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Race & ethnic relations: American and global perspectives

Marger, M. N. (2015). Race and ethnic relations: American and global

perspectives (10th ed.). Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.

jEWISH AMERICANS CHAPTER I I

Jews in America are a relatively tiny ethnic group-little more than 2 percent of the general population. But for their distinctive religious identification, they might logi- cally be analyzed within the context of white ethnic Americans (Chapter 10), with whom they share many of the same sociohistorical features. Yet, they warrant close study independent of other American ethnic groups for several reasons.

In many ways, Jewish Americans are a unique case amqng American ethnic groups. As people who for centuries had suffered persecution and dislocation in al- most all European societies, Jews found the United States a haven that provided for the first time a social atmosphere in which Jewish identity could be retained without fear of official repression and from which there was no need to contemplate flight. Jews in America also found their economic circumstances relatively unconstrained, in sharp contrast to the situation they had faced in Europe. So well nurtured were the opportunities offered them that Jews today represent the prototypical American ethnic success story. In only two generations, Jewish Americans collectively accom- plished a truly phenomenal upward mobility that makes theirs a compulsory case for the study of ethnic relations. Indeed, they present a compelling comparative case, against whi~h other groups' similarities and differences can be scrutinized and as - sessed. Why have Jewish Americans, as a collectivity, succeeded so evidently, and can their story be relevant to the experiences of other American ethnic groups, both historical and contemporary?

Unlike most American ethnic groups, Jews do not identify with a common homeland, having come from many nations. The broad geographical native region of the majority of Jewish Americans, however, is the same- eastern Europe- and a common language, Yiddish (a combination of mostly German and Hebrew ele- ments) , supersedes most national differences. Jews in the United States are best seen as an ethnic group: they clearly display a unique cultural heritage, a consciousness of community, and a group identity. Regardless of their degree of commitment to Jew- ish religious practices and beliefs (many are nonbelievers), and regardless of their na- tional origins, Jews recognize themselves as a people with common roots and with

3II

..

..

312 PART II ETH N ICITY IN THE UN ITED STATES

common cultural features, that is, as an ethnic group. 1 They are seen in that fashion , as well, by the larger society.

That Jewish Americans lack a common homeland does not in itself constitute a significant difference from many white ethnic groups in the United States. In most cases, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe arrived with little national con- sciousness; regional or village boundaries generally defined their sense of people- hood. Only in the United States, as a means of social adjustment and in response to out-group recognition, did they adopt a national identity.

IMMIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT

In some ways, Jewish patterns of immigration and settlement in the United States paralleled those of Italians. Both ethnic groups were primarily part, of the New Immi- gration, and following large-scale entrance, both found themselves initially at the bottom of the class hierarchy. Like the Italians, Jews initially settled mostly in the large cities of the Northeast. Many of the occupations of the two groups during the major period of immigration also overlapped, as did their residential areas . As non-Protestants who had emigrated from relatively backward societies, both groups were made-to-order targets of the nativist and racist ideas of the turn of the century. Furthermore, because both groups remained concentrated primarily in eastern cities, they did not blend easily into the larger society. The prejudice and discrimination they faced, therefore, proved more pernicious and dogged than those aimed at other white ethnic groups. Despite the similarities in their mode of entrance and settlement patterns, howe:yer, important differences between these two groups were also appar- ent. These differences led, as we will see, to different rates of mobility in the second and third generations and ultimately to different positions in the class system.

IMMIGRATION PATTERNS

Jewish immigration to America has a lengthy history. In fact, a few Jews supposedly accompanied Columbus on his first voyage. Three fairly distinct periods of Jewish immigration can be identified.

SEPHARDIC ] Ews The earliest immigrants to the United States included Sephardic Jews, whose ancestors were Spaniards and Portuguese. When the Jews were ex- pelled from Spain and Portugal in the late fifteenth century, many migrated to England, Holland, Brazil, and the Caribbean islands. The first American Jews came from all these locations and even from the Iberian peninsula (Glazer, 1957). The Sephardim are to be distinguished from the Ashkenazic Jews of central and eastern Europe, who constituted almost all Jewish immigration into the United States after the colonial period.

1 A national sur vey in 1990 found that most Jewish Americans defined their Jewish identity in ethnic or cultural, not religious, terms (Kosmin et al., 1991). This was confirmed again in a 2013 comprehensive survey of Jewish Americans. Almost two-thirds said that being Jewish is mainly a matter of ancestry and culture, not religion (Pew Research Center, 2013c). Thus most Jewish Americans consider themselves Jews primarily as members of an ethnic group.

CHAPTER I I J EW ISH AMERICANS 3 I 3

GERMAN J Ews A second and more sizable Jewish immigration to the United States was made up of German Jews who came with the great wave of other German immi- grants during the 1840s and 1850s. These Jews were socially and economically sev- eral notches below the earlier Sephardic Jews, who by that time were relatively prosperous and respected. Although most were merchants, their trade was at a level considerably less significant than that of their Sephardic predecessors. Many, in fact, were peddlers who moved westward with the country's expansion. Indeed, at the middle of the nineteenth century, most of America's twenty thousand itinerant tra - ~ ders were German Jews (Lipset and Raab, 1995). Dispersing widely to all parts of the country, German Jews settled in both large cities and small towns. Where they settled they commonly established clothing and dry goods or general stores, the ves- tiges of which are seen today throughout the United States (Brockman, 2001; Press- ley, 1999). A few developed into large national chains. Many familiar department store names, including Macy's, Bloomingdale's, Saks Fifth Avenue, and Neiman- Marcus, stem from German-Jewish founding families.

Collectively, the German Jews displayed rapid and substantial upward mobility; by the 1880s, most were middle-class entrepreneurs. Among the most successful of them emerged a small, aristocratic upper class which intermingled socially with the Gentile upper class and even intermarried among them (Baltzell, 1958, 1964 ). By the turn of the century, German Jews were so thoroughly assimilated that they had lost much sense of ethnic identity. Only their religious affiliation distinguished them from other Americans (Herberg, 1960).

EAST EUROPEAN J Ews By 1880, Jews were still only a tiny fraction of the American pop- ulation, numbering no more than a quarter million. In the_next three and a half dec- ades, however, two million Jews would come to the United States. It is primarily from this wave of immigration that the contemporary Jewish American population derives.

Jews coming to the United States after 1880 differed markedly from those who had settled earlier. To begin with, most were not from Germany but from eastern Europe, particularly Russia and Russian-occupied Poland. One of the key motivating factors behind the mass emigration of Jews from Russia was the severe oppression they were subjected to under tsarist policies. Following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II iQ. 1881, bloody pogroms were sanctioned, and onerous restrictions were placed on Jews in all areas of social and economic life. America, therefore, was seen not only as a destination of economic opportunities but also as a political haven, a society that promised liberation and acceptance (Biale, 1998) . Unlike the Italian emigration, which at first comprised mainly single men expecting to return, the Jewish emigration from Russia was a movement of family units who harbored few thoughts of returning to their homeland.

The East European Jews also differed from earlier immigrant Jews in their class origins: they were poorer and less educated. Jewish life in eastern Europe had been confined to all-Jewish villages and towns; as a result, these immigrants were ex- tremely provincial in contrast to the relatively urbane and worldly German Jews. Striking differences between the two groups also lay in their attitudes toward reli- gion. The East Europeans came with a version of Judaism far more traditional than the modernized and Americanized Reform Judaism of the Germans. To the German

.,

314 PAR T II ET H NIC IT Y IN TH E UN ITED ST ATES

Jews, Judaism was simply a faith that was not to interfere with assimilation into the core American culture and society. To the East Europeans, coming from the shtetl, or Jewish village, where religion governed all aspects of life, Judaism was an entire so- cial world. As Glazer and Moynihan explain, "In practice, tone, and theology, the Reform Judaism of the German Jews diverged from the Orthodoxy of the immi- grants as much as the beliefs and practices of Southern Baptists differ from those of New England Unitarians" (1970:130).

In addition to differences in class and religious practice, East European Jews did not disperse geographically as had the earlier German Jewish immigrants . Instead, they remained in a few large cities, especially New York, where they were concen- trated in lower-class ghettos. In this environment, the East European Jews, like the Italian immigrants of that time, experienced severely harsh conditions of work and residence. Many labored in garment factories, commonly called sweat-shops, where they worked long hours for scant salaries. In 1911, one-third of Jewish heads of household earned less than $400 a year; and in 1914, the average hourly wage of male clothing workers was about 35 cents. Even by 1930, garment workers were still earning an average of only $24.51 a week-less than the pay of workers in stock- yards and slaughterhouses (Howe, 1976). As a result, most families became work units in which women and children as well as men labored fifteen or eighteen hours a day, often taking piecework home with them.

