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Senior Lecturer Homa Bahrami and Professor Stuart Evans prepared this case study with Case Writer Dickson L. Louie and with research
assistance from Claire Rudolph as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an
administrative situation. Dr. Bahrami is on the board of directors of Fabrinet.
Copyright © 2014 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, or
transmitted in any form or by any means without the permission of the Berkeley-Haas Case Series.
Date: February 19, 2014
H O M A B A H R A M I
S T U A R T E V A N S
Real-Time Leadership at Fabrinet (A):
Navigating through the 2011 Thailand flood crisis
“Improvise, adapt, and overcome.”
UNOFFICIAL MOTTO OF THE U.S. MARINES CORPS
During the late evening of Saturday, October 22, 2011, Dr. Harpal Gill, Fabrinet's president and COO,
stood—waist-deep in water—in the flooded area of the company's Chokchai plant in Thailand.
Holding a flashlight to survey the immediate damage, Gill was also on the phone with Tom Mitchell,
the company’s founder, chairman and CEO. They were discussing the next steps they should take to
limit the potential damage to the company's two Thai production campuses and minimize any
disruption to its operations. A moment earlier, about 30 minutes before midnight, floodwaters had
broken through a wall and engulfed the plant's entire first floor. As a contract manufacturer, Fabrinet
specialized in the production of optical equipment, industrial lasers, and sensors. Now Gill and
Mitchell wondered what the priorities should be to restore operations and retain customers. The
Chokchai plant accounted for 40 percent of Fabrinet's existing manufacturing capability. Any
extended disruption would materially impact business.
The Chokchai plant's flooding was part of a larger natural disaster that hit Thailand in October 2011.
Due to relentless and constant rainfall since mid-summer 2011, Thailand now had its worst flooding
in over a half-century. Over 600 lives would be lost and many of the Thailand-based manufacturing
plants would be left idle for months thereafter. The components produced by these plants were a vital
link in the global supply chain. These included key components for automobiles, telecommunications
equipment, personal computers, and aviation products. Besides Fabrinet, other companies, such as
Honda, Hitachi, ACER, Western Digital and Goodyear, were all impacted. Now Mitchell, Gill and
their team would have to decide quickly on their next moves.
Complicating things, almost all of the Thai military and police personnel had already been diverted to
the capital city of Bangkok, about 30 miles southwest of Chokchai, to assist with potential flooding
and collateral damage. Mitchell, Gill and their emergency team would have to handle the immediate
crisis mostly on their own.
Background of Fabrinet
B5795
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FABRINET (A) 2
Fabrinet was founded in 2000 by (David) Tom Mitchell, one of the co-founders of Seagate
Technology, a pioneering disk drive manufacturer. After helping start Seagate in 1979, Mitchell then
served as its president and COO from 1983 to 1991. While at Seagate, Mitchell — a former U.S.
Marine captain who had served in Vietnam during the 1960s — earned a reputation within the
computer storage industry for being able to find innovative ways to produce disk drives at a lower
cost. In addition to relying on a high-volume strategy to achieve economies of scale, Mitchell also
relocated Seagate’s manufacturing operations overseas, close to key supply chain partners and where
labor costs were also lower. At the end of 1982, Seagate began to assemble disk drives in Singapore.
Within two years, Seagate transferred almost all of its manufacturing to Singapore, added a second
manufacturing site in Thailand, and reduced its California staff by half 1 . By pursuing a low-cost
strategy, Seagate saw a significant increase in market share, maintained its dominant position, and
reached $1 billion in revenue by 1987 2 .
