council was created, made up of the CIO, a President representing the business groups
(currently the President of Engineered Products) and the Chief Financial Officer. All ideas
advanced by the CIO were discussed by this council before being presented to the Executive
Committee. The IT Council met four times a year.
To ensure the business groups had a platform and hear what they had to say, Robert also created
the IT Leadership Committee, which brought together the IT Directors of the business groups and
shared services twice a month in order to take stock of current initiatives and better plan for
future projects. All irritants were duly noted, solutions identified and, when possible,
implemented. Finally, twice a year, IT senior management met with the company’s internal Audit
Committee, the group with the final say on rules and processes governing the production and
presentation of financial information. This committee assessed IT risk management, particularly
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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with respect to best internal control practices dictated by legislation and regulatory bodies (such
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example), and those ensuring business sustainability and
continuity (backup plans for critical applications, for example). The committee drafted
recommendations as needed and monitored their implementation.
The major orientations of the IT strategic plan
It’s always the same debate; there’s no such thing as the perfect model. It’s a question of balance: if
you’re too centralized, you lose contact with the day-to-day reality of your operations. If you’re too
decentralized, you gain in terms of operational performance, but you lose in global efficiency.
Effective management is a balancing act.
In addition to developing management principles and instituting a new governance structure, the
strategic plan defined priorities for the coming period.
So, in accordance with the shared service vision, services used by all the business groups would
be centralized and provided by shared service centres. According to Alcan executives, this
strategy would promote the development of expertise, connections among projects, optimal use
of specialists, reuse, negotiations with suppliers, standardization of practices and norms, and
generalized economies of scale. While supporting the individual and ongoing development of the
business groups without disrupting their activities, the implementation strategy was aimed at
progressively shifting responsibilities, applications, infrastructure, personnel and processes to the
shared service centres.
At the core of the plan was senior management’s desire to regain control of its outsourcing
strategy, which was monopolizing a large part of its budget. In the past, faced with mismatched
and poorly managed internal teams, large consulting and tech firms simply assumed leadership.
A new IT management team and major restructuring of activities combined with global skills
development encouraged Alcan to take back control in this area. Internal teams would now be
mandated to reflect, plan and make important choices affecting IT organization. Suppliers would
work with an internal team that was more experienced, more demanding and more competent –
not just in terms of content, but partnership management as well. In order to disrupt daily
operations as little as possible, these changes were implemented progressively as service
contracts were renewed, new people were hired and employees’ competencies improved through
training.
The first strategic IT plan affected four priority areas: (1) creation of an enterprise architecture,
(2) management of the technological infrastructure, (3) management of applications, and
(4) management of IT investments.
1. Creation of an enterprise architecture
One of the new Vice-President’s first mandates was to organize the enterprise technology
architects. “It was total chaos. There was no coordination between the near/offshore groups
whose operations significantly affected the others. The whole thing needed to be reorganized.” So
Robert hired a new Enterprise Architecture Director with the mandate to design the standardized
technologies and practices on which all new development within the company would be based.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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The new director identified the enterprise architects currently working for the company, analyzed
their competencies, and created seven new positions to be filled on his team. Three high-potential
architects were identified and transferred to the team.
The new team’s first task was to identify the common technological objectives of the major
projects that were currently underway. Then, based on its findings, the team drew up a list of
fourteen priority foundation blocks. With a view to reducing technological diversity and
standardizing methods, these blocks represented elements used by more than two business groups
that were pertinent to the uniformity of future applications and those currently being developed ‒
in other words, common platforms or applications on which future technological developments
would be based. These blocks included, for example, Information Exchange Infrastructure,
Enterprise Portal, Document Management, Identification and Access Management, Business
Intelligence, Knowledge Management, and Web Services Platform. The team began by focusing
on the blocks that IT Management considered to be the most urgent: Exchange Infrastructure and
Enterprise Portal. In addition to outlining the main concepts with respect to technologies,
standards and norms, and determining prices and responsibilities, the team was also mandated to
provide the technological solution for each block.
An example: one of the important aspects of the Information Exchange Infrastructure block was
data exchange in an SAP environment. Due to the ever-growing number of independent SAP
implementations in the various business groups, there was already extensive diversity in the ways
the groups organized data transfers (in-house products, various supplier platforms and SAP
platforms) between modules, between modules and the outside, and between modules and other
Alcan systems. This exponential increase in work methods required a growing number of
skills… and suppliers. After analyzing the problem, the architecture team selected one platform
(the original SAP product) and developed the necessary standard tools for data transfer. All future
applications and those currently being developed would then be required to integrate the standard
tools into their interfaces.
The leadership of this team, reporting to IT senior management, was located in Montreal. Team
members based in Montreal and Voreppe (France) worked closely with Infrastructure Shared
Services and the new Application Shared Competency Centre. Once a block had been defined,
developed, tested and was ready to be used by the groups, its management would be transferred
to one of the two shared-service centres, depending on the domain it most directly affected.
2. Technology infrastructure management
Alcan’s technology infrastructure was imposing, to say the least. With an annual budget of close
to $76 million, there were 400 sites to be linked, six major data processing centres to be
managed, 3,000 servers and 31,500 PCs (including almost 9,000 laptops) to be maintained,
almost 30,000 voicemail boxes to be managed and 3,700 support calls/month to be answered!
The result was unprecedented diversity and an overabundance of partners.
Although the vocations of the business groups were different, their needs in terms of technology
infrastructure were relatively comparable. According to the Chief Information Officer:
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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The infrastructure was the easiest thing to repatriate to a shared-service centre because the groups’
needs were very similar. Everyone wanted a network, a message handling system, data processing
centres, servers and workstations. And they wanted them to perform well, be reliable and not cost
much to run.
In 2003, following the Pechiney acquisition, Alcan had already started to implement an
infrastructure standardization plan, but the strategic plan wanted to go farther. “From an
infrastructure point of view, it was easy. We just had to consolidate and standardize what we’d
started.” The objective was to reduce the diversity and complexity of the technological
installations by standardizing the networks, servers and workstations. To do that, we created
Infrastructure Shared Services.
Naturally, we had to sell the idea to the business groups, but once Primary Metal, one of the major
groups, finally agreed, everyone else didn’t have much choice but to get onboard. As far as we were
concerned, Primary Metal was our point of no return. Once they were in, we were committed.
They started with the network, which was extremely complex. Successive acquisitions had left
the company with clusters of interdependent sites. For access purposes, several sites were linked
to the master site, which was linked to another master site, which finally provided access to a
core network. Service on these networks was provided by various suppliers: although big names
in the sector (MCI, Bell, Equant and Vidéotron) played a major role, there was a plethora of
small, local suppliers as well. As acquisitions and sales multiplied, so did the clusters ‒ to such
an extent that the company was forced to deal with major network instabilities. The removal of
even one of the links in the network could have unpredictable consequences that were difficult to
control: “It was like trying to manage a game of pick-up sticks!”
Less diversity affected not only technology, but also the suppliers with whom the company did
business. IT senior management started by negotiating a contract with a single supplier for the
network: Orange Business Services (part of the France Télécom group), that offered services
worldwide through various partnerships. Since nothing is ever simple, however, Alcan also had
to negotiate with Telstra, which had virtual monopoly in Australian telecommunications, in order
to provide service in that territory, which was not served by Orange Business Services. Once
these agreements had been reached, Alcan progressively transferred all its sites to the new
network. Based on the same line of reasoning, the message management contract was awarded to
IBM, which managed the system from its sites in Toronto and Montpellier (France).
The data processing centre situation was even more complex. Alcan’s six data processing centres
were operated by as many companies: CGI in Saguenay, IBM in Toronto, CGI in Montreal, T-
Systems in Paris, and T-Systems and HP in Germany. Even if Robert wanted to move quickly to
consolidate some of these centres, contractual obligations prevented him from doing so without
paying heavy indemnities. The agreements, which remained in effect until 2009, had to be
respected.
As far as the data processing centres were concerned, there was no point in rushing into things.
