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Race & ethnic relations: American and global perspectives

Marger, M. N. (2015). Race and ethnic relations: American and global

perspectives (10th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning .

HISPANIC AMERICANS CHAPTER 8 There are more people of Mexican origin in Los Angeles than in all but one city in Mexico; in New York City, there are more Puerto Ricans than in San Juan; and only in Havana are there more Cubans than in Miami. Together, Hispanic Americans number fifty -two million, almost 17 percent of the total U.S. population. And the Hispanic American ethnic category is growing rapidly and substantially. So rapid has the increase been, in fact, that today it has surpassed African Americans as the country's largest ethnic minority.

Hispanic Americans constitute several distinct ethnic groups, linked by a shared language and a cultural heritage derived, in the main, from Spanish colonialism. By far the largest group among them is Mexican Americans; the rest are people from the Caribbean and Central and South America, as well as a small group whose origins are traced to Spain (Figure 8.1). Because Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans are the oldest and, for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the largest elements of the Hispanic American population, in this chapter we focus mainly on those groups.

It is important to underscore the cultural variety among the various Hispanic American groups. These distinctions are often obscured by the common tendency of the media, government agencies, and the general public to lump together all those with Latin American origins, using the terms Hispanic or Latino. 1 South and Central America and the Caribbean are geographically vast, and the specific countries that make up these regions are each distinct in their historical development, their racial- ethnic composition, their cultural practices, and even their language. As to the latter, although these countries may be linked by a common linguistic heritage, anyone who

- Although the term Hispanic has been most freq uently used in the past few decades, Latino is today also .:ommonly used to describe those of various Latin American origins. Although some studies have found a preference for Hispanic over Latino (Gallup Organization, 2003 ; Tucker and Kojetin, 1996), others mdicate that a majority of Hispanic Americans prefer neither term, choosing instead to identify .:bemselves with their country of origin- "Mexican ," " Cuban," and so on (de la Garza et al., 1992; Pew Hispanic Center, 2002, 2009; Taylor et al., 2012). The U.S. Census itself has, at different times, used a ar iety of terms to describe the Hispanic American population. In this chapter, Hispanic and Latino are

.lSed interchangeably.

209

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210 PART II ETH N ICITY IN TH E UN ITED ST ATES

70

60

50

c 40 Q) (.)

Qj 0... 30

20

10

0 -+---'-----~--'-----r--'~--'~-'--~-'--~--'--~--'--~'--~'---,-'-~-'-~-'-~-'-,

Mexican Puerto Cuban Dominican Central South Rican American American

FIGURE 8.r I HISPANIC AMERICAN POPULATION Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2012a ).

Other Hispanic

has studied the SJ?anish language even minimally knows that the Spanish spoken by Mexicans is not precisely the same as the Spanish spoken by, for instance, Colom- bians or Argentinians, or, much less, Spaniards.

THE "IN-BETWEEN" STATUS OF HISPANICS

If a common theme runs through the unique histories and experiences of the several Hispanic groups in the United States, it is their intermediate ethnic status between Euro-American groups, on the one hand, and African Americans, on the other. In several important respects, Hispanics are an ethnic minority "in between."

MANNER OF E NTRY

Hispanic Americans have entered the society in a variety of ways. Although Mexicans have come to the United States in the last hundred years as voluntary im- migrants, they retain a heritage of having been absorbed into American society orig- inally as a conquered group . The area that today is the American Southwest was part of Mexico before being annexed by the United States in 1848 following the Mexican War. Mexicans living on those lands were subsequently incorporated into the United States, much in the fashion of classic European colonialism.

Puerto Ricans are a group not clearly part of either voluntary immigration or conquest. Puerto Rico became a territory of the United States in 1898 following the Spanish-American War, and in 1917 the inhabitants of the island were given the sta- tus of American citizenship. This enabled them to immigrate freely to the mainland

C HAPTER 8 H ISPANIC AMER ICANS 2 I I

with no restrictions . Puerto Ricans therefore are not technically immigrants, even though they come to the mainland from a distinctly foreign culture.

The movement of Cubans to the United States in the past five decades has been a voluntary immigration. Yet it has been different from those of most past groups in that it was initially impelled by political rather than economic motives. Moreover, the class characteristics of immigrant Cubans and the reception given them by the host society were unusual. As the sociologist Alejandro Portes has put it, "Seldom has a foreign group come to the United States so well prepared educationally and occupationally and seldom has this country received one so well" (1969:508).

The national origins of other groups that make up the contemporary Hispanic American population are varied, but the majority are first-generation immigrants who have come to the United States in the past four decades. Some, particularly those from Central American countries, have entered as refugees, escaping political violence, but most are voluntary immigrants who, like those before them, have come in pursuit of improved economic opportunities.

HISPANIC AMERICANS AND RACE

Perhaps the most obvious and consequential in-between feature of Latinos is their racial status. Members of all Hispanic American groups include a range of physical types.

Mexico is racially amalgamated to a greater degree than perhaps any modern so- ciety (van den Berghe, 1978). Over the past two centuries, its population has been transformed into one dominated by mestizos, a physical type_ combining European and Indian traits. Although many are either basically European, or at the other ex- treme, purely Indian, the vast majority of Mexicans today are racial hybrids. Most Mexican immigrants to the United States are mestizo, making them physically distinct fr om the Anglo majority but still "the least divergent racially of all non-Caucasian groups" (Murgufa, 1975:51). So ambiguous is the racial status of Mexican Ameri- cans that the U.S. Census Bureau has in the past classified them both as a separate " race" and as part of the white population. In any case, most Mexican Americans are physically distinct enough to be perceived by many Anglos in racial terms. (The cerm Anglo is used.in the Southwest and in other areas with a large Hispanic popula- rion to distinguish any non-Hispanic white.)

Puerto Ricans' in-between racial status is equally complicated. Whereas Mexi- ans are mostly mestizo, Puerto Ricans inherit a racial background that is a combi-

nation primarily of European and African but also some Indian elements . The large _.\frican population originally brought to the island as slaves intermarried with whites over several generations, and today, Puerto Ricans cover the entire color spectrum. On the island, racial distinctions are not so acute, and one's color is seen along a scale or continuum (Duany, 1998; Fitzpatrick, 1987; Padilla, 1958; Ro driguez, 1996). But problems arise in the United States, where there is a racial dichotomy, allowing for no intermediate categories. Many who are "white" on the -la nd may therefore find themselves classified as "black" when they come to

die mainland. The differential treatment they subsequently receive on the basis of dieir darker skin (by American standards) is frustrating and problematic because

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212 PART II ETHNIC ITY IN TH E UN ITED STATES

interracial marriages are commonplace in Puerto Rico, and social treatment of dar- ker groups is more equitable than on the mainland. Similar problems are encoun- tered by Dominicans who immigrate to the United States. They may consider themselves white, but in the American context they are often perceived as black (Duany, 1998).

In both Mexico and Puerto Rico, racial distinctions are often a function of class and cultural differences rather than of physical type alone. Those who rise in socioeconomic status or who adopt Western cultural ways may, accordingly, be "whitened." As we will see in Chapter 15, this is also the case in Brazil. In the United States, however, racial distinctions are based on skin color or other physical charac- teristics, in addition to ancestry, and are not modified by changes in class or culture.

Among the Hispanic groups in the United States, Cubans are the least racially heterogeneous, most falling into the American category of "white" (Diaz, 1980). Cuba itself is a racially variegated society, however, suggesting that t,he Cuban immi- gration has been racially selective (Portes et al., 1977). Most early Cuban immigrants were of higher social status in Cuba and hence whiter in color, whereas many of those who followed have been of lower class origins and of darker color (Pedraza- Bailey, 1985).

Racially and culturally, those from Central America constitute a very diverse collectivity. In addition to six different national origins, the Central American popu- lation includes indigenous, Afro-Caribbean, European, and mestizo peoples. Latinos from Central American countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua gener- ally evince mestizo origins, not unlike most Mexicans, but many are comparable to those from Caribbean countries, combining African and European origins.

Those from South American ·countries exhibit the entire color range. Most Peruvians, for example, resemble Mexicans, but Argentinians are indistinguishable from Euro -Americans. Many from coastal areas of Colombia closely resemble those from Puerto Rico or the Dominican Republic, but other Colombians are racially European.

The fact that Latinos manifest such a - broad range of physical types calls into question the very notion of race as it applies to these groups. In recent years, "His- panic" or "Latino" has sometimes been used as a racial designation. Police and news agencies, for example, commonly describe crime suspects in that manner (for exam- ple, "a 20-year-old Hispanic male .. . "). But the concept of Hispanic racial features is rendered meaningless in light of the fact that individuals within the various Hispanic groups exhibit every conceivable physical (that is, "racial") characteristic. And, Lati- nos themselves, regardless of national origins, see themselves differently in terms of race and ethnicity and the way they are perceived by others. "Divisions are evident," notes Ruben Rumbaut, "between regions and groups, within groups, and even within families" (2011:7) . Although "Hispanic" or "Latino" is often interpreted as a racial designation, it remains basically a cultural-that is, ethnic- description. Like other racial and ethnic designations, however, it is arbitrary and subject to change, as group identities and census categories are modified. The confusion and complexities of race and ethnicity as they pertain to Latinos is a perfect illustration, as discussed in Chapter 1, of how races and, to some extent, ethnic groups, are essentially social creations.

CH APTER 8 HI SPA N IC AMERI CANS 213

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LATINO MINORITY

Despite broad similarities, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cuban Americans, and the more recent Latino groups each display a unique history of immigration as well as unique patterns of settlement and adaptation.

M EXICAN AMERICANS

Relations between Mexicans and whites (Anglos) have, historically, been character- ized consistently by conflict, albeit of varying intensity. Early in the contact between these groups, a pattern of Anglo domination and Mexican subordination emerged. And, as with American Indians, the vehicle through which domination was initially established was physical conquest.

T HE MEXICAN W AR Mexico gained its independence from Spain in 1810, and at that time its territory encompassed an area as far north as what is today Colorado. Most of this northern Mexican region, far removed from the administrative capital of M exico City, was inhabited by Indians and a smaller number of Mexicans. As a means of populating the area, the Mexican government in 1821 granted permission for foreigners- mainly Americans- to settle in the area that today is Texas. By 1830 about twenty thousand Anglos were living in the Texas region, constituting a numer- ical majority. Culturally and physically distinct from the indigenous Mexicans and Indians, the Anglo settlers from the outset translated their differences into contempt and hostility toward these groups.

The Mexican government could exercise only limited control ovel- the Texas col- ony, and pressures from Anglos for independence grew steadily. In 1835- 36, the colony revolted and established itself as an independent republic. Mexico never recog- nized the independence of Texas; when it became clear that the United States favored annexation of the territory, much friction was created between the American and M exican governments, leading eventually to war in 1848.

The war proved disastrous for Mexico, which lost more than half its territory. The United States acquired what are today the states of California, Colorado, New M exico, Nevada, Utah, and most of Arizona, in addition to Texas, which had been annexed previously. Under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ending the conflict, M exicans living in what was now American territory were guaranteed the rights of American citizenship if they chose to remain. Most did, and it was from this nucleus that the Mexican American ethnic group evolved.

The significance of the Texas rebellion and the Mexican War cannot be over- stated as factors in shaping subsequent relations between Mexican Americans and Anglos in the Southwest. The borderlands remained an area of overt conflict long af- ter the conclusion of the war, and this protracted hostility intensified the mutually negative perceptions of Anglos and Mexican Americans (Grebler et al., 1970). Anglo-Mexican conflict did not characterize all of the Southwest to the same degree. In New Mexico, relations between the two groups were relatively peaceful by compar- ison with Texas, where the strife reached its most violent and bloody form. But in all cases, the war left a residue of antagonistic feelings and group images among Anglos and Mexicans that continued to color interethnic relations for many generations .