Following subsequent stints as president and COO at Conner Peripherals and then as the co-founder
and CEO at JTS Corporation during the 1990s, Mitchell decided to start a company on his own. He
founded Fabrinet, a low-volume, high-mix service provider that would manufacture complex optical
components for original equipment manufacturers on a contract basis 3 . Initially funded with $1
million of Mitchell’s own capital —Hambretcht & Quist Asia would shortly add another $20 million
through its Asian Pacific Growth Fund –– Fabrinet took over Seagate’s lease of the Chokchai
manufacturing site. Seagate then became one of Fabrinet’s first customers. Mitchell described why
he founded Fabrinet:
Every January, Forbes lists the top 100 stocks. [I noticed that in 1999] out of the top
15 stocks, five were contract manufacturers. I then got the idea for a business. A
service company doesn’t have a product, you don’t need any R&D or marketing and
you have a small sales force. After going into bankruptcy [at JTS] all that I wanted to
be was the ”CFO.” I didn’t really care whether I was the chairman or the CEO or the
president. I’ve learned so much from that bankruptcy. I learned that you have to
have a strong balance sheet to run a company…Today [at Fabrinet] we have a very
strong balance sheet. We started out with 20 million dollars in equity investment
[from Hambretcht & Quist Asia] and we never spent one penny of that 20 million
dollars 4 .
Over the next 10 years, Fabrinet would continue to expand its Asia-based manufacturing hubs, with
four factories in Thailand and another one in China (Fabrinet also has a factory in New Jersey). With
the 2005 transfer of JDS Uniphase’s manufacturing operations to Thailand, the company began to
focus almost entirely on the contract manufacturing of components and modules for optical
communications systems as well as industrial lasers and sensors 5 . Unlike other offshore contract
service manufacturers, which made handheld phone and tablet devices for many of the U.S.-based
electronics companies, Fabrinet introduced a “factory within a factory” concept. Its business model
required customers to provide the equipment needed to build their products. Fabrinet would provide
the labor, logistics, manufacturing discipline, and supply chain.
During the 2010-11 fiscal year, Fabrinet had total revenue of $743 million, operating income of $69
million, and internal cash flow from operations of $41 million. This represented a sharp increase over
2009-10 fiscal year when Fabrinet had total revenue of $505 million, an operating profit of $64
million, and an internal cash flow from operations of $18 million (see Exhibit 1 for income statements
for fiscal years 2009-10 to 2011-12). Fabrinet had been profitable since its inception largely due to its
cash-conservative business model.
1 Kyra Gebhardt, “Seagate Technology,” case study, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1999. 2 Ibid..
3 Jean-Jacques Maleval, “Do you Remember Controversial Tom Mitchell?”, Storage Newsletter.com, June 21, 2010.
4 Case interviews with Tom Mitchell, Dr. Harpal Gill and other Fabrinet executives between April 2012 and August 2013. All other quotes
are from these interviews unless otherwise noted. 5 Fabrinet, 10-K report for fiscal year ending June 29, 2012.
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FABRINET 3
“Almost all of the last 12 years [at] Fabrinet were ’operational cash positive’”, said Toh-Seng (T.S)
Ng, the company’s chief financial officer. “This is due to the nature of our business model, where
customers consign all their customized equipment and are responsible for R&D of the products we
manufacture for them.” 6
Ng also noted that Fabrinet’s cost-plus business model—reflecting much of Mitchell’s low-cost
manufacturing philosophy that he carried over from his tenure at Seagate—allowed the company to
stay competitive and retain customers.
Having issued its IPO in 2010 — after pulling back several earlier attempts due to a weakening
worldwide economy after the 2008 downturn — the company raised an additional $85 million. By
the end of June 2011, Fabrinet had a cash balance on hand of $127 million 7 . The company appeared
to be on its way to setting another record year in financial performance for the 2011-12 fiscal year.
Fabrinet’s Leadership DNA
While Mitchell was Fabrinet’s chairman and CEO, Gill served as president and COO, the company’s
second-in-command. Together, the two men had known each other for nearly 30 years. Gill, who
received his Ph.D. in engineering from the University of Bradford, U.K., reflected on their
relationship:
I have known Tom Mitchell since 1983. I first worked for him at Seagate. Then we
moved on when he started JTS. I [then] moved on to another company in Thailand.