Waiting until 2009 to do the changeover gave us time to plan a global strategy, find the best partner
and prepare a solid transition plan. Everything had to be done without affecting the groups’
operations, which was no easy task.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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According to the CIO, the ideal solution would be to use only two data processing centres for the
entire organization. This would reduce complexity without overly increasing system
vulnerability, as each centre could be the mirror site of the other.
With the aim of regaining control of activities (even outsourced activities), a team was set up
within the Infrastructure Shared Services group in Voreppe, France. The 78 people in the group
were basically repatriated from the business groups. To better meet local needs, IT senior
management also set up regional groups in Voreppe, Montreal, Saguenay, Shanghai and,
eventually, Brisbane (in Australia).
Before, we were just managing contracts. It didn’t take long, however, before things exceeded our
people’s technological expertise and they no longer had the capacity to understand what they were
managing. So we rebuilt a team of specialists. Now, not only could we manage our contracts, but we
could also plan our needs, better evaluate performance, solve problems with our partners, and work
toward the global development of our infrastructure. Once again, we were running the show.
To effectively manage all its activities, the Infrastructure Shared Service group set up the
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), which it then used to identify best
practices in IT infrastructure management and operations. Drawing its inspiration from ITIL, the
centre managed its support services by technical domain and its service delivery by process. The
result was improved performance and better control of service quality. In France, the group took
first prize at the 2006 IT Service Management Forum for the excellence of its ITIL process
implementation, coming in ahead of such industry giants as Airbus, Carrefour and GE Capital.
3. Application management
Like everything else, all the information systems were planned, created and maintained within
each of the business groups. Several SAP platform initiatives were going on at the same time:
these parallel operations on the same technological platform created enormous pressure on the
organization’s competencies in this area. Each of the projects used SAP variants, which increased
the complexity, required wider expertise, and complicated transfers and information reuse, as
well as updates and future implementation of new versions. This problematic diversity was not
limited to these specific projects, but found its way into almost all the applications used at Alcan.
There were, for example, over 400 different applications for financial management alone. Apart
from making it virtually impossible to access information easily, this diversity significantly
increased application management costs (in terms of maintenance, operations, training, updates,
etc.). Technological diversity also entailed the management of multiple partnerships.
In order to reorganize global application management, IT senior management created the
Application Shared Competency Centre with the aim of consolidating everything related to the
development, creation, delivery, maintenance and monitoring of applications under one
management. According to this model, everything connected to the management, planning and
analysis of needs remained under the auspices of the business groups (all administrative
applications, including generic SAP applications). Then, when they were ready for technological
development, the Application Shared Competency Centre took over. The idea was to repatriate
critical mass applications to the Application Shared Competency Centre and leave those used for
the specific needs of one group with that group (MES applications). “It had to make economic
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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sense.” Given the diversity of the business groups, it was considered preferable to let each one
consolidate the management of its MES applications.
While the transfer of the infrastructure to Infrastructure Shared Services was relatively
uncomplicated, the same could not be said for the applications.
The infrastructure was seen as a commodity. As far as the groups were concerned, if someone could
provide them with the same service at a lower cost and they didn’t have to worry about it, great.
Applications were another story altogether. The groups reacted immediately, afraid that if they
relinquished the development of their applications, they would lose control of their systems. This
phase entailed a lot of very long discussions with group senior managements.
Instead of playing the heavy and imposing the change by decree of senior management, Robert
decided that it would be wiser to proceed by increments. He gradually organized the central
management of applications until it became indispensable. This strategy worked well with the
business groups: since they were quite independent at a technological level, they grew to
appreciate the opinion and expertise that centralized management could give them.
You have to remember that I was relatively new to the scene as well; I didn’t have answers to all the
questions. It wasn’t as if the applications centre was completely functional. The basic principles were
easy to establish, but in terms of day-to-day operations, we had to start from the ground up.
Proceeding step by step allowed us to develop and implement methods so that we could test and
refine them.
After negotiating with the business groups, it was agreed that the maintenance of several
applications, including those being developed on the SAP platform, would be repatriated to the
shared application centre.
Although many people thought this was an odd decision, I personally believe that we tend to
underestimate the importance of maintenance in organizations. To achieve effective maintenance,
you have to know your systems and business processes inside out. You have to build relationships
with all your key people.
The central group thus began to assume control of maintenance, quickly adding the supervision
of all new SAP initiatives. As the legacy applications were integrated into the SAP platform, new
applications were placed under the responsibility of the shared competency centre. “It was a
gradual, painless transfer.”
The Application Shared Competency Centre was a centre that used the services of offshore
resources. Service in the Americas was provided out of major centres in Montreal and Chicago,
where there were 17 internal people and 55 outside consultants and contract workers. A similar
group based in Voreppe and Gennevillier (close to Paris) provided services for the rest of the
world. This group consisted of 73 internal people and 53 outside consultants and contract
workers. Finally, as for infrastructure, several tasks related to development, testing, maintenance
and surveillance were outsourced. IT senior management opted for a hybrid model: “nearshore”
(neighbouring countries) and “offshore” (overseas countries). Thus, a great deal of work was
done in Accenture centres in Bratislava (the capital of Slovakia) and Hyderabad (in India). The
company had chosen to maintain a site in Europe to facilitate communication with the Europeans,
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
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who were often less comfortable working in English, and to work in a common (or similar) time
zone, all based on an attractive cost structure. Accenture decided where the work would be done.
Alcan started by making an agreement that promised a certain result at a given price. As far as I was
concerned, Accenture could have part of the work done in China if they felt like it. I just wanted to
make sure that users could be served in English, French or German.
The purpose of this shared competency centre was to obtain a global overview of the company’s
information systems, make the most use of people’s competencies and encourage reuse.
We just finished a project! We took an SAP model that contained basic modules that came from
Tomago 1 Aluminium in Australia. Then we transferred it to Voreppe
2 so we could migrate to a new
version of SAP using a mixed team from Voreppe and Accenture consultants in France and India.
The model was then implemented at Sohar Aluminium, in the Sultanate of Oman, 3 by a mixed team
from Sohar, Voreppe and Accenture in Bombay. Alcan owns 20% of Sohar Aluminium. Finally,
through our Application Shared Competency Centre, we signed a five-year contract with Sohar to
support their new system. An Accenture centre in Hyderabad, India, actually that looks after that. To
get that contract we had to bid on the support project just like any other outside supplier.
Even if Alcan’s IT function did not identify itself as a service supplier for outside companies, this
collaboration underlined Alcan’s interest in the affairs of Sohar Aluminium.
Since Alcan had chosen SAP for its basic technological platform, this meant that, over the long
term, all new initiatives would be managed like an SAP integrated development project. Alcan
wanted to migrate to a global template that could standardize architecture while proving the
necessary flexibility to meet the needs of all of the business groups.
When companies say that they run on SAP, you’d think that they would be integrated and be able to
exchange information easily. Nothing could be further from the truth! Generally speaking, the SAP
instances they’ve implemented are so different that it’s as if, at the central level, they had installed
completely different systems.
The plan therefore provided for the migration of all current SAP instances, as well as all the old
legacy systems, to this new platform. A team of specialists would look after the new
implementations and could work in collaboration with local teams. This migration would have to
be carried out without disrupting any of the business groups’ activities. A detailed
implementation plan for this objective had yet to be drawn up.
4. IT investment management
There was no doubt that all this reorganization of IT management stemmed from Alcan’s need
for greater IT management visibility. All major projects that affected more than one entity or
concerning central services in one way or another could no longer be carried out independently.
Under the direction of strategic investment programs, therefore, IT senior management set up a
1 Tomago is a city on the east coast of Australia, about 164 km north of Sydney.
2 Voreppe is a city in southwestern France, just north of Grenoble.
3 The Sultanate of Oman is a small country (population 2.3 million) in the Middle East, on the southeast coast of the Arabian
Peninsula. It borders the United Arab Emirates on the northwest, Saudi Arabia on the west and Yemen on the southwest. It is
the site of large oil reserves that provide energy for Sohar’s aluminium smelters.