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214 PART II ETH NICITY IN TH E UN IT ED STA TES

THE EM ER GENCE OF E THNIC STRATIFICATI ON Although their property rights and political rights were guaranteed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Mexicans in the newly acquired American territory found themselves increasingly displaced by Anglos. Their property was taken through official and unofficial force and fraud, and they were gradually transformed into a colonized workforce serving the area ' s labor needs . Mexicans were also dispossessed politically, as Anglos firmly established themselves in power. The scenario of heavy immigration of Anglos followed by the divesting of Mex icans' economic and political power was played out somewhat dif- ferently from area to area. In New Mexico, for example, the indigenous Mexican population, called Hispanos, did retain some political and economic power. These people were descendants of the original Spanish settlers dating back to the 1600s, and they did not identify themselves with the later-immigrating Mexicans (DeSipio, 2006; Nostrand, 1973). In general, however, Anglos perceived Mexicans as a con- quered- and therefore inferior-people who quite naturally were relegated to subor- dinate ethnic status (Alvarez, 1973).

The development of ethnic stratification in the Southwest seems clearly in accord with Noel's (1968) theory, discussed in Chapter 2. All three factors necessary to the emergence of an ethnic hierarchy- ethnocentrism, competition, and above all, differ- ential power- came into play after 1821 in the confrontation of Anglos and Mexi- cans (Mclemore, 1973 ). Anglos settling the region were most intent on securing land held by Mexicans-hence the ensuing competition. With them, they also brought their racial attitudes, which led them to see Mexicans as an inferior people whose exploitation could therefore be justified. Finally, with their numerical power- and following annexation by the United States, their political power-Anglos became the dominant group, displacing Mexicans both legally and by force.

MEXICAN I MMIGRATION As a result of the Texas and Mexican wars , the first Mexicans were incorporated into American society through conquest. But subsequent genera- tions of Mexicans entered the United States as voluntary immigrants. Indeed, it must be remembered that the original Mexican Americans, those living on annexed lands, were a relatively small group , perhaps no more than seventy-five thousand (McWilliams, 1968). More than twice that number of Indians were living in the same territory. The overwhelming majority of Mexican Americans, then, entered as voluntary immigrants, motivated by the same push-pull factors as other immigrant groups.

The flow of Mexican immigration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was dictated primarily by the labor needs of the American Southwest (Camarillo, 1979; Tyler, 1975). Most simply, movement across the border was heaviest during periods when the demand for cheap labor was high. Although immigration was evi- dent during the remainder of the nineteenth century following the Mexican War, it reached enormous proportions during the twentieth century with the expansion of the American Southwest and the corresponding inadequacies of the Mexican econ- omy. The pressures of a continually growing population and the political destabiliza- tion brought about by the Mexican Revolution in 1910 further impelled migration northward.

Between 1910 and 1930, the development of railroads, mining, and agriculture, all labor-intensive industries, spurred the first great wave of Mexican immigration

CH APTER 8 HI SPAN IC AM ERI CAN S 215

into the United States (Mc Williams, 1968). As the chief source of unskilled labor in the Southwest, Mexicans became a subordinate labor force. They were commonly kept in debt by their employers, paid less than others for the same work, concen- trated in the least desirable occupations, often used as strikebreakers, and laid off most easily in distressful times (Barrera, 1979).

When they represented an excess labor supply, Mexicans were driven back across the border. During the 1930s, for example, not only were their jobs abolished but they served as convenient scapegoats for the area's unemployment and growing 1. welfare rolls. Deportations were launched in which undocumented immigrants were rounded up and sent back to Mexico. Repatriations also took place in which Mexi- cans, many of whom had been born in the United States, were induced to leave the country .

During World War II, a severe labor shortage once again prompted the importa- tion of Mexican workers. But by the early 1950s the deportations and repatriations of the 1930s were grimly repeated in a policy called Operation Wetback, designed to stem the flow of undocumented Mexican immigrants. In five years, 3.8 million people were sent back to Mexico (Moore and Pachon, 1976). Relatively few were actually deported in formal proceedings; most were simply rounded up and expelled. In the process, Mexicans were once again reminded of their tenuous status in the United States. People who simply "looked Mexican" were stopped and required to present evidence of their legal status . Although there is some question about the official number actually apprehended and deported (Garcia, 1980), Operation Wetback in any case created fear and suspicion among the Mexican American populace.

Today Mexicans are the country's largest immigrant group, and their numbers are swelled by a continual flow of undocumented entrants. During the past three decades, Mexicans have constituted about a quarter of all legal immigrants to the United States and more than half of all immigrants who enter without papers (Alba, 2013; Hoefer et al., 2010). As in the past, economic conditions are the chief motive of this migration.

T HE CHICAN O MOVEM ENT AND TH E D EVELOP MENT O F E THNIC CONSC IOUS NES S As with other ethnic groups, in the 1960s and 1970s Mexican Americans engaged in significant political activity as part of a period of growing ethnic consciousness. Perhaps the two most dramatic episodes of Mexican American political activism during this period were the movements led by Cesar Chavez and Reies Lopez Tijerina. Chavez's objective was to organize migrant farmworkers, and Tijerina focused on regaining co mmunal lands that he charged had been illegally taken from Hispanos in New .'v1exico.

Chavez's well-publicized movement of this period consisted of efforts to force growers in California and the Southwest to recognize his United Farm Workers un- ion (UFW) as the representative of thousands of migrant laborers, most of them .'v1exican Americans. Past efforts had been made to organize farmworkers in the Southwest, some even dating back to the early years of the twentieth century, but Chavez was the first to succeed. Through his organizing activities, Chavez became something of a folk hero to Mexican Americans, and his charisma thrust him into m e forefront of the larger Chicano movement, aimed at securing greater social,

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2I6 PART II ETHNI C ITY IN THE UNITED STATES

political, and economic rights for Mexican Americans (Solis-Garza, 1972; Steiner, 1970; Stoddard, 1973).

The movement led by Tijerina and his organization, the Alianza de las Mercedes, was more openly militant, and its objectives were less pragmatic than Chavez's. Tijerina argued that several million acres of land in New Mexico had been fraudu - lently taken from Hispanos following annexation of the territory at the conclusion of the Mexican War, and his aim was to recover them. To draw attention to his cause, he provoked several confrontations with federal and state officials, leading to his ar- rest and subsequent imprisonment (Knowlton, 1972). Although the Alianza helped in creating a national awareness of the Chicano movement, its goals were too vision- ary to yield concrete benefits.

Chavez's and Tijerina's movements were the two most prominent elements of the larger Chicano movement of the 1960s and early 1970s, which extended well be-

' yond specific personalities and organizations. Chicanismo was very similar to the black nationalist movement and was spawned in the same general atmosphere of minority activism in the 1960s. Its major goal was to galvanize Mexican American political action in order to assert group rights and expand economic and social op- portunities. Many of the same tactics employed by the black movement, including legal cases, protests, boycotts, and direct encounters with authorities, were adopted.

Like its black nationalist counterpart, the Chicano movement also represented an assertion of militant cultural pluralism. Rather than assimilation, the idea was to affirm the unique Mexican American culture and to instill in Mexican Americans a sense of ethnic pride and awareness (Madas, 1972; Steiner, 1970). Younger activists began to refer t<'> themselves as Chicanos rather than Mexican Americans and to pro- claim a more militant and antiestablishment position. The term Chicano had in the past referred to lower-class Mexicans, but it now began to represent an ethnic view- point (Macias, 1972; Moore and Pachon, 1976). Just as black had been substituted for Negro, Chicano came to symbolize an ethnic identity that repudiated the negative group image that had been imposed for generations by Anglos.

Just as black militancy subsided in the 1970s, so too did the Chicano movement. But as with black power, the long-range effects of Chicanismo were more substantial than they first appeared. Dramatic socioeconomic gains were not forthcoming, as governmental programs aimed at depressed Mexican American communities were short-lived. Intangible benefits, however, were more meaningful and lasting. A posi- tive group identity emerged among Mexican Americans, and ethnic unity was in- stilled through the idea of La Raza. 2 Most important, national attention was drawn for the first time to Mexican Americans as a sizable minority group .

PUERTO RICANS

The formation of the Puerto Rican minority in the United States differed consider- ably from the development of the Mexican American community. To begin with, Puerto Ricans are a relatively recent immigrant group. Even though they had

2 La Raza (literally, "the race") is not similar in meaning to the North American idea of race but is a somewhat vague concept denoting a common heritage or peoplehood.

C HAPT ER 8 HI SPAN IC AMER ICANS 2 17

maintained a presence on the mainland for most of the twentieth century, their numbers were quite small until after World War II. The greatest influx occurred during the 1950s, when nearly 20 percent of the island's population moved to the mainland. Whereas in 1940 only one thousand Puerto Ricans migrated, in 1953 almost seventy-five thousand did so (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976). In the 1970s, as the U.S. economy stagnated and low-skill jobs disappeared, the migra- tion to the mainland ceased and, in fact, a net return migration was sustained throughout the decade. The 1980s, however, saw a second major flow of Puerto Ri- cans to the mainland, creating an increased population (Boswell and Jones, 2006).

The push-pull factors impelling Puerto Ricans to migrate have been similar to those for other voluntary immigrant groups: a surplus population in an economically depressed society seeks economic betterment in a society that promises improved conditions. Puerto Rican migration has therefore fluctuated, depending on economic conditions both on the island and on the mainland. An unusually high birthrate coupled with a seriously underdeveloped economy created great pressures for out- migration from the island after World War II. Two factors increased the appeal of the mainland United States. First, with citizenship rights, Puerto Ricans could enter the country with no restrictions, quotas, or other legal steps. Second, with the estab- lishment of airline service, transportation between the mainland and the island became relatively cheap and rapid. The migration process for Puerto Ricans, then, was considerably less complicated than that for other groups.

Although the absolute size of the Puerto Rican migration to the mainland is not among the largest compared with past groups, it is numerically sign~ficant in relation to the island's population. By 1960 there were one-third as many Puerto Ricans on the mainland as in Puerto Rico, and by 1970 one-half as ma!ly (Bahr et al., 1979). In 2009, there were more Puerto Ricans on the mainland than on the island (Lopez and Velasco, 2011). Moreover, migration statistics do not accurately indicate the fre- quent back-and-forth movement between island and mainland, so it is quite reason- able to assume that a much larger number of islanders have, at one time or another, migrated. Indeed, during the three decades between 1940 and 1970, it is unlikely that a single Puerto Rican family was unaffected by this movement (Fitzpatrick, 1987; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976).

To a limited extent, Puerto Ricans participated in the ethnic movements of the 1960s and early, 1970s. Several groups emerged at that time, advocating control by Puerto Ricans of their communities and emphasizing ethnic identity and pride. The Yo ung Lords, for example, a militant group in Chicago and New York, imitated the activities of the Black Panthers in organizing Puerto Rican ghettos and calling for a redress of squalid conditions (Lopez, 1980). As with black and Chicano political ac- tivism, Puerto Rican militancy resulted in drawing the serious attention of national authorities to the Puerto Rican community for the first time. But as with blacks and Chicanos, programs of federal and community agencies directed at Puerto Ricans dwindled with the passing of militancy in the 1970s.