When Tom came back to start Fabrinet in Thailand, I worked with him to get the
company started. Four years later, Tom hired me back to join Fabrinet. .
As CEO, Mitchell communicated daily with Gill and his other senior managers about the business and
provided guidance to ensure that they were able to carry out their tasks. Mitchell achieved this without
“micromanaging” the senior team, striking the correct balance, rhythm and tone. Mitchell described
his leadership style:
I always wanted to be an officer in the Marine Corps…All I really cared about in
college was to be an officer. The Marine Corps helped shape me and I think that my
leadership skills were developed during the time I spent in the Marine Corps…[At the
time of the floods] I was just getting ready to go in for a full knee replacement so I
couldn’t be wading around in the water or climbing on big trucks...I managed that
with Harpal, just like any other Marine officer would do. Harpal called and said ’Hey,
Tom can we do that. I want to do this‘; we were also in constant contact..
Alert Status: Securing sandbags, shrink-wrap, pumps, and boats
Thursday and Friday, October 6 and 7, 2011 - Fabrinet’s management team remained cognizant of
the weeks of constant rainfall in late Summer 2011 as well as the increasing media coverage of
subsequent flooding in northern Thailand. In early October 2011, the team decided to take steps to
proactively monitor and anticipate potential flooding at its two Thailand manufacturing campuses —
Chokchai and Pinehurst (see Exhibit 2 for images of both campuses) — located about seven miles
apart. They believed this was necessary as the excess floodwaters flowed southward and found their
way into the Gulf of Thailand. In September 2011, after the news broke of flooding in the Nakorn
Sawan region of northern Thailand, (Exhibit 3), Fabrinet’s management team had decided to add 18
inches of height to its outer barrier wall along a rice field at its Chokchai plant as a precautionary
measure. Then, with the news of increased flooding in the Auyutthaya Province area that had affected
several high tech businesses and was now closing in on the two campuses, Fabrinet’s management
6 E-mail from TS Ng, February 28, 2013.
7 Fabrinet, Proxy Statement and 2012 Annual Report to Shareholders.
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FABRINET (A) 4
placed the company on “Alert Status” on October 6. Accordingly, Gill led a daily meeting of
Fabrinet’s “Emergency Preparedness/Disaster Recovery Team” (EP/DRT) ( Exhibit 4). This team
focused on putting together contingency plans for possible flooding at both manufacturing campuses.
Gill recalled:
Just before the flood, business was as usual. We were all geared up for probably the
best quarter in our history. [But] as the water got closer and closer from north to
south, the warning started getting stronger. Nobody really realized the magnitude of
the water coming down, and then they started talking about trillions of gallons.
That’s when Tom and I said, ‘Hey, this water is more than the normal rains we get‘
... There were industrial parks that are north of us. Then we started getting horrifying
news that some of them were almost getting drowned and there was some mention of
waters reaching as high as 20 to 25 feet deep. I just didn’t believe it for a while. This
water was coming and there was nothing stopping it. . We started making provisions
to protect against that amount of water in terms of how high the flood would become,
and add some more margin to it so that we were guaranteed safety, if you will. [The
local authorities] said the water would get up to about 1.2 to 1.5 meters in our region.
Mitchell initially doubted that the flooding at Fabrinet’s two manufacturing campuses would occur.
He recollected his initial thought about potential flooding at the Pinehurst campus.
Harpal and I went to see one [flood] gate off the river. It was all open land so we
thought, ‘How can the water absorb into that? It’s 22 kilometers of land and that’s a
lot of land.’ It had to cross through this elevated railroad end, then it had to go
through a golf course and finally our facility. We thought ‘That will never happen to
us — we’ll take all kinds of precautions,’. The general manager of that
manufacturing facility said to Harpal and me, ’I guarantee you there is a 99 percent
chance that this place will never be flooded,’ He’s such an accomplished man that I
think all three of us agreed ‘Okay, that won’t happen to us,’ but then Harpal and the
general manager began to take all the precautions for that facility [anyway].