Taking on the challenge of IT management in a global business context: The Alcan case – Part B
© HEC Montréal 12
strategic project office to closely monitor all IT projects valued at $2 million and over. The office
would evaluate project proposals to ensure that methodologies (planning, risk management,
control and follow-up plan, etc.) were respected. Although the operational management of these
projects would remain under the responsibility of the business groups, the project office would
keep a very close eye on all major projects.
To orchestrate the management of IT projects, the plan also made provisions for global
management of IT human resources. Alcan wanted to harmonize position titles, competencies
and roles, and to establish global succession plans, etc. in order to make the best use of the
competencies of the teams already established worldwide.
Robert reflected on his accomplishments. He had covered a lot of ground in just over a year! The
plan was ambitious, but the objectives were sound and the potential benefits, significant. He had
the ear and the support of the Executive Committee. The shared-services concept had gotten off
to a good start in the area of infrastructure management and integrated application development
management. The good relationships between the CIO and the business groups (the result of
Robert’s ten years as a consultant), the credibility and experience of the new central IT team, and
the results obtained to date convinced the business groups to get onboard. When Robert arrived,
the central IT group had often been the last to find out about IT initiatives in the business groups.
Now, the groups were more proactive, asking the competence centres for assistance in planning
their IT projects. It must be said, however, that the changes to date had affected only the least
controversial aspects (of IT services). The global implementation of the new IT management
philosophy would entail even greater changes in uncharted territories. The transformation of the
former Pechiney IT group had raised a great deal of concern because of the requirements of
French labour laws. How would the organization and senior management react? What about the
business groups? Ever the skilful strategist, Robert was planning the next steps. What new
challenges awaited the CIO in implementing his new IT management model?
2010-06-21
Modules/Module4/103940ERP Story (A).pdf
© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 009 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 4 Issue 1
March 2006
An ERP Story:1 Background (A)2, 3
Case prepared by Professors Carmen BERNIER 4 and Vital ROY,
5 as well as
Éric BRUNELLE 6
Business Context
In 1950, when the general insurance company Aux Bons Soins (ABS) was in its early days, it
offered a full range of general insurance products for individuals residing in the province of
Quebec. Over the years, Canada has seen a consolidation of its general insurance industry. Three
years ago, ABS acquired the insurance company General Maritime Protection, serving Eastern
Canada. Last year, ABS seized an opportunity to conquer Western Canada’s market by acquiring
Western General Insurance in Calgary. These acquisitions positioned ABS as a major pan-
Canadian insurer. To date, these three companies have continued to function autonomously.
Six months ago, management at ABS announced that it was bringing these three original
companies under a single legal entity to form ABS Canada. Jean Roberge was appointed Vice-
President of Information Technologies Management and was mandated to develop a strategic IT
plan. During the annual strategic planning meeting of the management committee, held recently
in Calgary, all of the committee members were pleased to see that the company and its two
subsidiaries were in a good position to plan an aggressive strategy for sales growth. This is the
context in which Jean Roberge recently presented a three-year strategic plan for the development
of information systems and technologies.
The plan, developed by a team of internal collaborators from the three original companies with
the support of consultants, was officially presented and approved at the annual management
meeting held in Calgary in March 2009. The main recommendation of the plan is to provide ABS
Canada with an integrated management system and processes that could be shared by the three
constituent entities for financial management, human resource management as well as sales and
1 This case was produced with the support of the Programme de parrainage professoral CGI and the Fonds de développement
pédagogique HEC. The authors would like to thank the evaluators for their valuable comments.
2 Translation from French of “Histoire d’ERP : le contexte (A),” case deposited under number 9 65 2006 005.
3 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship.
4 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
5 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
6 We wish to thank Jean-François Jutras for his collaboration in the writing and layout of the text.
An ERP Story: Background (A)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 2
marketing management. In particular, the team of experts that worked on the IT plan recommend
the acquisition of the ABC software package – specifically, the modules for finance and
accounting, human resources and sales.
Current Systems and Processes
Since the reorganization of the three original companies under the new company ABS Canada,
each company has continued to operate with its own information processes and systems.
Gradually, the controllers and vice-presidents of finance of each entity began to consider how
they could consolidate the accounting aspects and financial statements of ABS Canada. Similarly,
the vice-presidents of human resources met several times to begin harmonizing human resource
management policies and practices. Currently, a great deal of manual work is required to extract
information from the systems of the various companies and to prepare consolidated management
reports that provide an accurate picture of the financial and human resources of the new ABS
entity. As for sales and marketing, efforts to consolidate data have proved very difficult due to
the diversity and quantity of information available in the respective systems of the three original
companies.
The development of a strategic IT plan led to an analysis of the current situation and a discussion
of the desired situation for the new ABS Canada entity. In terms of information systems, the
following observations were made:
Element Current problem Desired situation
Applications Incompatible in terms of
functionality and architecture: no
possibility of data exchange
between systems;
Redundant applications and non-
optimal maintenance of various
systems based on different
technologies.
Identical functionalities for all
ABS components and integrated
applications that enable data
exchange;
Simplification of system
maintenance and architecture in
order to group original IT
functions into a single IT function
and achieve better management
of costs, expertise and use of IT
potential.
Data The definition of data differs
according to the original company (for
example, the customer identification
data retained is not the same in all of
the systems).
Consistent and accessible in real
time.
Interfaces Differ according to the application and
the original company.
Similar for all applications,
facilitating employee mobility.
An ERP Story: Background (A)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 3
In terms of business processes, the following observations were made:
Element Current problem Desired situation
Accounting
and financial
processes
Processes are specific to the
operations of the three original
companies.
Harmonization of accounting and
financial processes:
standardized end-of-period
processing;
accelerated processing cycles by
eliminating duplication and
manual verification;
consolidation of the three
companies into one in accordance
with provincial and Canadian
regulatory requirements;
reports for tactical and strategic
financial management rather than
purely operational.
Human
resource
management
processes
Processes are specific to the
operations of the three original
companies. Moreover, the two
acquired companies’ processes are
inefficient due to their obsolescence
and strictly operational style. The
strategic vision of HR management
as a company asset is not part of the
current processes, which make little
use of IT potential.
Harmonization of HR management
processes:
redefining the human resources
management approach of the new
ABS entity;
adding activities such as skill
management, skill development
and mobility;
improving process efficiency.
Sales and
marketing
management
processes
Processes are specific to the
operations of the three original
companies and correspond to a local
vision of the market.
Harmonization of HR management
processes involving:
creating an integrated marketing
vision for the new ABS entity;
improving process efficiency by
increased use of Web potential.
The Decision to Launch the IMSP Project
In the conclusion to his presentation of the IT strategic plan to the management committee, Jean
Roberge stressed the unique potential of an integrated management system for the development
of ABS Canada. He pointed out that managers at all levels as well as senior management could
track in real time the financial and marketing progress of the growth plan for the entire company,
from both a cost and profit perspective. Moreover, this system enables proactive decision-making
An ERP Story: Background (A)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 4
that takes into account the company’s global financial picture as well as its human resource
potential, which are key to the success of any service-oriented company.
Therefore, decision-makers can and must concentrate on the more lucrative activities or those
that are the most important strategically in terms of short- and medium-term growth. Lastly, a
shared management system for marketing initiatives and financial and human resources will
enable the implementation of a more efficient mode of operation by promoting better use of
expertise throughout the company. The forecasted financial benefits of the project are reduced
operating costs in the order of 10%, which could be achieved at the end of the second year
following implementation of the new system. The total cost of the project is evaluated at
$50 million spread out over the duration of the project, estimated at 24 months. A vanilla
implementation strategy is planned, which means minimum changes to the software package (if
possible, no changes at all) and standardization of the processes of the new ABS entity, based on
the processes inspired by best practices and proposed by ABC. Moreover, the system would be
delivered in three phases: 12 months for the finance, accounting and auditing module; 18 months
for the human resource module; and 24 months for the sales and distribution module.
On the basis of these advantages and this vision of IT aligned with business objectives, the
management committee that met in Calgary unanimously approved the recommendation to
launch the Integrated Management System and Processes (IMSP) project.
Back in Montréal, Jean Roberge is very pleased with the support of the management committee.