Today the Puerto Rican population is increasingly a second- and third- eneration ethnic group, with two-thirds having been born on the mainland. This is

especially evident in New York, where the largest number of Puerto Ricans continues ro reside. In 1950, more than 81 percent of all Puerto Ricans on the mainland lived there, and in 1970, 62 percent did so. During the 1970s and 1980s, Puerto Ricans

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218 PAR T II ETH N ICITY IN TH E UN IT ED STAT ES

began to disperse, with large commumt1es developing in California and Florida (Torrecilha et al., 1999; Whalen, 2005). By 2010, less than 20 percent of Puerto Ricans lived in the New York metropolitan area (Logan and Turner, 2013 ). Other significant Puerto Rican communities are found in Chicago, Philadelphia, and north- ern New Jersey, especially Newark and Jersey City. The remainder are primarily in cities of the Northeast. In addition, many-even some born on the mainland-have returned to Puerto Rico (Dockterman, 2011).

CUBAN AMERICANS

The conditions of immigration for Cubans and their subsequent settlement patterns have been unlike those experienced by either Mexicans or Puerto Ricans.

Given its geographical proximity to Cuba, the United States often served as a haven for Cuban exiles during times of political turmoil before and afteF the Cuban movement for independence from Spain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, one of the key figures of Cuban political history, Jose Martf, some- times called Cuba's George Washington, spent much of his exile during the 1880s in the United States. Small colonies of Cubans had for many years been present in Key West, Tampa, Miami, and New York.

THE C UBAN REVOLUTION AND L ARGE- S CALE I MMIGRATION In the 1960s, following the revolu- tion led by Fidel Castro, Cubans began to come to the United States in significant numbers. Whereas pull factors of migration were stronger for Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, push factors seemed more crucial for early Cuban immigrants. Their chief motivation was politkal refuge rather than economic betterment. Nonetheless, the underlying economic objectives of the emigres should not be overlooked. Because the revolution imposed a socialist system in Cuba, the power and economic opportu- nities for most of the early immigrants-who were mainly middle-, upper -middle-, or upper-class people-had been severely constricted. As Portes has explained, "The wealthy, the successful, the powerful, the educated saw their status challenged, their influence radically curtailed, and their economic position continuously menaced" (1969:506). Departure from Cuba, then, was not simply politically inspired but was calculated in the hope of reestablishing a relatively high socioeconomic status in the United States and returning to Cuba when political conditions were favorable. For later Cuban immigrants, economic factors in the decision to migrate were even more clearly apparent (Portes et al., 1977; Wong, 1974).

Cuban immigration from 1960 onward was aided immeasurably by American policies that in effect permitted the entrance of Cuban refugees without restriction. The political objectives of this policy are not difficult to understand. The chilled rela-

.,tions between the Cuban and American governments soon after the Cuban Revolu- tion were followed with strongly belligerent actions by the United States, including an American-sponsored invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and imposing a trade embargo against Cuba in the same year. The Cuban mis- sile crisis of 1962 firmly established the Castro regime as a basic element in the Cold War, and from that point forward Cuba became a bete noire for successive American administrations. Cuba was portrayed in the United States as a "communist strong- hold" and the Cuban people as "politically enslaved." The emigration of large

CHAPTER 8 HISPA N IC AMERI CAN S 219

numbers of Cubans, therefore, was seen as confirmation of this perspective, and the refugees were welcomed enthusiastically. 3

Large-scale Cuban immigration ceased in 1973 but resumed for a brief period in 1980, when more than 125,000 people came to the United States. The conditions under which this second immigrant wave left Cuba were graphically described by the American media, and the manner in which they arrived-most in small boats- further dramatized their entrance. They were dubbed Marielitos, in reference to the port of Mariel, from which most of them departed Cuba. These immigrants were generally lower in social class than the original Cuban refugees, and many were '- black or mulatto. As a result, they did not find adjustment to American society as smooth or their reception as enthusiastic. They experienced higher rates of unem- ployment, low-paid work, and dependence on charity and public welfare. Moreover, the presence of a criminal element among them served to taint the entire group (Corral and Viglucci, 2005; Portes et al., 1985).

Except for part of the second wave, most Cuban immigrants entered the United States with a strong family and kin support system that aided their adjustment con- siderably (Portes et al., 1977). Indeed, following the initial immigration in the early 1960s, succeeding immigrants were encouraged to come to the United States by rela - tives or friends who could offer them physical and economic assistance (Fagan et al., 1968). Although the presence of friends and relatives has also characterized the Mexican and Puerto Rican migrations (recall the network theory of immigration, discussed in Chapter 5), the support system of Cubans has been stronger and more complete. Moreover, Cubans have experienced substantial economic success and have therefore been able to offer greater assistance to those who have followed them. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and most other Latin American groups, by contrast, have remained collectively in a far less secure economic position.

As we will see, the Cuban American population is markedly distinct from most other Latino groups in demographic and socioeconomic features. It is older- the me- dian age is forty -one compared to twenty-seven for the rest of the Latino population- and the rate at which Cubans acquire U.S. citizenship (60 percent) is more than double the rate for other Hispanics (Pew Hispanic Center, 2006a). In terms of income, occupation, and education, it more closely resembles the non-Hispanic white popula- tion, and it has not been subject to the prejudice and discrimination that Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have historically experienced.

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DOMINICANS, CENTRAL AMERICANS, AND SOUTH AMERICANS

In the past two decades, the Hispanic American population has been infused with newer groups, from Central and South America and from the Caribbean, whose numbers in the United States previously were very tiny.

DOMINICANS Those from the Dominican Republic constitute the largest of the newer Latino groups, about 3 percent of all Hispanic Americans. Dominicans began

3 For thirty-five years, the U.S. federal government maintained an open-door policy for Cubans who fled to the United States. Under the policy, they were given immediate permanent resident status- terms affor ded no other immigrant or refugee group. The po licy was effectively terminated in 1995 with the elimination of Cubans' automatic acceptance as political refugees (Nackerud et al., 1999).

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220 PART II ETH NICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

arriving in large numbers in the 1970s, and their percentage of the Latino population has continued to grow. Between 1990 and 2000 the number of Dominican immi- grants nearly doubled (Grieco, 2004). More than half of all Dominicans have settled in the New York metropolitan area, where they are one of its largest immigrant groups. The remainder are in just a few states, mostly in the Northeast and Florida (Boswell and Jones, 2006; Logan and Turner, 2013).

When looked at in comparison with other Hispanic groups, Dominicans have fared more poorly, resembling in many ways the Puerto Rican patterns of adaptation and socioeconomic status (Hernandez, 2007; Kasinitz et al., 2006; Reimers, 2006). Most Dominicans work in low-paying service or factory jobs and are handicapped by low levels of education. Roughly half of Dominican families are headed by women, and they suffer a poverty rate considerably higher than the overall poverty rate in New York, where most reside (Bernstein, 2005) . The racial factor h~s also affected this group because most identify themselves as "mulatto" or "black" (Pessar, 1995).

CENTRAL AMERICANS Immigrants from Central American countries entered the United States in large numbers starting in the 1980s, mostly because of political unrest in the region. Many arrived as refugees and many were undocumented. Immigration from Central America continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s, though no longer as the result of political unrest. Today Central American immigrants come to the United States primarily as a result of the push-pull factors of employment and living conditions. Over half have come to the United States since 1990 (Logan and Turner, 2013; Stoney and Batalova, 2013 ; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007c).

Together, those from Central American countries constitute about 9 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States. The largest specific groups within this category are Salvadorans (more than 40 percent), Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans. As noted earlier, racially and culturally, Central Americans make up a diverse category.

On socioeconomic measures, compared to other Latino groups, Central Americans most closely resemble Mexicans: their level of education is low, their household income is low, and they occupy mostly unskilled occupational positions. There are, however, noticeable differences among the various Central American groups. Nicaraguans have higher incomes, higher levels of education, and are more apt to work in managerial and professional jobs than Guatemalans, Hondurans, or Salvadorans (Chinchilla and Hamilton, 2007; Logan and Turner, 2013; Stoney and Batalova, 2013).

SouTH AMERICANS Those whose origins are South American countries make up almost 6 percent of Hispanic Americans. The largest specific components of this subpopula- tion are from Colombia (by far, the largest, representing about one-third of the South American category), Ecuador, and Peru. There is also a sizable Brazilian pop- ulation in the United States, though this group is technically not part of the "Latino" world. It is difficult to estimate the size of these groups because so many have come to the United States as undocumented immigrants, but it is certain that their numbers are substantially larger than census figures would indicate (Margolis, 1998) . Like others who preceded them, these immigrants come in pursuit of economic better- ment, and many harbor expectations of returning to their origin societies after work- ing for a period in the United States.

CHAPTER 8 HISPANI C AMERICANS 221

A large number of immigrants from South America in recent years have been drawn to the United States as a result of economic uncertainties in their home coun- tries. In the early 2000s, economic conditions created hardships especially for middle-class families in countries like Argentina and Venezuela who were well edu- cated and had skilled occupations but who found themselves increasingly impover- ished or even unemployed. Thus the push factors motivating migration to the United States and other countries with strong economies intensified (Forero, 2001; M arrow, 2007; Price, 2006).

In their social and economic characteristics, South Americans in the United States exhibit stronger similarities to Cubans than to other Latino groups. On aver- age they are better educated, are concentrated in higher occupational categories, and earn higher incomes. Still, it is important to keep in mind that the category "South Americans" comprises not only a culturally diverse population but one with notice- able socioeconomic differences among its various groups.

HISPANIC AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS

POPULATION TRENDS Hispanic Americans constitute a rapidly growing ethnic minority. Between 1990 and 2010, the Latino population increased by 130 percent, far greater than the U.S. population in total. This is accounted for by a combination of contin- ued heavy immigration and a comparatively high birthrate.

In addition to their rapid growth rate, Hispanics in the United ~tates constitute a relatively young population. The median age of the Hispanic American population is twenty-seven, compared to forty for the non-Hispanic white population and thirty- seven for the total U.S. population. About one in three Hispanics is under eighteen years of age compared with one in five non-Hispanic whites. At the other end of the age spectrum, whereas about 5 percent of Hispanics are sixty-five or older, about 15 percent of non-Hispanic whites are in this age bracket. These demographic facts indicate that Hispanics are likely to account for almost half of U.S. population growth in the next fifty years (Durand et al., 2006) .

GEOGRAPHIC TRENDS In recent decades, the Hispanic population has been rapidly dis- persing widely ¢roughout all regions of the United States. Indeed, few states and re- gions do not now contain a Latino community of some size. This represents a sharp break with past patterns of settlement, in which Hispanics entered and mostly re- mained in the Southwest (Brown and Lopez, 2013 ; Parisi and Lichter, 2007; Parrado and Kandel, 2008; Smith and Furuseth, 2006; Zuiiiga and Hernandez-Leon, 2005).

This dispersion has been particularly evident among Mexican Americans. Mexican communities in the industrial cities of the Midwest had been in evidence for several dec- ades (Aponte and Siles, 1994), but the movement of Mexicans into other regions, par- ticularly the Southeast, has now become a substantial flow (Brown and Lopez, 2013; Durand et al., 2006; Frey, 2010; Smith and Furuseth, 2006). Consider that in Atlanta and Memphis, Hispanics (mostly Mexicans), never in the past more than a minor ele- ment of the population in those cities, now dominate the construction and landscaping trades (Schmitt, 2001b). Mexicans, along with some Central Americans, have become the main source of labor for meatpacking plants in Omaha, Nebraska, and numerous other smaller midwestern cities. And they make up the bulk of the workforce in poultry

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222 PART II ETH NICI TY IN T HE UNITED STAT ES

Colorado 2.1%

New Jersey 3.1%

Arizona 3.8%

Illinois 4.0%

Al l other states 25.4%

FIGURE 8.2 I PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE HISPANIC POPULATION Source: U.S . Census Bureau (2011).

plants in Delaware, North Carolina, and Arkansas and seafood-processing plants along the East Coast' (Durand et al. , 2006; Viglucci, 2000). Mexicans have also become a significant part of New York's large Latino population (Bernstein, 2005).