Like the Italians who streamed into New York and other large eastern cities at the same time, the East European Jews accepted housing conditions that were fre- quently brutal and demeaning, crowding into run-down tenements abandoned by previous ethnic groups. On the famous Lower East Side, 350,000 people per square mile jammed int9 squalid rooms and apartments in which sanitation facilities were meager at best. These degraded conditions of life only further confirmed the racist views of those who saw immigrant Jews of that time, along with other southern and eastern Europeans, as innately degenerate.

In sum, the urban environment into which immigrant Jews entered the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries required struggle and sta- mina, which could be sustained only by the expectation that life conditions would improve-possibly for them but surely for their children. "The generation that en- tered the immigrant ghetto," writes Ben Halpern, "was confronted by one over- whelming task: to get out or enable the next generation to get out" (1958:36). This goal proved atta inable for most. One important factor in accounting for the determi- nation of immigrant Jews to succeed in American society was their understanding that there was no return to the homeland; for most Jews, the commitment to the United States was final.

Given their striking differences in class, religion, and culture, it is little wonder that the German and East European Jews were initially antagonistic. The Germans viewed the new immigrants as illiterate, uncouth, and provincial greenhorns, who could only cause embarrassment to the American Jewish community and produce a backlash of anti-Semitism. By the 1890s, however, the divisions between the two groups were evaporating. Inspired partially by humanitarian motives and partially by the concern that they might be lumped with these poor and religiously traditional Jews in the eyes of their Christian neighbors, German Jews now accepted responsibil- ity for uplifting and assisting their East European cohorts (Wirth, 1956). By the end

CHAPTER I I JEWISH AMERI CAN S 3 I 5

of large-scale immigration in the early 1920s, the subdivision of the American Jewish community into German and East European groups was no longer apparent (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Yaffee, 1968).

JEWISH AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS

Since religion is not an item in the U.S. Census, the Jewish American population can only be estimated. All surveys indicate that the number falls between 5 and ~ 6.5 million, roughly 2 percent of the U.S. population (Pew Research Center, 2013c; Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2011; United Jewish Committee, 2003). This is a declining figure in both absolute and relative terms. Demographers have projected a continuing decrease in numbers, due to an unusually low birthrate in combina- tion with an increasing rate of intermarriage (Della Pergola et al., 2000). Even though they are only a small part of the American population, and a declining one as well, Jews in the United States constitute more than 40 percent of the world's Jewish population. Augmenting the Jewish American population in the last three decades have been immigrant Jews from the former Soviet Union and from Israel. Together, however, these groups constitute only a small portion of Jews in the United States .

From the time of their large-scale arrival in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Jews had traditionally been concentrated in northeastern states. Although they still reside predominantly in that region, they have dispersed in recent decades to the South, especially Florida, and to California in the West. Table 11.1 shows the states with the highest percentage of Jews.

Jews, like Italians, are among the most urbanized of American ethnic groups. In fact, half of the entire Jewish population in the United States is found in just seven large urban areas: New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, Boston, Washington,

T ABLE II.I

State

N ew York

California

Florida

N ew Jersey

Illinois

Pennsylvania

M assachusetts

M aryland

STATES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATIONS

Estimated Jewish Population

1,635,020

1,219,740

638 ,635

504,450

297,935

294,925

277,980

238,000

ource: Sheskin and Dashefsky (2011 ).

Estimated Jewish Percent of Total

8.4

3.3

3.4

5.7

2.3

2.3

4.2

4.1

316 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

and Philadelphia. 2 More than 20 percent are in the New York metropolitan area alone (Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2011).

JEWISH AMERICANS IN THE CLASS SYSTEM

SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS

The fact that most Jews of the New Immigration entered the society in relative pov- erty made their rapid upward mobility quite remarkable. As a group, Jews rose vir- tually from the bottom to the top of the stratification system in two generations. On all measures of social class-income, occupation, and education-Jews collectively rank higher than almost all other American ethnic groups.

The high socioeconomic position of Jewish Americans is well evident in family income and wealth. The median household income of Jews has far exceeded the na- tional average for several decades (Chiswick, 1993; Cohen, 1987; Massarik and Chenkin, 1973; Smith, 2005; Wilder and Walters, 1998). By 1990, the median Jew- ish American household income was 34 percent higher than for the society as a whole (Kosmin et al., 1991; United Jewish Committee, 2003). Table 11.2 shows the significantly greater percentage of Jewish families that fall into the higher income brackets. Almost 70 percent of Jewish households are above the national median of $50,000. One-quarter of Jewish Americans have household income above $150,000, compared to only 8 percent of all U.S. households. Similarly, Jewish Americans far exceed national averages in family wealth (Keister, 2003).

Commensurate with their relatively high income, Jews display a disproportion- ate concentration in higher-status occupations, namely, the professions, business ownership, and managerial positions. Although the German Jews had, for the most part, established themselves as part of the middle class by the late nineteenth century,

TABLE II.2 I SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF JEWISH AMERICANS

Income

Households with income below $30,000

Households with income above $100,000

.., Education

High school or less

College graduates

Graduate degrees

Source: Pew Research Center (20 13c ).

Jewish Americans ( % )

20

42

17

58

28

U.S. Population(%)

36

18

42

29

10

2 Studies of Jews in small towns an d rural areas include Rogoff (2001 ), Rose (1977), and Weissbach (2005) .

CHAPTER I I J EWISH AM ER ICA NS 317

the rise of the East European Jews since the cessation of large-scale immigration in the 1920s has been even more striking (Chiswick, 1984). Only in New York City, con- taining the largest concentration of Jews in the United States, did there remain a sub- stantial Jewish working class until the 1970s (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; Goldstein, 1980; Pritchett, 2002; Sklare, 1971). Quite simply, as Calvin Goldscheider has stated, "poverty and unskilled occupations are largely uncharacteristic of contem- porary American Jews" (1986:4). A recent survey (Ukeles et al., 2013), however, showed a surprising number of Jewish households in New York City (one in five) living in poverty. These were mainly Hasidic (ultra-Orthodox) families, Russian immigrants, and seniors.

Finally, the extremely high level of educational attainment among American Jews is well recognized, having been noted repeatedly in sociological studies (Goldscheider, 1986; Lehrer, 1999; Smith, 2005) . Indeed, the high income and occu- pational levels of Jews can be accounted for in large measure by their similarly high educational level. As shown in Table 11.2, 58 percent of Jews, compared to 29 per- cent of adult Americans in general, are college graduates; more than one-quarter of Jews have earned a graduate degree, compared to 10 percent of the general popula- tion. Only Asian Indians among other ethnic groups exhibit a higher percentage of college graduates. If education is the key to upward mobility in American society, Jews are the classic case of an ethnic group having converted educational opportu- nities into economic betterment in a relatively short time.

ETHNIC AND CLASS FACTORS IN UPWARD MOBILITY

The saga of Jewish upward mobility is often proclaimed as the great success story of American ethnic history. Indeed, no other ethnic group his seemed to rise so far so quickly. As a collective rags-to-riches case, Jewish Americans are often held up as an example for other groups to emulate. What has provided for this extensive collective mobility in only two generations? Here we might compare the Jews with other white ethnic groups, such as the Italians, that entered the United States on a large scale at precisely the same time yet have not exhibited a similar degree of upward mobility. This comparison may give us strong clues to why different ethnic groups experience varying rates of success in the United States and in other multiethnic societies as well.

Herbert G~ns has explained that in looking at the mobility patterns of ethnic groups, it is essential to try to understand whether what happens to them is "ulti- mately more or less a function of their characteristics and culture than of the eco- nomic and political opportunities which are open to them when they arrived and subsequently" (1967b:8) . That is, patterns of mobility among Jews, Italians, or any ethnic group can be seen as the result of either the group's cultural traits or the op- portunities to which the group is exposed , or perhaps a combination of those factors. Some of the same explanations of the economic and educational success of contem- porary Asian Americans, discussed in Chapter 9, have been offered to account for Jewish success.

b.'NATE ADVANTAGES? Jewish intellectual and occupational achievement in the United States, and in other societies as well, has been so consistently high that some have oncluded that Jews, collectively, are innately advantaged. That is, there is a genetic

318 PAR T II ETH N ICIT Y IN TH E UN IT ED ST AT ES

basis for Jewish accomplishment in science, the arts , and commerce. High intelli- gence among Jews, specifically Ashkenazi Jews, has been confirmed by IQ tests. "Jews have the highest average IQ of any ethnic group for which there are reliable data," notes psychologist Richard Nisbett (2009) . The result is a tremendous over- representation among those who are eminent in virtually all academic fields, includ- ing medicine, science, mathematics, law, and the arts.