From his perspective, the potential of an integrated software package will pave the way for the
true integration of the information systems and technologies at ABS Canada. This will make it
easier for him to re-engineer the main management systems (finance/accounting, human
resources, marketing) of the three companies, while preserving specific applications that give the
company a clear competitive edge. In fact, interfaces can be developed between ABC’s modules
and the company’s legacy systems that the company wishes to preserve. Moreover, this
technological renewal includes a systematic review of various disparate, and sometimes obsolete,
processes, in favour of better business practices. This exercise should lead to real progress in the
company’s practices, both in terms of its business practices and skills. This will help ABS to
maximize its IT potential so that it can do business throughout Canada and North America.
With the adoption of a new integrated software package, Jean Roberge is aware that the IT
function he is managing is profoundly changing his role, from the development of applications to
the flexible and rapid delivery of technological software solutions. The IT professionals at ABS
are concerned about the change in direction of the IT department. Jean Roberge believes that
these changes in the nature of the IT function will present several new challenges. Already hard
at work in his new functions, he knows that he cannot manage the ERP project single-handedly
despite its importance for the company. He must quickly find a project leader who has the skills
and experience to lead such an important project.
The Search for a Project Manager
Jean Roberge understands the enormous importance of ABS Canada’s first major IT project. Its
success is crucial in order to establish his credibility as a manager and in his new IT function.
An ERP Story: Background (A)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 5
Selecting a project leader is therefore extremely important. For Mr. Roberge, the ideal candidate
for this position should master the ABC software package and have excellent knowledge of the
systems being replaced and their functionalities. This candidate should also be able to exercise
his or her authority over the project team and have enough experience managing large-scale
projects to stay within the budgets and schedules set out by management.
Aware that the company does not have all the skills needed to take up the challenges that lie
ahead, Mr. Roberge has asked François Caron, from the firm GTI, a preferred supplier of ABS
for 10 years, to meet with him. Mr. Caron is a seasoned consultant who has been the technical
expert, analyst and project leader on several development and implementation projects of
financial and insurance systems over the last 20 years. He is currently the vice-president of
business development at GTI and has been in charge of the ABS Canada account for six years.
He regularly meets with the IT manager of ABS to discuss the company’s changing needs as well
as IT trends in the insurance industry. He asks Luc Martin, an expert in the delivery of ABC
solutions, to join him for the meeting with Jean Roberge.
The following afternoon, Jean Roberge presents the new IT direction of ABS Canada to François
Caron and Luc Martin. He discusses in more detail the urgent need to find a suitable project
leader for this major IMSP project. Jean Roberge believes that the IT function should assume
ownership of the project, since the proper technical functioning of this complex software package
will ensure its success. Moreover, he expects that the software package will be implemented
within the set timeframe and budget. With regard to employee adaptation to the new system, he is
confident that an effective and well-targeted training plan will allow employees to quickly
understand the system and resume their productivity.
This is not the first time the company is introducing a new information system. Employees expect to
have to change the way they do their work since the three companies are being merged into one.
However, the main change will be a new software package that users will have to learn.
In terms of project management, Jean Roberge stresses the fact that management expects
compliance with the set budget and schedule. He hopes that the project leader will prioritize the
quality of the product and effective management of its development. Since the project team
should, in his opinion, be comprised primarily of IT specialists, a homogeneous team like this
will require a project leader with extensive technical knowledge. Moreover, if the project is to
stay on schedule, Jean Roberge considers it crucial that the project leader exercise firm authority
in order to quickly resolve any conflict between the parties involved in the project. Lastly,
Mr. Roberge plans to lend strong support to this project as he has always done for other IT
projects, well aware that proper follow-up and a lot of technical support will be needed to ensure
the project’s success.
He asks François Caron to recommend three qualified candidates for the management of the
IMSP project.
The next day, François Caron and Luc Martin meet to discuss their meeting with Jean Roberge.
They discuss his expectations and examine the following points:
An ERP Story: Background (A)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 6
Questions:
1. What are the project’s main characteristics and challenges identified by Jean Roberge?
2. In your opinion, does the project have other characteristics or challenges that Jean Roberge
did not identify that should also be taken into account?
2010-06-14
Modules/Module4/103941ERP Story (C).pdf
© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 011 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 4 Issue 1
March 2006
An ERP Story:1 Troubles Ahead (C)2, 3
Case prepared by Professors Carmen BERNIER 4 and Vital ROY,
5 as well as
Éric BRUNELLE 6
Troubles Ahead
After choosing the candidate with the most experience with the ABC software package, the
Integrated Management System and Processes (IMSP) project at ABS Canada is launched.
Within weeks, however, unexpected difficulties gradually begin to arise. The project manager’s
first action is to establish an action plan with the IT department based on specific deliverables.
But this plan immediately creates controversy because several members from functional
departments, particularly finance and accounting, feel excluded from the outset. As a
representative from the finance department explains:
I know that this project is very important for the company, but I am convinced that ABS will lose out
in the end if we insist on delivering a product that doesn’t address our main problem, which is finding
better ways of working.
Later on, the project manager bluntly informs users that their business processes will soon be
turned upside down to allow the company to adapt to the system. A representative of the users
involved in the project has this complaint:
The only thing that matters to him is that we respect delivery times. He doesn’t take into account
personal considerations. Regardless of whether or not the needs of users are being met optimally, the
project manager insists on focusing on the technical implementation of ABC.
Several of the managers responsible for functions affected by the project feel that the project
manager is focusing his efforts on ensuring that the tasks of the project plan are executed as
quickly as possible, without showing any real concern for business processes. Moreover, team
1 This case was produced with the support of the Programme de parrainage professoral CGI and the Fonds de développement
pédagogique HEC. The authors would like to thank the evaluators for their valuable comments.
2 Translation from French of “Histoire d’ERP : difficultés à l’horizon (C),” case deposited under number 9 65 2006 007.
3 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship.
4 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
5 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
6 We wish to thank Jean-François Jutras for his collaboration in the writing and layout of the text.
An ERP Story: Troubles Ahead (C)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 2
members do not appreciate the project management style. “I’m discouraged and I feel paralyzed
in my work because I am constantly writing progress reports,” explains one member of the team.
After three months, the managers responsible for the functions affected by the project confirm
that the project manager has gotten swept up in political games that have prompted him to favour
ABS’s IT group.
These managers are beginning to think that ABC may be the wrong choice since it does not meet
their needs and the credibility of the IT department is being put to the test, including
Mr. Roberge. Despite this, the ABC experts have reiterated their message to function managers
and management that the many R/3 configuration options in addition to changes in the
company’s processes can have a significant impact on the evolution of business practices and
efficiency at ABS. A confrontation between the user groups and the IT function seems inevitable.
Mr. Roberge knows full well that this situation is jeopardizing the project. He also thinks that the
current project leader is not effectively managing the various dimensions of the project. Faced
with this situation, he is feeling a great deal of pressure from management at ABS. He decides to
take the weekend to evaluate the situation and decide on the future of the project.
Questions
1. Offer your own analysis of the situation to Mr. Roberge to help him pinpoint the main causes
of the difficulties of the project.
2. What should Mr. Roberge do now? Propose two possible solutions and present their
respective advantages and disadvantages.
2010-06-14
Modules/Module4/103942ERP Story (D).pdf
© HEC Montréal 2010
All rights reserved for all countries. Any translation or alteration in any form whatsoever is prohibited.
The International Journal of Case Studies in Management is published on-line (www.hec.ca/revuedecas/en), ISSN 1911-2599.
This case is intended to be used as the framework for an educational discussion and does not imply any judgement on the
administrative situation presented. Deposited under the number 9 65 2010 012 with the HEC Montréal Centre for Case Studies,
3000, chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3T 2A7.
Volume 4 Issue 1
March 2006
An ERP Story:1 Epilogue (D)2, 3
Case prepared by Professors Carmen BERNIER 4 and Vital ROY,
5 as well as
Éric BRUNELLE 6
Epilogue
Over the next few days, the current project leader is replaced by André Gagné, a candidate who
has studied accounting and has a master’s degree in information systems, in addition to solid
experience in the insurance industry. He has also managed several systems development projects
involving integration of information technologies and business process review.