Despite the growth of Latino communities throughout the United States, the vast majority of Hispanic Americans are still concentrated within just a few states. In fact, almost two-thirds of all Hispanics live in just four states- California, Texas, Florida, and New York (Figure 8.2) . Like African Americans, Latinos are primarily urban dwellers. Table 8.1 shows the metropolitan areas with more than 1 million Latinos.

Specific Latino groups are similarly concentrated in just a few states and major metropolitan areas. Although Mexican Americans can now be found in virtually every state and region, fully one-half still live in two states alone, California and Texas . Cubans are the most concentrated of the three major Hispanic groups, with about half residing in the metropolitan Miami area. Other sizable Cuban communi- ties are found in New York, northern New Jersey, Tampa, and Los Angeles, but in no way do they resemble the Miami community. Dominicans, like Cubans, are con- centrated in a single locale, New York City, where they now constitute the city's largest immigrant group.

Among the Central American groups, the major concentrations of Salvadorans and Guatemalans are in Los Angeles, where about one-fifth of all Central American immigrants reside. The largest cluster of Nicaraguans is in Miami, where they make up one of the city's largest Latino groups. In the past, Miami was primarily a Cuban American city, but in recent years it has become a magnet for all Hispanic groups, including tens of thousands from virtually every country in Latin America and the

C HAPTER 8 HI SPAN IC AME R ICANS 223

TABLE S. r I M ETROPOLITAN A REAS WITH M O RE T HAN O NE M ILLI ON L ATINOS (IN M ILLI ONS)

Percent of Total Number Population

Los Angeles- Long Beach, CA 5.7 45

New York- Northeastern, NJ 4.2 24

Miami-Hialeah, FL 1.6 66

Houston-Brazoria, TX 2.0 36

Chicago, IL 1.9 21

Riverside- San Bernardino, CA 2.0 47

Dallas- Fort Worth, TX 1.7 28

Phoenix, AZ 1.1 30

San Antonio, TX 1.1 55

San Francisco-Oakland- Vallejo, CA 1.1 22

San Diego, CA 1.0 32

Source: Motel and Patten (2012 ).

Caribbean (Alberts, 2006; Illa, 201 O; Logan and Turner, 2013 ). In addition to Los Angeles and Miami, other large Central American populations are found in New York, Houston, and Washington (Logan and Turner, 2013; Miyares, 2006).

South Americans are the most dispersed among Latinos. Nonetheless, half of all South Americans in the United States are found in just three metropolitan regions: New York- Newark, Miami-Fort Lauderdale, and Los Angeles (Logan and Turner, 2013 ). In several New York City boroughs, there are distinguishable Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian, and Argentine concentrations. Colombians have been settling in New York since the 1960s and have made a significant imprint on the residential and commercial life of certain neighborhoods. But even this group is composed mostly of those who have come to the United States only in the past two decades (Guarnizo and Espitia, 2007).

LATINOS IN THE CLASS SYSTEM

S OCIOECONOMIC S TATUS

As in other societal dimensions, Hispanic Americans seem to occupy an intermediate position-below Euro-Americans, but in several ways above African Americans-in the degree of economic success they have achieved and in the paths to upward mo- bility they are following. However, keep in mind that "Hispanic American" is an umbrella category encompassing several distinct groups. Thus important differences will be evident among them.

..

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224 PART II ETH NICITY IN THE UN ITED STATES

T ABLE 8. 2 I HISPANIC A MERICAN SOCIOECO N OM IC S TATUS, 2011

Median Household Percent of People Percent Income in Poverty Unemployed

Non-Hispanic white $53,444 13.0 5.6

Hispanic $39,589 25.8 8.4

Mexican $38,884 27.5 8.2

Puerto Rican $36,460 27.4 9.8

Cuban $38,808 19.3 8.0

Dominican $32,815 28.5 ' 9.9 Central American $40,307 24.9 8.7

South American $50,578 14.0 6.7

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2012a ).

INCOME, WEALTH, AN D PovERTY As shown in Table 8.2, despite moderate gains during the past two decades, Hisp~nic household income remains only about three-quarters of non-Hispanic white income. Though income for all Hispanic groups is substan- tially lower than for whites , there is a range among the specific groups. Cuban fami- lies and those from' South America on average earn more than Mexicans, who earn slightly more than Puerto Ricans. Dominicans are the lowest income-earning group among all Hispanics, and a larger percentage is below the poverty line.

Like African Americans, Latinos lag far behind whites in wealth (Figure 8.3). The median net worth of Latino families is about 5 percent of whites', and less than half

All households 70 ,000

13,566

Non-Hispanic - -- -- - ~ - -~ ~- --~ -- - 113,149

white householders [H -] 29, 169

Hispan ic householders

6,325

• Median net worth

D Median net worth excluding home equity

FIGURE 8.3 I W EALTH DIFFERENTIALS B ETWEEN WHITES AN D HISPAN ICS (2009 DOLLARS) Source: Pew Research Center (2011b).

CH APTER 8 HI SPAN IC AMERI CANS 225

of Latino families own their homes, compared to three-quarters of whites (Pendall et al., 2012). Possessing little wealth, Latino families were among those most severely affected by the deep economic recession of the late 2000s (Kochhar et al., 2009; Mather and Jacobsen, 2010). Between 2007 and 2010, Hispanic family wealth dropped by over 40 percent, compared to 11 percent for whites (McKernan, 2013).

With income and wealth well below average, Latinos- especially Mexicans and Puerto Ricans-are, predictably, disproportionately among America's poor. One- quarter of all Latinos are below the poverty line, a rate almost twice that of non- .. Hispanic whites (Table 8.2). As with income, however, there is a poverty range within the Hispanic American category: Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Central Americans below the poverty line are more numerous than Cubans and South Americans. Indeed, among a significant part of the Latino population, eco- nomic conditions are much akin to those of the black underclass (Reimers, 2006).

O ccurATJ ON The low incomes and high poverty rates of Latinos, particularly Mexi- cans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, reflect their generally lower occupational le- vels . Except for Cubans and most South Americans, Latinos are underrepresented in the higher-status occupational categories and overrepresented in the lower ones. For example, whereas almost 40 percent of non-Hispanic whites are in managerial or professional occupations, less than 20 percent of Hispanics are. At the other end of the occupational hierarchy, 16 percent of non-Hispanic whites but 23 percent of Hispanics are engaged in service jobs (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012a). Hispanics also exhibit high unemployment rates compared to non-Hispanic whites (Table 8.2). And, as with African Americans, official statistics understate the extent of this problem.

Again, it is important to keep in mind the social class differences among Latino groups. There are similarities among Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Central Americans, but Cubans and, to some extent, South Americans exhibit no- ticeably higher statuses on various measures of income, occupation, and education. For example, whereas only 16 percent of Mexicans are in managerial and profes- sional occupations, the comparable figure among Cubans is 31 percent, not radically different from the percentage of non-Hispanic whites.

What accounts for the relatively low levels of income and occupation of most ' Hispanic American groups? Although employment discrimination against Latinos

has historically been a factor for particular groups, especially Mexicans in the South- west and Puerto Ricans in New York, today low levels of education and their rela- tively recent entry into the labor force seem most critical (Camarillo and Bonilla, 200 1). Large proportions of all Latino groups have immigrated to the United States since 1965. As latecomers to the American postindustrial economy and with gener- ally lower educational levels, they have necessarily occupied the least skilled and lowest-paying jobs. Like African Americans, they have become disproportionately part of the most expendable element of the workforce, generally lacking the require- ments for positions above the semiskilled or unskilled levels. As an unusually young population, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and most Central Americans are most likely to lack marketable skills and work experience. They also lag in educational attainment. Hence, the economic gap between those groups and non-Hispanic whites remains wide.

226 PART II ETH N IC ITY IN THE UN IT ED STA T ES

T 8 I

HISPANIC A MERI CAN EDUCATIONAL L EVEL, P EO PLE AGE T WENTY-FIVE ABLE .3

AND OLDE R, 2011

Less Than High School Some Bachelor's High Graduate College Degree or

School( % ) Only(%) (%) Higher(%)

Non-Hispanic white 12.0 28.8 29.3 29.9

Hispanic 36.8 27.1 22.9 13.2

Mexican 42.2 27.0 21.2 9.6

Puerto Rican 24.9 29.8 29.1 16.1

Cuban 23.1 28.9 23.8 24.2

Dominican 33.7 25.9 25.1 15.3

Central American 46.5 24.5 18.8 ' 10.2 South American 15.6 26.0 27.5 30.8

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2012a ).

EDUCATI ON Perhaps the most serious factor in accounting for the lower occupational status and earnings of Hispanic Americans in general is their lower educational level. As shown in Table 8.3, only 63 percent of Latinos twenty-five years of age and over have completed high school, compared with almost 90 percent of non-Hispanic whites. The dropout rate among Latinos is also significantly higher compared to that of both whites and blacks. Advances in recent years have begun to close this ed- ucational gap, however. The proportion of younger Latinos who have completed high school is substantially higher compared to older Latinos, and the proportion at- tending college has also increased markedly (Cardenas and Kerby, 2012; Fry and Taylor, 2013; Pew Hispanic Center, 2009).

Although Latinos are narrowing the educational attainment gap with other ra- cial and ethnic groups, they still lag behind in college completion rates and remain the least educated. Moreover, as with African Americans, Hispanic American stu- dents are severely underrepresented in strongly competitive colleges and universities. Those high school graduates who go on to higher education do so primarily at less selective four -year schools or two-year community colleges (Carnevale and Strohl, 2013). However, as with income, it is important to consider the differences in educa- tional attainment within the Latino category. As is seen in Table 8.3, for example, the discrepancy between Mexicans and Central Americans, on the one hand, and Cubans and South Americans, on the other, is very great .

., Reasons for the lower educational attainment of Latinos, particularly Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, have been debated. Some contend that inappropriate cultural values fail to encourage successful school performance; others maintain that schools themselves, Anglo dominated as they are, do not address the unique needs of Latino students. One point about which there is general agreement is that lan- guage difficulties intensify the academic problems of these students (Celis, 1992; Moll and Ruiz, 2002; Orfield, 2002). Many Mexican American students in the

C H APTER 8 H ISPAN IC AM ERI CAl\S 2 27

Southwest are from families with non-English-speaking backgrounds, making their school experience trying, at best. Language problems create or exacerbate much of the high dropout rate and poor academic performance among Puerto Ricans and Dominicans as well.

In sum, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans are underrepre- sented at the higher levels of the mainstream economy and overrepresented among the poor. And, because they face the same increasingly technical and high-skilled ._ job market as African Americans with a correspondingly low skill level, they will continue to make up a large segment of the poor in the foreseeable future . In looking at the socioeconomic levels of these groups, it should be noted that these are aggre- gate figures reflecting the groups' general position in the American stratification system. There will obviously be an entire range of occupational and income positions within each group despite their disproportionate concentration at the lower levels. Moreover, evidence indicates that when adjustments are made for differences in human capital, especially education and English-language proficiency, there is little difference between Latinos and whites in occupational status and earnings (Duncan et al., 2006).