But is high IQ among Jews genetically based? A few have suggested that there is in fact reason to believe that over many centuries through a process of natural selec- tion, Jews have acquired an elevated intelligence (Cochran et al., 2005; Murray, 2007). After reviewing some of the most frequently cited genetic explanations, how- ever, Nisbett (2009) concludes that there is very little convincing scientific evidence to substantiate claims of innate advantage. Recall similar biological arguments put forth to explain high Asian achievement (Chapter 9), none of whith are given much credence. More fruitful explanations focus on varying ethnic cultures and the oppor- tunities that ethnic groups are afforded.

GRour CuLTURE Similar to a prevalent explanation of the comparatively high level of intellectual and occupational success among Asian Americans, Jewish culture is seen by some as the key to explaining the rapid and profound success of Jews in America.

The substance of this view is contained in what Bernard Rosen (1959) termed the "achievement syndrome." Groups differ, he explained, in their orientation to- ward achievement. In comparing Jewish immigrants with Italian immigrants, the for- mer are portr,ayed as adhering to a culture that encouraged independence and stressed achievement values and high educational aspirations in children, whereas the latter did not. Italian Americans traditionally stressed accomplishment only as it benefited the family in some concrete fashion. Individual achievement, however, was deemphasized because it destabilized the structure of the family unit and threatened its authority. Glazer and Moynihan write that "that form of individuality and ambi- tion which is identified with Protestant and Anglo-Saxon culture, and for which the criteria of success are abstract and impersonal, is rare among American Italians" (1970:194-95). Among Jews, however, it was preeminent. Thus, instead of plying their father's trade, as did most second-generation Italians, Jews aspired to higher occupational positions. As Philip Gleason explains, "Unlike Catholic peasant immi- grants, the Jewish immigrants did not regard intensive education and professional careers as something beyond their experience or capacity; they saw them rather as their natural lines of aspiration" (1964:168).

Perhaps the most frequently cited cultural value in explaining Jewish upward mobility, particularly as it contrasts with the more limited mobility of other ethnic groups of the New Immigration, is the group's attitude toward education. The value of learning has a rich tradition in Jewish culture extending as far back as biblical times, and it permeates all aspects of Jewish life (Fauman, 1958; Gleason, 1964; Strodtbeck, 1958). Because of this key cultural trait, it is held, Jews have quite natu- rally achieved proportionately greater success in business, academia, science, and the arts than have other ethnic groups.

The Jewish penchant for education is contrasted sharply with the traditional southern Italian apprehension about this institution . Rather than a means to social and economic advancement, education was viewed by immigrant Italians as having

CHAPTER I I JEW ISH AMERICAN S 319

little practical value and in some ways being antithetical to family and group inter- ests (Covello, 1967). Hence, they did not avail themselves of the educational oppor- tunities in the United States as quickly and exhaustively as did the Jews. Some have observed that even later generations of Italian American parents, including those of the middle class, have not overly pressured their children for achievement. "By their norms," concludes one study, "motivation as well as ability should come from the child, not the parent" (Johnson, 1985:189).

Intense family loyalty as part of the southern Italian culture was especially con- sequential for immigrants and their children. With an allegiance to family above all else, individual Italian Americans found it difficult to pursue occupations that did not concretely improve the family's welfare. The most important work objective was to find a steady, secure job that would contribute to the family's immediate well-being and that would not take the individual outside the realm of the family's influence. Such values restrained upward job mobility (Gambino, 1975; Gans, 1982).

Obviously, the choice of fulfilling short-range work goals instead of seeking the long-range advantages of continuing education was not unique to Italian immigrants and their children. But the norm was perhaps more firmly rooted among them. There is little doubt, then, that their skeptical view of formal education contributed heavily to their slower and more limited upward mobility compared to Jewish Americans.

GROUP OPPORTUNITIES Disputing the contention that ethnic groups differ in achieve- ment primarily because of internal group values, some maintain that differences de- pend mostly on the opportunity structure that groups encounter on entering the society and the skills they bring to that structure (Gans, 1982; Steinberg, 1989). The essence of this view is that class factors in general explain more about mobility than do ethnic cultures.

Although not denying differences in group culture, sociologist Stephen Steinberg (1989) argues that Jewish immigrants came to the United States with an advanta- geous occupational background that enabled them to cultivate the American eco- nomic system better than other ethnic groups could. Russian Jews entering the United States were not peasants but were urban people who had been engaged in manufacturing and commerce. Consequently, although they were certainly poor, they were equipped with skills that would serve them well in the expanding indus- trial economy. Italians and most other groups of the New Immigration were, by comparison, mainly agricultural peasants. Moreover, Jewish occupational skills com- plemented almost perfectly the needs of the rapidly growing garment industry, where so many Jewish immigrants found employment. "Jews," notes economist Eli Ginsberg, " had the good fortune to be in the right place at the right time" (1978:115). More- over, as the economy later shifted from agriculture and manufacturing to services, J ews benefited from their background in trade and commerce.

Nathan Glazer (1958) also points out that East European Jews who came to the United States had a long heritage of middle-class occupations, including the profes- ions and buying and selling, by contrast with other immigrant groups. Although sarist oppression had driven Jews from their traditional trades, their link to them

was not broken. Thus they came to the United States with little capital but not with aie limited horizons of the working class. In effect, the East European Jews were part

32 0 PA RT II ETH N ICITY IN TH E UN IT ED STATES

of the working class for only one generation. They were neither the sons nor the fathers of workers (Herberg, 1960).

Steinberg also questions the attribution of Jewish occupational success to the high value attached to learning. Although he does not deny that the higher rate of literacy among immigrant Jews compared, for example, to that of southern Italians was instrumental in their more rapid mobility, he maintains that substantial educa- tional advancement followed economic mobility rather than the converse. After looking at historical data, Steinberg concludes that for Jews, "economic success was a precondition, rather than a consequence, of extensive schooling" (1989:136).

In a similar fashion, the presumably lower educational and occupational aspira- tions of immigrant Italians can be accounted for by class as much as by ethnic fac- tors. That is, their attitudes toward education and work, particularly among the first and second generations, may have reflected their primarily working-class status, not simply their southern Italian heritage. Gans (1982) explains that many 'of the beha- viors and values he observed among second-generation Italian Americans in Boston's West End were not so much ethnic traits as working-class traits. Thus the limited mobility aspirations among working-class Italians might be expected as well among working-class families of other ethnic groups, even working-class Jews. As Gans has observed, "I continue to be impressed by how similarly members of different ethnic groups think and act when they are of the same socioeconomic level, are alike in age and other characteristics, and must deal with the same conditions" (1982:277- 78).

Looking at Italian American achievement and attitudes toward education as the products primarily 0,f a unique ethnic trait also fails to take into account the oppor- tunity structure in the old country, which dictated limited aspirations. "To whatever extent Southern Italians exhibited negative attitudes toward education," writes Stein- berg, "in the final analysis these attitudes only reflected economic and social realities, including a dearth of educational opportunities" (1989:142).

Historian John Briggs (1978) also discounts the idea of a predisposed negative view of education among southern Italians. He attributes their rejection of schooling in the United States, instead, to their expectation of an imminent return to Italy. It was not a lack of interest in education but the lack of relevance of American school- ing that led to its widespread repudiation, he contends. Schooling in the new country could be of little value if one's stay was only temporary.

To put the matter simply, those who interpret different patterns of mobility among immigrant Jews and Italians in class rather than ethnic terms stress that, whatever the extent of a group's occupational and educational background or tradi- tion, only when it is combined with a favorable opportunity structure can it enhance

., upward mobility. For Jews, there was a fortunate compatibility between the skills and experience they brought with them and the needs and opportunities of the American economic structure. And as Steinberg suggests, "It is this remarkable con- vergence of factors that resulted in an unusual record of success" (1989:103). Simi- larly, Samuel Baily (1999), in his study of Italian immigrants in Buenos Aires and New York City, concludes that the slower upward mobility of Italians must be seen as a product of the skill level most of them possessed, in combination with the job opportunities afforded by the host society. Valid comparisons among ethnic groups can be made, then, only when consideration is taken of the society's constantly changing opportunity structure.