The project leader’s main concern is to restore the project’s credibility and win the confidence of
the project’s team members as well as of the users and management. He reorganizes the project
team into multidisciplinary teams in charge of formulating solutions for each of the problems
identified by the project, while respecting the established project plan, budgets and calendars as
well as the constraints of the company. Each of these teams includes technical and management
experts as well as experts from each of the business units involved. Once this reorganization is
underway, André Gagné organizes an orientation meeting, followed by an evening cocktail hour
for all of the members of the project and the users involved.
A few weeks after the arrival of the new project manager, there is still apprehension about the
changes to come among the staff of the various business units affected by the project. The most
serious rumours are about the number of layoffs that will result from the implementation of the
new software package, the process review and the reorganization of tasks. André Gagné requests
and obtains the budgets needed to offer future users intensive information sessions on the
potential and features of ABC. He also gives users a more active role in the project: they are
made responsible for reviewing their business processes. As for ABS’s technical experts and the
1 This case was produced with the support of the Programme de parrainage professoral CGI and the Fonds de développement
pédagogique HEC. The authors would like to thank the evaluators for their valuable comments.
2 Translation from French of “Histoire d’ERP : épilogue (D),” case deposited under number 9 65 2006 008.
3 This project was made possible thanks to funding from the CGI Professorship.
4 Carmen Bernier is an Associate Professor and Director of the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
5 Vital Roy is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information Technologies at HEC Montréal.
6 We wish to thank Jean-François Jutras for his collaboration in the writing and layout of the text.
An ERP Story: Troubles Ahead (C)
Copyright © HEC Montréal 2
ABC supplier, their responsibilities evolve into the role of consultants who propose configuration
options that meet the needs of users.
Twelve months later, André Gagné and his team go live with the new information system at ABS
Canada. The project team and management at ABS are now confident that the new information
system will be used and will represent a major evolution in the company’s business practices.
While most of the team members are exhausted due to long hours spent on implementing the
project, they are all eager to move on to new challenges.
For the consultant, the time has come to carry out the project post mortem. François Caron
reviews the performance evaluation document that his client Jean Roberge has just submitted.
The second project leader has successfully met the challenge and exceeded the client’s
expectations. He is now getting ready to complete his report that will summarize the main points
of the project and the lessons learned.
Question:
Jean Roberge and François Caron wish to document the key elements that led to the success of
the ABS project. They ask you to prepare a synthesis report of these factors.
2010-06-14
Modules/Module3/The water's magic.pdf
Teaching case
Raise your glasses – the water’s magic!
Strategic IT at SA Water: a case study in
alignment, outsourcing and governance Alan Thorogood1, Philip Yetton2, Anthony Vlasic1, Joan Spiller3
1Australian Graduate School of Management, UNSW, Sydney, Australia; 2CORDS Limited, Sydney, Australia; 3Welsearch Limited, Melbourne, Australia
Correspondence: A Thorogood, Australian Graduate School of Management, UNSW, Sydney, Australia. Tel: 61 2 9931 9249 Fax: 61 2 9662 7621 E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract The South Australian Water case study illustrates the management challenges in aligning Information Technology with business objectives in a publicly owned corporation. To achieve the alignment, the new CIO begins by refreshing the IT infrastructure to support the required business applications. When the Government establishes ‘Improved water quality’ as a major corporate goal, the CIO seeks to add value to the business by developing a quality reporting system that leverages the existing technology. At the same time, he demonstrates to the corporation the IT function’s capability to deliver business value through the management of multiple outsourcing vendors. Journal of Information Technology (2004) 19, 130–139. doi:10.1057/palgrave.jit.2000017 Published online 13 July 2004 Keywords: outsourcing; strategy; project management; governance; government
Introduction
S outh Australian Water (SA Water) is responsible for the secure supply of quality water to Adelaide and the world famous Barossa Valley vineyards. Much of
South Australia is the Great Sandy Desert and the largest river, the Murray, is both shrinking and unpotable. SA Water addresses this challenge through an internationally recognised water-testing laboratory.
Historical context Water delivery is an ancient technology, which changed little until the introduction of electric pumps. It has always been more economical to lay one large pipe between two localities than it is to lay two smaller pipes. So, water delivery is a natural monopoly and is therefore often government owned or regulated.
Over the years, SA Water had evolved into a vertically integrated government department. In the past, its scope spanned from managing the catchment areas to retail billing and it had its own castings factory to make pipes. At its peak, it employed 6000 people, many of whom had
joined the organisation as apprentices and worked their way up through the ranks.
During the 1990s, the South Australian Government outsourced its IT infrastructure to EDS, privatised some State-owned businesses and corporatised others, including SA Water. After being restructured as a Government-owned corporation, SA Water outsourced the maintenance and operations of Adelaide’s water supply to United Water, a joint venture of Thames Water, Vivendi Water and Halliburton KBR. It also sold the castings business. This reflected SA Water’s goals, which had changed from ‘security of supply’ to ‘efficient security of supply’. More than 4000 employees left, many of them to join United Water.
Business background In the late 1990s, the Government became increasingly concerned with environmental issues and added water quality to the goals. The Government also directed the Corporation to become more customer-focused, more commercial and to develop a vigorous export-focused
Journal of Information Technology (2004) 19, 130–139 & 2004 JIT Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. All rights reserved 0268-3962/04 $30.00
palgrave-journals.com/jit
water industry based on the water-testing laboratory while providing a high-quality water supply.
The Government also appointed a new CEO, Anne Howe. She structured the organisation along functional lines with a separate business unit to manage the water-testing laboratory. In February 2003, the largest functional unit was Water Services, under John Ringham, incorporating Operations, Engineering and Projects, Infrastructure and Retail. The unit worked closely with United Water to implement and monitor projects. The Economic Develop- ment and Procurement function, headed by Jeremy Randell, was responsible for long term planning and directing the multi-million dollar investments that require South Aus- tralian Cabinet approval. (See Appendix A, organisation chart.)
The critical function for this case study was Water Technology, headed by Jack McKean. Through its capital planning capabilities, Water Technology interfaced with Economic Development and Procurement, and via its engineering, it assisted Water Services. The Information Services unit reported directly to McKean. McKean’s group also included the laboratory, called the Australian Water Quality Centre, whose goals and culture are more scientific than operational. The laboratory is located at Bolivar, a 40- min drive from SA Water’s head office in the Adelaide central business district.
Information systems: a new direction SA Water had a history of poor IT performance and, specifically, a reputation for uncompleted projects. This record did not encourage the business to invest in IT and some business units bypassed the IT function. For example, Water Services developed and maintained the SCADA1
system. Also, SA Water did not invest in the Geographical Information System beyond its initial implementation in the 1980 s. Typically, such systems are favoured in utilities.
In 1999, the CEO brought in an external appointee, David Johnston, as CIO. At that time, the IT infrastructure was unable to operate industry standard systems, for example, it could not even support an effective email service. Johnston introduced the concept of business-focused IT and set out to raise the IT profile throughout the organisation. He closed most of the old incomplete projects and proposed and won approval for a major upgrade in IT infrastructure to support the development of new systems in September 2000. A major network upgrade followed. A new email system became available in 2001, followed by a successful widespread upgrade of PCs. This upgrade was not intended to, and indeed it did not, deliver any substantive business benefits. The upgrade built a platform for future value- creating IT applications. The critical next step was to demonstrate that IT could deliver benefits to the business as a whole.
Johnston changed the division’s name to Information Services (IS) and established a goal to ’deliver the right information, at the right time, to the right destination regardless of the location’. To achieve this goal, the CIO publicly stated that IS would need to understand the business more and become business-focused. Under Johnston’s model of IS, the business owns both the information and the systems. His goal was for IS to be a
contributor to the strategic future of SA Water. He continuously told the business that it had power and that it must exercise that power at both the strategic and project levels.