CUBANS: A SPECIAL CASE

Cubans are unlike most other Latino groups in their adaptation to the American eco- nomic system. Indeed, few groups in American ethnic history have matched the phe- nomenal socioeconomic rise of the contemporary Cuban American community in so short a time. On all measures of socioeconomic status, Cl;lbans are clearly well in ad- vance of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans despite their more recent arrival. Their income and educational levels are higher, their unemployment rates are lower, and they are well represented across the occupational spectrum. What accounts for these striking differences?

CLASS B AC KGROUN D Cuban immigrants to the United States, particularly the first wave, brought with them a class background markedly different from that of most other Latinos. A disproportionate number derived from the middle and upper strata of prerevolutiolll;lry Cuban society. In their study of early Cuban refugees, Fagan, Brody, and O'Leary (1968) found that professional and semiprofessional occupa- tions were heavily overrepresented among this group, whereas fishing and agri - cultural jobs-those predominating in Cuba- were hardly represented at all. The occupational skills Cubans brought with them enabled them to work themselves more easily into the mainstream economy and climb rapidly even though most of them experienced downward mobility when they first entered the United States. In- deed, research has shown that among younger Cubans in the United States, the rate of upward mobility has been similar to that of immigrants from English-speaking countries (Massey, 1981a). In addition to their high occupational status in Cuba, the refugees were far better educated than most Cubans, and most were urban resi- dents. Succeeding immigrant cohorts displayed a somewhat lower class background but still represented a privileged sector of Cuban society (Portes et al., 1977) .

Cubans in the United States, then, differ radically from most other Hispanics in their social origins. Unlike Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, early Cuban immigrants

228 PART II ETHNICITY IN TH E UNIT ED STATES

were likely to have been occupationally successful and well educated before emigrat- ing. These higher skill and educational levels translated into rapid upward mobility in the United States.

RACE The more rapid ascent of Cubans in the American ethnic system is explained in some part by the fact that most immigrant Cubans have been white and there- fore have not been exposed to the added handicap of racial discrimination in the labor market, with which many Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans have had to deal.

THE MIAMI ETHNIC ENCLAVE Another advantage Cubans have had over other Hispanic groups has been the creation of an institutionally complete community in Miami, where most Cuban Americans reside. An ethnic enclave economy was established by early Cuban immigrants, composed of numerous small businesses serving the eth- nic community. In addition, a small manufacturing sector emerged that subsequently employed other Cuban immigrants who arrived with fewer skills and less financial capital. The presence of an ethnic subeconomy not only created jobs for these immi- grants but also enabled them to avoid the secondary labor market of the mainstream economy, where jobs ordinarily are temporary and do not provide for occupational advancement. Many of the Cuban immigrant workers who were employed by Cuban business owners eventually acquired the skills and capital needed to open their own establishments, which created an expanding Cuban subeconomy (Portes and Bach, 1985; Stepick and Stepick, 2002; Wilson and Portes, 1980).

Neither Mexican~ nor Puerto Ricans have been as demographically concentrated as Cubans, thus making the development of similar economic arrangements imprac- ticable. Moreover, neither group contained a substantial entrepreneurial class, pos- sessing both business capital and skills, that could re-create in the United States the position it held in its country of origin and thereby serve as the nucleus of an ethnic subeconomy.

U.S . GovERNMENT POLI CY Cuban economic success in the United States also has been very much a product of the fact that Cubans were received as political migrants- that is, as refugees-rather than as economic migrants. As a result, the U.S. gov- ernment provided aid to early-arriving Cuban immigrants that helped them in reestablishing their class position (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985; Stepick and Stepick, 2002). Mexicans and other Latinos, by contrast, have traditionally been received as economic migrants and have never been given similar government assistance.

CUBANS AND OTHER LATINOS Despite the extraordinary achievement of Cubans relative to other Hispanic Americans, their economic success in the United States should not be overstated. Although Cubans are certainly in a very different category from Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Dominicans, their median income is still below Anglos', and their poverty and unemployment rates are higher. Moreover, even though they are well represented in the higher-level white-collar occupations, most are still in clerical, semiskilled, or service jobs. Moreover, the economic gap between Cubans and other Hispanics is closing (Betancur et al., 1993; Perez-Stable and

CH APTE R 8 HI SPAN IC AME RI CANS 229

Uriarte, 1993; U.S. Census Bureau, 2007c). Many newly arriving Latinos from South American countries, for example, bring the same economic resources with them that early-arriving Cubans brought: high educational and occupational skills. And, like Cubans, they do not face a racial disadvantage.

The economic success of Cuban Americans has been lauded so often that an im- age has arisen of an ethnic group made up entirely of families that have prospered in the United States. But this popular image belies an increasingly evident internal '- socioeconomic discrepancy. The first waves of Cuban immigrants who came in the 1960s and 1970s have fared very well. More recent waves, however, arrived with fewer economic resources and have not experienced the very favorable reception given the earliest immigrants. The result is an increasingly evident income disparity within the group (Eckstein, 2009; Perez, 2007).

L ATINOS AND POLITICAL P OWER

Latino political power in the United States is still in its infancy. However, Hispanic Americans represent a growing and increasingly powerful political force. This was evidenced most clearly in the presidential election of 2012. Most political observers attributed the Obama victory in large measure to the resoundingly strong Latino vote, about three-quarters of which went to the Democratic candidate. Although Latinos have not yet mobilized as effectively as have African Americans in recent years, the rapidly growing Latino population assures that Hispanic American politi- cal influence will continue to blossom.

At the national level, Hispanic Americans are increasingly evident on the politi- cal scene, including 38 members of Congress and several cabinet appointments. In state and local politics, they have begun to flex their political muscle where they have been traditionally a large, or majority, element of the population. As early as 1981 San Antonio had elected a Mexican American mayor, and in 2005, Antonio Villaraigosa, the son of Mexican immigrants, was elected mayor of Los Angeles. This marked the first time a Mexican American had served in that office in modern times . Cubans have emerged as the dominant political force in Miami with its large Hispanic population, holding most high-ranking local political positions (Perez, 2007; Stepick, et al., 2003 ). In California and Texas, where the largest part of the Hispanic American population resides, Latinos are increasingly winning elections not only at the local level but to state offices as well. Although the Hispanic elector- ate in any state does not yet correspond to the Hispanic percentage of the popu- lation, its influence is becoming more apparent. By 2011, almost six thousand Latinos held publicly elected offices at various government levels-local, state, and federal (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, 2011).

Hispanic voting rates have lagged behind those of whites and blacks. This is mostly a product of the large percentage of immigrants in the Latino population, as well as the fact that the population is younger, which makes for fewer eligible voters. In 2012, Hispanics made up 17 percent of the general population, but comprised less than 9 percent of all voters (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera, 2013). However, an expanding population base and continued assimilation will probably stimulate in- creased political activism. In the 2008 national election, for example, although the Latino voting rate was significantly lower than for non-Hispanic whites and blacks,

.,

230 PART II ETH N ICITY IN TH E UN IT ED STAT ES

almost ten million Latinos voted, a 40 percent increase from 2000 (Campos-Flores and Fineman, 2005; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010f). In a number of states, Hispanics already constitute a critical swing vote (DeSipio, 2006). The significance of the Latino vote in the 2012 presidential election, in which a record number of Latinos participated, has already been noted. The Latino vote is likely to double in size within a generation in large measure a result of the fact that the Latino population is younger than any other ethnic group. Thus, those eligible to vote will increase markedly in the next few decades (Taylor et al., 2012).

That Latinos are a growing element of the population and a potential electoral force has not been ignored by the two major political parties at both local and na - tional levels. Presidential candidates, for example, now routinely make appeals to the Latino vote. Moreover, Hispanic Americans give indications of greater political independence, rather than voting strictly along party lines (Johnson, 20'04). This has enhanced their appeal to both parties. In 2007, a debate was held in Miami among the Democratic presidential candidates, who addressed mostly issues of concern to Hispanics; what made it unique is that it was conducted in Spanish and televised on the Spanish-language network, Univision. Following the debate, one Latino political figure proclaimed his vision of the Latino political future: "We're just getting started. Pretty soon the rest of the country will start looking like Miami. And just imagine what will happen in 2050, when 6 of the 10 largest US cities start with 'Los' or 'San'? Like us or not, here we come" (Lovato, 2007).

LATINOS IN THE GoRPORATE WORLD

As with African Americans, the role of Hispanic Americans in leadership positions in the American economy is limited. Very few of the largest U.S. corporations have Latinos on their boards of directors or in executive positions. Among CEOs of For- tune 500 companies, only six-little more than 1 percent- are Hispanic Americans (Diversity Inc, 2013 ). Nonetheless, there is evidence that an increasing number of Latinos are moving through the corporate elite pipeline (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2006). Also, an increasing number of Hispanic-owned firms are growing in eco- nomic significance, though most enterprises owned by Latinos are small, family - operated businesses (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006).

A disproportionate number of highly successful Latino entrepreneurs and cor- porate executives come from Cuban American backgrounds (Whitefield, 2000; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2006). As noted, the greater economic success of Cuban Americans by comparison with other Latinos is the result primarily of their generally higher class background and the entrepreneurial skills and resources many brought with them from Cuba. In Miami, Cuban Americans are the economically dominant ethnic group, in both large and small enterprises. Cubans are president of the city's largest bank, owner of the largest real estate developer, managing partner of the larg- est law firm, and publisher of the largest newspaper (Cardwell, 1998; Navarro, 1999).

Other successful Hispanic corporate executives exhibit social backgrounds simi- lar to the Cubans': they usually are products of at least middle-class families and are well educated. Moreover, as Zweigenhaft and Domhoff describe them, some have had an elite education "that gave them the social connections and educational cre- dentials to move quickly into responsible positions in the corporate community"

C HAPTER 8 HI SPAN IC AME RICANS 23 I

(2006:148). Few appear to have come from humble origins or did not use family backing or elite educations to rise to their positions. All, furthermore, are racially and culturally compatible with their Euro -American counterparts. What distin- guishes them more than any other characteristic, however, is their international ori- entation. Having grown up in various Latin American countries, they have a worldly background that reflects the kind of globalism within which contemporary corporate executives must function, and they are usually fluent in a language other than English.

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

Because of their in-between minority status, Latinos have not been subjected to the dogged prejudice and discrimination aimed at African Americans, but neither have they been dealt with as European immigrant groups were. John R. Howard refers to such intermediate groups as "partial minorities" and calls attention to their para- doxical position: "By being somewhat below the threshold of public consciousness with regard to 'minority problems' they escape some of the pervasive indignities vis- ited upon blacks, but, precisely because of this it becomes difficult to arouse public indignation at the depredations they do suffer" (1970:8- 9).

More precisely, an entire range of attitudes and actions has characterized the re - lations between Anglos and the several Hispanic groups. Variations have turned on each group's historical context, its geographical location, and its racial makeup. Those close to the dominant Anglo group, like most Cubans, ha've experienced little prejudice and discrimination; at the other extreme, dark-skinned Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have often encountered ethnic antagonism equal in form and degree to that suffered by African Americans.

HISPANIC STEREOTYPES

For as long as they have been part of the American ethnic mosaic, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans have labored under strongly negative stereotypes. These have arisen in response to the manner in which both groups became part of the society (more so in the case of Mexicans than Puerto Ricans) and as manifestations of American racist ideolog'y.