CHAPTER I I JEW ISH AMERICANS 3 2 I

GROUP CULTURE AND GROUP O PPO RTUNITIES: A SYNTHESIS Evidence can be marshaled to sup- port both the group culture and opportunity structure arguments regarding ethnic mobility; but as with most issues in sociology, the truth more likely lies somewhere between the two.

On the one hand, had Jews not possessed at least some propitious cultural traits, including among them a reverence for learning, it is not likely that such rapid mobil- ity would have been possible even within the context of a favorable opportunity structure. Educational opportunities in the United States existed for other European .. ethnic groups, but it seems evident that immigrant Jews availed themselves of these opportunities more thoroughly and avidly than did others. Moreover, Jews in other immigrant societies such as Canada, Argentina, and South Africa have displayed, as a group, economic and educational success comparable to that attained in the United States and have pursued similar occupations.

On the other hand, there is little question that immigrant Jews brought with them a wider range of occupational skills that automatically placed them a notch ahead of other ethnic groups in the labor market. As we saw in Chapter 8, the rapid economic success of Cuban immigrants in the United States in the past four decades, compared to that of other contemporary Hispanic groups, poses a quite similar case, as does the upward mobility of many Asian groups.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER

THE POLITICAL REALM Jewish participation at the higher levels of government has been relatively greater than that of Italians and most other southern and eastern European groups. In fact, Jewish representation in the federal government is far out of proportion to their share of the general U.S. population (Alba and Moore, 1982; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2008; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2006). Jewish entrance into the realm of American political power is a relatively recent phenomenon, however.

A few Jews were elected to Congress as early as the nineteenth century, but only in the past few decades have they been elected in meaningful numbers. Before 1945, only fifty -nine Jews had ever served in either house. The number of Jews in the U.S. Congress increased significantly after 1974 (Goldberg, 1996; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998, 2006). Today, in light of their minor proportion of the general pop- ulace, Jews are •overrepresented in the federal legislature, making up 11 percent of the Senate and 5 percent of the House (see Figure 10.1) . They are also strongly repre- sented as federal political appointees and civil servants and have occupied a number of Cabinet positions, particularly in Democratic administrations (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1998, 2006). Moreover, Jews play an important role in political campaign fi nancing at the national level (Goldberg, 1996).

Jews today experience few impediments to elective office at any level of govern- ment. In fact, a 1987 Gallup poll revealed that 89 percent of Americans would vote fo r a well-qualified Jewish presidential candidate; only 46 percent felt that way fifty years earlier (Gallup, 1982, 1988; Quinley and Glock, 1979). The acceptance of Jews in higher politics is demonstrated as well by the fact that Jewish candidates are today commonly elected to office by overwhelmingly non-Jewish constituencies W yman, 2000). In recent years, both U.S. senators from Wisconsin, for example, were Jewish, despite the state's Jewish population of only one-half of 1 percent. The selection of Joseph Lieberman, an Orthodox Jew, as the vice presidential candidate

322 PART II ETH NICIT Y IN TH E UNITED STATES

on the Democratic ticket in 2000 symbolically shattered any remaining barriers to Jewish American penetration of the very highest levels of government. Jewish Amer- icans have consistently shown a greater propensity than other ethnic groups for po- litical participation, and this may account in some measure for their increasing prominence in elective offices.

THE EcoNOMIC REALM With regard to economic power, Jews in the past were under- represented in the American corporate elite (Alba and Moore, 1982; Korman, 1988; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 1982, 2006). The strong Jewish participation in the busi- ness world traditionally was in small or medium-size firms (most of them self- owned), not the larger, more powerful corporations that dominated the American economy (Institute for Social Research, 1964; Kiester, 1968; Marger, 1974; Ward, 1965). Furthermore, where they had been successful in the corporate world, Jews more commonly entered the elite through the growth of their own companies rather than by climbing the organizational ladder of well-established concerns.

The past underrepresentation of Jewish Americans in the top echelons of the cor- porate world can be explained partly as discrimination and partly as a propensity for Jews to prefer independence in business and the professions. The two are related. Faced with discriminatory hiring practices, which did not decline significantly until after World War II, Jews naturally turned to self-owned businesses or independent professions such as law and medicine.

The historical dearth oJ Jews in the corporate elite is ironic in light of the com- monly held assumption among most Americans that Jews wield inordinate economic power. Studies beginning in the 1930s consistently showed this to be a misconcep- tion (Burck, 1976;' Fortune, 1936; Keller, 1953; Newcomer, 1955; Warner and Abegglen, 1963). To the extent that the public illusion of excessive Jewish economic power persisted, it may be explained to some degree by the conspicuous nature of certain industries in which Jews did exert a dominant influence, most notably movies and television, retail sales, and real estate (Glazer and Moynihan, 1970; McWilliams, 1948; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969).

The traditional pattern of Jewish absence from the corporate elite has changed markedly, with Jews increasingly entering the top executive positions of major cor- porations (Christopher, 1989; Klausner, 1988; Silberman, 1985; Zweigenhaft, 1984, 1987; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff, 2006) . In their study of the American power elite, Zweigenhaft and Domhoff (2006) conclude that, despite underrepresentation in some business sectors, Jews are actually overrepresented in the corporate elite. What- ever discrimination in large corporations and law firms continues to exist may be simply the lingering effect of past occupational barriers against Jews that, for the most part, have been formally taken down . Indeed, a study of the late 1980s con-

., eluded plainly that by then the disadvantage of Jews in the executive suites of major corporations had "all but disappeared" (Klausner, 1988:33).

PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION

For centuries Jews have commonly been victims of ethnic bigotry in Western socie- ties. As non-Christians they were particularly vulnerable to scapegoating during times of social adversity and were generally relegated to the role of economic and

CHAPT ER I I J EWISH AMER ICA N S 3 2 3

political outcast. Jews were made especially ready targets for oppression after the thirteenth century, when they were forced into separate communities in almost ev- ery European society in which they resided. The term ghetto was first used to de- scribe the area of Venice in which Jews were compelled by custom and law to live. It was subsequently applied to the Jewish quarter of all European cities. 3 Jews were forbidden to own land or join craft guilds and maintained an ever-tenuous civil sta- tus. The capricious nature of persecution and the lack of political security forced them to remain constantly vigilant and prepared to flee. Because of the need to re- main mobile, they turned to occupations such as tradesman, moneylender, or pro- fessional, which provided for easy movement of capital and skills (Fauman, 1958; Glazer, 1958). These occupational roles often carried social stigmas, which further provoked resentment and hostility from those who were required to deal with them.

THE ELEMENTS OF ANTI- SEMITISM

A set of distinct and consistent negative stereotypes, some of which can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages in Europe, has been applied to Jews. Among the most common of these are that Jews are monied, dishonest, and unethical; clannish, pride- ful, and conceited; and power hungry, pushy, and intrusive (Quinley and Glock, 1979). It is the connection of Jews with money, however, that appears to be the sine qua non of anti-Semitism- that is, prejudice and hostility toward Jews. As Glock and Stark put it, "Perhaps the most constant theme in anti-Semitism from me- dieval times down to the present is of the Jew as a cheap, miserly manipulator of money, forever preoccupied with materialism, and consequently possessing virtually unlimited economic power" (1966:109). As late as 1995, more than a quarter of non-Jewish whites supported the assertion that "[w]hen it comes to choosing between people and money, Jews will choose money"; even larger percentages of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans agreed (National Conference, 1995).

That Jews have more money than most people is, as Selznick and Steinberg (1969) explain, accepted as fact among a majority of non -Jews, though this in itself does not necessarily imply anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, even unprejudiced non- Jews exaggerat~ the extent of Jewish wealth, and it is, of course, only a short step to interpreting this belief in a negative manner. Although Jews in American society are, as we have seen, collectively higher in socioeconomic status than most other ethnic groups, this does not mean that all Jews are therefore wealthy. Like mem- bers of all ethnic groups, Jews will be found at every class level, even the very bottom. 4

Closely akin to the beliefs regarding the connection of Jews with money are tho se concerning Jews and business. "Of all the crimes and misdemeanors harged to the Jews," notes Stephen Whitfield, "the worst has been an uncanny

o r even supernatural capacity to make money, perverted into avarice" (1995:90). The shrewd and unscrupulous businessperson has been a tenacious negative

3 O n the development of European ghettos, see Wirth (1956 ).

- Fo r a description of the J ewish poor, most of whom are elderly, see United Jewish Committee (2003 ).