Implementing this repositioning of IS led Johnston to a strategic broker model of selective outsourcing (see Appen- dix B for press coverage of the broker model). Under this model, SA Water’s IS set up Service Level Agreements with external strategic partners, such as Aspect Computing, and with its own internal groups. IS retained the responsibility for risk management and the delivery of business benefits. It drew on external partners to provide much of the IT skills and advice. For the internal staff, Johnston recruited people from industry both to upgrade the group’s competencies and to change the group’s culture. Only the best people from the old IT team survived.
New roles and skills Two new senior appointments focusing on implementation reflected this repositioning of IS. Johnston brought in Chris James to develop relationships with strategic business partners and to act as the account manager, representing IS to the business. James was responsible for managing relationships with strategic partners, primarily Aspect Computing, and for managing relationships with other business units such as the laboratory and Water Services.
Ted Budas managed contract relationships with a focus on projects to deliver business benefits. A small consulting team also headed by Budas looked after new systems development and provided IT consulting services to the business. Budas relied on Aspect Computing, an external vendor, to provide technical development staff.
There were also other key new roles. Paul Rafferty looked after Customer Support, which included the internal Help Desk, and support services from EDS and Aspect Comput- ing. John Gradisar’s Infrastructure unit was responsible for both the computing infrastructure, such as LANs and servers, and telecommunications. Andrew Yates took responsibility for information delivery. Finally, Johnston developed internal Service Level Agreements covering Infrastructure Services, Customer Support and Information Delivery.
Three new organizational structures To support the new direction for Information Systems, Johnson created three new organisational structures. First, a group of senior executives and two independent external consultants met bimonthly as the Information Services Executive Committee. Although the CEO sponsored this meeting, McKean chaired it. The Information Services Executive Committee’s purpose was to focus on business issues and ensure that the top team was committed to and satisfied with the projects delivered on their behalf.
Second, a Project Governance Office was established to ‘provide assistance to business unit managers to maximise the success of y IT projects through the application of endorsed methods, tools and techniques’ (Guidelines for PGO: Internal memo, 2001). Project managers prepared standard project status documents for the fortnightly Project Governance Office meetings.
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Project ‘owners’, along with the external strategic alliance partners, attended the Project Governance Office (PGO) meetings, which Johnston chaired. Johnston made it clear that ‘the PGO does not have authority over individual IT projects. That accountability rested with the business unit owners.’ The PGO advised project managers and identified, investigated and reported on significant variances from plan, particularly time, cost or quality variances. In practice, the PGO dealt with a wide range of issues because it was the corporatewide forum for project managers to discuss issues and share tacit knowledge.
At the PGO, each project manager made a presentation and filed a written report on progress, issues, action to resolve issues and budget variances. During the meeting, people were encouraged to record learnings in the knowl- edge management system. The PGO’s goal was to ensure that all projects used approved methodologies, standar- dised metrics and reports.
Third, each IT project had a Project Board. The boards consisted of the project sponsor, a senior supplier representative (in practice, often a senior member of IS) and one or more users. The Project Board initiated the project, authorised each stage, gave advice, closed the project and conducted frequent project reviews.
PRINCE2 process: adopting a new methodology The methodology adopted was PRINCE2, which is an open standard, first released in 1989 for the UK Government (Office of Government Commerce, 2002). It is now widely used by Australian Government and UK commercial organisations, establishing processes that cross the pro- ject–business interface to enable the business to monitor and control a project.
The Project Board and Project Governance Office were both mandated structures of PRINCE2. Internal and external project managers were required to have received training in PRINCE2. A PRINCE2 consulting company based in Adelaide provided two training courses, an entry- level certification course and an advanced professional course. One SA Water employee had completed the professional training and two others had received certifica- tion. This consulting company also kept SA Water’s PRINCE2 documentation up to date to satisfy the evolving needs of the business.
As part of this process, an intranet-based knowledge management system was available to assist project man- agers. The project manager reviewed this knowledge base before starting a project and was responsible for updating it before closing a project. The Project Governance Office oversighted that process.
Application portfolio There were several key applications at SA Water. The mission-critical IT applications were billing, SCADA and laboratory, with the geographical information system (GIS) scheduled to become mission-critical in the long term, when it become the user interface to most systems. The GIS and billing system were managed by the IS department. The SCADA system remotely controlled and monitored the pumps, valves and sensors throughout the distribution network and catchment area. The system operated in a
stable environment in comparison with the billing and laboratory systems, where complications existed around vendor issues with billing, and reliability issues with the laboratory. Water Services managed and supported the SCADA.
The Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS) was a stand-alone system on its own hardware. This system automated the tracking of samples within the laboratory, allocation of tests to samples, validation of results, interpretation and report generation. SA Water contracted with Aspect Computing to supply IT contractors to support the system. The laboratory supported and managed this system, with assistance from IS.
The Waterscope project: a showcase of IS To integrate the new structure, processes and roles with the business, and to ‘sell’ the changes to business, Johnston wanted a showcase project that would be visibly successful and deliver business benefits. It had to deliver these benefits by leveraging the new technical infrastructure and demonstrating the broker model of outsourcing. The CEO agreed to the showcase concept and a series of workshops produced a short list of three suitable projects. The Waterscope project was selected in May 2001.
Waterscope’s goal was to provide access to timely water quality information needed to manage public health risks, such as the Yorke Peninsula Incident (see sidebar). It would reduce the cycle time between gathering water samples and raising alerts to possible problems, by reducing the impact of the delay before the verified and interpreted test results were available. It would further automate the collection of samples in the field by using barcode-reading PDAs2 and automatically publishing unverified results from LIMS as soon as the results were available.
The Gane and Sarson Data Flow Diagram (Figure 1) shows the intended system design, not all of which was implemented. Data would flow from the collection and testing of field samples (top left hand corner) through to the publication of results on the intranet (bottom right hand corner). Waterscope would retrieve information from LIMS and store it in PDAs for the collectors to take to the field. While there would be some field tests, most of the testing would be done in the laboratory. Waterscope would download the test limits for each sample’s field tests. If the field test were ‘out of bounds’, the collector could raise the alarm immediately. The geographical coordinates of the
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collection points would secure the system. Before the GPS system was introduced, SA Water relied on local employees who knew how to find the collection points.
The collectors would record the results of the field tests and the collection information, such as water temperature, in the PDA, then upload the data into LIMS when delivering the samples to the laboratory. As soon as the results were available, an Active Server Page would publish them on the intranet, clearly marked as unverified, pending confirmation of any out of bounds results. Once a scientist had verified the results, the intranet would reflect the new status.
In July 2001, the Board approved a small exploratory budget, equivalent to less than 10% of the total estimate. With this planning budget, the IS team prepared a business
case. Building the case required considerable business analysis skill and time, which the small IS team could not provide. Using a broker model of outsourcing, SA Water appointed DMR, Fujitsu’s consulting business, on a time and materials basis, to fulfil the role of identifying the benefits and associated costs. By September 2001, the estimated cost had risen by 10% and the project had to be de-scoped, with assistance from Water Services.3 It was then accepted that this was a business project with a technology component, rather than an IS project, and that it would require a large proportion of business analysis work, referred to as Business Intelligence (BI).
Version 1.0 of the business case was developed in late September 2001. SA Water selected DMR as the business
Gather specimens in
the field
PDA’s list of specimen testing points, c/w addresses & limits
Reads bar code from tap
Download test points and GPS co-ordinates for
route
Download
PDA’s list of specimens & field results collectedRecord specimen
Test specimen
Taken back to AWQC
Upload specimens & collected field
results
LIMS specimens & field results import
Specimens
Store in beaker
Initial
Verify abnormals
If required, 2nd
Publish unverified & verified results on
Intranet
LIMS results export
LIMS tests export
Results
Verified
ASP
LIMS
Intranet
GIS
Figure 1 Gane & Sarson Data Flow Diagram of Waterscope.
Table 1 The Waterscope Stakeholders
Laboratory Waterscope would affect the laboratory staff capturing data in the field. In addition, its goal was to publish laboratory results to the whole organisation. This would increase the transparency of the laboratory’s operations while automating its data collection.
Information Services IS wanted this project to be both highly visible and highly successful to prove the abilities of the new IS team, infrastructure and outsourcing model. It was to be a ‘proof of concept’ to encourage support for further IT projects.