~EXICAN A M ERICANS Feelings of racial superiority on the part of Anglos and policies reflecting those beliefs have been obvious since the American conquest of the South- west in the nineteenth century. More than anything, the historical circumstances that originally brought Mexican and Anglo into confrontation fashioned a set of group images that have remained stubbornly persistent.

As noted in Chapter 3, negative group images are ordinarily formed as a result of some form of interethnic competition, usually economic. In the Southwest, land and labor were the critical components in the development of mutual antagonism between Anglos and Mexicans. "To the early American settlers," writes Carey YlcWilliams, "the Mexicans were lazy, shiftless, jealous, cowardly, bigoted, supersti- tious, backward, and immoral" (1968:99). These images subsequently served to ra - tionalize the dispossession of Mexicans' lands and the exploitation of their labor.

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232 PART II ETH N ICITY IN TH E UN ITED ST ATES

The negative stereotyping of Mexicans was abetted by the fact that they were a con- quered people. To the Anglos this only confirmed even more positively their inferior nature. Correspondingly negative stereotypes of Anglos naturally arose in this situa- tion. To the Mexicans, Anglos were "arrogant, overbearing, aggressive, conniving, rude, unreliable, and dishonest" (McWilliams, 1968:99) .

Also critical in the development of negative stereotypes of Mex icans were the ra- cial attitudes Anglo settlers brought with them to Texas . From the beginning, Anglos viewed Mexicans as innately inferior on the basis of their racial characteristics (Moore and Pachon, 1976). Mexicans were different in language, culture, and reli- gion, but they were also physically distinct from the Anglos. As a mestizo people, they were not blacks, but neither were they whites. This in-between racial status led to the classification of Mexicans as a separate racial group, one perhaps a notch above blacks but clearly inferior to the Anglos. ,

The poverty and illiteracy of those Mexicans with whom Anglo settlers had the most dealings further strengthened these negative views. Mc Williams notes that most of the Anglos who settled in the Southwest borderlands in the mid-nineteenth century were middle-class people who failed to find a Mex ican middle -class counterpart. "If a larger middle-class element had existed," he explains, "the adjustment between the two cultures might have been facilitated and the amount of intermarriage might have been greater " (1968:75). Although upper-class Hispanos were initially seen in a different light, they too were eventually absorbed into the adverse image.

The negative stereotypes of Mexicans that developed during and after the period of conquest were maintained and even strengthened not only in the Southwest, but also in the sociefy generally. Mexicans were included among the "undesirable" groups denoted by the Dillingham Commission in the early 1900s, along with south- ern and eastern Europeans, falling somewhere between blacks, on one hand, and "white" Americans, on the other. It is instructive to note that despite their undesir- able status, Mexicans were so vital as a cheap labor supply in the Southwest that they were exempted from the restrictive immigration laws drafted at the time, largely on the basis of the commission's report.

The stereotypes developed in the nineteenth century continued to influence the views of Anglos in the Southwest and elsewhere throughout most of the twentieth cen- tury. In his study of a south Texas community in the early 1970s, Simmons (1971) found that Anglos believed Mexicans to be unclean, prone to drunkenness and crimi- nality, deceitful in dealings with Anglos, hostile, and unpredictable. Among favorable images of Mexicans were their "romantic" rather than "realistic " attitude and their fun-loving nature. But even the positive traits implied a childlike and irresponsible character, making the Mexicans appear deserving of their subordinate status .

Television and movies played a large role in perpetuating negative stereotypes of Mexican Americans, much as they did for African Americans and American Indians. In Hollywood films, Mexicans traditionally were portrayed as villains in confronta- tion with Anglos; even when they were allied with the Anglo heroes, their roles were ordinarily subservient and often ludicrous (Berg, 2002; Petit, 1980; Wilson and Gutierrez, 1995). Television commercials at times also perpetrated the villainous im- age of Mexicans (Martinez, 1972; Wagner and Haug, 1971). For example, in one of their ads, the Frito-Lay Company featured a cartoon character, the "Frito Bandito, " who cunningly stole Fritos corn chips from the kitchens of unsuspecting housewives,

CH APTE R 8 HI SPANIC AM ER ICANS 23 3

prompting the suggestion that shoppers buy two bags. As TV producers and mass- media advertisers have become more attuned to a growing Latino market, such ste- reotypical images are no longer common. Ten years after it was forced to remove its Frito Bandito ad, for example, the Frito-Lay Company advertised Tostitos, an- other corn chip product, this time with a character who spoke with a lilting Spanish accent and presented a romantic image of a distinguished, cultured Latino (Wilson and Gutierrez, 1995).

PUERTO RICANS Although they have not experienced a history of confrontation and conflict with Anglos, as Mexicans have in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans have none- theless commonly been stereotyped negatively. This is mainly a product of their ra- cial distinction and their generally lower-class position. Because much of the Puerto Rican population in the United States is dark-skinned, they often experience the same forms of prejudice as non-Puerto Rican blacks.

The dilemma of Puerto Ricans regarding their racial status in the United States is expressed dramatically by Piri Thomas, a dark-skinned Puerto Rican who has writ- ten of his New York experience. Thomas tells of an early incident that thrust on him the American race ethic. After applying for a door-to-door sales job, he is told by the employment manager that he will be called when "the new territory is opened up." His white friend applies immediately afterward and is told to start "on Monday." Realizing what has happened, Thomas relates the story to his black buddy, who tells him that "a Negro [sic] faces that all the time. " "I know that," Thomas replies, "but I wasn't a Negro then. I was still only a Puerto Rican" (1967:104f.

CUBANS Concentrated in a single city and having arrived more recently, Cubans have not had the kind of national exposure that Mexican Americans or even Puerto Ricans have had. Moreover, as a group that is for the most part physically indistin- guishable from the Euro-American population, Cubans automatically enjoy a status tha t precludes racially based stereotypes. Their generally higher class position has also provided some insulation from negative images .

Although the attitudes of Anglos toward Cubans in Miami were initially benign, subsequent events created an increasing bifurcation between the two groups. One area that has fueled Anglo resentment is language. Increasingly, Miami has become a bilingual city, and this has met with Anglo resistance. In 1980, a referendum was held to bar Dade County (Miami) from using public funds to conduct official busi- ness in any language but English and from promoting any but "American" culture. The measure, which narrowly passed, polarized the community along ethnic lines Boswell and Jones, 2006; Burkholz, 1980; Castro, 1992). The county commission

in 1993 voted unanimously to repeal the 1980 antibilingualism ordinance. The referendum on bilingualism disclosed the depth of the anti-Cuban sentiment

among Anglos. A survey conducted immediately following the vote revealed that nearly half of those who had voted for the ordinance did so as an opportunity to express their protest, not because they saw it as a good idea. Furthermore, more man half the Anglos who supported the measure said they would be pleased if it ~would make Miami a less attractive place for Cubans and other Spanish-speaking people" (Tasker, 1980). In recent years, Miami has become a predominantly His- panic city, but language continues to draw the strongest divide between Hispanics

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234 PA RT II ETH N IC ITY I N THE UN ITED ST ATES

and Anglos. As one Anglo expressed it, "Sometimes, I feel like I'm a visitor in my own country" (Morgan, 1998a).

An additional source of animosity has been Cubans' rabid and sometimes viru- lent politics, specifically as they relate to Cuba. Nothing better illustrated this than the Elian Gonzalez affair in 2000. It was perhaps the most polarizing single event separating the Cuban and Anglo populations in Miami, and even more broadly, the United States as a whole. Following his rescue at sea after his mother, along with several others, had drowned in an attempt to sail to Miami from Cuba, six-year-old Elian was temporarily placed in the custody of his great-uncle's family. The family subsequently refused to release the child for return to his father's custody in Cuba, which set off a five-month standoff with the U.S. Justice Department. The incident created a national drama- most Cuban Americans felt the child should not be re- turned to his father in Cuba, but most Anglos in Miami, as well as in th'e rest of the country, felt otherwise (Viglucci and Marrero, 2000). Many held that Elian was be- ing used by the Miami Cuban community as a political pawn in their longstanding ideological war with Fidel Castro. Elian was eventually reunited with his father, but the incident left Miami bitterly divided .

DISCRIMINATORY ACTIO NS

The in-between status of Hispanic Americans-between Euro -American ethnic groups, on the one hand, an-d African Americans, on the other-becomes more evi- dent in looking at patterns of discrimination. Hispanic Americans have lacked the heritage of a legal system that, in the case of African Americans, made discrimination legitimate. As a result, such actions have ordinarily been extralegal rather than for- mally endorsed by the state . Moreover, although discrimination against Latinos has been widespread and often intense, it has never been as profound and intransigent as that experienced by African Americans.

This is illustrated by Pinkney's study (1963) of one community with sizable Mexican American and black populations. General patterns of discrimination for both groups, he found, were similar but were much stronger in degree for blacks. For example, greater acceptance of Mexican Americans was evident in public accom- modations such as hotels and restaurants as well as in residential areas · and social clubs. Anglos also expressed greater approval for granting equal rights in employ- ment and residence to Mexican Americans . Pinkney attributed these differences in part to differences in skin color: .Mexican Americans, closer to the dominant Anglo group, were more acceptable. A more recent study revealed much the same pattern. In a series of experiments, John Dovidio and his colleagues found that in various

., social environments, Latinos do experience differential treatment, though not neces- sarily the most blatant forms that have traditionally characterized anti-black dis- crimination. Also the social distance of Latinos from Anglos was found to be markedly lower than for blacks from whites (Dovidio et al., 2010).

That it has not been as rigid, intense, and formalized as that aimed at African Americans should not disguise the severity of discrimination to which Latinos in some circumstances have been exposed, particularly Mexican Americans in the Southwest. Many of the actions against them in areas such as South Texas have been similar in degree and scope to those experienced by blacks, including segregated

CHAPTER 8 HISPA NIC AMERICANS 2 35

restaurants, churches, schools, and other public facilities (Burma, 1954; Grebler et al., 1970). Roberto Suro describes this social environment:

In South Texas in the 1950s, discrimination against Latinos was different because it was not based on the single immutable characteristic of skin color and because it was not primarily a matter of law. Culture and convenience dictated that poor, dark-skinned Mexicans should not mix with whites, that they should go to inferior schools, and that they would always work at the bottom of the labor force. And while segregation applied to all blacks, the discriminatory culture of South Texas distinguished among Latinos, treating some like Mexicans and others not. (Suro, 1998:81)

Physical violence against Mexicans in the Southwest also has a long history. McWilliams notes that in the mining camps of the nineteenth century, any crime committed was immediately attributed to Mexicans, for whom lynching was the ac- cepted penalty. "Throughout the 1860's," he writes, "the lynching of Mexicans was such a common occurrence in Los Angeles that the newspapers scarcely bothered to report the details" (1968:130).

Pou cE RELATI ONS An often turbulent relationship has traditionally existed between Latinos-Mexican Americans in particular- and various agencies of the criminal justice system (Moore and Pachon, 1976; Morales, 1972; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1970). Although the level of discrimination has historically been high in Texas, several of the most serious large-scale incidents of the modern era have taken place in Los Angeles. These include the notorious pachuco, or zoot suit, riots of 1943 and the East Los Angeles riot of 1970. In both cases, the police played major roles in either precipitating or sustaining the hostilities.