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324 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

stereotype of Jews for ages. Derivative of this image is the pejorative American phrase, to "Jew down," which means, roughly, to bargain craftily or to buy some- thing more cheaply than the seller initially offers it. The beliefs regarding Jews and business deal not only with ethics, however, but also with power and manipula- tion. Jews have been commonly seen as maintaining excessive influence in the business world and as controlling large segments of the economy of the United States and of other societies. The fallaciousness of this image has been confirmed repeatedly; and as noted earlier, in the past Jews have been underrepresented in the higher executive positions of the most powerful American and multinational corporations .

The attributions of Jewish power are often blatantly contradictory. One of the staples of crude anti-Semitism concerns the notion of world conspiracy. Curiously, Jews have been portrayed on the one hand as leaders of a world capidlist conspiracy and on the other as leaders of a world communist conspiracy. This inconsistency has never deterred anti-Semites from expressing both beliefs when the situation calls for it. Indeed, as McWilliams so aptly suggested, there is a tone of "demagogic genius" in this contradictory charge, "for it permits an appeal to the dispossessed and a threat to the rich to be voiced in a single sentence" (1948:92).

ANTI- SEMITISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Historically, three general periods of anti -Semitism in the United States can be de- fined, each characterized by a different level of intensity and content.

THE EARLY PERIOD During the early decades of Jewish settlement, anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination were minimal. Although there were anti-Semitic groups in colonial America, they were not excessively vocal or influential (Blau and Baron, 1963). During the era of the Old Immigration, between 1820 and 1880, German Jews were not essentially distinguished from their Christian coun- terparts except in religion; and as noted earlier, they mostly assimilated into the mainstream society. Like the early northern Italians, German Jews (and the earlier Sephardic Jews) were too insignificant numerically to evoke intense hostility. Fur- thermore, they were geographically dispersed and established themselves in eco- nomically secure positions, thereby avoiding the attention of nativist groups, which targeted the much larger, city-concentrated, and destitute Irish Catholic population.

This relatively concordant relationship with the Anglo-Protestant majority be- gan to change, however, with the entrance of the East European Jews in the 1880s . A harbinger of the changed attitude toward all Jews occurred in 1877 when Joseph Seligman, a prominent financier and political adviser, was denied entrance to the Grand Union Hotel in Saratoga, New York, a noted upper-class resort (Baltzell, 1964; McWilliams, 1948). From that point on, Jews were commonly barred from certain resorts, clubs, and college fraternities.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULAR ANTI - SEMITISM Like the southern Italians, immigrant East European Jews became prime subjects of the racist ideologies of the late nineteenth

C HAPTER I I J EW ISH AMER IC AN S 3 2 5

and early twentieth centuries. Just as the criminal tendency attributed to Italians was simply part of "their nature," the association of Jews with money was seen as deeply rooted in this group's heritage and perhaps even as genetic. Consider this brief pas- sage from Jacob Riis's influential essay of 1890, How the Other Half Lives:

As scholars, the children of the most ignorant Polish Jew keep fairly abreast of their more favored playmates, until it comes to mental arithmetic, when they leave them behind with a bound. It is surprising to see how strong the instinct of dollars and cents is in them. They can count, and correctly, almost before they can talk. ([1890] 1957:84)

This description, it should be noted, was not necessarily written in a derogatory vein. Indeed, Riis's essay was essentially sympathetic to the plight of both immigrant Ita - lians and Jews. Yet its racist assumptions are obvious. The racist element of anti- Semitism was, of course, carried to its ultimate by Hitler and the Nazis during the 1930s and 1940s, but its genesis can be traced to much earlier ideas and their expo- nents in the United States as well as Europe.

During the 1920s, American anti-Semitism was strongly abetted by the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and of Henry Ford, the noted industrialist. The Klan's anti- Semitic and anti-Catholic propaganda and actions during this time were as wide- spread and severe as its antiblack campaigns. As for Ford, his anti-Semitic program lasted from 1920 to 1927, during which time his newspaper, the Dearborn Indepen- dent, issued virulent attacks on Jews. 5 The "world Jewish conspiracy" idea was a regular component of the Independent, which used the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion as its basis. This was a well-known anti-Semitic tract, circulated origi- nally in the early 1900s by the Russian secret police. Its thesis asserted a Jewish con- sp iracy to achieve world domination through control of finance and banking, and it was used by the Russian tsars as a rationale for their oppressive policies and actions against the Jews. Though its contentions were repeatedly disproved, this manifesto was subsequently circulated widely, and its theme became a standard item of the lit- any of anti-Semitism. Ford later apologized to the American Jewish community for his attacks, saying that he had been misled, but many of the ideas espoused by the In dependent remained in wide circulation during the 1930s.

Although the anti-Semitism of this era was extremely vituperative, it rarely generated violence. Most of the discrimination against Jews involved their expul- sion or exclusion from various areas of social life, including clubs and resorts,

' neighborhoods, schools and colleges, and certain occupations (McWilliams, 1948) . As Jews began to occupy a disproportionate number of seats in elite colleges and professional schools in the early 1920s, restrictive policies were enacted, limit- ing their entrance. Strict Jewish quotas were established at Harvard and other Ivy League institutions as well as at medical and law schools throughout the country Baltzell, 1964; Bloomgarden, 1957; Korman, 1988). Jews were also blatantly dis-

criminated against in the professions, especially medicine, law, and academia. Jew- ish doctors, for example, were often refused appointments to hospital staffs and ~-ere denied clinical privileges. Law firms and university faculties imposed similar restrictions.

~cWilliams (1948) writes that the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and Ford's anti-Semitic campaign were not .mrelated. The Klan began to attract a mass following in 1920 w hen Ford launched his attack.

326 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

The rising level of anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination in the 1920s and 1930s can be seen as part of the popular anti-immigrant and isolationist sentiments that characterized this period. But it can also be seen as a response to Jewish upward mobility. Before the early years of the twentieth century, Jews were fa irly well re- moved from the general occupational structure, concentrating mainly in a few indus- tries, such as the garment trade, or operating their own small businesses. By the second decade of the century, however, second-generation Jews were beginning to break out of the insular Jewish community and challenge- most often, success- fully- members of the dominant group, particularly in the more prestigious occupa- tions and educational settings. Artificial barriers, in the form of quotas and other discriminatory policies, were therefore thrown up . The anti-Jewish attitudes that had emerged earlier in the 1870s among the well-to-do have been interpreted in much the same manner: as social barriers that arose in response to cQJnpetition for privilege (Higham, 1963; McWilliams, 1948) .

DECLINING ANTI- SEMITISM In the 1950s and, particularly, the 1960s, anti-Semitism in the United States declined precipitously. T he anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimina- tion that persisted took on more camouflaged and restrained forms. This downtrend has been unremitting.

The decline in recent decades of negative Jewish stereotypes and of anti- Semitism generally among the American public has been documented by numerous studies and opinion polls -(Anti-Defamation League, 1998, 2009a; Chanes, 1994, 2006; Gallup, 1982; Glock and Stark, 1966; Quinley and Glock, 1979; Selznick and Steinberg, i969; Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2011; Stember, 1966; Williams, 1977). The unscrupulous businessperson, for example, is no longer a foremost Jew- ish image among most non-Jews. Nearly half the respondents in polls taken in 1938 and 1939 believed that Jewish businesspeople were less honest than others. A 1952 poll reported a similar percentage. By 1962, however, that stereotype had dimin- ished considerably: 70 percent felt that Jewish businesspeople were no different from others, although the notion that they were shrewd in business remained strong (Stember, 1966). By the early 1980s, the percentage of those adhering to the stereo- type had further declined (Raab, 1989), and in 2009 only 12 percent of Americans held to the view that Jews are less honest in business than others (Anti-Defamation League, 2009a).