Water Services (Operations) Water Services wanted timely access to water quality information in order to repair the system quickly and minimise risks to public health.
Executive Management The CEO’s objectives with Waterscope were to improve the performance of the company with regard to water quality and cost effectiveness and build credibility with the Government.
Aspect Computing Aspect Computing wanted to leverage their knowledge of SA Water systems to become a preferred software supplier.
DMR DMR’s aim was to use the project to bind the vendor-client relationship and become the incumbent Business Intelligence supplier.
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partner to undertake the Business Intelligence (BI) work, and Aspect Computing as the business partner for the Systems Development (SD) team. In addition to the service providers, the main stakeholders represented on the project were the Water Laboratory, Information Services, Water Services and executive management (see Table 1 for more details).
Johnston appointed DMR consultants to the Project Director role and as the Project Manager for the Business Intelligence team. An Aspect Computing Project Manager headed up the Systems Development team. SA Water Services and laboratory staff, along with Marcel Althoff from IS, were appointed to the BI team.
There were some early conflicts between and misunder- standings about the structure by DMR and Aspect. For example, SA Water had to intervene in the Aspect Computing/DMR relationship to clarify the project man- ager’s reporting lines. Effectively, there were two project teams: Aspect Computing’s System Development team of developers and the Business Intelligence team composed of DMR consultants and SA Water managers. The two teams were located on separate floors in the same CBD building. The part-time DMR project director was Melbourne-based and on-site 2 days a week in Adelaide. Most of the users were located at the laboratory in Bolivar, outside Adelaide.
By January 2002, the Information Systems Executive Committee and the SA Water Board had approved the project budget and the project moved into the next phase of the PRINCE2 methodology. In that phase, the SD team received business requirements from the BI team and then constructed functional specifications. Gaining approval for these functional specifications caused friction because the SA Water people had limited time to approve the specifications, some of which ran to many pages, and the SD team needed approval before it could start to write code.
The DMR project manager, initially dedicated to the BI team, was pulled out early in the project’s life to attend to
other business in Melbourne. The BI team subsequently took unofficial guidance from Althoff with some contact with the DMR Project Director. Initially, SA Water Services and the laboratory under-resourced the BI team but corrected this in February 2002. Naturally, there were differences between the Aspect team of system developers and the BI team, but the differing interests and cultures within the BI team also reflected the different roles and interests within SA Water.
The Systems Development team reported directly to an Aspect Computing project manager for its day-to-day work. The Aspect Computing appointment was for delivery according to a fixed, but not detailed, specification. To assist in scoping the features and determining the Aspect Computing workload, the BI team categorised the features into mandatory, desirable and nice-to-have. Aspect Com- puting then estimated their workload based on the mandatory components.
Waterscope project governance Figure 2 shows the Waterscope Project Governance organisation chart.
The Project Board met monthly with Todd Heather chairing the meeting. The Project Governance Office met every week up to August 2002 and then fortnightly. These meetings managed issues such as the lack of development skills and availability of SA Water business people for the BI team. Most notably, senior managers on the Project Board were available to resolve conflicts over which desirable, as opposed to mandatory, deliverables were in scope.
Project challenges Because projects are unique, it is impossible to predict the outcomes with accuracy and this inevitably creates challenges. In this case, these included:
Project Board - John Howard, David Johnston, Roger Perry
Information Services Executive Committee
Project Governance Office
Project Director - DMR (Todd Heather)
System Development Project Manager - Aspect Computing
Business Intelligence Project Manager - was DMR, then
Marcel Althoff
Figure 2 Waterscope Project Governance.
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� A delayed link from the GIS, documented in the January 2002 PGO minutes, caused by unrelated work in a GIS project.
� Problems interfacing with LIMS in February 2002. Neither SA Water IS nor the laboratory understood some of the unusual data structures in LIMS and the quality of the data made it difficult to import into the Waterscope relational database. The initial project- planning phase did not identify this problem and the simultaneous project to upgrade LIMS made it more complex.
� Delays in PDA testing. Dr Jeremy Lucas, from the laboratory, reported that he was unable to perform testing using a PDA for 2 weeks in March 2002 because key people were on holiday. When the PDA became available in April, testing revealed that it could not read the barcodes, because of the placement of the labels on the pipes. The 350 field labels, which had earlier taken 2 weeks to attach, were then replaced correctly.
� Delays in approval processes in April 2002, because of the lack of available business resources.
� Use of unapproved technology, because there was no software architect to vet the technology. SA Water rejected some technology after partial development, which resulted in re-work.
In some cases, luck was in the project’s favour. For example, one of the Aspect Computing people tried scraping off a label and found that the bar codes rubbed off easily. Small changes in printing and ink corrected a fault that only natural ageing would have shown up.
Business outcomes By March 2003, the system had been implemented and was operating. The business people interviewed were satisfied with the functions delivered. Many people were aware of the project and recognised it as a success. The project board did not regard the project as complete; they would close the project only when another project delivered a corporate- wide data replication capability necessary for full function- ality.
Some of the participants felt that, in their experience, the project had cost too much, citing protracted decision- making timelines, with the project director unavailable much of the time; time-consuming reporting requirements for the Project Governance Office; technical inexperience and process incompatibility causing poor productivity in some areas; and higher than expected costs of managing the relationships. However, in the historical SA Water context, project performance had been good, with the project delivering most functionality to agreed budgets. As noted earlier, prior to Johnston’s arrival, IT projects had a poor record of accomplishment.
The PRINCE2 methodology received a mixed reception. Some described it as too ‘heavyweight’ for the project. (There were too many mandatory documents and manage- ment decisions for the size of the project.) Others saw the benefits as greater than the costs. The main issue of contention was the need to prepare detailed briefing reports for the PGO meetings.
Other projects The Works Management System was a major IT application project managed by Water Services. This system was designed to interface with United Water to provide bidirectional inter-organisational links for Works Plans. The project manager attended Project Governance Office meetings and provided updates to the Information Systems Executive Committee but the project did not use the PRINCE2 methodology.
Future plans SA Water had many future opportunities to use IT to benefit the organisation following years of low investment. In March 2003, plans included completing the substantial Works Management System discussed above, major up- grades to the GIS over a 5-year period, and installing a Standard Operating Environment for PCs based on Windows XP. SA Water was also considering a billing system replacement. However, replacing it would be a substantial investment. (For example, in New South Wales, Sydney Water had spent $70.2 million on a new system, which the New South Wales Treasurer acknowledged was ‘likely to be a dud’4.)
Waterscope has also helped to identify additional business benefits that will be low cost to implement with a simple expansion of the system. A Version 2 project may be justified.
Summary SA Water has been reorganised into a Government-owned corporation with clearly set goals, including a focus on water quality. The information systems function fell behind industry standards, but the CIO redirected it, refreshed the infrastructure and introduced the broker model of out- sourcing. He introduced new roles and skills to match the strategy. The Information Services Executive Committee, Project Governance Office and Project Boards all helped to exercise control over information systems projects. The PRINCE2 methodology integrated these new roles and structures. After these changes the Waterscope project was chosen to showcase the new capabilities.
Waterscope aimed to improve detection and rectification of water quality problems. It consisted of two projects teams, the Aspect Computing Systems Development team and the DMR and SA Water Business Intelligence team, which reported to a DMR project director who then reported to the Project Board. The project overcame some difficulties and relied on the new methods and structures to resolve them. Waterscope was recognised as a success with some qualifications.
Questions to guide case analysis
1. After Johnston’s changes, does the IS function fit the organisation and its environment? In considering the answer to this question, you should draw on models of IT structure and fit. In particular, ask how the new initiatives help IS to get closer to the business.
2. Is it the people, the structure, the methodology, the technology, the top team relationship, vendor support or the project management, that is the key to Waterscope’s success? Which of these elements did Johnston empha- sise to bring about improvement, and what risks to high- performance project practice remain?
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3. What important issues does this case raise about IS project governance?
4. David Johnston was headhunted and took up a new role in April 2003. What attributes should SA Water look for in a new CIO and what changes should the new CIO make?