The events surrounding the zoot suit riots have been well documented (Garcia and de la Garza, 1977; McWilliams, 1968). During the 1940s, the Los Angeles press waged a virulent anti-Mexican campaign, creating a rancorous mood among Anglos. Sensational accounts were presented of Mexican American youth gangs whose members took to wearing bizarre outfits called zoot suits. Following an incident in- volving Mexican American youths and sailors stationed in Los Angeles, two hundred servicemen began a four-day rampage, in which they drove through the Mexican area in taxis, randomly attacking those on the streets. The Los Angeles police did virtually nothing to halt the violence and in fact arrested many of the victims. Serious rioting continued tor almost a week, ending finally with the intervention of the mili- tary police. This incident permanently damaged Mexican-Anglo relations in Los Angeles for decades afterward, and it confirmed the ever-precarious status of the Mexican American community in an Anglo-dominated environment. Although other such incidents have rarely garnered as much public attention, police brutality (or in- difference, as the case may be) in dealing with Mexican Americans has been histori- ca lly commonplace.

The lack of trust in the police and the courts among Hispanic Americans is not something of the distant past. In fact, a national survey indicated that Latinos have a view of the criminal justice system not unlike that of African Americans. Fewer than ha lf of Latinos express confidence that police officers will treat them fairly or will not use excessive force on suspects, and fewer than half believe that the courts will deal with them fairly (Lopez and Livingston, 2009).

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236 PA RT II ET HN ICIT Y IN T H E UNITED STATES

In recent years, tension between Latinos and law enforcement agents has cen- tered mostly on efforts by state and local government to identify those who are undocumented. In 2010, about 5 percent of Latinos (8 percent of men, but only 2 percent of women) said that they had been stopped by police or other authorities and asked about their legal status in the United States (Lopez et al., 2010). Although this represented a decline from two years earlier, Latinos in general, Mexicans in particular, remain concerned about the use of these measures and their impact on friends and fami ly (Lopez et al., 2010).

R ES IDENTIAL SEGREGATION For Latinos, discrimination in housing has been generally less severe than for African Americans (Alba, 2009; Camarillo and Bonilla, 2001; Grebler et al., 1970; Iceland, 2009; Massey, 1981a, 1981b, 2001; U.S. \:ommission on Civil Rights, 1976). Studies have shown that Hispanic-Anglo segregation is lower than black-white (Anglo) segregation (Farley, 2011; Iceland, 2009; Iceland and Wilkes, 2006; Logan et al., 2004; Logan and Zhang, 2009; Massey, 2001; Mumford Center, 2001a).

Although residential segregation of Latinos may not be as severe as for African Americans, a recent analysis has shown little change in the index of dissimilarity for Latinos over the past two decades, leading the researchers to conclude that Latino segregation in general is persistent "at a moderate to high level" (Logan and Turner, 2013). Closer analysis, however, reveals that while overall Hispanic segregation is unchanging, there are clear differences among specific groups. In 1990, segregation of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans from whites was quite strong, stronger than for Mexicans. But in the two decades after 1990, there were large declines for these three groups while Mexican segregation remained very evident.

CURRENT I ssuEs AND T RENDS Today, anti-Latino discrimination seems focused mostly on large immigrant populations in specific locations, particularly on those who have entered the United States without papers. At times, however, this has had a spillover effect on all Hispanic Americans. As noted earlier, this has been especially evident in recent years as harsh measures intended to identify unauthorized immi- grants have been enacted by various state and local governments . Many worry about the effects of these measures on their employment and housing opportunities and also about deportation of family members.

In sum, discrimination against Latinos has been ongoing throughout American history, but it has differed in scope and intensity for different Latino groups and dif- fered as well by region. In any case, its severity has not been the same as that experi- enced by African Americans, today or in the past. Nonetheless, Latinos in general are conscious of ethnic discrimination aimed at them and express growing concerns that this is a continuing problem in American society. Latino discrimination may also be fueled by growing anti-immigrant attitudes as well as the awareness on the part of non-Hispanics of the increasing demographic power of Latinos. A national survey of Latinos in 2010 revealed that about one-third said that they or a family member had experienced discrimination based on race or ethnicity in the past five years. Al- most two -thirds felt that discrimination was a major problem that impeded their suc- cess in America, an increase from 54 percent in 2007 (Lopez et al., 2010). It is of

C HAPTER 8 HISPAN IC AMERICA N S 237

note that 70 percent of foreign-born Latinos were aware of discrimination and felt that it was a major problem, compared to about half of native-born Latinos.

Moreover, Americans generally have come to see Hispanics as the racial/ethnic group most often subjected to discrimination. Almost one-quarter of Americans say that Hispanics are discriminated against "a lot," a share higher than observed for any other group (Pew Research Center, 2010).

HISPANIC AMERICAN ASSIMILATION

In Chapters 10 and 11, we will see that Italian Americans, Jewish Americans, and other ethnic groups of European origin are best analyzed within the framework of the assimilation model of ethnic relations, wherein ethnicity becomes less intense with each succeeding generation. African Americans, by comparison, were seen in Chapter 7 as a case that more closely fits the inequalitarian pluralistic model; rather than decreasing in significance, ethnicity continues to shape intergroup relations and to affect in a basic manner most life activities of group members. Where do Hispanic Americans fit on the continuum of ethnic relations, and which model is best suited to their experience in American society? Similar to African Americans, there is some disagreement over whether they are basically like previous immigrant groups who have gone through stages of assimilation or whether their American experience evokes some form of pluralism.

As with other aspects of their American experience, it is important to keep in mind the diversity of the Hispanic population because patterns ot assimilation and pluralism have not been entirely the same for the various groups and subpopulations within them. There is evidence to support the view that Lat1nos in general have expe- r ienced a relatively low but increasing level of both cultural and structural assimila- tion. More specifically, however, the various Hispanic American groups exhibit a wide range of assimilation, extending from Hispanos in New Mexico-who have strongly assimilated both culturally and structurally into the dominant group-to black Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, who have displayed a low level of structural assimilation.

CULTURAL ASSIMILATION

Unlike African Americans, Hispanic Americans were not stripped of their native cul- tures on entering the society and have retained many ethnic traits, especially the Spanish language. Nonetheless, Latinos are moving toward cultural assimilation, though not necessarily in the same manner as Euro-American groups of the past.

LANGUAGE Latino cultural assimilation is strongly evident in language usage. Al- th ough Spanish is the most widely used non-English language in the United States, only a minority of Hispanic Americans speak only Spanish, and most of these are first-generation immigrants. As Latinos move to the second and third generations, English becomes their primary language (Alba, 2004; Pew Hispanic Center, 2002, 2009; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006; Portes and Schauffler, 1996; Rumbaut et al., 20 06). Moreover, even among those who continue to use Spanish in the home, the majority use English in other social contexts, like work and friendship groups. De la

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238 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Garza and colleagues (1992) found that not only did most U.S . citizens from each of the three major Latino groups use English or a mixture of English and Spanish at home but they preferred English-language media to either bilingual or Spanish- language media. Furthermore, over 90 percent of Latinos supported the proposition that citizens and residents of the United States should learn English. Later studies have confirmed even more strongly the view among an overwhelming majority of Latinos of the importance of learning and speaking English (Pew H ispanic Center, 2006c) . Clearly, then, contrary to a common public perception about the mainte - nance of Spanish, most Latinos prefer English and support its usage.

A national survey of Latinos indicated that language is strongly correlated to ac- ceptance of mainstream American values. That is, on key social issues, the views of Latinos whose primary language is English (mostly of the third generation) are more in line with those of the society as a whole than of Latinos who either ,speak mainly Spanish or are bilingual (Pew Hispanic Center, 2004b) . For example, 47 percent of Spanish-dominant Latinos find divorce acceptable, whereas 67 percent of English- dominant Latinos do, close to the same percentage (72 percent) as non-Latinos. This pattern is evident on other social issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and having children outside marriage.

PROXIMITY rn ORIGIN SocIETY One factor contributing to slower cultural assimilation among Latinos is the proximity of their society of origin. T his is especially evident for Mexican Americans . M ore than four decades ago , McWilliams observed that "[i]n migrating to the borderlands, Mexicans have not found immigrant colonies so much as they have 'moved in with their relatives'" (1968 :38). Today that observa- tion seems even more compelling. In a sense, the M exican immigrant in the South- west never really leaves Mexico . The frequency and ease of travel between the United States and Latin America have created a similar phenomenon for other Latino groups (Garcia-Passalacqua, 1994 ). Immigrant networks have made back- and-forth movement so commonplace that family units are best characterized as transnational, residing simultaneously in two societies.

Cubans present something of a unique case in this regard. Because early immi- grants came not expecting to stay and take on the life of the new society, they clung to the old culture more strongly than most other ethnic groups . This pattern is not uncommon in the case of political exiles, whose commitment to their adopted coun- try is never complete . Resistance to cultural assimilation is particularly evident among older, first-generation Cuban Americans, but this is changing with the second and third generations, for whom there are no thoughts of return (Goodnough and Gonzalez, 2006) . In their analysis of Cuban M iami, Stepick and Stepick concluded that "[i]n many respects , the children of Cuban immigrants have been assimilated in characteristic American fashion. They have abandoned the self-identity label of American, but neither do they identify as Cuban. Instead, they strongly prefer the hyphenated label Cuban-American" (2002:84) .

RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION Another important factor that has contributed to reten - tion of the ethnic culture among some Latinos is their residential concentration. This is especially apparent for Cubans . Unlike M exicans and Puerto Ricans, Cubans

C H APT ER 8 HI SPAN IC AM ERI CAN S 239

in the United States, especially those in Miami, have established a well-knit institu- tional structure that caters exclusively to the unique social and cultural needs of the group. Raymond Breton (1964) has suggested the idea of "institutional complete- ness" to describe the extent to which the needs of an ethnic group are met by institu- tions within the ethnic community- businesses, churches, newspapers, schools, and so on. Ethnic communities may range from those that are institutionally complete, in which members need to make no use of the host society's institutions, to those that are institutionally incomplete, in which the network of interpersonal relations is al-'- most totally within the context of the host society. Cubans in Miami appear to be at the extreme of institutional completeness. There is not even a need to learn English, because Miami is very much a bilingual city. Television stations broadcast and news- papers publish in Spanish; bilingual public schools are common; and food stores, res- taurants, and businesses of all kinds cater to the unique ethnic needs of the Cuban and other large Latino communities.

To a lesser degree this characterizes other Latino communities. New York City's huge Dominican population, for example, is heavily concentrated in one neighbor- hood, Washington Heights, within which almost all its cultural needs are met. More than other Latino groups in the city, Dominicans are residentially segregated and have the least exposure to non -Hispanic whites (Levitt, 2007).

Hispanic residential segregation may be related to high levels of immigration. That is, immigrants tend to cluster in enclaves among coethnics and, as the immi- grant generation gives way to their children, increased residential dispersion usually occurs. After examining ethnic residential patterns, John Iceland (2009) concluded that, since Latino immigration levels are high and many of the immigrants are of low socioeconomic status, increasing levels of Latino residential segregation might be expected in the short and medium term. Over the long term, however, as succeed- ing generations experience upward mobility, segregation is likely to decline.

R ACE AN D A SSIM ILATI ON For most Puerto Ricans and an element of the Dominican and Cuban populations, a racial factor complicates the assimilation process. For those darker in skin color, the incentive to retain the Spanish language and culture is a product of their perceived need to separate themselves from the African American population. It is more advantageous , they feel, to be identified with the Latino popu- lace than to ' be lumped with non-Hispanic blacks. For those who are neither clearly white nor black by American racial standards, the problem is even more acute, for they often find themselves marginal to both categories. For ex ample, among the Cuban American population, a relatively substantial portion who came as part of the 1980 refugee wave are, in the American sense, racially defined as black, as are many who were later arrivals. But they find themselves in a marginal position, pe- ripheral to the larger Cuban community and unable to assimilate into the African American community (Hay, 2009; Nordheimer, 1987; Ojito, 2000) .