With the start of its emergency preparedness efforts, Fabrinet began 24/7 patrols to monitor water
levels at both campuses and then made plans to secure the needed resources—sandbags, shrink-wrap,
pumps and boats —in anticipation of any potential flooding. Gill added:
We had kicked in an emergency protocol to start preparing for the worst. We set up a
committee, one for Chokchai and one for Pinehurst. We would meet together and
said, ‘what are the things we can do? Let’s not just sit back and hope and pray that
the water is going to come and go.’ So we started taking precautions based on
learning what others had not done and how the water had actually taken the better of
them ..
You meet in the morning, you meet in the afternoon. You have team players
assigned to different tasks. Then you check with everybody throughout the day. So
actions were being designed and being developed literally [in] real time, depending
on the situation?
Saturday and Sunday, October 8 and 9, 2011 – Starting on October 8, under the direction of the EP/DRT, the company quickly moved to fortify both campuses while continuing to monitor the news
of flooding in the north. Gill recalled:
We started building concrete walls in front of all the different entrances to the
factories. We got all of the sandbags ready. Made sure there was enough diesel in
case we lost power. That we had plenty of flashlights, and things like that…You
have to have clean water. You have to have power. You have to have some
[minimum level of] nitrogen or the PCBs to run the factory if something was to go
wrong. Power and transportation are very critical. So we had the fishbone diagram
[to depict] all the essentials we must have to continue manufacturing.
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FABRINET 5
In addition to the fishbone diagram that helped the EP/DRT better anticipate any contingencies
(Exhibit 5) another key factor was having the cash resources to purchase the needed sandbags, shrink-
wrap, pumps, and boats in anticipation of any potential flooding. This allowed Fabrinet to act quickly
and remain agile in a highly uncertain situation. Gill added:
If you have no money, then it’s a lost cause. I had the full authority from Tom. At
times like this, you don’t ‘nickel-and-dime.’ You have got to move fast because you
know everybody is going to be looking for boats. Everybody is going to be looking
for shrink-wrap. And everybody is going to be looking for sandbags..
For example, after consulting with Mitchell, Gill went ahead and ordered several thousand sandbags
to fortify the surrounding walls at the Chokchai campus. Gill said:
What you do is you know everybody’s going for the same thing. You move and you
think fast. You don’t wait. The only person [from whom] I needed to get approval
was Tom and Tom had already given me approval: ‘Go and take every precaution
you can.’ You just move quickly...The idea was ‘Get me the sandbags’…We (also)
brought our construction workers in from [Pinehurst Building 6] and we had those
really hard-working people put the 20,000 sand bags over [at Chokchai]. We built
walls that were five feet high against the entrance to manufacturing facilities.
There were two main keys to snatching up scarce resources like sandbags in this situation. First, Gill
instructed his employees to disregard the price, figuring that two or three dollar sandbags were a
worthwhile investment when compared to the cost of repairing damaged expensive manufactured
equipment. Second, the employees acted quickly, wasting no time quibbling over details. Because of
the clear organizational structure and the explicitly stated “go’s” and “no-go’s” surrounding decision-
making, employees felt empowered to act in a swift manner. Somasundram Ravendran, a Fabrinet
supply chain director and EP/DRT member, reminisced:
One thing I really admired is how the executives fully understood that the red tape
should be cut at that point [in] time. There should not be [any] red tape. They gave
us a free hand. And they [said], ‘Go and do. Just get it done. We agree that this is
what [we] would need to make the game plan happen.’