A significant change has also been registered in the perception of Jewish eco- nomic and political power. Public belief in the extensiveness of Jewish influence seemed to peak in the 1930s and 1940s. Forty-one percent of Americans in 1938 thought that Jews had too much power, and 58 percent thought so in 1945 (Quinley

"' and Glock, 1979). In 1952, 35 percent of Protestants and 33 percent of Catholics still answered yes to the question, "Do you think the Jews are trying to get too much power in the United States or not?" But in 1979, the percentages of Protestants and Catholics answering yes were only 12 and 13, respectively (Gallup, 1982). Opin- ion polls throughout the 1980s indicated similarly that only a small percentage viewed Jews as having inordinate power and influence (Smith, 1991) . In 2009, only 13 percent of Americans still embraced the stereotype of excessive Jewish power (Anti-Defamation League, 2009a). Stereotypes regarding "Jewish power, " however, remain steadfast among those who are most strongly anti-Semitic. Also, one-third of

CH APT ER I I J EW ISH AME RI CANS 3 2 7

Americans continue to believe that Jewish Americans are more loyal to Israel than to the United States (Anti-Defamation League, 2009a) .

In the realm of personal relations, negative attitudes toward Jews have also de- clined markedly. In a 1948 survey, 22 percent expressed the view that they would prefer not to have Jewish neighbors. By 1964, only 8 percent answered similarly, a figure that has never risen. Even intermarriage with Jews, perhaps the most sensitive area of interethnic relations, was viewed negatively by only 34 percent of non-Jews by 1981 (Public Opinion, 1987; Smith, 1991).

It is important to note that even during those times when it was intense and wide ranging, anti-Semitism in the United States differed from European forms in that it was never institutionalized, and no official anti-Jewish measures were ever enforced (Konvitz, 1978). Had this not been so, it is unlikely that Jewish Americans as a group could have attained their high position in the society' s stratification system as relatively quickly as they did.

In sum, it appears that prejudice and discrimination against Jewish Americans remain persistent among a small segment of the U.S. populace, but they are mainly random in occurrence, not organized and widespread as in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1991, for example, the exclusion of Jews by the Kansas City Country Club prompted Tom Watson, the professional golfer, to resign from the club in protest. Such restric- tive policies of certain fraternal groups, recreational clubs, and similar social organi- zations is a carryover from previous eras and is anomalous to the general tendency toward more ethnically open social organizations (Braverman a11d Kaplan, 1967; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969; Slawson and Bloomgarden, 1965).6

Blatantly racist anti-Jewish rhetoric is rare except among those who are part of the right-wing lunatic fringe of American sociopolitical life: and the same is true of occasional acts of violence against Jews. In the 1980s and 1990s, a rise in black anti- Semitism was evident (Anti -Defamation League, 1998; Golub, 1990), and some con- tend that it is among African Americans that anti-Semitism remains strongest (King and Weiner, 2007) . But even this may represent what Robin Williams calls "situa- tional antagonisms rather than deep -seated traditionalized hostilities" (1977:6) and appears to be declining (Anti-Defamation League, 2009a).

Furthermore, despite the persistence of certain traditional negative Jewish stereo- rypes, positive images of this group are also common in American society (Anti- Defamation League, 2009a; Martire and Clark, 1982; Quinley and Glock, 1979). Jews are ordinarily seen as intelligent, religious, and family oriented and are often admired for their accomplishments in science and the arts. A 2006 national poll showed that 77 percent of Americans had a favorable opinion of Jews whereas only - percent saw them unfavorably (16 percent voiced no opinion) . This rating was slightly higher than that given to Catholics and substantially higher than the rating of Evangelical Christians (Pew Forum, 2006). Of course, as explained in Chapter 7, surveys such as this do not always reveal people's true feelings, given their reluctance ::o voice what they feel are socially or politically incorrect opinions of minority groups . So, the level of Jewish acceptance may not be as high as indicated. In any case, it seems evident that positive views strongly outweigh negative ones.

- _.\study of Jewish life in Los Angeles (Sandberg, 1986) sh owed that Jews themselves perceived more anti-J ewish discrimination in private clubs than in any other area of social life.

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328 PART II ETH NICITY IN THE UNITED STAT ES

AccoUNTING FOR THE DECLINE What can account for this noticeable decline in anti- Semitic thought and action during the past few decades? Though such social trends are never attributable to a single factor, the general rise in educational level among the American populace does stand out as the single most important agent. Research and public opinion polls indicate consistently that anti-Semitism is related to educa- tional level. To put the matter simply, the lower the educational attainment, the greater the degree of anti-Semitism. For example, surveys of attitudes toward Jews have repeatedly found college-educated people more tolerant than those with less formal education (Anti-Defamation League, 1998, 2009a; Chanes, 2004; Gallup, 1982; Gilbert, 1988). Thus, as the level of education has increased for Americans generally, anti-Jewish attitudes and actions have waned correspondingly (Glock and Stark, 1966; Lipset, 1987; Quinley and Glock, 1979; Selznick and Steinberg, 1969).

' THE TENACIOUSNESS OF Am i-SEMITISM Although anti-Semitism in the United States today is probably as mild and subdued as it has been at any time or place in modern West- ern history, this does not mean that more malignant and intense anti-Jewish thought and action might not be evoked under certain circumstances . Prejudice and discrimi- nation, it should be remembered, are tools applied at varying times and degrees to protect the social, economic, and political advantages of some groups over others. In recent decades, for example, the overrepresentation of Jews in leadership positions of the mass media, particularly television and the movies, has produced frequent charges with anti-Semitic- intimations of Jewish "control" of the media. Also of con- cern have been the propaganda and violent actions of rabidly anti-Semitic right-wing extremist groups ,, which, though small in numbers, have used the Internet as a me- dium for spreading their messages .

Events in the Middle East in the 2000s seemed to give rise to a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Western Europe, the effects of which, many feared, would eventu- ally reach the United States. Most of the serious actions against Jews were instigated by militant Muslims in response to Israeli actions against Palestinians in the occupied territories (Eberstadt, 2004) .7 A parallel situation-most Western European coun- tries have much larger Muslim populations-simply did not exist in the United States. Nonetheless, even in the United States questions were raised as to whether anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist sentiments equated with anti-Semitism (Chanes, 2006; Dinnerstein, 2004) . Perhaps more disturbing for Jewish Americans, however, was the growth of the minority of the American public who believe that Jews were re- sponsible for Christ' s death. In 2009, more than a quarter held that view, up from 19 percent in 1997 (Anti-Defamation League, 2009a; Pew Research Center, 2004) .

Even if these trends prove only transitory, they demonstrate how venerable are anti-Jewish stereotypes and how confounding is the phenomenon of anti-Semitism . Jews themselves perceive the continued potential of serious outbreaks of anti- Semitism. In his study of Jewish baby boomers, Waxman found that 90 percent said they had not personally experienced discrimination. Nonetheless 80 percent

7 A 2009 survey revealed, however, that significant numbers of Europeans continued to express anti-Semitic beliefs regarding Jewish power in business and loyalty to Israel, aside from anti-Semitism stemming from Israeli actions in the Middle East (Anti-Defamation League, 2009b).

CHAPTER I I JEWISH AMERICANS 329

agreed somewhat or strongly that anti-Semitism "is a serious problem in the United States" (2001 :97). An even greater percentage of a national sample of Jewish Amer- icans in 2008 expressed similar concerns about anti-Semitism (American Jewish Committee, 2008). The comprehensive Pew survey of Jewish Americans in 2013 found that about half (54 percent) do not think there is a lot of discrimination against Jews in the United States today. However, a substantial minority (43 percent) said that Jews do face much discrimination. This perception is in contrast to that of the general public, only 24 percent of whom perceive much anti-Jewish discrimina- tion. 8 In the survey, 15 percent of Jews said they had experienced in the past year either being called offensive names or being snubbed in a social setting or left out of social activities because they were Jewish.

Perceptions of anti-Semitism, however, differ by generation and by other social variables . Older Jewish Americans, for example, are apt to see it as more prevalent and problematic than younger generations (Cohen, 2010). And Jews in small towns perceive more anti-Semitism than those in large cities. Moreover, Jews are more likely to perceive anti-Semitism in the United States as a whole, rather than in their local communities (Sheskin and Dashefsky, 2011 ). Conflicting views of contempo- rary anti-Semitism may also be the product of conflicting definitions of the very meaning of anti-Semitism itself. Consider, for example, the previously mentioned controversy regarding whether expressing displeasure with Israeli policies is tanta- mount to anti-Semitism.

' ASSIMILATION PATTERNS OF JEWISH AMERICANS

Jewish American patterns of assimilation have to a large degree resembled those of other white ethnic groups . Cultural assimilation has taken place increasingly and ir- revocably with each succeeding generation. The same may be said of structural as- similation, though less strongly within the realm of primary relations.