FUTURE P ATTERNS Despite the problems of language and proximity to their ongm societies, Latinos do appear to be moving along a trajectory of cultural assimilation. The Latino National Political Survey revealed much evidence of this movement (de la Garza et al., 1992). Regarding social networks and social distance, for example,

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240 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UN ITED STATES

although members of each specific national-origin group felt closer to and interacted more frequently with coethnics (that is, Mexicans with Mexicans, Cubans with Cubans, and so on), most felt closer to Anglos than to any of the other Hispanic national-origin groups.

The survey found that most Latinos do not identify themselves as members of a panethnic group- Hispanic or Latino- but as members of their specific national group or simply as Americans. Although members of the various groups expressed common views on some issues and attitudes, on many they also expressed marked differences. Hence, "to the extent that the Hispanic political community exists, there is scant evidence that it is rooted in alleged distinctive cultural traditions such as Spanish-language maintenance, religiosity, or shared identity" (de la Garza et al. , 1992: 13- 14 ). In sum, the survey found that Latinos were well within the mainstream of American political thought and action. "There is no evidence here," the study concluded, "of values, demands, or behaviors that threaten the n~tion's cultural or political identity" (1992:16). Similar findings were reported in a national survey of Latinos in 2002 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2002).

A more recent study revealed a relatively steady movement along an assimilation trajectory even for current Latino immigrants (Waldinger, 2007). The vast majority were shown to maintain only a moderate level of engagement with the societies from which they come. Although there are variations by country of origin, most see their future in the United States; only among the most recent arrivals are continued close ties to their home countries evident. In general, the longer the immigrants reside in the United States, the more strongly they identify with it.

Moreover,,as with African Americans, cultural assimilation is not entirely a one- way process. Rather, there is a growing interchange of Latino and American core cul- tures. Latino cultural influences are increasingly evident in American music, lan- guage, fashion, and cuisine: Salsa and Latin jazz are now standard musical genres; pop artists like Jennifer Lopez, Ricky Martin, and Marc Anthony appeal to a broad range of Americans; Spanish is today the most popular foreign language, taught na- tionwide in primary and secondary schools and in every U.S. college; and Americans prefer salsas and picantes as often as they do that most American condiment, ketchup (Fabricant, 1993; Garcia, 1999; La Feria, 2001). In a sense, what we are witnessing is continued assimilation alongside ethnic cultural affirmation- a phenomenon similar to that experienced by earlier generations of immigrants.

STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATION

Despite shortcomings in income, occupation, education, and political power, each succeeding Hispanic American generation has improved its status over that of the previous one, and it appears that Latinos are moving into greater participation in the society's mainstream economic and political systems. The pace and extent of sec- ondary structural assimilation, however, have been uneven for the three major groups. Puerto Ricans have proceeded more slowly and less effectively than Mexi- cans, who in turn have not progressed as rapidly as Cubans.

SECONDARY STRUCTIJRAL AssIMILATION Because Latinos entered the United States on a large scale only since the 1970s, they have not been able to use the economic and

CHAPTER 8 HISPA N IC AM ERICA N S 241

political systems as leverage in their pursuit of upward mobility and political power as effectively as earlier immigrants had done. By the time Latinos had begun to enter American society in significant numbers, the unskilled factory jobs that prior groups had used as economic springboards were already dwindling, and the local political machines, which had doled out many benefits to immigrants, no longer had much impact. The economic and political conditions faced by these groups, then, are closely parallel to those encountered by African Americans. Integration into main- stream economic, political, and social institutions, therefore, has been impeded sim- ply by these structural circumstances.

The factor of race in the case of Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and, less so, of Mexican Americans may also account for some of the lag in secondary structural as - similation (Rodriguez, 1996). As noted earlier, prejudice and discrimination, though not as well rooted and intense as those experienced by African Americans, are con- tinuing facts for Latinos, particularly in areas where they constitute a numerically significant part of the population. One possible scenario for the Latino population is for those who are racially defined in the American context as "black" to move toward the black side of the U.S. "color line," and those lighter-skinned to move to - ward the white side, in what was described in Chapter 4 as segmented assimilation (Bonilla-Silva, 2004; Frank et al., 2010; Suarez-Orozco and Paez, 2002).

Cubans in the United States have clearly exceeded other Latino groups in both their pace and degree of economic success. However, their upward economic mobil- ity in the past four decades has been not so much within the mainstream economic system as within a parallel Cuban economy, particularly in the Miami area. None- theless, given their class advantage- and, for most, thgir racial indistinctness- assimilation at the secondary level should be a less painstaking and lengthy process than it has been for either Mexican Americans or Puerto Ricans.

PRIMARY STRUCTURAL A SSIMILATION At the primary level of structural assimilation, Latinos have clearly advanced further than African Americans. We have already seen that on one important measure, residential integration, Latinos have begun to show strong signs of dispersion. Over half now live in suburbs, for example (Frey, 2010).

As explained, the rate at which members of an ethnic minority group marry those of the dominant group is perhaps the best evidence of how far the assimilation process has advanced. Although marriage across ethnic lines has occurred increas- ingly among Euro-American ethnic groups, it has not occurred significantly among African Americans. As in other aspects of comparison, Latinos seem to fall some- where between these two extremes.

Past studies indicated a trend toward increasing marital assimilation for His- panics (Fitzpatrick, 1987; Grebler et al., 1970; Jaffe et al., 1980; Mittelbach and M oore, 1968; Murguia and Frisbie, 1977; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1976; Valdez, 1983). Later data indicate a continuation of that trend. In fact, evidence sug- gests that Latinos are following the same generational patterns of intermarriage as European-descent groups did in the first part of the twentieth century (Lee and Bean, 2010; Qian and Lichter, 2007; Stevens et al., 2006; Wang, 2012). In 2010, more than one-quarter of Hispanic newlyweds married someone whose race or eth- nicity was different from their own (Wang, 2012) .

242 PART II ET HN ICITY IN TH E UN ITED ST ATE S

ASSIMILATION: LOOKIN G AHEAD

In accounting for the patterns of adjustment of Hispanic Americans and their rela- tions with Anglos, again we return to the theme of intermediacy, or in-betweenness. Unlike Euro-Americans, who obviously fit the traditional assimilation model, or African Americans, who in large measure do not, Latino groups fall somewhere be- tween these two extremes.

At present, only for Cubans and some from South American countries among the Hispanic American groups does the traditional ethnic, or assimilation, model seem largely relevant (Arias, 2001). For Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and most Central American groups, the nature of their entry into the society, their racial characteristics, and their class handicap make the assimilation model less clear-cut and impose at least some aspects of inequalitarian pluralism (Frank et al., 2010; Massey, 2008). '

Some analysts maintain that Latinos, for the most part, may be following the general path of assimilation followed earlier by Euro -American groups, though their slower and more tortuous movement in that direction is occurring with little notice. Linda Chavez (1991), for example, argues that their ongoing assimilation is con- cealed by the continued entrance of new immigrants in great numbers who remain more attuned to the ethnic culture and language. She also contends that Hispanic American leaders, strongly committed to multiculturalism, are responsible for gener- ating heightened ethnic conscj ousness in Latino communities in their attempts to re- tard assimilation.

In considering the future of Hispanic Americans, it is well to reiterate a point emphasized at the outset of this chapter: There are extremely diverse class, ethnic, and racial origins among those who make up this panethnic category, as well as great differences among its generations. As with Euro-Americans and, as we will see in the following chapter on Asian Americans, it is misleading to describe the broad composite of groups that make up this category in holistic terms. To speak of "Hispanic Americans" (or even "Latinos") as if this were a term with intrinsic meaning rather than a convenient Census Bureau category is overly simplistic and inaccurate . Hence, the kind of adaptation Hispanic Americans make in their absorp - tion into American society- as well as the imprint they make on the society and its culture- will undoubtedly be disparate, though uniformly strong.

SUMMARY

• As part of the American ethnic system, Hispanic Americans, or Latinos, occupy an intermediate status between Euro-Americans and African Americans.

~ Three major groups make up the Hispanic American minority-Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans- but groups from other Latin American and Carib- bean societies have, in the past three decades, become a large and significant component of this panethnic category. Each group is concentrated regionally, and each is primarily urban.

• Mexicans, the largest Latino group, have entered American society mostly as voluntary immigrants, but their roots in the United States reach back to Spanish colonial times before the American conquest of the Southwest. Puerto Ricans

CHA PT ER 8 HI SPAN IC AM ERI CAN S 243

are technically American citizens, yet they have arrived from a foreign culture, much as other immigrant groups have. Cubans are more recent arrivals and dif- fer from Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in class origins and racial features. Newer groups from Central and South America and the Caribbean have entered as voluntary immigrants, though some, particularly from Central American countries, arrived as political refugees.

• Latinos generally are below average on all measures of socioeconomic status and are a large element of the American poor. There are differences among the major groups, however, with Cubans and South Americans in a relatively '- higher position than Mexicans, who are somewhat higher than Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and most Central Americans .

• Latinos are in a less developed stage of political participation than are African Americans and, like the latter, are underrepresented in top positions in all institutional areas. Their potential power, however, is considerable.

• The level of prejudice and discrimination directed at Hispanic Americans has not been as intense as that experienced by African Americans but has been more se- vere than that suffered by Euro-American ethnic groups. Mexican Americans have commonly been the chief targets of ethnic antagonism in the Southwest, where traditionally most have lived.

• Compared with both African American and Euro-American ethnic groups, Latinos have displayed a slower pace of cultural assimilation, owing largely to their relatively recent entrance into American society. However, movement in that direction is clear, evidenced especially by the regularity of language assimilation.

• The speed and extent of secondary structural assimilation for Latinos have generally resembled African American patterns; but at the primary level, Latinos have outpaced African Americans, demonstrated by iHcreasing residential and marital assimilation.

C RITICAL THINKING

1. The category "Hispanic American" or "Latino" is, in fact, internally diverse, and most members of the specific groups prefer to be identified as members of those groups . Is it possible that a common, panethnic, identity might eventually emerge among Latinos of diverse origins if schools, media, government, and businesses continue to refer to them as part of a collective category?

2. As this chapter noted, newspaper and television news stories commonly refer to a crime suspect's racial identity. Among the descriptive terms used is Hispanic. How would you explain that descriptions like this are based on racial and ethnic stereotypes that not only provide little in the way of accuracy, but may actually be misleading and thus counterproductive?

3. Spanish is used by large numbers of people in many areas of the United States and is now the country's second most spoken language. Is it possible that the United States will become a de facto bilingual country in the future? Or does the pattern of language assimilation among Latinos make this development unlikely?

4. Think of ways in which Latino culture has been infused into the mainstream American culture. How does this illustrate the bidirectional nature of ethnic assimilation?

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244 PART II ETH N ICITY JN TH E UN IT ED ST ATES

PERSONAL/PRACTICAL APPLICATION

1. How do you think you would respond if a police officer stopped you for no ap- parent reason and asked for your proof of citizenship? Would you be offended, or would you feel that the officer was performing a rightful duty?

2 . As explained in this chapter, Hispanic Americans exhibit a wide range of physical characteristics, making "racial" identification virtually meaningless. Nonetheless, Hispanic Americans are very commonly portrayed in racial terms by the media, by law enforcement agencies, by government officials, by university administrations, and other societal institutions. How might this be accounted for? Does this demonstrate how races are socially created?