Case study participants
1. MBA students 2. Executives concerned about IS business deliverables.
Notes
1 SCADA systems are used to monitor and control plant status and provide logging facilities (www.foldoc.org).
2 PDA (Personal Digital Assistant): a rugged mobile hand-held computer that operates on batteries for considerable periods.
3 Much of the cost increase came about because the project costing rules changed. Previously, the accounting system did not allocate internal project costs to the project budget. To stay within the budget approved by the Board, the sponsor had to de- scope the project. For example, the SCADA interface that would have shown the status of valves was included in the benefits realization plan and but was specifically excluded subsequently.
4 For more details, see The Australian Financial Review 28 October 2002, ‘Audit of PwC water-billing job’.
References
Office of Government Commerce (2002). Introduction to PRINCE2 –
management overview, http://www.ogc.gov.uk/prince/(accessed 3rd February
2003).
About the authors Alan Thorogood is researching theoretical frameworks to assist management thinking with regard to IT flexibility, outsourcing and project management. In the research, he draws on nearly two decades of wide-ranging global industry experience. He is a PhD candidate in Professor
Phillip Yetton’s Fujitsu Centre for Managing Information Technology and teaches on the AGSM’s Executive MBA and full-time programme. The AGSM awarded his MBA in 2003 with the Australian Business Limited Prize for top academic performance and the Boston Consulting Group Prize for performance in strategy.
Philip W. Yetton is the Commonwealth Bank Professor of Management at the AGSM. He is a graduate of Cambridge, Liverpool and Carnegie-Mellon Universities. His major research interests are in ISD project management, IT strategic alignment, SMEs, strategic leadership, and IT- based strategic change. He has extensive consulting experience in both public and private sectors and is co- author of ‘Steps to the Future’ and has written more than fifty articles published in international journals.
Anthony Vlasic is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Australian Graduate School of Management. His major research interests focus on how organisations and industries can improve business value generated from project-based investments, with a particular focus on information system projects. Prior to joining the AGSM, Anthony worked as a project manager in Australia and Europe.
Joan Spiller is Managing Partner of Welsearch Pty Ltd and combines Board Directorships with consultancy work, particularly in strategy and operations. Consultancy fields include IT services, Bio-tech, Building & Construction, Communications, Health Care, Arts, Education and De- fence.
She chairs the Board of Flower & Samios Architects, and is a Director of several Arts organisations. Past Board Directorships include the Australian Broadcasting Corpora- tion, Victorian Rehabilitation Centre, Monash IVF, Monash Ultrasound for Women, Monash Reproductive Pathology & Genetics, and the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra. Her extensive experience in public sector policy development and operations includes senior executive positions in Health and Communications.
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Appendix A
South Australian Water – Abbreviated Organisation Chart at February 2003
Appendix B
CIO of tomorrow a service broker (The Australian, 26 June 2001)
IT chiefs should get used to outsourcing, Craig Baty says
THE Senate’s Finance and Public Administration commit- tee is reviewing the Government’s IT outsourcing initiative. Whether or not the final findings will praise or damn the outsourcing initiative, Gartner believes that outsourcing, and the use of external service providers in general, will continue to be a viable means of providing services to organisations in both public and private sectors.
Both global and local research leads Gartner to conclude that, by 2002, 80 per cent of enterprises will employ selective IT outsourcing to help control costs, overcome skills shortages and increase the flexibility of labor markets (0.7 probability).
Gartner’s Dataquest division predicts that the Australian IT services market (which includes outsourcing as the major component) will grow at a compound annual rate (CAGR) of 20 per cent from its current estimated 2001 size of $US14.3 billion ($27.5 billion) to $US24.6 billion by 2004, making Australia one of the world’s fastest growing and advanced markets for outsourcing services.
So what’s driving this growth, and what does it mean for the one in the hot seat – the CIO, who is responsible for delivering services?
Driven by an increasingly competitive marketplace and enabled by decreasing unit costs of basic technol- ogies (processors, storage, bandwidth), IT has expanded from a back-room resource providing competitive advantage (cost, time, quality), into a front-office resource (marketing, sales, environmental scan) that is a competitive necessity and essential for the survival of the enterprise.
CEO Anne Howe
Economic Development &
Procurement Jeremy Randell
Water Services John Ringham
Water Technology Jack McKean
Strategy & ChangeSecretariat CFO
Retail
Infrastructure
Operations Roger Perry
Engineering & Projects
Contract Operations
Chief Scientist AWQC Don Bursill
GM AWQC John Howard
Water Engineering Technologies
Information Systems David Johnston
Others including: Capital Planning,
Environmental Management,
Intellectual Property, New Business
Development, Payroll Business
Development Consulting & Projects
Manager Ted Budas
Infrastructure Manager
John Gradisar
Customer Support Paul Rafferty
Information Delivery Andrew Yates
Strategic Alliances Chris James
South Australian Water - Abbreviated Organisation Chart at February 2003
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Change, once viewed as a short period of transition between two longer periods of relative stability, is now a continuous process.
At the same time, the concept of a monolithic enterprise owning all products, services and channels required to address a customer’s needs is rapidly being replaced by strategic partnerships, virtual enterprises and integrated value chains.
This new environment is generating new critical success factors for IT investment. The need to operate in a dynamic business and technical environment is driving the need for technology infrastructures and application architectures that are flexible, maintainable and easy to integrate (while still providing functionality, cost-effectiveness and a timely and secure environment).
The traditional, centralised Information Systems (IS) organisation of past years is rapidly giving way to a more distributed structure.
We call this a role-based organisation because it represents an association of multiple organisational styles and sources that fulfil different roles for the enterprise.
While the IS organisation would not disappear, we do believe its form will change dramatically, encompassing a mix of service organisations, consultants, centres of excellence, resource pools and business liaisons, rather than a single integrated IT function within the business.
Many of the traditional functions of the IS organisation are moving to the business units or to external service providers (ESPs). These various structures can be thought of as organisational tools that need to be brokered and co- ordinated.
This is the chief role of the new IS organisation, and by extension the CIO. In fact, for most enterprises, the new IS organisation will be dramatically smaller and more busi- ness-focused. Total IT employment will continue to grow, but the number of those on the internal payroll may very well shrink, with many staff moving to external service providers.
Gartner expects that by 2002, the primary focus of IT management will shift from operational efficiency and effectiveness to information exploitation and inter-enter- prise operability (0.7 probability) and by 2004, fewer than 30 per cent of medium to large enterprises will maintain a full-service (internal) IS organisation (0.8 probability).
Gartner expects the IS organisation to be a more modular, flexible organisation that will align more closely with the speed of change in the enterprise than traditional structures could. While some enterprises will completely outsource all IT functions, and it is likely more than 85 per cent of enterprises will need some form of an internal IS organisation, albeit significantly changed in size and scope.
The lack of relevant IT skills in the market is driving many of the above changes to the traditional IS role and structure. Enterprises that were once accustomed to having enough IT professionals for every open position are now facing a systemic scarcity of relevant IT skills.
In fact, it is likely the current workforce shortage in many areas (but not all) is a long-term issue that will continue through 2003, as organisations are fundamentally restruc- tured to meet evolving business requirements.
In fact, IS organisations will increasingly focus on strengthening enterprise-specific business and IT manage- ment skills while selectively outsourcing technology-inten- sive external resources to handle operational or short-term activities.
Employment models and workforce values will change dramatically.
Permanent full-time employment will no longer be the standard; IT professionals will insist on continuous learning, opportunities to expand their experience portfolio and the right to request and receive intriguing new types of work.
To accommodate the needs of a changing workforce and organisational dynamics, management styles will have to change.
Treating employees well, paying them fairly, providing meaningful work, tying work to enterprise objectives, broadening work roles and trusting employees, all are crucial to making enterprises attractive.
But responding to the challenges of increased service provider reliance will require a dramatic rethinking of how the IS organisation is run.
The role of the CIO in this new world, thus moves from one of operational efficiencies and effectiveness, to that of being a broker of services.
Craig Baty is group vice-president of Gartner Research Asia-Pacific and Japan, based in Tokyo. E-mail: craig.ba- [email protected]
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Appendix C South Australian Water – Time Line
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