The new game was about setting clear ‘boundaries.’ Gill quickly established the boundaries of what
was possible, embodying an optimism for the best case scenario but also keeping in mind what was
realistic given the circumstances. This meant being resourceful as well as covering all the bases – to
“do the little things.” He had respect for the boundaries of others, vowing to delegate only those tasks
he would feel comfortable doing himself in order to reinforce the company’s established values of
safety and respect. Ravendran added:
Even though [Harpal] put a lot of pressure on the team, he also showed the
leadership. When we had the sandbags coming in, he helped carry the sandbags and
stayed on the front [lines] with the team. [Harpal] made sure that everything was
okay and that you could call him at anytime — [even] two or three a.m. — if you
foresaw any problems. [Just] call him up and then work together on [correcting the]
deficiency.
Finally, Gill kept in mind the limits of his own position as a leader, conceding when necessary but
also remembering to take care of himself by remaining calm, as he was aware that his employees
would feed off his positive energy or simply flounder by perceived negativity, panic or instability.
On October 8, Gill also released the first in a series of e-mails to Fabrinet’s customers keeping them
apprised of the “Alert Status” situation and what the company was doing to address it. (Exhibit 6)
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FABRINET (A) 6
Monday to Wednesday, October 10 to 12, 2011 - By October 10, flooding in the surrounding areas
made it impossible for some Fabrinet staff to come to work at both campuses. Customers were
promptly notified of the staffing shortages due to the floods.
Over the next two days, Fabrinet would continue to fortify both campuses in anticipation of possible
flooding at either location. Daily monitoring now showed that the water was beginning to rise at the
Pinehurst campus, but the location was still considered safe.
Mid-October 2011: Rising water levels and a helicopter ride
Thursday and Friday, October 13 and 14, 2011 – The Thai Government issued an evacuation order and flood warning for the Patum Thani and Rangsit areas, where the Pinehurst and Chokchai
campuses were respectively located. As a result, Fabrinet announced an immediate three-day
shutdown of both campuses from October 13, at 6 p.m. to October 15, at 10 p.m., for the safety of the
company’s employees. Mitchell emphasized:
[At Chokchai] we were responsible for, in a 250,000 square foot manufacturing
facility, about 1,800 people. We had to make an assessment of whether it's time to
stop thinking about revenue and start thinking about the safety of our people…that's
the most important thing. And then after the safety of our people has been resolved,
then we could go on with other things. But our first thought was the safety of our
employees.
Gill also stepped-up the frequency of the EP/DRT’s meetings to twice-a-day and top managers now
stayed on each campus 24/7. The company continued to take additional precautionary steps, such as
moving the IT servers at Chokchai to higher ground and reinforcing the barriers at both campuses. By
Friday, October 14, the water level began to rise slowly near the Pinehurst campus from 500 meters
away.
Saturday and Sunday, October 15 and 16, 2011 – The Thai Government rescinded its earlier evacuation alert on October 15, saying that it was a false alarm. As a result, Fabrinet announced its
plan to re-start operations at both campuses on October 17. In the meantime, water levels continued to
rise near the road in front of the Pinehurst campus. Over the next 48 hours, water levels would also
continue to rise around the Pinehurst campus, but had not yet penetrated the barriers.
Monday and Tuesday, October 17 and 18, 2011 – The Pinehurst campus remained shut down on October 17, due to transportation difficulties and concerns for employee safety. Limited production at
the Pinehurst campus resumed the next day. Water level continued to rise around the Pinehurst
campus and also began to rise around the Chokchai campus and at its nearby floodgates.
Wednesday, October 19, 2011 – Despite not being fully engulfed by water, the EP/DRT heard stories about other facilities in the local area being devastated by flooding. The water levels near the
Pinehurst campus and at the floodgates near the Chokchai campus continued to rise. Despite
conflicting media reports on the potential local damage, Mitchell and Gill decided to check out the
local area for themselves. Gill recalled:
The precautions were already going on and we still had dry space in the car parks.