CULTURAL ASSIMILATION

Each successive generation of Jewish Americans has displayed cultural characteristics less uniquely Jewish than the previous one. And as with other white ethnic groups, much of this as similation is related to upward class mobility. As they have moved fr om the working-class occupations and urban ghettos of the first generation to the middle-class occupations and suburbs of the second and third, Jews have steadily adopted lifestyles and values that characterize middle-class Americans generally. Like Italians of the second generation, the children of Jewish immigrants to some ex- tent found themselves wavering between the confines of the ethnic community and the larger society (Kramer and Leventman, 1961 ). Those beyond the second genera- tion, however, have clearly chosen the dominant culture.

Perhaps the most significant indicator of cultural assimilation among Jewish Americans is the gradual movement, beginning with the second generation, away fr om the Orthodox branch of Judaism, encompassing traditional and rigid forms of

Jews said that several other minority groups, including ga ys and lesbians, Muslims, and blacks, face far mo re discrimination th an they do (Pew Research Center, 2013 c) .

330 PART II ETH N ICITY IN T HE UN IT ED ST ATES

worship and belief, to the Conservative and Reform branches, each reflecting more Americanized practices and doctrines. Despite the predominance of Conservative and, especially, Reform Judaism, Orthodox Judaism continues to survive making up 10 percent of the Jewish population (Pew Research Center, 2013c). It is of note that the division of Jews into three denominational subgroups is, in the main, an American phenomenon. In non-American Jewish communities, people generally are either Orthodox or nonreligious. 9

Not only has there been a movement toward less rigorous forms of worship, but religious observance in general has diminished with each generation (Gans, 1958, 1967a; Kleiman, 1983; Sklare, 1969; Wertheimer, 1989, 1993). As Jewish Ameri- cans increasingly see their Jewish identity in ethnic rather than religious terms, the purely religious aspects of Judaism hold less importance. Only 15 percent, for exam- ple, say that being Jewish is mainly a matter of religion (Pew R,esearch Center, 2013c). Thus assimilation into the dominant culture, in a broad sense, continues, while Jews retain their ethnic identity.

STRUCTURAL ASSIMILATIO N

Jewish Americans have exhibited steady and in some ways substantial progress in the direction of secondary structural assimilation. We have seen that they have begun to participate fully in almost all areas of American society and have also begun to enter elites in most institutional realms, in some cases disproportionately so.

Structural assimilation at the primary level, however, is a more complicated mat- ter. Jewish Amei;icans have traditionally exhibited strong in-group cohesion in the realm of primary relations (Gans, 1958; Lenski, 1963; Ringer, 1967; Sklare and Greenblum, 1967). This stems from attitudes and actions of the larger society and from the in-group preferences of Jews themselves. Sklare (1978) explains the ambi - guity among out-groups regarding Jewish-Gentile social relations. Jews have com- monly been seen as "cliquish" when they retreat to their own communities but as "pushy" when they make serious efforts to enter Gentile primary groups. Fearing re- jection or at best a marginal acceptance, Jews more often than not were reluctant to leave the safety and psychological comfort of the ethnic group. As a result, concen- trated Jewish residential areas were unlike black ghettos-which developed primarily because of overt discriminatory actions and policies- in that they evolved through a combination of out-group discrimination and in-group choice. Also, Jews, like other ethnic groups, initially congregated in relatively homogeneous areas where ethnic in- stitutions were close at hand.

Today, discrimination and the attraction of ethnic institutions no longer play .., major roles in determining residential patterns, but Jewish concentrations are still ev-

ident in cities with large Jewish populations. These seem to be a product mostly of

9 In this regard, Konvitz (1978) notes that although the Reform movement began in Germany, it was most fully developed by German Jews in the United States . A fourth branch of American Judaism, Reconstructionism, is subscribed to by only 2 percent of Jews (American Jewish Committee, 2010). It is also important to note that the Orthodox branch of American Jud aism is itself split between those who believe that observance of Jewish religious ritual is compatible with the modern world (the "modern Orthodox") and thos e who separate themselves from the secular society (the "ultra-Orthodox," or haredim).

CH APTER I I J EW ISH AMER ICANS 3 3 I

housing markets, age, and socioeconomic factors, however, rather than the desire to live in Jewish areas (Goldscheider, 1986) . Moreover, Jewish Americans have gener- ally followed the pattern of other white ethnics in removing to suburbs, where ethnic homogeneity is much less apparent. Waxman (2001) reports that 65 percent of Jew- ish baby boomers described their neighborhoods as little or not at all Jewish in char- acter. Other aspects of primary structural assimilation are also related to age and to degree of religiosity. For example, when asked about friendship patterns, those who are younger and less religious are less likely to say that most or all of their close " friends are Jewish (Pew Research Center, 2013c).

INTERMARRIAGE It is in the realm of intermarriage that Jewish Americans today give the strongest indication of accelerating primary structural assimilation. Like Italians and other white ethnics, Jews are increasingly intermarrying with members of the dominant group as well as other ethnic out-groups.

Until the 1960s, intermarriage among Jewish Americans was very low, indeed, lower than for other white ethnic groups. A radical change in this traditional pattern, however, has become very clear in recent decades (Goldstein, 1980; Kleiman, 1983; Massarik and Chenkin, 1973; Pew Research Center, 2013c; United Jewish Commit- tee, 2003) . The 2013 Pew survey found that among those who had married before 1970, only 17 percent had a non-Jewish spouse; by 2013, almost half (44 percent) of all currently married Jewish Americans had a non-Jewish spouse. The tendency toward intermarriage is even stronger among younger Jewish Americans. Nearly six in ten (58 percent) of those who had married since 2000 had a non-Jewish spouse (Pew Research Center, 2013c). Thus more Jews now marry outside the ethnic group than within.

The swell in Jewish intermarriage is attributed to several factors. Jews in recent decades have entered occupational areas and social groups previously closed to them, placing them in social settings where there is increased ii;iteraction with non- Jews. Only a third of Jewish baby boomers report that all or most of their close fr iends are Jewish; and among younger age cohorts, the percentage is even lower (Pew Research Center, 2013c). Moreover, cultural assimilation has weakened ethnic traditions among younger Jews. Attitudes toward marriage outside the ethnic com- munity are therefore not as uncompromisingly negative as they were for older gen- erations. Furthermore, as noted earlier, in the United States generally there is an increasingly tolerant view of ethnic intermarriage.

T HE RANGE OF AssIMILATION Regarding assimilation, the Jewish American population, like all other ethnic groups in American society, is internally variegated. Some indivi- duals remain solidly attached to the ethnic group and retain a strong ethnic identity, whereas others have shed completely their ethnic attachments. Between these two ex- tremes, a range of assimilation is evident among Jewish Americans.

Those who identify themselves as Orthodox Jews, a small percentage, are at one end of the Jewish American population, immersed in Jewish life and religiously ob- servant. This includes, of course, the ultra-Orthodox Jews such as Hasidim who live in relatively insular communities but are only a tiny element of the Jewish American

opulation. At the opposite end are the "peripheral " Jewish Americans (about 30 percent) who are at best nominally Jewish. If they maintain Jewish friends, it is only

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332 PART II ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES

coincidental. Such people may be in the arts, professions, academia, or other occupa- tional areas in which a freer, more open social atmosphere prevails. In the middle is the largest element of Jewish America, the "moderately affiliated," who engage in some Jewish practices and maintain close Jewish friendships but are not deeply in- volved in organized Jewish life or ritual. Much of the differing patterns of assimila- tion are based on generation. Those who are older remain more attached to religious Judaism and their identity as Jews, while those younger increasingly eschew religion, with many identifying themselves as Jewish only on the basis of ethnicity. In fact, among millennials (those born after 1980), almost one-third say they have no reli- gion (Pew Research Center, 2013c) . It is important to consider, however, that a trend toward secularism is a general feature of the U.S. population, with those claiming no religious affiliation-about 20 percent-the fastest-growing portion of the U.S. reli- gious landscape (Pew Research Center, 2012c).

Immigrant Jewish populations from Russia and Israel in recent tiecades have fur- ther complicated the range of Jewish assimilation. Israeli immigrants have generally been from among Israel's secular Jewish population, those not committed to reli- gious orthodoxy. As to the Russians, most bring little if any Jewish background with them, and as one researcher has observed, "the challenge of integrating them into a Jewish American community has provided a degree of revitalization for Amer- ican Jewry" (Sorin, 1997:244). Immigrant Russian Jews, as well as some Israelis, have established institutionally complete enclaves that have further enabled them to confound rapid assimil~tion (Gold, 1999, 2000; Orleck, 1987).