We just wanted to know how much water [was] there, because now they’re talking
about eight billion cubic meters. They are talking about cubic meters of water, not
gallons of water. I said, ‘Hey, this water is coming.’ By now, we had gotten scary
information from the industrial parks that had been flooded by water and devastated,
so that’s when I said to Tom ‘We need to check [it] out from the top – where is this
water coming [from]?’
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FABRINET 7
Mitchell added:
One thing that was quite instrumental is because of lack of information, you had to
[assess the situation for yourself]. Harpal called me up and said ’I think we should
get a helicopter…fly around the area and…make up our own minds.’
After surveying the area by air, both Mitchell and Gill decided that the local area was becoming more
vulnerable to flooding. Seeking to protect the welfare of Fabrinet’s employees, the pair immediately
decided to send 95 percent of the employees on both campuses home that Wednesday mid-afternoon
as a safety precaution. Gill said:
I think the helicopter ride was a [critical] data point. We were taking a lot of data
points. We were driving around in big SUVs to see how much water was there and
how [much] worse it was getting so we had placed several people at a checkpoint.
Our security guards were placed in different locations [to see how much] worse it
was getting. Should things really get bad, they were to call the main post and say,
‘this is getting bad.’ Then, of course, [after] the helicopter ride, [we] really said,
‘this is going to get worse.’
At the Pinehurst campus, servers were moved to higher levels of the building, while at Chokchai, the
remaining staff, managers and external contractors were shrink-wrapping the equipment and work-in-
progress inventory as quickly as possible and moving them to higher levels. Other employees were
assigned to find additional sandbags, and shrink-wrap, pumps and boats. It was now becoming a race
against time with the inevitable possibility of flooding. Gill observed that this situation gave him new
insights about some of his employees:
At a time like this, you can really tell the difference between people. Those who can
make it happen and those who can’t. Some people are very ‘street-smart’; you give
them an action item and they go make it happen. Then there were others who were,
perhaps, not as fast-moving. They would look for decisions. They would say ‘Well,
maybe it can wait.’ [Then] there were others who [would] say ‘Lunch can wait.
Dinner can wait. This can’t wait.’.
Kevin Camelon, Fabrinet’s director of supply chain management, noted:
It’s a different set of people that know how to make it happen. We sent one of our
best guys who manage the sub-direct material…a most resourceful guy. He literally
got in the cabin of the truck and went everywhere..[so he could] pick up a boat, pick
up an engine, pick up generators...he sat in the cab the whole time.
October 20 and 21: Mild Flooding at Pinehurst and Rising Water at
Chokchai Thursday and Friday, October 20 and 21, 2011 – By the next day, the Thai Government had announced flood alerts throughout the region, including their plans to open the floodgates that would
allow the water to recede at both campuses. Meanwhile, water had breached the perimeter walls of
the Pinehurst campus and entered the parking areas. While the water level appeared to be stabilizing
at Pinehurst by October 21, the water level continued to rise outside of Chokchai’s perimeter. At both
facilities, the remaining staff, managers and contractors were shrink-wrapping and moving the
equipment to higher floors.
October 22: Major Flooding at Chokchai
Saturday, October 22, 2011 - In anticipation of the potential flooding of both campuses, a decision
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FABRINET (A) 8
is made to move some of the staff support functions – including procurement and finance – to another
locale and create an offsite hub, supported by approximately 20 people. Camelon, the head of
Fabrinet’s Supply Chain, a member of the EP/DRT and, whose apartment served as the satellite hub,
recollected:
We moved all the purchasing, planning and supply chain people, many of whom had
already lost their homes or a place to live, to a location near the airport which was 60
kilometers from the factory so they could live and work from there. [Later on] they
not only had to find what was needed by the factory to support the ongoing situation,
but manage the customers looking to find out what is happening…We salvaged
finished goods, moved them to the apartment and then managed the shipments from
there..
Believing that the Chokchai plant might be at risk if the water in the canal overflowed, Gill decided to
assess the local situation for himself that evening around 8 p.m. A mechanical engineer by training,
Gill had quickly concluded that a potential disaster was about to unfold. His instincts told him that the
entire Chokchai campus would soon be engulfed in a lake forming around the nearby canal. As the
water continued to rise, Gill’s mind raced ahead to what immediate steps he had to take to protect the
company’s employees, customers, and its future. He remembered:
For two days, the water just continued to rise, so one of my guys who lives only
about a quarter of a mile away from our factory…on the seventeenth floor said.
There’s water on the street—I say, ‘I need your keys,’ because he was still on
campus. I went to the seventeenth floor…took some binoculars and [from] what I
saw that night, I knew we were in trouble…You are filling the lake, and I realized by
now we were at the bottom of the lake. I am looking at it and I am only a quarter
mile away…I saw the canal and the canal isn’t moving. That’s the night when the
water continued to rise…I said to everybody, ‘Hey guys, I think we should all sleep
on the second floor‘ and they said, ’Well why?’ I said, ‘I just think there’s more fresh
air, we are closer to the side of the wall and maybe we can see any potential danger.’
Three hours later, Gill’s assumption proved true. He added:
We had people placed around the campus and at about eleven o’clock, eleven
twenty-two, the wall broke and I remember just standing there. The water came, just
like a tsunami, and within twenty, thirty seconds, there was so much water that it
kind of engulfed the whole campus.
Minutes later, Gill called Mitchell with the news that the Chokchai campus was now entirely flooded.
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FABRINET 9
Case Discussion Questions
1. What barriers and challenges did the Fabrinet team have to overcome?
2. What were the organizational and cultural foundations, set by Fabrinet’s founder Tom Mitchell, that enabled Dr. Harpal Gill and the EP/DRT to demonstrate real-time leadership?
3. How would you assess Dr. Gill and his team’s critical actions, leading up to the flooding at Chokchai? What worked? What could have been done more effectively?
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FABRINET (A) 10
Exhibit 1 Fabrinet income statement, 2010 to 2012
Fabrinet
Income Statement for Years Ended June 29, 2012, June 24, 2011, and June 25,
2010
(In thousands of US dollars)
2011-12 2010-11 2009-10
Revenues
Revenues $564,732 $743,570 $424,548
Revenues, related parties 0 0 81,164
Total Revenues $564,732 $743,570 $505,712
Cost of Revenues (502,818) (648,823) (441,370)
Gross Profit 61,914 94,747 64,342
Selling, general and administrative costs (23,466) (24,806) (16,192)
Expenses related to flooding
(97,286) 0 0
Expenses related to reduction in work force (1,978) 0 0
Operating (loss) income (60,816) 69,941 48,150
Interest income 844 494 327
Interest expense (427) (357) (500)
Foreign exchange gain (loss), net 1,569 (1,430) (40)
Other Income 395 216 153
(Loss) income before income taxes (58,435) 68,864 48,090
Income tax benefit (expense) 1,968 (4,535) (3,767)
Net (loss) income ($56,467) $64,329 $44,323
Source: Fabrinet Proxy Statement and 2012 Annual Report to Shareholders
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FABRINET 11
Exhibit 2 Fabrinet Thailand Campuses
Soure:
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET (A) 12
Exhibit 3- Map of the flood areas in Thailand
Source: www.thaiflood.com
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET 13
Exhibit 4- Emergency Preparedness/Disaster Recovery Committee
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET (A) 14
Exhibit 5- Pre-flood fishbone diagram
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET 15
Exhibit 6- Pre-flood letter to customers
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET (A) 16
Exhibit 7 Photos
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
FABRINET 17
E
Source: Fabrin
Source: Fabrinet.
For the exclusive use of S. Akyuz, 2017.
This document is authorized for use only by Selda Hilal Akyuz in Leadership - Sum 17-1 taught by Christina Bark, SUNY - New Paltz from July 2017 to January 2018.