LOOKING AHEAD: THE FUTURE OF ETHNICITY AMONG JEWISH AMERICANS

Patterns of assimilation and pluralism among Jewish Americans, although in most ways similar to those of other Euro-American groups, have been and will probably continue to be unique in other ways.

WANING ETHNICITY: THE STRENGTH OF ASSIMILATION Barring the unlikely resurgence of overt and widespread forms of prejudice and discrimination, the forces of assimilation seem no less irresistible for Jews than for other white ethnics in American society. In considering the status of Jewish Americans, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab concluded two decades ago that although they were not on the verge of disappear- ance, nonetheless, "current evidence suggests that group identity and cohesiveness are severely eroding for the la rge majority" (1995:47). In his study of Jewish baby boomers, Waxman, too, concluded that "in terms of social structural significance, as indicated by residential patterns, socioeconomics, language, and mate selection, there is a waning of Judaism and Jewishness for the group as a whole" (2001 :117). The more recent Pew survey (2013c) confirms a continuation of these apparent trends.

With upward mobility, geographic dispersion, and increased intermarriage, what is left for most individuals is essentially symbolic ethnicity, having dwindling impact on social life. Studies indicate not only a decline of Jewish identity among younger Jewish Americans (except for the minority who identify as Orthodox Jews) but also a tendency to choose social relations on a nonreligious basis (Pew Research Center, 2013c; Ukeles et al. , 2006) . Indeed, many Jewish leaders have in recent years

CHAPTER I I JEWISH AMERICA N S 333

expressed concern over the threat to the continued existence of the Jewish American community given the accelerated pace of acceptance of Jews into the mainstream so- ciety and the decline of blatant anti-Semitism. Such fears have been reinforced by de- clining birthrates and increasing intermarriage.

Ass1MILATION AND ]EwisH IDENTITY Despite unmistakable indications of continued cul- tural and structural assimilation, ethnic identity among Jewish Americans has been sustained in the last several decades by two seminal events of the modern era: the Nazi Holocaust and the founding of Israel as a nation-state. Both events served to make Jews in the United States more conscious of their heritage and instilled a sense of collective commitment to the preservation of the Jewish people. Even among younger Jewish Americans and among those who do not define themselves as Jews by religion, the Holocaust remains a strong element of Jewish identity, though the link with Israel may be waning (Pew Research Center, 2013c; Ukeles et al., 2006).

This sustained Jewish identity, however, must be seen in much the same way as the retention of ethnic identity among Italian Americans and other white ethnic groups: it is mostly symbolic. Jews continue to identify as Jews and to abide by some of the major Judaic rituals, such as attending synagogue during high holy days and having their sons (and increasingly their daughters) bar (bas) mitzvahed. But for most, the expression of their Jewishness does not extend much beyond these few practices. Put simply, a majority of American Jews have drifted away from reli- gious participation (American Jewish Committee, 2004; Goldberg, 1996; Smith, 2005; Wertheimer, 1989, 1993).

Although the decline of religious orthodoxy among most Jewish Americans is very evident, equally evident in recent years is a return to moi;e traditional religious practices by a small but growing minority. Ritterband, in fact, suggests a dichotomy in which the American Jewish community is becoming bimodal: "The more commit- ted Jews have increased their commitment while less committed Jews have more and more opened themselves up to the forces of assimilation" (1995:378). No one has better described the deep divisions that have arisen among Jewish Americans regard- ing this divergence than Samuel Freedman (2000). The split between those who de- sire a secularized Judaism and those who call for a reaffirmation of traditional beliefs and practices is, in his estimation, irreconcilable. So profound and abiding are the differences, writes freedman, that Judaism may very well fragment into divergent fa iths sharing only "a common deity and a common ancestry" (2000:354).

Contemporary Jewish ethnicity, even in its symbolic form, is not likely to wither in the near future simply because Jews remain the potential object of differential treatment. Even though their place in American society today is as secure as it has been at any time, the historical roots of anti-Semitism are deep and abiding and therefore continue to serve as a basis of ethnic identity. Despite their positions of prominence in academia, the arts, business, and politics, Jewish Americans may still feel, to some degree, that they are outsiders and thus not entirely part of the centers of secure influence (Cohen, 1985).

The marginality of Jews in American society has been greatly reduced in recent decades, but there nonetheless remains a fundamental cultural difference from their Christian neighbors-religion. This has created a kind of collective schizophrenia for Jewish Americans. As one writer has put it, Jews live "in a state of tension between

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334 PART II ETH N ICIT Y IN THE UN ITED STAT ES

the two values of integration and survival, and, regardless of where they stand on a survival-integration continuum, they find themselves pulled in both directions " (Liebman, 1973:134). Another has described their position in the American ethnic system as doubly marginal: "marginal to the majority culture, but also marginal among minorities" (Biale, 1998:27). Jewish Americans will therefore continue to be unique among American ethnic groups in their path toward assimilation.

SUMMARY • Jews collectively represent the great American ethnic success story. Paralleling

the immigration and settlement patterns of other groups of the New Immigra- tion, the East European Jews subsequently outpaced all others in upward social mobility.

• The high skill level of Jewish immigrants entering an industrializing economy provided broad opportunities for them, but certain aspects of the Jewish cultural heritage also helped to propel them quickly upward in occupational standing.

• On all measures of socioeconomic status (income, occupation, education), Jew- ish Americans today rank at or near the top among ethnic groups .

• Anti-Jewish attitudes and actions (anti-Semitism) in the United States have in- cluded not only negative stereotyping but also widespread exclusion from cer- tain educational institutions, business areas, and social organizations.

• Anti-Semitism has waned considerably in recent decades . Although some aspects of anti-Jewish prejudice and discrimination remain apparent, these are not or- ganized and popular efforts, as they were in earlier periods.

• Assimilation- both cultural and structural-for Jewish Americans has pro- ceeded with each successive generation. At the secondary level, Jews have begun to participate fully in almost all major institutions of the society; they have also begun to penetrate the leadership echelons of these institutions. At the primary level, Jews continue to exhibit strong in-group cohesion, but sharply increasing rates of intermarriage signify a fundamental change in this pattern.

• As with white ethnics, symbolic ethnicity best describes the character of ethnicity among most younger Jewish Americans.

• Although Jews continue to assimilate into American society, their religious uniqueness remains a source of ethnic identity and out-group recognition.

CRITICAL THINKING

1. Jewish Americans, as this chapter explains, are at or near the top on various -. measures of socioeconomic status (SES): occupation, education, and family in-

come. But some Asian American groups show similar (or even higher) levels of SES. In fact, in light of Asian Americans' upward mobility and educational suc- cess, some observers have referred to them as the "new Jews." How would you explain this similarity?

2. European Jews have immigrated in large numbers in the past not only to the United States but to other societies as well, such as Argentina, Canada, and South Africa. Has the assimilation process and the relative success of Jews in America been replicated in those societies?

C HAPTER I I J EW ISH AMER ICAN S 3 3 5

3. Although Jewish Americans are among the most assimilated and successful U.S. ethnic groups, many Jews still perceive the threat of anti-Semitism. How might this be explained? What conditions- political, social, economic- might provoke more virulent and widespread anti-Semitism in the United States? Refer to some of the theories of prejudice and discrimination discussed in Chapter 3.

4 . Many Jewish Americans are, in terms of religion, non-practicing, and an in- creasing percentage do not even subscribe to basic Jewish religious beliefs. Yet, most continue to identify themselves in ethnic terms as "Jewish " and very few '- convert to other religions. What might account for this continued ethnic identity?

PERSONAL/PRACTICAL A PPLICATION

1. In addition to their continuing identity as Jews no matter how observant they may be, Jewish identity also takes precedence over ethnic identity based on na - tional origin (German, Russian, Polish, and so on). Is this creation of religiously based ethnic identity unique in American society or are there other religious groups that might evolve in this way? Consider, for example, Muslim Americans and Mormon Americans. In terms of self-identity, which takes precedence for you, religion or ethnicity?

2. Historically, Jewish Americans have displayed more liberal positions on political and social issues than other religio -ethnic groups. How might this be explained? Examine some public opinion polls on different political and social issues (for example, party identification or abortion) to see if this is still the case.